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China’s New Approaches to the Taiwan Issue 513

American Foreign Policy Interests

American Foreign Policy Interests, 25: 513–525, 2003Copyright © 2003 NCAFP1080-3920/03 $12.00 + .08DOI:10.1080/10803920390267857

Adjustments in China’sTaiwan Policy in Recent Years

In recent years, while adhering to the basicprinciples of “peaceful reunification” and “onecountry, two systems” and to the eight-point pro-posal on developing Cross-Strait relations andadvancing the process of peaceful national reuni-fication at the present stage, the Chinese govern-ment has made some important adjustments inand supplements to its policy toward Taiwan ac-cording to the changing situation, which can beseen clearly in Jiang Zemin’s report to the 16thNational Congress of the Chinese Communistparty (CCP) and other Chinese leaders’ remarksabout Taiwan on various occasions. They havealso been reflected in Beijing’s positions and prac-tices toward Taiwan since late 2000. Theseadjustments include

1. Giving the one-China principle anew explanation: “There is but oneChina in the world, and both themainland and Taiwan belong to oneChina. China’s sovereignty and ter-ritorial integrity brook no divi-sion.”1 This new expression meansthat China is the “common home-land of compatriots on both sides.”2

It is very close to the expression inthe official documents of Taipei,including “ROC ConstitutionAmendments,”3 “The RegulationsRegarding the Relationship ofPeoples of the Two Sides Across the

Strait,”4 and “The Outline of Na-tional Unification.”5 The new expla-nation provides more room forreconciliation on the key issue ofdisputes between the two sides.

2. Stressing again and again that allissues can be discussed under thepremise of the one-China principleand specifying what can be dis-cussed, including how to end for-mally Cross-Strait hostility, theinternational space problem, the po-litical status of the Taiwan authori-ties, and so on.6 All those issues,which are very much of concern tothe people of Taiwan, can behandled appropriately throughequal and pragmatic consultationunder the one-China principle.

3. Indicating that under the “one-country, two-systems” framework,the Taiwan people “may keep [their]existing social system unchanged,enjoying a high degree of au-tonomy” after reunification, and“may join the people on the main-land in exercising the right to ad-minister the country and sharingthe dignity and honor of the greatmotherland in the internationalcommunity.”7 It seems that this ex-pression contains a new idea; thatis, China’s sovereignty brooks nodivision but can be jointly shared bythe people of the two sides after re-

China’s New Approaches toa Peaceful Solution of the Taiwan IssueChen Qimao

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unification. Jurisdictional poweris affiliated with sovereignty. Itcannot be separated but can be au-thorized to Taiwan under the one-country, two-systems framework. Itis a very important idea and needsfurther development.

4. Differentiating economic issuesfrom political issues and suggestingthat the two sides first solve eco-nomic issues such as the “threedirect links” problem while shelv-ing their political disputes. FormerVice Premier Qian Qichen hasmade clear that the direct shippingand air service is an economic prob-lem that can be solved apart frompolitical disputes; that Beijingdoesn’t demand the recognition ofthe one-China principle as a pre-mise for the solution of this prob-lem. Furthermore, Beijing agreesto define the air and shipping ser-vice as a “Cross-Strait” air-routeand shipping course.8 Qian alsostressed many times that theproblem can be settled through dia-logue between the relevant tradeassociations of the two sides (ofcourse, they will be authorized bythe governments).

5. While stressing that Beijing hasinvested hope in the people in Tai-wan for the settlement of the Tai-wan question and the completion ofthe reunification of the motherland,it has left the door open for theDemocratic Progressive party(DPP) and DPP authorities. QianQichen has appealed to the DPP togive up its Taiwan independenceplatform and to change its positiontoward the mainland. He declaredthat Beijing will distinguish themajority of DPP members from a

few stubborn separatists and wel-come them to visit the mainland intheir proper capacities.9 Beijing hasappealed again and again to the Tai-wan authorities to accept the 1992consensus in order to resume theCross-Strait dialogue and take prac-tical steps to settle the three directlinks problem.

