baptizing territory

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BAPTIZING TERRITORY:

RECONSTITUTING RUMELAFTER 1878

byAye avdar

Dissertation submitted to the History Department

in partial fulfillment of

the requirements for the degree of

Master of Arts

in History

Boazii University

2004


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Baptizing Territory: Reconstituting Rumeli after 1878

A dissertation prepared by Aye avdar

in partial fulfillment of the requirements for

the degree of Master of Arts at

the Department of History.

This dissertation has been approved and accepted by:

Prof. Dr. Huricihan slamolu (advisor)

Prof. Dr. Selim Deringil.

Assis. Prof. Ycel Terzibaolu


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to Lale


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zet

1878de Byk Gler ile Osmanldevleti arasnda imzalanan Berlin Anlamas,

Balkanlarda Romanya, Bulgaristan ve Srbistan devletlerinin bamsz birer

uluslararasaktr olarak domalarnsalamann yansra, Osmanlynetimini yine

Byk Glerin onay yetkisi altnda yaplmasngrlen bir dizi reformu uygulamak

zorunda brakyordu. 1880de hazrlanan ve Avrupa Komisyonunun onayndan

geen Rumeli Vilayetleri Kanunu, Osmanlmerkezi devletini Rumelide bir smrge

imparatorluuna dntryordu. Osmanlynetimi bu tasarybizzat kendisi

hazrlamolsa da, asla uygulamad. Blgede i karklklarn, ayaklanmalarn

kmasOsmanlhkmetinin bu yasayla ngrlen reformlaruygulamadiin

eletirilmesine neden oldu. Byk Glerin blgedeki istikrarszlnlemek iin

bulduklar

yntem dorudan mdahale idi. 1903te Mrzsteg, 1908de de Revaltasarlargndeme geldi. Avrupa devletlerinin temsilcileri de bizzat reformlarn

uygulamalarnda grev alacaklard. Reformlar, 1908 Jn Trk devrimiyle tamamyla

ortadan kalkt. 1912deki Osmanlkabinesi, Balkanlarda savaittifakkurulurken

yaklaan savanleyebilmek iin 1880 tarihinde yaplan kanunu bir kez daha

gndeme getirdi. Ne var ki stanbul kamuoyu yasann tartlmasna bile karyd.

Kaldki Balkan devletlerinin de savatan vazgemek gibi bir eilimleri yoktu.

Balkan Savalarnn ardndan Ege MakedonyasYunanistan snrlariinde kald.

Blge bu defa da Yunan modern merkezi ulus devletinin izdii bir merkezilemesreci ierisine girdi. Yunanistan nce mbadele ve zorunlu g ya da ge zorlama

yntemiyle blgedeki Yunan olmayan unsurlarsrgn ederek, buradaki demografiyi

deitirdi. Blgedeki yerleim yerlerinin isimlendirilmesi politikas, bu topraklarn

bundan byle Yunan merkezi devleti tarafndan Yunan ulusu adna ynetileceinin

gstergesi idi.

Tezin ilk iki blmnde Rumeli vilayetlerinin AvrupalByk Glerle Osmanl

mparatorluu arasnda nasl bir mcadele alanoluturduunu ve Osmanl

ynetiminin Byk Glerin mdahalelerine direnme biimleri yer almaktadr. Bu

iki blmn amacise Osmanlynetiminin merkezileme abalarile, Avrupa

mdahalesinin blgeyi merkezsizletirici etkisinin ortaya kardgerilimi ifade

edebilmektir. Tezin nc blmnde ise Yunan ulus devletinin Ege

Makedonyasnn hangi politik aralarla merkezi ynetimin bir nesnesi haline

getirdii aklanmaya allmtr. Bu blmn amacise, zellikle isimlendirme ve

kimlik politikalarnn yalnzca sylemsel politikalar olmadklar, aksine ulusal


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kimliin aslnda uluslararasalanda ina edilmesi nedeniyle yasal ve ekonomik

pratikler temelinde ekillendiklerini ortaya koymaktr.


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Summary

The Berlin Treaty of 1878, which was signed between the Great Powers and the

Ottoman Empire, not only created new nation states in the Balkans, such as

Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia, but also ordered the Ottoman administration to

implement reforms under the supervision of the European Commission. The Law of

Rumelin Provinces of 1880 was prepared to implement the Berlin Treatys

provisions on reforms. Since the Ottoman administration never applied these

reforms, it was criticized for causing the instable environment in the Balkans. The

resolution of the Great Powers was direct intervention to the Ottoman affairs in

Rumeli. According to the Mrzsteg reforms of 1903 and the Reval reforms of 1908,

the European diplomats would directly involve in the implementation of the reforms.

All these reforms were dismissed with the Young Turk revolution of 1908. The

program of the Young Turks was based on the centralization of administration

without any concession. The Ottoman government of 1912 took the Law of 1880 one

more time in order to prevent the possible war in the Balkans. However, the public

opinion in Istanbul was against even the discussion of the law. On the other hand, the

Balkan states would not withdraw from war.

The Aegean Macedonia passed under the Greek rule after the Balkan Wars. The

region was centralized by the Modern Greek nation state. The Greek administration

changed the ethnic composition of its territory by means of policies of forced

migration and population exchanges. The policy of renaming inhabited places was

one of the most significant identity politics of the Greek nation state. It was the sign

that the Greek nation state would rule over this territory on behalf of the Greek

nation.

First two chapters of this study focus on the tension between the Great Powers and

Ottoman administration, because of the intervention policies of Great Powers and the

resistance of the Ottoman administration. The centralization of the Aegean

Macedonia by the Greek central state is mentioned in the third chapter of this study.

The main goal of this chapter is to show that the policies of renaming and identity are

not only discursive policies; on the contrary, since national identity is a product of

the balance of power in international relations, the identity policies are formed on the

basis of legal and economic practices.


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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First I would like to thank my advisor, Prof. Huricihan Islamoglu, for her kind

encouragement and guidance. I should appreciate also to Prof. Selim Deringil and

Asst. Prof. Yucel Terzibasoglu for their comments and suggestions. Thanks to Nil

Mutluer, Volkan Aytar and Tracy Lord; they helped to me to write this thesis in a

more understandable way. Thanks to Ayegl Okan and my sister Hatice avdar for

their emotional support in every level of this thesis. Special thanks to Melek Taylan,

Nurdan Arca and Sevgi Sevgin, they were very patient and supportive while I was

writing this thesis. I appreciate to my father, Yaar avdar, because his ethical way

of understanding people and events is my main guide to understand events and

people in my life, he taught me to stay on my own feet, while I am seeking for

success that I desire. In addition, special thanks to ahin Utar, who listened to and

encouraged me patiently every time while I was trying to organize my ideas about

the naming and authority.


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Baptizing Territory: Reconstituting Rumeli after 1878

CONTENTS

zet iv

Summary v

Acknowledgements vi

Introduction 8

Chapter I

Reconstituting Rumeli: The Law of Rumelin Provinces of 1880 12

I.1. Legal Status of the People of Rumelin Vilayets 19

I.2. General Councils as Provincial Parliaments 22

I.3. Election Procedure 26

I.4. The Status of Governors and Other Officials of Central Government 27

I.5. Religious Communities and Education 30

I.6. Courts 34

I.7. Security 35

Chapter II:

The Resistance of the Ottoman Administration to Reforms,

and the Restoration of the Law of Rumelin Provinces in 1912 37

II.1. Mrzsteg Reforms 39

II.2. The Resistance of the Ottoman Bureaucracy and Officers: 1908 42

II.3. The Law of Rumelin Provinces of 1912 45

Chapter III:

Greek Administration in the Aegean Macedonia After 1912 49

III.1. Greek Position until the Balkan Wars 52

III. 2. General Consequences of the Balkan Wars 55


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III.3. Greece in Macedonia: Changing Demographic Composition 56

III.4. Centralization of Macedonia: Local Practices 62

III.5. Baptizing Territory 65

Conclusion 72

Bibliography 78

Appendixes

Rumeli VilayatKanunu (Layiha) 84

Maps

Kosova Viyalet at Beginning of the 20

th

Century 132Selanik (Thessalonica) Viyalet at Beginning of the 20thCentury 133

Manastir (Monastir) Viyalet at beginning of the 20thCentury 134

The Balkans in 1878 135

The Balkans in 1913 136


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Introduction

sim dediin, Hz. Ademden bu yana, kendini tayankh usul usul yourur,kh efsunlu iplerle skskbalard.sim dediin, yksekte uann belini bkecek,

alaktan geenin bandorultacak; pervasza perva, korkusuza korku katacak kadar kudretli idi.

