Authors:                  Robert M Hathaway

Volume:                   30

Issue:                    1

Pagination:               7-14

ISSN:                     0196125X

Subject Terms:            Sanctions                          International relations-US                          Nuclear tests                          Arms control

Geographic Names:         United States                          US                          India                          Pakistan

Abstract:

Earlier convinced of the need to maintain a tough stance, by the endof 1999 US lawmakers had turned their backs on sanctions as a tool ofnon-proliferation policy. Lawmakers' refusal to impose sanctions against India and Pakistan for conducting nuclear tests is examined.Copyright Arms Control Association Jan/Feb 2000

Full Text:

Earlier convinced of the need to maintain a tough stance, by the endof 1999 U.S. lawmakers had turned their backs on sanctions as a tool ofnonproliferation policy.

May 1998 was not a good month for U.S. non-proliferation efforts. OnMay 11 and 13, India detonated five nuclear devices, its first nucleartests in nearly a quarter century Not to be outdone, its bitter rivalPakistan conducted six nuclear tests of its own toward the end of the month.

Thesesudden developments, long feared but nonetheless catching Americanofficialsand intelligence analysts by surprise, effectively blew U.S. policytowardthe South Asian subcontinent to smithereens and laid down a directchallengeto the global non-proliferation regime.

Within the U.S. Congress, non-proliferation advocates likeRepresentativeEdward Markey (D-MA) and India-bashers such as Representative DanBurton(R-IN) voiced outrage and called for the immediate triggering ofsanctionsunder Sec. 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, universally known as

the Glenn amendment. New Delhi's actions were "reckless, shameful andirresponsible,"Markey insisted. Burton urged his House colleagues to "stopsubsidizingIndia's nuclear progress" by cutting U.S. economic assistance to NewDelhi."India took a terrible, terrible step yesterday," Senator Tom Harkin(D-IA)told the Senate the day after India's first round of tests.ParaphrasingFranklin Roosevelt, the Iowa Democrat declared that "yesterday is adaythat will live in infamy for the Nation of India."'

Of greater interest was the response of those who earlier had beenamongIndia's most vocal supporters. Representative Frank Pallone (D-Nj),perhapsNew Delhi's leading champion on Capitol Hill, expressed regret at thetestsbut insisted they should not derail the U.S.-India relationship. Butotherlawmakers usually sympathetic to India were less supportive. Many oftheleading members of the House's India caucus remained noticeablysilent,and some privately suggested that the caucus publicly condemn India.Severallegislators, including House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-MO),canceledplans to visit India. "In light of the nuclear tests," a Gephardtspokesmanexplained, "we did not want there to be the appearance of business asusual.

The situation was exacerbated 17 days later, when Pakistan conducteditsown tests. Aside from the expected condemnations of Pakistan andcriticismof the Clinton administration for allowing events to get so out ofhand,a number of members voiced anxiety that South Asian tensions couldspiralout of control. "This is the most serious situation since the Cubanmissilecrisis," Senator John McCain (R-AZ) warned, a judgment seconded bySenatorDaniel Patrick Moynihan (D-NY) .3

Only days after the tests, President Bill Clinton responded as he waslegallyobligated under the Glenn amendment, slapping wide-ranging economicandmilitary sanctions on New Delhi and Islamabad. Yet no sooner hadWashingtontaken this stand on behalf of global non-proliferation norms than it

beganto walk back from its position. Within 18 months, the U.S. Congressswungfrom applauding strict sanctions to urging the president to waive notonlythe Glenn amendment, but also the Pressler and Symington amendments,whichmandate further penalties for states engaged in certain nuclearactivity.(For more information on this legislation, see text box on p. 11.)Earlierconvinced of the need to maintain a tough stance as an object lessonforother nuclear threshold states, by the end of 1999 U.S. lawmakers hadcompletelyturned their backs on sanctions as a tool of non-proliferation policy.Congressional anger over the South Asian tests had given way toacceptance,even understanding. Congress, it would appear, had abandoned 25 yearsofnon-proliferation activity.

The U.S. Congress was trying to achieve multiple objectives that werenotentirely compatible. Concerned about proliferation and wanting a voicein foreign policy that would compete with the execufive branch, it hadmandated the sanctions. But when faced with post-Cold War nationalinterests,the growing influence of the domestic South Asian-American communityandan increasing interest in the subcontinent by U.S. business, thelegislatorsmoved non-proliferation to the back burner and renounced with dizzyingspeed the sanctions on India and Pakistan they had so recentlysupported.The impact of these steps on the non-proliferation regime is not yetclear.But what is apparent is that Congress' love-hate relationship withsanctionsas a tool of foreign policy is far from over.