6. Explicitly showing its support forthe Taiwan people’s desire to be themaster of their own lives and ex-pressing deep concern overTaiwan’s suffering from the eco-nomic recession and natural disas-ters of recent years, the mainlandhas indicated that it is willing toconsult with people in all walks oflife in Taiwan in order to establishthe Cross-Strait economic coopera-tive mechanism that will helpTaiwan to resume its economicprosperity and to promote the eco-nomic relationship between the twosides.10

7. Further showing its willingness anddetermination to solve the Taiwanissue peacefully. In the report to the16th National Congress of the CCP,Jiang Zemin underscored that “the23 million Taiwan compatriots areour brothers and sisters of the sameblood. No one is more eager than weare to resolve the Taiwan questionthrough peaceful means.” He added,“We will work in utmost sincerityand do all we can to strive for apeaceful reunification.”11 It is clearthat reserving the right of usingforce on the Taiwan issue is notmeant to coerce, to frighten, or tothreaten the Taiwan people but asthe last resort to check Taiwan in-dependence and to safeguardChina’s sovereignty and territorial



integrity.

All these adjustments, albeit with no shiftsin or revisions of China’s basic principles concern-ing the Taiwan issue, are important and signifi-cant and deserve much attention.

The Background andCauses of the Adjustments

The adjustments are not accidental; they stemfrom a broad background and deep causes. First,since late 2000, the Cross-Strait situation hasundergone significant changes, and some positivetrends favorable to a peaceful solution of the Tai-wan issue have developed. These include

1. The balance of power between thetwo sides is further developing infavor of the mainland. In the pasttwo decades and in the first twoyears of the new century, the main-land has achieved great reforms,opening to the outside world andimplementing its modernizationprogram, whereas Taiwan has suf-fered from economic recession andpolitical confusion. These develop-ments have further changed thebalance of power between the twosides. For instance, a comparison ofthe two sides’ gross domestic prod-uct (GDP) in 1990 shows that themainland only exceeded Taiwan by$250 billion; in 2002, the gap was$914 billion. In 1990, the amountof Taiwan’s foreign trade exceededthat of the mainland; in 2002, theamount of the mainland’s foreigntrade exceeded that of Taiwan bymore than $326 billion. In 1990, themainland had only a small foreigncurrency reserve; by 2002, it had aforeign currency reserve of morethan $286 billion, far exceeding

Taiwan’s reserve of $161 billion (alldollars U.S.).12

2. The economic integration of the twosides has accelerated significantly inrecent years. According to the as-sessment of many powerful eco-nomic and financial institutions,Taiwan’s investment on the main-land has reached $80–$100 billion.13

More important, the investment hasincreased not only in quantity butalso in quality. Because Taiwan’straditional industry flowed to themainland in the 1990s, Taiwan’shigh-technology industry followedsuit; the Yangtze Delta, with Shang-hai as its center, has becomeTaiwan’s investors’ favorite afterGuangdong and Fujian. And since2001, the mainland, instead of theUnited States, has become Taiwan’sbiggest market. The Taiwanpeople’s appeal to solve the threedirect links problem is becominglouder and louder. What is notewor-thy is that all these developmentsoccurred after the proindependenceDPP assumed power in Taiwan.This fact indicates that the integra-tion is driven by the demands of theeconomy and that the strength ofeconomic rule, much stronger thansome people’s political will, actuallyis irresistible.

