bangladesh's marxist-leninists ii

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Bangladesh's Marxist-Leninists: IIAuthor(s): Sumanta BanerjiReviewed work(s):Source: Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 17, No. 33 (Aug. 14, 1982), pp. 1311-1313Published by: Economic and Political WeeklyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4371237 .Accessed: 26/11/2011 06:39

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ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLY Atugust 14, 1982

Bangladesh's Marxist-Leninists-IISumantaBanerji

FROM a review of the last decade, it'is obvious that the different Marxist-Leninist groups faced an ideologicalcrisis immediately after the liberationof Bangladesh. Almost all of themagreed that the liberation was pri-marily brought about by the interven-tion of the Indian army - whichprevented a protracted national libera-tion war against Pakistan and pre-etn-pted the emergence of an indigenouspatriotic (probably Leftist) leadership- and that the Awami League gov-ernment was subservienit to SovietUnion and the Indian governmnent.Butthey differed on the strategy to befollowed. Was the main contradictionbetween the masses and the externalpowers represented by 'Soviet social-imperialists and Indian expansionists',or between the masses and the indi-genous feudal and compradore inter-ests? Wile these ideological debatescontinued, split after split followed inthe ranks, eroding the strength of theMarxist-Leninists and making themvulnerable to the militarily surperioroffensive launched by the state's re-pressive forces as well as the AwamiLeaguie hoodlums.In the meantime, the initial euphoriaamong the masses generated by the1971 liberation was fast evaporatingdIe to the inevitable crisis in the eco-nomic and political fields. Inflation,blackmarketing, hoarding of food-grains by profiteers and landlords, theemergence of Awami League armedhoodlums terrorising villagers andcitizens testified to the failure ofSheikh Mujibur's policies. In a des-perate bid to maintain power, Mujibdeclared Emergency on December 28,1974; made himself President for fiveyears in a constitutional change onJanuary 25, 1975 and stampeded allthe political parties into joining asingle party called the BangladeshKrishak Sramik Awami League(BAKSAL) on February 24 that year.T4e divided and enfeebled Marxist-Leninists could hardly be expected topose a challenge to this fast-mnovingpace of dictatorial onrush and providea viable alternative to the people ofBangladesh. In such a situation, thedecisive strike could be sprung onlyby an organised group. It was a sec-tion in the army which dealt the fatalblow by assassinating Mujib and hisfamily members on August 15. Law-ience Lifschultz in his "Bangladesh:

The Unfinisfied Revolution" has ex-haustively investigated the Americanlinks behind the August 15 events.But he has also - in the other part ofthe book dealing with Abu Taher'suprising - touched upon the popularfeeling of relief at Mujib's departureand expectation of a change. It is thismass expectation oni which the JatiyaSamajtantrik Dal (JSD) - a break-away group from the Awami League,led by students and young intellectualscommitted to a vague Leftist strategyof a 'socialist revolution' in Bangla-desh - capitalised, anid in conjunc-tion with the patriotic sections of the'jawans' of the Bangladesh almy attemp-ted an uprising on November 7,1975. But the uprising paved the wayfor the return of yet another dictator,Ziaur Rahmain, safeguarding the inter-ests of the same feudal and compra-dor interests, as evident from the re-cord of his regime. This experiencecarries lessons for the Marxist-Leniniists of Bangladesh. As oneMarxist-Leninist pamphlet referringto the November 7, 1975 events pointsout: "Why, in spite of the role ofpatriotic forces in the army, statepower again reverted to the same rul-ing clique instead of progressivepatriots? The answer to this questionis: the 'Jawans' of the army, althoughinspired by patriotic instincts, are notaware of their own class role. In thepresent socio-economic st-ucture ofBangladesh, the political leadershipwhich can make them aware of theirhistorical role and organise them tocarry out that responsibility has notyet emerged. Those who are carryingon the progressive Leftist traditionhave failed to come forward unitedlyto play their historical role" (Pro-gramme of the Patriotic Front, August1981(?)).JSD's ROLE

The ability of the JSD to fill thevacuum created by the absence of aneffective and viable revolutionary oppo-sition to Sheikh Muijibur Rahman'sregime (it was mainly the studentsand petty-bourgeois militants whoflocked to the JSD, which proved tobe a powerful challenge in November1975 when it received support fromthe army 'jawans' led by Abu Taher)should be a lesson for the Marxist-Leninists of Bangladesh. Uninhibitedby the need to explain subtle theoreti-