Elif afak, PinhanAccording to a story in the Quran, God honored the first human, Adam, when he

learned all the names of the creatures in the universe. Therefore, Adam became the

representative of God on earth. After Adam came to the earth with Eva, only he held

the authority to name the creatures of God. This story always makes me think that

naming has strongly been related with authority. Naming or baptizing somebody or

something is a kind of declaration that the name-giver or baptizer has authority over

the existence of the baptized human or the thing.

My thesis is inspired by a suspicion of renaming policies in the context of the

construction of nation states. For a very concrete example of this issue, we have an

ongoing debate over the Armenian Genocide. Clearly, if international community

accepts the concept of Armenian Genocide, Turkey would have a right to fear

compensation from the descendents of the Ottoman Armenians. Similar to this

problematic was that experienced between Greece and the Former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Greece opposed the usage of the name

Macedonia by the FYROM, because of the countrys potential claims over Aegean

Macedonia (or Northern Greece). Obviously, there are large national interests at

stake in the naming of territories.

My general context is the period of the transition from empire to nation state.

Specifically, I focus on the dissolution process of the Ottoman Empire into discreet

nation states, and crucial in this process was the imbalance of powers between the

Ottoman Empire and the European Great Powers. In this thesis, I am interested in the

naming policies within the context of the conflicting interests between these two

major blocs.

The naming policy was one of several tools for nationalizing former imperial

territories. Although, the renaming policy of the nation states is generally perceived

as largely an aesthetic issue, in fact my research suggests that the stakes in territorial

names are multiple and determining, including cultural, social, economic, and

political aspects. Indeed, it seems that renaming practices are one of the defense


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mechanisms used by nation states in their formation processes since renaming a

particular territory in a given nations language constitutes a declaration of

possession of that nation and thus implies the right of that nation state to establish

hegemony over it. In short, naming makes territories into political possessions.

While the naming had been unproblematic feature of local cultures, in this

transitional period we observe that the authority to assign territorial names became a

tool of the formation of nation states. Among the stakes listed above, I am most

concerned in this study with the emergence of new social reality carried out by the

legal processes involved in renaming policies.

Interestingly, while the nation state concept was widely acknowledged as a universal

political organizing principal, in the case of the transformation of the OttomanEmpire, the determination of the right to nation-statehood was mainly undertaken by

seven nations (the Great Powers of Europe). This they did for Ottoman Rumeli by

reconstituting it an autonomous region as preliminary to a maze mature nation-

state configuration, in the Berlin Congress of 1878. The second half of this process

of regularization handled by the Great Powers was their forced decentralizing

reforms in the autonomous region to the Ottoman administration. On the other

hand, those same seven powers authorized the nation states of the Balkans, to

establish a new social reality for that same region, which Greece did in a holistic

fashion, including the application of Greek names to former Ottoman lands and for

former Slavophonic peoples.

The historical context that this study focuses on includes three main developments in

the Balkans related to each other. First is the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire,

the second is the formulation of national identities and the third is the formation of

new nation states. All of these developments were in correlation with each other.

The Berlin Treaty was the most important text of that period, because it crystallized

and legitimized the claims of Balkan nations. On the other hand, the treaty

reconstituted the region as a contested territory between these nation-states, because

there was no way to satisfy their irredentist claims. The period was the age of

nationalism (Gellner, 1996; 115): In other words, the construction period of national

imaginations (Anderson, 1995: 20).

The Berlin Treaty created states, and freed them to figure their nations from their

imagined history and legendary events, and replace them into the limits that was


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determined according to romantic historical memories, instead of demographic, ethnic

or linguistic realities (Karpat, 2004; 7).

However, this study does not focus on the abstraction process of these

imaginations in discursive level. Rather, it focuses on the institutionalization

process of nationalism as an administrative preference in practical level. Hence, themain analysis object of this study is legal texts of this process.

Indeed legal instruments were one of the most important instruments of creation of

social realities, in this case nations, clearly based on the ultimate results in new

balance of power configurations. As a methodological inclination, I was guided by

Islamolus suggestion to read laws the main textual resources of my research- as

constitutive of social reality (slamolu, 2004). In this case the Berlin Treaty seems

as the main constitutive text of the new international social reality, including, ofcourse, that in the Balkans. Thus, in my reading of the laws, I tried to consider, in

what context, for which reason, and by whom these laws were proposed or imposed.

Thus, I try to discern and describe the power relations behind these legal texts.

It is striking that in the historical or political literature on these issues, legal texts are

used primarily as secondary and supportive, and not to be evaluated as the central

materials for historiography. For instance, Balkan economic historian Michel Palairet

builds a historiography on the base of statistics and purely economic categories, witha very limited help from the highly determining principles of the legal context.

Perhaps the most well-known Balkan political historian L.S. Stavrianos, while

sometimes interested in the international treaties and regulations, bases his

historiography on military and political struggles among the Balkan States.

Ahmed Selahaddin, an Ottoman intellectual from the Istanbul Darulfnun,

emphasizes legal regulations in the formation of the new Balkan context of the

period around the Balkan Wars. I find his work important for two reasons, one, hisdetailed analysis of legal documents, and two, his providing in Ottoman perspective

on these events.

Finally, of great importance to this thesis for assistance in developing definitions of

social reality in cultural history was Anastasia N. Karakasidou. Her work sometime

based on oral accounts of the contemporary inhabitants of Aegean Macedonia,

reveals much about the process of identity formation under the influence of the


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Greek Hellenization program, from the formation process of the Greek nation state to

the present.

In this study, specifically, I have tried to find the linkages between the centralization

of processes of the administration and the policy of renaming places in AegeanMacedonia. As a disputed territory, Aegean Macedonia passed through mainly two

different centralization processes. First one was the Ottoman Empire, and the second

one was the Greek nation state. The Ottoman Empire was transforming itself into a

centralized state. On the other hand, Greece was a modern nation-state, which had

Ottoman imperial legacy. Thus, this study focuses on the dissolution of the Ottoman

Empire and the formation of the Greek central administration in Aegean Macedonia,

after the Berlin Treaty of 1878.

In the first chapter, I elaborate on the Law of 1880 to show what sort of concessions

Ottomans had to give to the non-Muslim inhabitants and their European protectors.

In the second chapter, I tried to expose the resistance of the Ottoman bureaucracy to

these reforms, or decentralizating interventions of the European Great Powers. These

two chapters show why and how the Ottoman administration failed in the

centralization of the Rumeli Provinces.

The third chapter focuses on the centralization practices of Greece over Aegean

Macedonia in the period soon after the Balkan Wars. The Greek nation-state never

respected the multi-lingual and multi-religious social structure of the region. On the

contrary, it exiled the non-Greek peoples not only from administrative posts, but also

from the territory. With several ways of forced migration, it made its territory the

property of the abstract Greek nation. Renaming territory was one of the most

significant identity politics of the Greek nation-state until 1970s.


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Chapter I

Reconstituting Rumeli: The Law of Rumeli Provinces of 1880

The Berlin Treaty was a classic demonstration of Great Power diplomacy. The major

accomplishment of the congress was the re-establishment of the balance of power in

order to solve Eastern Question. However, the context and the realpolitik, which

was created by the Berlin Treaty, became national politics of the Balkan states

(Farrar, 1996).

If one accepts the premise that laws or rules are constitutive of social reality

(slamolu, 2004), it could be suggestible that the international treaties have been

constitutive of an international social reality. As the case with national law and rules,

international treaties represent different configurations of power.

the Macedonian Question was rooted in the diplomatic arrangements thatcollectively settled the Great Eastern Crisis of 1876-78. Macedonia was not only the

primary target of Greek, Serbian, and Bulgarian expansionism, but also a source ofconsiderable consternation for the Great Powers. Then the Treaties of Berlin andConstantinople, which were concluded in 1878 and 1881, respectively, dramaticallyaltered the geopolitical situation in the Balkans. The redistribution of Ottoman territoryleft Greece and Serbia in possession of areas that bordered the three Ottoman

provinces that made up Macedonia(Gerolymatos, 2002: 190).

