独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構 0 outline of japanese seismic design review guide of...
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Content
Ⅰ. Formation of seismic design code in Japan
Ⅱ. Outline of Japan Nuclear Safety Committee’s
Seismic Design Review Guide;
comparing Before and Revised
Ⅲ. Comparison the point of seismic design practice
between Japan and USA
Ⅳ. Conclusion
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Ⅰ.Formation of seismic design code in Japan
Nuclear Safety Commission ・ Regulatory Guide for Reviewing Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities (15pages) → 1981July Established 2006 Sept. Revised
METI (Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency)
・ Ministry Code No62 “Technical code for Nuclear
Power Reactor Facilities Article5 Seismic requirement” (1 page)
Japan Electric Association (Utilities) ・ Technical Guidelines for Seismic Design of Nuclear Power Plants
JEAG4601 ( ~ 1300pages) →1970,1984,1987,1991 Completed gradually (English version: NUREG/CR-6241) Now revising
Endorse
JNES
Technical support
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Formation of seismic design code in Japan NSC Seismic design Reviewing Guide (Revised)1.Introduction2.Scope3.Basic Policy 4.Classification of Importance in Seismic Design
5.Determination of design basis earthquake ground motion
6.Principle of seismic design Policy, Seismic force for each class
7.Load combinations and allowable limits
8.Consideration of the accompanying events of earthquake
Tsunami, Collapse of inclined plane
JEA JEAG4601 ( Now under revising )1.Basic items Purpose, Scope, Basic policy 2.Classification of Importance in Seismic Design
Classification, seismic force for each class
3.Earthquake and basic earthquake ground motion for seismic design Earthquake ground motion, Tsunami evaluation
4.Geological and ground survey
5.Safety evaluation of ground and seismic design of civil structures R/B base, around inclined plane, outside civil structures
6.Seismic design of building structures Material, load combinations and allowable limits, structural design, response analysis, seismic margin
7. Seismic design of equipment / piping system Load combinations and allowable limits, seismic force, response analysis, function maintenance evaluation, energy absorbing support
NSC Introduction to Safety Examination of Geology/Soil of NPP ( Not revised)
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Each task for the present ; after NSC Guide revised
NSC ・ Review Seismic Re-evaluation of Existing NPPs by utilities ・ Revise “Introduction to Safety Examination of Geology/Soil of NP
Ps”
METI (NISA) ・ Review Seismic Re-evaluation of Existing NPPs by utilities
・ Investigate lessons learned from the Niigatakenn-tyuuetsu- oki earthquake and effect to Kashiwazaki NPP
・ Upfill Ministry Code No62 Article5 “Seismic requirement”Utilities (Japan Electric Association ) ・ Seismic Re-evaluation of Existing NPPs according to revised NSC Guide ・ Review JEAG4601 according to lessons learned from the earthquake and re-evaluation of NPPs
JNES
Technical support
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Ⅱ. Outline of Japan Nuclear Safety Committee’s Seismic Design Review Guide; comparing Before and Revised
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
◆ ◆ NSC rNSC revisevised Sep. 2006ed Sep. 2006 their “Regulatory Guide for “Regulatory Guide for reviewing Seireviewing Seismic smic Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Design of Nuclear Power Reactor Facilities” ,Facilities” ,
to reflect seismological and seismic engineering prto reflect seismological and seismic engineering progress after 1995 Hyougo-ken Nanbu Earthquake. ogress after 1995 Hyougo-ken Nanbu Earthquake.
◆◆ NISA promptly required utilities to re- evaluate seiNISA promptly required utilities to re- evaluate seismic design of all existing NPPs according to revissmic design of all existing NPPs according to revised guide.ed guide.