3. Some significant shift in the think-ing of the Taiwan people in favor ofpeaceful reunification also can beseen in recent years. More andmore, the people of Taiwan preferto work, study, and live on the main-land. According to recent reports,right now there are one million Tai-wan people who work, study, andlive on the mainland; among them,

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about 500,000 are living in theShanghai area (the Yangtze Delta),and about 80,000 have purchasedhouses in Shanghai.14 A recent pollin Taiwan shows that 70 percent ofuniversity students are willing toseek jobs on the mainland aftergraduation.15 The political thinkingof the Taiwan people has alsochanged gradually but significantly.According to polls sponsored byvarious news media and institutionsin Taiwan in 2001 and 2002, al-though the majority of the Taiwanpeople (more than 80 percent) stillprefer to maintain the status quo,the percentage of people who saidthey could accept the one-country,two-systems principle as a possibleformula for future reunification var-ied from 10 to 30 percent in recentyears.16 Although those figures arenot accurate and stable in compari-son with the 1995–1996 figure of3–4 percent who said they couldaccept the one-country, two-systemsprinciple, it is a big increase.

All of these indications make Beijing moreconfident and inclined to believe that time is onits side. If only the mainland can keep pace withtime in its economic and political reform and itsmodernization program, Taiwan will not go away,and the possibility of peaceful reunification willincrease further.

Second, in the past 10 years, Chinese leadershave been more aware of Taiwan’s situation, in-cluding the Taiwan people’s expressed thinkingand desires; Taiwan’s “democratic politics”; itselections and its politicians’ popularity; Taiwan’seconomy and its superiority and weaknesses andclose connections with the mainland’s economy.Through practices and reviews, they have cometo know that the difficulties in peaceful reunifi-cation at present are not just challenges posed bya few die-hard separatists or the proindependence

DPP and Chen Shui-bian but by the majority ofthe Taiwan people, who prefer to maintain thestatus quo. Most Taiwan people who stronglydesire peace, stability, and development do notnecessarily stand for Taiwan independence, butat present they also do not support reunification.Many people want to wait and see in the comingdecades what will happen on the mainland, whatwill happen in the Cross-Strait relationship, andhow the mainland will treat Taiwan—and theyprefer to exercise their options in the future.

By summarizing experiences and lessons, theleaders in Beijing seem to have reached consen-sus on several points.

1. Although the Taiwan question mustnot be allowed to drag on indefi-nitely, trying to solve it in a hurrywould be harmful, as suggested inan old Chinese saying: ”More haste,less speed.”

2. Although reserving the right to useforce to check Taiwan separatistactivities is still necessary, coercionor the threat to force Taiwan to ac-cept reunification is not workableand would always be counterpro-ductive.

3. For a peaceful solution of the Tai-wan question and the realization ofthe complete reunification of China,the most important thing is to winthe hearts and minds of the Taiwanpeople. Only if the majority of theTaiwan people change their mindsand accept the one-country, two-systems principle will peaceful re-unification come. Hence all policiesconcerning Taiwan should be favor-able to winning the hearts of thepeople of Taiwan.

4. Although conditions for the solutionof political disputes between the twosides are not mature, conditions for



further economic cooperation, aswell as a solution of the three di-rect links problem, have becomeripe. It is wiser to put the economyahead of politics and to break thestalemate of Cross-Strait relationsthrough the solution of the threedirect links problem.

5. The Cross-Strait relationship isclosely related to Taiwan’s internalpolitics. Although facts have provedthat intervening in Taiwan’s inter-nal politics is counterproductive, itis still important for Beijing to studyTaiwan’s political systems, laws,elections, and the rules of politicalgames carefully so as not to repeatmistakes and to do something posi-tive for the improvement of theCross-Strait relationship.

The consensus indicates that through prac-tice, review, and study, the Chinese leaders havebeen getting more pragmatic and realistic in thehandling of the Taiwan issue.

Last but not least, in the coming two decadesChina will focus on the historical mission, as-signed by the 16th Party Congress and the 10thNational People’s Congress, of building a well-off society in an all-around way. This is an ar-duous and great task, including the objective ofquadrupling the GDP of 2000 by 2020, in-creasing China’s overall national strength andinternational competitiveness, achieving indus-trialization, establishing a full-fledged socialistmarket economy and a more open economic sys-tem, narrowing the gap between urban and ruralareas and between eastern and western regionsstep by step, raising the living standard of peoplegradually but significantly, further promotingdemocracy, and improving the legal system.