cal distinctioins of Marxistn-Leninisin-Maoism - in which the variousMarxist-Leninist groups of Bangla-desh delight to indulge - the JSDchose two issues: first, the generalfrustration among the masses becauseof Sheikh Mujib's failures in the eco-nomic sphere; and second, the patrio-tiC aspirations of the people, parti-cularly the army 'jawans' wlho hadfought in the liberation war andfound to their dismay that they werebeing forced to submit to pressuresfrom the Indian government (imme-diately after liberation, Major Jalilwho later became a leader of the JSD-- protested against the depredationscarried out by the Indian army, andas a result, was imprisoned by theMujib regime). These two issues werethe bases of JSD popularity in1974-75.But the JSD failed to achieve theirobjective, as their strike was confinedto a coup d'etat only. There was noplan to co-ordinate the mutiny in thebarracks with peasants' uprising in thecountryside, where 80 per cent of theBangladesh population lives. Such aco-ordination could have -re--emptedthe return of a careerist armyman-poli-.tician like Ziaur Rahman who continu-ed to represent the interests of theruling classes and imperialists. TheMarxist-Leninist groups who wereactive in the countryside at that timethe EPCP (M-L), the Purba BanglaCommunist Party (M-L) and the Sar-bahara Party - and were committedto armed struggle, suffered from pre-judices against the leaders of the JSD.The JSD leaders, Rab and Sirai, one-time activists of the Awami Leaguestudents' front, had played a prominentpart during 1971 in fighting and killingMarxist-Leninists. The mutual bitter-ness between the JSD ranks and Mao-ists continued even after liberation andstill lingers.The various Marxist-Leninist groupgof Bangladesh still do not have anyconcrete programme for the 'jawans'of the army. Yet, unlike soldiers inother parts of the sub-continent, themembers of the armed forces inBangladesh have a militant and radicalpast. Their role in the liberation warand their radicalisation in the course ofevents set them apart from the armedforces of Pakistan or India. It is signi-ficant that during the last one decadethere have been at least 20 small ormajor attempted army coups in Bangla-desh. While political observers candismiss them as foreign-inspiredattempts, a dispassionate analysis can-

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Auti(ist 14. 1982 ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL WEEKLYnot ignore the desperate urge for achange among the 'jawans? which hasled them all these years to support onecoUp or another. Not all the coupscan be explained as expressions ofrivalry among the army officers, whichincidentally is an important factor inthe crisis in the alrmed orces of Bangla-desh. As for the 'jawans', they pri-marily come from the peasantry orworkinig class families, and are affectedby the economic disabilities that havehit the poor in villages and cities in therecent years. To their utter dismaythey found that the November 7, 1905coup which many among them support-ed, brought about a regime which fail-ed to solve basic economic problems.Inflation reached alarming heightsduring Zia's six-year regime. Theprices of essential commodities showeda six to 10 times increase. The cost ofliving index duiring 1980-81, the lastyear of his government, went up by 17per cent. The country's economy whichduring the Pakistani days was domi-nated by 22 families, is today control-led bv 2 0 millionaires who have mush-roomed during the last decade bytaking advantage of the liberal creditpalicy of the banks for industrial deve-lopment. On the other hand, once-profitable industries like jute and tex-tiles have begun to show a decliningtrend in production. The public sectorcorporations have suiffered tremendousloss because of widespread corruptionand mismanagement.Instead of taking firm measuresagainst the upstart millionaires, Zialeaned more and more on the US forloans and imports. US commitment ofassistance which was only S 59.8 mil-lion in 1973-74 (during the last yearsof Mujib's regime) rose to $ 221.9 mil-lion in 1978-79, which significantlysvnchronised with a decline in Sovietcommitment - from $ 32 million in1973-74 to S 6.5 million in 1977-78.Similarly. the value of goods importedfrom the US went up from about S 80millionto $ 230 million between 1976-77and 1978-79, while that from East-ern Europe including the USSR show-ed a much smaller increase from $ 40million to a little over S 63 million.There wa7-sefinitely a shift, in the policyof devendence, from the Soviet campto the West, particularlv the US.

CHANGE IN DEPENDENCE PA- rERNIt was this clearly discernible changein the dependence pattern that forcedmany Marxist-Leninists to reassesstheir old judgment about the rulingpowers of Bangladesh. The Sarbahara

Party descrilbed Zia as a "puppet" of.US imperialism aind called for the des-truction of US imperialists, Sovietsocial-imperialism and Indian expan-sionists. But Toaha's SamyvabadiDalwhich at first supported Zia, at a laterstage accused him of subservience to'Indian expansionism' on issues likeFarakka. Toaha's consistent proximityto the official Chinese view, and hisadherence to Beijing's new fangled'Three World Theory' which holdsSoviet social-imperialism as the mainenermy, possibly led him to ignore Zia'spro-US stance. Yet, the national com-pulsion of ooposing Zia forced him tofind an ideological rationale that wouldjustify the opposition. What betterrationale could there be than brandingZie as a weak-kneed ruler kowtowingbefore India and the Soviet Union?Some other Marxist-Leninists, however,like the pro-Beijing faction of Bhasani'sNAP, held that Zia was a staunchfighter against the Indian expansionistsand Soviet social-imperialism and theysunk their identity into Zia's Bangla-desh Nationalist Party (BNP). In thename of opposing Indian expansionismand Soviet social-imperialism, someMarxist-Leninists did not hesitate toally with the extreme Rightwing ele-ments like the Muslim League orJamaat-e-Islami, who are traditionallvanti-Indian and anti-Communist. Dur-ing the recent elections, they -joinedthe 17-party National Front formed byAtaur Rahman Khan along with Right-wing elements to fight Russia andIndia.