Gerolymatoss paragraph can be rephrased as the Berlin Treaty represented a

configuration of national/ethnic/international power balances in the Balkans. The

parties to the treaty tried to realize their own interests through deliberations,

contestations and compromises. In this sense, articles of the Berlin Treaty reflected

the configuration of interests in the Balkans at the end of the 19thcentury.

What were these power configurations? In order to answer this question, we have to

remember the consequences of the Russo-Turkish War of 1876-77. Since the

Ottoman Empire was defeated by Russia, the Treaty of San Stefano gave Russia

considerable influence in the Balkans, causing much dissatisfaction among the

Balkan States (Stavrianos, 1958: 408-10). Unavoidably, the Great Powers decided to

hold a new congress in Berlin to solve the problems over the Balkans.

The participants at the Berlin Congress, held on 13 June-13 July 1878, were the

representatives of different interests over the region. The treaty was prepared and

signed for defining the new political environment of the Balkans, which the Great

Powers of Europe; Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and


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Ottoman Empire. On the other hand, since the young states of the peninsula, Serbia

and Greece, did not want this region to remain under Russian influence, they wanted

to have a say in the Balkans, to avoid from the formation of the Great Bulgaria.

According to the Berlin Treaty, the Rumeli provinces would remain under Ottomanrule. Bulgaria would extend from the Danube River to the Mount Stara Planina.

Eastern Rumeli (today Southern Bulgaria) would remain as an autonomous region.

Bosnia and Herzegovina would be annexed by Austria-Hungary, and Montenegro

and Serbia would gain their independence from the Ottoman Empire. Obviously, this

new configuration of interests pointed to many conflicts in the region. Firstly,

Bulgaria could not realize its Greater Bulgaria dream. It could not even send a

representative to the Congress. Secondly, although the Rumeli provinces remainedunder Ottoman rule, the treaty did not end the claims of the neighboring states.

Consequently, as Rumeli could not be shared between irredentist nation states of the

Balkans, the Berlin Treaty transformed Eastern Question into the Macedonian

Question. When this question was named as Eastern Question, it was pointing out

the issues between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan nations, in which were trying

to gain their independence. However, with the Berlin Treaty these issues crystallized

with the scrambling of the Rumeli, or the only part of the Balkans that stayed under

Ottoman rule.

The Berlin Congress did not only establish an independent Bulgaria, but also

provided full independence to Romania and Serbia, while Austria-Hungary annexed

Bosnia-Herzegovina. Following the Congress, the Balkan states became the

independent political actors of the international arena.

From the point of view of this study, since it stated that the Ottoman government had

to implement several reforms, the most significant article of the Berlin Treaty wasarticle 23.

The Sublime Porte undertakes scrupulously to apply in the Island of Crete the OrganicLaw of 1868 with such modifications as may be considered equitable. Similar lawsadapted to local requirements, excepting as regards the exemption from taxation

granted to Crete, shall also be introduced into the other parts of Turkey in Europe(emphasis are mine)1 for which no special organization has been provided by the

1It is significant that the treaty mentions the region as the parts of Turkey in Europe. Doubtless, itwas the language of diplomacy. In this period the naming of the region was a highly contested one.Harris emphasizes the problem over the usage of different names for Macedonia: The term

Macedonia does not appear of ten on modern maps, but it is in common use in a variety of ways,some of which are very confusing The name is usually employed in its most restricted and


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present treaty. The Sublime Porte shall depute special commissions, in which the nativeelement shall be largely represented, to settle the details of the new laws in each

province. The schemes of organization resulting from these labors shall be submittedfor examination to the Sublime Porte, which, before promulgating the Acts for puttingthem into force, shall consult the European Commission2 instituted for Eastern

Rumeli.3

According to Aram Andonyan, who is an Armenian Ottoman intellectual, article 23

stated that Ottoman Rumeli an autonomous region was under the control of the

European Commission. In order to prevent this autonomy, the Ottoman government

offered a reform project, which was more substantial than Europeans had demanded.

Eastern European Commission approved the draft law inclusive of the reforms,

which was called Rumeli VilayatKanunu (The Law of Rumeli Provinces) on 23

August 1880 (Andonyan, 2002: 202).4Rumeli provinces included Uskub (Skopje),

Monastir (Bitolya), Kosovo and todays Northern Greece or Aegean Macedonia.From the Ottoman point of view, this reform project had two aspects. First, it made

concessions both to the Great Powers of Europe and to the non-Muslim population

most of whom were affected by the Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian nationalisms.

probably its most correct- meaning to designate that region of the Balkans embraced within the threeTurkish vilayets of Salonika, Monastir and Kosovo... (1913B; 205). Never using the termMacedonia Ottomans instead referred to it as Rumeli. On the other hand, this region wasMacedonia for especially Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian nationalists, which were demanding

Macedonia as a part of their national territory. Consequently, the European diplomacy pointed out theregion as the European Turkey or the parts of Turkey in Europe refraining from offending any ofthe concerned parties.2With the Berlin Treaty, a new province was formed and entitled Eastern Rumeli in southernBalkans. It would be remain under Ottoman rule, with conditions of administrative autonomy (article13). A Christian Governor General would govern it. A European Commission would be formed withthe representatives of the Great Powers to arrange the new administration in the region, in concertwith the Ottoman government (article 15) (Aydn, 1992; 17-19). The same European Commissionwould also supervise the reforms in Rumeli vilayets. Eastern Rumeli unified with Bulgaria in 1885.This experience also affected the reform policies of the Ottoman government. Because of thisexperience, naturally, Ottoman governments were not voluntary to give such an autonomy to theregions were highly effected by the nationalistic policies of the Balkan states.3Treaty between Great Britain, Germany, Austria, France, Italy, Russia, and Turkey for the

Settlement of Affairs in the East: Signed at Berlin, July 13, 1878, The American Journal ofInternational Law, Vol. 2, No. 4, Supplement: Official Documents, October 1908, p. 4124Another case for similar practice that Ottoman administration gave some privileges to a region isLebanon. In Lebanon the problems between Druzes and the Marronites had been turned into aninternational problem. With the British and French armed intervention in 1861, the Ottomangovernment accepted to implement similar reforms in Lebanon. With these reforms, Lebanon had aspecial semi-independent provincial status: Mount Lebanon would be organized into a specialOttoman governorate, or mutasarrifiyya. A Christian governor was to head the mutasarrifiyya. Hewould be appointed by and directly responsible to the Sublime Porte (the Ottoman government)(Akarl, 1993: 33). All religious communities of Lebanon would send a representative to provincialadministration. A central council would be formed with two elected representatives from thesereligious communities. Ortaylemphasizes that neither vilayetlaw of 1864, nor 1871 included thearrangement that these religious communities sent representative to local councils as electing among

their members. It was a privilege that Ottoman administration accepted as a diplomatic concession inLebanon (Ortayl, 2000; 51).


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Secondly, it was a sort of diplomatic trick to gain time for a more advantageous

resolution in Rumeli.

The most significant characteristic of the Law of 1880 was its repeated emphasis on

the multi-lingual and multi-religious structure of the region. It constituted the regionas a kind of colonial province. There would be local parliaments in each vilayet.

These parliaments could negotiate the activities of the Ottoman central government

within their borders. The Ottoman central government would send a governor to the

vilayets, however, since he was only the representative of the central government on

the local autonomous administrative structure, that governor looked like a modern

colonial one. According to article 23 of the Berlin Treaty, the Ottoman government

had to take the approval of the European Commission, which was formed by thediplomats of the Great Powers of Europe. The Berlin Treaty also determined the

preparation process of the law. Several special commissions would be formed in the

provinces, and each would send their reports included local needs. The Ottoman

government manipulated these local commissions, and never applied the law of

1880. The law was a kind of diplomatic concession to the local rebels and the

European Great Powers. Obviously, such a reform project stated with the Law of

1880 was decentralizing the Ottoman administration in the Rumeli provinces.

The main problem of the Ottoman government was its inner conflict between the

required concessions for such reforms and its demand for the centralization of its

administration. It seems the multi-religious and multi-lingual social structure of the

region was a sort of legitimacy tool for the Great Powers to intervene to the Ottoman

affairs in the Rumeli. Since they advocated the rights of non-Muslims and tried to

provide an environment that the non-Muslims could take posts at the different levels

of administration.

