wenger, ch1: meaning, pp51-71

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50 Part I: Practice

world.I will end by arguing hat boundaries f practice are not sim-ple ines of demarcation etween nside and outside, ut form a com-plex social andscape fboundaries and peripheries.

' Practice as ocality. chapter 5 addresses he scope and limits of theconcept of community of practice. will discuss when o view a socialconfiguration as one community or as a consteilation of communitiesof practice. will thus start alking about other evers f social struc-ture, but still in terms of practice. will leave he discussion f othertypes ofstructuring processes or Part IL

' Knowing n practice. coda I ends this discussion of practice with abrief essay n knowing n practice. Echoing he argument of part I,I will summarize he themes ntroduced n each chapter by usingthem to ponder what t means o know n practice. This wil result na definition of learning as an nterplay of experience nd competence.

Because oda I gives an overview of part I, it offers a logical start-ing point if you like to begin with an overview and are comfortablewith terms hat are not yet well-defined. You would first see in a syn-optic fashion and in a specific context how the whole argument itstogether, and then be able to obtain details by referring to individ-ual chapters.

Chapter

Meaning

Our attempts o understand human ife open a vast space of relevantguestions from the origin of the universe o the workings of the brain,from the details of every thought to the purpose of life. In this vastrpace of questions, he concept of practice s useful for addressingrpecific slice: a focus on the exp erience f meaningfulness. ractice s,first and oremost, a process y which we can experience he world andour engagement ith it as meaningful.

Of course, n order to engage n practice, we must be alive n a worldin which we can act and nteract. We must have a body with a brain hatis functioning well enough to participate n social communities. Wemust have ways o communicate with one another. But a focus on prac-tice is not merely a functional perspective on human activities, evenrctivities nvolving multiple individuals. t does not address imply themechanics f getting something done, ndividually or in groups; t isnot a mechanical erspective. t includes not just bodies or even coor-dinated bodies) and not just brains even coordinated nes), but more-over that which gives meaning o the motions of bodies and the work-ings of brains.t

Let me illustrate this point by analogy o a work of art. There are allsorts of mechanics nvolved n producing a painting: a canvas, rushes,color pigments, and sophisticated echniques. he image tself s but a

thin veneer. Yet in th e end, for the painter and for the viewer, t is thepainting as an experience f meaning hat counts. Similarly, n the pur-suit of our enterprises, e engage n all sorts of activities with complexbodies hat are the result of millennia of evolution. Still, in the end, tis the meanings we produce hat matter.

This focus on meaningfulness s therefore not primarily on the tech-nicalities of "meaning." It is not on meaning as it sits locked up indictionaries. t is not iust on meaning as a relation between a sign anda reference. ut neither s it on meaning s a grand question on th e

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meaning of life as a philosophical ssue. Practice s about meaning s anercperience f eaeryd.ay ife.

If the kind of meaning am interested n is an experience, nd if itis not the kind we can ind in dictionary definitions or in philosophicaldiscussions, hen I need o address he questions f where t is locatedand how it is constituted. n this chapter, will fi rst argue hat:

l) meaning s located n a process will call the negotiation fmeaning

2) the negotiation f meaning nvolves he nteraction of two con-stituent processes, which I will call participation and reifcation

3) participation and reification orm a duality that is fundamentalto the human experience f meaning and thus to the nature ofpractice.

These concepts re essential o my argument, and I wil l start by ex-.plaining in some detail what I mean by them and just why they areimportant.

Negotiation of meaning

The experience f meaning s not produced out of thin air, butneither s t simpl y a mechanical ealization f a routine or a procedure.For Ariel, no two claims are he same, even h ough she has earned ocoerce hese laims nto manageable ategories. ndeed, medical claimsprocessing s largely a classificat ory ctivity. Its purpose s to imposestandards f sameness nd difference n the midst of a low of change othat claims can be recognized s belonging o cat egories men able owell-understood reatment. But for Ariel. this routinization must con-stantly be achieved new, claim after claim.

Our engagement n practice may have patterns, but it is the produc-tion of such patterns anew hat gives ise o an experience f meaning.When we sit down or lunch or the thousandth ime with the same ol-

leagues n the same afeteria, we have seen t all before. We know all thesteps. We may even know today's menu by heart; we may ove t or wemay dread t. And yet we eat again, we taste again. We may know ourcolleagues ery well, and yet we repeatedly engage n conv ersations.All that we do and say may refer to what has been done and said n thepast, and yet we produce again a new situation, an mpression, n expe-rience: we produce meanings hat extend, redirect, dismiss, einter-pret, modify or confirm - in a word, negotiate anew the histories of

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Chapter : Meaning 53

meanings f which they are part. In this sense, iving s a constant pro-cess of negotiation f neaning.

