annexures-i,ii, iii & abbreviation

7/31/2019 Annexures-I,II, III & Abbreviation

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National Report (Vol.-I)

Study on Impact of Restructuring of SEBs

Annexure-I

TERMS OF REFERENCE - Ministry of Power, GOI

The study should bring out the trends in following parameters starting five years

before the reorganisation exercise and thereafter.

Exercise of Restructuring

When was the process of restructuring initiated? Present status of restructuring.

Are new entities autonomous enough to function as independent commercial

entities?

Generation Company

1. How the Technical Parameters of generating company has behaved in general

as well as specifically in terms of PLF, heat rate, oil consumption, auxiliary

consumption, availability of plant, ABT incentive earned and unscheduled breakdowns.

2. How has the generating company planned new capacity to meet the demand

for power in the state (project demand of 5 years from now, i.e., 2010 for the purpose).

3. Management of inventory and receivables.

Transmission Company

1. How has the transmission losses behaved in the period?

2. Margin of profit/cost added to the pooled cost of power apart from losses.

Distribution Company

1. How has the transmission and distribution losses behaved?

2. How has the billing efficiency worked?

3. How has the collection efficiency been?

4. Study of transformer breakdown rate, average restoration time thereof,

interruptions per feeder per month both in terms of number of interruptions and duration

per interruption.

5. Management of turn over and receivables.

6. The margin of establishment cost of per unit of electricity sold.7. Payment of dues/subsidies by the State Government in the stipulated time.

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Annexure-II

List of Experts Detailed for the Study

Expert Relevant Expertise Job Profile

Dr. P. L. Sanjeev Reddy Former Secretary, Government of India Project Director

Shri P. AbrahamFormer Secretary (Power), Govt. of India

and Ex-Chairman, MSEBMaharashtra

and

GujaratShri M.V. Dhekne Former Member (Technical) MSEB

Shri T. Sethumadhavan Former AS&FA, Ministry of Power, GOI Karnataka

Shri R. PoornalingamFormer Secretary to Govt. of India and

Ex-Chairman, Tamil Nadu SEBTamil Nadu

Shri M. Sivarami Reddy Former Chief Engineer (Reforms),APSEB Andhra Pradesh

Shri V.S. AilawadiFormer, Special Secretary, GOI and

Ex-Chairman, ERC, Haryana

Haryana and

Madhya Pradesh

Shri V.K. SoodFormer Chairman, Delhi Electricity

Regulatory Commission

Uttar Pradesh and

Madhya Pradesh

Shri P.N. BhandariFormer Additional Chief Secretary and

Ex-Chairman, RSEBRajasthan

Shri P.S. Bami Former CMD, NTPC Ltd. Assam

Shri D.P. BagchiFormer Secretary, Govt. of India and Ex-

Chief Secretary Govt. of Orissa

Orissa and

West Bengal

Shri P.C. Shekar Reddy Project Coordinator Overall coordination

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Annexure-III

Issues raised in the Interim Report of Study on the Experience of PowerSector Reforms by the National Coordination Committee of

Electricity Employees and Engineers (NCCEEE) and

comments thereon of the Group of Experts

List of Trade Union Representatives who Attended the Meeting on 21st July 2006

at IIPA, New Delhi

S.

NoName Organisation

1 Shri E. Balanandan President, EEFI

2 Shri Ranjit Singh Vice-President, EEFI

3 Shri Akhtar Hussain General Secretary, Mazdoor Mahasangh, BMS

4 Shri B.S. Meel General Secretary, EEFI

5 Shri Chakradhar P. Singh Gen Secy, All India Federation of Electricity Employees

6 Shri K.R. Unnithan Secretary, Electricity Employees Federation of India

7 Shri S. Pancharatnam Vice-President, EEFI

8 Shri Ushinar Deb Secretary, AIFEE

9 Shri Mohan Sharma AIFEE (MSEB)

10 Shri Sukhdev SinghPresident,

All India Federation of Power Diploma Engineer11 Shri K.L. Gupta

Deputy General Secretary

Akhil Bhartiya Vidyut Mazdoor Mahasangh (BMS)

ISSUES RAISED BY TRADE UNION REPRESENTATIVES

AND REPLIES THEREON

Introduction

Prior to enactment of the EA, 2003 itself, as many as ten States (including Gujarat,

which had enacted State Reform Act, 2003) had restructured their SEBs since they felt

the necessity to do so, rather than due to any imposition from the Central Government

etc. It is also pertinent to mention here that different political parties were in power in

the States both at the time of restructuring and during the transition period. Even at the

