woodrow wilson school of public and international affairs...
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T H E P O L I T I C A L E C O N OM Y O F H E A L T H C A R E R E F O RM I N V I E T N AM
Le Thanh Forsberg
Oxford – Princeton Global Leaders Fellow Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs
Princeton University
ABSTRACT
The adoption of a new market economy based on a quasi‐central command under the current political system has resulted in adverse interpretations of the role of the state and its relations to social welfare services and market institutions. Against this backdrop, this paper studies the health care services and the challenges brought about by the rapid unregulated commercialization and decentralization of social services in Vietnam. The paper addresses two main questions: Under what conditions is the commercialization taking place, and what are the outcomes? On the surface, data may indicate improvements with increased investment in health care, as well as availability of a larger variety of services. However, a closer look reveals problems not only with the official data on which these conclusions are made, but also with the real outcomes in terms of access, quality and effectiveness of health care services.
The analysis suggests that there are increasing inequalities in the access to and quality of health care services as a result of the rapid and fundamental changes within the health sector. These changes are directly associated with the Vietnamese political economy at large and hence the institutional contexts of the health care system. Drawing on the experiences and outcomes of field studies in the health sector, the author suggests that changes in institutions governing access to health care services are important. This is true especially in the absence of a quality assurance system and a surveillance system to control service access and health care cost, adequate supervision and an effective decentralization. Also, in the absence of a strong civil society and pluralism, structural changes would require a central political and economic reconsideration of the health sector in the Vietnamese development, in which health care can play its natural role as a welfare investment in growth, rather than fiscal burdens.
Working paper 2011 for the Oxford‐Princeton Global Leaders Program, Oxford University and to be presented to the Oxford Symposium on Urbanization, Health and Human Security: Challenges for Emerging Markets, Green Templeton College, Oxford January 14 – 16, 2011. I would like to thank Professor Christina Paxson and Professor Evan Lieberman at the Woodrow Wilson School for useful comments to the earlier draft. Any more comments are welcome to send directly to [email protected]
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Table of contents
Abstract ........................................................................................................................................................................... 1
Table of contents ................................................................................................................................................................... 2
1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................................................. 3
2. The myth of Vietnamese marketization ........................................................................................................... 4
2.1 Country context: Development and challenges.......................................................................................... 5
2.2 The arrival of marketization and its implications ..................................................................................... 7
3. Marketization and development in the health sector ...................................................................................11
3.1 The health care system in retrospective and dramatic changes ......................................................11
3.2 The institutional aspects of “socialization” and decentralization of health services .............14
3.3The economic aspects of ‘socialization’ and decentralization ............................................................18
4. The politics of health care commercialization and institutional challenges .................................27
4.1 Marketization and health financing ...............................................................................................................27
4.2 The “socialization” and decentralization ....................................................................................................28
4.3 Corruption and the health information system .......................................................................................30
5. What lies ahead? Final reflections ....................................................................................................................31
References ..............................................................................................................................................................................34
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1. INTRODUCTION
The Vietnamese health sector has gone through significant changes as a result of macroeconomic reforms. Despite continuous improvements in health outcomes, great concern has been raised by academic researchers and policy experts on the socio‐economic impacts of these reforms to the health sector.1 The reforms have brought about rapid commercialization of health services, with strong focus on curative care and decline of the strong networks of communes’ primary care as results of financial constraints and health policies. These networks were built throughout the country in the 1950s promoting social equity and free access of health care for all. This was strongly regarded as a foundation for creating a relatively impressive health infrastructure and for Vietnam's overall remarkable health performance in terms of life expectancy and low infant mortality rate in comparison to Vietnam’s region and its income class.2
However, reforms in the mid‐1980s, resulting in the introduction of a market‐oriented economy with privatization of trade and social services (including health), have created changes and challenges directly to the health sector. This paper sheds light on the impacts of these reforms to and within the health sector, focusing on the commercialization process. Differentiated from most studies dealing primarily with development within the health sector, this analysis will pay attention to the links between the health sector and the political economy and overall development context within which the health sector as a social policy operates. The purpose is to better understand the institutional challenges to the health sector and what else the health policy planners have to face in order to adopt a more comprehensive view of reforms that may be needed in such dramatic changing environment. It is never an easy task to initiate any health sector reforms because of the nature of the health sector and its interest structures. Health involves everyone as individuals and as groups, and it is not a normal consumption product or service. It is a special product and investment for individuals and for society at large. This understanding is crucial, as is the political economy and circumstances within which the health sector operates, in order to adopt productive policies and instruments to effectively improve the efficiency and social equity of the health system.
The study relies on primary information from field studies in Vietnam in 2009 and 2010, as well as reviews of existing research in the field. It seeks to address two sets of questions: 1) Under what circumstance does commercialization occur and what outcomes has it created? 2) What are the institutional challenges to and which effective policies may be considered for improving the efficiency and equity of the health system?
First, it reviews the political economic context affecting reforms of health services in Vietnam by addressing key issues of the emerging marketization. It attempts to relate the commercialization context beyond the health sector to the overall political economic environment within which the health policy operates and compete with other development policy issues. The analysis then turns to discussions of the development of the health sector and what has been changing in the institutions governing the health
1 Pham, et al.(2001), Fritzen (1999), London (2004), UNDP (1999) 2 Pham, et al.(2001), Fritzen (1999), UNDP (1999)
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system. The following parts of the paper will continue to address the politics behind the institutional changes in this sector. The conclusion focuses on the impacts of the commercialization of health services to institutions governing the health system and raises key issues to policy consideration and implications.
2. THE MYTH OF VIETNAMESE MARKETIZATION
The pictures above illustrate how unbalanced the Vietnamese health care system has developed during the last fifteen years since profits, both individually and for health services, were introduced as a driving force of the health sector. These two pictures show two separate entrances to the same hospital – St. Paul General Public Hospital in Hanoi. I have passed them daily for a number of years as they are on one‐way streets leading to and from the city centre from where I lived. The first picture shows the welcoming entrance to a fairly modern facility, available to Hanoi city public officials and their families, and their connected socially privileged folk. Their special health insurance cards guarantee them well‐equipped treatments and care. The second picture shows a seemingly rotten and deserted facility for sick children from poor families. We have hardly seen the green door leading to the center open. Their free health insurance cards for children under 6 years of age guarantee them fee exemptions to treatments. However, without substantial informal fees, they can most likely sit in the waiting room indefinitely. The poor give no personal incentives for doctors to be there to welcome them.
Health centre forPublic Officials of the
Hanoi People’s Committee
Health Centre forHanoi’s Poor Children
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When public hospitals are turned into profit‐centers and adopt a fee‐for‐service mechanism without a strong quality assurance system and regulations, and quality of services are offered differentially between target groups, access to medical services increasingly favors public officials and those who can afford.3 This is a part of a process introduced by the Vietnamese government called ‘socialization’, ironically meaning embracing private investment resources and user fees to relieve state budget burdens. This has resulted in high costs of health services shouldered on individual households and deteriorating the very foundation of a health system that accommodated the country’s initial steps in transforming and modernizing the economy. Vietnam has gone through a remarkable transformation, from starvation and isolation to a low middle‐income economy and being internationally integrated in the last twenty years. Doubtless, the vast majority of Vietnamese have a better life today. In the health sector, the country has achieved tremendous gains in health outcomes given the basic level of economic development. The principles of equitable and universal rights in free access to basic health care and education had been one of the preconditions for the country to take advantage of a broad‐based growth of a young and fairly healthy and educated population. However, the arrival of rapid marketization with poorly designed and uncoordinated regulations has devolved this foundation of Vietnam’s development.
2.1 COUNTRY CONTEXT: DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES
Vietnam has undergone an impressive socio‐economic transformation. The country’s current economic development stems from its twenty years of reform, known as the Doi Moi (renovation process). The Doi Moi was introduced in 1986, after Vietnam experienced a huge economic crisis in the mid‐1980s during which over 70 per cent of the Vietnamese population was living in poverty and the average per capita income was less than $100. Since then, the economy has opened up with export and investment surging. In stark contrast to Vietnam’s economic situation in the mid‐1980s, the average economic growth rate has consistently been above 7 per cent per year for the last two decades; today’s GDP per capita is according to the Economist (2010) $1,240 (PPP: $3,380) and the household poverty rate stood at 12.3 per cent of the population in 2009.4 The country and its economy are increasingly outward‐oriented through investment‐ and export‐driven growth like China, and total export volume made up over 65 percent of the country’s GDP in 2008, with the US, the EU, Japan and Australia as its biggest export markets. The total income from export reached $62.7 billion in 2008, with crude oil, textile and garment products, footwear, seafood and rice as major export products.5 Vietnam is truly a “Tiger economy” and in a transition from an aid‐recipient status to becoming a middle‐income country. The country is also working hard to reach all of the Millenium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015, with major achievements already. Most indicators of the population’s living standards and welfare have been improved.6
3 UNDP (1999), Lindholm & Nguyen (2003), London (2004) 4 General Statistics Office of Vietnam (GSO 2010). 5 European Commission (2009), and statistics from the Vietnamese Ministry of Industry and Trade (MoIT) 2010.
