The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 11 | Issue 27 | Number 2 | Article ID 4146 | Jul 02, 2013

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What Role for Nuclear Power in Japan’s Future? 日本の未来、原発はいかなる役割を担うべき

Christopher Hobson

Japan is still struggling to deal with the hugelycomplex ramifications of the nuclear accidentat Fukushima Dai-ichi. While there is often ahope that disasters may act as a major catalyst,following 3/11 it appears that there has beenmore continuity than change in Japanesepolitics.1 Hymans has identified a similar stateof affairs, noting that debate about nuclearpower has ‘gone around in circles’ with Japanfailing to reach ‘a coherent long-term nuclearpolicy response.’2 Yet the very serious political,economic and technical challenges that haveemerged following the fateful events of 11March 2011 are slowly forcing Japan to come toterms with the role nuclear energy might playin its future.

The considerable social impact of the nuclearaccident has been widely reported.3 Here thefocus is on its consequences for energy policyin Japan. Whereas much of the debateconcerning Japanese nuclear power hascentred on the question of closure versusresumption, this article considers the changingcharacter of the debate in light of changes inthe nuclear industry and the new regulatoryregime that could result in partial resumptionof a number of nuclear power plants in thecoming years.

The most immediate task, however, remainsdecommissioning the Fukushima Dai-ichi plant,which will be a lengthy, costly and extremelydifficult process. Indeed, the full scope of whatneeds to be done remains unknown ‘becausenobody has yet examined many of the mostimportant parts of the wreckage.’4 The many

problems that have beset TEPCO’s efforts tomanage the plant have been widely reportedand do not need repeating here.5 Yet progressis slowly being made. In particular, given theconsiderable concern with TEPCO’s handling ofthe fuel rods in Unit 4, it is important to notethat as of 30 June 2014, 1,188 of the 1533 fuelrods have been removed without incident.6

Successfully removing all of the fuel from Unit4 will be a significant step forward in thedecommissioning process, but unfortunatelymay prove to be comparatively easy comparedto what lies ahead in Units 1- 3.

As a result of the Fukushima accident thesafety of nuclear power in hazard-prone Japanhas been seriously called into question. TheNuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) hasdeveloped a tough new regulatory regime inorder to minimise the risks of a similar accidentreoccurring. If strictly enforced, these newstandards are likely to significantly refashionthe role of nuclear energy in this country.According to a recent study undertaken byReuters, of Japan’s 54 nuclear reactors, the 6 atDai-ichi will be decommissioned, 14 willprobably restart at some stage, the future of 17is uncertain, and 17 others will likely never beused again.7 Not only would such an outcomepose significant economic and technologicalproblems for the nuclear industry, it raisesdoubts about whether nuclear energy can stillplay a major role in Japan’s future. In thisregard, Andrew Dewit recently surmised that,‘part of the reason nuclear appears not likely torecover its status as base-load power are theNRA’s new safety rules, in tandem withmaintenance schedules and other factors thatmake a very shrunken fleet unreliable. Another

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large reason for this likely outcome is, ofcourse, the stubborn opposition to nuclearpower.’8

Strengthening the safety culture of Japan’snuclear industry

When considering the changes required forreactors to be considered safe and eligible forbeing restarted, there has been a tendency tofocus on the technical adjustments required:bigger seawalls, backup generators in higherlocations, venting systems, renovatedemergency control rooms and so on. Japan’sutilities have already spent 2.2 trillion yen onadopting new nuclear safety measures inresponse to the accident at Fukushima Dai-ichi.9 Without downplaying these investments,it was notable that at a recent forum with theNRA’s international advisors, all stressed theimportance of changes required in the humandimensions of nuclear power.10 They stronglyemphasized the necessity of further developingand prioritizing a safety culture within theJapanese nuclear industry. Dr RichardMeserve, former Chairman of the U.S. NuclearRegulatory Commission, observed that all thedifferent investigations into the Fukushimaaccident pointed to failures of safety culture asa central factor. It is much easier to spendmoney on technological solutions than to makefundamental changes in human systems, butthis is ultimately what is needed in order fornuclear power to be safe in Japan. Indeed,there is a risk that relying excessively ontechnological fixes could give rise to a new‘nuclear safety myth’.

For those advocating Japan’s return to nuclearpower, a more robust safety culture isimportant not only for reducing the possibilityof any further major accidents, but also forhelping to restore public trust. The ‘nuclearsafety myth’ has been destroyed, along withpeople’s confidence in the government, TEPCOand the so-called ‘nuclear village’. For thoseseeking a return to nuclear, rebuilding this

broken trust is one of the most immediate anddifficult challenges following the Fukushimaaccident. But this is not simply about reactorrestarts. It also has a serious impact on therecovery process. For example, regardless ofactual radiation levels in decontaminated areas,many people do not believe what they are beingtold about safety, particularly for children. It ishard to argue that such a response is irrational,given the massive shortcomings with the waythe evacuation, relocation, compensation anddecontamination processes have beenundertaken and communicated.