For China, this is not only a great, encourag-ing objective; it also is an urgent task that mustbe achieved in the coming two decades. Just assome senior American China experts pointed out,

“Although China has produced record growth overthe past two decades, it faces perplexing economicproblems and deep wells of popular discontent,”17

including quite a few noneffective state-ownedenterprises; a rising unemployment rate; a frag-ile banking system with a large number ofnonperforming loans; a widening income gap be-tween urban and rural areas, between the eastand west regions and between the white-collarand blue-collar stratum; an incomplete social se-curity system; people’s discontents with bureau-cracy and corruption; frequent popular protests;and so on. The recent SARS crisis showed theunity and cohesiveness of the Chinese people andthe effectiveness of the Chinese government, butit also exposed the vulnerability of China’s pub-lic health system and an ecological problem. Allof these problems are unavoidable in a develop-ing country with a large population of 1.3 billionin a transitional period of development. Theyshould be addressed with great efforts, however,in a certain period of time. Furthermore, Chinanow lives in a period that has experienced a revo-lution in new technology. Science and technologyare advancing rapidly, and competition in overallnational strength is becoming increasingly fierce.Hence right now for the CCP, for China’s social-ist system, as well as for the whole Chinese na-tion, the central problem is to move forward orfall behind, develop further or collapse, achievefinal success or deal with failure.

China also regards the first two decades ofthe twenty-first century as an important periodof strategic opportunities18 that offers bright pros-pects that must be seized in order to build a well-off society in an all-around way. As known to all,China attaches much importance to the completereunification of the country, which it puts as oneof the three important missions of the new cen-tury. But in comparison with the buildup of thewell-off society, the reunification problem is thesecond in importance. It is clear that in the com-ing decades, the new Chinese leadership, beingmainly engaged in the arduous task of building awell-off society, will carefully and skillfully man-age the Taiwan issue, doing whatever it can to

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control the issue and not let it ruin its strategicopportunity. Obviously, if China seizes the oppor-tunity and achieves the goal of building a well-offsociety in the coming decades, the mainland willdefinitely be more attractive to the Taiwan people,thus providing more of a material basis for peace-ful reunification. On the contrary, if the main-land fails to fulfill the mission, the future of Chinawill be dim, and the reunification will be furtherpostponed.

The Nature of the Adjustments:New Approaches—Strategic, Not Tactical

So far those adjustments have not drawnenough attention either from Western experts orfrom experts in Taiwan. Some of them have no-ticed the changes in China’s policy, but theyregard those changes as minor tactical adjustmentsor some procedural and technical changes. Most ofthem underestimate the significance of the adjust-ments, not to mention the hawks’ intentional de-nial of them for their own political purposes.

By carefully studying the contents, causes,and background, we can clearly see that the ad-justments indicate China’s new approaches to apeaceful solution of the Taiwan issue. These newapproaches are strategic, not tactical; sincere, nottricky. They will be carried out for a long time,not temporarily. They mark the Chineseleadership’s new thinking on the Taiwan issue,reflecting its pragmatism and ability to keep pacewith the time.

On the other side, however, attention shouldbe paid to the fact that the Taiwan question isvery complicated and difficult owing to variousinternal and international factors, and that theapproaches cannot be undertaken once and forall but require a process. Some problems are un-der further study; some are controversial andneed time to form a consensus. Problems regard-ing final reunification—including the form anddesign of a unified China, Taiwan’s political sta-

tus after reunification, and how Taiwan is to sharethe unified country’s dignity and honor in theinternational community—can be further stud-ied and explored in the future, for they are noturgent and mature enough to be solved at thepresent stage.