Centre, a number of political alliances held office at different points of time during this

period. Yet, all of them were convinced about the need for restructuring the power

sector. Wide political support (cutting across party lines) for the restructuring exercise

without any coercion from any Act or Central Government only proves beyond doubt

that it was only the need, and not any other consideration, that was the prime driver for

the restructuring of SEBs. Obviously, it was felt that SEBs as existing then were

proving to be a tremendous strain on the States financial resources and that it was

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imperative to bring about changes that would ensure a more balanced growth of the

electricity sector. The necessity for restructuring the SEBs was recognised by a national

consensus arrived at in the Chief Ministers Conference in 1996. In this Conference,

the Chief Ministers, belonging to various political parties, agreed to undertake power

sector reforms as a part of Common Minimum National Action Plan for Power

(CMNAP).

The EA, 2003 generally seeks to harmonise and rationalise the provisions in the existing

laws so as to bring about improvements in quality and reliability of service to the

consumers. It repealed all the three erstwhile Acts [namely, IE Act, 1910, Electricity

(Supply) Act, 1948 and ERC Act, 1998] that regulated the electricity sector. The privatelicensees have been co-existing with SEBs in various parts of the country and supplying

electricity to consumers in specified areas as per provisions of the Indian Electricity

Act, 1910. The EA, 2003 provides for distancing the Government from the regulatory

functions and to limit its role to broad policy formulations. It has also sought to

incorporate the best elements of the electricity reform legislations of the above-

mentioned States. The EA, 2003 has, therefore, obviated the need for individual States

to enact their own reform laws and laid a road map along with comprehensive

guidelines for the States, which are in the process of restructuring their SEBs or are yet

to initiate the process. Also, the States were given flexibility to adopt reform model,

which they consider to be the most suitable. Enactment of the EA, 2003 is considered as

a watershed in the Indian Power Sector on account of introducing newer concepts like

power trading, open access, Appellate Tribunal, etc., and special provisions for the rural

areas.

Reorganisation of SEBs has been accepted as a national necessity. Already 13 States

have restructured their SEBs. West Bengal too has already initiated steps to restructure

its SEB. This leaves only eight states, which are yet to restructure their SEBs. Thismeans that now the remaining SEBs only cater to 27.8 crore population (total

population of these eight states excluding West Bengal) as against countrys population

of 112.2 crore (i.e., less than 25 per cent of Indias population).

Since less than 25 per cent of the countrys population is being served by the SEBs, the

opposition to EA, 2003 need to be re-looked. The challenges of our times is how best to

carry forward the restructuring exercise so that the power sector plays its role as a

dynamic catalyst for the social, industrial, commercial and economic well-being of the

nation.

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S

No.Issue Raised by NCCEEE Comments of the Group of Experts

1. The current reforms will lead tothe profitable sections of theelectricity sector being privatised

while the publicly owned state

entities will own the rest including

the largely loss making rural

areas. The competition created

between private and public

utilities on such unequal terms

can then be used to promote the

argument of greater efficiency ofthe private sector in contrast to

the public sector or state run

entities. These arguments are

repeatedly being used against

SEBs. The real issue of how to

professionalise the SEBs and

reform the decision-making

process in the Government to

make it accountable is never

addressed in such discussions.

The Group of Experts (GOE) is of the viewthat the main objective of the current reform

is to strengthen the power sector and to

create a healthy competitive environment so

that both the economy and the consumers are

benefited. This will also improve efficiency

of the public sector. The GOE is certainly in

favour of making the management of the

Utilities more professional. The GOE

believes that the Government must distance

itself from the day-to-day management ofpower Utilities. A number of

recommendations have been included in the

Report on professionalising the management

of the Utilities and making them

autonomous, independent, and commercially

viable.

The issue of rural electrification has beencommented upon in detail under item No. 14.

2. If we dismantle the SEBs, we need

to address how are the above vital

objectives of National and social

concerns going to be achieved? So

before we dismantle the present

structure completely, the UPA

Government should take stock of

the current reforms and the

lessons learnt from them. There is

a need to have a thorough publicreview of what has been the

impact of dismantling the SEBs in

some of the states before

irrevocably dismantling the

existing structure. The provision

of dismantling of SEBs must be

deferred by another six months,

while such a review is carried out.