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Despite these improvements, serious problems remain and new ones emerge. In contrast to the increasingly outward‐oriented and open economy, the political system remains an authoritative one‐party state with the Communist Party in control. The limitations of the one‐party system means that political opposition to the controlling regime is not tolerated and there is a lack of incentive for the elites in the state to reform. Furthermore, large‐scale civil organisations existing under the legal framework are entirely accountable to the state. The result is that true civil organisations are undermined and no single private organisation dares to challenge the official interests of the Communist Party. There are increasing social concerns over various problems and impacts evoked by corruption, land rights, unequal access to development resources and social services. Nevertheless, it remains difficult for different social groups to voice their concerns and take actions due to the lack of official channels and legal enforcement. The existing model of governance and public administration remains a control system rather than one based on efficiency and service delivery. It is evident that pockets of poverty remain since public investment and ODA have been mainly disbursed to benefit wealthy cities.7 Lack of social and economic investment in rural areas where 70 percent of the population still live has not only created disparities in regional development and a wider gap between rural and urban parts, but also runs a risk of pushing the low‐income groups ‐ rural farmers and the urban poor and near‐poor into the trap of poverty.8 This is in particularly true and problematic since the distribution of public expenditures among provinces is hardly pro‐poor while provincial authorities have been given much greater fiscal autonomy and responsibility over their own public expenditures.9 Furthermore, while the government has made attempts to transfer public expenditures to poor groups via national social‐targeted programs, resource allocation and management of public spending have often turned the poor down as very little actually reaches them.10 Development reports by the WB (2005, 2003) showed also this tendency. Despite the fact that ODA and government social spending have been pro‐poor, benefits of these funds gave above 40% of these resources to the richest 20% of the population while less than 7% went to the poorest. Thus, poverty reduction remains a challenge for Vietnam during the next decade if growth‐induced target continues to oversee the need for comprehensive welfare investment across social groups. Clearly the task is not simple to balance the political and rhetoric claims of ensuring social equity with the changing socioeconomic environment. Institutions for political and economic decision‐making constitute a major reform issue for which change has increasingly been advocated by intellectuals, the private sector, civil groups, the international development partners as well as some government
7 Forsberg (2007), Kokko and Tingvall (2008), Lieberman, et al.(2005). 8 London (2004), Kokko & Tingvall (2008). 9 Liberman et al.(2005); Forsberg (2007) 10 Recent reviews in 2008 by the National Assembly on the impacts of the 135 national‐targeted programs to support the poor and poorest communes came out with this conclusion after reviewing the situation of above 2300 poor villages through Vietnam which were supported by the 135 program. See also World Bank (2004), Vo Van Kiet (2008); Viet Bao News: ‘The trade‐off between poverty and growth in Vietnam’, on 8 January 2004 at http://vietbao.vn/Kinh‐te/Su‐danh‐doi‐giua‐ngheo‐doi‐va‐tang‐truong‐tai‐VN/10849661/87.
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officials. Decision‐making is still opaque to the public and there is a lack of institutional capabilities for policy implementation and legal enforcement. At the same time, public investment and resource allocation are increasingly captured by various state economic groups and corporate insiders. As the government bureaucracy and state corporate groups are closely tied to each other, decision‐making becomes vulnerable and the responses of the public sector turns primarily to vested interests. Therefore, economic and social policies have increasingly been designed in favour of state officials and elite groups, and of those who can afford to pay.11 Consequently, the rampant corruption is widely spread, making Vietnam one of the most corrupted states in Asia, according to the corruption index given out each year by Transparency International. A sound development is severely hampered and there is little scope for improvements until the political room and decision‐making are open to transparency and accountability.12
2.2 THE ARRIVAL OF MARKETIZATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Marketization in Vietnam does not mean what we are used to in a normal concept. It is a process in which the state adopts privatization in a way that allows the state to control and play a dominant role in a market economy. Indeed, the state economic sector and its players are still proposed to be the leading force in the economy in the drafting of the XI Party Congress Document to be enacted in January 2011. One of the fundamental and ideological concerns is perhaps that the state‐owned corporations are still symbols of the Communist party’s credibility and legitimacy in the economy.13 Hene, privatization has in fact never been adopted as an official term in any official economic policy documents. Instead, ‘equitization’ is used, above all to illustrate the partial privatisation of state‐owned companies, raising capital but maintaining control. The meaning of this distinction between privatization and equitization is to make privatisation in line with the Vietnamese communist mainstream ideological rhetoric of having a ‘socialist‐oriented market economy’, in which public investment resources, state budget, bank soft‐credits and development funds have been extracted to maintain and develop giant state corporations.14 This is in fact turning the development towards a heavily distorted market economy.
The transformation from a centrally planned economic system to a socialist oriented market economy has led to considerable changes in Vietnam’s socioeconomic development. However, development is still simply defined as economic growth with focus on heavy economic infrastructure. The central development planner led by the government’s Ministry of Planning and Investment puts it this way: in the Vietnamese tradition of development planning, all resources have to be mobilized for economic growth through investment in production and manufacturing, what remains can then be used for social development and environment.15 As such, social welfare services are seen as burdens and economic costs
11 Forsberg (2007). Vu (2009), 12 See documentation of the Annual Anti‐corruption Dialogue 2008‐2010 between the Government of Vietnam and development partners. For example, Vian (2010) 13 Political Report to the XI Communist Party Congress in 2011, Draft on the 2011‐2020 Socio‐Economic Development Strategy; Vu, Thanh Tu Anh (2004), “Essays on the political economy of reform in Vietnam”, Boston College Dissertations and Theses, U.S. 14 Pincus (2009); Vu, Q.V. (2009); Vu, T.T.A. (2004) 15 Forsberg (2007), results from field studies and interviews with MPI officials in Hanoi (2005‐2006).
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rather than a comprehensive component of development.16 Hence, the main concern for the Vietnamese state since Doi Moi has been how to sustain resources in the state budget so as to guarantee resources available to the state industrialization priorities while transferring state financial responsibility of social services to households.
Preoccupied with the political vision of economic growth, the government’s development priorities and public investment planning have had to be designed accordingly. While the state officials and its economic elites have enjoyed a large share of public investments in state‐led industrial infrastructure, there has been a lack of political priorities on social investment, in which health care seems to suffer seriously. This is clearly shown by the state’s disproportionally low investment in health care. The state budget expenditure on health care has constantly been 1‐2 % of GDP and on average 5% of the total state budget: 5.9% in 1990 and 4.8% in 2003.17 There has only been exception with education sector, which has enjoyed a much larger share of state budget, while health care and social security and safety net also show low priorities in state budget allocation. Reviews by the Ministry of Labors and Social Affairs (2010), figures for state budget to social security and safety net has been low and remains gradually declined over the years: 12% in 1990 and 9.25% in 2008.
Allowing marketization under the banner of a socialist‐oriented market economy creates no clear borders between public and private ownership of public resources and market access. State and public officials go wild into owning public investments, market shares and social services at the cost of economic efficiency and the private sector.18 For instance, there are still about four thousand companies totally or partly owned by ministries and provincial governments despite two decades of equitization. The Ministry of Defence and the military own over a hundred companies ranging from telecom, banking, real estate and construction. The Ministry of Industry and Trade owns hundreds of companies in trade, export‐import services, manufacturing, construction, real estate and banking. Even the Ministry of Health administers dozens of state companies in pharmaceuticals and medical equipment. VINAPHARM, for example, is the Vietnamese biggest pharmaceutical corporation owned by the state and directly under the supervision and administration of the Ministry of Health. It has dozens of daughter companies and owns all pharmaceutical producing units in public ownership. A main point of concern is that it does not only hold a monopoly position in the domestic market of production, trading and distributing drugs and medical equipment, but also operates hotel and restaurant services, real estate, food retails, and commercial leasing of offices and warehouses.19 Large SOEs like Electricity of Vietnam, Vietnam Airlines or Vinacomin (mining), are all managed by a relevant ministry, all have opened hotels, resorts, banks, financial services, securities and insurance subsidiaries. These moves not only enable them to shift values from public companies to private entities and take a healthy cut of their profits, but also to pursue diversification of business in order to protect their monopoly
16 Forsberg (2007) 17 UNDP (1999) and MoH (2008). According to the National Health Accounts the state budget to health fell down to 3.5% in 2006, but has picked up later since 2007, see (MoH 2008). 18 Pincus (2009); Vu (2009) 19 See Introduction to the Vietnam Pharmaceutical Corporation (VINAPHARM), Ministry of Health at its website: http://vinapharm.net.vn/page.php?type=about&id=13.
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positions in Vietnam.20 Their capital is allocated from the state budget or soft loans and credits from banks directly under government guarantees. The government, in spite of poor results shown by state inspections and audits, continues to use public resources to cover their capital needs even when they make severe losses, misuse capital or are at risk of bankruptcy as a result of poor management.21 Enterprise surveys show that while SOEs generate low revenue growth and poor job creation, they still control a substantial part of total enterprise assets and absorb nearly half of investment in Vietnam. The Ministry of Finance has begun to order state audits on major state corporations and enterprises. It found that of the huge total SOEs assets by 2006, debts were 22 % and 76% of the total capital volume were bank loans mainly under state guarantees. In some cases, their debts were 42 times bigger than their own capital.22 The media has turned to domestic banks to ask why bad loans to these state corporations account for such a large share of their bank capital resulting from government orders. When many of them are running at risk of bankruptcy now, government public expenditures have to be extracted to rescue them. The consequences of this type of marketization and economic structure may soon exposed, relieving the cost for the real economy. One indicator is already seen now by constant high price inflation in the last few years, which many economists see as results of this imbalanced economic structure as well as the current monetary policy.23 Reports by the media from the Consultative Group Meeting between the Government of Vietnam and development partners in Hanoi on December 7‐8, 2010 show deep concerns raised by the donor community on the structures of SOEs in the economy. It is difficult for them to understand what the objectives of the equitization are, where the transparency between them being SOEs and private businesses is, as well as what the real role of the government as public owner and supervisor of the SOEs is. No doubt public investment and economic efficiency has been somewhat wasted when the SOEs can produce very little economic value, but eat up substantial parts of public resources, especially when their businesses are expanded into a wide range of sectors and activities, including social services. Through easy access to state capital via land rights and development credits, state companies maintain control over the economy without transparency of capital allocation or obligations to report their cash flow or balance sheets. Lack of state regulators’ supervision and opaque state decision‐making
20 See Pincus (2009), Vu, Q.V. (2009). Vu.T.T.A wites on The Saigon Times: Competition or rent‐seeking (Canh tranh hay muu cau dac loi) on 4 December 2010, viewed at http://www.thesaigontimes.vn/Home/diendan/ykien/44376/Canh‐tranh‐hay‐muu‐cau‐dac‐loi?.html 21 Vu, Q.V (2009), Hayton, B (2005), and various articles in foreign and Vietnamese media. See “State Auditor finds many state-owned enterprises prone to bankcruptcy, cited on-line Vietnam Business News on http://vietnambusiness.asia/state-auditor-finds-many-state-owned-companies-prone-to-bankruptcy, 2 December 2010; Bloomberg, “Vinashin Loan Woes May Drive Up Debt Costs for Vietnam's State Companies”, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-03/vinashin-loan-woes-may-drive-up-loan-costs-for-vietnam-s-state-companies.html, 2December 2010. 22 See further Q.V. Vu (2009), Pincus (2009). 23 Pincus (2009), Vu, T.T.A writes in The Saigon Times: Torn between growth and inflation (Giang co giua tang truong va lam phat), on 28 November 2010, viewed at http://www.thesaigontimes.vn/Home/diendan/ykien/44003/Giang‐co‐giua‐tang‐truong‐va‐lam‐phat.html.