Some people hold that China’s purpose is justto win time and that sooner or later China willuse force to solve the Taiwan question. That isabsolutely not true. It is not in China’s intereststo use force to solve the problem. Taiwan is a partof China. The Chinese people have always re-garded Taiwan as a “treasure island of the moth-erland” and the 23 million Taiwan compatriotsas “brothers and sisters of the same blood.” Awar between the two sides would surely be de-structive to Taiwan, resulting in a heavy toll oflives and wealth. Much infrastructure would bedestroyed, industry would be devastated, a lot ofpeople would migrate to other countries, and capi-tal would flow from the island at a dramatic rate.All those occurrences would not only be losses toTaiwan but also losses to the whole of China.

The mainland also would pay a high cost in aCross-Strait war, including the loss of human lifeand economic and financial damage caused bysanctions, embargoes, and international isolationimposed by Western countries. Such a conflictwould also risk triggering a military confronta-tion with the United States. China’s process ofreform and opening up would be suspended, andthe plan to build up a well-off society in an all-around way would be disrupted. China’s prosper-ous coastal areas might be involved directly inthe war and would suffer greatly. In addition, evenif the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) could gethold of Taiwan, they would be regarded by theTaiwan people as occupying troops and would faceTaiwanese opposition and resentment, whichmight last for many decades, if not centuries.

Therefore, when Jiang Zemin said, “No oneis more eager than we are to resolve the Taiwanquestion through peaceful means,” he was abso-lutely sincere. Now, as the possibility for a peace-ful solution in the future is increasing, why shouldnot the Chinese leaders seize this opportunity to



make new approaches to solve this difficult prob-lem? China does reserve the right to use force asthe last resort to protect its sovereignty andterritorial integrity, and no one should underes-timate China’s determination. Using force, how-ever, is the last thing China would like to do onthe Taiwan issue. That is also China’s clear-cutposition, not a temporary tactic.

Taiwan’s Responseand Its Internal Politics

To date the Taiwan authorities have paid littleattention to Beijing’s policy adjustments and newapproaches. They are used to downgradingBeijing’s new policy adjustments partly becauseof their ideology and bias and mainly because ofinternal politics in the island.

In 2004 there will be two big elections in Tai-wan, the “presidential election” in the spring andthe “Legislative Yuan” election in the winter.Right now all political parties on the island areinvolved in the campaign. Recently two large op-position parties in Taiwan, the Nationalist party(KMT) and the People’s First party (PFP), haveformed a coalition and recommended a joint can-didate list—Lian Zhan and James Soong—for the“presidential election.” The “Lian–Soong coali-tion” constitutes a big challenge to Chen Shui-bian’s efforts to win a second term. In the recentpoll conducted by various news media and inves-tigation institutions, the coalition exceeded ChenShui-bian by 10 percent, no matter who Chenpicks as his deputy in the election.19 Hence DPPpower is now at a critical juncture. Chen Shui-bian and his colleagues are trying their best towin the election.

Chen now faces a dilemma. Usually the DPPand its ally—the Taiwan Solidarity Union(TSU)—have a solid constituency amounting toabout 35 percent of the vote, whereas the pan-blue camp (KMT + PFP + NP [the New party])has a constituency of about 45 percent. Hence thekey to the victory is who can win the votes of the

middle stratum, which accounts for approxi-mately 20 percent of the electorate, most of whomare intellectuals, entrepreneurs, and liberal pro-fessionals. To win the elections, Chen Shui-bianshould do his best to fix the ailing economy so asto meet the demands of the people, especially ofthe middle stratum. For this purpose, he shoulddo something to improve Cross-Strait relations.Among various options, the most important thinghe can do to win the support of the middle stra-tum is to solve the three direct links problem,which is widely regarded as good medicine forTaiwan’s ailing economy. But if he takes serioussteps to settle the three direct links problem, hemight receive strong opposition from the sepa-ratists, including the fundamentalist indepen-dents in the DPP and the TSU, and lose theirsupport. That’s why Chen Shui-bian hesitatesto make any response to Beijing’s policy ad-justments.