Dr Mike Weightman, former UK Chief Inspectorof Nuclear Installations and Chief Executive ofthe Office for Nuclear Regulation, observedthat trust could only be rebuilt in a slow andincremental fashion through the nuclearindustry repeatedly and consistentlyprioritizing safety, behaving in an open mannerand presenting information in ways easilyunderstandable to the general public. Inparticular, he strongly argued for the need forall actors involved – the government, theregulator, the utilities – to be as transparent aspossible. Dr Meserve concurred, noting thatkeeping things behind closed doors only stokesfears and concerns. This echoed the findings ofthe Kurokawa report, which argued that thelack of transparency was an important factorthat led to the accident, identifying ‘a cozyrelationship between the operators, theregulators and academic scholars that can onlybe described as totally inappropriate’.11 Makingthese changes may be easier said than done.

The Challenges of Change

There are significant challenges to successfullyinstituting the safety culture and transparencythat has been identified as necessary fornuclear energy to operate in Japan in a waythat the public can feel is safe. In particular,the NRA’s international advisors stronglyemphasized the need to create a workplaceculture in which staff can provide critical, open

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feedback and air alternative opinions. Even ifone does not completely accept KiyoshiKurokawa’s conclusion that the ‘fundamentalcauses’ of the Fukushima accident ‘are to befound in the ingrained conventions of Japaneseculture’,12 one may still question how quicklysuch a direct approach could be developed inthe context of a Japanese workplace. In thisregard, Jeff Kingston has observed that, ‘inJapan, promoting transparency is a work inprogress because it challenges entrenchedgovernment practices and inclinations.’13 Theproblem, of course, is not limited to Japan.

The Onagawa Nuclear Power Plant

Looking beyond Fukushima, there are signsthat it is possible to build a more safety-conscious culture within the Japanese nuclearindustry. In this regard, it is worth recalling theexperience of the Onagawa nuclear plant, theproverbial dog that did not bark. As one studynotes, Fukushima Dai-ichi and Onagawa‘shared similar disaster conditions, nuclearreactor types, dates of operation, and anidentical regulatory regime. Yet their fateswere very different. The Fukushima Dai-ichiplant experienced fatal meltdowns andradiation releases. … Onagawa managed toremain generally intact, despite its proximity tothe epicenter of the enormous earthquake’.14 A

key factor identified in explaining thesedrastically different outcomes is that theTohoku Electric Power Company had a strongersafety culture than TEPCO, especially when theplants were first being built.

The experience of the Onagawa plant suggeststhat there is nothing unique to Japanese societypreventing development of a more robustsafety culture. While the utilities may now bebuilding higher sea walls and installing newventilation systems, there is less evidence thatthese technological renovations are beingmatched by the necessary institutionalchanges. The Hatamura report criticisedTEPCO for being insufficiently concerned with‘clarifying the causes behind the accident andthereby contributing to the prevention of therecurrence of a similar accident.’15 This attitudehas been further reflected in the rathergrudging and incomplete manner in which theutilities have engaged in the screening processfor reactor restarts. This has resulted in strongNRA criticisms of the quality of safety checkapplications, many of them incomplete andlacking important information.16 Rather thanaccepting the need for more thoroughapplications, ‘nuclear power plant operatorsand government officials have largely blamedNRA Commissioner Shimazaki Kunihiko for thedelay in giving the green light for theresumption of reactor operations’,17 whichappears to account for the recent end of histenure at the NRA. More troubling evidencecan be found in the lack of progress indeveloping realistic evacuation plans in areaswhere there are reactors applying for restarts,despite this clearly being identified as a majorarea in need of improvement after theFukushima accident.18 Certainly institutionalchange is something that occurs gradually, butgiven how central human failings were to theFukushima accident, there are valid concernsthat pushing ahead with reactor restarts whilefocusing mainly on instrumental andtechnological fixes will leave Japan vulnerableto future accidents.