◆ ◆ Utilities started re-evaluation from the step of geologiUtilities started re-evaluation from the step of geological surveycal survey
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Item Before Revised
Design Base Design Base Earthquake Earthquake DefinitionDefinition
・ S1: Return period more than 10000y
Stay in elastic region *・ S2: Return period more than 50000y
Keep function * * Class As 、 A component
・ One DBE Ss:
Consider active fault hereafter
late Pleistocene (80000-130000y before)
Keep function *・ Sd for design (Not earthquake) to stay in
elastic region * Sd=α×Ss ; α 0.5≧ * Class S component
Geological Geological SurveySurvey
Use most updated knowledge and technique
Consideration of Consideration of Vertical Seismic Vertical Seismic ForceForce
Fv= 1/2 FH (Static) Define Fv dynamically
Over DBEOver DBE
EarthquakeEarthquake
Possibility of over DBE earthquake cannot be denied. Risk by over DBE is to be assessed for reference
Seismic Seismic ClassificationClassification
As, A, B, C S (old As and A), B, C
Old A class ranked up to As
Phenomena Phenomena
accompanying accompanying earthquakeearthquake
ConsiderConsider the effect of;the effect of;
・・ Tsunami,Tsunami,
・・ Collapse of around inclined planeCollapse of around inclined plane
1. Main points of the revision1. Main points of the revision
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Basic Earthquake Ground Motion S 1
Basic Earthquake Ground Motion S 1
Basic Earthquake Ground Motion S 2
Basic Earthquake Ground Motion S 2
BeforeBefore
RevisedRevised
Active Faults
Past Earthquakes
Seismo-tectonic Features
Intra-plate Earthquakes
Basic Earthquake Ground Motion SsBasic Earthquake Ground Motion Ss
Inter-plate Earthquakes
Gro
un
d m
otio
n E
valu
atio
nG
rou
nd
mo
tion
Eva
lua
tion
Considered Earthquakes (①)
Gro
un
d m
otio
n E
valu
atio
nG
rou
nd
mo
tion
Eva
lua
tion
Considered Earthquakes (①)
( Horizontal componentonly )
Both Horizontaland Vertical
(②)(②)
(③)
(③)
(④)
(④)
Near Field Earthquake
Maximum Design Earthquake
Extreme Design Earthquake
Shallow Inland Earthquakes
Design Earthquake Ground Motion SdDesign Earthquake Ground Motion Sd
Site-specific Ground motionwith specified source
Ground motion with non-specified source
1.1 DBE Definition - Earthquake Research Flow1.1 DBE Definition - Earthquake Research Flow
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
BeforeBefore
RevisedRevised
Active Faults
Past Earthquakes
Seismo-tectonic Features
c. Intra-plate Earthquakes
a. Inter-plate Earthquakes
b. Shallow Inland Earthquakes
・ Earthquake documents
・ Active faults research
・ Seismicity near site
◆ Consider with each research methods
◆ Consider with each source type
DBE Definition - Earthquake ConsiderationDBE Definition - Earthquake Consideration
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
BeforeBefore
RevisedRevised
◆ Empirical methods (Response spectrum evaluation)
◆ Empirical methods + Strong motion evaluation using Earthquake source model
Point source
Consider the effects of the fault plane
Evaluate the Ground motion directly
DBE Definition – Ground Motion EvaluationDBE Definition – Ground Motion Evaluation
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
BeforeBefore
RevisedRevised
Consider Near-field Earthquake (M6.5) Consider Near-field Earthquake (M6.5) by way of precautionby way of precaution
周期(s)
擬似速度応答スペクトル(cm/s)
0.01 0.1 1 10
1
10
100
Estimate the upper level of the ground Estimate the upper level of the ground motion due to the earthquakes source motion due to the earthquakes source of which are difficult to specify in spite of which are difficult to specify in spite of detailed survey in the vicinity of the of detailed survey in the vicinity of the site, site, directly on the basis of near-source directly on the basis of near-source strong motion recordsstrong motion records
周期(s)
擬似速度応答スペクトル(cm/s)
0.01 0.1 1 10
1
10
100
DBE Definition – Near-Field EarthquakeDBE Definition – Near-Field Earthquake
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
BeforeBefore
RevisedRevised
◆ ◆ Consider the active faults that has activity in 50,000 yearsConsider the active faults that has activity in 50,000 years