The study by the Group of Experts brings out

that restructuring of SEBs in a majority of

States have led to significant improvements

in their overall performance. The positive

impact is reflected by way of improved

technical and financial performance, and also

greater customer satisfaction. However, it isimportant to note that restructuring is only

the beginning and not the end of the process.

It must be accompanied by continuousefforts to enhance efficiency and quality of

service. The new structure makes it easier to

bring about these changes.

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3. It is time to take stock of these

assumptions of the EA, 2003. Thestate of the power sector after

unbundling of many of the SEBs

and also after enactment of EA,

2003 does not give any confidence

that these measures are

succeeding.

The study by the Group of Experts clearly

establishes that in most of the States, whichhave restructured their SEBs, significant

benefits have accrued to all the stakeholders.

In its Report, the Group of Experts has

presented notable and highly encouraging

achievements of some power Utilities after

restructuring.

4. Competition and liberalisation in

the electricity supply industry

mergers have also taken place

between distribution andgenerating companies. The end

result, as it is becoming evident

now, is that industry is growing

into bigger monopolies albeit of a

different mix than the earlier

vertically integrated electricity

utility.

The study establishes that SEBs were

monopolistic and monolithic organisations.

These were unwieldy from a management

perspective and unviable from a financialpoint of view. As of now, the SEBs are

functioning as monopolies, and customer

interest is not getting the due attention. The

Regulatory Commissions have adequate

powers to ensure that no private monopolies

emerge and also to protect consumerinterests.

5. Open Access:

After restructuring under EA,

2003, the transmissioncorporations, which will be state-

owned, will be responsible for the

cost of augmenting the

transmission system. As these

corporations are nothing but the

residual portion of the earlierSEBs, who are already facing a

severe financial crunch, it is not

clear how these entities would

raise the necessary resources.

On the other hand, the study establishes that

transmission and distribution sub-sectors,

which were neglected under the SEBs, arenow getting focused attention. Most of the

TRANSCOs and some of the DISCOMs

have now become viable. As a result, they

are now getting additional investments. The

initial phase of joint ventures in the

transmission sector has been encouraging.

This is indeed a clear benefit of

restructuring.

6. Power trading:

Attempts to trade electricity can

result in unscrupulous cornering

of electricity, sweetheart deals

between generators and

distributors, using limitations intransmission capacity as a

mechanism for arbitrage (Enron

used this extensively during the

California crisis) and so on.

Power trading in the country is in a nascent

stage. Even so, it has helped some

Utilities/SEBs to sell their surplus power to

needy power Utilities and earn some income.

Transmission Utilities have also been able to

earn some revenue by way of wheeling of

power. Power trading is thus a beneficial

proposition for the buyer and seller as well

as the state-owned Transmission Utilities. As

regards apprehensions regardingmalpractices, the institution of Regulators is

now in place to ensure that power trading is

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fair and transparent.

7. Cross Subsidies

Cross-subsidies are the only wayto ensure social equity. Whilethere is a case for reducing tariffs

for the industrial consumers who

are charged very steep rates, this

should be done not by drastically

raising the rates of the cross-

subsidised category, but by

reducing thefts and other losses.

The Group of Experts feels that restructuring

and social equity need not be in conflict witheach other. Restructuring has brought the

much-needed accountability in the power

sector. The separation of losses into various

restructured Utilities has facilitated focused

attention at all levels to reduce thefts and

losses. This can certainly bring down the

cost of power. The Group is of the view that

steady pace of restructuring is imperative to

achieve social equity.

8. Impact of Unbundling of SEBs:Experience of Reforms

The last 15 years of reforms with

frequent tinkering in the

Electricity(Supply) Act, 1948 and

the unbundling of SEBs have not

changed the deepening of the

financial crisis of the electricity

sector. Instead, these reforms

have added huge financial

burdens on the State and centralGovernment through APDRP and

other schemes The resultant

increase in price of electricity has

added burdens on agriculture,

industry and the domestic

consumers, without any

improvements in the quality of

supply.

The study brings out that the financial healthand operational performance of the

restructured Utilities are steadily improving.

The All-India ratio of subsidy booked by

Utilities to the total revenue has come down

from 20.75 per cent in 2001-02 to 11.19per

cent in 2004-05. The losses of Utilities,

which were on the increase until 2001-02 (Rs

29,252 crore) has come down to Rs 21,667

crore in 2004-05. In the normal course, but

for the improvements brought about, thisfigure may have gone up to a staggering Rs

38,000 crore. Major reduction of subsidy

was achieved in the States, which have

restructured their SEBs. An all round

improvement in the performance has been

observed. This has benefited the public at

large.