Taipei’s response to Beijing’s approachesand initiatives in the coming days will be predi-cated mainly on expectations of political devel-opments in 2004, which reflect uncertainty. Asa politician, Chen Shui-bian is not capable ofmanaging public affairs, but he is a master at play-ing political games. To win elections, he uses atwo-pronged strategy. One involves doing some-thing to meet the desires of people. Currently hisslogan is “striving for economy and conduct-ing big political reform.” Because it will be diffi-cult for him to revitalize the economy in a shortperiod without solving the three direct links prob-lem with the mainland, he is putting moreemphasis on “political reform” (mainly indicat-ing punishment for corrupt officials and restruc-turing the heijin [“black–gold” politics] in orderto demonize the KMT [the ruling party in Tai-wan for decades] and to win the support of themiddle strata that are very important to hisvictory). The other strategy involves doing some-thing provocative to irritate the mainland: forexample, reemphasizing the one-side, one-coun-try theory; trying his best to visit Washington,D.C., and make a speech there; breaking the “re-stricted zone”of holding referendums in order to

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create conditions for holding a plebiscite to de-cide Taiwan’s political status in the future; seiz-ing every opportunity—including the SARS prob-lem, the World Health Assembly’s rejection ofTaiwan’s participation, the recent politicalstruggle involving the passage of the “nationalsecurity law” related to Article 23 of the BasicLaw of Hong Kong to demonize the mainland,and so on. If the mainland responded strongly, hewould take the opportunity to orchestrate anddirect the native Taiwanese anger toward themainland and the mainlanders on the island inorder to isolate the pan-blue camp and win thesupport of the native Taiwanese.

Therefore, at present it is very difficult topredict the result of the 2004 elections, whichsurely will have a significant impact on the Cross-Strait relationship in coming years. It seems thepan-blue camp and pan-green camp (DPP + TSU)will conduct a very close campaign, yielding oneof three possible outcomes.

1. Chen Shui-bian wins his secondterm, and the DPP + TSU coalitionwins a majority in the “LegislativeYuan.” Beijing must be prepared toface this possible outcome. SomeDPP members have gone to Beijingand told officials there that if ChenShui-bian can get a second term, hewill be bold enough to improveCross-Strait relations because therewould then be no need for him tofear to lose the support of the fun-damentalists once again and as thechairman of the proindependenceDPP, he would not fear being at-tacked as the “betrayer of Taiwan.”However, most officials and schol-ars in Beijing are skeptical of thismessage. They are worried that abig victory of the proindependencepan-green camp would greatly en-courage the separatists and exertheavy pressure on the new DPPauthorities to promote additional

separatist activities, resulting in anew crisis.

2. The pan-blue camp wins the elec-tions next year. It might be helpfulto break the political stalemate inthe Cross-Strait relationship in or-der to resume the political dialoguebetween the two sides and to solvethe three direct links problem inas-much as the KMT and the PFP havemade clear their recognition of the1992 consensus and their intentionto solve the problem as soon as pos-sible. But it seems there will be nodramatic changes in the Cross-Strait relationship in the near fu-ture given the fact that a majorityof the Taiwan people still prefer tomaintain the status quo and theexistence of several political dis-putes between the two sides, in-cluding the “international space”problem and Taiwan’s political sta-tus (the “ROC” problem), which aredifficult to settle at present.

3. Chen Shui-bian wins a second termwith a very close margin, while inthe election for the “LegislativeYuan,” the pan-blue camp wins amajority. In this case, the standoffin the Cross-Strait relationshipmight be prolonged, and therewould be no big change in the nearfuture. Nevertheless, economic in-tegrity would continue, and thethree direct links problem would besolved sooner or later if no majorcrisis occurs.

