artigo amado luiz cervo

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A ascenso o Basil no cenio intenacional:

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AMAdO LUIz CErvO*

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In the course o their sixteen years in ofce, Presidents Fernando HenriqueCardoso (1995-2002) and Luiz Incio Lula da Silva (2003-2010) were twostatesmen who defned the pattern o Brazils integration into the internationalscene at the turn rom the 20th into the 21st century. Cardosos ideas and decisionsdrew inspiration rom the neoliberal political philosophy, while Lulas derived

rom a logistic mission o the State. The two presidents modes o thinking arenot sufcient to explain their strategies, though. As he essayed the logistic modelo oreign policy in his second term, Cardoso, the neoliberal turned skepticalwhen he ormulated the concept o asymmetrical globalization, paved the wayor his successor, who adopted the new model to promote Brazils interdependentintegration into the international scene.

From neoliberalism to global interdependence

Neoliberalism had both adverse and positive eects on Brazils internationalrelations. Adverse eects included unilateral opening o the domestic consumersmarket, oreign trade defcit, oreign indebtedness, sale o assets o Braziliancompanies, submission to consensuses and advice rom capitalisms center,obedience to the rules o global governance established by the rich to their ownbeneft, and the sacrifcing o relations with emerging countries in avor o thefrst world; in sum, a countrys loss o power on the international scene.

In time, though, economic opening resulted in the modernization oindustrial plants and made the Brazilian economy more competitive, while

re. Bas. Polt. Int. 53 (special edition): 7-32 [2010]

* Tenured Emeritus Proessor o History o International Relations o University o Brasilia UnB and seniorresearcher o National Council or Scientifc and Technological Development CNPq ([email protected]).


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liberalism led to a smaller role o the State and the attendant rise o society. Lulaboarded this train already on the move and advanced arther on the path o realinterdependence. He discarded previous mechanisms o dependent integrationand placed Brazil among the nations that move on their own eet in search o

their destiny, with their governments support. Here lies the jump in quality othe Brazilian model o integration into the international scene at the turn o themillennium: the States intermediary role and external action on behal o the socialsegments, subsuming the national interest, which encompasses the objectives oproducers and consumers, entrepreneurs and wage earners alike.

To stake out its space in the world, instead o just opening itsel to the worldas beore, Brazil would have to ace up the asymmetries caused by the inequalityo power and benefts in the international order. To what extent has Lulas Brazilsucceeded in this respect?

The international order at the outset o the new millennium is in a stateo eervescence involving actors and powers. Neoliberalism has receded to theperiphery and placed itsel at the service o the European Union and the UnitedStates, which reinorced their political, geopolitical, and economic alliance andresisted the regulation o economic activities, the root o the 2008/09 crisis. Onthe other hand, globalization had altered an order imposed by the liberal doctrineor the order dominated by the States and its military power, and by transnationalcorporations. Old capitalisms supremacy and global logistic have had to come aceto ace with the emerging nations, which have come together to tame globalizationsimpetus. To the north, one sees what Bertrand Badie calls thepowers impotence;to the south, we see the counterpowers play; and according to Gilberto Dupas,both actors recognize the limits o the national States.

In the south, counterpower springs rom the social and political legitimizationon whose bases the rules o the new order are to be defned so as to beneft all; itsprings urther rom democracy, which leads to the ormulation o these rules. Itsprings also rom neoliberalism, which motivates individuals and, on the otherextreme, rom terrorism, which nourishes the root causes. Globalizations order is

entering a new, still more global phase: each actor eels bound to the whole to therich and to the poor, to the developed and to the emerging countries, and to thosebenefted or excluded by capitalism since all are aected by international trade,peace and war, the environment, human rights, the energy and the fnancial crises,and the scarcity o ood. The entry o new actors on the stage adds other voices tothe criticism o global asymmetries, and hampers diplomatic negotiations. Thisexplains the stagnation o multilateralism, which was supposed to draw up therules or the global order in the 21st century; it also explains the deensive reactionon the part o the developed countries, which reactivated the G-8, as well as the

conrontation o two dispute settlement strategies: the Chinese-Brazilian, throughthe peaceul means o diplomatic negotiations, and the US-NATO, through theviolent means o intervention or sanction.


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Brazils Rise on the International Scene: Brazil and the World

Since Cardoso and during Lulas Administration, international order hasundergone signifcant changes. These changes have allowed Brazilian oreignpolicy to mitigate the internal eects o the order established by others and, at thesame time, to become an active participant in the ormulation o the new order.

How has this occurred?With globalization o democracy seeming a utopian objective, as shown by

the American ailure in Iraq and by the continuity o the Chinese political regime,why not democratize globalization? This objective, susceptible o producing real,positive eects, is the mainspring o Brazilian oreign policy.

As a frst step, Lulas oreign diplomacy adopted this approach at the WorldTrade Organizations Conerence in Cancn, in 2003. Since World War II,international economic regulations had been established by capitalisms center inits own avor. Developing countries, later called emerging countries, were at the

most spectators at negotiation tables, and would certainly abide by the rules. Allo this was seen as natural. Ater Cancn, in the view o Brazilian diplomacy,either the emerging countries would participate in the ormulation o the rulesor the process would stop. To create counterpower, this diplomacy worked thenand thereater to orm coalitions in the South, the frst o which was the G-20,a group o countries established on the occasion o the Cancn Conerence toaddress trade issues.

The determination to democratize globalization added new acets to oreignpolicy: reinorcement o the role o the State as an international negotiator;sovereign deense o national interests, including big business under the processo being globalized; alliances with emerging countries with identical objectives,beginning with those o South America; open dialogue with, instead osubservience to more developed countries; and a component o morality in theorm o fght against poverty and hunger.1

Lula has maintained the tradition o ormulating and programming oreignpolicy as a State policy. It has preserved values, interests, and modes o conductadopted through historical channels, such as an industrial calling and a harmonious

connection between the State and society. It has preserved Brazils historicalparticipation in multilateral negotiation organizations and increased by morethan thirty percent the number o countries where Brazil maintains diplomaticrepresentations. It has established three external objectives: a) market liberalismensuring reciprocity o benefts; b) expansion o business abroad through tradeand internationalization o Brazilian companies; and c) reinorcement o militarypower to inuence global order and sectoral regimes. This is what makes thelogistic strategy o incorporation into the international scene.

1 BADIE, Bertrand. LImpuissance de la puissance: essai sur les nouvelles relations internationales. Paris: Fayard,2004. DUPAS, Gilberto.Atores e poderes na nova ordem mundial. So Paulo: Unesp, 2005. PAROLA, AlexandreG. L.A ordem injusta. Brasilia: FUNAG, 2007.


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Consolidation of the logistic mode of participation in the international scene

At the 2003 World Economic Forum in Davos, Lula, as an initial message ohis frst Administration, made clear his dissent rom the neoliberal model, which

he saw as an exaltation o the market-god. In the view o Foreign Minister CelsoAmorim, blind aith in open markets and in the States stepping back cannot inducedevelopment and equality among nations. The new leaders have thus developedan awareness o the role o the State and demanded political action to allow thecountry to penetrate global processes as an active agent in the system, withoutsubmitting itsel to the play o traditional orces.

A logistic State is one that does not lend itsel merely to rendering services, aswas the case at the time o developmentalism, or to remaining a passive spectator omarket orces and hegemonic power, as was the case at the time o neoliberalism.

It is a logistic State because it reassumes developments strategic planning andthe unction o supporting and legitimizing the initiatives o other economicand social actors, to which it delegates responsibilities and power. Contrarilyto literatures presumption about globalization, this new mode introduced byCardoso and consolidated by Lula prevents governments rom being incapableo governing owing to international orces. Being Brazil an organized society,with its class associations bringing together industrialists, armers, bankers,workers, businessmen, and consumers, it is incumbent on the State to support theachievement o the interests o these segments o society, watching over the welare

o all, which is the supreme national interest. As all o this depends on both internaland external actors, the State ensures that the national interest has a weight onoreign policy, and becomes an agent o global governance. This developmentwarrants seeing oreign policy in the Lula era as a decisive step toward maturity.