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A further challenge to instituting a more robustsafety culture is that the economics point in adifferent direction. The utilities are losing hugeamounts of money while the reactors stayoffline, retrofitting the reactors is proving to bevery expensive, and this is not even consideringa l l t h e c o s t s t h a t w i l l c o m e f r o mdecommissioning plants that do not meet thenew standards. Given the way these companiesare haemorrhaging money, it is not surprisingthat they are primarily concerned with gettingthe reactors operating again. They are veryunlikely to go ‘above and beyond’ when itcomes to safety. Furthermore, Ramseyer hasargued that the government has created aperverse set of incentives for utilities not toinvest extensively in safety, because if anaccident of a similar or greater magnitude toFukushima does happen, governmentintervention is unavoidable.19 As Kenji Kushidanotes, ‘if nuclear operators are too big tofail—since nuclear problems tend to get worsewith time if not properly managed—they maynot undertake sufficient safety measures.’20

Considering that TEPCO is primari lyresponsible for the second worst nuclearaccident in history, it has actually gotten offvery lightly, avoiding closure or any criminalprosecutions. Much like the 2008 financialcrisis, the intervention of the government mayhave created a major moral hazard goingforward.

Tepco subcontract workers

A related issue lies in the deeply problematicsub-contracting system on which the Japanesenuclear industry depends. The vast majority ofworkers are employed by other organisations,sometimes at five or six removes from theactual plant operator. In 2010, 89 percent ofDai-ichi workers were contract workers, almostexactly the same as the industry as a whole, inwhich 88 percent of the approximately 83,000nuclear workers in Japan were contractors.21

This pattern has cont inued with thedecommissioning of Fukushima Dai-ichi, whichis now being undertaken by a workforce ofabout 900 TEPCO employees and a further5,000 contractors.22 Through this complexsystem of sub-contracting, workers receivelower wages and are deprived of importantrights. There is a clear hierarchy, withemployees o f the energy companiesundertaking the safest duties, while those atthe bottom of the sub-contracting chain arelittle more than ‘radiation fodder’, generallytaking up the most dangerous tasks andreceiving the least training and protection.23

The socio-economically weak positioning ofthese workers leaves them with fewalternatives, hence the provocative descriptionof the subcontracting system as effectively aform of ‘nuclear servitude’.24

The nuclear industry in Japan is predicated onthe subcontracting system.25 In addition to thebasic problems of relying on such exploitativelabour relations, the sub-contracting system issimply not conducive to developing the safetyculture that would be essential for the safeoperation of nuclear reactors in Japan. Throughthis complex system of sub-contracting,accountability is diffused, while training andprotection are limited. Such practices shouldbe of considerable concern, especially in lightof recent revelations that around 90% of theworkers at Dai-ichi defied orders and fled theplant during a critical stage of the disaster.26

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Problems at the plant have continued well afterthe crisis ended. There have been persistentreports of serious problems with workingconditions, with complaints about ‘working inthe stifling protective gear, the relatively lowpay, loneliness - and stress’.27 These issues aresignificant not only because the wellbeing ofthese people matters, but also because they areengaged in vital work. Exhaustion or stresscould lead to human error, misconduct or evensabotage. There have been instances ofcontaminated water leaking due to mistakesmade by workers, leading one former employeeto warn that similar problems may reoccur‘unless the working environment and workingconditions improve’.28 In this regard, it is amatter of concern that a government officialinvo lved in the management o f thecontaminated water at Dai-ichi has recentlyobserved that working conditions at the plantare ‘no better’.29 The on-going problems at Dai-ichi do not inspire much confidence thatTEPCO or any of the other utilities will fosterthe kind of workplace in which safety culture isprioritized.

Fuel roads at Fukushima Dai-ichi No. 4 plant

While there has been limited evidence ofinstitutional change in the nuclear industry,there have been more positive developments onthe regulatory side. It appears that the NRAhas genuinely been trying to assert itsneutrality and institute a ‘safety first’ culture. It

has been given a particularly difficult mandate:on the one hand, it must convince the nuclearindustry of the need to drastically upgradesafety standards, and on the other, it has topersuade a sceptical public that they aregenuinely independent. This is made morechallenging by the limited resources available.The NRA currently has only approximately1,000 staff, which has led Jeff Kingston toquestion whether it has sufficient humanresources ‘to oversee strict enforcement of newsafety guidelines and institutionalize a cultureof safety’.30 To date, there are indications thatthe NRA has maintained its independence andwithstood increasing political pressure for fast-tracking nuclear restarts. The recentappointment of Professor Tanaka Satoru as anew NRA commissioner, however, has causedconsiderable apprehension due to his strongties to the ‘nuclear village’.31 There are alsoconcerns that this may portend further politicalintervention in nuclear regulation by Abe andhis administration. Tanaka and his colleaguesat the NRA will have to try to dispel thesedoubts by clearly prioritizing the public interestand withstanding political pressure.