I will use the conce pt of negotiation of meaning very generally ocharacterize he process y which we experience he world and our en-gagement n i t as meaningful.2 Whether we are alking, acting, hink-ing, solving problems, or daydreaming, we are concerned with mean-ings. I have argued hat even routine activities ike claims processingor eating n a cafeteria nvolve he negotiation of meaning, but it is all

the more true when we are nvol ved n activi ties hat we care about orthat present us with ch allenges: hen we look n wonder at a beautifullandscape, hen we close a delicate deal, when we go on a special date,when we solve a difficult mystery, when we listen o a moving piece ofmusic, when we read a good book, or when we mourn a dear riend. Insuch cases, he ntensity of the process s obvious, ut the same processis at work even f what we end up negotiating urns out to be an expe-rience of meaninglessness. uman engagement n the world is first andforemost a process f negotiating meaning.3

The negotiation f meaning may nvolve anguage, ut it is not lim-ited to it. It includes our social elations as factors n the negotiation,but it does not necessarily nvolve a conversation r even direct inter-oction with other human beings. The concept of negotiation often de-notes reaching an agreement between people, as in "negotiating aprice," but it is not limited to that usage. t is also used o suggest naccomplishment hat requires sustained ttention and readjustment, sin "negotiating a sharp curve." want to capture both aspects t once,in order to suggest hat living meaningfully mplies:

l) an active process f producing meaning hat is both dynamicand historical

2) a world of both resistance nd malleability3) the mutual ability to affect and to be affected

+) the engagement f a multiplicity of factors and perspectives5) the production ofa new resolution o the convergence fthese

factors and perspectives6) the ncompletenes s f this resolution, which can be partial, en-

tative, ephemeral, nd specific o a situation.

I i ntend the term negotiation o convey a flavor ofcontinuous nter-tction, of gradual chievement, nd of give-and-take. y living n th eworld we do not just make meanings p independently f the world,


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but neither does he world simply mpose meanings n us. The negotia-tion of meaning s a productive process, ut negotiating meaning s notconstructing t from scratch. Meaning s not pre-existing, but neither sit simply made up. Negotiated meaning s at once both historical anddynamic, contextual and unique.

The negotiation of meaning s a process hat is shaped by multipleelements and that affects hese elements. As a result, this negotiationconstantly hanges he situations o which it gives meaning and affects

all participants. n this process, negotiating meaning entails both in-terpretation and action. In fact, this perspective does not imply afundamental distinction between nterpreting and acting, doing andthinking, or understanding nd responding. All are part of the ongoingprocess f negotiating meaning. This process lways enerates ew cir-cumstances or further negotiation nd urther meanings. t constantlyproduces new relations with and in the wo rld. The meaningfulnessof our engagement n the world is not a state of affairs, ut a continualprocess f renewed egotiation.a

From this perspective, meaning s always he product of its negotia-tion, by which mean hat t exists n this process f negotiation. Mean-ing exists neither n us, nor in the world, but in the dynamic elation ofliving n the world.

The dynamics f negotiated eaning

The processing f a given claim form by a processor ike Arielis an example of the negotiation of meaning. t takes place n a con-text that combines vast array of factors, ncluding he organization fthe insurance ndustry, he official and unofficial raining he processorunderwent, he way the particular claim looks, past experiences withsimilar claims, he way the day s going, who else s around, what elseis happening, nd so on. The contexts hat contribute o shaping he

experience f a claim reach ar and wide in time and space.When Ariel grabs a new claim, she may not know exactly what to

do, but she s in familiar territory. Even f there s a problem, she maybe annoyed but she s not surprised; t will be resolved eventually. nfact, she can hardly recall he tentativeness f that first day, he unset-tling mysteriousness f those raining weeks, he reaching ut duringher first months on the floor, when ust about every claim she was pro-cessing resented ne problem or another. t had seemed o bi g then


claims processing, Alinsu, the medical establishment. ut no w it isfarniliar. It is her job, and she s reasonably ood at it.

The claim too comes with a history. It started out as a blank formdesigned by technical pecialists t Alinsu. r wa s approved y variousprofessional associations efore t was printed. It was sent to a clientcorrrpany where a benefit representative istributed t to an employee.It was partially filled out by that employee and submitted to medicalprofessionals who completed t. Then it was sent back o Alinsu, where

it was first sorted by clerical personnel o be routed in a bundle toAriel's processing unit. And now it is on her desk, o be coerced some-how into the confines of the processible.

Processing claims requires a very specific way of looking at a claimform. The ability to interpret a claim form reflects he relations thatboth the claim and Ariel have o particular practices. Ariel contributesto the negotiation of meaning by being a member of a community andbringing to bear her history of participation n its practice. similarly,the claim contributes to this process by reflecting aspects of practicethat have been congealed n it and ixed n its shape. would say hat theprocessor as a member of a community of practice embodies a ong anddiverse process of what I will call participation similarly, the claim asrn artifact of certain practices embodies a long and diverse process ofwhat I will call reifcation. It is in the convergence f these tw' pro-cesses n the act of processing he claim hat the negotiation of meaningtakes place.

As a pair, participation and reification efer to a duality fundamentalro the negotiation of meaning. n order to clarify why this is so, I willfirst discuss ach erm separately efore urning to the duality that theircomplementarity orms.

Participation

My use of the term participation alls within common usage. tis therefore helpful to start with webster's definition: "To have or takei pirrt or share with others in some activity, enterprise, tc.)." partici-

Pirtion efers o a process f taking part an d also o the relations with'thcrs that reflect hi s process. t suggests oth action an d connection.