9. Unmetered Electricity Supply for

Agricultural SectorUnmetered supply introduces

distortions as it allows pilferage

and does not promote efficiency.

The rate of electricity for

agriculture needs to be pegged

lower than the average rate of

electricity as agricultural sector isgiven off-peak power, generating

much needed base demand on the

system. If populist measures suchas free electricity are introduced,

they can only be fulfilled by

The Group of Experts is also of the same

view and has made several recommendationson this aspect in its Report.

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sporadic and poor quality supply.

10. Impact of Unbundling of SEBs:

Experience of ReformsThere is no conviction among the

states that the reforms are

imperative. It is this allurement of

large financial assistance, which

is goading the states to reluctantly

show just enough progress on the

prescribed steps to qualify for

release of the next installment of

financial assistance. It is this

fiscal distress that compels moststates to practice the model of

power reforms prescribed by

MOP-PFC, IBRD

This point has been answered at item 8

above. The fiscal distress of the power sectoris the outcome of not adequately addressing

this issue for a long time. Reforms and

Restructuring are necessary and inevitable to

sustain Indias economic growth.

The study brings out that restructuring of

SEBs is a necessary condition but not a

sufficient condition for achieving a

turnaround of the power Utilities in the

States. In those States, where restructuring

has been undertaken in a lackadaisicalmanner, the results have not been up to the

mark. On the other hand, where restructuring

has been carried out with a greater

conviction, significant improvements have

been noticed. The GOE feels that majority of

the States have proceeded with restructuring

in the right earnest.

11. Reform Implied in EA-2003

Out of eight (8) states where SEBs

have been unbundled five (5) haveshown deterioration in AT&C

losses. On the other hand, out of

eight (8) States where SEBs

continue to exist only three (3)

have shown deterioration.

As per updated data, AT&C losses have

come down on a sustained basis in four

States (out of the seven States in Group-1).Delhi (which has not been covered in our

Study, but on which the Group had an

opportunity to look at the performance) has

also shown remarkable improvement in this

area. Hence, it can be easily inferred that

majority of the States which have

restructured their SEBs have shownperceptible improvements in reducing

AT&C losses. The Utilities in other States

(Group-1) have not shown the desiredprogress since they have not paid due

attention to certain vital aspects, which have

been brought out in our Report.

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12. The experience with private Orissa

Distribution Power Utilities that

failed to restore the supply in theflood-affected villages in 200001 is

a glaring example, some serious

issues of which were unveiled in the

Soven Kanungo Committee Report.

Delhi DISCOMs which were

privatised in great hope of reducing

losses, also failed in providing

economical, reliable and financially

efficient service to Delhi where

electricity prices are sharply risingand power cuts and interruptions

are increasing.

The experience of Delhi has been quite

encouraging and the AT&C losses have

come down from 59.51 per cent in 2002-03to 43.55 per cent by 2004-05.The position

regarding increase in tariffs in Delhi is given

below:

Year

Tariff

Increase

projected by

consultants

Actual

Increase

2002-03 10per cent NIL

2003-04 10 per cent 5.1 per cent2004-05 10 per cent 10 per cent

2005-06 5 per cent 6.6 per cent

Privatisation of electricity distribution in

Delhi has saved at least Rs 6,000 crore over a

five-year period. Although Orissa has been a

mixed success, it has saved an otherwise

payable subsidy of Rs 3,000 crore over the

last decade.

Orissa had not planned its transition phase ofpower sector restructuring as was done by

Delhi. It completely withdrew the support to

DISCOMs, once they were privatised. It did

not step in to support the DISCOMs even in

difficult times like super cyclone in the

State. This is one reason for the initial

setback to Reforms in Orissa.

13. Increase in Cost of Power

Generated/Purchased

After 10 years of reforms (2001-02),

the cost of generation of one unit of

SEB power was still in the range of

130 paise while the NTPC and IPP

power was of the order of 240

paise, the cost of SEBs have

doubled in these 10 years while that

of NTPC and IPPs has more than

tripled. The SEB finances have seensignificant deterioration on this

count.

As per information provided by NTPC, the

total cost of supply of power (including fixed

and variable costs) for all NTPC stations

have only increased from 144.86 paise/kWh

in 2001-02 to 164 paise/kWh in 2005-06. In

West Bengal, however, the NTPC cost of

supply of electricity has come down from

204 paise/kWh to 172 paise/kWh during the

same period.