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over resource allocation help SOEs to maintain monopoly, at the expense of the private sector and social investment.24 A clear outcome of this marketization is a distorted market economy and competition. A growing number of the SOEs and their beneficiaries, often referred to as ‘red capitalists’, eat up much of the available public resources, and economic and social policies are increasingly designed to preserve their gains. As a result of state budget and public resources being abused and unproductive, state investment in social development has been neglected and total state budget to social security has been reduced due to shortage of state capital.25 This is above at the cost of the poor and vulnerable groups. Coupled with high social service costs especially in medical services and a lack of social security, about forty million Vietnamese are struggling with their increasing economic and social insecurity, of which 10‐12 million are people living in extreme poverty (below the $1 threshold).26 While aggregate economic growth continues and average income improves, living standards remain critical to rural and low‐income earners due to economic hurdles to access to basic social services and the unequal distribution of growth and development funds.27 The gap in income distribution between the rich and the poor is increasingly widened. While Vietnam succeeded in remarkable reduction of poverty during the first decade of Doi Moi reform owning to a broad‐based growth and social inclusion, of each two million people being lifted out of poverty today a million falls back to poverty. Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung told the country's National Assembly on May 31 2009 that the number of households going hungry has doubled in one year, simply due to the cause of uncontrollable price inflation.28 The statement seems to validate the current situation as price inflation keeps soaring in 2010 to almost 10%. Other government policy experts have increasingly admitted that major hurdles to the Vietnamese economic growth tie to the long‐term structural planning, and this favors trade‐off between poverty and growth: The growth model that worships quantitative, expansion and diversification of the state sector in the market in favor of the minority rich at the expense of comprehensive investment in social development across social groups will damage all the efforts in poverty reduction in the country.29
24 Pincus (2009), Vu, T.T.A writes in The Saigon Times on 4 December 2010 http://www.thesaigontimes.vn/Home/diendan/ykien/44376/Canh‐tranh‐hay‐muu‐cau‐dac‐loi?.html. 25 Data shown in the 6th Draft of the Social Security Strategy for 2010‐2020, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Hanoi October 2010; See UNDP (1999), Pham, et al. (2001) 26 See Drafts of the Social Security Strategy 2010 – 2020, Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Hanoi, October 2010 27 Former Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet wrote: Don’t let the poor be forgotten (Dung de nguoi ngheo bi gat ra ben ngoai) on http://tuoitre.vn/Chinh‐tri‐Xa‐hoi/252302/Dung‐de‐nguoi‐ngheo‐bi‐gat‐ra‐ben‐le.html, on 12 April 2008; Viet Bao News: ‘The trade‐off between poverty and growth in Vietnam’, on 8 January 2004 at http://vietbao.vn/Kinh‐te/Su‐danh‐doi‐giua‐ngheo‐doi‐va‐tang‐truong‐tai‐VN/10849661/87 28 See M. Ann Overland, ‘Vietnam’s Troubled Economy’, Time Magazine, on Monday June 9, 2008 accessed at http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1812810,00.html#ixzz0iAgyiU2d on March 15, 2010. 29 Former government minister and ADB management board member expressed concerns over Vietnam ‐ The more the economy grows the poorer the nation is, on 10 February 2010 at http://www.bbc.co.uk/vietnamese/vietnam/2010/02/100210_tranxuangia_warnings.shtml; and Vu, T.T.A writes on the Saigon Times: Giang Co giua Tang Truong va Lam Phat (Conflicts between Growth and Inflation) on 28 November 2010 at http://www.thesaigontimes.vn/Home/diendan/ykien/44003/Giang‐co‐giua‐tang‐truong‐va‐lam‐phat.html.
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3. MARKETIZATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE HEALTH SECTOR
3.1 THE HEALTH CARE SYSTEM IN RETROSPECTIVE AND DRAMATIC CHANGES
Reviews of the Vietnamese health care system highlight significant changes in relations to how it was organized and the way it has developed. What has been highlighted most in studies of the health care system in Vietnam are its impressive gains in health outcomes given the low level of economic development.30 Prior to the economic reform launched in 1986, the state succeeded to commit to the promotion of social equity in health care and providing access to basic health services free of charge for patients universally. The state’s strong commitment to make basic primary and preventive care accessible to the population was effectively carried out through a network of commune health centers (CHCs) that had been launched in early 1950s, beginning to be built in the north and extending to the south after the war ended in 1975. About ten thousands communes had a CHC, covering 99% of all communes in the country by 1997, delivering basic primary care with both preventive and curative services.31 CHCs were mainly financed by local agricultural cooperatives. While CHCs provided services and facilities as the first point of access to health services, they were efficiently run and got supported by a network of intercommunal polyclinics (ICPCs), intended to give backup services. At the higher level, district health services were available via district hospitals and served as intermediary between provincial and central levels, and communal levels. There were about ten district hospitals in each province providing both basic and specialized services. They also ran preventive medical services such as childhood immunizations as well as public health surveillance, with public financing through allocation from provincial health bureaus as state budget. Provincial and central health services were to focus on preventive medicines training of medical staff and production of drugs. Figures by 1997 showed that over 293 general and specialized provincial hospitals were available to provide comprehensive care.32 As a result of this basically sound health infrastructure Vietnam gained significant remarks for the health outcomes with much lower infant and maternal mortality rates and longer life expectancy than many better–off countries. This is significant given the limited economic resources Vietnam had in wartimes and during international economic sanctions, only lifted in late 1993. The legacy of the health sector development was the role of the state and its strong commitment to promote social
30 UNDP (1999), London (2004), Frittzen (1999) and Pham, et al.(2001) 31 UNDP (1999) 32 Vietnam has 64 provinces and cities. The majority of central and specialized hospitals are located in big cities, above all Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City UNDP (1999)
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equity and the recognition of how important a community‐based “spirit” was in the development of primary care in Vietnam.33 However, consequences of the economic crisis in the middle of the 1980s, caused by international economic sanctions, the end of Soviet aid and a price inflation of over 700%, resulted in severe state budget constraints and spending cuts. The 1986 Doi Moi renovation implied market liberalization and privatization of trade and the agricultural sector and brought to an end of the cooperative system and shifted the health and other social service delivery systems to dramatic changes. It began in the health sector in 1989 with the introduction of user fees and private drug sales, as well as a gradual legalization of private service practices. What came out as immediate changes in the health sector was that public spending on health declined and out‐of‐pocket payment increased. Out‐of‐pocket expenditures were estimated as at 59% of total health expenditures already in 1989 and increased to 84% in 1998.34 Another major change was that health planning shifted its priorities to curative care, up to about 80% of the health budget, primarily in provincial and central hospitals.35 UNDP (1999) reviewed that only 1.4 % of total state health expenditures were spent to the ICPCs in 1990, and 6% to CHCs in the same year. These figures of state budget allocation to primary health care and CHS has kept declined over the years.36 More than 60% of state health expenditures were spent on non‐basic services, mainly on provincial and central hospitals, between 1991 and 1997. Meanwhile, a large proportion of the state health spending was also in an “other” category, which was discrete and unknown to outsiders (23.5% in 1991 and 33% in 1997).37 In the 2005 National Health Accounts, the Ministry of Health reported that the state budget funding to communal health further decreased to only 2.3% of total state health spending. The central level accounted for 36.8%, the provincial level for 44.7% and the district level for16.2%.38 Thus, neither policy priorities nor state financing were in place to develop and invest in the communal health networks. Primary health care at communal‐based centers entered a crisis with shortage of resource allocation, spending cuts, degraded physical facilities, and a drainage of medical staff as salaries could not be paid. The strong community‐based care centers with a network of village health workers began to deteriorate. This affected the quality of service and access to medical services at communal level and the equity elements of health planning at large, with a sharp declining utilization and access of the poor to public basic care. This became extra hard for the poor since public health staff began to operate private practices during off‐hours and charging informally for care, and prescribing drugs of unknown quality. This was already out of control and beyond regulations by the health authorities in the early 1990s.39
33 UNDP (1999); London (2008), Fritzen (1999); Pham et al. (2001); Lindholm & Nguyen (2003) 34 WB (1993); Nguyen, et al. (2006) 35 Frizten (1999) 36 With an exception of declining between 1991 – 1994, see (UNDP (1999) 37 UNDP (1999) 38 Ministry of Health (2008) 39 Fritzen (1999); Lieberman, et al. (2005)
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Already in the late 1980s and the following years, utilization of public health services declined sharply. It was recorded that aggregate utilization rates dropped 50% from roughly two to one consultation per person per year between 1987 and 1990. Hinders to access to services at communal care centers due to the lack of medical staff and quality of care were reasons driving patients to private clinics which were without quality surveillance or supervision by health authorities.40 With no systems of quality control or patient’s medical report system, or a mechanism to control health care costs, medical service costs became excessively high and uncontrollable.41 The health spending structure changed; of the total 80% out‐of‐pocket payments, almost 88 % went to drug purchases, largely provided by private drug vendors and without prescriptions.42 The insurance system introduced in 1993 covered only 12% of the population by 1997, mainly public officials and state employees. As results, disparities in quality of care and health outcomes have become widened due to the economic costs of health service commercialization and designs of insurance coverage. Access to care had become according to ability to pay. An extraordinary remark here is that the poor does not only have less access to basic primary care and medical services, but also has to consume much more of their incomes on health care than the rich. The design of access to medical care based on the ability to pay, which is contrast to the principles of financing medical services according to the ability to pay, has resulted in significant economic costs and burdens to the low‐income and poor groups. It is reported that the richest 20% of the population pay 5% of their income to health care while the poorest 20% pay 8.4% in 2003.43 Furthermore, public spending and resource allocation in health services was inequitably distributed. It was highly in favor of the better off as allocations were mainly invested in hospital curative care and in‐patient services at higher hospital levels and specialized hospitals at district or provincial level. Data by 1997 showed that the richest 20% of the population captured 56% of the state expenditure at these levels while only 2% served the poorest quintile.44 The share of public hospital use shown in 1998 reveals the same trend. While the poorest quintile accounted for 3.2% of all services, 9.6% was acquired by the richest quintile.45 Added to this is the use of private care by the richer segments of the population. A recent review by Tran (2009), show that the poor and low‐income groups do not have access to high quality health services. While the poor tend to seek in‐patient care at CHCs more than higher tertiary levels of care, the rich are likely to mainly access provincial and central hospitals where more public resources are invested. The health planning priorities and spending cuts in primary care at communal level has direct impacts on the structure of quality as well as access to medical services. Consequently, lack of resources and investments in CHCs and primary care at local level resulted in the decline of primary care, which caused the utilization and service quality