The Retreat

Discomfort with the Glenn amendment sanctions surfaced shortly aftertheywere imposed on Pakistan and served to trigger a broader discussion ofthe utility of sanctions in general. It was time "to engage in aseriousdebate on the merits of using unilateral economic sanctions to achieveforeign policy goals," Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN) declared.Observingthat the threat of sanctions had deterred neither India nor Pakistanfromtesting, he worried that U.S. sanctions could destabilize a Pakistanalreadyburdened with enormous economic and political problems. "An unstablePakistan

with nuclear weapons," he added, "is not in our interests."4

Other comments focused more narrowly on U.S. economic interests."Pakistanis not a trading partner we can afford to lose," cautioned thechairmanof the House Agriculture Committee, Robert Smith (ROR), reflectingsentimentespecially pronounced in wheat-growing areas of the Pacific Northwest."There is no leverage in cutting off our sales," complained SenatorMitchMcConnell (R-KY). "It does not make a difference on the dinner tableinIslamabad, but it sure will in Topeka."5

Recognizing this widespread dissatisfaction with sanctions, the Senateleadership created a special 18-member task force, headed by McConnelland Joseph Biden (D-DE), to examine both the way the India andPakistansanctions were working, and the larger question of how effectivesanctionsare in influencing the behavior of other nations. "There's a feelingonboth sides of the aisle that perhaps the proclivity to place economicsanctionson countries around the world and with not a clear way of ending thosehas become a problem," explained Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) inwhatwas clearly an understatement. 6

It did not take long for this uneasiness over the Glenn amendmentsanctionsto translate into congressional action. The initial breach in thesanctionsregime came in early July, less than two months after the first Indiantest. The impetus behind this move was readily apparent. Pakistan wastheleading foreign buyer of U.S. white wheat, and the third largestoverseaspurchaser of all U.S. wheat. But unless Congress acted to permitexportfinancing, U.S. farmers would be unable to participate in winter wheatauctions in Pakistan, scheduled for mid-July.

"We are six days away from a disaster," warned Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR)in early July. "Farmers around the country are staring an economictrainwreck in the eye."' The full Senate apparently agreed, rushing throughlegislation without the normal committee review and voting 98-0 togiveboth India and Pakistan a one-year exemption from Glenn amendmentrestrictionson Department of Agriculture financing for the purchase ofagriculturalcommodities from U.S. farmers.' The Senate bill originally containedauthority

for the president to waive other sanctions as well, but a filibusterthreatby Senator John Glenn (DOH), author of the Glenn amendment and perhapsthe Senate's leading non-proliferation expert, succeeded in gettingthisprovision dropped.

Action in the House was equally swift and revealing of congressionalpriorities.Representatives Robert Livingston (R-LA) and David Obey (D-WI), thechairmanand ranking minority member, respectively, of the House AppropriationsCommittee, urged a more considered approach, but not even these seniorpower brokers could slow the stampede. This legislation, itssupportersargued, did not indicate any lessening of the U.S. commitment tononproliferation.To the contrary, by crafting a more focused sanctions policy, it wouldhelp secure the domestic base for maintaining sanctions.

Such elaborate rationalizations could not hide the actual intent ofmostmembers, however. Hardly a word about nonproliferation figured in theHousedebate. No one displayed anger at India or Pakistan for violatinglong-standinginternational norms against testing. Instead, the debate was all abouthelping the U.S. farmer, about not losing markets or penalizingAmericanwheat growers. The House's leading non-proliferation proponents werenoticeablyabsent during the debate. Not surprisingly, the House followed theSenate'slead and adopted the measure in time for American farmers to take partin the Pakistani wheat auction.9

This modest step was quickly followed by others. The day after theHouse'sapproval of the wheat relief bill, the Senate, with the blessing oftheadministration, adopted the Brownback amendment. The Brownbackamendment-namedfor its author, Kansas Republican Sam Brownback, chairman of theSenatesubcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian affairs-provided thepresidentwith the authority to waive, for a period of one year, Glenn,Symingtonand Pressler amendment sanctions, except for those pertaining tomilitaryassistance, dual-use exports and military sales.

Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), chairman of the Foreign RelationsCommittee,complained that the Senate had "rushed forward, willy nilly," withoutadequatereview or committee hearings, but chose not to block passage.10 Glenn,

who might have been expected to protest this gutting of his namesakelegislation,was conveniently away from Washington training for the space shuttleflighthe was to make later in the year. Recalling Glenn's absence sometimeafterward,one insider conceded that while not deliberately planned, Senateactionon the legislation at the very moment its primary opponent waspreoccupiedwith other matters was more than simply a happy coincidence.

The Brownback amendment (formally known as the India-Pakistan ReliefActof 1998) was incorporated into the fiscal 1999 omnibus appropriationsbilland signed into law in October 1998. Following its adoption, PresidentClinton quickly restored funding for U.S. military training programsinIndia and Pakistan, as well as government-backed financing and creditguaranteesfor U.S. firms doing business there. Clinton also lifted restrictionsonU.S. commercial loans and credits to both countries and announced thatWashington would support a pending Pakistani request before theInternationalMonetary Fund. Encouraged by the absence of opposition to these steps,Clinton then moved to eliminate another long-standing irritant in theU.S.-Pakistanirelationship by agreeing to pay Islamabad $325 million in cash and$140million in goods as compensation for 28 F-16 aircraft that Pakistanhadearlier bought, but whose delivery had been prevented by the 1990triggeringof the Pressler amendment. Once more, Capitol Hill acquiescedvirtuallywithout dissent.