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14. Rural Electrification

What is left unanswered is if the

SEBs disappear as mandated underEA, 2003, what happens to rural

electrification after this

restructuring? If all the distribution

companies run commercially, and

make profit as their primary

objective, obviously they would not

supply power to non-viable rural

areas.

Financially sound DISCOMs can address

issues of rural electrification better than sick

SEBs, which are subsisting on StateGovernments subsidies.

The Central Government has launched

RGGVY to address the crucial issue of Rural

Electrification. The scheme envisages 100

per cent village electrification by 2009. The

scheme has a grant component of 90 per cent

of the project cost which can even be availed

by private DISCOMs.

The Report has, among other things,

recommended adoption of the practicesfollowed in Andhra Pradesh, Gujarat,

Maharashtra and West Bengal in regard to

new approaches to Rural Electrification.

15. Alternative Approach to Power

sector Reforms

There is adequate evidence to prove

that unbundling of SEBs and

restructuring of the electricity

industry as envisaged under the EA:

2003 has only deepened the crisis ofelectricity industry and not

improved its poor financial

conditions. The growth in

generation capacity has also sloweddown and rural sector has been

isolated from the responsibility of

the state. If the objective was to

improve the health of the electricity

sector, this could have been

achieved under E(S) Act, 1948 aswell and did not need the new Act,

2003. It is now clear that the

solutions to the problems of the

electricity sector have to be found

within the parameters of an active

state sector and not by wholesale

dismantling of existing institutions.

It may be early to evaluate the final outcome

of the Reform efforts, as sufficient time is

needed for the Utilities to stabilise. However,

it has been seen that most of the restructured

Utilities are showing positive trends in

respect of almost all parameters wherever

reasonable autonomy has been accorded tothem. The level of consumer satisfaction in

these States also appears to be higher. This

could not have been achieved by these States

without adopting reforms and restructuring.Even the better performing SEB, i.e., West

Bengal SEB, has also decided to restructure

with an objective to improve its performance

further.

Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948, did not have

adequate provisions to make power sectorattuned to the present-day needs and

requirements. Hence, enactment of the EA,

2003 was imperative.

16. Alternative Approach to Power

sector Reforms

Under the liberalisation policies,we have seen the demoralisation of

the employees due to gratuitous

The Group of Experts agrees on the necessity

of involving employees and their

representatives in efforts to improve theworking of the Utilities. A major success

factor for the efficient performance of the

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attacks on the engineers and

employees from the policy makers.

We need to establish a policy, whichinvolves the workers and other

employees in plugging electricity

losses and improving the efficiency

of the sector. If a time bound

programme of theft reduction is

taken with the participation of the

engineers and employees unions, it

is not difficult to bring down thefts.

But for this, the Government must

also have the political will toproceed against those who are

using political clout to steal

electricity.

Utilities is HRD and the Report contains

several recommendations on this aspect.

17. Mandatory unbundling of SEBs

should be excluded from the Act.

It could be replaced by the

necessary provisions to clearly

account for the transactions

between the Generation,

Transmission and DistributionComponents of the industry

functions.

Restructuring of SEBs is mandatory under

the EA, 2003. 13 States (about two-thirds of

the major States) have already restructured

their SEBs. In addition, Government of WestBengal has taken a decision to restructure its

SEB. Thus leaving only a handful of States,

which are yet to reorganise their SEBs.The restructuring of SEBs into independent

functional entities provides much needed

autonomy to the resultant entities, so that

these can perform better, instead of working

as parts of an omnibus organisation.

The GOE is of the view that restructuring of

SEBs is in the interest of managerial and

operational efficiency and in consumer

interest.

18. Each Distribution circle in variousstates should be made a separate

cost and profit centre and there

should be energy audit at the circle

level as well.

The skills and expertise of the

engineers, technicians and workers

from the States should be pooled to

fully exploit our hydro-potential in

most expeditious manner.

The Group of Experts agrees on the need fordeveloping the concept of cost and profit

centres within each Utility, at appropriate

levels, which forms part of every

professional management. Restructuring

itself addresses these issues.

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ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviation Expanded Form

ABT Availability Based Tariff

ACS Average Cost of Supply

ADB Asian Development Bank

APCPDCL Andhra Pradesh Central Power Distribution Company Ltd.