However, especially under the reign of Abdulhamid II, the Ottoman bureaucracy was

trying to transform the empire into a modern central state on the base of being

Ottoman. They were trying to create an Ottoman identity (Deringil, 2002, 74).

The policy to provide equal rights for non-Muslims was emphasizing this demand.

However, giving privileges to the non-Muslims was damaging this idea. Thus, while

the Ottoman governments were giving diplomatic concessions with several reform


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projects to the non-Muslims and their European protectors, at the same time, they

resisted to implementation of those reforms5

In this chapter, I will summarize and discuss the articles of Law of Rumeli Provinces

of 1880, which address the multi-lingual and multi-religious social structure of theregion. First, I will point to the significance of this text, which was never put in

effect: Both the Berlin Treaty and the Law of Rumeli Vilayets represented

imaginings on the part of European Powers about the way they wanted to see the

Balkans, as a multi-lingual, a multi-religious, civil society environment. This

construct remained awkward in the late 19th century environment of centralizing

states with rising nationalist sentiments. But then, for the European Powers the multi-

lingual and multi-religious social order may have provided space for intervention tothe Ottoman domains. Such an intervention aimed at transforming the Balkans in

such a way that it would be ungovernable by the modernizing, centralizing Ottoman

State.

The Ottoman bureaucracy and diplomats reacted both to the Treaty and to the Law of

Rumeli Provinces, which was formulated in compliance with article 23 of the Berlin

Treaty. They were aware of the Great Powers intentions and in the drafting of the

Law, an attempt was made to fashion the Law in such a way as to meet theexpectations of the Europeans. At the same time, as is evidenced, in the Ottoman

reluctance to the foreign interventions to the domestic affairs, the Ottoman

bureaucracy was caught between its needs to centralize its administration and the

effects of the European intervention, which had decentralizing effects. I will discuss

the reactions against the law and the foreign intervention, in the third chapter.

Article 23 can be summarized in 3 points: Firstly, it recast the administration in the

Rumeli provinces and established the autonomy of the region and as had earlier beendone in the case of Crete6. Second, the article established special commissions,

5In 1880, when this law was prepared, Sadrazam Mehmed Said Pasha (or Kk Said Paa) who wasSadrazam in 1912 July was Sadrazam as well. With the order of Abdlhamit II, he prepared a projectabout centralization of the Ottoman administration. This is meaningful to show the Ottoman

bureaucracys conflict between European intervention to decentralized Ottoman administration andOttomans own centralization needs. For a brief biography of Sadrazam Mehmed Said Pasha seeKuran, 1970.6Because of the revolts in 1841, 1858, and 1867 the Ottoman government accepted to implementsome reforms in Crete. The special condition of Crete was determined withHalepa Mukavelenamesi

(Halepa Agreement, 23 October 1868). According to this agreement, the governor general of Cretewould be appointed for 5 years by the Ottoman government among local Christians. His


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consisting of local people represented, determined the details of the new

administration. Third, this article granted rights of approval to the European states. In

fact, a European Commission consisting of representatives of the Great Powers was

formed for Eastern Rumeli. This commission also set out to form a new

administration for the Rumeli provinces. It is obvious that, the provisions of article

23 took away the administrative abilities of the Ottoman central government. The

Ottoman government even lost the right to organize a new administration in the

Rumeli Provinces, because the government had to take into consideration the needs

of the local commissions and get the approval of the European Commission.

The Ottoman government prepared the Law of Rumeli Provinces under these

conditions. The government formed numerous local commissions while preparingthe law. However, it seems there were issues about the representation of the local

inhabitants of the provinces. The government appointed its own officials and the

people more loyal to the central government to these commissions, and, as I will

mention later, this situation caused problems in the preparation process of the draft

law. The local Christian inhabitants of the provinces sent petitions to the European

Commission complaining of the policies of the central government, which prevented

the local representatives taking part in the commissions (Bozhinov and Panayotov,

1978).

The draft law included many details that should normally be part of a constitution. It

began with a chapter defining the rights of citizens for this region alone, then it

constituted a provincial parliament, and then it defined other institutions of a state,

including a separate election procedure. The significance of the text of the draft law

is that it emphasized the multi-lingual and multi-religious character of the region.

The draft law called for representation of local Christians and other religiouscommunities at every level of the administration in Rumeli provinces.

Administration of these provinces was reorganized in hierarchically clustered local

commissions (from the level of nahiye to the vilayets, every district has a

undersecretary would be Muslim. A general council would be formed in the island with 80 members,49 of them non-Muslim. This council would decide on local issues and meet once a year. The generalcouncil had the authority for collecting tax and for controlling local incomes and expenditures. Theisland was divided into 5 vilayets. Each vilayetwould be administered by a Muslim or non-Muslimgovernor. If the governor was Muslim his undersecretary would be non-Muslim or vice versa. The

officers in Crete would be elected among local peoples. These reforms would be a kind of example forother parts of Ottoman territory (Tokay, 1995; 24).


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commission), which the elected and natural members representing the local

inhabitants at every level. The natural members of the local commissions were

basically the religious leaders and the officials of the central state. Elected members

of the commissions came throughout the multiple-level constituency elections in

nahiyes, kazas, sancaks and vilayets. On top of the hierarchy of these commissions

was a General Council, apparently similar to a local or federal parliament at each

vilayet.

The draft law guaranteed the representation of the different lingual or religious

communities in the General Council. In addition, central government had to prefer

the people, knowledgeable in local languages and customs, to appoint to the

administrative positions. Every law to be applied in the region had to be translatedinto local languages. Similarly, in the courts, people could use their mother-

languages, and (if it was possible) the judges and attorney generals had to be

knowledgeable in local languages. In fact, the draft law reconstituted the Rumeli

administration within autonomous lingual and religious communities, since

administrative hierarchy in every district (throughout the local commissions) had its

own autonomy to manage its domestic issues, and the authority to monitor the

workings of its sub-districts commissions. Furthermore, as independent from those

administrative councils and commissions, the draft law regarded the autonomy of the

vakfs of the religious communities. These vakfs had the right to manage the issues

remained under their control, like charity works, education and the issues about their

places of worship.

All these points show that the Law of Rumeli Provinces constituted not only the

administrative scheme of the Rumeli Provinces, but also the relationships between

Ottoman government and the multi-religious and multi-lingual society of the region.

Apparently, these councils constructed a multi-level negotiation between local

representatives (power holders) and the central government, throughout local

councils. The elected and religious leaders as natural members of the General

Council represented the local inhabitants, while the officials, as natural members of

the Council, represented the government. It means theoretically, the central

government could not do anything without the approval of these communities in the

region.


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However, in this context, the new party of the negotiation process is the Great

Powers intervening into the Rumeli affairs of the Ottoman Empire throughout their

constituted legitimacy within international treaties. Especially the Berlin Treaty and

article 23 provided the authority to monitor Rumeli affairs of the Empire. The most

significant legitimizing tool of the Great Powers was the multi-religious and multi-

lingual social structure of the region. It means, there were Christian populations in

the region, and the Great Powers got their protection authority within the

internationally constructed rules of inter-state relations. Together with the provisions

of the Law of Rumeli Provinces, the logical consequence of this situation was the

decentralization of Ottoman Rumeli.

At this point, I want to summarize the basic points of some articles of the draft law,which outline the regions multi-lingual, multi-religious, decentralized social and

administrative structure.

I.1. Legal Status of the People of Rumeli Vilayets

The first chapter of the Law of Rumeli Provinces is entitled Ahali-i Vilayatn

Hukuk-u Umumiyesi, (the general legal status of the people of the vilayets). This

very formalization in the article suggests that a special status was given to the people

of Rumeli, since a vilayet law, and a constitution were already in place since 1864

(?). Moreover, the first article of the Law of Rumeli Provinces, declared that the

people of each Ottoman vilayet had legal status, which was granted by the

constitution (Kanuni Esasi, 1876) and the law of the provinces (vilayetlaw of 1864).

The second article of the layiha (draft), which was accepted, states that all people of

vilayets had equal rights and responsibilities under the law. The third article

guaranteed freedom of worship to all members of all religions, including officially

unrecognized ones, on condition that they did not violate the general customs and

public order. The fourth article guaranteed the personal freedom of all people of the

vilayets.