In October 1999, Congress took a further step by adopting, as part ofthedefense appropriations bill, another, more sweeping Brownbackamendment-sometimescalled Brownback II. This measure gave the president permanentauthorityto waive, with respect to India and Pakistan, all the provisions oftheGlenn amendment. In addition, it authorized the president to waive theSymington and Pressler amendment sanctions, which had prohibitedalmostall U.S. economic and military assistance to Pakistan since 1990.Finally,the legislation stated that the "broad application" of export controlson Indian and Pakistani government agencies and private companiessuspectedof having links to their country's nuclear or missile programs (theso-called

"entities list") was "inconsistent" with U.S. national securityinterests.Instead, the lawmakers urged the executive branch to apply U.S. exportcontrols only to those agencies and companies that made "direct andmaterialcontributions to weapons of mass destruction and missile programs andonlyto those items that can contribute to such programs."

Brownback II represented an extraordinary reversal of American policy.The measure handed the president the authority to lift all sanctionsimposedupon India and Pakistan as a result of their 1998 nuclear tests. Moreremarkablyyet, Congress abandoned even those sanctions it had placed uponPakistanprior to Islamabad's tests. Seventeen months after its nucleardetonations,Pakistan found itself far better off vis-a-vis American nuclearnon-proliferationlaw than it had been at any time since 1990. Finally, with itsstatementon export controls, the U.S. Congress appeared to condemn rigorousstepsto prevent the transfer of sensitive technology that might be used inthenuclear weapons or missile programs of India or Pakistan, andimplicitlyauthorized the export of materials that might indirectly assist thoseprograms.It was a stunning retreat from Capitol Hill's decades-long reliance onpunitive measures to block the spread of weapons of massdestruction.11

Never happy about being forced in 1990 to trigger the Pressleramendment,the executive branch saw Brownback II as the achievement of a long-desiredobjective. Administration officials were pleased with the measure inanotherrespect as well. An earlier draft of the legislation would havesuspendedfor five years the Glenn, Symington and Pressler sanctions, whereasBrownbackII, as finally adopted, gave the president the latitude to lift thesanctionsonly when and if he saw fit. This flexibility, the State Departmentbelieved,would strengthen the president's hand in subsequent negotiations withIndiaand Pakistan.

The timing of these proceedings also merits mention. A House-Senateconferencecommittee adopted the defense appropriations bill containing BrownbackII on October 11, 1999. The following day the Pakistani military

dismissedthe civilian government in Islamabad and seized power. On October 13and14, the House and Senate respectively took up the defense bill. Bothhousesadopted the measure by substantial majorities. The military coup inPakistanwas all but ignored during debate over the bill, with only one memberofeither house troubling to go to the floor to express skepticism aboutthewisdom of a wholesale abandonment of sanctions against Pakistan at thevery moment the Pakistani military was throwing out a democraticallyelectedgovernment. True, Brownback 11 was but one small provision in a hugebillappropriating over one-quarter of a trillion dollars. Nonetheless,thissilence about contemporaneous events in Islamabad suggests just howfarCongress had traveled since the South Asian tests 17 months earlier.

South Asia in the Congressional Mindset

All in all, it had been a remarkable year and a half. The UnitedStateshad imposed extensive sanctions and then just as quickly lifted notonlyGlenn amendment sanctions, but Symington and Pressler amendmentrestrictionsas well. Initially expressing concern for the global non-proliferationregime, Congress, in less than 18 months, had moved to the positionthatit should not jeopardize other interests in pursuit of unobtainablenon-proliferationobjectives. How does one explain this dramatic transformation incongressionalattitudes and actions?

The Indian-American community

Part of the explanation is political. As the 1990s unfolded, SouthAsia,and India in particular, gained increasing prominence on thecongressionalagenda. This new politically inspired concern for the region partlyreflectedchanges in the Asian-American community. As recently as 1980, therewereonly 387,000 IndianAmericans in the United States. But the next twodecadessaw a dramatic increase in the size of this community. By 1997, thisnumberhad more than tripled, to 1,215,000. (The total U.S. population duringthe same period grew by 17.8 percent.) By the later date, the Indian-Americancommunity comprised the third largest Asian-American population in the

country, surpassed only by Chinese- and Filipino-Americans.

Numbers tell only part of the story. The Indian-American community isalsohighly educated and prosperous. Fiftyeight percent of the adultcommunityhas at least a bachelor's degree. A larger percentage of the Indian-Americanwork force holds a managerial or professional position than any othergroupin the country, with especially high representation among well-paiddoctors,engineers, scientists, architects and computer professionals. As aresult,the Indian-American per capita income exceeds that of every othergroupin the country, including whites.12

[IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH] Captioned as: A Nebraska wheat farmer harvests hisfieldin summer. U.S. wheat farmers would have faced significant economicconsequenceshad Congress not waived the nuclear testing-related sanctions imposedonPakistan, which is the third-largest importer of U.S. wheat.

