Western Sahara Conflict Impedes Maghrib UnityAuthor(s): Yahia ZoubirSource: Middle East Report, No. 163, North Africa Faces the 1990's (Mar. - Apr., 1990), pp. 28-29Published by: Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP)Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3012555 .

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Western Sahara Conflict

Impedes Maghrib Unity

Yahia Zoubir

Brian Young

Yahia Zoubir is assistant professor in the Washing? ton Semester Program of The American University.

In early 1989, the movement toward

Maghribi integration, coupled with signs of a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Western Sahara, generated a great deal of optimism. The reality a year later is far less rosy. The major factor is Morocco's procrastination in moving forward with the UN peace plan which it, along with the Sahrawi inde? pendence movement, Polisario, agreed to in August 1988.

Throughout the 1980s, Algeria took the leading role in bringing together the Maghribi states to form a Maghrib Union. Algeria and Morocco agreed to renew diplomatic relations on May 16, 1988; their joint communique spoke of a "just and definitive solution to the Western Sahara conflict through a free and regular referendum for self-deter? mination held without any constraints whatsoever and with utmost sincer? ity."1 The Saudis, who until then had provided about $1 billion a year to help Morocco wage its war against the Polisario and their Sahrawi Arab Dem-

28

ocratic Republic (SADR), seemed eager to help bring an end to the conflict. King Hassan's offer of Sahrawi auton? omy if they decided to remain part of Morocco represented a potentially ac? ceptable formula to all parties. Al? though the king made it clear that he opposed Sahrawi independence, he did agree to UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar's peace plan in August 1988, which included the modalities for a cease-fire and a referendum on self- determination.

The Polisario, for its part, reduced its military activities and made conces? sions regarding the list of voters (based on the 1974 Spanish census). Polisario also agreed to a vote on either indepen? dence or integration with Morocco, de? spite the fact that in 1975 the Interna? tional Court of Justice found no basis for Morocco's claim to sovereignty over Western Sahara.

Due mainly to pressures from Alge? ria, France and Saudi Arabia, King Hassan met with Polisario represen? tatives on January 4 and 5, 1989. He argued shortly thereafter that he had met with "Moroccan subjects." Polisario, despite this provocation and the SADR's absence from Maghrib unity talks, declared a unilateral cease? fire which it observed until September 24.

Once the Arab Maghrib Union was proclaimed in mid-February 1989, though, King Hassan made a volte-face on the Sahara issue. In Morocco, the king has made it clear that he had no intention of relinquishing the Western Sahara, despite his international com? mitment to a referendum. He has made "repossession of the provinces" a mobi? lizing call. At the Maghrib level, King Hassan tried to use regional integration to wean Algeria away from the SADR, and to present the SADR as an impedi? ment to Maghrib unity. By agreeing to the UN peace plan, the king reduced Morocco's international isolation and prevented further recognition of the SADR by other nations.2 He has tried to solidify his US support by offering to base NATO's F16s in Morocco after their removal from Spain and agreeing to allow US and NATO low-level flight exercises?now restricted in Ger? many?on Moroccan soil.

Middle East Report ? March-April 1990

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Why, at a time when many Third World regional conflicts have experi? enced substantial progress toward reso? lution, has the conflict in Western Sa? hara taken a turn for the worse? The

key factor is Moroccan domestic poli? tics. King Hassan skillfully made it a question upon which to test "national" resolve and distract attention from po? litical and socioeconomic dilemmas. Hassan had hoped that the sharp rise in

phosphate prices in 1974?Western Sa? hara is a territory extremely rich in

phosphates and other minerals?would solve the country's economic problems. But prices fell sharply in 1975-76 and

again in 1981-82, leaving Morocco no means of repaying its heavy borrowing in the international financial market. The Western Sahara war has absorbed considerable resources, despite assis? tance from the US, France and conser? vative Arab regimes. In September 1989, in compliance with International Monetary Fund demands, the govern? ment abolished food subsidies as a first

stage of financial restructuring. Prices for bread and other basic foods have recently gone up 6 to 10 percent. The

palace attributes the austerity measures to the Sahara war.

Along with military spending, Mo? rocco has pursued another policy to

pacify the Sahara. Beginning in 1976, King Hassan designated Western Sa? hara a special development zone, in?

vesting billions of dollars in El Ayoun and Smara. Construction of an interna? tional airport, a 35,000-seat stadium, an ultra-modern hotel, a hospital, a long highway (Tan Tan-Layoune-Dakhla) and two coastal ports (Layoune and

Boujdour), were made possible through "national solidarity taxes." Further? more, Moroccan settlers got very at? tractive incentives, such as double

wages, tax exemptions and subsidized

housing. Sahrawis get high-paying ad? ministrative positions to keep them

away from politics, and often to induce them to relocate in the north.

One of the more spectacular exam?

ples is that of Omar Hadrami, director of military security for Polisario until

1988. Hadrami defected to Morocco in

August 1989 after disputes with his comrades led to his demotion in Polisario. His decision was reportedly induced by Moroccan offers of large sums of money. On January 19,1990, he was offered a high-level post in the Moroccan interior ministry. Hadrami's

testimony became the centerpiece of a

costly Moroccan effort to influence in? ternational opinion, including an 8-

page, $1 million advertising supplement in Time magazine in November and December 1989.

These efforts have not been entirely successful. Moroccans are increasingly upset with these expenditures. More

importantly, Sahrawi "hearts and minds" have not been won. Sahrawi nationalism remains intact. And the

king's policy has made holding a ref? erendum more difficult. Losing the Sa? hara through a referendum could cost

King Hassan his throne. Before his trip to Spain in September

1989, the king declared that "there is

nothing to negotiate [with Polisario] because Western Sahara is Moroccan

territory."3 Polisario's response came in the form of a devastating attack against Moroccan forces in Western Sahara, beginning a series of military incursions

against the fortified walls. Not only were these attacks a rebuke to those who claimed that Polisario was no

longer a credible force, but they also demonstrated Algeria's tacit approval. Their message was quite clear: either the Western Sahara conflict is resolved in a fair manner or the idea of a united

Maghrib is doomed. What is puzzling is that King Hassan

is quite aware of what is at stake. Why is he willing to sacrifice Maghribi inte?

gration?perhaps the best guarantee for the survival of the monarchy?for this inflated Moroccan nationalism? The

king's daring moves are partly the result of the contradictory signals he receives from his international friends who, while encouraging him to find a peace? ful solution, continue to provide him with the weapons and money to con? tinue the war. ?

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Footnotes

1 New York Times, May 17, 1988. Morocco had broken relations in March 1976 following Algeria's recognition of the SADR.

2 To date, 74 countries have officially recognized the SADR.

3 ABC (Spain), September 24, 1989.

Middle East Report ? March-April 1990 29

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