Improving transparency is another area wherethere is considerable work to be done. Thegovernment’s reticence to release the 772interviews undertaken as part of theInvestigation Committee on the Accident at theFukushima Nuclear Power Station is the latestin a long list of cases in which the authoritieshave sought to withhold information related tothe accident.32 More generally, the Abeadministration has tried to stifle debate and theairing of alternative opinions. Late last year theLDP rammed the ‘Specially Designated SecretsProtection Law’ through the Diet with littlediscussion, raising fears about its impact onfreedom of the press and the right to freespeech. Reflecting on problems with the law,Lawrence Repeta notes that, ‘many Japanesecritics say that Japan’s most pressing need ismore transparency, not greater secrecypower.’33 The Abe’s cabinet’s reinterpretation

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of Article 9 of the constitution on 1 July 2014proceeded in a similar fashion, with littledebate or regard for public opinion. Not only dosuch developments pose serious threats toJapanese democracy, they are the exactopposite of what is necessary for promoting thesafe use of nuclear energy.

A related challenge for the NRA, as well as thegovernment and the nuclear industry, is toimprove communication with the public. This isnot only about improving disclosure, but alsoconcerns how this information is shared withthe public. There is still a tendency for TEPCOto release raw data or information in an overlytechnical format that is difficult for non-expertsto decode. Such an approach attempts toreinforce ‘a hierarchy of information authoritythat delegitimizes citizens’ knowledge,opinions, and concerns, and instead legitimizesthe voices of “insiders” in state agencies,scientific and technological institutions, andindustry.’34 Yet with the discrediting of nuclearexperts following the Fukushima Dai-ichiaccident, many people do not know who orwhat to trust. The result is problems withmisinformation, rumours, confusion anddifficulty in differentiating among levels of risk.The resulting situation is taking its toll, withpeople suffering from ‘fear and depression,resulting from both well-intentioned andpolitically motivated ignorance on radiationdoses and effects following the accident.’35

These feelings are reinforced by the lack ofgood will shown by TEPCO, which hasconstantly sought to shift responsibility andlimit its liability for the consequences of thedisaster. The most recent example of suchbehaviour is TEPCO’s rejection of a proposal bythe Nuclear Damage Compensation DisputeResolution Centre to increase compensationpayments for psychological damage suffered bypeople from Namie. TEPCO and the rest of thenuclear industry need to significantly improvethe way they interact and communicate withthe public, and especially with those directlyimpacted by the Fukushima accident.

The ‘nuclear village’ still has much work to doin responding to people’s valid concerns aboutthe potential political, economic, social andenvironmental costs of nuclear power after theFukushima accident. I have argued elsewherethat TEPCO being more open about theprob lems they are encounter ing indecommissioning Fukushima Dai-ichi isperhaps the only way that it might rebuild somedegree of trust with the public. 3 6 Thisobservation is relevant to the whole nuclearindustry in Japan. To date there has beenlimited evidence that the utilities haveundertaken the kind of institutional learningnecessary for rebuilding trust and developing astronger safety culture.

Breaking the Impasse

‘The nuclear village’s pre-3.11 paradigmappears to be history’,37 but it remains unclearwhat exactly will replace it. Despite pollsconsistently showing that a clear majority inJapan opposes nuclear power, this sentimenthas not greatly influenced political outcomes:the pro-nuclear LDP is now firmly back incontrol of Japanese politics, with anti-nuclearcandidates failing to perform strongly in recentelections. As such, it is hard to determineexactly what role anti-nuclear sentiment willplay in shaping the future of Japan’s energypolicies. It is unlikely to be sufficiently strongto prevent a series of restarts in the near tomedium future. Abe may be hoping that theseinitial restarts will create momentum backtowards nuclear power,38 but it is more difficultto determine the fate of the many reactors thatremain a long way from matching the NRA’sregulatory standards.

The lack of public support is certainly not adeterrent against Abe continuing to advancehis pro-nuclear agenda. Abe and his supportershave repeatedly indicated that they are notparticularly interested in debating policychoices, as long as they maintain a rulingmajority. They have been pushing Japan back to

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nuclear power, while doing little to respond tothe understandable concerns of a scepticalmajority.39 Yet there are limits on how muchthis approach can achieve, especially once theeasier restarts have been accomplished. In thisregard, Aldrich has argued that local politicswill be more determinative in shaping thefuture of nuclear power in Japan. In particularhe observes a sharp division between differentcommunities near nuclear plants:

The perspectives of direct andneighboring host communityleaders on this issue are stronglypolarized; those representativesfrom communities which havebenefited most strongly continueto support nuclear power and haveyet to speak out against it. Thosehailing from communities whichface externalities but have fewerbenefits have rallied against thetechnology.40