Until recently, this wealth and status had not translated intopoliticalclout, but that is rapidly changing. Since the community is widely andrelatively evenly distributed throughout all parts of the country, fewcongressional districts are without at least a handful of Indian-Americanfamilies. Even in states such as Kansas, where the Indian-Americancommunityis negligible, Senator Brownback notes that they make their presencefelt.13The largest concentrations, however, reside in the major industrial-urbanstates of New York, New Jersey, California, Pennsylvania, Michigan,Ohio,Illinois, Texas, Florida and Massachusetts. As a whole, the communityhasavoided identification with either of the two major political partiesandgives generously to both. Indian-Americans raised $4 million on behalfof political candidates for the 1992 election, and the figures arealmostcertainly significantly higher today.14 "By their engagement and theiraggressiveness," Brownback has observed, "they're able to influencethingsbeyond their numbers."15

Indian-American organizations now deliberately reach out to theirWashingtonrepresentatives. Professional groups, such as the American Associationof Physicians of Indian Origin, increasingly invite leadingcongressional

supporters to address their meetings. The Indian American FriendshipCouncil-totake but one example-sponsors a legislative conference in Washingtoneachyear, which prominent U.S. lawmakers are invited to address. The July1999conference, for instance, was attended by nearly 40 U.S. lawmakers andfeatured speeches by House Minority Leader Gephardt; HouseInternationalRelations Committee Chair Benjamin Gilman (R-NY); and Doug Bereuter(R-NE),chairman of the House Asia subcommittee.

These congressional addresses do not always feature careful ormeasureddiscussion of U.S.-Indian ties. Instead, these events encourage anoutpouringof praise for India, condemnation of Pakistani policies and devotiontostrong Indian-American ties. The U.S.-Indian relationship, Gephardttoldcouncil members at the 1999 conference, is possibly the most importantbilateral relationship in the world. Though perhaps harmless, suchexuberancemay serve to mislead members of the IndianAmerican community about thecurrent state or future direction of U.S. policy.

An important development for the clout of the Indian-Americancommunityon Capitol Hill occurred following the 1992 elections. That autumn,RepresentativeStephen J. Solarz (D-NY) fell victim to redistricting and lost hiscongressionalseat. The influential chairman of the House subcommittee on Asia hadbeenwidely regarded as India's most energetic advocate in the Congress,andover the years had, almost alone among his congressional colleagues,raisedlarge sums of money in the Indian-American community. Solarz's defeatopenedthe door for a junior New Jersey Democrat, Frank Pallone, who up tothistime had displayed no particular interest in either American foreignpolicyor the Indian-American community.

At first the loss of Solarz was seen as a blow to the community'sinfluence,but Pallone was a shrewd politician who had a need and recognized anopportunity.The need arose from the vicissitudes of redistricting, which hadthrowna large Indian-American population into his new congressionaldistrict.The opportunity arose from the vacuum created by Solarz's departure. Afew weeks after the 1992 elections, Pallone enlisted six other

Democratsand Florida Republican Bill McCollum to organize the CongressionalCaucuson India and Indian Americans. One of the first congressional caucusesdevoted to promoting relations with a single country, the group grewfarmore rapidly than Pallone could have envisioned in even his wildestfantasies.By mid-1999, the India caucus, as it was invariably called, boasted amembershipof 115 members, over a quarter of the entire House of Representatives.

Galvanized by Pallone's energetic leadership and considerable skillsforpublicizing both the caucus and his own role in Indian-Americanaffairs,the organization aggressively argued the case for better U.S.-Indianrelations.Pallone's office established an effective information andcommunicationsnetwork and made certain that caucus members knew whenever the Housewasslated to vote on issues of interest to the Indian-American community@The caucus distributed talking points, enlisted floor speakers andlinedup votes. It provided India, for the first time, with an institutionalbase of support on Capitol Hill and, according to one analyst, an"anchorto windward."

The Pakistani-American community

The Pakistani-American population is only one-tenth the size of theIndianAmericancommunity. Not surprisingly, it lags far behind its larger rival initsvisibility and its clout on Capitol Hill. Pakistan has nocongressionalequivalent of the India caucus. Various efforts to organize a Pakistancaucus have foundered on congressional indifference and the hardpoliticalreality that publicly aligning themselves with Pakistan holds fewpoliticalincentives for most members of the U.S. Congress.

Throughout the 1980s and the close Pakistani-American partnershipagainstthe Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Texas Democrat Charlie Wilsonwasan energetic and effective advocate for Islamabad in the House ofRepresentatives.But since Wilson's retirement from Congress in 1996, no one hassteppedforward to take his place. The situation is slightly more favorableforPakistan in the Senate, where several members, including Brownback,

Harkinand Robert Torricelli (D-Nj), are viewed as particularly sympathetictoIslamabad. Pakistan's marginally stronger position in the Senate hasinfluencedthe legislative strategy of the Clinton administration as it hassoughtstatutory relief from congressionally mandated sanctions againstIslamabad.In both 1998 and 1999, with Brownback I and II, the administrationfocusedits efforts on securing adoption in the Senate. Since the equivalentHousemeasure contained no comparable provision, a Senate-House conferencecommitteeresolved the issue, neatly sidestepping the potential obstaclerepresentedby a separate House vote and a mobilized India caucus.