◆ ◆ For Ss, consider the active faults that has activity in the late PleistoceneFor Ss, consider the active faults that has activity in the late Pleistocene(( referring to last Interglacial stratareferring to last Interglacial strata [[ about 80,000 – 130,000 years beforeabout 80,000 – 130,000 years before ])])
Active Fault of Low activity (Return period more than 50,000 Active Fault of Low activity (Return period more than 50,000 )) → → Consider as the source of SConsider as the source of S22
Active Fault of high activity (Return period more than 10,000 Active Fault of high activity (Return period more than 10,000 ))
→ → Consider as the source of SConsider as the source of S11
Consider as the source of Inland Earthquakes for SsConsider as the source of Inland Earthquakes for Ss
Active Faults ConsiderationActive Faults Consideration
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
In-landIn-land
Seismic profiling by Seismic profiling by controlled seismic sourcecontrolled seismic source
Seismic ProfilingSeismic Profiling
Off-shoreOff-shore
Supersonic wave surveySupersonic wave survey
・・ Over 10km Over 10km beneathbeneath
the sea bottom can bethe sea bottom can be
searchable now searchable now
1.1. 2 2 Geological SurveyGeological Survey
Requirement for most updated technique and more Requirement for most updated technique and more detailed survey in the vicinity of the sitedetailed survey in the vicinity of the site
RevisedRevised
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
BeforeBefore
RevisedRevised
Consider Vertical Seismic Force as ½ as Horizontal, staticallyConsider Vertical Seismic Force as ½ as Horizontal, statically
Consider Both Horizontal and Vertical Seismic Force dynamicallyConsider Both Horizontal and Vertical Seismic Force dynamically
Dynamic
Dynamic
1.31.3 Consideration of Vertical Seismic ForceConsideration of Vertical Seismic Force
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
BeforeBefore
RevisedRevised
As
A
B
C
4 classes
RPV, PCV etc.
ECCS, RHRS etc.
Main Turbine System etc.
Other Facilities
3 classes
C
B
S
A s … Designed with S 2
also designed with S 1
A … Designed with S 1
( Maintains Safety Function )
( Remains within Elastic limit )
S … Designed with S s
also designed with S d
( Maintains Safety Function )
◆ A and As classes are integrated into S class
( Remains within Elastic limit )
( Remains within Elastic limit )
2. Seismic Classification2. Seismic Classification
Sd = α×Ss , α 0.5≧
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Aseismic classification and seismic force
★ Total of four classifications of A, B, C class, and still more important As class.
Before
( Note 5 ) CI : Story shear coefficient to Static force required by civil code for non-nuclear structure( Note 6 ) Although turbine equipment is classified into C class according to a functional classification, turbine equipment of BWR is B
class
PRESENT Example of Major facilities
Seismic force Aseismic
importance BWR PWR
Basic earthquake ground motion S2
As
・Containment Vessel ・Control Rod ・Residual Heat Removal
System ・Emergency Diesel Generator ・Reactor Pressure Vessel
etc
・Containment Vessel ・Control Rod ・Residual Heat Removal
System ・Emergency Diesel Generator ・Reactor Vessel
etc Basic earthquake ground motion S1 or 3.0CI either large
A ・Emergency Corel Cooling System
etc ・Safety injecting System
etc
Seismi force of 1.5CI (Note 5)
B
・Waste Disposal System ・Turbine equipment(Note 5)
etc
・Waste Disposal System etc
Seismi force of 1.0CI C ・Main Generator
etc
・Main Generator ・Turbine equipment(Note 5)
etc
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Example of Major facilities
REVISION
BWR PWR Aseismic
importance Seismic force
・Containment Vessel ・Control Rod ・Residual Heat Removal
System ・Emergency Diesel Generator ・Reactor Pressure Vessel
etc
・Containment Vessel ・Control Rod ・Residual Heat Removal
System ・Emergency Diesel Generator ・Reactor Vessel
etc
・Emergency Corel Cooling System etc
・Safety injecting System etc
S
・Horizontal sesmic force and vertica seismic force
(dynamic)due to the basic earthguake ground
motion Ss are combined both in the unfavorate direction
・Elastic design ground motion Sd or 3.0CI either large
・Waste Disposal System ・Turbine equipment(Note 5)
etc
・Waste Disposal System etc
B same as present
・Main Generator etc
・Main Generator ・Turbine equipment(Note 5)
etc
C same as present
Revised
It is changed into a higher rank from the present classification.