In this brok, I will us e he term participation o describe he sociale pcricncc of living n rh e world n terms of membership n social om -rrrrrni l ics rnclact ivc nvolvcmcnt n social enterprises. ar t icipat ion


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in this sense s both personal and social. It is a complex process hatcombines doing, talking, thinking, feeling, and belonging. t involvesour whole person, including our bodies, minds, emotions, and socialrelations.

Participation is an active process, but I will reserve he term foractors who are members of social communities. For instance. will notsay that a computer "participates" in a community of practice, eventhough it ma y be part of that practice and play an active ole n getting

certain things done.s Neither will I say that a fish n its bowl n the ivingroom participates n a family. But I would be open to considering hata family dog, for instance, participates in some peripheral but real wayin that family. n this regard, what I take to characterize articipation sthe possibility of mutual recognition. When we shave a piece of woodor mold a piece of clay, we do not construe our shaping hese objects ascontributing to their experience of meaning. But when we engage n aconversation, we somehow recognize in each other something of our-selves, which we address. What we recognize has o do with our mutualability to negotiate meaning. This mutuality does not, however, entailequality or respect. The relations between parents and children or be-tween workers and their direct supervisor are mutual in the sense hatparticipants shape each other's experiences of meaning. n doing so,they can recognize something of themselves n each other. But theseare not relations of equality. In practice, even he meanings f inequal-ity are negotiated n the context of this process f mutual recognition.

In this experience of mutuality, participation is a source of identity.By recognizing he mutuality of our participation, we become part ofeach other. n fact, the concept of identity is so central hat I will post-pone more detailed discussion until Part II, where t will be the maintopic. Here I will just say that a defining characteristic f participationis the possibility of developing an "identity of participation," hat is, anidentity constituted hrough relations of participation.

Before I proceed, t is worth clarifying a few more points about myuse of the term participation.

. Firsl, participation as will use the term is not tantamount o collab-oration. t can nvolve all kinds of relations. conflictual as well as har-monious, ntimate as well as political, competitive as well as cooper-ative.

. Second, articipation n social communities shapes ur experience,an d it also shapes hose communities; the transformativc otential


goes oth ways. ndeed, our ability (or inability) o shape he practiceof our communities s an important aspect of our experience ofparticipation.

. Finally, as a constituent of meani ng, participation s broader hanmere engagement n practice. Claims processors re not claims pro-cessors ust while they work in the office. Of course, hat time of in-tense engagement ith their work and with one another s especiallysignificant. But they do not cease o be claims processors t five

o'clock. Their participation is not something hey simply turn offwhen they leave. ts effects on their experience re not restricted othe specific ontext of their eng agement. t i s a part of who they arethat they always arry with them and that will surface f, for instance,they hemse lves appen o go o the doctor, ill out an nsura nce orm,or call a c ustomer service center. In this sense, articipation goesbeyond direct engagement n s pecific activities with specific people.It places he negotiation of meaning n the context of our for ms ofmembership n various communities. t is a constituent of our iden-tities. As such, participation s not something we turn on and off.

From this perspective, ur engagement with the world is social, venwhen it does not clea rly involve interactions with others. Being in ahotel room by yourself preparing a set of slides or a presentation henext morning may not seem ike a particularly social vent, yet ts mean-ing is fundamentally ocial. Not only is the audience here with you asyou attempt o make your points understandable o them, but your col-leagues re here oo, ooking over your shoulder, s t were, epresent-ing for you your sense faccountability to the professional tandards fyour community. A child doing homework, a doctor making a decision,e traveler eading a book - all these activities mpli citly involv e otherpeople who may not be present. The meanings of what we do are al-ways social. By "social" I do not refer iust to family dinners, company

picnics, chooldances, nd church socials. Even drastic solation as nrolitary confinement, monastic seclusion, r writing - is given meaningthrough social participation. The concept of participation s meant tocapture hi s profoundly ocial haracter four experience flife.

Reification

The term re'iJication s less common than participation. But Ihopc to show that, n conjunction with participation, eification s a


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very useful concept o describe ur engagement ith the world as pro-ductive of meaning. Again, t will help o start with Webster's efinitionof reification: To treat (an abstraction) s substantially xisting, or asa concrete material object."6

Etymologically, he term reification means making nto a thing." Itsusage n English has a significant wist, however: t is used o convey heidea hat what s turned nto a concrete, material object s not properlya concrete, material object. For instance, we make representation s f

"justice" as a blindfolded maid holding a scale, r use expressions uchas "the hand of fate."

In everyday iscourse, bstractions ike "democracy" or "the econ-omy" are often talked about as hough hey were active agents. Whena newscast eports hat "democracy ook a blow during a military coup,"or that "the economy eacted slowly to the government's actionr" heprocess f reification provides a shortcut o communication.