The U.S. business community

Constituent pressure, of course, constitutes only one of many sourcesofinfluence on members of Congress as they deal with South Asian issues.In recent years, since India began opening up its economy in 1991,economicconsiderations and the American business community have also assumed alarger role on matters pertaining to the subcontinent. Although itspromisestill far exceeds its actual performance, the Indian market, with itsalluringprospect of several hundred million middle-class consumers, hasincreasinglyattracted the attention of both Wall Street and Main Street.

This new business interest has been reflected on Capitol Hill. Manymembersof Congress, constantly on the lookout for fresh sales and investmentopportunitieswhichcan mean more jobs for constituents and greater profits for localbusinessesfindtheir gaze more and more drawn to South Asia and to India above all.Paeansto India's economic reforms have replaced denunciations of Nehruviansocialismas standard congressional rhetoric. Traveling legislators, who onceshunnedthe subcontinent, now regularly pass through New Delhi, the financialcenterof Mumbai (Bombay) and the Indian Silicon Valley in Bangalore.

Private groups such as the U.S.-India Business Council and the IndiaInterestGroup lobby individual members of Congress on behalf of sanctionsreliefand U.S. government credits and investment guarantees, According toseveral

of Capitol Hill's most knowledgeable South Asia experts, U.S. businessand agricultural groups were "key" to the July 1998 rollback of someofthe Glenn amendment sanctions. 16 These same organizations alsosupportedthe 1998 and 1999 Brownback amendments that further loosenedlegislativerestrictions on India and Pakistan. Combined with a larger, morepoliticallyactive Indian-American community, American business interests over thepast seven or eight years have pushed the U.S. Congress to pay moreattentionto South Asia and, most strikingly, to foster a more cordial U.S.-Indianrelationship.

New threats to American security

Security considerations have contributed as well to this newfoundinterestin U.S.-Indian partnership. For many years, most members of Congresssawthe region primarily in terms of the Cold War competition with theSovietUnion. Pakistan was a valued ally, while India, for reasons mostlegislatorsfound utterly inexplicable, was entirely too cozy with Moscow. Withthedisappearance of the Soviet threat, however, congressional anxietieshaveincreasingly centered on two other potential challenges to Americansecurity:China and Islamic fundamentalism. The result has been a shift inattitudestoward India and Pakistan.

Confronted with the grim scenes from Tiananmen Square at the verymomentthe Cold War was coming to a close, many members of Congress, bothconservativesand liberals, almost effortlessly replaced their concerns about aSovietthreat to American ideals and interests with similar worries about thePeople's Republic of China. In the eyes of some, India took on a newimportanceas a hedge against a China turned aggressive. Others asked if theworld'slargest democracy and its most powerful democracy did not share avaluesystem fundamentally at odds with that espoused by the communistregimein Beijing. Brownback, for one, is outspoken in his criticism of themannerin which the Clinton administration has handled relations with ChinaandIndia. The White House, he charged in a speech to the U.S.-IndiaBusiness

Council in June 1999, has consistently rewarded China, "a country thathas openly and continually challenged U.S. interests and values,"while"first ignoring, and now punishing" India. "The inequity in thissituation,"he contended, "is both striking and counterintuitive. Why reward thecountrywhich is aggressively working against everything we stand for, and atthesame time punish and blackmail a country with which we share basicvaluesand interests?"

A growing concern about terrorism sponsored by radical Islamic groupsmatchedthis uneasiness about the future course of U.S. relations with China.Andfears about Islamic terrorism served to promote anxieties about MuslimPakistan and, in some quarters, new support for India. More and more,U.S.legislators equated Pakistan with an Islamic fundamentalism that, intheirview, posed a serious threat to American interests at home and abroad.Islamabad's support for the anti-Indian insurgency in Kashmir and,evenmore, for the radical Taliban in Afghanistan only reinforced suchconcerns.

Congressional backing for Israel entered into the equation as well.Someof Israel's friends on the Hill voiced concern that Pakistan mightshareits nuclear knowhow with Iran or other Arab states hostile to Israel.Shortlyafter Pakistan's nuclear tests, a group of legislators circulated newsreports highlighting a visit to Pakistan by Iran's foreign minister,andpointedly speculated whether the trip, coming on the heels ofIslamabad'snuclear tests, was mere coincidence. "We believe it is vital for theCongressto learn the full story about Pakistan's nuclear weapons program andanypossible illegal transfers of information and technology to Iran,"theywrote. Robert Menendez (D-Nj) warned his House colleagues that"Pakistan'sdecision to test a nuclear weapon has raised the frightening specterofan 'Islamic bomb' being directed at Israel." 17

Limits to U.S. Sanctions

The net effect of this rapid shift on sanctions policy toward SouthAsiais difficult to determine. At the most basic level, it is hard to

escapethe conclusion that U.S. non-proliferation policy toward South Asia-thepolicy of the executive branch as well as of the Congress-has utterlyfailedif success is defined as keeping nuclear weapons out of the region. Aquartercentury of American threats, blandishments and exhortations deterredneitherIndia nor Pakistan from moving forward on a nuclear weapons program.Thecertainty of sanctions did not stop either country from conductingnucleartests. And having crossed that nuclear Rubicon, neither New Delhi norIslamabadwas compelled to roll back its weapons program because of U.S.sanctions.

