waterloo project
DESCRIPTION
A series of military maps showing events leading up to the Battle of Waterloo, depicting the main stages of the campaign.TRANSCRIPT
The Waterloo Project
military strategy in the campaign of June 1815
Aim
This collec<on of military maps aims to convey the course of events during the series of ba@les that culminated in the ba@le of Waterloo, which ended the revolu<onary era, the Napoleonic wars and forced peace on western Europe for almost half a century. Without it, Britain would not have been able to establish her prominence in world affairs and the course of the European colonial period might have been very different.
These maps will therefore tell the story of the final stages of the struggle between two generals; Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington, and Napoleon Bonaparte, Emperor of France.
The scale used does not permit accurate depic<on of individual subsidiary units or the complex interac<on between opposing units in direct contact.
Military symbols
Most contemporary military maps of Waterloo and its associated ba@les show Allied forces in red and the French in blue. Here we use current NATO conven<on that iden<fies enemy forces in red, and friendly units in blue. Colours such as orange or black have different uses, and are not used here to depict Dutch or German Allies.
Current military symbol conven<on (frames, modifiers) is used to show unit type, size, posi<on and command.
Prepara<ons Wellington placed his three main corps to defend Brussels and his supply route to the ports of Ostend and Antwerp, west of a line of demarcation with Blucher’s army which ran along the Roman road from Maastricht to Ligny. He considered his long lines of supply the most likely target of Napoleon’s advance from his concentration point for the Army of the North near Mauberge. Wellington also prepared for a less likely French attack on Brussels.
Napoleon’s first move
The French entered the Netherlands at dawn on 15th June. They took Charleroi from its Prussian defenders by noon. Blucher had already decided to concentrate his forces around Sombreffe, near Ligny. Wellington wanted to be sure this was not a diversionary preparation for an attack via Mons on his supply lines, and waited for more news.
Napoleon’s strategy unveiled Napoleon exploited Wellington’s hesitation and split the Army of the North into three with Marshal Ney commanding the left, and Marshal Grouchy taking the right. His aim was to defeat Blucher first, then take on Wellington. Napoleon brought up the rear with a strategic reserve in order to deliver the decisive blow to whichever of his opponents was left. Wellington ordered a general advance to Nivelles when he realised Napoleon was advancing on both sides of the Brussels road.
Quatre Bras, 16th June Two brigades of Perponcher’s Netherlands Division held their position until Wellington could bring up reinforcements from his 5th and 3rd Divisions. Marshal Ney hesitated, then only attacked with his Second Corps. Napoleon ordered Ney’s uncommitted reserve under d’Erlon to support Grouchy against Blucher in Ligny. But Ney recalled his reserve when he struggled to take Quatre Bras. D’Erlon arrived too late to take part in the battle from which Ney had already withdrawn.
Ligny, 16th June Meanwhile, Blucher’s three corps came under heavy attack around Ligny from Grouchy’s units, starting with a fierce artillery barrage. His centre gave way. But the reinforcements Napoleon organised caused confusion by arriving on the French left, and then turning back to Quatre Bras on Ney’s orders. Grouchy was unable to turn victory into rout. Blucher, unhorsed in an unsuccessful cavalry charge, regained command and ordered a retreat northwards towards Wavre, on Wellington’s left.
Calm before the storm
The 17th June was a missed opportunity for Napoleon.
Ney did not return to Quatre Bras with reinforcements.
Grouchy went a[er Blucher, who managed to give him the slip. Wellington used the <me to prepare a strong defensive posi<on on a ridge immediately south of Mont St Jean. A narrow front allowed him to defend in depth, providing he protected his supply lines to the right and rear, and was joined by Blucher at his le[. It was a gamble between a great defensive general, and his opponent; the leading offensive strategist of his day.
The Ba@le of Waterloo As Sunday 18th June, 1815 dawned, the Allies and the French formed up on two ridges south of Mont St Jean. Wellington placed most of his army under shelter from French artillery on the reverse slope, but manned two forward strong points on his right and centre: the Chateau of Hougoument and the farmhouse of La Haye Sainte. A smaller position at Papelotte was on his left. Artillery was scattered among his divisions. Napoleon did not see the imbalance in the opposing forces and deployed two corps on either side of the Brussels road, with one corps in reserve at the rear. Most of his artillery formed up in a grand battery in the centre of his position.
Hougoument
The French attack began with an artillery barrage on Allied positions around the chateau, followed up by Reille’s 2nd Corps. The surrounding woods were cleared by Allied artillery, but the French pressed on and briefly entered the chateau before being pushed back. Though fewer in number, the troops holding the position were some of Wellington’s best. Hougoument never fell to French forces and became the anvil on which Wellington beat his opponent into a manageable shape.
La Haye Sainte
The Allied position at La Haye Sainte came under fire from the Grand Battery where a brigade from Perponcher’s Division was attacked by the leading units of d’Erlon’s First Corps. His instructions had been to attack the Allied left in echelon, leading from the right, but he did the opposite and missed an opportunity to expose the weaker Allied left. Instead he took La Haye Sainte and the outpost of Papelotte. The forward Netherlands brigade had to withdraw to a less isolated position.