This succinctness erives rom a slight illusion of ex cessive eality,but it is useful because t focuses he negotiation f meaning. This is thesubtle dea want to capture by using he term reification. We projectour meanings nto the world and hen we perceive hem as existing nthe world, as having a reality of their own. For example, my own use ofthe term reification n the context of this book s itself a case n point.The term s a projection of what mean. t is an abstraction. t does notdo the work by itself. But after a while, as use t to think with, it startstalking o me as hough t w ere alive. Whereas n participation we rec-ognize ourselves n each other, n reification we project ourselves ntothe world, and not having o recognize ourselves n those projections,we attribute o our meanings an independent existence. his contrastbetween mutuality and projection s an important difference betweenparticipation and reification.

The concept f rei,frcationI will use the concept of reification very generally o refer to

the process f giving form to our experience y producing objects hatcongeal his experience nto "thingness." n so doing we create pointsof focus around which the negotia tion of meaning becomes rganized.Again my use of the term reification s ts own example. am ntroduc-ing it into the discourse ecause want to create a new distinction oserve as a point of focus around which to organize my discussion. Writ-ing down a law, creating procedure, r producing trxrl s a similar

Chapter 1: Meaning 59

process. A certain understanding s given form. This form then be-comes a focus or the negotiation of meaning, as people use he law toargue a point, use he procedure o know what to do, or use he tool toperform an action.

I would claim that the process f reification so construed s centralto every practice. Any community of practice produces abstractions,tools, symbols, tories, erms, and concepts hat reify something of thatpractice n a congealed orm. clearly, I want to use he concept of rei-

fication n a much broader sense han its dictionary definition. But Iwant to preserve he connotations f excessive oncreteness nd pro-jected eality hat are suggested y the dictionary definition. ndeed, noabstraction, ool, or symbol actually captures n its form the practices nthe context of which t contributes o an experience f meaning. A med-ical claim, for instance, eifies n its form a complex web of conven-tions, agreements, xpectations, ommitments, and obligations, nclud-ing (on the part of med ical professionals) he right to bilr for certainservices nd the obligation o do so n a srandardizedway nd (on thepart of the nsurance ompany) he right to decide f the claim s egiti-mate and duly filled out, together with the obligation o honor he claimif it is.?

with the term reification mean o cover a wide range of processesthat include making, designing, epresenting, naming, encoding, anddescribing, as well as perceiving, nterpreting, using, reusing, decod-ing, and recasting. Reification occupies much of our collective energy:from entries n a journal to historical ecords, rom poems o encyclo-pedias, rom names o classification ystems, rom dolmens o spaceprobes, rom the Constitution o a signature on a credit card slip, fromgourmet recipes o medical procedures, rom flashy advertisements ocensus ata, rom single concepts o entire theories, rom the eveningnews o national archives, rom lesson plans o the compilation of text-books, rom private address ists o sophisticated redit reporting data-bases, rom tortuous political speeches o the yellow pages. n all thesecases, aspects of human experience and practice are congealed ntofixed forms and given he status of object.

Reification hapes ur experience. t can do so n very concrete ways.Having a tool to perform an activity changes he nature of that activity.A word processor, or instance, eifies a view of the activity of writing,but also changes ow one goes about writing. The effects f reificationca n also e ess bvious. eifying he concept f gravityma y no t changeits cffect on our brdics, bu t it does hange ur experience f the worrd


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by focusing our attention n a particular way and enabling new kinds ofunderstanding. imilarly, eifying he concept of body weight as a mea-sure of self-worth does not make us heavier but can weigh heavily onour sense f self. The reification of claims processing hrough he typeof forms and procedures escribed n Vignette I can detach work activ-ities from other personal xperiences o the point where the generallyreificative ature of the work gives he ob of claims processing partic-ular character. Even the regularly scheduled reaks eify what is work

and what s not.Again, I should clarify a few points about my use of the concept ofreification before proceeding.

Reification an efer both to a process nd ts producr, and I will usethe term in both senses. his liberty is not just a lack of rigor, butpart of the point.If meaning xists nl y n its negotiation hen, at helevel of meaning, he process nd the product are not distinc t. Reifi-cation s not just objectification; t does not end n an object. t doesnot simply ranslate meaning nto an object. On the contrary, my useof the concept s meant o suggest hat such ranslation s never pos-sible, and hat the process nd the product always mply each other.

Claims processors re not the designers f the rules and forms theyuse, yet they must absorb hem nto their practice. n an nstitutionalenvironment such as a claims processing ite, a very large portion ofthe reification nvolved n work practices comes rom outside hecommunities of workers. Even so, however, eification must be re-appropriated nto a local process n order to become meaningful.8The process f reification does not necessarily riginate n design. Adetective may spend much ime studying ingerprints on a doorknob;an archaeologist s fascinated y traces of ancient ife in a cave. Mosthuman activities produce marks n the physical world. These marksare vestiges. hey freeze leeting moments of engagement n prac-tice nto monuments, which persist and disappear n their own time.Whether intentionally produced or not, they can then be reinte-grated as eification nto new moments of negotiation of meaning.Reification can ake a great variety of f orms: a fleeting smoke signalor an age-old pyramid, an abstract ormula or a concrete ruck, asmall ogo or a huge nf ormation-process ing ystem, a simple wordjotted on a page or a complex argument developed n a whole book,a telling glance r a ong silence, a private knot on a handkerchief ra controversial tatue n a public square, n mpressionist ainting l'a butterfly or a scientific pecimen n an entomologicll ollcction.

