06-09-11 ubcja restructuring nycdcc 5-26-11

8/6/2019 06-09-11 UBCJA Restructuring NYCDCC 5-26-11

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June 29, 2011

Honorable Richard M. Berman

United States District Judge

United States District Court (SDNY)

Daniel Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse500 Pearl Street, Courtroom 21B

New York, NY 10007

Re: United States v. District Council of New York and Vicinity of the United Brotherhood of

Carpenters & Joiners of America, et al; (Index No. 90 Civ. 5722) (RMB)

DearJudge Berman:

This letteris in response to the May 26, 2011 United BrotherhoodofCarpenters & Joiners of

America, (UBCJA) International Union and the New York City District CouncilofCarpenters

(NYCDCC) and Lathamand Watkins proposed Restructuring Plan forthe NYCDCC, while its Local

Union autonomy has been suspended undera temporary Trusteeship imposed under the LMRDA.

Perthe Court Conference ofJune 28, 2011, we are submitting this toyou as we requestedandas you

have approved.

It is ourpurpose and intent to clearly identify specific instances ofviolations ofFederal Laws relative

to the contract (CBA) and within the Restructuring Plan which do not eliminate the fraudor

corruption, orserve torestore the democratic function & purposes ofthe Consent Decree and the

NLRA.

As yourhonoris aware, the Attorneys representing United BrotherhoodofCarpenters rank & file

memberlegal interests in this matter, the United States Attorneys Office and the Independent Review

Officer, both have an enormous taskaheadofthem in deciphering the entire 21-yearhistoryofthis

RICO action.

Togetherand with the input ofrank & file Union Carpenters through RO Walshs Advisory

Committee, theymust strike and severanyandall illegal Contract language, UBCJA Constitution &

NYCDCC By-Law illegallanguage; and Pension, Annuity, Health & Welfare and Apprentice Trust

Fundlanguage known toviolate the NLRA and LMRDA. The savings and severability clause

language, which add nothing, have allowed the illegallanguage toremain, and evermore illegal

language tobe added to the contracts overthe duration ofthe Consent Decree and particularly within

the past 16-years during the tenure ofthe UBCs International General President.

The items addressedabove furtherrequire vettingforconformance to ERISA, EBSA, SEC

regulations and Internal Revenue Code laws and statutes. This is a serious undertaking, which cannot

be rushedorforced through, in amere 30-day timeframe as the UBCJA Internationalare attempting

at this juncture ofthese proceedings, or, within the 10-days requestedat the Court conference on June

28th.


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The UBCJA & NYCDCC RESTRUCTURING PLAN dated May 26, 2011, in that it has been put

forth as fully complying with the Consent Decree, without propervetting, review and implementationofthe veto pen, is beingrushed throughby the UBCJA attorneys, who know full well that it does not

comply with the Consent Decree orthe laws cited.

Theiracceleration ofthe Restructuring Plan shouldbe viewed with skeptical eyes, as it evinces their

desire to see what they can get away with before this honorable Court.

We ask that you review this letter, the issues presented within in and the cases citedbefore approving

any portion oftheirrequest.

Sincerely,

John Musumeci

William T. Doherty

Cc: file

Where citation to case-law is lengthy, bolded or underlined it is for member benefit (context).


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UBCJA INTERNATIONALRESTRUCTURING & BY-LAW PLAN dated May 26, 2011

With regard to the Latham & Watkins letter, at page-1, paragraph 2:

Sentence one, right out ofthe gate the UBCJA Internationaland theircounselofrecord which the

rank & file members payfordirectly, start with a 40-page Lexis-Nexis report from the UniversityofCalifornia, Boalt Hall JournalofCriminal Law.

Saidreport is afirmreminderofpast and present crimes. Judge Conboy states: Although these

efforts have successfullybroken the cycle ofmurders, beatings, disappearances, andviolence that

plagued the District Councilbefore the imposition ofthe Consent Decree, they have not yet been able

to stamp out corruption, racketeeringand Benefit Fundabuses. The members & yourhonorshould

note the emphasison murderas the first reminderofwhat can anddoes occur; and, that there is an

intent here, duly imparted to the UBC rank & file members conscious mind which stands contrary to

the fraudulent claims ofapathymade by the IRO.

With regard to the Latham & Watkins letter, at page-1, paragraph 3;

Judge Conboy stated: More recently, while these anti-corruption efforts have been ongoing, the

District Counciland the UBC have alsobeen fighting to preserve the economic viabilityofthe

Carpentersfranchise in New York. Not only has the Unionbeen challengedby the national economic

crisis (a thirdofthe active membership is out ofworkandmanyof the remainderare workingonly

sporadically), but it is also underattackbyboth non-union labor(including undocumented workers)

andrival unions. http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=US&vol=295&invol=495

With regard to the Latham & Watkins letter, at page-2, paragraph 2, sentence 2:

Judge Conboy stated: The economic downturn has greatlyreduced the numberofconstruction

projects, with the New York Citymarket decreasing 22% between 2006 and 2009. With fewer

construction projects, the total numberofhours workedby Union carpenters decreasedfrom 17.2

million to 14.4 million.

This statement regarding the Total Man-Hours reported to the Benefit Funds is in direct contravention

to the Second Report ofthe IRO, dated_____which declared the Political Contribution Assessment of

5-cents an hourtobe $1,155,132 for FY 2007, $1,055,129 forFY 2008 and $882,045 forFY 2009.

Predicatedon the Nickelan HourPolitical Department assessment forthe years 07-09, Total Man-

Hours (M/H) are as follows, FY-2007 23,102,640 M/H, FY 2008 21,102,580 M/Hand FY 2009

17,640,900 M/H.

Fiscalyear2007 recorded 23.1 Million man-hours verses the 17.2 Million man-hours reported to the

Court by Latham & Watkins, equating toa 5.9 Million man-hour, or34.30% differential.

Fiscalyear2009 recorded 17.6 Million man-hours verses the 14.2 Million man-hours reported to the

Court by Latham & Watkins, equating toa 3.4 Million man-hour, or23.94% differential.


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Here alone, forthe two Fiscal Yearnotedabove, Latham & Watkins, LLP has reported to the Court

9.3 Million man-hours less than what was actuallyrecorded tobolsterthe UBCJAs position fora

National & NYCDCC Economic Crisis; and, accordingly since the figures are suspect, they should

be granted no weight by this Court.

The differingfigures are being usedby the UBCJA International to justify theirbogus claimofa

National Economic Crisis so critical to the NYCDCC that they wouldrequest that this Court approve

a 100% Full Mobilityrequirement forthe entire Territorial Jurisdiction ofthe New York City District

CouncilofCarpenters and the creation ofan InteriorSystems Local Union, that it warrants

suspension of the NLRA & LMRDA laws and that the UBCJA Internationalbe allowed to subsume a

role guaranteedonly the Congress ofthe Unites States ofAmerica, that being - the authorityofthe

Legislative Branch ofgovernment toauthor/write, vote, enact andamend Federal Law.

Moreover, Latham & Watkins and the UBCJA International Union have intentionally skewed these

figures to present false andmisleadingdata to the Court and this so called National Economic Crisisis beingfurtheredby the Building Trades and Employers Association (BTEA) viaabogus 26-point

plan and Subway Campaign, replete with advertising tofalsely persuade the Public, the Politicians

and the Courts that NYCDCC Union Carpenters wage andbenefit packages are too high and

unsustainable.

FY 2010 man-hourdata is not yet published. However, predicatedon the recordedand paid Man-

Hours using the 15,294 active memberfigure from 10/31/10 andan average Hourly wage for

rounding purposes of$43.00 perM/Hforthe CarpenterJourneyman package (as abase estimate) and

utilizing the FY 2009 M/H Totalof17,640,900 total M/H's:

On average the rank & file journeyman Carpenterwouldgross 1,153 M/H x $43 = $49,579.00

peryear.

At an average of35% with-holding < $17,353>, net take home pay = $32,226 before the rank

& file workerfiles a short orlongform itemized tax return. That translates to $619.73 per

week net pay, hardly enough tolive in NYC.....BTEA wants toreduce this by 20-25%and

honestlybelieves that people living in oraround NYCDCC, orthe 5-Boroughs are making it

in New York.

It seems appropriate, in light ofthe proposed Restructuring Plan & Bylaw changes that prior toany

change, that more detailedanalysis is required. The Trustees & Fiduciaries shouldbe required to

produce areport detailing numbers foreach local union (Total, Average, Mean) andbe required to

show ademographicbreakdown byage, the ratioofapprentices to journeyman employed, the ratioof

woman employedandofminorities as dataavails itself.

The reports shouldalsodepict the man-hourrelation to the dollarvolume and type ofwork produced

in anygiven year, andfurtherbe broken down by specific American Institute ofArchitect (AIA) &

Construction Standards Institute (CSI) General Conditions & all Division ofWork - shown in detail

by Specification Section fromreports garneredby & from GC's & Subcontractors.


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Moreover, given the amounts ofmonies spent on Labor-Management Relations, this should come in

the formofamandate byaformalorderofthe Court. Ifthe current leadership does not have this

information available to themat the snap ofafinger, (through the IT dept. & the funds) they cannot

begin toaddress anylong term problems, let alone the immediate ones.

Ifthe NYCDCC employees do not comprehend why these facts, data & numbers are required - they

shouldbe summarilyvetoedandreplaced with competent executives with a comprehensive

knowledge ofthe Construction Industry.