Two actors, among others, contribute to the consolidation o the logisticState in Brazil: the high degree o societys organization, which acilitates theleaders coordinating work; and political and economic stability, which promptsthe linking o internal governabilitys logic to the logic o global governance. Thecombination o these actors, when placed at the service o development, gives

rise to the logistic State, whose conduct diers rom that o the neoliberal State,especially as it recovers the decision-making autonomy in the political sphere andturns to the reinorcement o national economys hard core in the economic sphere.

In light o this conceptual ramework, we can now review the dierentareas o external activity geared to the achievement o the nations interests. Andthereater we can assess the results, as it is appropriate to a study o the countrysinternational relations.2

2 CERVO, Amado Luiz. Insero internacional: ormao dos conceitos brasileiros. So Paulo: Saraiva, 2008.

CARDOSO, Jos Celso (org). Desafos ao desenvolvimento brasileiro. Braslia: Ipea, 2009. BRASIL, Ministriodas Relaes Exteriores. Poltica Externa Brasileira I. Braslia: FUNAG, 2007. Idem, DEP: Diplomacia, Estratgiae Poltica. Braslia, MRE, n. 1, 2004. GUIMARES, Samuel Pinheiro. Desafos brasileiros na era dos gigantes. Riode Janeiro: Contraponto, 2005.


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Hgh ty tthed t ntegtn nt the g sene

Brazil is orging ahead in the 21st century to become a globalist country.But its mode o integration into the international scene diers rom that o other

globalist countries, such as Chiles. Chiles international insertion fts the trade-oriented globalism that prolongs societys inancy by taking as guidelines reetrade treaties and an economy based on primary exports, i.e., neoliberal preceptso the 1990s. Brazil adopts the industrialist globalism mode, characterized at thisstage o maturity o the development process by two essential eatures: reciprocalmultilateralism and economic internationalization. We advance now to a morethorough study o these eatures to describe the Brazilian mode o incorporationinto the international scene in the 21st century.

The concept of reciprocal multilateralism

Brazilian oreign policy in the 21st century operates through reciprocalmultilateralism: We want ree trade, but ree trade characterized by reciprocity,said Lula in Davos on January 26, 2003. Reciprocity does not apply only tointernational trade. In all areas o the international order economy, trade, security,environment, health, and human rights reciprocity is ensured when the ruleso multilateral order beneft all nations. Without these rules, international orderremains at the mercy o the stronger, as shown since 1945 by the discussions at

GATT-WTO and the UN, the two pillars o multilateralism.As a co-ounder o these two more relevant multilateral organizations devotedprimarily to trade and to security, respectively, Brazil has maintained continuityo ideas and conduct, as it has advocated the peaceul, negotiated solution odisputes and the promotion o the interests o the rich and the poor throughthe international trade system. However, multilateralism has not been guidedby these principles over time. In the 21st century, the Security Council still lacksrepresentativeness, impartiality, and efcacy or maintaining peace, while theWTO lacks balance in the decision-making process to meet the nations interests.

As o 2003, Brazilian oreign policy has ound more power to demandreciprocity in international relations. We have ormed the G-20 in Cancun,when the United States and the European Union were attempting to impose anunair agreement that let arm subsidies virtually untouched and oered littleor no opening to products o interest to developing countries, while demandingrom these disproportionate concessions, wrote Celso Amorim.

Brazilian diplomacy applies its concept o reciprocal multilateralism to tradeand security, but also extends it to all areas o international relations. The conceptinvolves two presuppositions: the existence o rules to govern the international

order, without which the power disparity will prevail in avor o the great powers;and the joint ormulation o these rules, so that they will not avor the interestso some to the detriment o the interests o others.


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Reciprocal multilateralism eliminates two theoretical utopias or anunderstanding o Brazilian oreign policy: hegemonic stability, and a necessaryconnection between oreign policy and political regime.

The hegemonic stability theory lies at the oundation o an international order

based on the unilateral conduct o the dominating power the United States sincethe end o the Cold War or on the subservience o the others and the attendantirrelevance o the multilateral organizations. But a hegemonic instability theorywould serve just as well as an explanation, according to Badie, as can be seen incontestation, anti-Americanism, terrorism, the outbreak o the fnancial crisistriggered at the hegemonic center, the random conduct o certain powers, the easewith which the States move. As hegemony does not engender order, much less anacceptable order, only multilateralism can preserve the order rom the nationsselfshness, in the view o Brazils oreign policy. In other words, the ideal order

is the multilateral order.A political regime does not necessarily show any connection with peace,

development, justice, and mankinds welare. Liberal and democratic regimesoperate toward these ends but may also operate in an opposite direction. InSouth America, development models have shown similar results, regardless o thedemocratic or authoritarian nature o the dierent regimes.3

Reciprocal multilateralism: examples

To describe the reciprocal multilateralism that characterizes the Brazilianoreign policy in the 21st century, we have chosen examples in fve areas, or didacticpurposes. (1) reciprocity in the international economy and in the decisions o thegreat economic powers: the G-8, whose meetings are attended by the BrazilianHead o State; and the fnancial G-20, whose frst summit was held in November2008 to combat the eects o the crisis and the stagnation o the developedcountries; (2) international trade and Brazils conduct at WTOs Doha Round,as well as its determination to establish coalitions among emerging countries; (3)international security, especially the eorts beore the Security Council, and thevalorization o the strategy o negotiation instead o that o violence in dealingwith issues; (4) climate changes and other environmental issues; (5) health andhuman rights.

1. intentn enmy: G-8 nd G-20

The basic characteristic o Brazils international economic relations is thepursuit o actual interdependence, i.e., o reciprocity in the achievement o intereststhrough negotiation at dierent orums, and o economic internationalization.

3 BRASIL, Ministrio das Relaes Exteriores. Poltica Externa Brasileira, I. Braslia: FUNAG, 2007. AMORIM,Celso.A diplomacia multilateraldo Brasil. Braslia: FUNAG, 2007.


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Since 2003, negotiations have incorporated this economic policy and guideddiplomacys conduct at the WTO, in connection with the Free Trade Area o theAmericas (FTAA), and toward the European Union, as well as in the ormation ocoalitions with emerging countries. The purpose o this strategy is to strengthen

ties to the largest possible number o nations, blocs, and regions, regardless otheir geographical situation, but with emphasis on the Southern Hemisphere,where Brazilian interests are more evident. In 2004, or instance, Argentina wasthe second largest destination o Brazilian exports, ater the United States, whileChina came third, and southern countries were the destination o fty percent ototal exports. In 2010, China ranks as Brazils frst trade partner.

In economic relations with the European Union and the United States, theunrestricted liberalization o business, fnancial, and products ows does not servethe achievement o the national interest, as the country still lags behind them in

productivity. With unrestricted liberalization, Brazil would jeopardize its industrialuture. It is under this light that one should understand the rejection o ree tradetreaties, which perpetuate asymmetries; the search or partnerships and coalitionsin the South; the attention to Mercosur; and the construction o South Americaneconomic unity all o which are eatures o oreign policys realism. While theNorth oers little other than a large market, and requires much in structural terms,relations with the South are more avorable, in addition to oering opportunitiesthat would be insane on the part o good policy to miss.

The fnancial crisis that erupted in September 2007 in the United Statesand then spread to Europe, ollowing the same pattern o capitalisms 1929 crisis,reveals the new equilibrium o the international economy, thus showing theappropriateness o Brazils international economic policy, which maintains strongties to the North, but reacts logistically to change. On the one hand, emergingcountries appear, with good regulation, high productivity, production, and exports,in addition to holding huge amounts in United States Treasury papers; on theother, one sees bad regulation, high imports level, consumerism, low savings, andpublic indebtedness at the center o capitalism.

