ultra-low fertility in east asia: 'babymaking mchines'goin ......birth registration data...

Ultra-low Fertility in East Asia:

“Babymaking machines” going on strike?

Yen-hsin Alice Cheng

鄭雁馨

Vienna, Austria

7 December, 2018

“Health Minister Hakuo Yanagisawa, 71, in January publicly described women as "baby-making machines" and suggested Japan had a birthrate problem because women were failing in their duty to produce children. In November, Hakubun Shimomura, 52, one of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's top aides, said the country could easily address a national shortage of public daycare if women would simply "stay at home and raise their children.“ (Washington Post, March 2007)

Finger-pointing and scapegoat?

Derogatory terms for unmarried women above age 30: “leftover women”,

“defeated dogs”, “single parasite”, “culprit of national security problems”, etc.

Rigid patriarchal family and cultural system that can’t keep pace with women’s rising status & respect their basic rights

What babymaking machines?!

East Asian Families

A few facts about East Asia

East Asia contains 1/5 of world population

Asia = 60% of the world’s population; 1/3 of this share is East Asia

Incredible rapid decline in fertility with limited signs of reversal

Unprecedented and persistent low fertility in one of the most family-oriented social contexts

Remarkably rapid economic development and yet a region with a deep-rooted Confucian culture system:

(1) women’s subordinate role;

(2) traditional family values/obligations;

(3) collectivist norm that constrain individual behaviors and options

(4) xenophobic value that lauds ethnic homogeneity;

The Scope of East Asia

The scope of East Asia (Population=1.6 billions)

Population size: China (1.4 billions), Hong Kong (7.4 millions), Japan (127 millions), South Korea (51.5 millions), and Taiwan (23.5 millions)

GDP per capita (nominal): China ($8,643), Hong Kong ($46,080), Japan ($38,448), Korea ($29,938), and Taiwan ($24,292) (IMF 2017)

Mongolia and North Korea are less studied due to data availability. Both with PTFR of ~2 children

Singapore?

Often juxtaposed with other East Asian countries due to its impressive economic development, Confucian culture, son preference, and equally fast-declining fertility over the past decades.

But strictly speaking it’s located in Southeast Asia

Overview of East Asian fertility

Rapid fertility decline since mid-20th century, dipping down to below replacement-level in mid-1980, except China

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

PTFR in East Asia, 1960-2016

Japan South Korea Taiwan Hong Kong China

Data sources: World Bank https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN/ and Department of householdregistration, Ministry of the Interior, Taiwan https://www.ris.gov.tw/app/portal/346

PTFR in South Korea: 1.05 (2017) 0.96 (2018)

Historical records:0.89 in Taiwan, 20100.90 in Hong Kong, 2003

https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.TFRT.IN/

https://www.ris.gov.tw/app/portal/346


The emergence of son preferences since 1980

100

105

110

115

120

125

Se

xR

ati

o a

t B

irth

Japan

China

Taiwan

Korea

Hong Kong

Data source: National Bureau of Statistics in China; vital statistics of Japan and South Korea; Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong; Department of Household Registration, Taiwan


% of age 25-29 population with tertiary education

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010

JP_Men

JP_Women

SK_Men

SK_Women

TW_Men

TW_Women

HK_Men

HK_Women

CH_Men

CH_Women

Data source: Barro and Lee 2018


Female Labor Force Participation, 1990-2016

30,0

40,0

50,0

60,0

70,0

80,0

90,0

20-2425-2930-3435-3940-4445-4950-5455-5960-64

LF

PR

Korea199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016

30,0

40,0

50,0

60,0

70,0

80,0

90,0

20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64

LFP

R

Japan19901991199219931994199519961997199819992000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012201320142015

10,0

20,0

30,0

40,0

50,0

60,0

70,0

80,0

90,0

20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64

LFP

R

Taiwan199019911992199319941995199619971998199920002001200220032004200520062007200820092010201120122013201420152016

Data source:International Labor Organization

Overview of East Asian Fertility

Marriage delayed but also marriage foregone, except for China

20

22

24

26

28

30

1970 1995 2010

Mean age at marriage

Japan

South Korea

Taiwan

Hong Kong

China

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

% never married men at age 50

China

Korea

TaiwanHong Kong

Japan

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015

% never married women at age 50

China

Korea

TaiwanHong Kong

Japan


Why do we care about marriage when studying fertility in East Asia?

Marriage is still closely linked to fertility

Decomposition of fertility changes in Taiwan, 1975-2015 (PTFR: 3.11.18)

-0,0296

-0,1638-0,1335

0,0114 0,0192

-0,0004 -0,0016

-0,25

-0,20

-0,15

-0,10

-0,05

0,00

0,05

0,10

0,15

15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49

Contribution of marital fertility rate Contribution of marriage rate

Net change in ASFR


So, are there NO babies outside of marriage in East Asia?