The fact ofthe matteris, approving the requested By-Law changes andgranting the UBCJA

the legislative powerofCongress, in abolishing the NLRA & LMRDA laws willlead toone

thing Wage & Benefit Packages forInteriorSystems Local Unions in which the Journeyman

Carpenters shallbe expected to workfor60% ofthe wages ofthe full Journeyman Package bythe illegal creation ofHelperCategories as is now beingdone in the Pacific Northwest

Regional CouncilofCarpenters. Moreover, the UBCJA has implementeda National Skills

Form with facially unlawfullanguage, known to them, theircounselofrecord PNWRCC

counsel toviolate the NLRA, LMRDA andmany Supreme Court precedent andlandmark

decisions. Movants shalladdress this in a separate exhibit attached hereto.

With regard to the Latham & Watkins letter, at page-2, paragraph 2, sentence 1:

Latham & Watkins, LLP stated: In 2010, the District Council commissionedoutside consultants

from FMI Corporation (confidentialreport, which they have sat on since last August to insure therewouldbe insufficient time to challenge it, the sources, etc) to prepare a studyofthe market forUnion

Carpentry. That study was attachedas Exhibit B, and it states that the District Council is at precarious

crossroads.

The economic downturn has greatlyreduced the numberofConstruction Projects, with the New

York Citymarkerdecreasing 22% between 2006 and 2009. With fewerconstruction projects, the total

numberofhours workedby Union Carpenters decreasedfrom 17.2 million to 14.4 million.. re:

Latham & Watkins at 2.

Movants have investigated this firmandforcefullyobject to the acceptance ofthe FMI Corp. Report

as havinganybasis in fact. It is a completelybiasedreport, froman agency known tobe a Union

Busterwithin the Construction Industry. FMI Corporation core experience dates to perhaps 2007 with

the Architectural & Engineering (A/E) markets.

The core business has matured past "accounting" forsmallbit players in the non-union Associated

Builders & Contractors (ABC) construction sector- to teaching & trainingand conducting seminars.

In short, most seminars are in essence an excuse fora weekendfield trip toa Luxury Resort in which

just enough, the bare minimumofbusiness is conductedas it is so called, to qualify the Corporate

Fieldtrips tofarawaydestinations as a write-offwith the IRS - nothingmore, nothingless.


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There isn't alarge Engineering News Record (ENR) Construction Firmormoderately sized Regional

GC orSubcontractorwho would consideran ounce ofadvice from this firm. The sophisticated

Regional players Doug McCarron speaks ofare the large Multi-Billion dollartop Engineering News

Record (ENR) firms and they willgenerallyavoid hiring such afirm, particularlygiven theirrelative

inexperience in the largerscheme ofthe industryas a whole. ($30M Gross).

FMI, Inc's core business is in the Right to WorkforLess States ofNorth Carolina, Florida, and

Arizona & in Seoul, Korea. They train people andbusiness how toavoid the laws, theircorporate

resume dates to 2007.

FMI, Inc has neverbuilt ormanageda project ofany size, norcould they. Accordingly, no credible or

reputable firm would take anyadvice from them. They host Weekend & Work-Weekgetaway

Seminars on meaningless topics, which bydesign are an excuse forthe Corporate get away soyou

can get aroundofGolfin at a high endresort, hit the slopes, go jet-skiing etc. and conduct just

enough so calledbusiness to qualify the trip as a Tax Write-Off/Business expense forthe attending

Corporations & Firms, barely passing IRS rules.

Certain seminars are primarilygeared towards avoiding & end-running the law. Topics such as "How

toget a WaiverofSovereign Immunityfrom Indian Tribes" give you areallygood ideaoftheir

mindset towardbusiness and the rule oflaw.

FMI Corporation has not producedone legitimate LaborReport which can be verifiedby the Court,

the United States Attorneys office or the IROs office, norhave they producedone legitimate Federal

Tax Return foran ENR top 10 GC ortop 10 Subcontractordepicting Gross Profit Margins of24%

(Union) to 37% Non-Union) orthe Net Profit Margins.The Construction Industryaverages 10-12% overheadand profit (OH & P) during the best oftimes;

and, that is qualified toan exceptionally wellrun firm - one with the requisite experience, bonding &

credit capacity, equipment, tools and know how sustained through a competent Subcontractor, Ma-

terial Supplier, Vendoranda competent well trained Workforce.

Typicallarge Public Works contracts and Private contracts, regardless ofcontract form, inclusive of

PSA-PLA Agreements are cappedat 5% OH & P. Change orderwork, when warranted is adifferent

animalaltogether.

Were Gross Profit Margins sustainable at 24% to 37%, w/ogetting into net profit margins - the fact is

the NYCDCC and every Trade involved with BTEA, BCTC & ContractorAssociations would have

100% Full Employment, record employment in fact. There isn't an ounce ofCredibilityordiscernable

fact presented within the entire Report. When amanagement consultingfirm with such alimitedrole

within the Multi-Billion dollarUnion Construction Industry, one with a historyofUnion Busting,


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cites as areliable source, the FreedomofInformation Law (FOIL), and its corporate history is

such as described in its own literature anddates to 2007, little credence can be given to the entire re-

port.

The fact ofthe matteris the UBCJA Internationaland the named Labor-Management participants

(pages 76 ofthe Restructuring Plan) directed this firm to write it exactlyas it was "scripted", as a

means to sell theirdoom & gloom prophecy to the Court. It is an insult to people's intelligence & de-

picts the lengths the UBCJA International willgo todefraud the rank & file oftheirdue process rights

and the ability toretain theirLocalautonomyand controlofLocal Union and NYCDCC matters, as

they see fit, andas the law provides.

Anydoubt that BTEA, BCTC & ContractorAssociations are not heavily involved in these matters

can be put torest. This is a collusive andfraudulent effort todefraud the rank & file and the Court.

References:

http://www.fminet.com/fmi-speeches,

http://www.fminet.com/media/pdf/FMI_History.pdf

http://www.nrtw.org/rtws.htm

http://www.nwcarpenters.org

PACIFIC NORTHWEST REGIONALCOUNCILOFCARPENTERS

Movants note the following excerpts from the PNWRCCs newly executed Contract, post dissolution & mer-

gers, wherein the specific goalandaimofthe UBCJA International is togrant the ContractorAssociations an

illegal kickback in wages & benefits, forthe newlyformed InteriorSystems Locals.

y SENIOR DRYWALL UTILITY WORKER (formerlya Journeyman Union Carpenter) $21.40/hr, re-

duced 40% from Journeyman Rate is: $35.66 and set at $39.23 perhourforForeman. Effective: 6-1-10

to 5-31-12 (Illegalre-classification ofa Journeyman Carpenter, to that ofa helper, for40% ofthe for-

merwages andbenefit rate).

y MandatoryAnnual Training, orno Wage Increase perCBA

y OT, M-SAT Double Time After12, insteadofafter10

y Private Jobs $500korLess = 85% ofJourneyman Wage Package

y Eliminate Zone Pay = Full Mobility

y Eliminate Travel Time, Regardless ofDistance to Project


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y When put up on Company Camps...."Camp orBoard Lodging" Paid @ $3.00 /Day.

y Weekend TravelHome...they will payforTollorFerry with documentedreceipt(s)

y NW WALL & CEILING - UTILITY WORKER Wage Scale (not an apprentice) 1st 6-months,

$17.83/hr- 2nd 6-months $19.61/hr

y

Movants note:

UBCJA Constitution, dated November11, 2010, page Standing Decisions of the General Executive

Board, September17, 1887 Grading wages is demoralizing to Union principles and to the

welfare of the Trade and no Local Union should adopt the system of grading wages.

The Proposed NYCDCC Restructuring Plan, with its requisite demandforan Interiorsystems Local,

tobe awarded to the corrupt Wall & Ceiling ContractorAssociation will expresslyviolate the UBCJA

Constitution by the forced impartation ofgraded wages at 40% below Journeyman Wage & Benefit

scale; and, shall thus serve as aformofa kickback to the ContractorAssociation in direct & flagrant

contravention to the requirement that the Consent Decree eliminate any & allforms orracketeering

activityand corruption. This is one such instance, wherein the UBCJA and theircounselattempt to

play the Court forfools via the tobe determined (TBD) language within the 5-26-11 restructuring

plan.

MANDATORY SKILLS FORMS & ONE YEAR "IRREVOCABLEASSIGNMENT" of:

I________________(print name) assign to the __________________(fill in Council) frommy earn-

ings, a sum equal to the Unions Membership Dues. Assessments, and Initiation Fee (the Union will

notifymy Employerofthe current amount). I authorize & direct my Employertodeduct such sum

and toremit the Money to the Union Monthly.

This Assignment is irrevocable forOne (1) Yearfrom this date oruntil Termination ofthe Labor

Agreement, whicheveroccurs first. This Assignment shallbe renewed Automatically, forsuccessive

12-month periods, unless the Union andmy Employerreceive my written Notice ofTermination of

this Assignment not more than twenty (20) days and not less than ten (10) days priortorenewalofthe

Assignment.

This Authorization is effective regardless ofmy status as a Member, Non-Member, or"Financial


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Core" payerandapplies regardless ofany Future Resignation ofMembership on my part.

I herebyauthorize the UNITED BROTHERHOOD OF CARPENTERS AND JOINERS OF AMER-

ICA toact as my collective bargainingagent in dealing with my employer in regards to wages, hours,

andotherconditions ofemployment. All previous authorizations made byme are revoked.

Name:_______________________________________Date:_______________________________

On March 1, 2011, the attorneys representing the NYCDCC, DeCarlo, Connor& Shanley, vialetter,

sought an opinion from the Court toallow interested parties, e.g. parties to the collective bargaining

agreement in question, the Consent Decree, andother interested parties, the opportunity tomake

submissions to the Court regarding theirposition on this issue, and have the Court issue aruling that

would clarify the matter.