APDRP Accelerated Power Development and Reforms Programme

APEPDCL Andhra Pradesh Eastern Power Distribution Company Ltd.

APNPDCL Andhra Pradesh Northern Power Distribution Company Ltd.

APSPDCL Andhra Pradesh Southern Power Distribution Company Ltd.

APSEB Andhra Pradesh State Electricity Board

APTRANSCO Andhra Pradesh Transmission CorporationAPY Akshay Prakash Yojana

ARR Annual Revenue Requirement

ASCI Administrative Staff College of India

ASEB Assam State Electricity Board

AT&C losses Aggregate Technical and Commercial Losses

BESCOM Bangalore Electricity Supply Company

BST Bulk Supply Tariff

CEA Central Electricity Authority

CERC Central Electricity Regulatory CommissionCESCO Central Electricity Supply Company (of Orissa)

Ckt. km. Circuit Kilometre

CMD Chairman and Managing Director

CMP Common Minimum Programme

CPSU Central Public Sector Undertaking

DAS Data Acquisition System

DBST Differential Bulk Supply Tariff

DHBVNL Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitaran Nigam Limited

DISCOM Distribution CompanyDPS Detailed Policy Statement

DTs Distribution Transformers

EA Electricity Act

EHV Extra High Voltage

ERC Energy Review Committee

ESCOMS Electricity Supply Companies

ESP Electrostatic Precipitator

FD Functional Director

FDP Financial Development PlanFEEEA Federation of Electricity Engineers and Employees Association

FIs Financial Institutions

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FRP Financial Restructuring Plan

FSA Fuel Surcharge Adjustment

FY Financial YearGEB Gujarat Electricity Board

GETCL Gujarat Electricity Transmission Corporation Limited

GIS Geographical Information System

GVP Grama Vidyuth Pratinidhi

GRIDCO Grid Corporation of Orissa

GSECL Gujarat State Electricity Corporation Limited

GUVNL Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited

HERC Haryana Electricity Regulatory Commission

HPGCL Haryana Power Generation Corporation LimitedHRD Human Resource Development

HT/LT High Tension/Low Tension

HV High Voltage

HVPNL Haryana Vidyut Prasaran Nigam Limited

HVDS High Voltage Distribution System

IIM Indian Institute of Management

IIPA Indian Institute of Public Administration

IPP Independent Power Producer

IT Information TechnologyJGY Jyoti Gram Yojana

KVA Kilo Volt Ampere

kWh Kilo Watt Hour

LE Life Extension

MD Managing Director

MOA Memorandum of Agreement

MOU Memorandum of Understanding

MoP Ministry of Power

MPSEB Madhya Pradesh State Electricity Board

MPPGCL Madhya Pradesh Power Generating Company Limited

MSEDCL Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Company Limited

MTEF Medium Term Expenditure Framework

MW Mega Watts

MYT Multi Year Tariff

NEP National Electricity Policy

NES Non-conventional Energy Sources

NHPC National Hydroelectric Power Corporation Limited

NTPC National Thermal Power Corporation

NPTI National Power Training Institute

O&M Operation and Maintenance/Operation and Management

OERC Orissa Electricity Regulatory Commission

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OHPC Orissa Hydro Power Corporation Limited

OPGCL Orissa Power Generation Corporation Limited

OSEB Orissa State Electricity BoardPFC Power Finance Corporation Limited

PGCI Power Grid Corporation of India Limited

PLF Plant Load Factor

PSRF Power Sector Restructuring Fund

PSUs Public Sector Undertakings

PWC Price Water House Coopers

R&M Renovation and Modernisation

RAO Regional Accounting Officer

REC Rural Electrification Corporation LimitedREL Reliance Energy Limited

RGGVY Rajiv Gandhi Grameen Vidyutikaran Yojana

RLA Residual Life Assessment

RMS Revenue Management System

SBM Single Buyer Model

SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition System

SEBs State Electricity Boards

SERC State Electricity Regulatory Commission

SLDC State Load Despatch CentreSPCB State Pollution Control Board

ST&D Sub Transmission and Distribution System

T&D Transmission and Distribution

TFYP Tenth Five Year Plan

TOR Terms of Reference

TPC Tata Power Companies

TTPS Talcher Thermal Power Station

TRADECO Trading Company

TRANSCO Transmission Company

UGVCL Uttar Gujarat Vij Company Limited

UPPCL Uttar Pradesh Power Corporation Limited

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annexures-i,ii, iii & abbreviation

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