These bald judgments, however, demand qualification. The fact thatU.S.policy ultimately failed to keep nuclear weapons out of South Asiadoesnot mean that it was without impact. Absent U.S. opposition, India andPakistan might well have accelerated their weapons programs. The SouthAsian nuclear race might have heated up far sooner, and with resultsfarmore dangerous, had the United States not invested considerable time,energyand diplomatic capital in trying to prevent the spread of nuclearweaponryto the subcontinent. In truth, definitively evaluating the success orfailureof America's non-proliferation policies in South Asia is not as easyasit may first appear.

Moreover, in gauging the effectiveness of U.S. sanctions-both thethreatand their actual imposition-in influencing the behavior of IslamabadandNew Delhi, one must also recognize that the United States neverattemptedto wield the full force of its economic might. Glenn amendmentsanctionswere perhaps more notable for their gaps than their comprehensivenature.India, for instance, had been scheduled to receive $54.3 million indevelopmentassistance in fiscal year 1998. Of this total, $36.3 million was foractivitiesexempt from the Glenn amendment sanctions--child survival projects,healthand family planning programs, environmental projects, and relatedprograms.U.S. food aid to India, which totaled approximately $92 million ayear,

was also permitted under the Glenn amendment. Ultimately, India lostonly$12 million in direct aid and $9 million in housing loan guaranteesfromits 1998 aid package, and $4-5 million in deobligations from moneyappropriatedin earlier years. Even U.S. opposition to World Bank loans was hedged,as Clinton administration officials argued that the ban did not extendto humanitarian assistance. Pakistan similarly escaped many of themoredraconian aspects of a full aid cutoff.18 For all the hue and cryaboutinflexible sanctions, the Glenn amendment proved remarkably flexible.

In part, this reluctance to use all the means at its disposal to wreckthe economies of India and Pakistan reflected a U.S. recognition thatasimportant as non-proliferation was, the United States had othercriticalinterests in South Asia that deserved protection as well. India andPakistanoccupy a strategic corner of the globe, and regional instability couldthreaten American political and security interests in the Middle East,central Asia and the Indian Ocean. Important U.S. economic interestsrequiredsafeguarding. Washington sought to promote economic development fortheregion and to address pressing social needs. Good governance and thestrengtheningof democratic institutions were key American objectives. Fosteringregionalcooperation and combating terrorism and narcotics trafficking wereotherpriorities. In other words, no one objective, no matter how worthy,wasso vital as to justify jeopardizing Washington's ability to pursue itsmany interests in the region.

Pakistan's precarious political and economic situation also placedlimitson how hard Washington could lean on Islamabad. Ever mindful of thefactthat an economic or political collapse in Pakistan might contribute tothe rise of Islamic radicalism, U.S. officials drew back from actionsthatmight push Pakistan over the edge. Augmenting these fears, moreover,wasthe concern that an impoverished Islamabad might look for ready cashbyselling its nuclear technology to Iran or other "rogue" nations,therebycontributing to the very proliferation Washington sought to block.

Finally, the refusal of the international community to follow theAmericanlead in imposing penalties on India and Pakistan undercut the impactof

U.S. sanctions and reduced congressional incentives for plugging theloopholesin the American sanctions regime. Japan and several European nationsdidsuspend loans and grants or apply other economic sanctions followingtheMay 1998 tests, but like U.S. sanctions, the global regime wasnoteworthymore for its exceptions than its inclusiveness.

This combination of circumstances has led most South Asian experts-thoughnot necessarily non-proliferation specialiststo conclude that a U.S.policybuilt around the threat or use of sanctions has failed to advance theAmericannational interest.19 This judgment reflects the congressionalconsensusas well. In a speech on April 3, 1999, Representative Gary Ackerman(DNY),who had replaced Pallone as the Democratic co-chair of the Indiancaucusearlier that year, spoke for many of his congressional colleagues whenhe observed, "Sanctions are too blunt a weapon to be used by usagainsta sister democracy such as India. Sanctions aren't good for India; andthey aren't good for America either."

Not even new Indian and Pakistani provocations slowed Capitol Hill'sheadlongrepudiation of sanctions. The publication by India in mid-1999 of adraftnuclear doctrine envisioning the creation of a nuclear triad of air-,sea-and groundlaunched nuclear weapons-a plan roundly condemned by theClintonadministration and a handful of legislators-had absolutely no effectoncongressional support for Brownback 11. Instead, India partisans suchasPallone took the publication of the draft doctrine as anotherindicationof New Delhi's transparency and political maturity. India, Palloneinsisted,had good reason to seek a credible deterrent, considering theprovocationsof Pakistan and China.20

Similarly, Pakistan's reckless involvement in and responsibility fortheKargil incursion, which in the summer of 1999 briefly revived fears ofa full-scale conflict between South Asia's nuclear-armed rivals,failedto derail congressional approval for Brownback 11. Tests of nuclear-capableballistic missiles by both countries went largely unnoticed on theHill.