40 Fritzen (1999) 41 Tran Tuan, et al. (2005) 42 Van Doorslaer, et al (2007) 43 Lindholm & Nguyen (2003) 44 UNDP(1999); Deolalikar (2002) 45 Deolalikar (2002)
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of commune health centers to be reduced sharply. Decrease in utilization affects resource availability and declines in resources result in decreased quality of services. It is essential that when patients lacked of access to local health care become overcrowded the higher‐tier services, hospitals have begun to create dual‐tiered standards of treatment: one to the poor and one to those who can pay. In addition, the lack of policy priority as well as budget allocation has led to raising revenue, collecting fees and selling drugs having become part of the service in all CHCs. Field studies across regions in 2009 and 201046 have shown that these changes have affected the quality of health care services. The new incentives to generate revenue through fee collection and drug sales have raised the number of consultations doctors perform on their patients. They also affect the two important variables of the service quality: prescribing practices and diagnoses. Over‐prescriptions and duplicated doctor consultations has become common.47
The lack of resources and investments in CHCs and primary care at local level could also been seen as a result of rapid commercialization and quasi‐privatization of medical services. Poorly paid public medical staff and deterioration of public assets and facilities have triggered the troublesome combination of inefficiency and unresponsiveness from the public side and ineffectiveness and raw market behavior from the private sector. When public doctors can redirect their public services to their off‐hour practices at home, prescribing and selling drugs privately without being held accountable, it does not only hurt the public service system but also patients. Incentives to demand frequent consultations and over‐prescriptions for doctors’ incomes have taken over, distorting the quality of care, the moral and professional relations to patients and contributing to the increase of medical costs.48
3.2 THE INSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF “SOCIALIZATION” AND DECENTRALIZATION OF HEALTH SERVICES
As shown, primary care has declined as results of new policy reforms that set priorities to develop and invest in curative care at district and provincial levels. Lack of primary care and services at commune level initiated a referral system to higher‐tier levels where the poor and the rich compete for different kinds of care services. Deteriorating services began with fee‐for‐service and rapid uncontrolled commercialization of curative care emerged as a result of fiscal constraints. The beginning of the commercialization of health services emerged in 1989 with fee collection and private drug sales and practices, and has been further compromised by new policy development since the mid‐1990s. Concerns of state fiscal constraints and management of health services resulted in two major changes of the institutional set‐up for public care sector. The first institutional and policy change is the introduction of the so called “socialization” of social services. The other is the decentralization of state budgeting and organization of public services.
46 I carried in‐depth interviews with hospital directors in central, district and commune levels in Hanoi, Kien Giang and Saigon to study the service delivery and how they cope with financing. 47 See also MoH (2008), Fritzen (1999), Deolalikar (2002) 48 Fritzen (1999); Lieberman, et al. (2005)
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‘Socialization’, in the Vietnamese context, was launched in 1997.49 It initially meant to mobilize private financing through user fees and investment capital in social services, including the health care sector. This socialization, in reality and ironically, means marketization or partial privatization of social services in a normal terminology: to shift a large part of the financing burdens from the state budget to the users of the service and embracing private investment resources and actors in service provision as well as encouraging service quality differentiations based on ability to pay. This last character of this socialization is adopted as “elective” services.50
The transformation from a centrally planned to a socialist oriented market economy is known to have led to considerable improvements in Vietnam’s socioeconomic development. However, development is still simply defined as economic growth with focus on heavy economic infrastructure. As such, social welfare services are still seen as costs rather than an investment in development.51 To reduce the economic burdens to the state budget, private financing is encouraged and fee‐for‐service is further enacted. The introduction of ‘socialization’ is considered having changed the incentive structure of the health services, together with decentralization in the health sector.
Indeed, the institutional reform led by the Prime Minister’s Decree 10 launched in 2002 allowing fiscal decentralization and managerial autonomy over the public service delivery has altered the structure and incentive of health services. The main target for the government to adopt this institutional change was to improve effectiveness in use of state budget through the change of budget allocation and planning process. This formal procedure was considered to solve the bureaucratic problems of the central public administration in health sector. This move implies granting fiscal autonomy and management authority to public‐fee collecting service institutions, primarily hospitals.52 According to Decree 10, hospital managers are given much greater control over their spending, employment of medical staff, fee collections and revenue funds. Along with Decree 10 in the health sector, the new 2002 Budget Law that came into effect in 2004, and gives sub‐national and provincial authorities more power and greater control over their public expenditures and resource allocation to lower levels. In the health sector, provincial health departments bear more obligations to organize and deliver care while the sub‐national branches of the Vietnam Insurance Agency collect contributions and purchase services.
The structural changes brought by the decentralization means that authoritative power is shifted away from the Ministry of Health (MoH). The role of the MoH as a direct service provider was transferred to service stewardship.53 MoH remains as in norm setting of the national health objectives as well as performance and standards to provincial‐level norms. The MoH also defines the quality requirements of human
49 The ‘socialization’ concept was first adopted in the Vietnamese 8th Party Congress in 1996, in which socialization was defined as social mobilization and social policy issues had to be addressed through the principles of social mobilization, and health care should be the responsibility and immediate concern of each and every citizen.49 50 The adoption of ‘elective’ services to public hospitals as part of socialization refers to services for which patients pay additional fees in return for better quality services such as shorter waiting time, better quality room and higher tech equipment, see MoH (2008, p. 76) 51 See Forsberg (2007) 52 Ministry of Health (2008) 53 Lieberman, et al. (2005)
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resources and equipment, treatment guidelines, and performance standards to the health sector through decrees and circulars. It directs central resources to provinces as well as the poor and vulnerable groups through the sectoral components of the national social‐ targeted programs.
However, this institutional set‐up is causing increased challenges for the MoH, in terms of its relations to the central macroeconomic budgeting as well as its role as central government authority in health care towards other health constituencies.
For health care to be considered central in the political economy of development, the role and institutional capacity of the MoH matters. It relates to power relations in decision‐making over public funding and resource allocation, as well as competent capability and bargaining power to defend and argue for health sector status in development. It also concerns institutional capacity of the MoH to design sound health policy and implement it. Thus, the role of the MoH in health policy and management as well as in national politics is important to the development of the health sector.
Drawing on perspectives from various actors within and outside the health sector shows that the major power over resource allocation and development planning rests on the Ministry of Finance (MoF) and the Ministry of Planning and Investment (MPI) who often do not consider health as an investment but rather as a cost. Meanwhile, the MoH is considered having a low status within the ministerial hierarchy and lacking capability to show to the MoF and MPI the importance of health for development overall and for economic growth and productivity. In addition, the Vietnamese state’s priorities mandate that resources are first set aside to generate high economic growth, and what remains can then be used for social development and environment.54 This explains the disproportionally low shares of health care in the annual state budget. The low allowance from the state budget can also be a sign of the weak ability of the health ministry to carry out reforms and implement health policy. It also affects effective allocation of public health budget, especially when the Ministry of Finance also shares responsibility in allocating the recurrent side of the health budget, which may rely on other criteria.
In this new set‐up, the MoH mainly focuses on administrative norms and guidance to personnel policy and financial management as well as allocation of central funds. While the MoH remains the sectoral and central authority in the health sector, the new decentralization brought by the 2004 Budget Law has given provincial and local authorities much greater autonomy and discretionary power in prioritizing, mobilizing and allocating of public resources, and in implementing policies. This is problematic as priorities and distribution of public expenditures among provinces are not pro‐poor as well as lack of incentives to promote social development. 55 Reports and updates on how provinces allocate their state health budget remain a formality, without the Ministry having a set of monitoring and evaluation instruments to assess if national policy priorities and goals are met, or whether actual spending of state and public health resources is consistent with national health objectives and sectoral policies. At the same time, the central health budget has increasingly declined in the overall health expenditures and the share and fiscal responsibilities of provincial authorities are now
54 Forsberg (2007) 55 Lieberman, et al. (2005); Forsberg (2007)
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much greater. MoH has in reality much less authoritative power and control over how public health spending is prioritized and allocated or transferred to lower tiers, and how much revenues are collected.56 Here, one can question how health service incentives began to change and local authorities deal with health financing as results of these institutional changes.
The fiscal decentralization means public health expenditures become the main responsibility of provincial authorities who also bear power in allocation to provincial, district and communal levels of care. Provincial authorities allocated 85‐90% of total public health sector expenditures in the 1990s,57 which is under the so‐called ‘general health budget’. The remaining 10% was administered and determined by the MoH under national program expenditures aiming at combating high‐priority diseases or national child immunization programs. Today, this trend remains stable. Of the central budget allocation, over 60% is used for medical staff salaries, their allowance and insurance. Only 37% left is allocated to health sector development, of which 46% and 51% are spent at the national and provincial levels respectively. Roughly 3% remains for the district and commune levels. Thus, public hospitals’ main budget and revenues are generated by user fees.58
This does not only imply that government priorities to primary and preventive care at local levels remain weak and that more resources are directed to the provincial level. It also demonstrates that fiscal constraints imposed by central budget allocation affect significantly investment in health services. Self‐revenue from health services and user fees constitute the large bulk of central and provincial health development budgets.59 Thus, provincial authorities have to rely on public hospital managers to deliver services and generate revenues. This in turn affects the incentives for public hospital managers and provincial authorities to exert their discretionary power over fee policies and technical and facility investment allocation to direct resources to where it can generate most revenues.