Needless to say or deny, Beijing pays greatattention to political developments in Taiwan.Nevertheless, choosing the leaders of Taiwan isthe business of the Taiwan people. Beijing hasneither the intention nor the capability of inter-



vening in the elections. No matter who takespower in Taipei next year, Beijing will make fur-ther approaches to achieve a breakthrough in theCross-Strait relationship under the one-Chinaprinciple while doing its best to prevent a newcrisis.

China’s New ApproachesProvide More Space forChina and the United Statesto Seek Common Pointson the Disputed Taiwan Issue

Since 1950 the Taiwan issue has been themost sensitive and explosive problem in Sino–U.S.relations. It is at the core of the bilateral rela-tionship. Although there are quite a number ofdisputes between the two countries—includingdisputes on human rights, nonproliferation ofweapons of mass destruction, trade imbalance,intellectual property rights protection, and soon—it seems that none of those disputes exceptthe Taiwan issue will lead to a confrontation thatmight trigger a war between the two countries.

As known to all, since the 9/11 terroristattacks, Sino–U.S. relations have improved sig-nificantly. The two countries have kept coop-erating in combating terrorism, preventing theproliferation of weapons of mass destruction, andundertaking efforts to solve the Korea nuclearproblem peacefully. China is no longer regardedby most Americans as a “threat” or a “strategiccompetitor” but as a candid, constructive, coop-erative partner, even an ally in combating ter-rorism. The presidents of the two countries havemet four times in a short period (less than twoyears, which is very unusual), and they have ex-changed views time and again on important is-sues via telephone. Political consultations andsecurity dialogues between senior officials of thetwo countries have been held frequently. Bilat-eral economic cooperation has been further pro-

moted, and military exchanges, although limited,have been resumed.

Of course, deep-rooted disputes between thetwo countries cannot be solved in a short period.Despite progress in Sino–U.S. relations since9/11, the Taiwan problem remains a time bombin the bilateral relationship. When PresidentBush assumed power, his administration changedthe policy of “strategic ambiguity” on the Tai-wan issue to one of clarity by declaring that theUnited States would “do whatever it takes to helpTaiwan defend herself.”20 Meanwhile the Bushadministration has not made clear whether theUnited States will use its forces to help defendTaiwan if Taipei declares independence. FromChina’s point of view, this policy shift wouldsurely encourage Taiwan separatists.

More important are not only the ad-ministration’s statement but also the real actionsit has taken since 2001 to strengthen military tieswith Taiwan, including large numbers of ad-vanced weapon sales to Taiwan, inviting Taipei’s“defense minister” to visit the United States andmeet with American senior officials, sendingPentagon officers to Taiwan to survey Taiwan’sdefense capability, and helping Taipei to renovateits C4I system, upgrading the training of Taiwan’smilitary officers to levels of general and admiral,dispatching military observers to attend Taiwan’smilitary exercises, and so on. The Americans ar-gue that all these steps are necessary to main-tain the balance of military power in the TaiwanStrait, whereas from China’s point of view, theyare serious violations of the three Sino–U.S.joint communiqués. China also fears that in-creasing U.S.–Taiwan military ties would resultin Taiwan’s integration into U.S. defense net-works, which would amount to a de facto resto-ration of the 1954 Washington–Taipei alliance,seriously damage the basis for Sino–U.S. rela-tions, and possibly lead to a confrontation be-tween the two countries. That is why mostobservers in the two countries hold that theSino–U.S. relationship is still fragile despite sig-nificant progress made after 9/11.

However, for their own interests, both coun-

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tries want to keep the Taiwan issue under con-trol in order to prevent new Taiwan Strait crisesand to maintain peace and stability in the Asia–Pacific region. China’s new approaches toward apeaceful solution of the Taiwan problem providemore space for the two countries to seek commonground on the disputed issue. All U.S. adminis-trations since 1972 have made clear that theUnited States is pursuing a one-China policy, thatthe United States does not support Taiwan inde-pendence, and that the United States does notoppose China’s reunification. But the UnitedStates insists that the solution be peaceful. TheBush administration has also reiterated thatposition. Because China is now emphasizingpeaceful approaches and engaging Taiwanthrough economic cooperation, cultural ex-changes, and people-to-people communicationsrather than military pressure, it seems that it ispossible for China and the United States to seeksome common grounds on this thorny issue.

