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11/21/2015 KICC Application 1 Goizueta Finance Group 2015 M&A Competition Benjamin Detemmerman, Benjamin Poon, Jia Tang, Kasper Stockel, Michael Bolliger Synergy is Still King NAVIS Global

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11/21/2015 KICC Application 1

Goizueta Finance Group

2015 M&A Competition

Benjamin Detemmerman, Benjamin Poon, Jia Tang, Kasper Stockel, Michael Bolliger

Synergy is Still King

NAVIS Global

Company & Industry

Problem

Analysis

Whole Foods should merge with Publix

Merging with Publix allows shareholders’ gain to be maximized

Overview

Problems &

Solution

Financials

Whole Foods should not go private with

Blackstone

Executive Summary

11/21/2015 2GFG M&A Competition 2015

Company and industry overview

11/21/2015 3

MissionTo promote the vitality and well-

being of people by supplying the

highest quality, most wholesome

foods available.

Locations412 9 10

Growth rate• Grocery market 3%

• Natural retail market 9%

Company IndustryCompany Industry

Core

competence

• Premium quality brand

• Superior customer

shopping experience

GFG M&A Competition 2015

Increasing costs & competitions hamper Whole Foods’s growth

11/21/2015 4

Missing Targets by

Sales Growth -0.6%

Sales/Square

Foot

-5%

ROIC -0.6%

Gross Margin is narrowing COGS is growing

Same store sales growth decelerated The only driver of growth is expansion

Costs

Com

petition

20%COGS 2013-15

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Same Store Sales Growth

34.8%

35.0%

35.2%

35.4%

35.6%

35.8%

36.0%

2013 2014 2015

Gross Margin

290

315

340

365

390

415

440

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Number of Stores

Results:

Falling short of expectations

GFG M&A Competition 2015

Key Question:

How to maximize shareholder value in the long run?

Whole Foods’s possible alternatives

11/21/2015 5

Go private and get

acquired by Blackstone

Merge with Publix

Others?

GFG M&A Competition 2015

Whole Foods should not be acquired by The Blackstone Group

11/21/2015 6

….while Whole Foods is not the caseCompanies that go private with PE are usually

Whole Foods currently has If Whole Foods goes private with PE

• Mature firms with no growth prospect

• Struggling with a FCF problem

• In need of capital restructuring

• Suffering from agency problem

• The industry is growing, and Whole Foods

ranks first

• FCF/OCF = 25.94%

• High debt capacity

• Committed executives

• Sound long-term plans

• Low market price

• Restructure of management level

• Short-sighted, strategies made to ensure

a profitable exit strategy in 3-5 years

• Disadvantageous to shareholders’ gains

GFG M&A Competition 2015

Whole Foods’s possible alternatives

11/21/2015 7

Go private and get

acquired by Blackstone

Merge with Publix

Others?

GFG M&A Competition 2015

Whole Foods should merge with Publix

11/21/2015 8

Whole Foods Market

• The largest natural and organic foods

supermarket in the U.S.

• 433 stores worldwide, including UK, Canada

and across 42 U.S. states

Publix

• One of the 10 largest-volume supermarket

chains in the U.S., rank 1st in Florida

• 1,109 store locations in 6 Southern states

取長補短,相得益彰 (Compensate our weaknesses while gain through combined strengths)