The reference was made to the Final Orderand Judgment ofContempt and Remedy (Order) Docu-

ment #961, dated May 26, 2009 with respect to the 67% - 33% Request SystemforHiring Workers

and Employees from the NYCDCC Out ofWork List (OWL).

On April 1, 2011, vialetter, DeCarlo, Connor& Shanley stated The District Council wishes to ex-

plore with the Association ofWall-Ceilingand CarpenterIndustries ofNew York, Inc. (Associa-

tion) aresolution ofthe issue that is acceptable toall parties and in accordance with the Order. Thus,the District Councildoes not wish toburden the Court at this time with this issue. Brian F. Quinn

subsequently withdrew the request priorto the April 6th Conferencing session.

On May 26, 2011, 10-days afterpro-se Movants filed the motion forrelief, the UBCJA International

and the NYCDCC publisheda 138-page Restructuring Plan, wherein theirnew position toavoid

compliance with the Court Orderdated May 26, 2009 regarding the 67% - 33% mandate forhiring

from the OWL wouldbe replacedby the UBCJA & the Wall & Ceiling Association simply eliminat-

ing the 50-50 Rule and the 67%-33% May 26, 2009 Court Orderaltogether.

This position does not make law. Moreover, said position is an express violation ofthe Consent

Decree and the Court Orderand is a Unilateral Change toboth the Collective Bargaining Agreement

and the Consent Decree, as perNLRB v. Katz, 369 US 736 (1962); and, as such is a prima-facie vi-

olation ofNLRA Sec. 8(a)(5).

The UBC statements regarding establishment ofa Labor-Management Corporation are patentlyfalse,

as one already exists, andmembers are already taxedandassessedforthese services.


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Moreover, theircommentary that and Wall & Ceilingandotheremployerswillingness to participate

may well hinge on the elimination ofthe so-called 50-50 rule (Latham & Watkins letterat pg. 5)

have nobasis in fact orlaw. It is what they stated in theirMarch 16, 2011 letter, nothingmore than a

position.

Painting it as a critical issue with the notation that UBC General President Douglas McCarron will

seekameeting with Review OfficerDennis Walsh and Assistant United States Attorney Benjamin

Torrance within the next ten days todo so, lends nomore credence to theirposition. Ref: UBC at 5,

Latham & Watkins 5-26-11 letter.

Movants request the Court issue an Orderto Show cause, perstandard Court Motion Practice

andforce the UBCJA Internationaland the NYCDCC and theirattorneys tobring the issues

they wish todiscuss directly to the Court. Movants furtherrequest a permanent Injunction re-straining the UBCJA International & the NYCDCC fromanyfurtherattempts toback-door

theirdesire tore-write the Consent Decree terms and conditions to suit theirown agenda, and

that ofwhat has proved tobe a corrupt Contractorassociation via informal Conferencing pro-

cedures andrelaxed Court Rules.

The United States Court ofAppeals forthe Second Circuit which decision issued February 20, 2007

made it amply clearat 9, pg. 7 The Consent Decree is clearand unambiguous. King, 65 F. 3d. at

1058. The Consent Decree addresses CBAs in two places: Paragraph 4(f)(1)(b) and Job Referral Rule5(B). However, neither empowers the Union to circumvent the Consent Decree through a CBA.

At 14, pg 8, the Court ofAppeals stated Rule 5(B) does not permit the Union tomake unlimited

changes to the Job Referral Rules in a CBA. This is particularly true when Job Referral Rule 5(B) is

read in conjunction with Consent Decree Paragraph 11, which again, provide that [t}o the extent that

this Consent Decree conflicts with any current orfuture rights, privileges orrules applicable to the

District Councilor its membership, the District Councilhereby waives compliance with any such

right, privilege orrule an agrees that it and its membership willact in accordance with this Consent

Decree.

At 21, pg. 8, the Court ofAppeals stated Paragraph 11 further requires the Union to make the

Job Referral Rules part of the District Council By-Laws.

Movants note that the UBCJA International, the District Counciland its attorneys ofrecord

have failed toabide by this specific requirement and include the Job Referral Rules part ofthe


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District Council By-Laws as orderedby the Court. Ref: Exhibit C, pg. 94-125 ofLatham &

Watkins May 26, 2011 138-page Restructuring Plan Status Update.

Movants respectfullyrequest the Court issue a contempt Orderanddirect the UBCJA, the

District Council, its agents andattorneys ofrecordand the Wall & Ceiling ContractorAssocia-

tions frommakingany such changes, and/or issuingany Unilateral Contract changes to the

CBAs; andagain respectfullyrequest that the contract be extendedforone-year, to preserve

andmaintain the status-quo until such a time as the Local Union Elections, the District Coun-

cil Elections are held, all statutory election challenges, ifanyare heardandresolved per

DOL/OLMS requirements oflaw and the Local Union and District Councillimited suspen-

sion oftheirautonomy is restoredas requiredbylaw.

Movants note that the 18-month statutory period has expired, and has alimited extension

which we askbe rescindedby Orderofthis Court. Movants request that intervening supervi-

sion be placed underthe controlofthe United States Attorneys office, the Independent Re-

view Officerand the District Councils new DirectorofOperations.

NORTHEAST REGIONALCOUNCIL SKILLFORM INDIVIDUALCONTRACT WAIVER

PLEASE PRINT LEGIBLY! Mark!below.I ama:

[ ] Journeyman carpenter[ ] Apprentice carpenterYear_______________Name_______________________________________________________Date___________________UBC ID#_____________________UBC Local #____________Date ofBirth______________________Ad-dress_____________________________________________________________________________City_______________________State______Zip__________Email_____________________________Phone #___________________________

YOU MUST BE AVAILABLE TO ANSWER THIS PHONE NUMBERBETWEEN 2 P.M.

AND 6 P.M.Ethnicity (Optional):[ ] Asian [ ] Hispanic orLatino [ ] White [ ] BlackorAfrican American [ ] Other

YOU HAVE EXPERIENCE TO ACCEPT WORK IN THE FOLLOWING:(Mark with an !below.)


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[ ] Metal Framing [ ] Concrete Carpet Flooring Transit Level[ ] Drywall [ ] Bridges/Highway Sheet Goods Total Station[ ] Drywall Finishing [ ] HeavyHighway Vinyl Tile NuclearFacilities[ ] Ceilings [ ] Wood Framing Wood Flooring (Nail,Glue) Foreman[ ] Trim & Millwork [ ] Scaffolding Wood Flooring (Sand & Finish) Drug-Tested Jobs

[ ] Solid Surface [ ] Will work with Heights Synthetic TurfInstallation Lather[ ] Cabinetry [ ] Siding/Roofing ComputerFloor[ ] Store Front [ ] Piledriving[ ] Doors & Hardware [ ] Welding[ ] Fixtures-Furniture[ ] Concrete[ ] Bridges/Highway[ ] HeavyHighway[ ] Wood Framing[ ] Scaffolding[ ] Will work with Heights

[ ] Siding/Roofing[ ] Piledriving[ ] Welding[ ] Doors & Hardware[ ] Fixtures-Furniture[ ] Carpet Flooring[ ] Sheet Goods[ ] Vinyl Tile[ ] Wood Flooring (Nail,Glue)[ ] Wood Flooring (Sand & Finish)[ ] Synthetic TurfInstallation[ ] ComputerFloor[ ] Transit Level[ ] Total Station[ ] NuclearFacilities[ ] Foreman[ ] Drug-Tested Jobs[ ] Lather

PLEASE MARK WHICH COUNTIESWITHIN YOURLOCAL IN WHICH YOU PREFER

TO WORK. Members of

Specialty Locals 252, 251, 178, and 39 may mark any county in any state.(Mark with an Xbelow)

New Jersey Commercial Locals

Local 255[ ] Atlantic

Local 254[ ] Hunterdon

Local 253[ ] Bergen[ ] Burlington [ ] Mercer[ ] Essex


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[ ] Camden [ ] Middlesex [ ] Hudson[ ] Cape May [ ] Morris [ ] Passaic[ ] [ ] Cumberland [ ] SomersetNewYorkCommercialLocals

Local 291 Local 290 Local 279 Local 277

[ ] Albany [ ] Nassau [ ] Columbia [ ] Broome[ ] Clinton [ ] Suffolk [ ] Dutchess [ ] Cayuga[ ] Essex [ ] Orange [ ] Chemung[ ] Franklin [ ] Putnam [ ] ChenangoLocal 276

[ ] Allegany[ ] Cattaraugus[ ] Chautauqua[ ] Erie[ ] Somerset[ ] Sussex

[ ] Union[ ] Warren[ ] Gloucester[ ] Monmouth[ ] Ocean[ ] Salem[ ] Fulton [ ] Rockland [ ] Cortland[ ] Greene [ ] Sullivan [ ] Delaware[ ] Hamilton [ ] Ulster[ ] Herkimer[ ] Montgomery [ ] Westchester[ ] Jefferson[ ] Rensselaer[ ] Lewis[ ] Saratoga [ ] Madison[ ] Schenectady [ ] Oneida[ ] Schoharie [ ] Onondaga[ ] Warren [ ] Oswego[ ] Washington [ ] Otsegoh l[ ] Livingston[ ] Monroe[ ] Niagara[ ] Ontario[ ] Orleans[ ] Wayne[ ] Wyomingg[ ] Schuyler[ ] Seneca[ ] St. Lawrenc[ ] Steuben[ ] Tioga[ ] Tompkins[ ] Yates