However, the major changes that decentralization in combination with socialization brought about are to public hospitals. In 2006, the government introduced Decree 43 to further legalize ‘socialization’ of health services through fee‐for‐service and encouragement of private investments and financing of health services. Being responsible as service providers with greater autonomy in financial issues, fee collections and revenue generation, public hospitals have been turned into profit centers. Today, they have much more discretionary power in management of service access and quality of care, especially under the effects of ‘selective’ service practices that public hospitals are encouraged by this socialization. Studying the impacts of Decree 10 and Decree 43 to the management of health care services, London (2008) and Lieberman et al (2005) have seen as results increasing inequalities of service access as well as distortions of service quality.
56 WB (2010), Lieberman et al.(2005), and Fritzen (1999) 57 It was 85% in 1995 while the remaining 15% of the state spending fell into the so‐called national program expenditure that the MoH determined and administered, see UNDP (1999) & Lieberman et al. (2005) 58 MoH (2008) 59 MoH (2008) and (2010)
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A report by the Ministry of Health (2008) also noted that under the ‘socialization’ policy to increase private investment in the health sector, there is pressure for these private investments to generate profits. In the autonomy given to public hospitals by financial decentralization, the policy aims at facilitating stronger economic incentives for staff and managerial scope to cover operating costs by shifting financial responsibility from service providers to users. However, many question having public hospitals as private and profit‐oriented centers with the service users as financiers. The Ministry’s report also defines that public hospitals are encouraged to transform into businesses or non‐public institutions with full power in setting up their welfare funds or bonus funds. Evidently, the rapid commercialization of medical services is the results of the ‘socialization’, while decentralization of public hospital services is a form of privatization with public hospitals turning into profit centers.
With the lack of careful design and management of decentralization with sound governance and coordination, this has also led to a diffusion of power and regulations to an extent that there is plenty of room for interpretations of implementation of national goals and regulations. Greater power and negative incentives for local authorities and hospital managers determined by financial and revenue constraints can put the system beyond the control of regulators. A challenge for the Vietnamese health institutions and governance is how to enforce responsibility and ensuring accountability among local authorities and health institutions’ managers.
The current institutional set‐up and decentralization indicate that it is difficult for the central health policy makers to oversee what happens on the ground and to have a coherent response to problems. Compliance with regulations and quality and advancement of social equity remains challenging. This is especially true in the absence of a norm‐based quality assurance system and strong coordination between the MoH and provincial authorities and public health institutions. Given that the information system and statistical data in Vietnam remains inadequate, the MoH does not have the ability to design sound policies and implementing capacity. The limited power and management capacity also affect the MoH’s ability to control, regulate and coordinate local governments and health service units, and to develop mechanisms to hold local government, service units, and workforce accountable.60
3.3 THE ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF ‘SOCIALIZATION’ AND DECENTRALIZATION
3.3.1 ACCESS AND SERVICE DELIVERY
Effects of both the ‘socialization’ program and the decentralization of service delivery as well as access to medical services have been quite significant. The socialization program restructures the incentives of services when public hospitals become profit‐centers through fee‐for‐service, and decentralization gives these public hospitals greater autonomy and discretionary power in determining the quality of services, user charges, staff recruitments, staff salaries and prescriptions drugs sales.
60 See Frittzen (2006); Lieberman, et al. (2005)
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Today, access to medical services is claimed to be well organized by official figures. MoH (2008; 2010) shows that Vietnam has a comprehensive primary health care network with 100% communes having a commune health station (CHCs), and 69% of these CHCs having a medical doctor in 2009.61 To make sense of these official figures, one must ask how many of these CHCs are actually running and providing medical services. The figures do not make sense given the poor public financing and the lack of policy and development priorities during the last two decades of health care reforms, which has resulted in sharp declines in utilization of CHCs. Declined utilization of CHCs also means less financial incomes for medical staff and facilities, which results in further decrease of quality and access of care in CHCs. Even the poor which are the main users of CHCs often have to be referred to higher tiers.62 When costs rise to cover revenue and profits to public hospitals, access to quality health services for the poor become highly challenging and costly. Furthermore, the poorer the commune is the worse the problems are. They are stuck in a bad circle. Recent studies show that exemptions from payment of medical services for the poor do not exist in reality at commune level, and thus the poor are being excluded from primary care at this level. The poor are always referred to the higher‐tier care level. The studies demonstrate the point that even if the poor are supported by government programs to be exempted from paying user fees at hospitals, it is essentially difficult for them to obtain these exemptions in practice.63 Referral to the higher‐tier hospitals with more specialized and higher quality also means more economic costs to travel and get access to services since they are mainly located in urban centers and they are associated with large private costs that hospital users have to pay. This problem of lack of access to medical services for the poor is particularly relevant in the relationship to financing arrangements, as finance to commune care is still off‐budget as state budget allocation reaches only to district level, which was about 3% of total state budget for health.64 There is one critical practice that prevents the rural and the poor from access to basic care and quality services. The design of current insurance policy to support access for the poor to medical services never consider the common practice of informal “envelope” payments in the country and access is denied if informal payments cannot be arranged.65 The development in the health services clearly indicates that access to medical services and better care facilities is in favor of the higher‐income and urban citizens.
There is a clear linkage between impacts of socialization and decentralization, and quality of service delivery. A report by MoH (2008) highlighted how much the drive to maximize revenues and profits by the public care institutions has raised their financial resources and how it affects service quality and performance. One evident factor is that both prescriptions and diagnoses are quantitative oriented, and investments are highly devoted to curative care of specialized and higher standards. Public care institutions tend to invest in service development that generates high revenues such as diagnostic testing and clinical imaging services. As a result, the quality of care is highly affected.
61 MoH(2010) 62 Tran (2010a), Deolalikar (2002) 63 Tran (2010a); Deolalikar (2002); MoH (2008) 64 MoH (2008) 65 WB (2009); Deolalikar (2002)
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Overuse of diagnostic tests and high‐tech scanning and over‐prescription of expensive drugs, or duplication of doctor consultations, have become common.66 Abuse of services for profit motives clearly does not only affect the quality of services, but also raise treatment costs, and even hinder the poor from access to curative services due to the costs.67 Another factor that affects the quality of service indirectly is the level of medical staff’s salaries. While fiscal autonomy is granted to public hospital units, staff recruitment and their salaries are still under central public provision. The current wage system means severely low wages in the public services. In the health sector, commercialization of health services and decentralization practices has improved incomes besides salaries substantially.68 For this reason doctors and medical staff migrate to provincial and central public hospitals where higher standards and specialized services can generate high revenues, and where the central budget is mostly allocated. A study shows that 84% of all well‐trained medical staff was found in 39 central‐tier public hospitals.69 This also affects service quality. As many bypass local health centers they end up in overcrowded central hospitals, creating a serious challenge for these hospitals to meet service demands and provide good services.70 A report of this problem in the Hanoi National Hospital of Pediatrics highlighted that while the medical staff at this hospital remained the same figure of 70 staff, the number of outpatient pediatric patients per year increased from 94,294 in 1994 to 435,000 in 2008.71 The head of the Hanoi Central Oncology Hospital, when interviewed, reveals that his hospital facilities and medical staff can only meet on average 25% of total services and treatments that are required. Three patients sharing a single bed in in‐patient services and intensive care is a common situation of most central specialized hospitals in Hanoi, of which the worst are Bach Mai Hospital and the National Pediatric Hospital. There is a clear lack of facilities, and the lack of quality doctors is even more acute. External health policy experts in Vietnam share a great concern that the country does not only need more doctors, but more importantly better doctors. Today, only 10% of medical students get internships. A critical issue related to quality of services and health outcomes is the relationship between pharmaceutical drugs and health. Drug use relates to both general health and medical costs significantly. The current reporting of medical practices is that there is high risk of loss of potential health gains in Vietnam due to drug use and prescriptions. There are clear signs of under‐use for example of drugs for treatment of tuberculosis and of over‐use for example of antibiotics imposed by doctors or private drug vendors.72 Another concern of drug use and prescription is medical costs, partly because of the quantitative attitude that drives medical practices to generate extra incomes. Although
66 MoH (2010) and MoH (2008) 67 MoH (2010) 68 MoH (2008) 69 Fritzen (2006) 70 MoH(2008) 71 Vian (2010) 72 Lindholm& Nguyen (2003); MoH (2008); Lieberman et al. (2005)
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there are no mechanisms to control and report the real medical costs for households and public health institutions, it is possible to see the linkage between drugs and the overall medical costs. More than half of total health expenditures in Vietnam are spent on drugs. Two thirds of the drugs in Vietnam are sold without prescription in small private drug vendors owned by poorly educated pharmacists or public doctors as their side business.73 Their profits rely on volume sold. A small proportion of drugs are sold via doctor prescriptions. The abuse of medical practices in drug over‐prescription is well reported. It is common that multiple drugs, excessive quantities and unnecessary or expensive brand‐name drugs are prescribed and even sold directly to patients in public care institutions at uncompetitive and high prices. Inappropriate incentives for profits via a discrete kick‐back system from pharmaceutical distributing agents to medical staff encourages wrong practices. Their drug sale volumes rely on the frequency of medical prescriptions.74 Fritzen (1999) noticed that already in the 1990s fee collections and private drug sales largely determined the revenues of most grassroots CHCs due to the lack of fiscal budget and the decline in policy priorities to primary care. To generate revenues and staff incomes, a quantitative attitude was common in the medical practices – prescribing and diagnosing ‐ that directly affected the quality of care services. Duplication of doctor consultations and over‐prescription of drugs were already common. State‐owned enterprises dominated (and still do today) the drug supply and imposed their own inefficiencies on the market and management. In the hierarchical organization of the public care institutions, these state pharmaceutical companies impacted their clients – local hospitals and health centers. CHCs were forced to purchase drugs solely from these state companies, and medical staff was obliged to meet this demand. Questionable economic incentives drive both drug companies and medical staff in generating revenues and incomes through medical services. Today, despite the sole monopoly of distribution and supply by the state, more room is opened for import of international drugs and new companies and tough competition among drug distributing agents are starting to break the monopoly system and gain market shares. The new agents are aggressive to marketize new drugs directly to medical staff, creating an inappropriate incentive system and raising drug prices. Media coverage on corruption and abuse in the delivery of health services in Vietnam is extensive, especially in the coverage of drug prices and kick‐back systems between drug distributors and medical staff on sales of medicines.75
3.3.2 CORRUPTION AND HEALTH‐SEEKING BEHAVIOR
Corruption in the health care system is pandemic.76 It took no one by surprise when the Government and development partners focused their annual anti‐corruption dialogue on this problem in the health sector in November 2009. It was reported that both grant
73 MoH(2008); Lindholm& Nguyen (2003); Fritzen (1999) 74 WB (2009); Lieberman et al. (2005); Acuna‐Alfaro (2009) 75 Acuna‐Alfaro (2009) 76 See documentations of reports on Corruption in the Health Sector presented at the 6th Annual Anti‐Corruption Dialogue in Vietnam between the Government of Vietnam and all Development Partners, 17 November 2009, in Vian (2010)
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and petty corruption co‐exist in the health sector. Grant corruption is majorly observed in state management in public health investments such as licensing and procurement. This is seen as a consequence of decentralization without supervision and accountability and of “socialization” that calls for partial privatizing of public hospitals, in turn creating unhealthy economic incentives. Meanwhile, petty corruption is widespread due to the abuse of power, work ethics and informal arrangements to improve the low wages of medical staff, as well as patient mentality accepting corruption as normal.77 A report by Acuna‐Alfaro (2009) from media coverage of corruption in the health sector reveals that there were in total 210 articles in 2008 and 2009 covered in six national media outlets alone about corruption in the health sector. The main topics these media reports focused on were ranging from gaining commissions by doctors from drug sales, personal gains from health insurance refunds by medical staff, corruption practices from “socialization” of public hospitals, licensing, management decisions overseeing medical facility establishments, health properties or personnel recruitments. Envelope payments and commissions to medical staff, or requiring patients to overprescribe tests and medicines were also reported among the main topics.