GFG M&A Competition 2015

How are the synergies going to benefit Whole Foods

11/21/2015 9

Cost Synergies

Growth Synergies

• Significant reduction of COGS

• Reduction of overhead costs

• Having access to pharmacy industry and boost

product sales

• Increase in online sales

• Cross-selling opportunities

0%

2%

4%

6%

8%

10%

2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Same Store Sales Growth

34.8%

35.0%

35.2%

35.4%

35.6%

35.8%

36.0%

2013 2014 2015

Gross Margin

GFG M&A Competition 2015

Narrowing Gross Margin

Decelerated Sales Growth

Benefits from SynergiesExisting Problems

Synergy benefits under different scenarios

11/21/2015 10

• Overhead savings 4%

• COGS savings of 3.5%

• EBITDA margin on Pharmacy products

8.5%

• Overhead savings 2%

• COGS savings of 2%

• EBITDA margin on Pharmacy products

7.1% but sales 20% below expectations

• Ready to eat products 22% below

expectation

18.63%

39.45%

11.86%

30.05%

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

100.00%

Worst Case: $4.69bn Cost

Synergies and Merger Gains

Overhead Costs COGS

Pharma Extension Ready to eat extension

20.50%

39.24%

10.89%

29.37%

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Best Case: $7.73bn Cost

Synergies and Merger Gains

Overhead Costs Cogs

Pharma Extension Ready to Eat Extension

• Overhead savings 2.5%

• COGS savings of 2.5%

• EBITDA margin on Pharmacy products

7.9%

15.74%

37.23%

13.07%

33.96%

0.00%

10.00%

20.00%

30.00%

40.00%

50.00%

60.00%

70.00%

80.00%

90.00%

100.00%

Base Case: $5.81bn Cost

Synergies and Merger Gains

Overhead Costs Cogs

Pharma Extension Ready to Eat Extension

Best Case Base Case Worst Case

GFG M&A Competition 2015

Growth

Synergies

Cost

Synergies

Growth

Synergies

Cost

Synergies

Growth

Synergies

Cost

Synergies

Whole Foods shareholder gains

11/21/2015 11

• Publix pays a 20% premium to acquire all of Whole Foods Shares

• 1 WFM to 1.8 Publix share exchange rate

• WFM Shareholders own 45% of the total shares of the post-merger firm

• Why Shares? So WFM Shareholders maintain an ownership stake

Merger Approach: Exchange of Shares

BEST CASE BASE CASE WORST CASE

Post-merger firm now worth $34.06bn $32.02bn $30.95bn

Total gain to Whole Foods

shareholders

$16.10bn $14.84bn $14.23bn

Buyout may be unfavorable – Whole Foods is currently underpriced

• Growth uncertainty and increasing competition drives down current price

• Whole Foods share is underpriced:• Current share price: $29.93

• Intrinsic value: $34.45

11/21/2015 12GFG M&A Competition 2015

Comparison of Alternatives

• Blackstone pays a premium to take Whole Foods private.

• The worst case merger scenario would generate higher returns than a 30% premium.

• The best case merger scenario would generate higher returns than a 50% premium.

11/21/2015 13GFG M&A Competition 2015

Merging with Publix is always the best option

11/21/2015 14

• Highly unlikely – LBO Industry Premium Avg. of 24.3%

• Best alternative for Whole Foods shareholders is to merge

GFG M&A Competition 2015

10.00

11.00

12.00

13.00

14.00

15.00

16.00

17.00

WFM CurrentValue

Historic Avg.Premium

30% PE Case Worst Case 50% PE Case Best Case

Comparison of Alternatives

Whole Foods’s possible alternatives

11/21/2015 15

Go private and get

acquired by Blackstone

Merge with Publix

Others?

GFG M&A Competition 2015

Why Whole Foods is the best fit for Publix?

16

Financial

• Increasing sales in natural and organic food industry• Unleveraged• Solid cash positions (FCF/OCF=25.94%)

• The largest natural and organic foods supermarket in the U.S.

• Strong brand image

• National presence, covering 42 states• Global presence

Geographical Brand

Cultural

• Great cultural fit

Strategy Compatibility

GFG M&A Competition 2015

11/21/2015 KICC 2014 17

Don’t sell the chicken that lays golden eggs.

別殺生金蛋的雞

Index Page

11/21/2015 AIG M&A Case 2015 18

• Cover Page

• Executive Summary

• Company Overview

• Problem Analysis

• Alternatives Tree

• M&A with Blackstone

• Bad Timing - Underpriced

• M&A with Publix

• Synergies

• Scenario Analysis

• Shareholder Gains

• Financial Comparison

• Whole Foods is the best fit for Publix

• Appendix:

• Risk & Mitigation

• Implementation Timeline

• Historical LBO Premiums

• Distribution of Merger Gains

• Alternatives Evaluation

• Position Map

• Synergies with Publix Pharmacy

• Key Assumptions of Synergy Calculation

• Calculation of Total Shareholder Value

Appendix: Risks & Mitigation

11/21/2015 AIG M&A Case 2015 19

Risks

1. Risk of adverse selection

2. Cultural risks: both companies have distinct cultures with could

result in incompatibilities, lower productivity, turnover of key talents

3. Strategic risk leading to costly diversion:

Mitigation

1. Risk of adverse selection: Incentivize actions by performance-

contingent payout structures and other incentive structures

2. Cultural risks: walk the talk and articulate the mission and vision

of the new company on a steady basis.