One example of this is Hakodate citygovernment’s lawsuit to halt the constructionof the Oma nuclear power plant, which islocated less than 30 kilometres away across theTsugaru Strait.41 In another recent case, theFukui District Court ruled to prohibit therestart of two reactors at Oi nuclear powerplant due to safety concerns.42 These actionsand rulings will make it more difficult for Abeto repeat the kind of strong-arm tactics that hehas used to force through the new secrecy lawand reinterpretation of the constitution.Attempting to significantly interfere in theindependence of the NRA or undermine thenew regulatory regime may be sufficient foranti-nuclear sentiment to become politicallyrelevant.

Given the on-going impacts of the Fukushimaaccident, it is understandable that supportersof nuclear energy emphasize the considerablesafety upgrades and the tough new regulatory

regime, which are meant to prevent anotherdisaster. But as Japan painfully discoveredwhen the ‘nuclear safety myth’ was shattered,it is impossible for nuclear power – or indeedany energy source – to be 100% risk free. Thisis still the case and one should not downplaythe huge social costs of the Fukushimadisaster, which has left more than 130,000people in limbo unsure when – if ever – theywill be able to return to their homes. If nuclearpower is to be used again in Japan, there willbe risks. Yet there are risks that come with allenergy sources. Indeed, prominent climatescientist James Hansen has recently co-authored a paper that argued ‘global nuclearpower has prevented about 1.84 million airpollution-related deaths and 64 gigatonnes (Gt)CO2-equivalent greenhouse gas (GHG)emissions that would have resulted from fossilfuel burning’.43

Such arguments are relevant, given that infiscal 2013 88% of Japan’s energy consumptiondepended on fossil fuels, which had asignificant impact on the country’s trade deficitand its carbon emissions.44 Considering thesedifficult realities, it is important to be openabout the real and potential dangers of nuclearpower, and also to consider them in comparisonto the costs and benefits that come from otherenergy sources.

Looking towards the future, compromise anddialogue on all sides is needed. Amongst thoseseeking an end to nuclear power in Japan, thereis sometimes an unhelpful tendency to revert toemotional hyperbole, such as warning that afurther accident at Fukushima ‘would destroythe world environment and our civilization’.45

The more persuasive arguments againstnuclear energy are the ones that avoidcaricaturing it as some kind of nefarious evil.Those seeking a different energy future forJapan have raised important and validquestions about the storage of nuclear waste,the hidden costs involved with nuclear power,and the very real dangers posed by future

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natural disasters. Scholars such as AndrewDeWit, and entrepreneurs such as SonMasayoshi, have provided compellingarguments that Japan could benefit greatly byinvesting more heavily in renewables andenergy efficiency.46 In this regard, Abe’s limitedinterest in renewable energies is rathershortsighted.47 Even supporters of nuclearpower should recognize the value of enhancingJapan’s under-developed renewable energiessector, thereby creating a more well-roundedenergy portfolio for the country.

What Japan needs is a more sophisticateddiscussion about what kind of risks the countryis willing to tolerate, and what role nuclearpower should play – i f any – given thedisastrous consequences of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear accident. On this point, Japan canlearn from the German decision to embark onan ‘energy revolution’ (Energiewende).Chancellor Angela Merkel created an EthicsCommission on Safe Energy Supply, composedof a cross section of German society withrepresentatives from politics, industry,academia and religion. They collectivelyreflected on what was best for the country andits future, and then reached a unanimous set ofrecommendations. This process built on apublic debate dating back to the Chernobylaccident, and ultimately helped to generate astrong societal consensus behind the decisionto abandon nuclear power and prioritizeinvestment and policies to promote renewableenergy. Public backing for Energiewende isespecially important as it now faces significantchallenges, most notably the increase of energycosts.48

The issues that Japan must consider aredifferent, but no less difficult, and areconnected to its history, its economic situation,its lack of resources, its vulnerability to naturalhazards, the experience of Fukushima, and thedemands of a changing climate. There is noeasy solution to Japan’s energy dilemma, sodifferent options should be openly and

responsibly debated. Collectively the countrymust assess the pros and cons not only ofnuclear power, but all other relevant energysources. In doing so, it is important toremember that risk-free energy is not possible,and that cost considerations—in financialterms, in safety terms, and in terms ofgreenhouse gas emissions—are important.