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YOUARE TRAINED / CERTIFIED IN THE FOLLOWING:(Mark with an !below.)[ ] Boom Truck Cert [ ] Cleanroom Class [ ] Asbestos Abatement[ ] ROV Operator[ ] DoorHardware [ ] Firestop Class[ ] Forklift Industrial [ ] Certified Locksmith [ ] Foreman A Class

[ ] Forklift Rough Terrain [ ] Solid Surface InstallerClass [ ] PowderActuated Tool[ ] Rigging [ ] First Aid / CPR Cert [ ] Lead Renovator[ ] Hand Signaler Rigging [ ] PALM (Built-Rite) [ ] Fall Protection[ ] Scaffold Erector[ ] HAZMAT [ ] Certified Steward[ ] Scaffold User[ ] OSHA 10 [ ] TWIC Card[ ] Certified Welder[ ] OSHA 30 [ ] STP Cert[ ] Light Gauge Weld [ ] MSDS [ ] WABO Cert[ ] RebarStick Weld [ ] Hazardous Waste 40 Hour[ ] Blueprint Reading[ ] RebarWire Weld [ ] FORBO [ ] LaserLevel[ ] Stick Cert Weld [ ] INSTALL Carpet [ ] Green Awareness[ ] TIG Cert Weld [ ] INSTALL Resilient [ ] Ceiling Certification

[ ] Wire Cert Weld [ ] INSTALL Wood 1 [ ] Confined Space[ ] Insulated Concrete Forms [ ] INSTALL Wood 2 [ ] NuclearPlant Access

COMMENTS:___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

I ____________________________________(Print Name), assign to the Northeast Regional Coun-cilofCarpenters, frommy earnings, a sum equal to the Unions check-offassessment and initiationfee (the Council will notifymy Employerofthe current amount). I authorize anddirect my Employertodeduct such sumandremit the money to the Union monthly. This assignment is irrevocable forone(1) yearfrom this date oruntil the termination ofthe LaborAgreement, whicheveroccurs first. Thisassignment shallbe renewedautomatically, forsuccessive12 month periods, unless the Union andmyemployerreceive my written notice oftermination ofthis assignment not more than twenty(20) days and not less than ten (10) days prior torenewalofthe assignment.

This authorization is effective regardless ofmy status as amember, nonmember, orfinancial corepayerandapplies regardless ofanyfuture resignation ofmembership on my part.

I herebyauthorize the NORTHEAST REGIONALCOUNCIL OF CARPENTERS toact as mycollective bargainingagent in dealing with my employer in regard to wages, hours, andothercondi-tions ofemployment. All previous authorizations made byme are revoked.

Signature_______________________________________________Date______________________

SKILL(S) FORM Prima-facie example of Illegal Individual Contract by the UBCJA Intl.

In Steele v. Louisville N.R. Co. 323 US 192 (1944), the supreme Court noted at:


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Section 2, Second, requiring carriers tobargain with the representative so chosen, operates to

exclude anyotherfromrepresentinga craft. Virginian R. Co. v. System Federation, supra, 300 U.S.

545 , 57 S. Ct. 598. The minoritymembers ofa craft are thus deprivedby the statute ofthe right,

which they wouldotherwise possess, to choose arepresentative oftheirown, and its members cannot

bargain individuallyonbehalfofthemselves as tomatters which are properly the subject ofcollective

bargaining. OrderofRailroad Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 , 64 S.Ct. 582,

and see underthe like provisions ofthe National LaborRelations Act J. I. Case Co. v. National Labor

Relations Board, 321 U.S. 332 , 64 S.Ct. 576, and Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. National Labor

Relations Board, 321 U.S. 678 , 64 S.Ct. 830.

The labororganization chosen tobe the representative ofthe craft orclass ofemployees is thus

chosen torepresent allof its members, regardless oftheirunion affiliations orwant ofthem. As we

have pointedout with respect to the like provision ofthe National LaborRelations Act, 29 U.S.C.A.

151 et seq., in J. I. Case Co. v. National LaborRelations Board, supra, 321 U.S. 338 , 64 S.Ct. 580,

'The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the termsof separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining

power and serve the welfare of the group. Its benefits andadvantages are open to every employee

ofthe repre- [323 U.S. 192, 201] sented unit ....'The purpose of providing for a representative is

to secure those benefits for those who are represented and not to deprive them or any of them of

the benefits of collective bargaining for the advantage of the representative or those members of

the craft who selected it..

MOVANTS NOTE THE NLRA & RLA are intertwined in statutory text.

The representative which thus discriminates maybe enjoinedfrom sodoing, and its members maybe enjoinedfrom taking the benefit ofsuch discriminatoryaction. Nomore is the Railroadboundby

orentitled to take the benefit ofa contract which the bargainingrepresentative [323 U.S. 192, 204]

is prohibitedby the statute frommaking. In both cases the right asserted, which is derived from

the duty imposed by the statute on the bargaining representative, is a federal right implied from

the statute and the policy which it has adopted. It is the federal statute which condemns as

unlawful the Brotherhood's conduct.'The extent and nature ofthe legal consequences ofthis

condemnation, though left by the statute to judicialdetermination, are nevertheless tobe derivedfrom

it and the federal policy which it has adopted.' Deitrickv. Greaney, 309 U.S. 190, 200 , 201 S., 60

S.Ct. 480, 485; BoardofCommissioners ofJackson Countyv. United States, 308 U.S. 343 , 60 S.Ct.

285; Sola Electric Co. v. Jefferson Electric Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 , 177 S., 63 S.Ct. 172, 173, 174; cf.

Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 , 63 S.Ct. 573.

Solongas alaborunion assumes toact as the statutoryrepresentative ofa craft, it cannot rightly

refuse to perform the duty, which is inseparable from the powerofrepresentation conferred upon it, to

represent the entire membership ofthe craft. While the statute does not deny to such abargaining

labororganization the right todetermine eligibility to its membership, it does require the union, in

collective bargainingand in making contracts with the carrier, torepresent non- union orminority

union members ofthe craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in goodfaith.


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Wherevernecessary to that end, the union is required to considerrequests ofnon-union members of

the craft and expressions oftheirviews with respect to collective bargaining with the employerand to

give to them notice ofandopportunityforhearing upon its proposedaction.

Since the right asserted by petitioner 'is ... claimed ... under the Constitution' and a 'statute of

the United States', the decision of theAlabama court adverse to that contention is reviewable

here under 237(b) of the JudicialCode, 28 U.S.C.A. 344(b), unless the Railway LaborAct itself

has excluded petitioner's claims from judicial consideration. The ques- [323 U.S. 192, 205] tion here

presented is not one ofa jurisdictionaldispute, determinable underthe administrative scheme set up

by the Act, cf. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297 , 64 S.Ct. 95; General

Committee v. Missouri-Kansas-Texas R. Co., 320 U.S. 323 , 64 S.Ct. 146; General Committee v.

Southern Pacific Co., 320 U.S. 338 , 64 S.Ct. 142; BrotherhoodofRailway & Steamship Clerks v.

United Transport Service Employees, 320 U.S. 715 , 64 S.Ct. 260; Id., 320 U.S. 816 , 64 S.Ct. 435, or

restrictedby the Act tovoluntary settlement byrecourse to the traditional implements ofmediation,

conciliation andarbitration. General Committee v. Missouri- Kansas-Texas R. Co., supra, 320 U.S.332, 337 , 64 S.Ct. 150, 153.

IN J.I. CASE, 321 US 332 (1944)

The petitioner, J. I. Case Company, at its Rock Island, Illinois, plant, from 1937 offered each

employee an individual contract ofemployment. The contracts were uniformandfora termofone

year

While the individual contracts executed August 1, 1941 were in effect, a C.I.O. union petitioned the

Boardforcertification as the exclusive bargainingrepresentative ofthe production andmaintenance

employees. On December17, 1941 a hearing was held, at which the Company urged the individualcontracts as abartorepresentation proceedings. The Board, however, directedan election, which was

won by the union. The union was thereupon certifiedas the exclusive bargainingrepresentative of the

employees in question in respect to wages, hours, andotherconditions ofemployment. [321 U.S.

332, 334] The union then asked the Company tobargain. It refused, declaring that it could not deal

with the union in anymanneraffectingrights andobligations underthe individual contracts while

theyremained in effect. .

The Board held that the Company hadrefused tobargain collectively, in violation of8(5) ofthe

National LaborRelations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. 158(5); and that the contracts hadbeen utilized, bymeans

ofthe circulars, to impede employees in the exercise ofrights guaranteedby 7 ofthe Act, 29U.S.C.A. 157, with the result that the Company had engaged in unfairlaborpractices within the

meaningof8(1) ofthe Act. It ordered the Company to cease anddesist fromgiving effect to the

contracts, from extending themorentering into new ones, fromrefusing tobargain andfrom

interfering with the employees; and it required the Company togive notice accordinglyand tobargain

upon request...

Individual contracts no matter what the circumstances that justify their execution or what

their terms, may not be availed of to defeat or delay the procedures prescribed by the National

Labor RelationsActlooking to collective bargaining, norto exclude the contracting employee


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fromadulyascertainedbargaining unit; normay theybe used toforestallbargainingor tolimit or

condition the terms ofthe collective agreement.

'The Board asserts a public right vested in it as a public body, charged in the public interest

with the duty of preventing unfair labor practices.' National Licorice Co. v. National Labor

Relations Board, 309 U.S. 350, 364 , 60 S.Ct. 569, 577. Wherever private contracts conflict withits functions, they obviously must yield or the Act would be reduced to a futility. [321U.S. 332,

338] It is equally clear since the collective trade agreement is to serve the purpose

contemplated by theAct, the individual contract cannot be effective as a waiver of any benefit

to which the employee otherwise would be entitled under the trade agreement. The very purpose

ofprovidingby statute forthe collective agreement is to supersede the terms ofseparate agreements

ofemployees with terms which reflect the strength andbargaining powerand serve the welfare ofthe

group. Its benefits andadvantages are open to every employee ofthe represented unit, whateverthe

type orterms ofhis pre-existing contract ofemployment.

