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相楽洋Hiroshi SAGARA
東京工業大学Tokyo Institute of Technology, Japan
Nuclear data and its preparedness for nuclear non-proliferation and
security
2018 Symposium on Nuclear Data
2
Contents
Title Title
• Introduction: Needs of nuclear data from nuclear non-proliferation technology
• Non-destructive assay• Nuclear disarmament and technical
challenge• Next generation fuel cycle with proliferation
resistance
3
Introduction
Title Title
• Nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear security is the one of the most crucial measures demanded in the present world.
• For prevention, detection and responses of malicious acts, variety of technologies are utilized such as radiation measurements or material barriers,
• The needs and required accuracy of nuclear data in nuclear non-proliferation and security are much different from these in the nuclear reactor physics
• The present research focuses on the current status of nuclear data and its preparedness for nuclear non-proliferation and security, and to prioritize the needs for nuclear data measurements especially in these fields.
4
Diversity of threats to nuclear utilization
4
IAEA INCIDENT AND TRAFFICKING DATABASE (ITDB) Fact Sheet 2016
HEUHEU theft incident at Moldova
www.nti.org
4 GRAMS
5
Terminology of 3Ss, Safety, Security and Safeguards/non-proliferation
RI: Radio Isotope, RDD: Radiological Dispersal Device, RED: Radiological Exposure Device
Security Safeguards/NonproliferationSafetyNon-state Actor State ActorNuclear System
・Theft・Diversion
・Sabotage・RI Theft・RDD/RED
・Diversion・Miss-use
・System failure・Natural Disaster
Use of Nuclear Explosive DeviceRadioactive Mat. Release to Environment
Events/Threats:
Consequence:
・Breakout・Use of Nucl. Weapon/Experiments
・non-fulfillment of International conventions
・
・Human Factor
Challenges to the human society
6Copyright2018 H. Sagara
Quantitative regulation in SafeguardsSignificant Quantity & Timeliness Goal
Except for 238Pu>80%
IAEA Safeguards glossary 2001 edition
8
Quantitative regulation in Physical ProtectionU.S. Department of Energy
Copyright2018 H. Sagara 8
DOE M 470.4-6
9
Quantitative regulation in Nuclear Security Border control
Copyright2018 H. Sagara 9
Detection of unauthorized nuclear material Detail analysis would be performed in the framework of nuclear forensics
11
Objectives
Focusing the nuclear data important in nuclear non-proliferation and security, ① NDA Techniques surveillance② Nuclear reaction and data surveillance and analysis③ Prioritizing the requirement of nuclear data measurement, Finally propose the list of nuclear data important in nuclear non-proliferation and security
NDA technique NDA1 NDA2 NDA3Required accuracy 5% 5% 5%Important nuclear data and current uncertainty
σn,f,i(E) 10% σn,g,i(E) 7% σp,n,i(E) 5%
Measurement priority
◎ 〇 △
JSPS Kakenhi Grant Number JP17K07005 Sagara, Katabuchi
14
NDA: Irradiated fuel
JNMM, Vol. XL, 2012
• DOE Next Generation Safeguards Initiative
• NDA needs for nuclear material accounting when the continuity of knowledge is disconnected.
• Target accuracy of Pu measurement less than 5%
• R&Ds are on going all over the world.
15
Title Title
JNMM, Vol. XL, 2012
Light techniques
Accurate techniques
NDA Techniques
JAEA-REVIEW2015-027
NDA: Irradiated fuel
16
NDA –Passive γ・n-
Title Title
Fig. 2F2 PIE Benchmard[1](C:Cal、E:Exp)
• 137Cs<~3%• 242,244Cm,
134Cs,154Eu,144Ce,106Ru/Rh,125Sb
< ~10% • C.Y. MOX
1 H. Sagara et al., J. Nucl. Sci Technol, vol. 51, no. 1, p. 1-23 (2014)., 2 S. Shiba, H. Sagara, INMMJ ann. Mtg. 2018.
Fig. Passive gamma Passive Gamma Emission Tomography[2]
𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘+1 =𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘
∑𝑖𝑖 𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛽𝛽𝑓𝑓𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 − 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗
�𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗∑𝑚𝑚𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑓𝑓𝑚𝑚𝑘𝑘
Median Root Prior-Expectation Maximization(MRP-EM)
pj:j番目の検出器における投影値
fjk:反復回数kにおけるj番目の
画素値Cij: iからjの検出確率Mj:注目画素jとその周囲の画
素から求められた中央値β: 調整係数
• Needs for next generation safeguards equipment
17
NDA active Photo-nuclear
17
NDA with photo-fission
Difficulty to measure heavily shielded nuclear material by passive
methods
High energy photon may penetrate shields→ Applicable for nuclear material detection?