Total of three classifications of S, B, and C class. (Present As and A class were unified and it considered as S class.)
REVISED
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Load combination and allowable limitBefore
★Load combination and allowable limit corresponding to four classifications
PRESENT
Allowable limit Load combination Aseismic
importance Facilities
(1)Capability fully deformation (margin of ductility) as a structure and appropriate safety margin to ultimate strength
(2)Allowable stress based on a
suitable standard and standard
(1)Basic earthquake ground motion S2 and normal load, etc
(2)Either basic earthquake ground motion S1 or static load and normal load, etc
As
Allowable stress based on a suitable standard and standard
Basic earthquake ground motion S1 or static load and normal load, etc
A
same as the above static load and normal load, etc B
same as the above same as the above C
Building/ Structure
(1)Even when the structure of a portion carries out plastic deformation fairly, excessive modification, a crack, breakage, etc. arise and the function of facility is not affected.
(2)Yield stress or the allowable limit of equivalent safety
(1)Basic earthquake ground motion S2 and operating load,etc
(2)Basic earthquake ground motion S1 or static load and operating load etc
As
Yield stress or the allowable limit of equivalent safety
Basic earthquake ground motion S1 or static load and operating load, etc
A
Allowable stress based on a suitable standard and standard
Static load and operating load ,etc
B
same as the above same as the above C
Equipment/
piping
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
REVISION Facilities Aseismic
importance Load combination Allowable limit
S
(1)Basic earthquake ground motion Ss and normal load ,etc
(2) Elastic design ground motion Sd or static load and normal load, etc
same as present
B
Building/ Structure
C same as present same as present
S
(1)Basic earthquake ground motion Ss and operating load, etc
(2)Elastic design ground motion Sd or static load and operating load ,etc
(1)Stress analysis is same as the present .
(2) The check of active component to basic earthquake ground motion Ss is based on comparison with the acceleration using the actual probed examination ,etc
B
Equipment/ piping
C same as present same as present
Revised
★Load combination and allowable limit corresponding to three classifications
REVISED
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
3 . Consideration to the phenomena accompanying earthquake
★The concrete demand is not described
The demand to the natural disaster of a landslide, tsunami or high tide, and others is specified independently.
BeforeBefore
RevisedRevised
(1) Influence of the safety function on the f acilities by collapse of a circumference slope
(2) Influence of the safety function on the f acilities by tsunami
★Followings should be taked into account in the seismic design
The maximum height of tsunami + The water level at the time of high water
★Height of installation of plant ★Water proof design of
facilities or equipment etc
The minimum water level of tsunami ★Management by the design
of facilities or equipment etc
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Ⅲ. Comparison the point of seismic design practice
between Japan and USA
Here present Japan side
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
1. 1. Load combinations and allowable stress limitsLoad combinations and allowable stress limits
Operating states and earthquakes are combined as above, considering probability of earthquakes and probability and duration of accidents.