It also is urged that such individual contracts may embodymatters that are not necessarily includedwithin the statutory scope ofcollective bargaining, such as stock purchase, group insurance,

hospitalization, ormedicalattention. We know ofnothing to prevent the employee's, because he is an

employee, makingany contract provided it is not inconsistent with a collective agreement ordoes not

amount toorresult fromoris not part ofan unfairlaborpractice. But in sodoing the employermay

not incidentally exact orobtain anydiminution ofhis own obligation orany increase ofthose of

employees in the matters coveredby collective agreement.

Hence we find that the contentions of the Company that the individual contracts precludeda choice of

representatives and warrantedrefusal tobargain during theirduration were properlyover-ruled. It

follows that representation to the employees by circularletterthat they had such legal effect wasimproperand could properlybe prohibitedby the Board. [321 U.S. 332, 340] One minormatter

remains forconsideration. The literal terms of the Board's order require the Company to 'cease

and desist from (a) giving effect to the individual contracts of employment or any modification,

continuation, extension or renewal thereof, or entering into any similar form of contract with its

employees for any period subsequent to the date of this decision,' and to give written notice to

each to that effect and that 'such contract will not in any manner be enforced or attempted to

be enforced' and that 'such discontinuance of the contract is without prejudice to the assertion

of any legal rights the employee may have acquired under such contract.'

These provisions, it has been argued, gobeyond the Board's power, leave employees free tobringbutthe Company powerless todefendactions on the contract, and prohibit makingfuture contracts even

when not obnoxious to the law ortoany collective agreement.

The Board, of course, has no power to adjudicate the validity or effect of such contracts except

as to their effect on matters within its jurisdiction. National Licorice Co. v. National Labor

Relations Board, supra. The Board, however, would construe the ordermore narrowly than its terms

suggest. It says, 'The provision in question, as we have seen, is based upon the finding that the

contracts were utilizedas ameans of interfering with rights guaranteedby the Act and constitutedan


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obstacle to collective bargaining. Read in the context ofthis finding, the requirement ofthe cease and

desist provisions enjoins petitioneronlyfrom continuing toderive benefits from the contracts

heretofore utilized toforestall collective bargaininganddeterself-organization, andfrom entering

into new contracts eitherforthe purpose ofagain thus utilizing themorundercircumstances in which

similarinfringement ofthe collective bargaining process wouldbe a probable consequence. The

paragraph does not prevent petitioner from contracting with individual employees under

circumstances which negative any [321 U.S. 332, 341] intent to interfere with the employees'

right under theAct. ... Thus construed, the challengedrequirement is but areasonable safeguard ....'

We agree, but the literallanguage ofthe ordermay wellbe read in quite different meaning, especially

when separatedfromfindings and standingalone in the Court's enforcement order. It then becomes

the language ofthe Court, and the Court would not be bound tolook upon the Board's construction as

its own. Questions of construction had better be ironed out before enforcement orders issue

than upon contempt proceedings. A party is entitled to a definition as exact as the circumstances

permit of the acts which he can perform only on pain of contempt of court. Nor should he be

ordered to desist from more on the theory that he may violate the literal language and then

defend by resort to the Board's construction of it. Courts' orders are not to be trifled with, nor

should they invite litigation as to their meaning. It will occur often enough when every

reasonable effort is made to avoid it. Where, as here, the literallanguage ofthe ordergoes beyond

what the Boardadmits was intended, correction shouldbe made. Paragraphs 1(a) and 2(a) ofthe

decree ofthe court below are herebymodified, byadding the words in italics, toreadas follows:

'1. Cease anddesist from:

(a) Giving effect to the individual contracts ofemployment oranymodification, continuation,

extension, orrenewal thereoftoforestall collective bargainingordeterself-organization, orenteringintoany similarformofcontract with its employees forany period subsequent to the date ofthis

Decree forsuch purpose orwith such effect.

'2. Take the followingaffirmative action which the Boardfinds will effectuate the policies of

the Act:

(a) Give separate written notice to each ofits employees who signedan individual contract of

employment oranymodification, continuation, extension, orrenewal[321 U.S. 332, 342] thereof, or

any similarformofcontract forany period subsequent to the date ofthis Decree, that such contract

will not in anymannerbe enforcedorattempted tobe enforced toforestall collective bargainingordeterself-organization, that the employee is not requiredorexpectedbyvirtue ofsuch contract to

deal with respondent individually in respect torates ofpay, wages, hours ofemployment, orother

conditions ofemployment, and that such discontinuance ofthe contract is without prejudice to the

assertion ofanylegalrights the employee may have acquired undersuch contract ortoanydefenses

there-toby the employer.'

As somodified the decree is AFFIRMED.

_________________________________________________________________________________


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UNITED BROTHERHOOD ofCARPENTERS & JOINERS ofAMERICA,

INTERNATIONAL

SKILLFORM:

Movants note that the SKILL FORM presented in PNWRCC and the newly established NortheastRegional CouncilofCarpenters (NRCC) encompassing the formerEmpire Regional Councilof

Carpenters (ESRCC) forupstate New Yorkand the formerNew Jersey Regional Councilof

Carpenters has been intentionally with-heldfrom this Court via non-inclusion in the Proposed

NYCDCC Restructuring Plan soas tofraudulently induce the Court toaccept the motives andactions

ofthe UBCJA Internationalas pure.

Nothing couldbe furtherfrom the truth. The UBCJA International, acting underthe temporary

suspension ofLocal Union and NYCDCC autonomy, seeks to impart said Skill Form afterthe fact,

and to issue the orderas afait-accompli and unilateral contract change which, ofcourse is an act of

badfaith, fraudandartifice whichbydesign are to enforce an Individual Contract and execute awaiverofthe CBAby individual workers and employees who wouldotherwise sign such adocument

underthe directed threat ofbeing terminatedfrom theiremployment. As such, andas the United

States Supreme Court noted in Virginia Power & Electric Co. 319 U.S. 533 (1939) under a

separate issue, but under the same legal theory it is a patent attempt to achieve ends other

than those which can be fairly said to effectuate policies of the act.

The UBCJA International Union in seekingan illegal waiver, in an individual contract viafraud,

coercion anddirect and indirect threats andfearofeconomic reprisal has establisheda prima-facie

violation ofemployee Rights. Given under17 & 18 ofthe 1:90-cv-5722 Consent Decree, that this

Court has exclusive jurisdiction to hearandresolve anyandallmatters underits terms andconditions; and, furthernoting the Supreme Courts admonishment in J.I. Case, wherein they stated:

The Board, ofcourse, has no powertoadjudicate the validityoreffect ofsuch contracts except as to

theireffect on matters within its jurisdiction. National Licorice Co. v. National LaborRelations

Board, supra.

Movants request that this Court take up this mattersua-sponte upon the facts presented.

Movants furthernote, that the UBCJA, International has expresslyviolated 29 U.S.C. Sec.

158. The NYCDCC, BTEA & the Wall & Ceiling Contractors Association are engaged in

Contract Negotiations fora new Collective Bargaining Agreement; and, saidactions are a

prima-facie violation ofNLRA Section 8(a)(5) andaderivative violation ofsection 8(a)(1), asboth parties are actively colluding todefraud the rank & file and the Court.

Movants also note that Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213 (1972)

We held in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 , that a union did not violate 8 (b) (1)

byfiningmembers who went to workduringalawful strike authorizedby the membership andby

suing to collect the fines. The Court reviewedat length in that opinion the legislative historyof7 and

8 (b) (1), and concludedbya close majorityvote that the disciplinarymeasures taken by the union

against its members on those facts were within the ambit ofthe union's controloverits internal


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affairs. But the sanctions allowed were against those who "enjoyedfull union membership." Id., at

196.

Yet when amemberlawfullyresigns from the union, its poweroverhim ends. We noted in Scofield

v. NLRB, [409 U.S. 213, 216] 394U.S. 423, 429 , that if a union rule "invades or frustrates an

overriding policy of the labor laws the rule may not be enforced, even by fine or expulsion,without violating 8 (b) (1)." On the facts, we held that Scofield, where fines were imposedon

members by the union, fell within the ambit ofAllis-Chalmers. But we drew the line between

permissible and impermissible union action against members as follows:

". . . 8 (b) (1) leaves a union free to enforce a properlyadoptedrule which reflects alegitimate

union interest, impairs no policy Congress has imbedded in the laborlaws, and is reasonably

enforcedagainst union members whoare free toleave the union and escape the rule." Id., at

430.

Under 7 of the

Act the employees have "the right to refrain from any or all" concerted activities

relating to collective bargaining or mutual aid and protection, as well as the right to join a

union and participate in those concerted activities. We have here no problemofconstruinga

union's constitution orbylaws definingorlimiting the circumstances underwhich amembermay

resign from the union. 4 We have, therefore, only toapply the law which normally is reflected in our

free institutions - the right ofthe individual to join ortoresign fromassociations, as he sees fit

"subject ofcourse toanyfinancialobligations due andowing" the group with which he was

associated. Communications Workers v. NLRB, 215 F.2d 835, 838. [409 U.S. 213, 217]

The Scofield case indicates that the powerofthe union overthe member is certainly nogreaterthan

the union-membercontract. Where a member lawfully resigns from a union and thereafterengages in conduct which the union rule proscribes, the union commits an unfair labor practice

when it seeks enforcement of fines for that conduct. That is to say, when there is a lawful

dissolution of a union-member relation, the union has no more control over the former member

than it has over the man in the street.