Articles 5-12 define the procedures for trials in the vilayets. According to these

articles, nobody could be arrested unless there was a call that shows because of

which crime, according to which law, he/she would be arrested, prepared by a judge.


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If someone was caught red-handed, he must be tried in court within 24 hours.

Everyone had the right to be released on bail, and showing a sponsor, except there

was a danger that he/she could escape from the city. Additionally, policemen or

gendarme could not conduct searches on personal properties, unless a judge had

authorized it.

In articles 13 and 14, taxation was limited by considerations of the public interests

and public security as specified by laws. Article 15 guaranteed the right of residence

in all territory of the Empire for all citizens. Article 16 guaranteed immunity of

private property from unlawful intervention by third parties. Confiscation and forced

labor were banned, and limited by public interest (this was an issue well covered by

article 17). Article 18 recognized the freedom of education under the supervision ofgovernment. Similarly, article 19 guaranteed freedom of press, and prohibited

investigation prior to publication.

Article 20 tried to distinguish properties of local and central governments. The

vacant places that belong to the miri would be left to the vilayet (valilik,

governorship, the representative of central administration) according to need, and the

empty spaces in cities and towns would be left to the municipalities.

Article 21 defined some particularities in regions, which were multi-religious and

multi-lingual. Firstly, this article declared that government could employ everybody

without regard to his/her ethnic origin, if there was need. More notably, in areas,

where the majority of population was Muslim, kaymakams (the head officials of

districts) and mutasarrfs (the governors ofsancaks) would be appointed from among

Muslims, while in areas, where the majority were non-Muslims they would be

appointed from among non-Muslims. Finally, persons, who knew the local languages

in addition to Turkish, were preferred for these positions. However, nobody could beappointed mutasarrif or kaymakam in his/her own district or township. Article 22

dictated that the official language was the lisan- Osmani (Ottoman). However,

people, who knew local languages, were preferred for the position of the judge

(hakim) and of the public prosecutor (mdde-i umumi). The mustantiks were

certainly appointed from among the people who knew local languages. The petitions

would be submitted to civil servants or judges, if it was necessary, could be written

in officially recognized languages of the country. The writs, official reports, court


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records etc. were to be written in Turkish and the language that parties preferred.

Court procedures would be carried out in languages preferred by the parties. Laws

and other orders of governor in vilayets would be published both in Turkish and in a

principal language of that vilayet.

According to article 23,only either the government itself or the committees, which

were recognized by the central government, could accept petitions, which were

written by one or more persons, or a congregation. Article 24 declared that the

General Councils would be established in each vilayet. The majority of the members

of the councils would be elected by the people of a given vilayet (this articles details

are in the fourth chapter of the Law of Rumeli Provinces). Article 25 stated that in

vilayets government could use police and regular army to maintain public order andsecurity (It means irregular armies (babozuklar) could not be used, placing certain

restrictions on central government). Similarly, article 26 declares that the Circassian

(erkes) warriors would not be settled in those vilayets.

This chapter of the Law of Rumeli Provinces described the social environment of the

Rumeli vilayets of the Ottoman Empire. The most striking characteristic of the region

was that it was multi-lingual and multi-religious. No doubt, the articles and clauses

making it possible for persons of different religions to hold administrative positions,the religions of administrators were concessions made by government to the non-

Muslims of the region; the usage of local languages was more than a concession, but

also a way of establishing better administration.

It should be kept in mind that the Ottoman government recognized only the Greek

Orthodox Patriarchate and the Bulgarian Exarchate at that time. Thus, this article

meant that only these churches and the languages of these churches are acceptable

officially. It meant that unrecognized churches could not be represented atadministrative levels, such as catholic or protestant missionary churches.

Additionally, it should be noted that Serbia also had territorial demands over

Macedonia and it also tried to Serbianize Macedonia by the use of churches and

schools. However, for the Ottoman administration, the Serbian population did not

have a legal political or religious existence (Lange-Akhund, 1998: 58). After 1890s,

IMRO (Inner Macedonia Revolutionary Organization) would also try to establish an


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autonomous Macedonian Church. Thus, this article limited the number of Christian

communities to officially recognized ones.

I.2. General Councils as Provincial Parliaments

The text of the Law of the Rumeli Provinces makes a distinction between the

authorities of local and central governments, and I believe this is one of its most

significant points. Governors in provinces represented the central government, while

the General Councils took decisions on the domestic issues of the vilayet.

The fourth chapter of the draft established the General Councils for each Rumeli

provinces named Vilayet Meclis-i Umumileri (Provincial General Councils). There

were three kinds of members in these General Councils. Firstly, the appointed

members (aza-y tabii), which are mfts, nakibs, the leaders of non-Muslim

communities, undersecretary of governor, defterdar, the directors of justice,

education, and the public works, and the inspectors of finance and justice. Secondly,

General Councils had elected members (aza-ymntehibe). According to article 69,

each kaza (district) was accepted as a single electoral district out of which two

representatives would be elected to the General Council. Half of the members of the

Council would be subject to by-elections in two years. These members of the

General Councils would receive salaries from the vilayetbudgets. Thirdly, there were

various appointed members of the General Councils (aza-ymensube).The governor

would appoint those members from among the elites of the vilayet: primarily among

the most respected property owners, merchants, and tradesmen; secondarily among

experts of science and education, for four years (Law of Rumeli Provinces, article

72). The number of appointed members would be one out of four of elected members

at most.

The General Council met in the beginning of October each year, for two months. At

the end of two months, or when the topics of discussion were over, the governor

would adjourn the meeting. If there was a need for a longer time (a maximum of 15

days), the governor had to inform the central government. The governor could not

disband the General Council without the approval of the Council of Administration.

Under extraordinary conditions, the governor could decide to dispersal of the

General Council. In this case, the election had to be held within two months. The


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General Council would decide with a simple majority of its members, and the all

votes were equal. According to article 78, no security personnel, except for

policemen, who were appointed for the security of the General Council, could enter

the sessions of the Council.

Articles 82and 83gave an autonomous status to the General Councils. According to

article 82, the General Council had the right to propose laws to the central

government, as to discuss the laws, which were sent by the central government. The

central government had to discuss the drafts sent from General Councils, and if the

central government could not discuss it in 4 months, it would be regarded as enacted

by central government. According to article 83, the governor was responsible not

only to the central government but also to the General Council, in the issues relatedto the budget of vilayet. The governor had to seek the approval of the General

Council, before submitting the provincial budget to central government.

Article 84 made a distinction between the revenues and budgets of central

government and the vilayet. According to this article, the local government did not

have to aid the expenses of the central government related to military affairs.

Reciprocally, the local government did not have to share the revenues of central

governments investments, in postal services, customs, telegraph, the monopoly ofsalt, the license of alcoholic drinks, official seals etc. However, all sources of

revenue of the vilayet,except the central governments investments were included to

vilayetbudget. The 15 percent of these revenues were left to the General Council.

The whole cash of the vilayetwas kept at the local branch of Bank-Osmaniin the

account A. This account was divided into two sub-accounts under the signs of B

and C. The cash in account B was spent for the needs of local administration, and

the C was left to the national treasury. However, the central government (the

Ministry of Finance) had to request to use the account C. In the vilayet, the governor

and the defterdar, in livas the mutasarrf and the accountant, and in sancaks the

kaymakamand the director of public property (mal mdr) were the responsible for

the expenditures. All of them had to report to the General Council in its first session.

Additionally, the expenditures for justice, gendarme and police services belonged to

the General Council.


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If the governor wished to spend more than his allocated budget line, he had to

consult with the General Council. Article 86 stated that the General Council, if it

wanted, could inspect the budgets of the Administration Councils of livas and inform

the governor. According to article 87, if it was necessary, the General Council could

earmark 1 percent of whole revenues of the vilayet for education and public

improvement (in addition to the vilayets portion of 15 per cent). According to article

89, councils of liva, and then the General Councils would solve the conflicts in areas

where the property survey (tahrir) was not completed; if there were a re-arrangement

in taxation, the General Council would inform the central government. Article 91

stated that if the central government wanted to levy new taxes, the General Council

would decide on how they would be collected.

Article 98 provided legal immunity for the members of the General Council, and

article 99 stated that the members of the General Council could submit the

documents about themselves in their own language.

All these articles show that the General Councils were, in fact, local parliaments of

the Rumeli Provinces, since they had the authority to enact laws on their own, and

propose laws in related to the local issues of vilayets- to the central government. All

vilayets had their own budgets. They were able to appoint civil servants.