The approach Abe is presently pursuing issetting Japan on course for an unproductiveand suboptimal middle ground, in which it isexposed to the potential risks that follow fromoperating nuclear reactors in a countryvulnerable to multiple natural hazards(earthquakes, tsunamis, volcanoes, typhoons),while receiving limited benefit, given that it ispredicted that nuclear power may constituteless than 10% of Japan’s energy supply.49 Inlight of this situation, Hymans has predictedthat ‘the coming nuclear restarts… can beexpected to be highly inconsistent andpoliticized, and to routinely violate economicand technical rationality.’50

The direction Japan is headed – essentiallycutting the baby in half – will solve neither theeconomic nor environmental challenges Japanfaces in securing its energy supply, nor will itsatisfy the anti-nuclear majority or pro-nuclearbusiness groups. Rather than continuing histroubling moves to supress debate, Abe needsto use his position of strength to foster an openand inclusive discussion about Japan’s futureand what role nuclear energy should play in it.Unfortunately there are few signs that Abe iswilling to do so.

Christopher Hobson is Assistant Professor,School of Political Science and Economics,Waseda University and Visiting ResearchFellow, United Nations University. He is thecoeditor with Paul Bacon and Robin Cameronof Human Security and Natural Disasters(Routledge 2014), and coeditor with Paul Baconof Human Security and Japan’s Triple Disaster(Routledge 2014). These books will be launched

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at an event at the United Nations University on2 9 J u l y 2 0 1 4 .(http://unu.edu/events/upcoming/book-launch-hu m a n - s e c u r i t y - a n d - j a p a n s - t r i p l e -disaster.html#overview)You can follow him onTwitter at @hobson_c

Recommended citation: Christopher Hobson,"What Role for Nuclear Power in Japan’sFuture?", The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 11,Issue 27, No. 2, July 7, 2014.

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Notes

1 Richard J. Samuels, 3.11: Disaster and Changein Japan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,2013).

2 Jacques Hymans, “Veto Players and JapaneseNuclear Policy after Fukushima,” in PossibleFutures for Japan (NYU Press, forthcoming).

3 Mark Willacy, Fukushima (MacmillanAustralia, 2013).

4 Matthew L. Wald, “Assessing FukushimaDamage Without Eyes on the Inside,”(http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/world/asia/measuring-damage-at-fukushima-without-eyes-on-the-inside.html) The New York Times,June 17, 2014.

5 Andrew DeWit and Christopher Hobson, “Abeat Ground Zero: The Consequences of Inactiona t F u k u s h i m a D a i i c h i , ”(https://apjjf.org/site/view/3991) The Asia-Pacific Journal 11, no. 35 (September 2, 2013).

6 TEPCO, “Decommissioning Plan of FukushimaD a i i c h i N u c l e a r P o w e r , ”(http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/decommision/index-e.html) accessed June 25, 2014.

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7 Mari Saito, Aaron Sheldrick, and KentaroHamada, “Japan May Only Be Able to RestartOne-Third of I ts Nuclear Reactors ,”(http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/01/us-ja p a n - n u c l e a r - r e s t a r t s - i n s i g h t -idUSBREA3020020140401) Reuters, April 1,2014.

8 Andrew DeWit, “Japan’s Energy PolicyI m p a s s e , ”(https://apjjf.org/-Andrew-DeWit/4102) TheAsia-Pacific Journal 12, no. 14, accessed June25, 2014.

9 “Nuclear Safety Expenditures Top ¥2T r i l l i o n , ”(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/07/05/national/nuclear-safety-expenditures-top-%C2%A52-trillion/) The Japan Times Online,July 5, 2014.

1 0 On 11 June 2014 the United NationsUniversity hosted a closed expert meeting withNRA Commissioner Oshima Kenzo and theNRA’s three international advisors: Dr RichardMeserve (USA), Dr Mike Weightman (UK), andMr. André-Claude Lacoste (France). A video ofthis meeting will be available soon. For as u m m a r y , s e e h e r e(http://fgc.unu.edu/en/news/experts-emphasize-fostering-a-safety-culture-in-the-nuclear-energy-industry.html).

1 1 The Fukushima Nuclear Acc identIndependent Investigation Commission, TheOfficial Report of The Fukushima NuclearAccident Independent Invest igat ionC o m m i s s i o n(https://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf) (The National Diet of Japan, 2012).

12 Kiyoshi Kurokawa, “Message from theC h a i r m a n , ”(https://www.nirs.org/fukushima/naiic_report.pdf) in The Official Report of The FukushimaNuclear Accident Independent InvestigationCommission (The National Diet of Japan, 2012).

13 Jeff Kingston, “Abe Promotes Secrecy,S ide l in ing Transparency and OpenG o v e r n m e n t , ”(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2013/10/05/commentary/abe-promotes-secrecy-sidelining-transparency-and-open-government/) The JapanTimes, October 5, 2013.