I

Chapter : Meaning 6lwhat is mporrant_about il these objects s that they are onry he tip

of an ceberg, which ndicates arger conrexts f significance ealized nhuman pracrices. heir character s eification s ot onry n their formbut also n the processes y which they are ntegrated nto these prac-tices. Properly speaking, he products of reificatilor,

"r",rot si_ply corr_

crete' material objects. Rather, hey are reflections of these practices,tokens of vast expanses f human meaninss.

The double dge f reificationAs an evocative hortcut, he process freification can be very

powerful. A politician can reify voters' inarticulate ongings n onephrase hat galvanizes upport. A good ool can eify an

""iiuiiyso as o

amplify ts effects while making he activity effortress. procei.rre ca'reify a concept so that its application s automatic. A formula can ex_press n a few terms a regularity hat pervades he universe.

But the power of reification - its succinctness, ts portability, itspotenrial physical persistence, ts focusing effect is aiso ts danger.The politician's slogan an become a substitute or a deep understand-ing of and commitment o what t stands or. The tool ."n orriry

""tiu-ty around ts inertness. rocedures can hide broader meanings n blindsequences f operations. And the knowledge of a formula c-an ead tothe llusion hat one fuily understands he processes t describes.. The evocative power of reification s thus double_edged. lassify_ing people under broad categories an focus attention on a kind ofdiversity, but the reification can give differences nd similarities a con-creteness hey do nor actuaily possess. imilarly, f an organization is-plays a statement of varues n its robby, t has created a reification ofromething hat does or should pervade he organization. hough this"romething" is probably much more diffuse and intangible n- prac-tice, t gains a new concreteness nce ramed n the tobb"y. t becomes

romething people can point to, refer to, strive for, appeal o, and useor misuse n arguments' et, as a reification, t may seem disconnected,frozen nto a rext hat does nor caprure he richness flived.*f..i"n."ffid.that can be appropriated n misleading ways. As a focus of at_lcntion that can be detached rom practice, he reification may evenbe scen with cynicism, as an ironic substitute or what t was ntendedlo rcflcct.

Indced, my us e of th e term reification oe s no t assume n nherentcrrrrcsp'ndcnce ctwccn a svmbol an d a referent, tool an d a function,Ot I phcn,mcn,n ln d ln intcrprctation. )n hc c'ntrary, th e concepr


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of reification suggests hat forms can ake a life of their own, beyondtheir context of origin. They gain a degree f autonomy rom the occa-sion and purposes f their production. Their meaningfulness s alwayspotentially expanded nd potentially ost. Reification as a constituent ofmeaning s always ncomplete, ongoing, potentially enriching, and po-tentially misleading. The notion of assigning he sta tus of object tosomething hat really s not an object conveys sense f mistaken olid-ity, of projected oncreteness. t conveys sense f useful llusion. The

use of the term reification stands both as a tribute to the generativepower of the process nd as a gentle eminder of its delusory perils.

The duality of meaning

In their interplay, participation and reification are both distinctand complementary, s suggested y the ll ustration n Figure l.l.' Thereification of a Constitution s just a form; it is not equivalent o a citi-zenry. Yet t is empty without the participation of the citizens nvolved.Conversely, he production of such a reification s crucial o the kind ofnegotiation hat s necessary or them to act as citizens and o bring to-gether he multiple perspectives, nterests, nd n terpretations hat par-ticipation entails.

As the figure suggests, articipation and eification cannot be consid-ered n isolation: hey come as a pair. They form a unity in their duality.Given one, t is a useful heuristic o wond er where the other is. Tounderstand ne, t is necessary o understand he other. To enable one,it is necessary o enable he other. They come about through eachother, but th ey cannot replace each other. It is through their variouscombinations hat they give ise o a variety of experiences f meaning.

We don't usually hink of the experience f meaning as a duality be-cause he interplay of participation and reification emains argely un-problematic. Processes f reification and participation can be woven so

tightly that the distinction between hem seems almost blurred. Theuse of language n face-to-face nteractions s a good example. Words asprojections of human meaning are certainly a form of reification. nface-to-face nteractions, however, speech s extremely evanescent;words affect he negotiation of meaning hrough a process hat seemslike pure participation . As a consequence, ords can ake advantage fshared participation among nterlocutors o create shortcuts o com-munication. t is this ight nterweaving f reification nd participationthat makes onversations uc h a powerful or m of communicrrtion.

Chapter I: Meaning

Figure l.l. The du ality of participation and reification.

More generally, he negotiation f meaning weaves articipation andreification so seamlessly hat meaning seems o have ts own unitary,self-contained xistence: medical laim s a medical laim; a smile s

a smile; ok e s a oke. Of course, t is often convenient o act as houghmeanings re n actions r artifacts hemselves. o a medical claim s n-deed a medical claim; t was produced o be a medical claim; t exist s orus n a civilization where everything concurs o make t a medical claim.And yet what t is to be a medical laim s always efined with respectto specific orms of participation hat contextualize meaning. t cannotbe assumed o be ntrinsic or universal.