The Court ofAppeals gave weight to the fact that the resigning employees had participated in the vote

to strike. We give that factorlittle weight. The first twomembers resignedfrom the Union fromone

to twomonths afterthe strike hadbegun. The others did sofrom seven to 12 months afterits

commencement. And the strike was still in progress 18 months afterits inception. Events occurring

afterthe callingofa strike may have unsettling effects, leadingamemberwhovoted to strike tochange his mind. The likelyduration ofthe strike may increase the specterofhardship to his family;

the ease with which the employerreplaces the strikers maymake the strike seemless provident. We

do not now decide to what extent the contractualrelationship between union andmembermay curtail

the freedom toresign. But where, as here, there are no restraints on the resignation of members,

5 we conclude that the vitality of 7 requires that the member be free to refrain in November

from the [409U.S. 213, 218] actions he endorsed in May and that his 7 rights are not lost by a

union's plea for solidarity or by its pressures for conformity and submission to its regime.

Reversed.


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Machinists 412 U.S. 84 (1973)

The Companyfiledan unfairlaborpractice charge with the National LaborRelations Boardalleging

that the Union hadviolated 8 (b) (1) (A) ofthe National LaborRelations Act, 61 Stat. 141, 29 U.S.C.

158 (b) [412 U.S. 84, 87] (1) (A). 5 The General Counsel issueda complaint, and the Board held

that the Union violated 8 (b) (1) (A), byfining those employees who hadresignedfrom the Unionbefore returning to workduring the strike, andbyfining those who hadresignedafterreturning to

work to the extent that such fines were basedon post-resignation work.

The Union contends, however, that aresult different from Textile Workers is warranted in this case

because, [412 U.S. 84, 89] even though its constitution does not expresslyrestrict the right toresign

duringa strike, it does impose on members an obligation torefrain from strikebreaking. The Union

asserts that this provision has been consistently interpreted tobindamember, notwithstanding his

resignation, toabstain from strikebreakingforthe duration ofan existing strike. It urges that this

provision maybe enforcedas amatterofcontract law against one whose membership has ceased,

because it was an obligation he undertook while amember.

The provision in the Union's constitution which proscribes strikebreakingby its terms purports onlytodefine "misconduct ofamember." Nothing in the record indicates that Union members were in-formed, priorto the bringingof the charges that were the basis ofthis action, that the provision wasinterpretedas imposinganyobligation on aresignee. 9 Thus, in orderto sustain the Union's position,we wouldfirst have tofind, contrary to the determination ofthe Boardandofthe Court ofAppeals,that the Union constitutionby implication extended its sanctions to nonmembers, and then furtherconclude that such sanctions were consistent with the Act. But we are nomore disposed tofindanimplied post-resignation commitment from the strikebreaking proscription in the Union's constitutionhere than we were tofind it from the employees' participation in the strike vote andratification ofpe-nalties in Textile [412 U.S. 84, 90] Workers. 10 Accordingly, the judgment ofthe Court ofAppealssustaining the Board's findingofan unfairlaborpractice on the part ofpetitionerUnion is Affirmed.

The United Brotherhood ofCarpenters and Joiners ofAmerica Constitution, dated November1,2010 at Article 47, page 61, states:

Resignation of Members:

A. Section 47. A membercan withdraw orseverconnection with the United Brotherhoodbysubmittinga clearand unequivocalresignation in writing to the Local Union. A memberwhoresigns can onlybe readmittedas a new member.

Movants note the language in the Skill Form precludes such resignation, makes nomention ofthe UBC Constitution andoperates as an irrevocable waiverandassignment ofany & all em-ployee rights, violates landmark Supreme Court decisions, and is fraudulent on its face. In

Scofield, 394 U.S. 429 (1969) the Supreme Court holds a Union Rule invalid if it impairs

a policy Congress has embedded into the Labor Laws.In Communication Workers ofAmerica v. Beck 487 U.S. 735 (1988) established the notification requirement & agency

fee payers & Section 7 rights.


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In Magnavox, 415 U.S. 322 (1974)The Supreme Court stated: The Board's position, as noted, has

not always been consistent. But its present ruling is, we think, quite consistent with 7 rights of

employees. It is the Board's function to strike abalance among "conflictinglegitimate interests"

which will "effectuate nationallaborpolicy," including those who support versus those whooppose

the union. NLRB v. Truck Drivers Union, 353 U.S. 87, 96 .

Movants note the Skill FormforPNWRCC & NRCC strike no such balance, and is unlawful

on its face. Further, we note that as soon as the Court turns it back, the UBCJA willbring this

in the backdoorand use the exact same language todefraud the rank & file, The United States

Attorneyand this honorable Court.

In Mastro, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (United Brotherhood of Carpenters)

The Supreme Court stated:Apart from the issues raisedby petitioners'affirmative defenses, the pro-

ceedings reflect aflagrant example of interference by the employers with the expressly protectedright

oftheiremployees to select theirownbargainingrepresentative. The findings disclose vigorous ef-

forts by the employers to influence and even to coerce theiremployees toabandon the Carpenters as

theirbargainingrepresentatives and to substitute Local 318. Accordingly, unless petitioners sustain at

least one oftheiraffirmative defenses, theymust sufferthe consequences oftheirunfairlaborpractic-

es violating 8 (a) (1), (2) or(3) ofthe Act, as amended.

In the absence ofsome contractualorstatutory provision to the contrary, petitioners' unfairlabor

practices provide adequate groundforthe orderly strike that occurred here. Underthose

circumstances, the striking employees do not lose theirstatus andare entitled toreinstatement with

back pay, even ifreplacements forthem have been made. 9 Failure of the Board to enjoin

petitioners' illegal conduct or failure of the Board to sustain the right to strike against that

conduct would seriously undermine the primary objectives of the LaborAct. [350U.S. 270, 279]

See Labor Board v. Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665, 673 . While we assume that the employees, by

explicit contractual provision, could have waived theirright to strike against such unfairlabor

practices and that Congress, by explicit statutory provision, could have deprived strikers, under the

circumstances ofthis case, oftheirstatus as employees, the questions before us are whether or not

such a waiver was made by the Carpenters in their 1949-1950 contract and whetherornot such a

deprivation ofstatus was enactedby Congress in 8 (d) ofthe Act, as amended in 1947.

I. Does the collective-bargaining contract waive the employees'right to strike against the unfairlabor

practices committedby theiremployers? The answerturns upon the properinterpretation ofthe

particularcontract before us. Like othercontracts, it must be readas a whole and in the light ofthe

law relating to it when made.

". . . we have twodeclared congressional policies which it is ourresponsibility to try to

reconcile. The one seeks to preserve a competitive business economy; the otherto preserve


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the rights oflabortoorganize tobetterits conditions through the agencyofcollective

bargaining. We must determine here how farCongress intendedactivities underone ofthese

policies to neutralize the results envisionedby the other." Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union

No. 3, 325 U.S. 797, 806 .

This contract was made in the light ofthat declared policy. A similar dual purpose is emphasized asfollows in 1 of the National Labor RelationsAct, as amended:

"It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes ofcertain

substantialobstructions to the free flow ofcommerce and tomitigate and eliminate these

obstructions when they[350 U.S. 270, 280] have occurredby encouraging the practice and

procedure ofcollective bargainingandby protecting the exercise by workers offullfreedomof

association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for

the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual

aid or protection." 61 Stat. 137, 29 U.S.C. 151. See also, the declaration of policy in 1 (b) of

the Labor Management RelationsAct, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 141 (b).

The two policies are complementary. They depend for their foundation upon assurance of "full

freedom of association." Onlyafterthat is assured can the parties turn to effective negotiation as a

means ofmaintaining "the normalflow ofcommerce and . . . the full production ofarticles and

commodities . . . ." 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. 141 (b).

On the premise offairrepresentation, collective-bargaining contracts frequently have included certain

waivers ofthe employees'right to strike andofthe employers'right tolockout to enforce their

respective economic demands during the termofthose contracts. Provided the selection ofthe

bargainingrepresentative remains free, such waivers contribute to the normalflow ofcommerce andto the maintenance ofregularproduction schedules. Individuals violating such clauses appropriately

lose theirstatus as employees. 10 [350 U.S. 270, 281]

The waiver in the contract before us, upon which petitioners rely, is as follows:

"5. The Union agrees that during the termofthis agreement, there shallbe no interference of

any kind with the operations ofthe Employers, orany interruptions orslackeningof

production ofworkbyanyofits members. The Union furtheragrees torefrain from engaging

in any strike orwork stoppage during the termofthis agreement."

That clause expresses concern forthe continuedoperation ofthe plant and has a naturalapplication tostrikes and work stoppages involving the subject matterofthe contract.

Conceding that the words "in any strike orwork stoppage during the [one-year] termofthis

agreement," ifread in complete isolation, may include all strikes and work stoppages ofevery nature,

yet the trial examiner, the Boardand the Court ofAppeals agree that those words do not have that

scope when read in theircontext and in the light ofthe law underwhich the contract was made. This

unanimityof interpretation is entitled tomuch weight. 11


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Forthe reasons statedabove and those given by the Boardand the court below, we conclude that the

contract did not waive the employees'right to strike solelyagainst the unfairlaborpractices oftheir

employers.