14 “Onagawa: The Japanese Nuclear PowerPlant That Didn’t Melt down on 3/11,”(http://thebulletin.org/onagawa-japanese-nuclear -power -p lant -d idn%E2%80%99t -me l t -down-311) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,accessed June 25, 2014.

15 Investigation Committee on the Accident atFukushima Nuclear Power Stations of TokyoElectric Power Company, Executive Summaryof the Final Report of the InvestigationCommittee on the Accident at FukushimaNuclear Power Stations of Tokyo ElectricP o w e r C o m p a n y(http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/final-report.html), 2012.

16 NHK World, “Japan’s Nuclear RegulatorC r i t i c i z e s U t i l i t i e s , ”(http://www3.nhk.or.jp/nhkworld/english/news/20140625_36.html) accessed June 26, 2014.

17 “Tohoku Electric Seeks Reactor Restart;Praise, Anger Expressed over NRA Changes,”(http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201406110056) AJW by The AsahiShimbun, accessed June 25, 2014.

18 Hamada, Kentaro, “Evacuation Plans StirFresh Doubts over Japan Nuclear Restarts |R e u t e r s , ”(http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/30/japan-nuclear-evacuation-idUKL2N0P801D20140630)Reuters, June 30, 2014.

19 J. Mark Ramseyer, Why Power CompaniesBuild Nuclear Reactors on Fault Lines: TheC a s e o f J a p a n(http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/papers/pdf/Ramseyer_698.pdf), Harvard

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John M. Olin Discussion Papers, 2011.

20 Kenji Kushida, “The Fukushima NuclearDisaster and the Democratic Party of Japan:Leadership, Structures, and InformationChallenges During the Crisis,” The JapanesePolitical Economy 40, no. 1 (2014): 29 – 68.

21 Hiroko Tabuchi, “Day Laborers Brave Risksa t J a p a n ’ s N u c l e a r P l a n t s , ”(http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/10/world/asia/10workers.html) The New York Times, April9, 2011, sec. World / Asia Pacific.

22 Justin McCurry, “Plummeting Morale atFukushima Daiichi as Nuclear Cleanup TakesI t s T o l l , ”(http://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/oct/15/fukushima-nuclear-power-plant-cleanup) The Guardian, October 15, 2013, sec.Environment.

23 Paul Jobin, “Back to Fukushima,” HesaMag 4,no. Autumn-Winter (2011): 35–39.

24 Annie Thebaud-mony, Nuclear Servitude:Subcontracting and Health in the French CivilNuclear Industry, 1 edition (Amityville, N.Y:Baywood Pub Co, 2011).

25 Christopher Hobson, “Hidden Insecurities:The Workers of Fukushima Dai-Ichi,”(http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9781138013131/) in Human Security and Japan’sTriple Disaster: Responding to the 2011Earthquake, Tsunami and Fukushima NuclearCrisis (London: Routledge, 2014).

26 “90% of TEPCO Workers Defied Orders, FledF u k u s h i m a P l a n t i n 2 0 1 1 , ”(http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201405200031) AJW by The AsahiShimbun, accessed July 6, 2014.

27 Mari Saito, Kiyoshi Takenaka, and JamesTopham, “Insight: Japan’s Long War to Shutd o w n F u k u s h i m a , ”(http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/08/us-j

apan-fukushima-idUSBRE92417Y20130308)Reuters, March 8, 2013.

28 “Ex-Fukushima Worker Warns of More Leaksf rom Has t i l y Cons t ruc ted Tanks , ”(http://financegreenwatch.org/?p=11328)Mainichi, December 23, 2013.

29 Iizuka, “Conditions at No. 1 No Better.”

30 Jeff Kingston, “After 3.11: Imposing NuclearEnergy on a Skeptical Japanese Public,”(https://apjjf.org/-Jeff-Kingston/4129) The Asia-Pacific Journal 11, no. 23, accessed June 25,2014.

31 “New Nuclear Watchdog CommissionerReceived Additional Industry Payment,”(http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/social_affairs/AJ201407050057) AJW by The AsahiShimbun, accessed July 6, 2014; Mari Saito andKentaro Hamada, “Independence of Japan’sNuclear Regulator Questioned after Shakeup,”(http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/10/uk-japa n - n u c l e a r - r e g u l a t o r -idUKKBN0EL0K020140610) Reuters, June 10,2014.

3 2 “Government Shows No Intention ofDisclosing Fukushima Disaster Interviews,”(http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201405240045) AJW by The AsahiShimbun, accessed June 28, 2014.