Rich countries hold requent meetings to discuss the direction o internationalrelations and their own interests, especially those that are not addressed bymultilateral decisions o global organizations. For some years now, they haveinvited emerging countries they see as global actors to sit at the table. At the2007 Germany Summit, or instance, the G-8 (Germany, Italy, France, UnitedKingdom, United States, Japan, and Russia) invited one o the G-5 (China, India,South Arica, Mexico, and Brazil), and oered President Lula the opportunityto attend the negotiations o the rich. At its 35th Summit, held in Aquila, Italy,in July 2009, the G-8 decided to convert itsel into the G-14 (G-8+G-5+Egypt).

The invitation addressed at the G-5 was prompted not by mere courtesy but bythese emergent countries weight, needed or addressing the issues and solvingproblems on a global scale.


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When the developed economies went into recession in 2008, the G-8 wasorced to dilute itsel into the fnancial G-20, which shelters the twenty largesteconomies plus the European Union, a orum then established or adoptingmeasures against speculation and or reigniting growth. But it is the rich countries

deense instinct that explains the maintenance o the G-8, which in June 2009had been declared dead by Celso Amorim and; Lula, accordingly, characterizedthe same orum as inadequate to make decisions about the international economy.At the June 2010 Toronto meeting o the two orums, the G-8 reormulated itsmodus operandi.

As the instinct o deense, coupled with emerging interests and themultiplicity o economic negotiation orums (G-8, G-15, G-20, and Central Banks)ails to conciliate decisions, it entails the irrelevance o these multilateral meetingsor conceiving the new economic order, to be ultimately determined by the rich

and the emerging countries. The rich countries economic stagnation reectsadversely on Brazilian economy in three ways: a reduction o exports, especiallyo manuactures, o oreign direct investment, and a slackening o the pace oeconomic growth. Reaction to these eects has been threeold: intensifcationo investments under the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC); reinorcemento the southern coalitions aimed at reorming the international fnancial system,the IMF, and the World Bank; and the making o ten billion dollars available tothe IMF to reinorce its lending resources.

At economic orum meetings, Brazilian government has advocated biouelsas a means o meeting the energy challenge, which is similar to the challengepresented by China, with its massive population and its ast growth pace, to climatechange. The investment protection issue, which puts in opposition the interests otwo worlds, has been shited to bilateral agreements. A new orm o protectionismhas come up into the discussion, introduced by countries such as Canada and theUnited States, which proclaim the reedom o investment but begin to reconsiderand even prohibit businesses that might lead to the acquisition o their strategiccorporations by emerging countries through shares transer.

As regards intellectual property, which protects patents and technologicalinnovation, discussion at the G-8 aces a similar situation. Regulations in avoro laboratories and corporations o rich countries are accepted with reservationsby India and China, while Brazil has already issued compulsory licensing omedication against AIDS, thus breaking its patent.

From the negotiations with the big ones i one might speak o realnegotiation between rich and emerging countries three conclusions can be drawn.First, the meetings address issues that are vital to Brazilian interests; the countryshould identiy which regulations it would be advisable to accept and make its

policy clear at multilateral orums and at the time o negotiating internationalagreements. Second, it is necessary to learn rom this process, as the country nowbecomes a holder o intellectual property and international investor. Third, the


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perception imposes itsel o how important it is or the national interest to preservedecision-making autonomy in oreign policy, as expressed in President Lulasunpolished words at the conclusion o the Germany meeting: The developedworld thinks that it can make a speech and that we have to take it as the last

word and obey.4

2. intentn tde nd the WTo

Globalization stimulates international trade in goods, services, and actors.The volume o oreign trade, exports and imports reects on the income oproducers and consumers, on the employment level, and on the countrys externalfnances. Hence, attention should be devoted to trade.

Ater the trade defcit o the 1990s owing to the devaluation o the Realin

1999, Brazilian oreign trade showed an upward trend, but it was only as o 2003that this rising trend confrmed itsel, with considerable surpluses, owing to higherconsumption and higher prices o export commodities. Finance Ministry datashow that exports totaled 48 billion dollars in 1998, 60 billion in 2002, and 197.9billion in 2008, alling to 152.3 billion in 2009, due to the crisis. Surpluses alsoarose, rom minus one billion dollars in 1999 to 40 billion in 2007. This was theyear when the list o exports was urther diversifed, including agribusiness exports,in which Brazil is a world leader (it ranks frst as an exporter o ethanol, sugar,coee, and orange juice), and sophisticated exports, such as aircrat and sotware.Manuactures, which accounted or 52.3 percent o the total, exceeded primaryexports then. In 2007, the United States and the European Union accountedor less than hal o Brazilian exports 65 billion dollars as compared with 161billion dollars. As consumption in rich countries ell, China became Brazil s frsttrade partner in 2010.

Despite globalization, the modernization o the Brazilian productive system,and the logistic strategy or integration into the international scene, Brazil has notbeen able in the 21st century to substantially modiy its list o exports and to reap

greater benefts rom oreign trade. In 2009 it exported more commodities thanmanuactures. As regards manuactures, 40 percent went to the major economies(United States, European Union, and China), while another 40 percent went toLatin America, which attests to the attention to the neighbor countries.

These data illustrate the Brazilian diplomacys activism at the WTO. As anadvocate o the liberalization o markets, Brazilian diplomacy seeks to addressthe imbalance between Brazilian productivitys higher status within the globalsystem and its low participation in international trade. Two specifc objectives driveBrazilian participation at these negotiations: to secure the liberalization o the

4 BATISTA JR. Paulo Nogueira.O Brasil e a economia internacional: recuperao e deesa da autonomia nacional.Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2005.


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agricultural market and the end o arm subsidies in Europe and the United States;and reusal to make any concessions on manuacture trade as long as this injusticeis not redressed. That is, to establish the reciprocity o trade benefts between therich and the emerging countries. This Brazilian trade policy practiced also at the

WTO governs all negotiations; and as it met with resistance, it caused the collapseo the FTAA and o the Mercosur-European Union Free Trade Agreement.

The trade G-20 was ormed in Geneva, in August 2003, during preparatorymeetings and thus preceded the Cancun Conerence. It is made up o emergingcountries willing to prevent the acceptance o results predetermined by theNorthern powers at multilateral trade negotiations. Its original membership hasbeen expanded rom twenty to twenty-three member countries, whose ministerialmeetings take place at regular intervals. The WTO has been taken by surprise bythe upsurge o the emerging countries, which has caused it to change its modes onegotiation. It no longer accepts prior agreements between rich countries proposedto the Assembly as a possible consensus to be imposed rom above. The interestso the South now make part o the negotiations dynamics.

The two groups conrontation, particularly on the agricultural issue, draggedon or the entire decade, hampering negotiations, and confrming Celso Amorimsprediction that the WTO would tend to become irrelevant. On one side, stood therich countries, which did not yield to the emerging countries right to take part inthe decision-making power which determines global trade order, demanding rom

them the liberalization o their industrial markets without giving up their armpolicies; on the other side, stood the emerging countries, which since Cancn hadgained sufcient power to do away with subservience in international relationsand to ensure reciprocity in the achievement o interests. In June 2006, the DohaRound negotiations were suspended and were actually resumed only at the end othe decade. But discouragement took hold o diplomats and specialists. Agriculturalnegotiations were thus shited to the United Nations, which convened a majorFAO Assembly in 2008, in Rome, to discuss ood security, which was placed injeopardy by the ood crisis. The meeting was attended by orty heads o state and4,800 delegates rom 192 UN member countries.

As it happened at the WTO, negotiations at FAO also bogged down andyielded insignifcant results. In brie, at trade negotiations, countries easily shitresponsibilities to one another.