1year
1day
1hour
1min
DependentEvent
Probability
( / year )
Operating States
( / year )
Earthquake
Com
bina
tion
wit
hS 1
Inde
pend
ent
Eve
nt
S1 (Dependent)
(Ex.) Taking into account of occurrence of S1 in the long term after LOCA
1year
1day
1hour
1min
DependentEvent
Probability
( / year )
Operating States
( / year )
Earthquake
Com
bina
tion
wit
hS 1
Inde
pend
ent
Eve
nt
S1 (Dependent)
1year
1day
1hour
1min
DependentEvent
Probability
( / year )
Operating States
( / year )
Earthquake
Com
bina
tion
wit
hS 1
Inde
pend
ent
Eve
nt
1year
1day
1hour
1min
DependentEvent
DependentEvent
Probability
( / year )
Operating States
( / year )
Earthquake
Com
bina
tion
wit
hS 1
Inde
pend
ent
Eve
nt
S1 (Dependent)
(Ex.) Taking into account of occurrence of S1 in the long term after LOCA
Outlines of Japanese Practice Outlines of Japanese Practice (Based on JEAG 4601)(Based on JEAG 4601)
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Allowable Stress of Piping (Type 1)
Allowable stress state
Stress Class
Primary stress
(including bending stress)
Primary +
Secondary stress
Primary +
Secondary + Peak stress
ⅢAS 2.25 Sm3 Sm
Fatigue usage factor
<= 1.0ⅣAS 3 Sm
S1 (ⅢAS) , S2 (ⅣAS)
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
2.2. 1 1 Spectrum Modal AnalysisSpectrum Modal Analysis
4. Response Analysis
of the Building
3. Input the DBE into the Building, Taking into
Account of the Ground
2. Design Base Earthquake 1. Target Spectrum of DBE
Design FRS FRS
6. Dynamic Design Analysis of Components Based on their Own Proper Periods
5. Making of FRS for Reasonable Evaluation of Components
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
◆ Shear-Beam Modeling of Building○ Consolidates each mass
of each facility and building structure to the floor Level
○ Evaluate Stiffness of Column & Bearing-Wall against Bending-Moment & Shear Force
2.1.1 Structures2.1.1 Structures
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
◆ Response Analysis of Building
○ Modeling of Building
○ Input Ground-Motion from Analysis of Soil
○ Evaluate Response of Each Floor
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
・ Stress must be below allowable stress・ Deformation must be below allowable deformation・ Shear strain must be below allowable strain for Ss
Stress
Collapse
Maximum Load
Linear AreaAllowable Strain for Ss
Shear Strain
Limit Strain
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Beam Element (Wall)
Mass-Stiffness Model 3-D FEM Model
■ Mass-Stiffness Modeling
■ FEM Modeling
質点Mass
Beam Element(Wall)
Beam Element(Floor)Mass
◆ ◆ Structures ModelStructures Model
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Japan USA
・ Occasionally, static force 3Ci *
(for As,A Building) is dominant
* 3 times larger than civil code for
general structure
?
◆ Structures design result
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
・・ Structures - WallStructures - Wall The walls of NPPs’, arranged in a well-balanced manner, are about 10 times as thick as those of general buildings. Reinforcement have a far large diameter than that of general buildings, and is arranged more densely.
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
・・ Structures - Base mat Structures - Base mat
The NPPs have strong foundation slabs 3 – 7 meters thick to withstand a great seismic force.
about 3 – 7 m
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
2.1.2 Piping Systems2.1.2 Piping Systems
RPV
Response Stress Allowable Stress<
Evaluation
Dynamic Design Analysis of equipments based on their own proper periods
Own Proper Periods (s)Res
pon
se A
ccel
erat
ion
(G
)
Input
Allowable Stressex.Allowable stress state ⅢAS : 2.25SmAllowable stress state ⅣAS : 3Sm
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
◆ Design floor response spectrum, Damping Factor
Japan USA
Design floor response spectrum:
10 % Peak Broadening to absorb
model or analysis uncertainty
?
Damping Factor
JEAG4601
・ piping 0.5 ~ 2.5 % ・ welded structure 1.0
・ bolt, rivet fixture 2.0
・ PCCV 3.0
・ reinforced concrete 5.0
RG1.61
・ variable according to
stress level
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
2.2 Time Historical Analysis2.2 Time Historical Analysis for major facilitiesfor major facilities
Time (s)
Input DBE waveA
ccel
erat
ion
(G
al)
CRD Guide Tube
CRD Housing
Fuel Assembly
Separator
Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV)
RPVStabilizer
PCVStabilizer
Rea
ctor
Bu
ild
ing
Diaphragm Floor
Sh
rou
d
Th
erm
al W
all
Earthquake responses of some components around reactor are evaluated as a coupled system with the building and the ground.