The complementarit.y fparticipation nd reffication

Although seamlessly oyen nto our practices, he complemen-tarity of participation and reification s something amiliar. We use t asirmatter of course n order o secure ome continuity of meaning acrosstime an d space. ndeed, n their complementarity, articipation nd e-ification can make up for their respective imitations. They can compen-sate or each other's shortcomings, o o speak.

. On the one hand, participation makes p for the nherent imitations


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meeting to introduce a new policy in order to avoid misunderstand-ings; we discuss what we read in order to compare and enrich ourinterpretations. Participation is essential to repairing the potentialmisalignments inherent in reification. When the stiffness of its formrenders reification obsolete, when its mute ambiguity is misleading,or when its purpose is lost in the distance , then it is participation thatcomes o the rescue.

. On the other hand, reification also makes up for the inherent limita-

tions of participation. We create monumentsto remember the dead;

we take notes to remind ourselves of decisions made in the past; weshare our notes with colleagues who could not attend a meeting; weare surprised by the way someone else describes a common eventor object; we clarify our intentions with explanations and represen-tational devices; we coordinate our coming an d going with clocks.Mirroring the role of participation, reification is essential to repair-ing the potential misalignments nherent in participation: when theinformality of participation is confusingly loose, when the fluidityof its implicitness mpedes coordination, when its locality s too con-fining or its partiality too narrow, then it is reification that comes tothe rescue.

On e advantage f viewing the negotiation of meaning as constitutedby a dual process s that we can consider the various trade-offs involvedin the complementarity of participation an d reification. ndeed, given

an action or an artifact, it becomes a relevant question to ask how theproduction of meaning s distributed, hat is, what is reified and what isleft to participation.

. A computer program, for instance, could be described as an extremekind of reification, which can be interpreted by a machine incapableof any participation in its meaning.

. A poem, by contrast, is designed to rely on participation, that is, to

maximize the work that the ambiguity inherent in its form ca n do inthe negotiation of meaning.

From such a perspective, communication is not just a quantitativeissue. Indeed, what says more: the few lines of a tightly written poem

or a volume of analytical comments on it? The communicative abilityof artifacts depends on how the work of negotiating meaning is dis-tributed between reification and participation. Different mixes becomedifferentially productive of meaning.

ChaPter : .Meantng 65

The complemenrarity f participation and reification yields an obvi-

ous but profound principle or .ndeauors hat rely on some degree of

continuiiy of meaning communication, esign, nstruction, or collab-

oration. Participation and reification must be in such proportion and

relation as o compensate or their respective hortcomings' When too

much reliance s placed on one at the expense f the other, he continu-

ity of meaning s likely to become problematic n practice'

. If participation prevails if most of what matters s left unreified-

then there may not be enough material o anchor he specificities fcoordinat ionandtouncoverdivergingassumptions.Thisiswhylaw-yers always want everything n writing'

. If reification prevails if everything s reified' but with little oppor-

tunityforsharedexperienceandinteract ivenegotiat ion_thenthere-"y no, be enough oue,l"p n participation o recover a coordinated'

relevant, or generative meaning' This helps explain why putting

everything n writing does no t seem o solve al l ou r problems'

In cases f mismatches' t is necessary o analyze he situation n

terms of the duality and o redress ny mbalance' Merely adding more

participation o participation or more reification o reification may not

irelp much, because " for- of participation or reification s by itself un-likely to correct ts own shortcomings: ot iust another memo' not iust

a n o t h e r m e e t i n g . . ' .

A fundamental ualitY

The duality of participation and reification will appear again

rrndagain as develop my argument n this book' This duality s a fun-

tlame"ntal spect f the constitution of communities of practice, of their

cvolution over ime, of th e relations mong practices' f th e dentities

of participants, nd of the broad r organizations n which communities

of practicexist.

I n t h i s c o n t e x t' a s l t r i e d t o e m ph a s i z e w i t h t he d i a g r a m o f F i gu r eI . , it is mportant nnt o interpret he duality of participation

and reifi-

cation n teims of a simple opposition. willen d hi s chapter y expand-

in g this point. fyou "i .in a hurry an d ee l ha t enough as been said

rrlrcady, ou may want to skip th e fine points am making here an d

nlove on o th e next chapter. ut if yo u have he patience nd he ncli-

nrltion, he n eading n will help clarifyboth th e nature of th e relation

bclu'ccn lrticillitrion rn d eification nd , more Senerally' ha t mean


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66 Part I: Practtce

by a duality as opposed o a di chotomy. The latter clarifi cation willbe useful since will introduce a number of dualities n the comingchapters. ndeed, thinking in terms of complex dualities ather thanmere dichotomies s fundamental o the conceptual ramework of thisbook.