33 Lawrence Repeta, “Japan’s 2013 StateSecrecy Act -- The Abe Administration’s Threatt o N e w s R e p o r t i n g , ”(https://apjjf.org/-Lawrence-Repeta/4086) TheAsia-Pacific Journal 12, no. 10, accessed June28, 2014.

3 4 James Tol le fson, “The Discurs iveReproduction of Technoscience and JapaneseNational Identity in The Daily YomiuriCoverage of the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster,”Discourse & Communicat ion , 2013,doi:10.1177/1750481313510817.

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35 James Conca, “Scaring The Japanese PeopleWith Radiation Is Criminal - Forbes,”(http://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2014/06/25/scaring-the-japanese-people-with-radiation-is-criminal/) Forbes, June 25, 2014.

36 Christopher Hobson, “Rebuilding Trust inT e p c o , ”(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2014/04/24/commentary/japan-commentary/rebuilding-trust-tepco/) The Japan Times, accessed June29, 2014.

37 Andrew DeWit, “3.11 and Japan’s Shift toSmart, Distributed Power,” Asia Policy, no. 17(2014): 159–64.

38 Mari Saito, Aaron Sheldrick, and KentaroHamada, “Japan May Only Be Able to RestartOne-Third of I ts Nuclear Reactors ,”(http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/01/us-ja p a n - n u c l e a r - r e s t a r t s - i n s i g h t -idUSBREA3020020140401) Reuters, April 1,2014.

39 Jeff Kingston, “After 3.11: Imposing NuclearEnergy on a Skeptical Japanese Public,”(https://apjjf.org/-Jeff-Kingston/4129) The Asia-Pacific Journal 11, no. 23, accessed June 25,2014.

40 Daniel P. Aldrich, “A Normal Accident or aSea-Change? Nuclear Host CommunitiesRespond to the 3/11 Disaster,” JapaneseJournal of Political Science 14, no. SpecialI s s u e 0 2 ( 2 0 1 3 ) : 2 6 1 – 7 6 ,doi:10.1017/S1468109913000066.

41 “Court Hears First Arguments in OmaN u c l e a r P l a n t L a w s u i t , ”(http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/fukushima/AJ201407040041) AJW by The AsahiShimbun, accessed July 6, 2014.

42 “Fukui Court Blocks Oi Nuclear ReactorR e s t a r t , i n L a n d m a r k R u l i n g , ”(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/05/21/national/fukui-court-blocks-oi-nuclear-reactor-

restart-landmark-ruling/) The Japan TimesOnline, May 21, 2014.

43 Pushker A. Kharecha and James E. Hansen,“Prevented Mortality and Greenhouse GasEmissions from Historical and ProjectedNuclear Power,” Environmental Science &Technology 47, no. 9 (May 7, 2013): 4889–95,doi:10.1021/es3051197.

44 “Energy Report Calls for Reliance on NuclearP o w e r , ”(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/06/17/national/energy-report-calls-for-reliance-on-nuclear-power/) The Japan Times Online, June17, 2014.

45 Harvey Wasserman, “The Crisis at Fukushima4 D e m a n d s a G l o b a l T a k e - O v e r , ”(http://warisacrime.org/content/crisis-fukushima-4-demands-global-take-over) War Is A Crime,accessed July 1, 2014.

46 For a list of Andrew DeWit’s publications inThe As ia -Pac i f i c J ourna l , s ee here(https://apjjf .org/-Andrew-DeWit).

4 7 Chisaki Watanabe and Masumi Suga,“Renewables Get Raked over Coals under Abe,”(http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2014/04/14/business/renewables-get-raked-over-coals-under-abe/) The Japan Times Online, April 14,2014.

48 Chris Bryant, “Germany’s Renewable EnergyE x p e r i m e n t C o m e s a t a C o s t , ”(http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/c5b9815a-1c44-1 1 e 3 -a8a3-00144feab7de.html#axzz36fkiQTQg)Financial Times, September 15, 2013.

49 Andrew DeWit, “Japan’s Energy PolicyI m p a s s e , ”(https://apjjf.org/-Andrew-DeWit/4102) TheAsia-Pacific Journal 12, no. 14, accessed June25, 2014; Mari Saito, Aaron Sheldrick, andKentaro Hamada, “Japan May Only Be Able toRestart One-Third of Its Nuclear Reactors,”

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(http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/01/us-ja p a n - n u c l e a r - r e s t a r t s - i n s i g h t -idUSBREA3020020140401) Reuters, April 1,2014.

50 Jacques Hymans, “Veto Players and JapaneseNuclear Policy after Fukushima,” in PossibleFutures for Japan (NYU Press, forthcoming).