Of heavy burdens of health care costs, Vietnamese households suffer from uncontrollable informal fee arrangements and an unhealthy pharmaceutical market involving doctors, pharmacists and drug companies. A series of articles in best‐selling local newspapers and media such as TienPhong and Vietnamnet online news over the last years have revealed that the kickback systems to doctors and health professionals for prescriptions have generated far higher prices on medicines, especially in public hospitals.78 Comparing drug prices listed by the MoH and the prices available on most pharmacies, reporters revealed that the majority of medicines available in pharmacies have 200‐300% higher prices than the import prices; some brand name medicines cost even 700% of the original import price. In pharmacies attached to central hospitals, such as the national pediatric hospitals, parents of sick children were forced to by medicines at 60% higher prices than private pharmacies outside the hospital, where prices of medicines are already several hundred percent too high. The situation is similar in most other national public hospitals or private hospitals where doctors are involved in selling medicines through their home clinics or through kickback from pharmaceutical companies.79
Through price controls and interviews with pharmacists from pharmaceutical supply companies, reporters discovered in 2010 that doctors are offered up to 30% of the total incomes pharmaceutical companies get from doctors overall prescriptions. A tablet was imported at the price of 500 VND and sold at 10000 VND to patients, 20 times the
77 See Vasavakul (2009) and other reports in Vian (2010). 78TienPhong, Pharmaceutical companies offer kick‐back on doctors’ prescriptions onhttp://www.tienphong.vn/Tianyon/Index.aspx?ArticleID=189428&ChannelID=2,, Cong tyduoc lot taybacsike don accssed on 22 March 2010; and Kick‐back to doctors http://www.tienphong.vn/Tianyon/Index.aspx?ArticleID=189128&ChannelID=2, Chietkhauchobacsi on 17 March 2010 (Inspection launched investigations) 79Vietnamnet, The truth of patients being robbed by medicine prices on http://www.vietnamnet.vn/psks/201003/Suthatvenguoibenhbibonrutquagiathuoc900238/ accessed on 23 March 2010.
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original price.80 Through income from kickbacks from pharmaceutical companies, doctors can earn up to fifty times their monthly salary.81 The lucrative prescriptions of imported drugs has caused overcharges for sick patients and distorted conditions for a national pharmaceutical industry to develop.
Vasavakul (2009) shows a highly corrupted health sector in Vietnam where services and health workers are concentrated to people who can pay higher prices. Unhealthy incentive systems are increasingly the causes of unequal access to health care and imbalanced health care services. While services are preserved for state officials and those who can pay, unofficial payments and corruption can make health workers withhold services from those who cannot afford to pay. Since doctors and health specialists engage in a dual‐system working in public hospitals and their home clinics to maximize their private gains, service quality and performance standards are distorted. Systematic connections between public hospitals and private medical equipment companies and between doctors and pharmacists have spiked medical expenses, adding severe economic burdens on the sick and the poor. Especially, since the universal access to healthcare as a right of citizenship has been eliminated and the majority of the population is uninsured, low‐income and poor families are most vulnerable. Lucrative economic and commercial incentives pull doctors and health professionals to training in complicated curative care, which have made health services and the workforce severely unbalanced.
3.3.3 HEALTH FINANCING AND INSURANCE SYSTEM
The health financing structure of the Vietnamese health care system today is still determined by out‐of‐pocket payments. In official figures by the MoH (2010), out‐of‐pocket health expenditure accounted for 80% in 2000 and 52% in 2008. It has shown a sharp decline in household direct payments, partly because of public and state health spending has increased especially with increase in health insurance. The proportion of state health budget as percentage of total state public expenditure has increased from 4.8% in 2002 to 10.2% in 2008. The total national health expenditure as percentage of GDP is estimated at 6.2% in 2007. This is a positive trend. On the other hand, it is worth noting that there is a clear lack of effective mechanism to measure the real medical costs and payments that the households are paying. Given that statistical data and the health information system are well known to be insufficient both in terms of data collection and validity of data quality, official figures are most certainly under‐reported. In reading of the health financing report by the Ministry of Health (2008) alone, figures of out‐of‐pocket payments differentiated significantly between pages. Other official reports by the WB (2008) show that the percentage of OOP in total health expenditure was about
80TienPhong, Kick‐back to doctors on ,http://www.tienphong.vn/Tianyon/Index.aspx?ArticleID=189128&ChannelID=2, Chietkhauchobacsi on 17 March 2010 (Inspection launched investigations) 81 TienPhong, Pharmaceutical companies’ kick‐back to doctors: Shocking!, on http://www.tienphong.vn/Tianyon/Index.aspx?ArticleID=188986&ChannelID=2, Cong tyduocchietkhauchobacsi – Choang, accssed on 23 March 2010.
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70% in 2008 and 73% in 2004. Others calculate that the current figure of OOP is above 75%.82
Despite the difference, what these numbers say is that Vietnam has among the highest private and out‐of‐pocket (OOP) health financing in the world. Clearly, public spending on health is under‐budgeted despite growing public investment demands and its use is inefficient. This implies that while the state remains the main provider of provisions of health care services, households are the main financiers of the health system.
Today, total public expenditure in health accounts for some 27% of total health financing in Vietnam (including the central budget 6%; local budget 10%; ODA 2%; and social insurance primarily health insurance of 9%). The state budget covers about 30% of total health care costs despite the rapidly increasing health care demands. It mainly covers very small salaries and allowances to health professionals and their social insurance. Funds for running services, equipment and medical investment as well as facility maintenance has to be generated from private investment and service users. Thus, public hospitals’ main revenues are from direct service user fees. Of the hospital revenues from service user fees, the majority is spent on facilities that are in favor of industrial and commercial service infrastructure. Local commune primary care receives hardly any fiscal allocation from the official state budget. Financial resources to these networks are currently mobilized through state targeted programs, while provincial health budgets allocate roughly 15% to commune health centers.
The health insurance system makes the problems more acute. Health insurance was introduced in 1992 to cover some socially targeted groups such as government officials, state employees and staff of foreign invested companies, and those considered indigents such as war heroes, war invalids and their children. It covered 12% of the population in 1997 without any changes in price scheme paid by the Vietnamese Health Insurance Fund between 1995 and 2007. However, formal insurance coverage and price scheme have risen sharply in the last two years. Today, the government reports that health insurance coverage is estimated at 60.5% of the total population in 2010, aiming at universal coverage by 2015. The insurance premium rate is set now at 4.5% of salary for the formal sector and at 4.5% of the minimum salary for other groups since January 2010.
Despite a development in the health insurance aiming at reducing the medical costs for users and the health financing system, there are critical issues in the formal procedures and informal arrangements that prevent the users from benefiting from the insurance, and from improving the procurement and refund systems between service providers and the insurers. While the insured can be covered and benefit from insurance coverage in formality, they are, especially the poor and the exempted groups, often hindered to access services without informal fees, known as ‘envelope’ payments.83 These fees are offered to all kinds of medical staff from doctors to nurses, or mid‐wives and other health workers. Thus, it is difficult for people to get access to their insurance benefits. To public hospitals, there is no effective mechanism to record, report or measure service costs. Neither can they control doctors in their prescriptions and consultations. Research and media have covered the problems of the Vietnamese Health Insurance
82 See Lieberman &Wagstaff (2009), p.5 83 WB (2009); Deolalikar (2002), Vian (2010)
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Fund being under‐budgeted due to the duplication and falsification of doctors’ medical records to claim refunds and medical reimbursements.84 Hospitals still defend two‐tier standards of treatment for those who are insured and not insured. Interviewing directors of district hospitals in my field studies, one understands that the formal reimbursement amount paid under the government’s health insurance to hospitals for health services is outdated. To generate revenues, hospitals have to rely on user fees and informal arrangements. In the Vietnam Financial Review the Head of a district hospital in Saigon reveals that hospitals receive only VND 3000 (US$0.15) for each physical examination conducted while the normal fee is around VND 30000. Hence, unequal treatment of patients exists, and the insured patients also get underserved. The Vietnamese Health Insurance Fund (VHIF) is running a loss as simple check‐ups can be very expensive to the insurance fund. Furthermore, the price paid by the VHIF to reimburse drugs, often 30% higher than the market price, has kept the Fund constantly in deficit since it was set up in 1992.85 How to balance insurance funds has been the major challenge to the health insurance system.