Thus, it is evident that during Zia'sregime, the bogey of 'Indian expansion-ism' and 'Soviet social-imperialism' -on the fear of which an entire genera-tion had been brought up in Bangla-desh - continued to be evoked bothby Zia (to oppose Awami League) andZia's opponents, including some Marx-ist-Leninists. The bogey was a conveni-ent by-pass for Zia to divert the atten-tion of the masses from domestic eco-nomic problems, as well as a handystick to beat the Opposition. The latteralso found it a suitable slogan to curlyfavour with the anti-Indian sections ofthe population. The pattern of politicalcampaign was a close parallel to theIndian situation, where the CIA isevoked as the bogeyman - both by theruling party (which blames 'foreignhands' for every failure) and the LeftOpposition (which attacks the rulingparty for not being tough enough withthe CIA).Com-mentingon the pre-occupationof Bangladeshi Marxist-Leninists with

Inidia and Soviet Uniioin,one of theirfollowers in a self-critical mood says:"All their discussions and decisionsstem from their opposition to Russiaand India, not from a Marxist or a classviewpoint.. They do not work in theinterests of our people, but for thesake of their internationaI allies." (SyedTarikuzzaman, Forum, October 19,1981.) The same criticism is made byanother Bangladeshi Marxist-Leninisttheoretician, when he says that Leftistsin Bangladesh "dissociated from classstruLggles, have] become direct or in-direct servants of one superpower inthe name of opposing the other".(Badruddin Umar. "Leftists of -Bangla-desh", Sanskr-iti, September 1981.)

IIEAL.rTHYIGNSThese comments are healthy signs of

a new realisation among Marxist-Lenin-ists of Bangladesh. Their experienceduiring the. last 10 years as well asthe recent developments in China haveforced them to take a fresh look attheir own couintry and slowly diss-associate themselves from Chinesepolicies. Both the factions of the Sar-baharaparty have (lenounced the presentChinese leadership. The Anwar Kabir-led faction has called upon all "devot-ed Marxists to firmly oppose the neo-re-visionist leadership of China and upholdMao Zedong Thought". The other fac-tion led by Ziauddin has urged all Marx-ist-Leninists to reject the 'Three WorldTheory' of the "revisionist ChineseLeadership". The Purba Bangla Com-munist Partv (M-L) in a circular pub-lished sometime ago stated: "After hav-ing analysed the national and inter-national policies of the present Chineseparty, we can come unhesitatingly tothe conclusion that revisionists are inpower today in the Teng-led Chinesepar-ty.... But we believe that theywould not be able to remain in powerfor long." Abdul Huq's RevolutionaryComnmunist Party of Bangladesh hasalso rejected the 'Three World Theory'but remains firm in the Maoist strategyof 'encircling cities with villages'.It is significant that these are thegroups which still have some armedbases in the countryside, and enjoymass popularity in their bases. TheSarbahara party for instance reguilarlyholds people's courts to punish localcriminals in the villages they control.But one has to admit at the same timethat both numerically and area-wisetheir influence is marginal in the con-text of entire Bangladesh.There are still no political forces onthe ho)rizoncapable of bringing together

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all the splinitered Marxist-Leninistgroups around a single coherent set ofstrategy and tactics. Identification ofthe principal contradiction, isolation ofthe main enemy and selection of -thepotential allies, develoment of a flexi-ble combination of legal and under-ground functioning, assigning a role tothe army 'jawans' in the future revolu-tion - are still questions to whichsatisfactory answers have to come up.It is on these questions that the variousMarxist-Leninists are dffering, shiftinaand splitting.To list catalogue of groups and theirspecific features would miss the pur-pose. There are at least 12 groups.It might be useful, though somewhatunfair, to regroup them under thefollowing headings: those who regardthe contradiction between feudalismand the masses as the basic contradic-ti.on, and those who do not accept this.The first group can be subdivided intotwo: -those who primarily work legallyin open mass fronts. and those whoare underground. Among the groups atthe moment, at least three groups- theSarbahara Party, the RevolutionaryCommunist Party of Bangladesh (M-L)and the Purba Bangla Communist Party(M-L) - are functioning from- theunderground and carrying out armedoperations. Among those groups whichdo not regard feudalism as the mainenemy, and anpear to stress the deve-lopment of capitalism in agriculture arethe Bangladesh Communist Party (M-L),Bangladesh Janamukti Party, and Work-ers Party. All the three work throughopen mass organisations.