Finally, the October 1999 coup in Islamabad did not halt the drive tofreePakistan from Pressler as well as Glenn amendment restrictions.Congress,it would seem, was hell-bent on lifting sanctions on its South Asianfriends,come what may.

The Sanctions Paradox

Given the remarkable backpedaling that so rapidly followed theimpositionof the Glenn amendment sanctions, one might reasonably ask whyCongressadopted legislation mandating such sanctions in the first place. Fewregionalspecialists believe Washington's nuclear-related sanctions haveworked.Most contend that congressional legislation has produced faulty policybased on a failure to understand South Asia's regional dynamics.Sanctions,many would add, have even been counterproductive to the achievement ofU.S. non-proliferation objectives. So has the South Asian experiencedisillusionedCongress about the utility of sanctions as a foreign policy tool?

On the contrary, there has been a dramatic increase in sanctionslegislationin recent years. From a congressional perspective, sanctions and thethreatof sanctions are not the illogical or misinformed initiatives manyforeignpolicy experts assume. Such measures meet various congressional needs.First, they give Congress a voice in determining U.S. foreign policy,ina sphere in which the executive branch wields most of the power. Tocomplain,therefore, that sanctions are a blunt instrument, as many critics do,missesthe point. They are better than no instrument at all.

Second, sanctions can represent a legitimate effort to warn foreigngovernments.not to take particular actions or cross certain lines. Few people in1985thought that the Pressler amendment would ever be triggered. Itsprincipalpurpose was to caution Islamabad not to push its nuclear developmenttoofar.

Third, sanctions sometimes reflect a congressional distrust of theexecutivebranch. Congress might legislate non-proliferation sanctions, forinstance,because it believes that the White House is not giving this issuesufficient

priority.

[IMAGE PHOTOGRAPH] Captioned as: Citizens protest the U.S.-imposedsanctionson India ky dumping Coke and Pepsi down a drain in 1998. The Indian-Americancommunity helped pressure Congress into lifting the sanctions in 1999.

Finally, the enactment of sanctions can serve political or partisanneeds.By including a presidential waiver in sanctions legislation, Congresscanin effect have it both ways. Legislators can appear to be taking atoughstand on an issue while actually placing ultimate responsibility uponthepresident for imposing sanctions and for the negative consequences thesanctions might produce.

Although South Asian developments suggest that some members ofCongresshave now begun to rethink the wisdom of this wholesale reliance onsanctions,particularly those of a unilateral nature, legislation threateningsanctionsmeets too many congressional needs to be removed from the legislativearsenalin the near future. Indeed, in the very month that Clinton imposedGlennamendment sanctions on India and Pakistan, the House adopted theInternationalReligious Freedom Act of 1998, which by some estimates could result innew sanctions on as many as 75 countries.21

So we are left with something of a paradox. Congress appears to havelittlestomach for maintaining sanctions against India or Pakistan, either topunish them for their tests, to coerce them into reversing thedirectionof their nuclear programs, or more generally, to send a message toothernuclear threshold states that may be tempted to emulate the Indian andPakistani examples. Nor does the Hill appear prepared to hold out foradeal in which the United States would lift sanctions in exchange forspecificIndian or Pakistani steps short of a complete nuclear rollback, suchassigning and ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Legislatorsareunwilling to pay the domestic price sanctions frequently entail,particularlysince sanctions hold no assurance of success in achieving U.S. non-proliferationobjectives. Members, moreover, have a legitimate fear that a punitiveapproach

toward Islamabad and New Delhi will preclude the achievement of otherimportantU.S. objectives in South Asia, strain Washington's relations withfriendsand allies, or push Pakistan over the precipice into the clutches ofIslamicradicalism.

Nonetheless, members of Congress will almost certainly continue toinsiston their right and responsibility to exercise a voice in the conductofthe nation's foreign policies, as indeed they should. With differentpoliticalconstituencies and constitutional duties than the president, they willfrequently disagree with the executive in their definition of thenationalinterest, and in their judgments as to the best means for preservingandpromoting that interest. And they will remain attracted by theapparentadvantages sanctions legislation offers.

So the paradox is likely to remain, recalling the old adage thateverybodywants to go to heaven, but no one wants to die. Congress will continueto encroach upon the executive's freedom of action, to mandatesanctions-andto recoil at the consequences. U.S. policy, in short, is likely toreplaythe strange gyrations that marked congressional efforts in 1998 and1999to fashion a policy to meet both the new nuclear realities of SouthAsiaand the new political realities of Washington. Whether American policywill also advance the global nonproliferation agenda is rather more indoubt.

KEY LEGISLATION

Symington Amendment

Adopted 1976. Sec. 101 of the Arms Export Control Act, formerly Sec.669of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.

Prohibits most U.S. assistance to any country found trafficking innuclearenrichment equipment or technology outside of internationalsafeguards.President Jimmy Carter found Pakistan in violation of the Symingtonamendmentin 1979 because of Islamabad's clandestine construction of a uraniumenrichmentplant. U.S. aid to Islamabad was possible between 1982 and 1990 onlythroughthe use of presidential waivers.