These articles show that the General Council had complete autonomy on provincial

domestic issues. Moreover, the articles on the relations between governor

representing central government, and the General Council, show that this law defined

the negotiation process between the administrative center of the Empire and the

provinces. Basically, according to the draft law, the governor had to convince the

General Council while conducting his work.

Actually, these general councils can also be seen in the vilayet laws of 1864 (Vilayet

Nizamnamesi) and 1871 (dare-yi Umumiye-yi Vilayet Nizamnamesi). The main

difference of the general councils of the Law of 1880 is that these councils were

authorized in re-organization and implementation of laws of the Ottoman central

government. On the other hand, the definition of the general council in the vilayet

laws of 1864 and 1871 does not include that kind of authority, it had only a kind of

advisory role on the local issues of the vilayet: General council of vilayet discussed

about the issues relating to reparation of the roads and public buildings, and the


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requests of local people about these issues. The council advised to governor about

the taxes that levied on people of vilayet. Then again, general council could not

decide about these issues. Members of general council could only explain their ideas.

However, the realization of these ideas and requests were depended on the policies of

central government. These councils did not have a judicial personality. Their

meetings did not have any practical reason, these meetings were shows (Ortayl ,

2000; 90-91). In the vilayet laws of 1864 and 1871 since general council did not have

any legislative and executive authority, the administrative council had a more central

role in the vilayet administration. It seems the Law of 1880 tried to provide

autonomy throughout strengthening general council as ornamenting it with

legislative and executive authorities, since the council were formed with elected

members, instead of appointed ones as administrative council.

I.3. Election Procedure

The election procedure, which was defined in the text of the law, gave substance to

the General Councils. According to the procedure, every religious and lingual

community had equal rights to send representative to the Councils.

The rules of the election were arranged in chapter 12. The first subtitle of this chapter

is about voter lists. Accordingly, to be eligible, a candidate had to be an Ottoman

citizen, and at least 21 years of age. He had to be a regular taxpayer. A conviction for

murder would make him ineligible. Eligibility would be limited to property owners,

merchants, craftsmen and their sons. Ulema (scholars), priests, members of the

clergy, teachers, doctors, judges, officials, and people who were educated at the

Darlfnunor a foreign university and received a diploma, were exempted from the

precondition of taxpaying and property ownership. Soldiers, gendarmes and

policemen were ineligible during their term of office. Additionally, the law brought

forth the literacy requirement, which would be valid after 15 years from the

enactment of the law.

Councils of Elders (ihtiyarheyetleri) would prepare the voter lists to be re-arranged

every September. These had to be displayed in a public place. The objections to the

lists had to be submitted to the ihtiyar heyeti within 15 days. The Community


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Councils and the Councils of Elders were elected every year, and members could be

reelected.

After these general conditions, the law puts forth the rules of nahiyeelections. The

candidates of theNahiyeCouncils had to pay a minimum of 50 kuruin taxes and toreside at that nahiye. Ineligible people included those who were not subject to civil

law (in its entirety or partially), convicted of murder or ordinary crimes, or servicing

a foreign country and had applied for citizenship of a foreign country.

Then the law arranged the elections in kazas. Article 199 stated that the candidates of

kaza councils should pay at least 100 kuru (in addition to other conditions as

specified for nahiye elections). The nahiye councils would elect them for 2 years.

According to article 208, candidates for livacouncils should pay at least 150 kuruoftax. The members of nahiyecouncils would elect them. Each livawould send two

members to the General Council elected from among its own members.

Roles of the nahiye, kaza andsancak administrative councils were very important in

the administrative scheme of the provinces, because of the multiple-level election

process, which was defined by the draft law. Then, these councils structures

determined the structure of the General Councils. These local councils were to be

formed basically by the officials of central government and the representatives of the

local population. For instance, according to article 114, every liva has its own

administrative council, and the work of these councils were basically discussing and

deciding the mutasarrfs activities and the disagreements between the local people

and the officials. These councils were composed of the mutasarrf, his assistant, and

the accountant of liva, mft, the leaders of the non-Muslim communities, and the 6

elected members from the administrative councils of kazas. Similarly, every kaza had

its own administrative council, which was formed in the same way: The electedmembers of a given kazasent by the administrative councils of nahiyes depended on

the kaza.

Since religious leaders were the natural members of the local administrative councils,

one could claim that the multi-lingual and multi-religious structure of the provinces

was reflected in the councils by this election procedure.


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I.4. The Status of Governors and Other Officials of the Central Government

The second chapter of the Law of Rumeli Provinces was on governors (Valilere

Dair). Article 27 (the first article of this section) stated that the governors were the

chief administrative officials appointed for 5 years as Sultans deputy in the vilayets.Article 28 pointed that these governors were only responsible to the central

government in issues related to their mission.

Article 30 arranged the extraordinary situations: According to this article, the

governor could declare idare-i rfiye (state of emergency) in one or more districts

in his region. State of Emergency could be declared if the population disobeyed a law

or order, causing civil strife that could not be suppressed by regular means. The

governor had to send a written decree together with the reasons for declaring theState of Emergency immediately to the central government. Once the reasons for

declaration were over, the State of Emergency had to be abolished.

Articles 31and 32 highlighted the authority of the governor as the chief of the local

officials: Governors would oversee the application of laws and orders. They would

supervise the officials, which were either popularly elected or appointed by

governors. Governors could not create new official posts unless specified by laws.

All officials without exception were under the governors command. The

gendarmeries and the policemen of the vilayets were as well under the command of

governors.

Article 33 stated that the governor would call for election for the Provincial General

Councils, Councils of Administration, Municipality Councils and NahiyeCouncils.

Then the governor would call General Councils for meeting, and report to the

Council on his responsibility areas and activities, and adjourn the sessions.

However, according to article 34 governors were responsible also to the General

Council on provincial income and budget any issues. In addition, according to article

43, the authority of the governor to spend money from his budget was limited by the

determination of the General Council; the governor could use unallocated monies

only under extraordinary conditions to keep general security in a given province after

he convinced the General Council and the central government.


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The governor would manage the province together with the provincial

Administrative Council. The Administrative Council consisted of both

representatives of local inhabitants and central government. The third chapter of the

draft law, which arranged the central administration of vilayets, determined the

structure the Administrative Councils. According to the chapter, the erkan-vilayet

(Administrative Council) of the vilayetincluded mstear(undersecretary), defterdar

(the head of the financial department), adliye mdr (the director of justice),

mektupu (secretary), the directors of agriculture, commerce and the public works,

zaptiye alay beyi (the commander of security troops), mft (the leader of the

Muslim community), the leaders of the non-Muslim communities, and the 8

representatives of the General Council.

The Administrative Council could not intervene with the Governors daily work.

However, if the Governor seeks their opinion the Council could state its own take on

the issues. Additionally, the Governor had to confer with the Administrative Council

in the emergency issues not mentioned in the laws. The Administrative Council

could also discuss the Governors precautionary measures. In those cases the

governor had to inform the central government, as well. If the situation was too

critical to wait for the answer of the central government, the governor could take

precautionary measures by taking full personal responsibility. Article 53 stated that if

the central government did not answer the governors question in three months, it

meant that the application was accepted.

Following that point the draft law started to define members of the Administrative

Council in terms of their authority and responsibility.Mstear(undersecretary) was

similar to a deputy-governor. In ordinary periods, he would carry on the relationship

with the religious communities and would manage their issues. Thus, if the governor

was Muslim, he should be non-Muslim or vice-versa. Additionally, he was

responsible for collecting and keeping the statistical data on the population of the

vilayet.

Defterdar(the head of financial office) was in charge of the financial issues of the

vilayet, such as taxes and other financial claims of the central government, public

revenues, and the preparation of the budget of vilayet. He was responsible both to the

governor and the Ministry of Finance in the central government.


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Adliye Mdr (Director of Justice) was basically an intermediate person between

the laws and the local councils. He would declare the central administrations laws

and orders to the local appliers.

Mektupu(a secretary of sorts) was in charge of the written documents of the centraladministration of vilayet. Directors of agriculture, commerce, and the public

improvement simply would manage these sectors according to the directives of the

central government in line with the public interest.