II. Does 8 (d) ofthe National LaborRelations Act, as amended, deprive individuals oftheirstatus as

employees if, within the waiting period prescribedby 8 (d) (4), they engage in a strike solelyagainstunfairlaborpractices oftheiremployers?Here again the background is the dual purpose ofthe Act

(1) to protect the right ofemployees tobe free to take concertedaction as provided in 7 and 8 (a), 15

and (2) to substitute collective bargainingforeconomic warfare in securing satisfactory wages, hours

ofworkand employment conditions. Section 8 (d) 16 seeks tobringabout the termination and

modification ofcollective-bargainingagreements without interrupting the flow ofcommerce orthe

production ofgoods, while 7 and 8 (a) seek to insure freedomofconcertedactionby employees at all

times. [350 U.S. 270, 285]

The language in 8 (d) especiallyrelied uponby petitioners is as follows: "Any employee who engages

in a strike within the sixty-day period specified in this subsection shalllose his status as an employeeofthe employerengaged in the particularlabordispute, forthe purposes ofsections 8, 9, and 10 of

this Act, as amended . . . ." 61 Stat. 143, 29 U.S.C. 158 (d).

Petitioners contend that the above words must be soread that employees who engage in any strike,

regardless ofits purpose, within the 60-day waiting period, therebylose theirstatus as employees.

That interpretation woulddeprive Ciccone and his fellow strikers oftheirrights toreinstatement and

wouldrequire the reversalofthe judgment ofthe Court ofAppeals. 17 Ifthe above words are read in

complete isolation from theircontext in the Act, such an interpretation is possible. However, "In

expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but

look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy." United States v. Boisdore'sHeirs, 8 How. 113, 122. See also, Peck v. Jenness, 7 How. 612, 622-623; Duparquet Co. v. Evans,

297 U.S. 216 , and United States v.American TruckingAssns., 310 U.S. 534, 542 -543.

Reading the clause in conjunction with the rest of 8, the Board points out that "the sixty-day

period" referred to is the period mentioned in paragraph (4) of 8 (d). That paragraph requires

the party giving notice of a desire to "terminate or modify" such a contract, as part of its

obligation to bargain under 8 (a) (5) or 8 (b) (3), to continue "in full force and effect, without

resorting to [350U.S. 270, 286] strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing

contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such

contract, whichever occurs later." Section 8 (d) thus seeks, during this natural renegotiationperiod, to relieve the parties from the economic pressure of a strike or lockout in relation to the

subjects of negotiation. The final clause of8 (d) also warns employees that, ifthey join a proscribed

strike, they shall there bylose theirstatus as employees and, consequently, theirright to

reinstatement.

The Boardreasons that the words which provide the key toa properinterpretation of8 (d) with

respect to this problemare "termination ormodification." Since the Board expresslyfound that the

instant strike was not to terminate ormodify the contract, 18 but was designed instead to protest the


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unfairlaborpractices ofpetitioners, the loss-of-status provision of8 (d) is not applicable. We sustain

that interpretation. Petitioners' construction would produce incongruous results. It concedes that prior

to the 60-day negotiating period, employees have aright to strike against unfairlaborpractices

designed tooust the employees'bargainingrepresentative, yet petitioners' interpretation of8 (d)

means that ifthe employees give the 60-day notice oftheirdesire tomodify the contract, theyare

penalizedforexercising that right to strike. This would deprive them of their most effective

weapon at a time when their need for it is obvious. Although the employees'request tomodify the

contract woulddemonstrate theirneedforthe services oftheirfreely chosen representative,

petitioners' interpretation would have the incongruous effect ofcuttingoffthe employees'freedom to

strike against unfairlaborpractices aimedat that representative. This wouldrelegate the employees to

filing charges undera procedure too slow [350 U.S. 270, 287] tobe effective. The result would

undulyfavorthe employers and handicap the employees during negotiation periods contrary to the

purpose ofthe Act. There also is inherent inequity in any interpretation that penalizes one party toa

contract forconduct induced solelyby the unlawful conduct ofthe other, thus givingadvantage to the

wrongdoer. 19

Petitioners contend that, unless the loss-of-status clause is applicable to unfairlaborpractice strikes,

as wellas to economic strikes, it adds nothing to the existinglaw relating toloss ofstatus. Assuming

that tobe so, the clause is justifiable as a clarification ofthe law andas a warning to employees

against engaging in economic strikes during the statutory waiting period. Moreover, in the face ofthe

affirmative emphasis that is placedby the Act upon freedomofconcertedaction andfreedomof

choice ofrepresentatives, anylimitation on the employees'right to strike against violations of7 and 8

(a), protecting those freedoms, must be more explicit and clearthan it is here in ordertorestrict them

at the very time theymaybe most needed.

There is sufficient ambiguity here to permit consideration ofrelevant legislative history. While such

history provides no conclusive answer, it is consistent with the view takenby the Boardandby the

Courts ofAppeals forthe Secondand Seventh Circuits. 20

SenatorBall, who was amanagerforthe 1947 amendments in the Senate andone ofthe conferees on

the bill, stated that 8 (d) made mandatory what was already[350 U.S. 270, 288] good practice and

was aimedat preventing such interruptions ofproduction as the "quickie strikes" occasionally used to

gain economic advantages.

"The provision in the National LaborRelations Act defining collective bargaining, and

providing that where a contract between a union andan employer is in existence, fulfilling theobligation on both sides to protect [bargain] collectivelymeans givingat least 60 days' notice

ofthe termination ofthe contract, orofthe desire forany change in it, is anotherprovision

aimed primarilyat protecting the public, as wellas the employee, who have been the victims

of`quickie' strikes. I do not think that is takingawayanyrights oflabor. . . it is simply saying

that they shouldallfollow the sound, fair, and sane procedure which amajorityofthe good

ones now follow." 93 Cong. Rec. 5014.

One minorityreport suggestedafearthat 8 (d) wouldbe applicable to unfairpractice strikes. The


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suggestion, however, was not even made the subject ofcomment by the majorityreports or in the

debates. 21 An unsuccessfulminority cannot put words into the mouths ofthe majorityand thus,

indirectly, amendabill. 22

The record shows that the supporters ofthe bill were aware ofthe established practice which

distinguishedbetween the effect on employees ofengaging in economic strikes and that ofengagingin unfairpractice strikes. 23 [350 U.S. 270, 289] IfCongress had wanted to modify that

practice, it could readily have done so by specific provision. Congress cannot fairly be held to

have made such an intrusion on employees' rights, as petitioners claim, without some more

explicit expression of its purpose to do so than appears here. 24

Finally, petitioners seek support fortheir interpretation of8 (d) from the fact that its last clause makes

a cross-reference to 8, 9 and 10 ofthe Act. Such reference does not expand the scope of8 (d). It

merelymakes it clearthat if8 (d) is violatedby the employees to whom it applies, then theylose their

status as employees forthe purposes of8, 9 and 10. 25

As neitherthe collective-bargaining contract nor8 (d) ofthe National LaborRelations Act, as

amended, stands in the way, the judgment ofthe Court ofAppeals is Affirmed.

_________________________________________________________________________________

Skill Form cont.

Given the lengths to which the UBCJA International Union willgo, undertheirlimitedauthority to

suspend the Local Unions & NYCDCC autonomy underthe Trusteeship imposed perthe LMRDA, it

bares ofnecessity to include the entire case citedbelow, as related to the Skill Form, whether it be

enacted underthe terms and conditions ofthe stilloperative Collective Bargaining Agreement, or

whetherthrough fraud, artifice & collusion with Wall & Ceilingand BTEA, the UBCJA has inten-

tionally with-held same from the proposed New York City District CouncilofCarpenters Restructur-

ing Plan which incorporates exactions through the illegal portions ofProposed By-Law changes,

which byoperation andlaw remain the Local Union members todraft, consider, debate, freely ex-

change ideas andfinally holdavote upon; andremain outside ofthe International Carpenters Union

authority in the first instance.

U.S. Supreme Court

PATTERN MAKERS v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95 (1985)

473 U.S. 95

PATTERN MAKERS'LEAGUE OF NORTHAMERICA,AFL-CIO, ETAL. v. NATIONAL

LABOR

RELATIONS BOARD ETAL.


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CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATESCOURT OFAPPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH

CIRCUIT

No. 83-1894.

Argued February 27, 1985 RearguedApril 22, 1985

Decided June 27, 1985

Petitionernationallaborunion's constitution provides that resignations from the union are not

permittedduringa strike. The union fined 10 members who, in violation ofthis provision, resigned

duringa strikeby petitionerlocal unions andreturned to work. Respondent employerrepresentative

thereafterfiled charges with the National LaborRelations Board (Board), claiming that such levying

offines constitutedan unfairlaborpractice under8(b)(1)(A) ofthe National LaborRelations Act,

which makes it an unfairlaborpractice fora union torestrain orcoerce employees in the exercise of

their7 rights. The Boardagreed, and the Court ofAppeals enforced the Board's order.

Held:

In related cases this Court has invariablyyielded to Boarddecisions on whetherfines imposedbya

union "restrainedorcoerced" employees. Moreover, the Board has consistently construed 8(b)(1)(A)

as prohibiting the finingofemployees who have resignedfroma union contrary toarestriction in the

union constitution. Therefore, the Board's decision in this case is entitled to this Court's deference. Pp.

100-116.

(a) The Board was justified in concluding that by restricting the right of employees to

resign, the provision in question impaired the congressional policy of voluntary unionism

implicit in 8(a)(3) of theA

ct. Pp. 104-107.

(b) The proviso to 8(b)(1)(A), which states that nothing in 8(b) (1)(A) shall "impair the

right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or

retention of membership therein," was intended to protect union rules involving

admission and expulsion and not to allow unions to make rules restricting the right to

resign.Accordingly, the Board properly concluded that the provision in question is not a

"rule with respect to the retention of membership." Pp. 108-110.