Adopted 1977. Sec. 102(b) of the Arms Export Control Act, formerlySec.670 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as amended.

Prohibits U.S. foreign assistance to any non-nuclear-weapon state (asdefinedby the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty) that, among other things,detonatesa nuclear explosive device. President Bill Clinton imposed Glennamendmentsanctions against India on May 13, 1998, two days after New Delhibrokeits self-imposed 24-year moratorium on nuclear testing. On May 30,1998,Clinton invoked similar sanctions against Pakistan, followingIslamabad'ssix nuclear tests on May 28 and 30.

Pressler Amendment

Adopted 1985. Sec. 620E[e] of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 asamended.Originally banned most economic and military assistance to Pakistanunlessthe U.S. president certified, on an annual basis, that Pakistan didnotpossess a nuclear explosive device, and that the provision of U.S. aidwould significantly reduce the risk of Pakistan possessing such adevice.In October 1990, President George Bush was unable to issue thiscertification,which triggered the Pressler amendment prohibitions. In 1995, theBrownamendment exempted most forms of economic assistance from the Pressleramendment prohibitions.

Brownback I

Adopted 1998. The India-Pakistan Relief Act of 1998, incorporated intothe fiscal 1999 omnibus appropriations bill (Public Law 105-277).

Provides the president with authority to waive, for a period of oneyear,Glenn, Symington and Pressler amendment sanctions on India andPakistan,except for those pertaining to military assistance, dual-use exportsandmilitary sales.

Brownback II

Adopted 1999. Incorporated into the fiscal year 2000 defenseappropriationsbill (Public Law 106-79).

Gives the president indefinite authority to waive, with respect to

Indiaand Pakistan, all the provisions of the Glenn, Symington and Pressleramendments.States that the "broad application" of export controls on Indian andPakistanigovernment agencies and private companies suspected of having links totheir country's nuclear or missile programs is "inconsistent" with thenational security interests of the United States, and urges theapplicationof U.S. export controls only against agencies and companies that make"directand material contributions to weapons of mass destruction and missileprogramsand only to those items that can contribute to such programs."

NOTES

1. Edward Markey, draft letter to President Clinton, May 12, 1998; DanBurton, Dear Colleague letter, May 12,1998; Tom Harkin, Congres

sional Record, May 12, 1998, p. S4680.

2. Congressional Record, May 12,1998, p. H3081; Eliza Newlin Carney,"AnotherKind of Arms Race," National journal, June 6, 1998, p. 1306.

3. Jim Abrams, "Asia: U.S. Says Situation Serious, Calls for GlobalEfforts,"Associated Press, June 1,1998.

4. Richard Lugar, Dear Colleague letter, June 4, 1998.

5. Robert Sn-dth, Congressional Quarterly, June 6, 1998, p. 1544;MitchMcConnell, Congressional Quarterly, July 11, 1998, p. 1891.

6. Tom Raum, "Senate Panel to Study Effectiveness of U.S. Sanctions,"AssociatedPress, June 27,1998.

7. Congressional Quarterly, July 11, 1998, p. 1891.

8. In addition, the legislation permanently removed medicines, medicalequipment and fertilizer from the application of sanctions.

9. Public Law 105-194, the Agriculture Export Relief Act. U.S. wheatfarmerswon the contract.

10. Congressional Record, July 15, 1998, p. S8184.

11. The export control provision of this measure was even morestartlingfor coming at a time when congressional Republicans were inflamed overpossibly illegal transfers to China that might have assisted Beijing'smissile development efforts.

12. Sharon M. Lee, "Asian Americans: Diverse and Growing," PopulationBulletin,June 1998; Karen Isaksen Leonard, The South Asian Americans (Westport,CT Greenwood, 1997). The author is indebted to Joanna Yu for herresearchassistance in compiling these statistics.

13. Author interview with Senator Sam Brownback, August 3, 1999.

14. Carney, "Another Kind of Arms Race," p. 1306.

15. Brownback interview.

16. Barbara Leitch LePoer, et al., "India-Pakistan Nuclear Tests andU.S.Response," CRS Report for Congress, November 24, 1998, p. 35;Brownbackinterview.

17. Gary Ackerman, et al., Dear Colleague letter, June 11, 1998;RobertMenendez, Dear Colleague letter, June 16, 1998.

18. LePoer, et al., pp. 22-26.

19. See, for example, Richard N. Haass and Gideon Rose, eds., A NewU.S.Policy Toward India and Pakistan (New York: Council on ForeignRelations,1997); and Richard N. Haass and Morton H. Halperin, eds., After theTests:U.S. Policy Toward India and Pakistan (New York: Council on ForeignRelations,1998).

20. Aziz Haniffa, "Pallone Hails New Delhi's Transparency," IndiaAbroad,August 27, 1999,

21. Public Law 105-292.

Robert M. Hathaway, who served for 12 years on the professional staffofthe House In ternational Relations Committee, is director of the AsiaProgramat the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner.Further reproduction or distribution is prohibited without permission.

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