photon
18
NDA active photo nuclear
232Th(γ,n)238U(γ,n)
235U(γ,fission)
233U(γ,n)
233U(γ,fission)232Th(γ,2n)
232Th(γ,fission)
233U(γ,2n)
235U(γ,n)
238U(γ,fission)
235U(γ,2n)
238U(γ,2n)
Fig. Photonuclear cross sections 図 235Uのガンマ-核分裂断面積と実験値
Kimura, Sagara, Chiba, JNST(2016)Kimura, Sagara, Chiba, Proc. ND2016 (2016)
• Principle validation of γ-fission for U enrichment
• For accuracy <5%, uncertainty of σ(γ,fis) <3%
19
NDA active photo nuclear, Bremsstrahlung spectrum
C. Kim, H. Sagara, INMMJ ann. Mtg 2018
1.E-09
1.E-07
1.E-05
1.E-03
0.1 1 10
FLU
X [1
/CM
2/SO
URC
E]
ENERGY [MEV]
FLUX DISTRIBUTION WITH 6MEV SOURCE
(PHITS)photon electron
y = -0.0002x2 + 0.0026x + 9.44587.5
8
8.5
9
9.5
10
10.5
11
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100Ratio
of r
eact
ion
rate
11-
6 M
eV
Enrichment (%)
Photofission Rate of Reaction Ratio 11-6MeV
1.E-08
1.E-07
1.E-06
1.E-05
1.E-04
1.E-03
0.1 1 10
FLU
X [1
/CM
2/SO
URC
E]
11MEVphoton electron
• Preliminary calculation showed the correlation between enrichment and fission reaction rate ratio
• For next step, experiments are planned.
20
Nuclear Data needs for NDA
o Nuclear data needs for NDA in nuclear non-proliferation is ongoing
Focusing the nuclear data important in nuclear non-proliferation and security, ① NDA Techniques surveillance② Nuclear reaction and data surveillance and analysis③ Prioritizing the requirement of nuclear data measurement, Finally propose the list of nuclear data important in nuclear non-proliferation and security
You cooperation is very welcomed both Non-proliferation and Nuclear Data community !
21
Nuclear disarmament and technical challenge
References
International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification:IPNDV, https://www.ipndv.org/
Kimura, Tomikawa, 2018 AESJ annual mtg.
22
Recent nuclear disarmament topic:IPNDV
Title Title
• IPNDV(International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament
Verification) is an ongoing initiative that includes more than 25 countries with and without nuclear weapons
• the U.S. DOS announced that the U.S. government would lead the IPNDV in 2014, in cooperation with the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
• Goal: to identify critical gaps and technical challenges associated with monitoring and verifying nuclear disarmament.
• Phase I report is now open, https://www.ipndv.org/
24
Flow of nuclear weapon disarmament
Title Title
2424
Declaration correctness verification
施設全体、解体前後における管理の連続性(Chain of Custody: CoC)
25
Example: Verification elements and techniques
Temporary Store
Temporary Store
Site Storage Dismantlement Building
STEP- 6~7 STEP- 8 STEP- 9~10
NDA Check Point Dismantlement Station
NM(BEFORE)
NDA
HE NM
NDA
Temporary NDA Check Point
Gate Gate
(ENTER) (EXIT)
Holding Area (AFTER)
<Datalink>
HE
Inspector's Room Control Room
Site Storage Dismantlement BuildingTemporary Storage
Temporary Storage
Dismantlement Station
NDA check point(After)
NDA check point(Before)
Temporary Holding Area
Inspector’s Room Control Room
検認:核物質の存在パッシブガンマ/中性子
アクティブガンマ/中性子
検認:核物質の存在・同位体組成
パッシブガンマ/中性子アクティブガンマ/中性子
検認:爆薬の存在、核物質の不在
アクティブガンマ
NDASurveillance camera
Review station
機微情報保護遠隔監視技術
検認:爆薬の存在アクティブガンマ
Verification SNMPassive g/nActive g/n
Verification HEActive g
Verification SNM, Isotopic ratioPassive g/nActive g/n
Verification HEActive g
Information SecurityRemote monitoring
26
Verification technical Challenges
• Biggest challengeso Detection and verification of heavily sealed
chemical explosiveso Verification of heavily sealed HEU enrichment
and the fissile quantity more than certain levelo Active methods, especially active neutrons,
should be avoided by safety (political?) reasonso Difficulty to measure radio-rays from sealed
containerso Limited measurement space and capacity
Any idea?