The financial mismanagement of the health insurance fund is often considered one of the major problems to why reforms in health insurance have been launched several times during the last ten years without success. A problem is that the incentive system allows pharmaceutical companies to lobby to make their medicines included in insurance lists. Doctors can fabricate prescriptions to claim huge insurance refunds for medicine for private gains. Technical input and high‐tech medical equipment are also used to form a major part of health insurance expenses. The imbalance between low input from insurance holders and the huge over‐spending of insurance funds has threatened the national health insurance fund to go bankrupt.86
Constant changes in the health insurance system have not resulted in comprehensive outcomes and it is still debated. While the health policy planners are still trying to figure out who can be insured, what to be covered and how much the insurance should cover for those 52 million Vietnamese that the government claims to have cover, the other uninsured 35 million people are at high risk of falling into poverty when encountering catastrophic medical expenses. In principle, a decent number of the poor are granted exemptions from health service charges. In practice, exemptions to free health care were only granted to those considered indigents at grassroots levels.87 There are still known problems of lack of formal procedures and implementation of policies in Vietnam, as well as informal practice arrangements in public services in which corruption is wide‐spread.88 Hence, it is critically important to understand how financing arrangements and insurance coverage policy function and impact in this culture and practices.
While more people who are insured and get access to better care with high service standards, many are still neglected. The “socialization” and adoption of user fees has led
84 WB (2009), Acuna‐Alfaro 92009), Vian (2010) 85 Ministry of Finance (2010) “Health Insurance in Vietnam: Relief is at hand” Vietnam Financial Review, November Issue, Hanoi. 86 See T. Vasavakul, (2009) 87 O’Donnell et al. (2005); Deolalikar (2002) 88 See Documentations of High‐ranking Roundtable Discussion on Corruption in the Health Sector between the Vietnamese Government and development partners, 6th Anti‐corruption Dialogue in Vietnam on 17 November 2009. See Vian, Taryn (2010).
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to a situation where the richest 20 percent of the population has increased their share of hospital utilization while the poorest 20 percent has reduced their hospital utilization, despite the fact that access to health care among the poorest is clearly stated as crucial. The latest report on health financing by the MoH in 2008 – 2009 already admitted that Vietnam has the highest percentage of households affected by catastrophic health expenditures of all 59 countries included in a multi‐country analysis in 2003. It is on average five times larger than other developing countries when it comes to incidences of catastrophic payments relative to 40% of the annual non‐food consumption. The MoH estimated in 2008 that health service costs soared up to 75% of the monthly non‐food per capita expenditure of a poor household. An in‐patient treatment episode of acute pneumonia for a child under 5 years of age costs 6.5 times more than the average monthly non‐food expenditure, and 15% of the non‐food expenditures for the poor.89 Moreover, these averages do not adequately reflect how severe the situation is for different households that need health services. Above the nominal user fees, it is common that patients pay much higher medical costs through various unofficial fees to doctors and other medical staff.
It is increasingly obvious that health expenditures cause a considerable burden for Vietnamese households and set many households on the road to poverty. Studies by Wagstaff and van Doorslaer (2007) showed that the burdens of wildly expensive medical expenses like user fees and out of pocket payments are considered the cause pushing many millions of people below poverty line across Asia, and Vietnam is among the worst. The OOP share remains highest in Bangladesh, India and Vietnam. It also shows that the number of individuals pushed into poverty by OOP payments is greatest in India, China and Vietnam, while the relative increase in poverty is greatest in Vietnam where the poverty rate rises by 30%. Bangladesh, China, India and Vietnam continue to have the highest incidence of catastrophic payments.
Middle‐income households are also affected because of medical expenses that are considered forced payments. In times of illness, there is no option for low‐income families but to try to find money for needed treatments. It is truly an evil circle for poor families being hit by catastrophic illness incidents since they have to either ask for loans with high interest rates or sell capital goods or livestock, or grasp money from the food budget or even withdraw children from school. The reduced access to health care has also forced people into self‐medication or to avoid seeing a doctor for non‐acute problems, which may both endanger their health and others due to disease resistance or transmissions. Lack of access to medical services also forces more people to private drug vendors who tend to sell drugs without prescriptions and more drugs than needed, or even give irrational combinations of drugs, or sell fake medicines.90 The other burden is the informal fees to compensate doctors’ low salaries. As the result of this system, the paradox to some social targeted groups, such as the poor and children under 6 years of age, who are exempted from user fees, and low‐income and poor families with insurance coverage, is that formal procedures to get health services are still critically decided by various kinds of informal fees added on top of their expensive drug bills.91
89 Ministry of Health (2008). This figure should be read with caution and in relations to under‐reported of the actual informal fees patients have to pay. 90 Pham et al. (2001) 91 WB(2009)
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The economic side of the causal relationship between “socialization” and health financing arrangements also shows that while medical costs are increasing burdens to people, this relationship mainly brings favors to service providers. A report by the government and the World Bank (2005) showed that reported household spending for user fees was nearly five times more than the user fee revenues reported by hospitals in 2001‐2002. Adams (2005) also noted that the incomes from fee payments are up to 15 times larger than those officially recorded as hospital revenues.92
4. THE POLITICS OF HEALTH CARE COMMERCIALIZATION AND INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES
The health care sector in Vietnam has undergone huge changes, and naturally the institutional bodies have found it hard to keep up. Although there are many challenges deriving from the level of economic development and the level of education, much can be traced to the political environment. Policy decisions, albeit most often with good intentions, are behind the incentive structures throughout the system that are accelerating many of the wrong‐doings and difficulties for the population. It is therefore necessary to put also detailed problems within the context of Vietnam’s political climate in general, and the political and interest‐driven decision‐making in the health sector.
4.1 MARKETIZATION AND HEALTH FINANCING
The Vietnamese health care system is characterized by limited public expenditure and a very high level of out‐of‐pocket household spending, and health financing has been a key for the way the health system is organized. Understanding why state and public health expenditures are still limited in relations to the overall national economic incomes, political choices matter in the planning and decisions of resource allocation. The Vietnamese politics of development planning is still dominated by pure economic growth‐led investment thinking, in which public resources are extracted to secure finances to various state‐led industrial investments in production and manufacturing sectors, mostly captured by the central and local state economic actors. Given the characteristics of the marketization in Vietnam, it is obvious that lack of resources for social service development makes the health sector as well as other public services vulnerable to commercial and unregulated market forces including public hospitals or semi‐private clinics run by public doctors.
To have resources distributed to improve living standards in all regions, especially the poorest and remote parts is already a challenge, but the more acute challenge is the political commitments and managerial capacity of public investment and fund allocation in order to prevent corruption from eating up all the resources before they reach the beneficiaries. Furthermore, public expenditures are still in favor of services that can mainly be utilized by the rich even though formal programs and policies are oriented towards the poor. Debates in the parliament and media coverage on this issue has been explosive recently, especially after the National Assembly reviews of the 135 national‐
92 Kokko & Tingvall (2008), Adams (2005)
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targeted program to support the poorest villages and wards in remote parts further evidenced this problem. Evidently, the kind of marketization in Vietnam that is to secure and protect the interests of limited state elites and state economic actors has led to a macroeconomic trap for the health sector and a microeconomic tragedy for millions of Vietnamese.
While Vietnam has gained tremendous health outcomes given the limited economic resources, the current political constraints and economic mechanism of health financing are shaping the overall performance of the health sector in a way that excludes a large segment of society from better health care and creates significant inequalities in the access, utilization and quality of care between the rich and the poor and between regions in the country. It is evident that the health care system in Vietnam is designed according to a fee‐for‐service payment method to get access to medical services rather than financing services according to ability to pay. In a more progressive system, financing services depends on the higher the income the higher the contribution. However, the design of both health insurance and medical costs in Vietnam is in favor of the better off, and cover providers’ service quantity rather than quality. State budget allocation is also prioritizing central and provincial public hospitals in curative care while neglecting primary care at commune levels. As already noted, there is a critical relationship between financing arrangements and the current structure of service delivery that is characterized by rapid commercialization.
4.2 THE “SOCIALIZATION” AND DECENTRALIZATION
The reality of health policy and its service structure in Vietnam has increasingly proved that health care is considered a special commodity that involves mainly service providers and customers rather than a special right people have to social welfare services. Critically, the “socialization” process of health services is the reason behind this change when fee‐for‐service methods and rewards of private investment in public hospitals were launched. One main evidence that “socialization” is creating rapid inequality of access to health services is the call for development of a system called ‘elective services’ in public hospitals.93 Elective services introduced in this context mean services for which patients pay additional fees in return for better quality such as shorter waiting time, better quality room and high‐tech facilities and equipment.94 This is the fundamental shift from the foundation of social equity that enabled Vietnamese people universal access to free basic health care as their right of citizenship in the past to more liberal market‐led services. While the institutional setting will help advance the better‐off to better services and high standards of treatment, the poor may even suffer more due to the economic incentives that will drive medical staff and hospital managers away from basic service delivery. Since “socialization” aims at public hospitals making profits and increase shares of private investment, it increasingly creates unequal access to health services because the health sector development and investment is moving towards targeting those who can pay. At the same time public administration reform and decentralization
93 MoH(2008) 94 MoH(2008)
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grant hospitals managerial and fiscal autonomy which has led to unhealthy investment incentives and promoted supplier‐induced demand and duplication of services. Consequently, it drives up medical costs and out‐of‐pocket spending. If this trend continues in combination with the current decentralization without delegation of accountability and quality control and uniformed goals for better care to all and everyone, raw commercialization will continue to lead and deteriorate the health services in Vietnam. While decentralization is expected to promote local accountability and innovation, systematic citizen involvement in setting the goals, design and financing for health care, and in monitoring service provision, it can also fail if not properly handled. In a country where sound governance, quality assurance, fiscal stability and local accountability are missing, decentralization can mislead economic incentives and misguide service management or enhance corruption. Clearly decentralization in the Vietnamese health care system has led to local initiatives in planning, delivering and financing services. However, while public hospitals have gained significant financial revenues, decentralization has also created disparities between regional and among public services in terms of service development investment, access and utilization as well as quality of health services. Perhaps it is time to call for a healthy recentralization of the health sector stewardship, in which the MoH can play a better role and focus on tasks being the health regulator to stream‐line national health objectives, safeguarding access to medicines and care through a universal base, setting up quality assurance systems for drug supplies, evidence‐based medicine and resulted‐oriented performance while promoting local governance and accountability. In the current institutional and interest structures of the health sector, the central ministry’s major concern is to ensure that the health services can cope with raising service demands; it mainly focuses on the interests of service providers ‐ public hospital revenues, medical staff’s security and state pharmaceutical companies to hold monopoly of distribution and supply of medicines. At the same time, it has neither a mechanism to control medical costs, quality assessment system nor a check‐and‐balance system for the service users to raise their concerns. Although major public concerns have placed the rapid socialization of health services and decentralization of service delivery and management as dual causes of rapid commercialization of health care and rising medical costs, the above institutional conditions are on the other hand considered main causes behind widespread corruption in the health sector.