Similarly, Maarif Mdr (the director of education) was responsible for the

education issues. In the section on the directors of general education, it seems the

most important item was article 63. According to this article, the revenues of the

religion-based community vakfs were allocated to these communities schools.These communities under the supervision of the director of education spent these

revenues.

Chapter 16 was on the civil servants of the vilayets. According to the general

principles of this chapter, every civil servant was responsible to the central

government in all their activities. If the citizens were to sue the civil servants, and if

the courts decide there was a misuse by them; the civil servants would compensate

the damages done by their acts. If he could not provide compensation, the citizen

could seek compensation from the government. In this case, the government would

pay only the material damages. According to article 292 the directors of the vilayets

could be elected from among the members of General Councils.

The situation of the governor seems very conflicted, since he was an in-between

situation with General Council and the central government. He was similar to an

appointed prime minister to a mostly elected local parliament. Because of his doubly

representative role, he had to convince both central government and General Council.

From the central governments point of view, he represented the local parliaments

demand. On the other hand he was the representative of the central government in the

province, which had even its own parliament. From this perspective he could be seen

as a colonial governor of sorts.


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I.5. Religious Communities and Education

Chapter 8 established the Community Councils. Article 141 establishes at each kaza,

Community Councils made up of each religious community (Muslim and non-

Muslim). The members of these Councils were elected from among the members ofthe communities. The trustees of the vakfs (which are founded by the communities)

could not become members of the Councils. The job of the Councils was basically

organizing the spending of the revenues of vakfs according to the communitys

needs. Although there was no limit for the community needs or services, the law

refers only the fields of schools, places of worship, funerals and charity functions.

The reference of the Community Councils was primarily the local administrative

councils, secondly the General Councils, and in the field of education theEducational Councils. In addition, the primary schools and the junior high schools

(rdiye) were under the authority of the respective religious communities. In

addition, the incomes of these schools ware left to these communities (article 266,

chapter 14).

Chapter 15 also organized the rights and responsibilities of religious communities. It

concerns the sects (mezahib). According to this chapter every religious community

had equal guarantees, immunities and privileges. Every officially recognizedreligious community could elect its own leaders and nobody could intervene with the

relationships between these communities and people. Every priest kept all his rights

while he traveled to Rumelis other vilayets. In addition, their rights were valid in all

Ottoman lands as well.

The property rights were respected for every officially recognized sect. These

properties could only be expropriated if there was a certain public benefit involved.

The residences of the clergy members (regardless of their position), and the buildingsused for charity were exempted from all taxes. These religious communities had to

provide for the needs of their own schools and temples. The places and the

investments of the religious communities, which were not used for educational,

religious or charity purposes, were subject of taxes like ordinary places and

investments.

Chapter 14 organized the educational system in Rumeli. According to article 265, all

schools of vilayet were subject to centrally instituted laws, implementation of which


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was under the supervision of the vilayet director of education. The share of the

community schools in the budget was proportional to their original contribution into

the budget of vilayet. However, the primary schools and the junior high schools

(rdiye) were under the control of respective religious communities. As well the

incomes of these schools were left to these communities.

Article 267 organized the foundation of universities in vilayets. According to the

article, while the governor elected the teachers of the university, he had to consider

the proportions of religious communities in vilayet. In addition, although the official

medium of instruction of the universities was Ottoman, education could also be

carried out in different languages. According to article 268 every religious

community had the right to establish schools. Article 269 stated that every child of 6-13 years old either had to go to school, or go through home schooling. No child had

to learn the religion beyond his/her own. The inspectors of education were also being

appointed among the religious community, which was the founder of the school.

Primary schools students were educated in only their mother tongue.

The problem of education and churches had always been important in the

relationships between the Christian population of Rumeli and the Ottoman Empire.

These articles importance is based on one of the main problems (the problem ofschools and churches- Mektepler ve Kiliseler Meselesi) of the years following the

revolution in 1908. In fact, all churches of Rumeli were dependent on the

Patriarchate. When the Bulgarian Exarchate split away from the Patriarchate, many

of the churches of the Slavic communities preferred to be dependent on the Bulgarian

church. Churches were the main contested area of the Bulgarian and Greek

nationalisms in this period. Following 1908 revolution, the CUP government formed

a commission within Bulgarian and Greek communities to solve the problems

between these two churches. Then, the government decided that the majority of the

population had the right to establish church in a given town or village. The

Patriarchate resisted this decision. Then, the government decided that Bulgarian

Exarchate could found churches only those places the Bulgarian population had a 2/3

majority. Besides, government would found the church and school for people who

were not members to either church. (Selahaddin, 1914: 69-70). It seems there was no

way to satisfy those two churches, because of their competition over the Balkan


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people. Churches were the most important spaces of propaganda for Bulgarian and

Greek nationalisms over Rumeli together with schools.

At this point, I would like to remember the special status of Orthodox Church in

Ottoman Empire, because this special status gave opportunity to Greek subjects ofthe Empire awaring their national identity earlier than other ethnies7 of the

Balkans.

By making all Romans (formerly Orthodox subjects of the Byzantine Empire)members of the Ottoman Rum millet, the Ottomans officially sanctioned the ChurchsOrthodox universalism, thus facilitating the legitimation of Grecophone ecclesiasticalelites over the Balkan ethnies. Additionally, after 1453, the Church assumed

jurisdiction over the civil affairs of the Orthodox communities (Roudometof,1998; 18)

This special status provided a great opportunity to the church to constitute itshegemony all peoples of the Balkans. First of all the Greek Patriarchate was an

Ottoman institution derived from its Byzantine counterpart. Moreover, Roudometof

mentions that the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul gave a very important ideological

service to Ottoman Empire, especially in the era that liberal and nationalistic ideas

was raising. The Patriarchate of Istanbul did not support the Greek national

revolution, because of its secular position. Istanbul Patriarchate had always worked

together with Ottoman Sultan (Macar, 2003; 45). In 1833, the Greek Patriarchate had

been founded. However, the Istanbul Patriarchate would regard it 17 years later. The

conflict between ecumenical Patriarchate of Istanbul and national church of

Greece did not end (Macar, 2003: 47). After Greek historiography re-invented

Byzantium Empire as historical root of Greek nation, the problems between these

two churches were softened. On the other hand, after Greek Revolution of 1821, the

power of Greeks in Istanbul reduced. Ottoman administration did not give them

important posts in state administration, and preferred Armenian and Muslim people

(Macar, 2003: 47)

Even though, the hegemony of the Istanbul Patriarchate in the Balkans was also

strengthened by the Ottoman administration to establish its supremacy over

7It is very hard to use the term nation for these groups in the Balkans, especially in this period.Roudometof uses the term etnie for these distinct groups of the Balkans: Contrary to modernsecular nations, characterized as they are by a mass public culture, common economy, and the legalrights and duties of their members, ethnies are predominately premodern social formations.Membership in an ethnie does not necessarily lead to attributing political significance to ethnic

differences. I would like to suggest that Greeks, Albanians, Bulgarians, Serbs, and Romanians wereethnies in the Ottoman Balkans, and were clearly aware of their differences (Roudometof, 1998; 12).


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Bulgarian or Serbian churches in the Balkans (Lange-Akhund, 1998: 26) in the

second half of the 18thcentury:

In 1766 and 1767, Patriarch Samuel, citing huge deficits as his reasons and theinvolvement of the local pashas in the election of archbishops, reluctantly subsumed the

autocephalous archbishops of Pec and Ohrid under the ecumenical seat. Thisexpansion of the Patriarchates authority has been interpreted as proof of Greek

domination over other Balkan peoples(Roudometof, 1998; 19-20).

Since, the role of Greeks changed in the 18thcentury, when Balkan ethniesbecame

aware about their national identities and claim national independence from the

Ottoman administration, they also wanted to found their national churches as

breaking away from the Istanbul Patriarchate.

The reception of Enlightenment into Orthodox Balkan society led to a growing trendtoward secularization and critical thinking The central place of ancient Greecewithin the Western Enlightenment led to a reconstitution of the relationship betweenmodern Greeks (Greek-Orthodox) and ancient Greeks (Hellenes) (Roudometof,1998: 32).