28
Security & Proliferation Resistance by deign of Nuclear Fuel
(240)(242)(Fuel Production) (Fuel Protection)
19
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
0 20 40 60 80 100Burnup (GWd/t)
K-in
f
0%Np
7gHM/shere, 10%EU
2%Np
5%Np
Pebble bed HTGR– Ref. GENES4/ANP2003, 1106– 220MWth – 100MWe– Inlet 500- Outlet900 oC
Fuel sphere
Example for HTGR
1mm
Coated fuel particle (CFP)
Fuel kernel with Np-237
6cm
Adjustment on packing fraction of CFP leads spectrum optimization
21
Fig. Kinf vs Burnup
0102030405060708090
100
0 1 2 3 4 5Np-237 ratio in initial fuel (%HM)
Isot
opic
com
posi
tion
(%).
Pu-239
Pu-240
Pu-241
Pu-242
Pu-238
Fig. Pu vector at EOC vsNp Doping
PWR
Inner Core(IC) 288 Outer Core(OC) 274Radial Blanket(RB) 96SS Shield 102ZrH Shield 108Control Rod(CR) 40Control Rod(CR) 17
Z
R cm
IC
OC
RB
IC OC RBS
hie
ld(ZrH
)S
hie
ld(SS)
Coolant(Na)
Cladding(ODS ferritic Steel)Fuel pellets(U-Pu MOX)
100cmCore
20cmAxial-Blanket
20cmAxial-Blanket
Fuel pellets((U-MA)Ox)
Gas plenum
Gas plenum
Moderator(ZrH1.65)
Fuel pellets((U-MA)Ox)
Moderator(ZrH1.65)
Axial Blanket Fuel
269 329194
289
309
Fast Spectrum Reactor Blanket
Gas cooled reactor
Molten Salt Reactorthe Fluoride salt cooled high temperature reactor
Protected Plutonium Production (P3)-Experimental study by irradiation tests@ATR, Idaho, U.S.A.-
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Pu
Isoto
pic
Vecto
r (E
xperim
ent)
(wt%
)
Pu Isotopic Vector (Calculation) (wt%)
Pu238
Pu239
Pu240
Pu241
Pu242
Fig. Comparison between experiments and calculations in Pu isotopic vector
NU-Np samplesGood agreement between experimentsand calculations
Koyama et al., JNST, 2008.
Fig.UNIS-B
Fig. Cross-Section of Joyo
0mm (Core)
Am241+350mm(Ax-Ref )
Fig.SMIR
Am241Am243(Rd-Ref)
MK-II FuelInner ReflOuter ReflControl RodNSUNIS-BUNIS-CSMIRMARICO
Am loadedassembly30
Protected Plutonium Production (P3)-Experimental study by irradiation tests@Joyo, Japan-
Reaction Rate σφ Am241(n,g)
Good agreement between experiments and calculations in
Pu vector
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
Pu Is
otop
ic C
ompo
sito
n (C
AL) [
at%
]
Pu Isotopic Compostion (Exp) [at %]
Pu238Pu239Pu242
Pu
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0E-02 1.0E+00 1.0E+02 1.0E+04 1.0E+06
242g
Am
Isom
eric
Rat
io in
tota
l 241
Am
cap
ture
Neutron Energy [eV]
CurrentKoyama et. al, 2008Dovbenko, 1971JENDL/AC-2008JENDL3.3ENDF/B-VII
Experimental data supports
the latest cross-section libraries
of Am242g isomer ratio
Sagara et al., Mater. Sci. Eng.. vol. 9. no. 1. 012006. May, 2010.
31
Nuclear Data needs for proliferation resistance
o TRUs (n,g), (n,f) are important to control the Pu isotopic vector
o Simulation results of Pu isotopic vectors were well validated by experiments in thermal and fast reactors
o Challenge would be the verification or accounting TRU composition in the fuel material
o Other data such as TRU multiplicity, spontaneous fission, decay heat is also important
32
Summary
Title Title
• The needs and required accuracy of nuclear data in nuclear non-proliferation and security are much different from these in the nuclear reactor physics
• Research on the surveillance of nuclear data and its preparedness for nuclear non-proliferation and security has started to prioritize the needs for nuclear data measurements especially in these fields.
• This would open the new field to connect non-proliferation and nuclear data
Contact: sagara@lane.iir.titech.ac.jp
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