Within the institutional context of the MoH, the structure and capacity limits how the MoH can exercise their administrative and planning authority over the health system. First of all, the organization and staff efficiency of the MoH remains in a traditional setting of the central planning – vertical order but fragmented management. One policy division does not work in good coordination with the others within the MoH. The health policy unit is directed and controlled by the Department of Finance and Planning, whose major concern is how to cope with health financing rather than strategic planning for the entire health system. Lacking an overall steering force with visions and a toolbox for solutions, health policy continues to struggle with ad hoc issues and solutions. Changes begin to take place to both tackle the quality and utilization of primary care at grassroots levels. The government recently adopted a combination of resolutions.
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Decision 950 was introduced in 2007 to further invest in and upgrading commune health centers in disadvantaged regions and providing extra stipends for communal health workers. In combination with this directive, MoH adopted Decision 1816 to establish a program in which doctors and medical staff from upper hospital levels are rotated to lower level to support and help improve medical service quality. They are supposed to give medical training and technical support to medical workers in lower‐level hospitals, especially at the grassroots levels. This is also promoted in the promotion of the government’s ideal of ‘social responsibility and obligations for doctors’. These acts are further stipulated in combination with a number of government decisions, such as Decree 63 launched in 2005 to subsidize health insurance coverage for the poor and Decision 139 in 2002 to make each province establish a health care fund for the poor using national budget funds. Clearly, decisions to increase funding and to force medical staff to work at local centers are cause for questioning the statistics on CHC coverage and operations.
In the best hope of health policy planners, these various supporting decisions and programs are well enforced and not overlapped, and informal economic payments and profit incentives seize to be hurdles for the poor to get access to these support policies. The concern remains that despite good decisions, there is no good legal enforcement and governance. Evidence across developing countries and in Vietnam has shown that administrative decentralization to provincial control of health services decreases provision levels and reduces access to services for the poor, unless it is accompanied by “good” local governance.95
4.3 CORRUPTION AND THE HEALTH INFORMATION SYSTEM
Why is corruption considered pandemic in the health sector in Vietnam? Apart from the political and institutional weakness in managing the public sector, it is also caused by social perception and mentality. While petty corruption is considered widespread due to the public mentality in seeking benefits from services, wanting more from the service than others, the existence of heavy grand corruption from the service provider‐induced demand and within the sector management is perhaps more damaging and resistant to change. Abuse of power and work ethics to rise medical costs for financial revenues of hospitals and extra incomes to medical staff is indeed triggered by the design of institutional solutions to the health sector reforms during the last decade. In this, socialization and decentralization of service delivery and sector management are considered the driving force.
Public administration reform, more than ever before, needs to address the wage issues to avoid the incentives for service provider‐induced demand, especially in the pharmaceutical sector and its relationship to the delivery of care services. It is a means to create efficiency and better incentives in delivery of services, so that medical staff can focus on their medical tasks and performance instead of being economic administrators or businessmen.
95 Mubarak et al. ( 2004); Fritzen (1999); Lieberman et al. (2005); Liu et al. (1999); Bossert & Beauvais (2002)
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The state monopoly in pharmaceutical production, supply and distribution has been an issue behind the high medical costs and corruption among medical staff and pharmaceutical distributors due to health‐seeking behavior.96 Weak controls and the lack of sound and fair market regulations in the pharmaceutical market, has made imported medicine distributors more offensive in rewarding commissions to doctors for drug prescriptions, distorting procurement and licensing procedures in order to ensure market entry and shares.97 From this value chain that involve doctors, hospital managers, pharmaceutical distributors and the insurance agency, corruption is aided and hence add medical costs to striking prices for Vietnamese service users.
A norm‐based mechanism and quality assurance system rely on flows of accurate statistical data and reliable information. User fees and insurance reimbursement rates can reflect different costs and expenditures depending on the settings of the information system. Quality assurance and performance assessments depend on how medical practices and results are reported. Neither of these system requirements are considered adequate and effective in the health service delivery and sector management between hospitals, and among central and local governance authorities of health care.98 Central health sector planners need accurate and timely information for planning resource allocation based on health outcome and performance data. Nevertheless, misleading or over‐reporting and even under‐reporting exist in all levels. Field studies in provincial and district and commune levels reveal under‐reporting of child mortality or misleading resources used for different purposes from targeted resources in reductions of child and maternal mortality. Reports are fabricated from examinations and fee collections for insurance refunds. Information asymmetry is often a huge problem for patients to know their rights or get medical records or why they have to pay or get referral. Doctors are their only information source to rely on.99 Throughout the health system and service delivery, there is no database for medical records of treatment or drug prescriptions. Where something exists, there is no mechanism to validate the quality. Thus, problems in the information system of the health sector are part of the reason why corruption and abuse of power can be widespread in the service delivery.
5. WHAT LIES AHEAD? FINAL REFLECTIONS
The Vietnamese health care sector has gone through significant changes during the last two decades. The social and economic impacts brought about by the Doi Moi reform since 1986 have made the health sector transforming from a highly equitable system with strong networks of primary care at grassroots level to a segmented system focusing on curative care and commercialization of services aiming at the high and middle income classes. Central economic planners preoccupied with securing public resources for state‐led industrialization have made social services vulnerable of fiscal constraints and lacking public development investment priorities. The shortage of
96 In Vian (2010); WB (2010); Fritzen (1999) 97 WB(2009) 98 MoH(2008); WB (2009), Tran et al. (2010b) 99 Wendling and others in Vian (2010); WB (2009); Tran et al. (2010a); Huy et al. (2003). There was also a series of media reports on child and maternal mortality being under‐reported in Phu Luong district hospital, covered by VietnamNet in 2009.
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financial resources led to a decentralized system of service delivery and sector management, and “socialization” of health services to encourage private investment of public hospitals. Fee‐for‐service and profit‐orientation with user fees as the main financial resource are the current characteristics of Vietnam’s health service system.
These changes are increasingly challenging the road to an equitable and efficient health sector in Vietnam. The political force of ‘socialization’ and institutional force of decentralization have increasingly made reforms in health care costly and impossible for reaching the government’s own goal of an equitable, efficient and developed health care system. Public hospital managers, medical staff and pharmaceutical companies have become involved in creating a rapid commercialization of services, controlled by unregulated market principles. Wildly expensive medical costs have become heavy burdens on individual households who are the main financiers of the health care system.
This development in health care services is threatening to deteriorate Vietnam’s achievements in poverty reduction and to eliminate sound conditions for the country to sustain its economic growth. Reform and privatization of the health services has brought in the services development of internationally advanced treatments, and increased financial revenues for public hospitals. However, the health services are increasingly designed to meet demands of the rich and privileged. Access to basic health care services has become more difficult for the low‐income and poor groups, let alone the higher quality of medical services and treatments, because the resources are directed towards investments in quality and advance curative care to meet the demands of those who can pay. More social groups suffer from social insecurity and the poor are being marginalized. Thus, there is a need for more comprehensive political ideological readjustments over the development goals, and a by necessity restructured institutional setting in the health sector in particular has to consider which goals the health sector should achieve. The latter follows the earlier. Once a political choice is made, health policy planners can have better visions and readiness to build capacity and design the system to reach the goals.
The Ministry of Health as sector stewardship would have to be given full mandate to secure a sound and sustainable fiscal budget and gain credibility in relations with provincial authorities and key government economic planners, as the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Planning and Investment. MoH also needs to be given central mandate and orders in setting norms and quality assurance system to control over service performance and measure service costs. In order for the Ministry to gain credibility and authority in the health sector institutional reform, uniformed public administration reform of the public sector’s wage levels are crucial. This would essentially help the health sector build the right economic incentives to medical staff, which in turn is supportive for public hospitals to initiate other necessary institutional restructures such as setting up controls of medical costs, quality assurance systems and service provider‐induced supply and work ethics.
Last but not least, to sustain conditions for the health sector institutional reforms and readjust the rapid commercialization of medical services, financing arrangements would have to be placed right in relations with service delivery and the overall role of the health sector in the macroeconomic development. If the goals of an equitable and efficient health sector can be reached with central government essential public
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resources, the design of financing the services would have to take into account the socioeconomic and income differences between and among groups and regions, as well as between services of primary and curative care. Health insurance has to accordingly address the balance between who and what the insurance can benefit, as well as the costs and inefficiencies that may involve. The health system has revealed how harmful and costly it has been to individuals and households by huge out‐of‐pocket payments. Designing tax‐financing or community‐based insurance solutions is a challenge in Vietnam, as deciding on income tax and the mechanism of tax collection is still confusing and not functioning.
Evidence from other socially advanced countries and transitional economies in Eastern Europe has shown meaningful experiences of health sector reforms.100 It shows that it is achievable to have social equity and system‐wide efficiency as well as cost effectiveness. A model built on public financing of primary care, private financing of supplementary care, pluralistic delivery of services, and managed competition can be achievable if the basic structures and incentives are put in place.
It unlikely that the Vietnamese Communist Party, which gained power and remains in power still resting heavily on the sacrifice of the entire population during several wars, believes its own rhetoric goal of social equity. Initially, that enabled them to build a broad‐based community health care network and a great deal of credibility with the people and internationally for the country’s remarkable health outcomes. Today, the rhetoric aspiration for a more efficient, equitable and universally accessible health care is again declared, but on more liberal market principles the Vietnamese way rather than through genuine social mobilization and “community‐based spirit”. The majority of people can now access health care at the expense of their everyday needs, and at the mercy of the state and market forces rather than as their own rights to welfare services.
Money alone cannot buy health and create good policies, but money‐related incentives can evidently push millions of people to chronic diseases and economic insecurity due to catastrophic medical costs.
100 Kornai & Eggleston (2001)
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