Prevent the Misuse of Stolen Credentials James Romer – Chief Security Architect EMEA

Beyond Two-Factor: Secure Access Control for O365

• All attendee audio lines are muted

• Submit questions via Q&A panel at any time

• Questions will be answered during Q&A at the end of the presentation

• Slides and recording will be sent later this week

• Contact us at webinars@secureauth.com

Webinar Housekeeping

Security Professional

Third-Party Research

• Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report• Dedicated a section to credentials

• M-Trends 2016 Report• Observation #1 -- Credentials, in general

• Password Complexity enforcement • Single Factor Authentication to publicly exposed applications

1. The Trouble with Tor – Mathew Prince https://blog.cloudflare.com/the-trouble-with-tor 2. 2016 Data Breach Investigations Report by Verizon http://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights-lab/dbir/2016/ 3. Mandiant M-Trends 2016 https://www2.fireeye.com/rs/848-DID-242/images/Mtrends2016.pdf

Standard 2-Factor

2 Factor #FAIL – Disclaimer

• The following 2 Factor Fail Slides are examples of where and how that second factor has failed or been compromised. This does not mean to illustrate the removal of the use of second factor authentication methods. We recommend evaluating the security need of the identity being protected by the second factor authentication method.• We are in danger of running towards a broken methodology

2 Factor #FAIL – Hard Tokens

• Hard Tokens Anyone?• Provisioning and management nightmare• User experience • How about crafty users ?

2 Factor #FAIL – SMS

• SS7 – Thank You Karsten Nohl• Social Engineering • Mobile Phone Providers are a weak link• DRAFT NIST Special Publication 800-63B

• Must not send to VOIP based numbers• Deprecated SMS as an Out-of-Band Authentication

2 Factor #FAIL – KBQ-KBA

• Social Engineering• Some are based on Public Record• Users tend to forget answers• Security Practices guide users to leverage incorrect answers

2 Factor #FAIL – Simple Push-to-Accept

• Human Behavior --- Implementation• Wrongly accept authentication requests

Dave Kennedy DEFCON 22 -- Destroying Education and Awareness https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vcA6dLl5Sa4&feature=youtu.be&t=30m38s

User Experience / Security

Not all users are created equal, but everyone hates

additional auth. steps

Getting beyond the old school, multi-step/interruption processes

Clean authentication experience enhances user adoption

Balancing security needs with user preferences – don’t have compromise

Users choose how they want to authenticate

Flexible authentication workflows for different user groups

Best PossibleUser Experience

SECURITY

HAPPYUSERS

MFA Step

Deny

Redirect

Allow

Go PASSWORDLESS – Even less disruption for users

Multi-Layered Risk Analysis Only require a MFA step

if risk present

Single Sign-OnConvenience of removing log-in

across multiple systems

User Self-ServiceAllow user to help themselves

without a Help Desk call

On-Prem AppsHomegrown AppsSaaS AppsVPNData Stores

• Password Resets• Account Unlocking• Enrollment• User Personal Info

• Library of over 8000+ apps• All Federation protocols supported• Support custom branding

• Enough Doom and Gloom! – The Solution?

• Recognizes people• Makes it easy• Is part of a

community• Adjusts over time

Pre-Authentication Risk AnalysisAdaptive Authentication

• Layered Risk Analysis = Stronger Security

• No User Experience Impact

• Only present MFA when needed

• No other vendor has as many “layers”

Device Recognition

Threat Service

Directory Lookup

Geo-Location

Geo-Velocity

Geo-Fencing

Fraud Detection

Identity Governance

Behavior Analytics

Behavioral Biometrics

Pre-Authentication Risk AnalysisAdaptive Authentication

Device Recognition

Threat Service

Directory Lookup

Geo-Location

Geo-Velocity

Geo-Fencing

Fraud Prevention

Identity Governance

Behavior Analytics

Behavioral Biometrics

Do we recognize this device?Associated with a user we know?

Real-time Threat IntelligenceIP Address Interrogation

Group membership and attribute checking Request coming from a known location?

Do we have employees, partners or customers here?

Has an improbable travel event taken place?

Who should/does have access rights?High Access Rights = greater risk/vulnerability

Track normal behaviorLooking for anomalies

Typing Sequences & Mouse MovementsUnique to each user on each device

Access request coming from within or outside a geographic barrier

Reduce # of OTPs, Block device class,Identify “porting” status, Block by carrier

Phone Number Fraud PreventionSecure Phone-based Authentications & Comply with NIST Standards

OTP Spam Prevention

Regulate number of OTPs allowed

Number been ported without consent?

Block by global carrier networks

Block by phone number class

A component of SecureAuth Adaptive Authentication

Block Recently Ported Numbers

Block by Number Class

Block By Carrier Network

Protecting the Identity and the 2fA Method

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O365 Support

• SecureAuth and O365• Certified Microsoft Integrator :

https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/documentation/articles/active-directory-aadconnect-federation-compatibility/#secureauth-idp-720• Rich/Thick Client support for Outlook, Lync, Skype for Business, Web based

access and Mobile app access for the office suite • Intelligent and Adaptive access control for the organization

Demo

• SecureAuth and O365• Browser access from an untrusted device• Browser access from a trusted device• Browser access from an anonymous source

Become Proactive!

• Now that we have all this information on our Identities what else can we do with it?• Take automated actions• Provide the most appropriate 2fA option• Apply continuous authentication measures• Lock the User account / Reset Password• Report Automated Action to SIEM• Send Notification to Administrators• Send Notification to User • Allow the valid Identity to self remediate with Service Service tools

In Summary – 2fA Is Not Enough

Profound difference between being “compliant” & actually

being “secure”

Antiquated 2FA doesn’t provide adequate access controls• KBAs - socially engineered• Tokens & devices can be

compromised• OTPs via SMS/Text can be

intercepted• Push-to-accept known to

routinely be falsely accepted

Old school approaches & methods carry an increasing IT burden and cost to manage

Compliance/2FANOT Enough

30+ MFA MethodsChoice and Flexibility

Multi-Layered Risk Analysis Strengthen security with

minimal disruption to users

+• Fingerprint Biometric• Symbol-to-Accept• SecureAuth App (w/

Fraud Detection)• 25+ more methods…

+

Infinite Workflows Different auth workflows for

groups, individuals, and/or apps

SIEMSecurity Info & Event Mgmt

UBAUser Behavior Analytics

DashboardVisualize Access Control Data

Data Sharing Correlate Access Control Data with Your Security Operations Center (SOC)

We use ADFS – Do we need to replace it?

• SecureAuth as a claims provider trust• Take advantage of best of breed 20+ authentication techniques• Utilise 10 layers of pre-authentication risk checking – bring authentication

intelligence into ADFS • Compliment ADFS with all common SSO standards • Deploy adaptive authentication without impacting the users

• SecureAuth authentication adapter• Installs into ADFS to provide adaptive authentication• Take advantage of best of breed authentication techniques

Question & Answer

THANK YOUCopyright SecureAuth Corporation

2017