For Brazil, multilateralisms ailure at trade negotiations in the 21st centuryboth harms and disturbs political decisions in matters o oreign trade: shouldone continue to wager on global ree trade, move toward the bilateralism o reetrade as advised by diplomats o the Cardoso era and some businessmen, or seek

an alternative in the South? As long as a change o strategy did not occur, theSouth alternative began to materialize. Trade with China now ranks frst, SouthAmerican integration has been promoted with this purpose in view, and in


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December 2009 Brazil signed a trade agreement with 22 developing countries,under which mutual taris have been reduced by 20 percent.5

3. Seuty nd the Seuty cun

The powers security policy shows an internal ace, the provision o means,and a strong connection with oreign policy. Despite multilateralism and theormation o blocs, security is grounded on internal reality, rom where it drawsthe means or action and or exercising the decision-making power. In recentyears, the Brazilian academia has involved some groups in the study o securityissues, which are no longer limited to a concern on the part o the armed orcesand o diplomacy. According to Vaz, there is a gap in Brazil between the strategiccapability and the perception o the role to be played at the regional and global

levels.With its ability to orm consensuses, Brazilian diplomacy osets the armed

orces scarce means o dissuasion and deense. This is why it extols Brazilsinternational role in security matters. It berates the United Statess unilateralpreemptive action, the doctrine o European intervention and terrorism; inaddition, it to links security to development and to the combat o hunger. Itproposes a strategy o avoring negotiation over the resort to violence or thesolution o conicts and the maintenance o peace. It points out the positiveeects o its praxis on the construction o peace and calls or the democratizationo decisions at the Security Council as another way o achieving reciprocity inthe multilateral order. It has recently taken initiatives in this respect, such as theattempted mediation between Iran and the West in regard to that countrys nuclearprogram; also in the talks between Arabs and Israelis regarding conicts in theMiddle East. But Brazilian diplomacy has not been successul in its attempt to jointhe exclusive club o political and military power, which remains frmly closed.

The 1996 plan to reorm national deense led to institutional advances, suchas the establishment o the Ministry o Deense and the alternation o civilian

ministers at its whelm, which however produced no eect on the countrys strategiccapability. Ten years later, the Lula government drated a second plan conceptuallyappropriate or reequipping the armed orces but whose results are not yet known:to restart the military industry and technological research aimed at providingthe armed orces with internal means. But as long as a cultural change does notoccur in the country, oreign policy will remain deprived o operational means.

Despite these contradictions, Brazilian oreign policy moves on withthe intention o playing a relevant role in the feld o security, based on thenegotiated conict solution. In 2004, Brazil joined Southern Cone countries,

5 BRASIL Ministrio das Relaes Exteriores. O G-20 e a OMC: textos, comunicados e documentos. Braslia:FUNAG, 2007. Idem, Resenha de Poltica Exterior do Brasil, n. 83, 2003. See Inorme sobre o ComrcioMundial2008 O comrcio em um mundo em processo de globalizao, prepared by the WTO.


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Argentina and Chile, secured the cooperation o Uruguay, Peru, and Bolivia,assumed the command o the troops, and acted to bring peace, development, andredemocratization to Haiti Brazils major involvement in UN peace missionssince 1946.

Let us now look at two objectives o Brazilian external involvement: the UNSecurity Council and the South American Deense Council.

Consistently with its pacifst oreign policy, Brazil has preerence or amultilateral approach as a mechanism or solving conicts. It attaches importanceto the UN Security Council, o which it has made part since its ounding, andrequently participates in peace missions. But Brazil calls or a reorm o theCouncil in view o its lack o representativeness and o eectiveness in acing 21stcentury conicts.

In 2005, the Brazilian government submitted to the UN General Assembly a

proposal or the Councils reorm, a proposal that had the support o other memberso the G-4 (Brazil, India, Germany, and Japan), a group o major powers thatwish to be made permanent members o the Council. Despite the G-4 endeavors,global reaction prevented the reorm. The fve permanent members ear o losingpower, the regional rivalries among powers, and disagreement as to the natureo the reorm have kept the Council just as it was when it was established rightater World War II.

On the occasion o the signing o the treaty establishing the Union oSouth American Nations (Unasur) in Brasilia in 2008, the Brazilian governmentsubmitted a proposal or the establishment o a South American Deense Councilas one o Unasur steering bodies. Ater some obstacles to its establishment wereovercome, the Deense Council was ofcially established in March 2009. Itspurpose is to keep external powers away rom security matters in South America,to maintain the region as a zone o peace and negotiation, and to solve any regionalconicts.

Threats to security in Brazils neighborhood do not come rom thereequipment o the nations armed orces, ideological dierences between

governments, o geopolitical rivalries. But the United Statess reactivation o theIV Fleet, which operates in Latin America, Central America, and the Caribbean,inactive since 1950, and the use o seven airbases ceded by Colombia are a regionalhegemonic powers answer to South Americas pretended security autonomy.6

6 VAZ, Alcides Costa. La agenda de seguridad de Brasil: de la afrmacin soberana hacia la cooperacin. In:Cepik, Marco e Socorro, Ramrez (orgs.).Agenda de Seguridad Andino-Brasilea. Bogot: Fescol, 2004, p. 145-

174. PAGLIARI, Graciela De Conti. O Brasil e a segurana na Amrica do Sul. Curitiba: Juru, 2009. BRASIL,Ministrio das Relaes Exteriores. Poltica Externa Brasileira, II. Braslia: FUNAG, 2007. Idem, Resenha dePoltica Exterior do Brasil, n. 96, 2005. ALSINA Jr. Joo Paulo Soares. Poltica externa e poltica de deesa noBrasil: sntese impereita. Braslia: Cmara dos Deputados, 2006.


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4. cmte nd the envnment ssues

In the view o the Brazilian oreign policy, the environmental issueencompasses three other issues: the planets survival; development; and hunger.

Multilateral negotiations or establishing appropriate regimes to address these issueshave always been carried out under the auspices o the United Nations. ThreeConerences were devoted to the matter: Stockholm in 1972; Rio de Janeiro in1992; and Johannesburg in 2002. Brazilian diplomacy has played a signifcantrole in this area, with the intention o introducing the reciprocity o eects intothe discussion.

The industrial countries introduced the environmental issue intomultilateralism at the Stockholm Conerence; thereater, the developing countriesinjected their interests into the discussion, and in this Brazil has had a prominent

role, as it has always associated the issue with development, and more recentlywith sustainable development.

The discussion has turned into polemics. On one side, the rich countriesascribe poverty and hunger to causes located in the South, such as corruption,government incompetence, and the restricted opening to the economic agentso capitalisms center. Since Rio-1992 they have been willing to fnance projectso their interest. On the other side are developing countries, who point to theindustrial countries as the culprits o environmental degradation and o theinequality among nations. Though hampered, the discussion has proceeded,with conceptual gains or the developing countries, but with scant actual eectsin general.

Climate change has become the most salient issue in the discussion. Itsuraced in 1992, was the subject o a convention that entered into orce in 1994,made headway ater the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, in orce since 2005, and has attractedpublic attention owing to the reports o the Intergovernmental Panel on ClimateChange, released by the United Nations since 1990.

International law sets targets or pollutant gas emissions that cause the

planets warming; these targets are compulsory or the industrial countries andlet to the emerging countries sense o responsibility. Alleging that compulsorinessintereres with its sovereignty, the United States has reused to ratiy the KyotoProtocol, thus setting up a serious obstacle to the regimes success ten years aterit was established. Moreover, the Copenhagen Conerence ailed.

Under these circumstances, the United Nations is going ahead with itseorts to save the planet rom the climatic scourges that compromise not onlythe planets very survival but also the survival o the poor. In late 2007, the XIIIUnited Nations Climate Change Conerence was held in Bali, Indonesia, and was

attended by 189 countries. Totally isolated, the United States gave in and fnallya protocol o intentions or the post-Kyoto era was signed, to enter into orcein 2012. The regime was supposed to make progress as the emerging countries


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committed themselves to reduce their emissions with the help o technologiesfnanced by the rich countries, including the United States, which would thenmake quantifed cuts.7 But the truth is there has been no progress. This is theconclusion warranted by the ailure o the 2009 Copenhagen Conerence, the 15th

conerence o parties on climate change, which was attended by heads o state andfteen thousand delegates.