(c) The legislative history does not support petitioners' contention that Congress did not

intend to protect the right of union members to resign. Pp. 110-112. [473U.S. 95, 96]

(d) Nor is there any merit to petitioners' argument that because the common law does

not prohibit restrictions on resignation, the provision in question does not violate

8(b)(1)(A). Pp. 112-114.

724 F.2d 57, affirmed.

POWELL, J., delivered the opinion ofthe Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and WHITE,

REHNQUIST, and O'CONNOR, JJ., joined. WHITE, J., fileda concurringopinion, post, p. 116.


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BLACKMUN, J., filedadissentingopinion, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined,

post, p. 117. STEVENS, J., filedadissentingopinion, post, p. 133.

Laurence Goldreargued the cause forpetitioners. With himon the briefs were Marsha S. Berzon,

Michael Rubin, George Kaufmann, and David M. Silberman.

Deputy SolicitorGeneral Friedreargued the cause forrespondent National LaborRelations Board.

With himon the briefwere SolicitorGeneral Lee, Norton J. Come, and Linda Sher. Edward J. Fahy

filedabriefforrespondent Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers Association. *

[ Footnote * ] Paul Alan Levyand Alan B. Morrison filedabriefforTeamsters fora Democratic

Union as amicus curiae urgingreversal. Briefs ofamici curiae urgingaffirmance were filedforthe

ChamberofCommerce ofthe United States by Carl L. Taylor, Glenn Summers, and Stephan A.

Bokat; forthe National Right to Work Legal Defense Foundation by Raymond J. LaJeunesse, Jr.; and

forSafeway Stores, Inc., et al. by Warren M. Davison and Wesley J. Fastiff.

JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion ofthe Court.

The Pattern Makers' League ofNorth America, AFL-CIO (League), alaborunion, provides in its

constitution that resignations are not permittedduringa strike orwhen a strike is imminent. The

League fined 10 ofits members who, in violation ofthis provision, resignedduringa strike and

returned to work. The National LaborRelations Board held that these fines were imposed in violation

of8(b)(1)(A) ofthe National LaborRelations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(b)(1)(A). We granteda petition for

a writ ofcertiorari in ordertodecide whether8(b)(1)(A) reasonablymaybe construedby the [473

U.S. 95, 97] Boardas prohibitinga union fromfiningmembers who have tenderedresignations

invalid under the union constitution.

I

The League is a national union composedoflocalassociations (locals). In May 1976, its constitution

was amended to provide that

"[n]oresignation orwithdrawalfroman Association, orfrom the League, shallbe accepted

duringa strike orlockout, orat a time when a strike orlockout appears imminent."

This amendment, known as League Law 13, became effective in October1976, afterbeingratifiedby

the League's locals. On May 5, 1977, when a collective-bargainingagreement expired, twolocals

began an economic strike against severalmanufacturing companies in Rockford, Illinois, and Beloit,

Wisconsin. Forty-three ofthe twolocals'members participated. In early September1977, afterthe

locals formallyrejecteda contract offer, a striking union membersubmittedaletterofresignation to

the Beloit Association. 1 He returned to work the followingday. During the next three months, 10

more union members resignedfrom the Rockfordand Beloit locals andreturned to work. On

December19, 1977, the strike ended when the parties signeda new collective-bargainingagreement.

The locals notified 10 employees who hadresigned that theirresignations hadbeen rejectedas

violative ofLeague Law 13. 2 The locals further informed the [473 U.S. 95, 98] employees that, as

union members, they were subject to sanctions forreturning to work. Each was finedapproximately


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the equivalent ofhis earnings during the strike.

The Rockford-Beloit Pattern Jobbers' Association (Association) hadrepresented the employers

throughout the collective-bargaining process. It filed charges with the Boardagainst the League and

its twolocals, the petitioners. Relyingon 8(b)(1)(A), the Association claimed that levyingfines

against employees who hadresigned was an unfairlaborpractice. 3 Followinga hearing, anAdministrative Law Judge found that petitioners hadviolated 8(b)(1)(A)byfining employees for

returning to workaftertenderingresignations. Pattern Makers' League ofNorth America, 265 N. L.

R. B. 1332, 1339 (1982) (decision ofG. Wacknov, ALJ). The Boardagreed that 8(b)(1)(A) prohibited

the union from imposing sanctions on the 10 employees. 4 Pattern Makers'[473 U.S. 95, 99] League

ofNorth America, supra. In holding that League Law 13 did not justify the imposition offines on the

members whoattempted toresign, the Boardreliedon its earlierdecision in Machinists Local 1327

(Dalmo VictorII), 263 N. L. R. B. 984 (1982), enf. denied, 725 F.2d 1212 (CA9 1984). 5

The United States Court ofAppeals forthe Seventh Circuit enforced the Board's order. 724 F.2d 57

(1983). The Court ofAppeals stated that byrestricting the union members'freedom toresign, LeagueLaw 13 "frustrate[d] the overriding policyoflaborlaw that employees be free to choose whetherto

engage in concertedactivities." Id., at 60. Noting that the "mutualreliance" theory was given little

weight in NLRB v. Textile Workers, 409 U.S. 213 (1972), the court rejected petitioners'argument that

theirmembers, by participating in the strike vote, had "waived theirSection 7 right toabandon the

strike." 724 F.2d, at 60-61. Finally, the Court ofAppeals reasoned that underScofield[473 U.S. 95,

100] v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969), labororganizations may impose disciplinaryfines against

members only iftheyare "free toleave the union and escape the rule[s]." 724 F.2d, at 61.

We granteda petition fora writ ofcertiorari, 469 U.S. 814 (1984), toresolve the conflict between the

Courts ofAppeals overthe validityofrestrictions on union members'right toresign. 6 The Board hasheld that such restrictions are invalidanddo not justify imposing sanctions on employees who have

attempted toresign from the union. Because ofthe Board's "special competence" in the fieldoflabor

relations, its interpretation ofthe Act is accorded substantialdeference. NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc.,

420 U.S. 251, 266 (1975). The question fordecision today is thus narrowed to whetherthe Board's

construction of8(b)(1)(A) is reasonable. See NLRB v. City Disposal Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 830

(1984). We believe that 8(b)(1)(A) properlymaybe construedas prohibiting the finingofemployees

who have tenderedresignations ineffective underarestriction in the union constitution. We therefore

affirm the judgment ofthe Court ofAppeals enforcing the Board's order.

II

A

Section 7 ofthe Act, 29 U.S.C. 157, grants employees the right to "refrain fromanyorall [concerted]

. . . activities . . . ." 7 This generalright is implementedby[473 U.S. 95, 101] 8(b)(1)(A). The latter

section provides that a union commits an unfairlaborpractice ifit "restrain[s] orcoerce[s] employees

in the exercise" oftheir7 rights. 8 When employee members ofa union refuse to support a strike

(whetherornot arule prohibits returning to workduringa strike), theyare refrainingfrom "concerted


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activity." Therefore, imposingfines on these employees forreturning to work "restrain[s]" the

exercise oftheir7 rights. Indeed, ifthe terms "refrain" and "restrain orcoerce" are interpreted

literally, fining employees to enforce compliance with any union rule orpolicy wouldviolate the Act.

Despite this language from the Act, the Court in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175

(1967), held that 8(b)(1)(A) does not prohibit labororganizations fromfining current members. InNLRB v. Textile Workers, supra, and Machinists v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973) (percuriam), the

Court foundas a corollary that unions may not fine formermembers who have resignedlawfully.

NeitherTextile Workers, supra, norMachinists, supra, however, involveda provision like League

Law 13, restricting the members'right toresign. We decide today whethera union is precludedfrom

fining employees who have attempted toresign when resignations are prohibitedby the union's

constitution. 9 [473 U.S. 95, 102]

B

The Court's reasoning in Allis-Chalmers, supra, supports the Board's conclusion that petitioners inthis case violated 8(b)(1)(A). In Allis-Chalmers, the Court held that imposing court-enforceable fines

against current union members does not "restrain orcoerce" the workers in the exercise oftheir7

rights. 10 In so concluding, the Court reliedon the legislative historyofthe Taft-Hartley Act. It noted

that the sponsorof8(b)(1)(A) never intendedforthat provision "`to interfere with the internalaffairs

ororganization ofunions,'" 388 U.S., at 187 , quoting 93 Cong. Rec. 4272 (1947) (statement ofSen.

Ball), and that otherproponents ofthe measure likewise disclaimedan intent to interfere with unions'

"internalaffairs." 388 U.S., at 187 -190. From the legislative history, the Court reasoned that

Congress did not intend to prohibit unions fromfining present members, as this was an internal

matter. The Court has emphasized that the crux ofAllis-Chalmers' holding was the distinction

between "internaland external enforcement ofunion rules . . . ." Scofieldv. NLRB, 394 U.S., at 428 .

See also NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 73 (1973).

The congressional purpose to preserve unions' controlovertheirown "internalaffairs" does not

suggest an intent toauthorize restrictions on the right toresign. Traditionally, union members were

free toresign and escape union discipline. 11 [473 U.S. 95, 103] In 1947, union constitutional

provisions restricting the right toresign were uncommon, ifnot unknown. 12 Therefore, allowing

unions to "extendan employee's membership obligation through restrictions on resignation" would

"expan[d] the definition of internalaction" beyond the contours envisionedby the Taft-Hartley

Congress. International Assn. ofMachinists, Local 1414 (Neufeld Porsche-Audi, Inc.), 270 N. L. R.

B. No. 209, p. 11 (1984). 13

C

Language andreasoningfromotheropinions ofthis Court confirm that the Board's construction of

8(b)(1)(A) is reasonable

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