Circa 2015, very low rates of non-marital births (NMB):

1.5% in South Korea

2% in Japan

4% in Taiwan

8% in Hong Kong

No statistics for China, yet likely also extremely low due to traditional family values and stigma for NMB.

However, rising % of pre-nuptial pregnancies (PNP) (or bridal pregnancy, BP) have been observed in all these countries


% bridal pregnancies have increased substantially over the past decades

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1999 2000-2009 2010-2015

Taiwan (BirthCoh)

Taiwan (MarrCoh)

Japan (BirthCoh)

Japan (MarrCoh)

South Korea (MarrCoh)

Hong Kong (BirthCoh)

Data sources: Iwasawa, Miho and Kenji Kamata. 2014. "Marriage Preceded by Pregnancy and Women’s Employment." Japan Labor Review 11(4):21-51. Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/tokusyu/syussyo06/syussyo2.html#02 Birth registration data and Statistical Yearbook of Taiwan Kim, Yujin and Jinwoo Lee. 2018. "Bridal Pregnancy and Women’s Educational Attainment in South Korea, 1970–2009." The History of

the Family 23(3):426-45. doi: 10.1080/1081602X.2018.1474785. Gietel-Basten, Stuart and Georgia Verropoulou. 2018. "The Changing Relationship between Marriage and Childbearing in Hong Kong."

PloS one 13(3):e0194948. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0194948.

% births within 8 months after marriage

https://www.mhlw.go.jp/toukei/saikin/hw/jinkou/tokusyu/syussyo06/syussyo2.html#02


With pre-marital conceptions rising, what about cohabitation?

Cohabitation in East Asia has also been rising overtime, but its prevalence

seem to be much lower than in Europe.

Limited data on % of ever cohabited in most East Asian societies

Japan 2004: 10-15%

Taiwan 2004: ~20%

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

Cohabitation rates (%) by birth cohort

Japan Taiwan China

Data sources: Tsuya 2006; Yu & Xie (2015); KAP survey of Taiwan 1998 & 2004

Causes of Ultra-Low Fertility

What factors led to such changes in fertility and marriage in East Asia?

Economic development, educational expansion, rising female labor market

attachment delayed union formation & higher opportunity cost

Tempo effects provide partial explanations substantial quantum changes

Childcare and education High expenses on child-rearing

Delayed policy responses work-family conflict

Deteriorating labor market conditions unemployment, precarious work

Stalled gender revolution persistent patriarchal values

Lowers the likelihood of compatible couples

Exacerbates work-and-family conflict, particularly for women

Affects division of labor at home

Negative impact on policy effectiveness

Patriarchy and division of labor:

Women’s Role at Home

Male-breadwinner model: women still shoulder the bulk of domestic chores with their changing social roles and rising status

Sources: Survey on Time Use and Leisure Activities, Japan; Hsu (2008)；Kim (2017); Hsiao (2005); Yang (2017)

The gender gap is closing due to decreasing women’s hours and rising men’s input

60%

65%

70%

75%

80%

85%

90%

95%

100%

1990 1995 2000 2010 2016

Women's Share of total housework hours

Japan South Korea Taiwan China Hong Kong

Patriarchy and family policy:

Why pronatalist policies didn’t work?

In the case of Taiwan:

Too much focus on raising fertility, but not on declining marriage rates

and potential aversion of childbearing pressure

Parental leave (2002, “a visible yet unreachable benefit”)

Repercussions for women

Men discouraged by traditional gender-role values

Only 3% of new parents take 2-year leave; 60% had a 6-month leave % men taking leave: < 5% in 2006; 17% in 2017

% new parents taking parental leave: from ~¼ in 2009 to ~1/2 in 2017

Salary gap between men and women

Men’s economic burden & persistent male-breadwinner value

Confucian Culture and Patriarchy

Confucian culture stresses the importance of structure and hierarchy in social relationships and values a patrilineal family system

Such family lineage that continued along male descendants is often associated with practices that reinforces patriarchy:

Virilocal living arrangements after marriage

Women adapting to husband’s family & shoulder the care of parents-in-law

Investment in daughters thus considered expensive and unnecessary

Son preferences

Ancestral worship, inheritance, passing down family name, old age security, etc.

creating tremendous pressure on married women

Subordinate role of women

The three obediences for a woman means women should obey her father as a daughter in the natal home, her husband as a wife in a marriage, and her sons in widowhood


Subordinate role of women: the case of foreign migrant wives

Migrant wives come from neighboring less developed countries

Common anecdotes about in-law issues and maltreatments but they were expected to

endure such treatments because of the filial piety runaway migrant wives!