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Japan USA
・ Support for hot piping and component;
・ Mechanical snubber or Oil snubber usually adopted ・ Energy absorbing support like Lead Damper will be adopted for APWR
( Code prepared and verification test finished)
Sticking problem resolved?
◆ Piping and component support design
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
3.1 Achievement of Tadotsu-Shaking Table1985 1990 199
52000 2003
Phase I (Proving Test of component)
PCVs (PWR,BWR), RPVs (PWR,BWR), Core Internals (PWR,BWR), Primary Recirculation Loop (BWR), Primary Coolant Loop (PWR)
Emergency Diesel Generator System,Computer System, Reactor Shutdown Cooling System
Main Steam & Feed Water piping with EBS,RCCV, PCCV, Steam Generator with EBS
1980
Seismic Tests for Regulation
NUPEC JNES
Fragility Test Series
2006
Phase III (New Design and Fragility)
Phase II (Proving Test of System Facilities)
3. Technical Expertise for Seismic Response of Facilities3. Technical Expertise for Seismic Response of Facilities
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
3.2 Example1 Concrete Containment Vessel
Reinforced Concrete Containment Vessel (RCCV)
scale : 1/10
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
Simulation
Design
Tests
◆ Results (RCCV)
increasing input motion gradually (from 2×S2)
Results:
○RCCV was safe up to 5×S2.
○RCCV collapsed by shear force
at 9×S2.
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独立行政法人 原子力安全基盤機構
2.2 Example 2 Seismic Fragility Tests
A:Horizontal Shaft Pump
B:Electrical Panel
C:Control Rod Insertion of PWR
D:Control Rod Insertion of B WR
E:Large Vertical Shaft Pump
C: D: C.R. INSERTION
A: E: PERFORMANCE FOR ROTATION
B:ELECTRICAL FUNCTION
4141
◆ Data Example: Fragility of Electric Panels
EVALUATION METHOD EXPERIMENT
TEST PANELSCRITICAL ACCELARATION
(x9.8m/s2)CRITICAL PARTS
INPUT ACCELARATION
(x9.8m/s2)TEST RESULTS
Main Control Panel 5.6 (S-S) display system 6 (S-S, F-B) No Malfunction
Reactor Auxiliary ControlPanel
9.8 (F-B) module switch 6 (S-S, F-B) No Malfunction
Logic Unit Panel 6.7 (S-S) power unit 6 (S-S, F-B) No Malfunction
Signal Processing Panel 4.4 (S-S) AC controller card 4.3 (S-S)Error of AC
controller card
Instrumentation Rack 4.2 (S-S)differentialpressure
transmitter6 (S-S, F-B) No Malfunction
Motor Control Center 4.5 (F-B) auxiliary relay 6 (F-B)
Error of magneticcontactor causedby auxiliary relay
chatter
Power Center 4.4 (F-B) air circuit breaker 5.0 (F-B)Damage of aircircuit breaker
Metal-Clad Switchgear 4.2 (S-S)vacuum circuit
breaker4.7 (F-B)
Damage ofvacuum circuit
breaker
DIFFERENT TYPE PANELSCRITICAL ACCELARATION
(x9.8m/s2)CRITICAL PARTS
Logic Unit Panel 6.2 (S-S) auxiliary relay
Motor Control Center 7.1 (F-B)molded case circuit
breakerPower Center 4.3 (F-B) protection relay
Metal-Clad Switchgear 4.0 (S-S)vacuum circuit
breaker
4242
Comparison the point of seismic design practice between Japan and USA
Hoping USA side will be presented in near future
4343
Ⅳ. Conclusion ・ Research on Niigataken Tyustsu-Oki Earthquake July 2007is now on-goi
ng
・ This colloquium seems to be good occasion to present followings sequentially
1. Research output on the earthquake and influence to Kashiwazaki NPP 2. Lessons learned 3. Re- evaluation result of existing NPPs
4. How item 2 and 3 treated in Japanese seismic design code