As suggested y Figure 1.1, a duality s a single conceptual nit thatis formed by two inseparable nd mutually constitutive lements whoseinherent tension and complementar ity give the concept ichness and

dynamism. n what follows, will clarif y this idea by contrasting heduality of participation nd reification with related) more raditional di*chotomies f opposites for example, acit versus explicit, ormal ver-sus nformal, individual versus collective, private versus public, con-scious ersus nconscious, r people versus hings. will do so via a istof statements, n each case aying oth what the duality of participationand reification s and what t is not.

) Participation and reifcation are a duality, nlt lpposites.

Participation and reificati on are not defined merely by opposition oeach other. The tacit is that which is not made explicit; the informalthat which is not for malized; he unconsci ous hat which is not con-scious. But participation s not merely what s not reified. Both partici-pation and eification are processes efined each n their own terms. Asa result, they are not m utually exclusive. On the contrary, hey takeplace ogether; hey are wo constituents ntrinsic o the process f ne-gotiation of meaning, and their complementarity eflects he inherentduality of this process.

Participation nd reification both require and enable each other. Onthe one hand, t takes our participation o produce, nterpret, and usereification; o here s no reification without participation. On the otherhand, our participation equires nteraction and thus generates hort-cuts o coordinated meanings hat reflect our enter prises nd our takeson the world; so here s no participation without reification.

) Participation and reification a.re no d,imensions hat interact; heydo not define e spectrum.

One way to avoid hinking starkly n terms of opposites s to consider aspectrum. Knowledge can be more or less explicit; learning can bemore or less ormal; an impression can be more or less conscious;meaning can be more or less ndiv idual. While a co ntinuum does al-low more nuanced istinctions, t is still a relation between pposites.


Moving to one side mplies eaving he other. More of one mplies essof the other.

With an interacting duality, by contrast, both elements are alwaysinvolved, and both can ake different orms and degrees. n particular,there can be both intense participation and ntense eification. n fact,the creative genius of great scientists and artists can be constru ed asstemming rom their ability o bring the two together: on rhe one hand,an intense nvolvement with the reificative ormalisms of their disci-

pline; and on the other, a deep participative ntuition of what those or-malisms are about. This is true of a scientist ike Albert Einstein. whoinsisted n he mportance of exploring deas ntuitively as well as beingable o give hem mathematical xpression. t is as ru e of a musicianlike Johann Sebastian ach, who combined ntricate orms of musicalstructure with melodic nspiration.

Such a perspective as pedagogical mplications or teaching omplexknowledge: an excessive mphasis on formal ism without correspond-ing levels of participation, or conversely neglect of explanations ndformal structure, can easily esul t n an experience f meaninglessness.

I Participation and reffication mply each other; hey do not substi-tute or each other.

Increasing he level of participation or reification does nor dispensewith the other. On the contrary, t will tend to increase he require-ments o r the other.

Indeed, eification always ests on participation: what s said, epre-sented, or otherwise brought into focus always assumes history ofparticipation as a context for its int erpretation. n turn, participationalways rganizes tself around eification because t alwa ys nvolves arti-facts, words, and concepts hat allow t to proceed.

Explicit knowledge s thus not freed rom the tacit. Formal processesare not freed rom the nformal. n fact, n terms of meaningfu lness, heopposite s more ikely. To be understood meaningfully as a representa-tion of a piece of physics nowledge, n abstract eification ike E = mc2does not obviate a close connection o the physics community but, onthe contrary, equires t. In general, iewed as a reification, a more ab-stract or mulation will require more intense and specific participationto remain meaningful, ot ess.

From such a perspective, t is not possible o make everything ex-plicit and thus gct rid of the tacit, or to make everything ormal andthus ge t ri d ol'thc infilrmal. t i s possible nly o change heir relation.


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68 Part I: Practrce

I Participation and, effication ransform heir relation; they d,o nottranslate nto each other.

A dichotomy ends o suggest hat there must be a process by whichone can move rom one to the other by translatio n nto a different butequivalent tate. We can ran sform acit knowledge nto explicit knowl-edge or vice versa; we can formalize a learning process; we can shareour thoughts; we can make our e motions more conscious. y contrast,a change n the relations of participation and reification s never neu-tral; it alwa ys ransforms he possibilities or negotiating meaning.

. Participation s never simply he realization f a description or a pre-scription. Participating n an activity that has been described s notiust translating he description nto embodied experience, but re-negotiating ts meaning n a new context.

. Reification s not a mere articulation of something hat already exists.Writing down a statement of values, expressing n idea, painting apicture, recounting an event, articulating an emotion, or bui lding atool is not merely giving expression o existing meanings, ut in factcreating he conditions or new meanings.

As a consequence, uch processes s making something explicit, for-malizing, or sharing are not merely ranslations; hey are ndeed rans-formations the production of a new context of both participation andreification, n which the relations between he tacit and the explicit,the formal and he nformal, he ndividual and he collective, re o berenegotiated.

I Participation and reffication d,escribe n interplay; they are notc assificat ry categories.

There is a fundamental difference etween using a distinction o clas-sify things e.9., meanings, houghts, knowledge, earning) as one poleor the other and using a distinction o describe an nherent nterplay.