Migrant brides who married native Taiwanese, Japanese, and Korea men have lower fertility than their native counterparts (Yang et al. 2012; Yamauchi 2010; Korekawa

2017; Kim 2018)

0,00

0,50

1,00

1,50

2,00

2,50

3,00

3,50

4,00

1940-1949 1950-1959 1960-1969 1970-1976

Ages 40+ Marital Fertility Rates, Taiwan

Native Migrant

0,00

0,50

1,00

1,50

2,00

2,50

3,00

3,50

4,00

1967-1969 1970-1979 1980-1989 1990-1995

Ages <40 Marital Fertility Rates, Taiwan

Native Migrantbirth cohort

Data source: stacked 1979-2016 WMFE surveys, married women (N=449,322)

Why lower fertility among migrants than native women?

The fertility of migrant women is generally higher than native women in many developed society, but not in East Asia. WHY?

Prejudice and discrimination exacerbate women’s subordinate role in lower-SES marital families

Maltreatments in martial families and complaints about being viewed as “childbearing machine” abound

Lower fertility among migrants persist even when spousal age gap is controlled for

The Paradox: Why do migrant women who often did not have a high school degree and have limited career prospect have lower fertility than native women in East Asia?


A stalled gender revolution under

the Confucian doctrines?

Are there changes in attitudes and values?

54,32

59,32

49,09

24,6428,08

20,85

15

25

35

45

55

65

Total Men Women

Newlyweds should live at the man’s family

1995

2015

(percentage of people choosing this option)%

27,9424,41

31,63

49,9246,03

54,21

15

25

35

45

55

65

Total Men Women

Newlywed should have their own residence

1995

2015

(percentage of people choosing this option)%

Data source: Taiwan Social Change Survey



2,16 2,122,20

3,573,49

3,65

2,0

2,5

3,0

3,5

4,0

Total Men Women

It is fine to have a quarrel with the mother-in-law when there is disagreements

1985

2015

(1 very wrong- 5 not wrong at all )

Mean score

2,48 2,46 2,50

4,20 4,07

4,34

2,0

2,5

3,0

3,5

4,0

4,5

5,0

Total Men Women

It is fine to get a divorce when couples have compatibility problems

1985

2015

(1 very wrong- 5 not wrong at all )

Mean score

Are there changes in attitudes and values?




Son preferences worsen under the “fertility squeeze" caused by ultra-low fertility?


2,0

2,5

3,0

3,5

4,0

4,5

Women Men Total

To Continue the family lineage, one ought to have at least a son

TSCS_1994 TSCS_2011 TSCS_2016

(1 not important— 6 absolutely important)

Son preference slows down

progress in gender equality

and fertility would likely

remain very low

The Future of Marriage (and Fertility)?

Why do fewer people marry (and have children) in East Asia?

The common cited reason of “haven’t met a suitable partner” among singles

What factors interfere with compatibility of single men and women?

Persistent hypergamy norm and resistant male pride?

The unexplained “mate-searching” and “couple dynamics” in low-fertility

East Asian contexts need more qualitative research

Virilocal marriage practice, son preference, and persisting gender

discrimination at workplaces could have prompted women to invest more

time at work that is at odds with forming unions and childbearing

Lack of ideal marriage role-models in parental generations


Proportion never in union at age 45-49, 2010-2050 holding contemporary forces of

attraction by age-only (solid line) and by age and education (dashed line)

Data source: Albert Esteve, Joan Garcia Roman, Ridhi Kashyap, Fukuda Setsuya, Yen-hsin Alice Cheng, Wanli Nie, and Hyun Ok Lee, 2017, “The Implications of Demographic Change for Asian Marriage Markets, 2000–2050”, paper presented at 2017 AnnualMeeting of the Population Association of America, Chicago, IL: Population Association of America, 2017-04-27 ~ 2017-04-29


Fertility will likely stay low if (1) NMB remains rare, aand (2) society-at-large is slow in making traditional family practices adaptive to women’s new roles

Unlike in Europe, “replacement migration” is rarely considered as a policy option What else can be done?

In addition to pro-natalist policies, what governments should do to improve the welfare of individuals in ultra-low feritlity societies?

Social infrastructure needed for rising share of lone-person households?

Potential social consequences of excessive unmarried low-SES bachlors?

The implications of thinning kinship?

If the best-educated women have higher risk of childlessness, does it mean that there will be an evolutionary selection of genes from mothers with lower education?

* Special thanks goes to Mr. Chen-Hao Hsu for excellent research assistance! *

Thank you for your attention！

ultra-low fertility in east asia: 'babymaking mchines'goin ......birth registration data...

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