5. Heth nd humn ghts

Military spending and the costs fnancial systems recovery ater the recentcrisis have required huge sums, particularly in the developed countries. Theinternal and international impact has been indierence toward hunger, theinternal difculties o many nations, and the heightening o international tension.

Mankinds ood situation became more serious in 2007-08.The Brazilian oreign policy regarding human rights, as in the aorementioned

cases, is critical o an international order devoid o reciprocity or justice. Humanrights have been seen traditionally by the North in light o the ideas inherent tothe liberal revolutions o the 18th century, which were incorporated into the UnitedNations 1948 declaration. Since World War II, this strain o political philosophyhas inspired the realism o international relations theory and o political praxis,which vests the States with hegemony or defning the global order on the basiso interests and power, or rather, on the basis o the interests o those that wieldpower, without taking morals into consideration. This realism, a target o criticismin the North as well, does not match the Brazilian vision, which or decades hasassociated human rights with development and, in the Lula era, with combatingpoverty and hunger.

At the UN General Assemblies he has attended since 2003 and at meetingso world leaders and o multilateral organizations, President Lula or his diplomatshave chastised an order that ignores the scourge o hunger and disease, therebyviolating human rights. On the domestic ront, action is taken through social

programs such as the Family Grant, the driving engine o the Zero Hungersubprogram; on the external ront, action is taken through cooperation extendedto poorer countries, especially rom Arica. Beore Lula, the Brazilian governmentalready resorted to international negotiations in this area, and achieved results, suchas the Trade-Related Aspects o Intellectual Property Rights-TRIPS mechanismadopted by the WTO, under pressure rom the emerging countries, so as to reinin the right to medical drugs patents and expand the use o these medicines whenrequired by public health. As an example, it may be mentioned that in 2007, theLula government, rustrated over the lack o results in the negotiations with a

7 LAGO, Andr Aranha Corra do. Estocolmo, Rio, Joanesburgo: o Brasil e as trs conerncias ambientais dasNaes Unidas. Braslia: FUNAG, 2007.


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lab holding the rights to the Eavirenz, a drug or combating AIDS, ordered thecompetent agency to break its patent.8

Internationalization of the Brazilian economy

For the frst time in history, internationalization o Brazilian companies hasbecome part o the countrys external strategy. Lula indicated this conceptualchange at the 2005 Davos World Economic Forum when he said: SomethingI have repeatedly said to Brazilian businessmen is that they should not be araidto make their companies into multinationals, to make investments in othercountries, as this would be very good or Brazil. At meetings with businessmen,Celso Amorim, has reafrmed the objective o turning Brazil into a globalizedcountry, through the expansion o its businesses abroad. Brazil has exchanged a

participation in the international scene through dependence and subordinationor a sovereign, cooperative participation, said the President that same yearbeore hundreds o businessmen in So Paulo. The dialogue between Lula andthe business community will continue.

A trend that has deserved much attention in international relations since1990, globalization maniests itsel in two ways: access to markets and expansiono internal businesses abroad and o external businesses into the internal domain.Europe and the United States have benefted rom globalization and therebyincreased their systemic competitiveness since the end o the Cold War. Brazilsobjective in this regard is to have strong corporations to compete on a global scale,with the States logistic support and the fnancial support o national institutions,such as the National Economic and Social Development Bank (BNDES) and theBank o Brazil. I Cardoso privatized [enterprises], Lula conglomerated [them].The Presidents fnger is behind the ormation o the great national conglomerates.Despite this earlier achievement, Brazil has a long way to go beore attainingthe density o developed countries, whose multinationals co-opt their owngovernments, which then orm coalitions and use pressure to inuence decisions

at multilateral organizations, such as the WTO, the IMF, and the World Bank,and or the signing o bilateral treaties, and ultimately to obtain internal andintergovernmental rules in their own avor.

The Brazilian businesses rising globalization trend has been recorded bythe Brazilian Society o Studies on Transnational Corporations and EconomicGlobalization, whose data we have used here.

The internationalization o the Brazilian economy has picked up speedsince 2005, in tandem with the trend in the emerging countries. Brazilian directinvestments abroad have increased an average o 14 percent a year, rising rom

8 CORREA, Luiz Felipe de Seixas (org.). O Brasil nas Naes Unidas: 1946-2006. Braslia: FUNAG, 2007.PAROLA, op. cit.


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6.4 billion dollars in 2004 to 18 billion dollars in 2006, but alling to 13.9 billiondollars in 2008 and dropping to 4.5 billion dollars in 2009 owing to the globalfnancial crisis. The emerging countries held about 5 percent o direct investmentsabroad in 1990 but this percentage exceeded 20 percent by 2007. In that year,

with 180 billion dollars consolidated, Brazil had become the second oreigninvestor among the emerging countries and oreign investments in Brazil totaled34.6 billion dollars, a 100-percent increase over the previous year. In early 2008,international reserves totaled 194 billion dollars, a threeold increase over theprevious two years (59.8 billion dollars), and continued to rise, exceeding 250billion dollars in 2010, ater the country received the investment grade rom therisk rating agencies. In December 2008, Brazils consolidated direct investmentabroad totaled 149 billion dollars.

Brazilian corporations invest abroad, starting in South America, where they

maintain about one thousand companies, showing that the movement involvesmedium companies as well as large groups. Among the major ones, Vale do RioDoce and Petrobras lead the way, ollowed by Gerdau, Embraer, Odebrecht, Ita,Braskem, Votorantim, Camargo Correia, and WED, and others. They operate invarious areas, including mining, prospecting, metallurgy, industry, and technology.Because o the legislation in neighbor countries, investments have been redirected:between 2001 and 2008, investments in Argentina ell rom 15 percent to 9 percent;between 2001 and 2010, the share o investments in the United States, whichbecame the main investments destination, rose rom 13 percent to 37 percent oBrazils total direct investments abroad.

The companies motivation varies: a valued currency, which promptsthe acquisition o shares in multinationals; the establishing o subsidiaries;the association with or the purchase o other companies, which acilitates theraising o fnancial resources abroad; technological development; and raisingproductivity to a systemic global level, in addition to stimulus to higher qualityexports. Globalization occurs also when a company enters production chains in aworldwide network. By ailing to ollow this trend, national economy perpetuates

its structural dependence. As a remarkable example o this gain in maturity, oneoten reers to Embraer, whose perormance has been studied by Martinez.Ater its 1994 privatization, anchored on the technological knowledge

amassed by two previous centers the Brazilian Aeronautics Center and theAeronautics Technological Institute the Brazilian Aeronautic Corporation-EMBRAER turned to global market, adopted new innovation processes,replenished its resources, and embraced specialization or competing. Years later, itranks as third maker o commuter jets in the world, and its products have toppedthe list o Brazilian exports.

The central countries are showing signs o concern over the pace and theeects o the internationalization o businesses rom emerging countries and arestarting a dangerous tendency to reverse globalization. Substantial fnancial stock


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is being accumulated in the treasury o emerging countries that are exporters oraw materials or manuactures, such as the Arab countries and China. Thesecountries establish sovereign unds, which currently total about three trilliondollars, o which 250 billion in possession o the Brazilian treasury.

The reversal o the fnancial situation now under way still does not displacethe hegemony o the capital o developed countries, but is leading these countriesto resort to other orms o protectionism, such as raising difculties to or barringtranser o the control o the assets o their multinationals to emerging countries,arguing that control o their multinationals determine their structural positionon the capitalist systems hierarchy.