In a duality, what is of interest s understanding he interplay, notclassifying. he dual ity of participation and reification s not a classi-ficatory scheme. t does not classify meanings, houghts, knowledge,or learning as tacit or explicit, formal or informal, conscious r un-conscious, ndividual or collecti ve. Rather, t provides a framework oanalyze he various ways n which they are always both at once.

Traditional dichotomies are useful distinctions when they are usedto highlight an aspect f a process hat has not received enough atten-tion. But when t comes o issues ike meaning, nowing, or lcarning,


dichotomies annot provide clean classificatory ategories ecause heyfocus on surface eatures ather han on fundamental rocesses. or in-stance, he contrast between explicit and acit knowledge s quite usefulbecause t is important to recognize he existence f aspects f knowl-edge hat we cannot easily articulate; hence, being able o tellandbeingable o do are not equivalent.

Classifying nowledge as explicit or tacit runs nro difficulties, how-ever, because oth aspects re always present o some degree. For ex-ample, people who know how to ride a bicycle often cannot

articulatehow they keep heir balance. n particular, hey cannot say which waythey steer n order to avoid falling, even hough they do it right.ro Toclassify iding a bicycle as aci t knowledge s tricky because eople arenot exactly peechless bout he process. hey can ell you, or instance,that you must pedal and steer, hold the bar, and not wiggle oo much orsit backward unless you're a pro. Classifying nowledge hen becomesa matter of deciding what counrs as explicit, and that depends on rheenterprise we are nvolved n.

Walking s a very embodied knowledge, but if someone ells me rowalk, can do it. Requiring only this yields a good enough elation be-tween he explicit and the tacit for cerrain purposes, hough probablynot good enough or an orthopedist who needs o know which musclesI use o keep my balance nd move my legs but that is a different en-terprise altogether. Conversely, 'd bet that physicists, whose knowl-edge many of us would consider very explicit, would have as hard atime articulating exactly how they make sense f concepts uch as orceand space-time as we have explaining how we ride a bicycle. When itcomes o meaningful knowing n the context of any enterprise, he ex-plicit must always top somewhere. t is always possible o find aspecsthat are not explicit, and this is exactly what a duality of participationand reification would predict: we produce precisely he reification weneed n order to proceed with the practices n which we parricipate.

The duality of participation and eification s more undamental hanour ability o put things n words, create ormalisms, rticulate our feel-ings, or share our thoughts. t i s therefore mportant not to reduce par-ticipation and reification o any of the dichotomies have mentioned.

. For instance, articipation s not just tacit, nformal, or unconscious,because ur participation ncludes actions ike having a conversation,teaching a formalized curriculum, or reflecting on our motives.

. Reification s not just explicit, because here are many ways of rei-fying thrrt rc not simply putting hings nto words. A painting, or


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70 Part I: Practice

instance, eifies a perception of the world, an understanding. t is anexpression hat makes a statement nd focuses ur attention n spe-cific ways. But it is difficult to say whether his expression s explicitor tacit. Similarly, building a tool or systematically gnoring peopleto let them know they are outsiders re acts ofreification hat cannoteasily be classified s acit or explicit.

. Neither participation nor reification an be easily hought of in termsof contrasts f individual versus collective, or private versus public.Participation s clearly a social process, ut it is also a personal xpe-rience. Reification allows us to coordinate our actions and is there-fore of a collective character, ut it shapes ur own perceptions ofthe world and ourselves.

. Reification an be public to the extent har it produces angible ob-jects, but participation can also be public ro the extent rhat our ac-tions are observable. oreover, he effects f both on our experienceare not so visible or easily classified s public or private.

Finally, he duality of participation nd eification s not ust a distinc-tion between people and things. It is true that participation s some-thing we do as persons, nd reification has o do with objects. But theduality of participation and reification suggests recisely

hat, n rermsof meaning, people and things cannot be defined independently ofeach other.

. On the one hand, we experience he world as we make t amenableto our practices. remember being awed by the complex system ofdistinctions and nuances hat wine tasters have developed o de-scribe what to most people s merely a better or worse glass f wine.

. On the other hand, our sense f ourselves ncludes he objects withwhich we identify because hey furnish our practices. Mastering hewine-tasting ocabulary nd being able o appreciate nd discuss llthe nuances f a good wine can become a source of distinction, pride,

and dentity.What t means o be a person and what t means o be a thing both n-

volve an interplay of participation and reification. From this perspec-tive, people and hings do not have o be posited as a point ofdeparture.They need not be assumed s given o start with. It is engagement nsocial practice hat provides he baseline. Through the negotiation ofmeaning, t is the interplay of participation and reification hat makespeople and hings what they are.

Chapter : Meaning

In this interplay, our experience and our world shape each otherthrough a reciprocal el ation that goes o the very essence f who weare. The world as we shape t, and our experience s he world shapesit, are ike the mountain and he river. They shape ach other, but t heyhave heir own shape. They are reflections feach other, but they havetheir own existence, n their own realms. They fit around each other,but they remain distinct from each other. They c annot be transformedinto each other, yet they transform each other. The river only carvesand the mountain only guides, yet in their interaction , he carving be-comes he guiding and the guiding becomes he carving.

7 l

wenger, ch1: meaning, pp51-71

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