Allied cavalry charge
Seeing the Allied centre weakening, Wellington’s second in command sent his Household and Union cavalry brigades to counterattack. Their charge routed several French infantry brigades, but overreached and got as far as the French artillery before a counter charge by French lancers and two light cavalry divisions. It was a costly action for the Allies who had significantly less cavalry than the French. This action put the Allied cavalry out of action for most of the remainder of the battle. Meanwhile, light horse units of Blucher’s Fourth Corps approached from the East.
Ney’s cavalry charge
Marshal Ney also saw an opportunity in the Allied centre and sent 5000 horse charging towards the gap between Hougoument and La Haye Sainte. But his cavalry advanced without infantry support. Wellington’s infantry formed squares and held their ground, his gunners firing at the French, then dashing for safety within the squares. Ney was unable to spike the Allied guns they overran during the charge. Meanwhile, the Prussians had entered Placenoit at the rear of the French right flank and were seen north of La Haie on the Allied left. Napoleon sent part of his reserve to protect his flank.
Napoleon’s last move After his failed massed cavalry charge, Ney rallied the rest of Reille’s and d’Erlon’s Corps and some horse artillery for an all-out attack on the Allied centre, starting with La Haye Sainte. Faced with von Bulow’s Fourth Corps in Placenoit on his right flank, Napoleon sent additional Imperial Guard units to re-take Placenoit from the Prussians. He personally led the remainder of his Guard towards La Haye Sainte where he handed them over for an all-or-nothing attack on the Allied infantry before more Prussian reinforcements arrived. But Wellington had strengthened his centre-right with an Anglo-Dutch brigade from Braine-L’Alleud, a cavalry brigade, and placed his guards units along the ridge. Here, the Imperial Guard were turned back.
Why the Allies won
It was not Wellington’s greatest victory. He started the campaign badly. He was indecisive and failed to read Napoleon’s intent. He did not trust key subordinates like Uxbridge; his cavalry commander. He took considerable personal risks on the ba@lefield, by directly supervising troop deployments within range of the French. But he chose his ground well so that he could defend in depth, made use of the early Allied success at Quatre Bras to regain the <me he lost earlier in the campaign, and kept in touch with the Prussian command. On the field, he used his best units to good effect and made his opponent pay heavily for errors of judgment. But in the final analysis, none of this would have been enough without the <mely arrival of von Bulow’s IV Corps and von Ziethen’s 1 Corps.
Why the Allies won
So it was not just Wellington’s victory. It was also Blucher’s.
The elderly Prussian general suffered a serious setback at Ligny but was able to retreat in good order, regroup at Wavre and keep the French under Marshal Grouchy away from Waterloo long enough to deny Napoleon the reinforcements he needed. Blucher’s Corps commanders, par<cularly von Bulow (IV) and von Ziethen (I) took ba@le to the French. While von Ziethen reinforced the weak Allied le[, Von Bulow threatened to turn the French right flank. These coordinated ac<ons started to close the jaws of a gigan<c trap. Grouchy squeezed a victory against the Prussians at Wavre, but it was too late to be of any use to Napoleon.
Why Napoleon lost Napoleon was well below his usual form at Waterloo.
He opened hos<li<es late in the morning in order to let the ground dry for heavy ar<llery and cavalry. He therefore ran out of <me when the Prussians approached on his right. Napoleon was absent at key stages of the ba@le, leaving cri<cal decisions to his staff. His subordinates were not the best from his previous campaigns. His able Chief-‐of-‐staff, Berthier, was already dead and his replacement, Soult, issued ambiguous orders at cri<cal stages in the ba@le. Napoleon delegated much of the decision-‐making to Ney who made a series of tac<cal errors culmina<ng in his wasteful mass cavalry charge. Grouchy was outmanoeuvred by Blucher when it most ma@ered. D’Erlon changed his axis of advance, missing a cri<cal opportunity to expose the weak Allied le[. Taken together, these tac<cal errors placed Napoleon at a disadvantage. Napoleon’s ar<llery concentra<on in a Grand Ba@ery lacked the mobility and flexibility he needed to press home the advantage of early successes. He overes<mated Wellington, didn’t see his uneven deployment or exploit the weak Allied le[ while he had the opportunity. He underes<mated Blucher.
Sources Informa<on used in this account came from a long list of accounts of the Waterloo Campaign, of which Saul David’s excellent All The King’s Men, ISBN 978-‐0-‐141-‐02793-‐7, Penguin 2013, deserves special men<on.
Websites: h@p://[email protected]; Wikipedia -‐ Ba@les of Waterloo, Quatre Bras and Ligny
Maps were drawn from contemporary military maps of the ba@le, civilian poli<cal maps and current digital maps including Google Maps. The maps included here are meant to illustrate key stages in the evolu<on of the campaign and are not necessarily accurate in geographic detail. They do not depict all units engaged in simultaneous ac<ons.
This presenta<on is circulated for educa<on and entertainment. It may be copied and distributed on a not-‐for-‐profit basis without further permission, providing its source has been acknowledged.
The Waterloo Project; TJJ Inglis, January, 2014.