3. Strategic risk leading to costly diversion: Clear process

planning and scenario technique to address unexpected outcomes

Index Page

Appendix: Implementation Process

11/21/2015 AIG M&A Case 2015 20

2016 2017 2018

1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q 1Q 2Q 3Q 4Q

Overhead Costs

Gradual Implementation

COGS

Cost Savings

Pharmacy

Pre-launch marketing

Post-launch marketing

Ready-to-Eat

WFM Ready-to-Eat in Publix

Evaluation and improvements

1 Year Pilot

covering 10% of

Publix Stores

Planning

Phase of 2

Years Index Page

Appendix: Historical LBO Premiums

11/21/2015 AIG M&A Case 2015 21

Index Page

Appendix: Distribution of Merger Gains

11/21/2015 AIG M&A Case 2015 22

Index Page

• Merged Company Value: $34.06bn

• WFM Shareholders Value $16.1bn

• Merged Company Value: $32.07bn

• WFM Shareholders Value $14,84bn

• Merged Company Value: $30.95bn

• WFM Shareholders Value $14.23bn

Best Case Base Case Worst Case

68.95%

31.05%

Best Case Distribution of Merger Gains

Whole Foods Shareholders Publix Shareholders

71.00%

29.00%

Base Case Distribution of Merger Gains

Whole Foods Shareholders Publix Shareholders

76.90%

23.10%

Worst Case Distribution of Merger Gains

Whole Foods Shareholders Publix Shareholders

Appendix: Alternatives Evaluation

11/21/2015 KICC 2014 23

Customer Base

Expansion4 0 0 5

Cost of

Implementation4 3 4 2

Time Needed 3 3 3 1

Ease of

Implementation3 4 3 1

More DesirableLess Desirable

Merging with Publix Acquired by

Blackstone

International

M&A

Integrate with

suppliers

0 1 2 3 4 5

Index Page

Appendix: Position Map

11/21/2015 AIG M&A Case 24

Fre

sh F

ood

Non

-perishable

Premium Value

Index Page

Appendix: Synergy potential of Pharmacies in Whole Food Stores

11/21/2015 KICC 2014 25

• Publix Pharmacies open new growth driver for

the merged company

• In-store pharmacies to provide health consulting

to advice customers on diets, nutrition, and

weight loss by eating more organic and natural

foods in order to prevent diabetes and high

cholesterol.

• Future Vision: expand health services to Whole

Foods Markets

Index Page

Appendix: Key Assumptions of Synergy calculation

11/21/2015 KICC 2014 26

• Three Cases considered

• Best Case: 4.4Bn

• Base Case: 3.1Bn

• Low Case: 2.7Bn

• 38.5% Tax Rate

• WACC 9.2%

• EBITDA margins of 8.5%

• Ramp up of synergies of 5 years

Key Assumptions of Synergy calculation

Index Page

11/21/2015 KICC 2014 27

Index Page

Appendix: Calculating the Total Shareholder Value

Publix P $20,00 WFM P $29,93

Publix # 777090000 WFM # 357860000

Publix V $15.541.800.000 WFM V $10.710.749.800

Premium 20%

Price Paid $12.852.899.760

Shares Issued by Publix to pay for WFM 642644988

Total Shares post-merger 1419734988

Share Exchange Rate 1,80 Publix Shares for each WFM share

Apparent Cost $2.142.149.960

PVCS $5.818.000.000

Apparent NPV Publix $3.675.850.040

Value of New Company $32.070.549.800

New Stock Price $22,59

True Cost $3.806.028.518

True NPV Publix $2.011.971.482

WFM Shareholders get 3806028518 65,42% of the merger gains

Publix Shareholders get 2011971482 34,58% of the merger gains

WFM Shareholders now have 45,27% of the total shares in the new company

Publix Shareholders now have 54,73% of the total shares in the new company

WFM total shareholder value $14.841.722.170

Publix total shareholder value $17.228.827.630

$32.070.549.800

71.00%

29.00%

Base Case Distribution of Merger Gains

Whole Foods Shareholders Publix Shareholders