Beore seeking developed markets, Brazilian capital was channeled primarilyto South America, especially to Argentina, where today it is part o Quilmes, inthe brewery area; o Perez Companc, in the uel and energy sector; o Loma Negra,

the cement concern; o Alpargatas, in textile and ootwear; and o Acindar, thesteel company; in addition to major export packinghouses.9

integtn nd tesm: estshment f the g netwk

The ormation o blocs is the trend in international relations in the 21stcentury, although it lacks the dynamics o the 1990s. The European Union hasgiven up on a Constitution, rejected through plebiscites in 2005, and replaced itwith the Lisbon Treaty, which has also ailed to obtain unanimous approval othe 27 members. In South America, governments endeavor to improve social andeconomic conditions, which had deteriorated at the time o neoliberalism, andseek domestic solutions, based on national projects, in addition to programmingdierent modes o participation in the international scene. Here also, somegovernments do not view integration as an efcient strategy or overcomingdifculties. Under these circumstances, the Brazilian oreign policy, o a markedintegrationist bent, makes use o integration processes to establish or consolidatethe cooperation and power network directed at the South, starting rom South

America and advancing toward alliances with other regions, so as to achieve thegoal o making Brazil into a global-oriented country.

Mercosur and Unasur

The concept orelations along the same axishas been introduced into theinternational relations theory on the basis o a study by Patrcio, who investigatedthe role played in the origin and development o integration processes by bilateralrelations between key countries in a region, such as France and Germany in the

9 BRASIL, Ministrio das Relaes Exteriores. Poltica Externa Brasileira, II. Braslia: FUNAG, 2007. Idem,Resenha de Poltica Exterior do Brasil, n. 96 e 97, 2005. SARFATI, Gilberto. Carta Internacional, USP, out. 2007.MARTINEZ, Maria Regina Estevez.A globalizao da indstria.


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case o the European Union, and Brazil and Argentina in the case o MERCOSURand South America. We have presented this concept and reviewed its applicationto the South American case in my bookInsero Internacional.

Brazil-Argentina relations were aected by the 1999 devaluation o the Real,

the Brazilian currency, and even more seriously by Argentinas proound economicand social crisis in 2001-2002. At the outset o the 21st century, the governmentso Nstor Kirchner and o Luiz Incio da Silva aced a trade dispute caused byBrazilian export manuactures that hindered Argentine industrialization. Otheractors helped raise urther difculties in the management o bilateral relationsand their impact on neighbor countries: scarce provision o energy, the acquisitiono Argentine debt bonds by the Venezuelan government, and the approval oVenezuelas adhesion to MERCOSUR by Uruguay and Argentina and obstructionon the part o the Brazilian and the Paraguayan Congresses or some years. As

regards multilateral negotiations, the two countries have been in tune becausethey have identical interests. The same has occurred in regard to regional securityon the occasion o the crisis between Colombia and Ecuador in March 2008,triggered by a preemptive action by Colombia against a guerrilla camp locatedon Ecuadoran territory. In brie, the axis has survived, the partners walking sideby side though not hand in hand.

In addition to the exponential growth o Brazilian direct investments inArgentina, bilateral trade has also been avorable to Brazil. Between 1996 and2003, Argentina recorded yearly surpluses o nearly one billion dollars, equivalentto a little over 10 percent o total bilateral trade. Between 2004 and 2007, as areection o the Argentine crisis, it was Brazils turn to record surpluses that roserom 1.8 billion to 4.0 billion dollars. Signifcantly, manuactures account ornearly all Brazilian exports, less than 30 percent o Argentinas. This dierencein the exports list is an indication o unequal development.

Succeeding her husband as President o the Republic in 2008, CristinaFernndez de Kirchner expressed willingness to reestablish good understandingwith Brazil, as Argentina had shown to be capable o economic recovery. Attention

was then given to deepening integration in the areas o energy, science andtechnology, deense, production, space, and nuclear matters. This past February,the two countries signed seventeen bilateral agreements covering these areas, anindication that both see relations along an axis as being essential.

The frst South American countries summit meeting, held in Brasilia in2000, reected the intent o urthering regional integration, with Mercosur asa starting point. An action plan or the integration o regional inrastructure(IIRSA) was then established. The 2004 summit meeting o the 12 countriesin Ouro Preto, Minas Gerais, took steps in this direction, establishing unds

to fnance economic convergence and the organization o a uture communityo South American nations. The Mercosur Parliament, with its headquarters inMontevideo, later replaced the Interparliamentary Commission. As a matter o


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act, Mercosur decisions mingled with South American decisions, showing thedesired intertwining o the two integration processes.

Brazilian oreign policy sees Mercosur as a political project that neoliberalismscrisis and the continued existence o asymmetries have made more exible.

Organized segments o Brazilian society intended to use it in avor o their businesstransactions, while diplomacy envisages it as an instrument or reinorcing theinternational bargaining power. All things considered, integration purports toestablish a regional hub more appropriate or achieving the objectives o multilateralreciprocity and o globalization o the Brazilian economy. At bottom, just as in allcountries and sectors o international relations, the hegemony o national interestscomes frst, more so in the 21st century than in the 1990s.

The building up o South America advanced, consistently with Brazilianpolitical thinking, with the announcement o the Community o South American

Nations at the 2004 Cuzco Summit, which was established on the Margarita Islandin 2007, but became institutionally enacted under the Union o South AmericanNations-Unasur constitutive treaty signed on May 24, 2008 at the summit o thetwelve South American countries in Brasilia.

On the basis o its operational structure and purposes, one could say thatUnasur does not play only a mediating role between Brazilian interests and oreignpolicys global objectives. I it becomes operational, the recently created nucleuso power the entity South America will ully meet Brazilian interests.

The Union is structured into our bodies: The Council o Heads o State,the Council o Foreign Ministers, the South American Deense Council, and theCouncil o Delegates.

Unasur came into being to serve political, geopolitical, and economicobjectives. In the political area, when the Member States unanimously approvedecisions, their intention is to put the region on the world map, express theunison voice o the countries in a multilateral setting, and enhance its politicalindependence, as it enjoys the status o a legal entity under international law. In thegeopolitical area, although it is not a military alliance, it creates a regional nucleus

o power and ascribes emphasis to regional security; disputes in this context aresettled through diplomatic activity, on the basis o South American internationallaw doctrines, respect o sovereignty, and nonintervention in the internal aairs othe States. This precludes the intervention o external powers and organizations,such as the OAS, the Rio Group, and the old Inter-American Treaty o ReciprocalAssistance signed at the outset o the Cold War. In the economic area, Unasurseeks to promote production, energy, and inrastructure integration, but withoutreplacing either Mercosur or the Andean Community, both o which remain active.

This South American integration process displays two distinctive

characteristics: originality as compared with other experiences and the act thatit starts with political and geopolitical rather than economic integration, as wasthe case o the European Union.


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Doubts raised at the time o Unasurs ounding regarding its perormancequestioned the possibility o excessive bureaucracy, the superimposition o regionalbodies, the scarceness o fnancial resources, and the difculty given the cult osovereignty and political arrogance o implementing projects aimed at improving

inrastructure and at energy integration. One fnds in South America a varietyo models o international integration, and dierent worldviews and concepts oregional integration. Nevertheless, avorable conditions warrant this new steporward in the process o integration: economic growth early in the century andgreater social inclusion, in addition to the establishment o fnancial reserves andthe availability o energy stocks.10

Casting the net beyond the neighborhood

The casting o a global network as a goal o Brazilian oreign policy in the21st century gains impetus with reciprocity multilateralism impelled by diplomacy,which establishes coalitions and takes the leadership in global negotiations, andwith economic internationalization, impelled by Lulas personal interest and byeconomic and social agents. The net weaves its frst threads in South America inthese two aspects and, ortifed at its base, extends toward the world, as i thiswere Brazils natural locus. We should now look at this long-reach movement andthe ties to blocs, regions, and countries beyond South America.

1. bs nd egns

Relations between Europe and Brazil take place in three contexts: relationsbetween the European Union and Mercosur; relations between the EuropeanUnion and Brazil; and relations between European countries and Brazil. Since 1995negotiations have been under way or establishing a European Union-Mercosurree trade area; but though fteen years have elapsed, no conclusion has beenreached. The impasse is due to the Brazilian aversion to treaties that do not includereciprocity, as is the case here and with the treaty calling or the establishment othe Free Trade Area o the Americas (FTAA), which has never been concludedeither. Europeans and Americans do not relinquish their agricultural subsidies andprotectionism but demand concessions in the areas o industrial goods, public callto bids, and services, which would place Brazils industrial development at risk.