With these developments, the Greek identity started to be independent from

Orthodox Church and secularized itself. Thus it can be said that, Orthodox

Patriarchate of Istanbul (Byzantine legacy) lost its power, together with Ottoman

Empire:

modern concepts of secular statehood and nationality associated with the ideas of

the Enlightenment and Western rationalism came to disrupt and subvert both Ottomanrule and Orthodox unity in the Balkans. The eventual conflicting nationalisms which

sprang out of this ideological transformation were the forces that brought the hared

Byzantine legacy to an end in Balkan Society(Kitromilides, 1989; 152).

Naturally, the Istanbul Patriarchate resisted to this ideological transformation that

Kitromilides mentioned above (Kitromilides, 1989; 159). Hence, in the 19 thcentury

and more than ever after the Tanzimatreforms, the relationship between Patriarchate,

Ottoman administration and the Christian populations became very problematic,

because of the rise of the separatist Bulgarian and Romanian clergies. In fact, for

Bulgarians liberating themselves from the Ottoman Empire and liberating their

church from the Greek Patriarchate was the same. In 1870, the Ottoman Empire

allowed the formation of the Bulgarian Exarchate. It was the official beginning of the

competition between two churches. This struggle was also linked to the organization

of schools and to education, which was under the authority of the churches (Lange-

Akhund, 30).


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On the other hand, because of the Greek initiative on the traditional Orthodox

Patriarchate of Istanbul, the relationship between Greek nation and the Istanbul

Patriarchate was the most problematic one among other Balkan nations.

The proclamation of the independence of the Church of Greece from the Patriarchateof Constantinople was urged in the very first year of the War of Independence Theindependence of the Church of Greece, which according to Orthodox canon law couldonly be granted by the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople, was proclaimedunilaterally by a local synod of Greek bishops in 1833 at the initiative of the Bavarianregency. This move was never recognized by the Patriarchate in 1850, with theeventual total conversion of the Church of Greece to the secular values of Greeknationalism and its transformation into an official arm of the civil state, to the pointthat the Church of Greece spearheaded all nationalist initiatives in the latter part of the

nineteenth and throughout the twentieth century (Kitromilides, 1989; 165-166).

Greek Church and the schools that were founded as dependent to the Church became

the main tools of the Hellenization of Orthodox population. This method would be

followed by also Bulgarian and Serb nationalists in the Balkans. At the end, the

issues about the schools and churches would continue and became one of the reasons

of the Balkan Wars.

I.6. Courts

According to the draft law, every nahiyehad a court of peace (Sulhmahkemesi). The

governor would appoint the head of the court, and the head of the court had twoassistants (one Muslim and one non-Muslim) elected by the nahiye council. The

courts of livawere arranged with articles 219-228. In every liva there should be a

judge, an interrogator judge, and two assistants. The governor would appoint the

judge for this court. In every livacourt, there should be an attorney general and few

interrogators.

With articles 229-237, the draft arranged the vilayetcourts of appeal. Every vilayet

had a judge, two advisors, and two assistants (one Muslim, one non-Muslim). Thecentral government would appoint the head of the court of appeal and advisors, while

the General Council would elect assistants (one Muslim, one non-Muslim) and

Ministry of Justice would appoint them. In every court of appeal there should be an

attorney general (basavc), and few interrogators.

The courts of livawould hold the appeal cases, which were sent by lower courts, and

the personal, legal, and commercial cases involving assets worth up to 5000 kuru. In

murder cases and cases involving assets worth more than 5000 kuru, the appeal


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right was reserved. The appeals of the livacourts were hold in Istanbul. The appeal

courts of vilayetwould hold the appeals from livacourts and the murder cases. This

courts appeals could be hold only in Istanbul.

In the chapter titled Mevaid-i Mahsusa (The Special Conditions), the draft lawstated some details on the courts. According to article 243, contracts and the

privileges of the foreigners were reserved. The judge of appeal and the attorney

general should hold a diploma from Darlfnunor should have served as judge or

attorney general in Istanbul for a minimum of 5 successive years. The trials were

open to the public, if there was no need for closed meetings. Article 247 stated that

the testimonies of non-Muslims and Muslims were considered equal. Article 248

guaranteed the independence of courts; no civil servant could intervene to the courts.Additionally, article 251 stated that neither heads of courts nor the advisors of the

courts of appeal were dismissible. According to article 252 the authorities of the

justice and administration were certainly separated. The Nizamiye Courts could

accept direct petitions. The civil servants and the gendarmes had to help to the courts

to their decisions.

I.7. Security

Chapter 17 is on the gendarmerie and the police force. According to the chapter, in

cities and villages, primarily the gendarmerie, secondarily the police force was

responsible for public security. They were under the supervision of vilayet. The

vilayet kol aas (Director of Security) had the authority to appoint police officers,

but on the issues of public order, he was under the supervision of the Ministry of

Military Affairs. The gendarmerie was financed from the vilayetbudget (from out of

the A account of vilayet). Muslims and non-Muslims should be chosen for the

security offices in proportion to their population in the vilayets. The salaries of the

security personnel of the vilayet would not be less than the salaries of the central

army members. Article 310 stated that the foreigner (European) officers could be

employed in gendarmerie troops. Following that the draft detailed the responsibilities

of security troops and the hierarchy in these troops.

The law ended with the chapter entitled Fasl- Mahsus (the Special Chapter).

Article 327 stated that all laws, which were not comfortable with this law, would be


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dismissed.

In summary, the concluding paragraph of the chapter says:

We, the members of the European Commission on Eastern Rumeli approved and

sealed this draft which was proposed to fulfill the requirements of article 23 of the

Treaty of Berlin on July 13th, 1878. This draft law sent by Bab- Ali consists of

administrative details of the Ottoman provinces of Rumeli8.

8 Babali 13 Temmuz sene 78 tarihinde Berlin'de akdolunan muahedenamenin yirmi nc bendi ahkamnicraen muahedename-i mezkurede kendileri

iin tekilat-mahsusa tasrih klnlan Rumeli'deki vilayat-ahaneye idhal klnacak nizamat hakknda Rumeli-i arki-i Avrupa komisyonunun rey ve

mutalaasnistifsar etmiolmakla muahedename-i mezkuri imzalayan devletlerin komiserleri bulunan muharririn imza ibu nizamname layihasnn canib-i

Babaliden tarafmza tebliklnan layiha zerine icra ettikleri tetkikatn neticesi ettiini beyan ederek tasdiken lil-mekal ibu nizamname layihasnimza ve

armalmhrlerimizle temhir eyledik.. The following have signed this draft on 23 August 1880, in Istanbul: Asm (Hariciye NazrThe Minister of

External Affairs- Asm Paa), Sahak Abro Efendi (ura-yDevlet Azas-The Member of ura-yDevlet), Msy Kuan from Austria, Broneoyan from

Germany, Obara from France, Fiy Moris from Great Britain, Vernoni from Italy, and Hitrov from Russia.


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Chapter II

The Resistance of the Ottoman Administration to Reforms, and the Restoration

of the Law of Rumeli Provinces in 1912

In this chapter, I will try to explain the opposition of the Ottoman bureaucracy to the

law and the changes made in the draft law of 1880 to avoid the coming war in 1912.

The simple evidence for the fact that the Ottoman bureaucracy rejected these reforms

in Rumeli is that the law was never implemented. The central government attempted

to manipulate the text to suit its own purposes. Ahmed Selahaddin summarizes how

that manipulation took place:

In the light of the contents of article 23 of the Berlin Treaty, these reforms wereaccepted in 1880. However, it was not implemented as it was declared in the Treaty.

Despite reassurance that the reforms would be discussed in specially constructed localcommissions, in which local people would be fully represented, and presented to theBabalias separate nizamnames, Babaliset up councils with its own officials, whichwere responsible for gathering information about local needs in the provinces. On thebasis of the information gathered by councils, Babali then collected the information

from these councils and prepared the draft law, in Istanbul. Finally, the preliminarydraft had been approved by a special commission, which consisted of two membersrepresenting the Ottoman government and the representatives of Great Powers, on 23

August 1880.(Selahaddin, 1914: 204-205).

Petitions from the Bulgarian inhabitants of Rumeli show how the Ottoman central

government formed the local commissions and how the local inhabitants resistedcentral governments manipulation.

One petition, which was signed by the municipalities of Monastir (Bitolya), Prilep,

Ohrid, Veles and Lerin and sent to the European Commission in Istanbul, on 5th

April 1880, claimed that local people were not represented in the local commissions,

which were formed in order to discuss the content of the reform package. The

Petition reads as follows:

The