GHOST OF THE PASTThe ghost of the past still haunts allthe groups. The failure to resolve thetussle between stress on domestic classconflicts and that on the contradictionbetween the nation at large and theexternal colonial nowers dogs them atevery step. In 1971 they paid the pricefor ignoring the rising mood of hosti-

lity of the entire East Bengali peopleagainst West Pakistan, and lost theleadership of the movement to theAwami League. In 1975 again, theirpie-occupation with theoretical debatesabout relations between Banggladeshand India to the neglect of the moreurgent task of uniting therselves andmobilising the masses against internalcorruption and repression of the Mujibregime, paved the way for an arm';faction to strike the blow, and later forthe JSD to emerge as the motivatingforce for the next change. The*domes-tic class conflict on the one hand, andthe contradiction between Bangladeshpeople and external colonial powers

(with West Pakistan in 1971, withSoviet social-imperialism and India in1975 and with US imperialism today)on the other keep shifting - some-times one, sometimes the other assum-ing importance. It is the failure toidentify the main contradiction at agiven time in a fast changing politicalscenario that has led the BangladeshMarxist-Leninists to let slip opportuni-ties in the past, even though they can-claim a band of dedicated cadres anidthe martyrdom of the largest numberof ranks and followers.The attempts by some of the activegroups to break away fr(om Chineseinfluence, the setting un of the 'Sha-heed Biplabi 0 Deshapremik SmritiSamsad' (mentioned earlier) as a centre

of united. action against repression notonly for the revolutionary group butfor other radical elements outside theMarxist-Leninist fold, the renewal ofinterest in Marxism among a largebody of students and young oeople asevident from the growth of studygroups, are perhaps straws in the wind.If an imaginative leadership with acoherent strategy that would link dav-to-day practice for the workers andpeasants with a revolutionary proljectof ultimate transformation of Bangla-desh society, can bring together thesevarious strands into a unified body,only then can the Marxist-Leninistsmake their bid for the leadership of thenext popular upsurage.

(Concluded)The University of Papua New Guinea

(Port MIoresby)ECONOMICSDEPARTMENTApplications are invited from suitably qualified persons for the followingpositions in-the department of Economics:1. ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR/SENIORLECTURERPreference will be given to candidates having a Ph. D. or equivalent,internationally recognized academic achievements and ability toprovide leadership in teaching and research. The applicantsshould have specialized in the Economic Theory of Socialism,Economic Planning and Comparative Economic Systems, having astrong interest in Marxian Economics with reference to developingeconomies.The successful applicant will teach mainly in the final year of theundergraduate Economics Degree and in the Honours Programme,from First Semester (February) 1983.2. SENIOR LECTURER/LECTURERPreference will be given to candidates having a Ph. D. or equivalentqualification. Teaching and/or research experience relevant to adeveloping country would be an advantage.The applicants should have specialized in Macro Economics withapplied interests in International Trade Theory, Regional Economicsand Economic Policy.The successful applicant will be engaged in teaching undergraduateand Honours level courses and in supervising research at Honoursand Postgraduate levels.SALARY: Associate Professor K20,680 per annum plus gratuitySenior Lecturer K18,680 per annum plus gratuityLecturer 2 K16,830 per annum pius gratuityLecturer 1 K14,980 per annum plus gratuity.Applications will be treated as strictly confidential and should includea full curriculum vitae, a recent passport size photograph, the names

and addresses of three referees, and an off-print copy of relevantarticles published in journals of international standing.The successful applicant will be offered a contract for a three-yearappointment. The gratuity entitlement is based on 24% of salaryearned -and is payable in installments or lump sum and is taxed at aflat rate of 2%. In addition to the salaries quoted above, the mainbenefits include: support for approved research; rent-free accommoda-tion; appointment and repatriation airfares for appointee . anddependants; settling-in and settling-out allowances, 6 weeks annualrecreation leave with home airfares available after each 18 months ofcontinuous service; generous education subsidies for children attendingschools in PNG or overseas; a salary continuation scheme to coverextended illness or disability. Applicants who wish to arrange second-ment from their home institutions will be welcome.Applications should be forwarded to the Assistant Secretary (Staffing),University of Papua New Guinea, P 0 Box 320, UNIVERSITY,o reachhim not later than 31 August 1982.SECRETARY UNIVERSITYOF PNG)

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