However, recognizing Brazils role in the international economy and inmultilateral negotiations, especially in the conclusion o WTOs Doha Round ando the Mercosur-EU agreement, the European Union, at a special summit meeting

10 PATRCIO, Raquel C. de C., As relaes em eixo ranco-alems e as relaes em eixo argentino-brasileiras:gnese dos processos de integrao. Lisboa, ISCSP, 2007. CERVO, Amado Luiz. Relaes internacionais da

Amrica Latina: velhos e novos paradigmas. So Paulo: Saraiva, 2007. COUTO, Leandro Freitas. O horizonteregional do Brasil: integrao e construo da Amrica do Sul. Curitiba: Juru, 2009. SARAIVA, Miriam Gomes.As estratgias de cooperao Sul-Sul nos marcos da poltica externa brasileira de 1993 a 2007. Revista Brasileirade Poltica Internacional, n. 50 (2), 42-49, 2007.


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held in 2007, proposed to coner on Brazil the status o a strategic partner, aproposal that was endorsed by the European Parliament. In the European view,Brazil, as a key country in the region, is an indispensable ally in meeting globalchallenges related to climate change, human rights, intellectual property, industrial

policy, and other economic and social issues. The European decision was based onspecifc data and on expectations: Brazil accounts or approximately 80 percento Mercosurs GDP; while the European Union accounts or 22 percent o theBrazilian oreign trade, it directs only 1.8 percent o its oreign trade to Brazil.European investments in Brazil are signifcant, but business would increase shouldthere be a better regulatory ramework and lower customs duties i adopted,these measures would acilitate European Unions relations with South America.

This concession to Brazil signals a change in the European blocs internationalstrategy; since its ormation, the bloc had assigned priority to inter-bloc relations,

assuming that it would export its model o integration that yielded recognizedbenefts. Brazil became European Unions eighth strategic partner, ater the UnitedStates, Japan, Canada, India, Russia, China, and South Arica. The programmingo the joint cooperation plan began promptly and has continued at ministerialmeetings and at a series o Brazil-European Union summits held since then.

The fnancial crisis aected the European Union, disclosing some countriesheavy public indebtedness, triggering recession, and threatening the Euro. Tradewith and investments in Brazil were indirectly aected. A urther difculty inrecent bilateral relations has been raised by Brazilian diplomacys strong reactionto the EUs collective measures and police action to contain and disciplineimmigration. This reaction was especially strong in view o the detention andmistreatment o about 2,500 Brazilian tourists at the Madrid airport in 2008 andthe mistaken execution o Brazilian Jean Charles at the London subway. All these,as Itamaraty ofcially pointed out, meant disregard or human rights.

Bringing together potentially great economies, Brazil took the initiative oorming a political bloc o emerging countries, which was ormally establishedin 2007, under the acronym BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, and China. The bloc

purports not only to promote business transactions among its members by alsoto coordinate their diplomatic activity and adopt common stances in respect oissues o their interest in international negotiations. Its weight on the internationalscene has rapidly increased owing to the accelerated growth o the our economiesand to the recession that has aected the rich countries. As was the Braziliandiplomacys desire, rom now on multipolarity is a act, so that the establishmento rules or the global order has now to mean shared responsibility.

Since the frst BRIC oreign ministers meeting in Yekaterinburg, Russia,in May 2008, there have been other meetings o oreign ministers as well as o

other authorities. In 2009 summit meetings o the our great emerging countrieshave been held on a regular basis, the frst o which also in Yekaterinburg and thesecond in Brasilia in 2010. The bloc is gaining lie and now has inuence on the


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establishment o the rules that govern the global order by the fnancial G-20, theIMF and World Bank policies, the United Nations reorm, the Doha Round andthe legal rameworks in important areas o international relations. World power isthus acquiring a new ace, with BRIC being on the same ooting as the old G-8.

IBAS is another political group devoted to cooperation among its membersand to the harmonization o positions vis--vis the international scene. It cameinto being in Brasilia in 2003, bringing together three major southern countriesinclined to make autonomous decisions each one being the major democracy onits respective continent: India, Brazil, and South Arica. Other than global intereststhat occupy the group in their successive summit meetings, such as associatingsocial inclusion and development, South-South cooperation is envisaged underagreements covering areas o specifc needs, such as trade, security, inormationtechnology, energy, health, ood, and interconnection with Mercosur.

The emerging countries have given indication o their strength at the jointBRIC-IBAS summit meeting held in Brasilia in April 2010, when internationaleconomy was acing the worst crisis since the Great Depression o the 1930sand at a time when global governance is at a crossroads, acing the challenge opromoting sustainable development.

In May 2008, Lula attended the summit meeting o the member countries othe Central American Integration System (SICA) held in El Salvador, to reinorceeconomic, political, and cultural relations with one more regional bloc, one thatunites eight countries o Central America. The command o the United NationsStabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), successully carried out withconcern or economic and social issues, has opened the doors o the Caribbean toBrazil. Not only Haiti but also other countries in the region are receiving attentionrom the Brazilian government, which provides logistic support or businesstransactions and investments, especially or oil prospecting and the productiono biouels. The new interest in the region, previously removed rom Brazil andclose to the United States, was illustrated by the Brazilian diplomacys disastrousinvolvement when the Honduran Judiciary and Executive deposed President

Manuel Zelaya in 2009, accused o threatening to subvert the Constitution.The net extends also to Arica and the Arab countries. Lula has visitedArica more than a dozen times, in addition to helping bringing about the AricanCountries-Latin America summit meeting and being a special guest at the AricanUnion Summit. Positive results rom this approximation include programs inthe area o health, especially or combating AIDS, credit lines, the presence oBrazilian contractors, activity by Petrobras, integration with Mercosur, increasedexports, and a common stance against arm subsidies. Although economic andstrategic returns rom relations with the Community o Portuguese-Speaking

Countries (CPLP) are scant, cultural gains are substantial. Arica is creatingavorable conditions or oreign presence, and in this respect the United States,China, and Brazil stand out.


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Since 2003, the government intended to change the Brazilian policy towardthe Near East and the Arab countries and even to establish an Arab-Latin Americanbloc so that the two regions could raise their voices at international negotiationsand Brazil could expand its trade with the Muslim world. This thought led to

the South America-Arab Countries Summit held in Brasilia in May 2005, anew example o Brazilian diplomacys activism. The summit was attended by 33countries 11 rom Latin America and 22 rom the Arab world, including the sixmembers o the Gul Cooperation Council and 800 businessmen. The summitelicited no concern on the part o the powers used to intervening in the region Europe and the United States given the Brazilian diplomacys moderating roleworldwide. The same cannot be said o the agreement signed by Brazil. Turkey,and Iran aimed at making possible the Iranian nuclear program. On the occasion,Secretary o State Hilary Clinton voiced the indignation o the United Statess

conservative sector against the Brazilian diplomacys nave intervention in an areawhere western powers have been traditionally involved.

2. btesm

Bilateral relations or relations between a given country and a blochave intensifed in the 21st century or three main reasons: frst, the crisis omultilateralism, as illustrated by the United Nations inefciency and its stagnatedreorm, and the WTOS incapacity to conclude the Doha Round; secondly, theStates reinorcement ater neoliberalisms ailure, especially in Latin America, andthe United Statess unilateralism; thirdly, the prolieration o bilateral ree tradeagreements the new trade policy carried out outside the WTO.

Bilateral ree trade agreements have stricken a atal blow against negotiationso a global agreement at the WTO. Brazilian diplomacy abhors the ormer as muchas it preers the latter. By 2007, a network o approximately 400 o these bilateralagreements had been signed, encouraged by the United States, eventually joinedby the European Union, particularly in Asia and in Latin America.

Relations between Brazil and the United States unold in a dual context:on the one hand, the oundation provided by a historical political and economicalliance between the two countries, whose benefts have always been perceivedand appreciated by both parties, regardless o which governments are in ofce;on the other hand, competition between the two, both as regards geopoliticalviews and the conrontation o specifc economic interests. This substratumconditioned bilateral relations under the two Administrations o George W.Bush and Luiz Incio Lula da Silva in the frst decade o the 21st century. Thetwo leaders talked with each other with rankness and autonomy, whether in

agreement or disagreement.Used, just as their predecessors, to consulting with businessmen o theirrespective countries, Bush, Lula, and Barak Obama have had little to do to help


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them move orward on their own and discover business opportunities on theother side, as the way has been opened decades ago. But the presidents o thetwo countries have established on their own a special partnership under thetechnological cooperation agreement signed in Camp David in March 2007, on

the production and marketing o ethanol and other biouels. In addition, the twogovernments have signed a military cooperation agreement in April 2010, withoutcompromising sovereignty. And through negotiations, they have solved bilateraldisputes, such as the one caused by WTOs authorization or Brazil to retaliateagainst the United States because o cotton subsidies.

Relations between Brazil and China, viewed as strategic by both governmentsview as strategic, are based on the principles o mutual trust, bilateral trade,and coordination o positions in respect o multilateral policies, pursuant thecommuniqus issued by Hu Jintao and Luiz Incio Lula da Silva, the two

presidents, as they exchanged visits in 2004 and 2010. Relations are closely ollowedby the Brazil-China Businessmen Council. Studies sponsored by this Councilhave shown that Brazil has progressed rom being an exporter o commodities tobeing a destination o Chinese investments and that since 2009 China ranks frstas Brazils trading partner. During Jintaos last visit, a wide-ranging Joint ActionPlan was established.

The strong eort to establish a partnership springs rom the amiliaritycultivated at multilateral orums, such as the conerences on the environment, thefnancial G-20, and BRIC, and fnds bilateral expression in trade and investments.Imports o capital goods, raw materials, and intermediary goods have acilitatedthe expansion o the Brazilian industry, while the imports o fnal consumergoods have allen to approximately 10 percent. The trend o business transactionsattenuates the pressure o Brazilian industrialists on the government to containthe entry o Chinese manuactures, such as ootwear, plastics, and textiles, as wellas Itamaratys complaint because o the lack o Chinese investments in Brazil. Onthe other hand, Brazilian investments in China are scarce and restricted to the areao technological cooperation between Brazils National Space Research and the

Chinese Space Agency, which in 2007 launched jointly a remote sensing satellite.Brazil and India take common positions at multilateral orums, especiallyaimed at changing trade rules to their beneft, but their bilateral cooperation ismeager and IBAS does not fll this gap. Despite good political and geopoliticalunderstanding, as illustrated by BRICs very existence, another country thatmaintains bilateral relations with Brazil much below the potential is Russia, asregards both trade and technological cooperation. There persists in Braziliandiplomacy a utopian presumption o a possible transer o military technologyby other countries, such as Russia, France, China, and the United States. This

presumption became evident in the attempts made by Deense Minister NelsonJobim, all o which rustrated, as it is natural to expect in this area o internationalrelations.


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To celebrate the frst centennial o Japanese immigration, Japans CrownPrince visited Brazil in 2008. On that occasion, an assessment was made o ourhistorical bilateral relations, comparable to those established with the UnitedStates, i one considers the participation o Japanese companies in Brazils

industrialization process in recent decades. Brazilian agribusiness exports to Japanalso enhance these relations, recently intensifed by cooperation in the area obiouels production and marketing. The challenges to be met or strengtheningthese relations urther call or the expansion o bilateral trade, still modest, andor higher Japanese investments, which have remained stagnant in recent yearsand kept Brazil as a seventh destination.

As regards Europe, in addition to maintaining traditional relations, theLula government has renewed the nuclear agreement with Germany and nowwelcomes Frances renewed interest in our country. Portugal and Spain are the

21st century newcomers, as our bilateral relations shited rom the sentimentalto the instrumental plane. As dynamic agents o economic internationalization,the two Iberian countries have turned their attention to Brazil, which they havechosen as their preerential partner in Latin America or both economic andcultural reasons. Around 2000, Brazil became the frst destination o Portugueseand Spanish direct investments abroad, which have been channeled in Brazil toboth large and medium enterprises. As privatizations have ceased, just as has theestablishment o great corporations, particularly in the area o communications,these ows will tend to abate.

In South America, despite the ormation o blocs, relations privilege thebilateral trend, such as in energy integration projects, or instance. On the occasiono Argentinas bicentennial celebration, two books edited by Botana and Russelhave compiled excellent analyses o the internal and external profle o that country,Brazils main partner. They also explain in depth the concepts odeclinacin ando international extravo, as well as Brazils success and difculty in dealing withArgentina. Countries with a strong introspective bias, such as Venezuela, Bolivia,Ecuador, and Paraguay do not disturb Lulas good humor, and he maintains

spontaneity in his relations with their leaders.From the preceding and on the basis o other cases not mentioned, oneconcludes that in the world o globalization all attention should be devoted tobilateralism, the crucial path or ensuring the achievement o national interests.This is a tempting stance, as multilateralism and integration are two waning trends,while the unettered movement o national States seems to be the rising tendency.11

Received July 1st, 2010Accepted November 11, 2010

11 LIMA, Maria Regina Soares de & Hirst, Monica (orgs.). Brasil, ndia e rica do Sul: desafos e oportunidadespara novas parcerias. So Paulo: Paz e Terra, 2009. OLIVERIA, Henrique Altemani (org.). China e ndiana Amrica Latina. Curitiba: Juru, 2009. COSTA, Carla Guapo da. A cultura como actor dinamizador da


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Since Cardoso and during Lulas Administration, the international order has undergonesignificant changes. These changes have allowed the Brazilian foreign policy to mitigateinternal effects of an order established by others and, at the same time, to become anactive participant in the formulation of the new order. To democratize globalization becamethe mainspring of Brazilian foreign policy. In the scope, President Lula has maintainedthe tradition of formulating and programming foreign policy as a State policy, and alsohas fostered the logistic strategy of incorporation of Brazil into the international scene.

resum

Do governo Cardoso ao governo Lula, a ordem internacional passou por significativasmudanas. Essas mudanas permitiram a poltica externa brasileira mitigar os efeitosinterno da ordem estabelecida pelos outros ao mesmo tempo em que participa ativamente

na formulao de uma nova ordem. Democratizar a globalizao tornou-se motivao dapoltica externa brasileira. Nesse escopo, o Presidente Lula manteve a tradio de formulare programar a poltica externa brasileira como poltica de Estado, mas tambm aprofundoua estratgia logstica de insero do Brasil no cenrio internacional.

Key-wds: Brazilian foreign policy; new global order; emerging countries.

pvs-hve: poltica externa brasileira; nova ordem global; potncias emergentes.

economia: os investimentos portugueses no Brasil. Lisboa: UTL, 2005. PINO, Bruno Aylln. As relaes Brasil-Espanha na perspectiva da poltica externa brasileira (1945-2005. So Paulo: Emblema, 2006. RUSSELL,Roberto (org.). Argentina 1910-2010: balance del siglo. Buenos Aires: Taurus, 2010. BOTANA, Natalio R.(org.).Argentina 2010: entre la rustracin y la esperanza. Buenos Aires: Taurus, 2010. Principais sitesutilizados:Ministrio das Relaes Exteriores, Universidade de Braslia (Mundorama, Cena Internacional), Universidade de

So Paulo (Carta Internacional, Contato), Instituto de Pesquisa do Rio de Janeiro (Observatrio Poltico Sul-Americano), Conselho Empresarial Brasil-China, Sociedade Brasileira de Estudos de Empresas Transnacionais eda Globalizao Econmica, Instituto Argentino para el Desarrollo Econmico, Centro Argentino de EstudiosInternacionales, Centro Latinoamericano de Administracin para el Desarollo.

artigo amado luiz cervo

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