In October 2002, at the Crawford summitbetween President Jiang Zemin and PresidentBush, the two leaders seized the opportunity todiscuss the Taiwan problem. Despite basic differ-ences on the issue, they found common groundin keeping the situation under control and inavoiding the intensification of disputes that couldlead to war. President Bush’s reassurances thatthe United States will abide by the threecommuniqués and the one-China policy and thatthe United States stands against21 Taiwan inde-pendence have been helpful in alleviating thetense situation in the Taiwan Strait.

On June 1, 2003, in the Evian meeting be-tween the new Chinese President Hu Jintao andPresident Bush, the two leaders discussed theTaiwan issue among other important issues.President Hu underscored the Chinesegovernment’s insistence on “peaceful reunifica-tion and the one-country, two-systems” policy andsaid it would make the greatest efforts to achievethe reunification of the two sides peacefully. Chinahopes the United States will keep its commit-ments on the Taiwan question and will not givethe wrong signal to Taiwan independence forces.

President Bush reaffirmed that the United Stateswill continue to abide by the one-China policy andsaid that this policy—based on the three U.S.–China joint communiqués, the Taiwan RelationsAct, and America’s stand against Taiwan inde-pendence—has not changed and will not bechanged.22 “Within that context, if necessary,” headded, “we will help Taiwan, to the extent pos-sible, defend itself.”23 Bush’s remark explicitlyindicates that the disputes between the two coun-tries on America’s arms sale to Taiwan remainunresolved. In comparison with the remark hemade on April 21, 2001 (“do whatever it takes”),he seems to have changed his tone a bit andachieved more balance toward the two sides ofthe Strait. This, of course, is helpful in keepingthe issue under control, in avoiding new Straitcrises, and in maintaining peace and stability inthe Asia–Pacific region.

Breaking the Vicious Cycleof Military Buildup Acrossthe Taiwan Strait

To prevent a new strait crisis, the most im-portant thing right now is to break the viciouscycle of military buildup across the Taiwan Strait.The United States has stressed that since 1996China has conducted a buildup of short- andmedium-range missiles targeted at Taiwan inareas adjacent to the strait and that by 2002, thetotal number of missiles had reached approxi-mately 350. To counterbalance the mainland’smissile deployment, the United States argues, itis necessary for America to sell arms to Taiwanand to strengthen military ties with the Taiwanmilitary. China argues that it has deployed mis-siles along the coast area of the strait only be-cause the United States has violated the August1982 communiqué since 1992 by selling largenumbers of advanced weapons to Taiwan and thatTaiwan separatist forces, encouraged byAmerica’s military support, are growing. Thisvicious cycle constitutes a hotbed of new crises.



What is important is not to debate who shouldbe blamed for this turn of events but how to re-move the detonator of new potential crises andprevent a military confrontation between the twosides in order to turn the vicious cycle into a be-nign one. China has taken the initiative. At theCrawford summit President Jiang Zemin sug-gested that if the United States abided by theAugust 1982 communiqué to limit and graduallyreduce its arms sales to Taiwan, China mightsuspend the further deployment of missiles tar-geted at Taiwan or even reduce the missiles al-ready deployed. As this is the first time since 1996that China has made an initiative to preventmilitary confrontation in the Taiwan Strait, itdeserves high-level attention.

At the summit President Bush did not makean immediate response to Jiang’s proposal. Butrecently, it is been learned, President Bush didrespond to President Jiang, saying that althoughthe United States is paying great attention to thisproposal, it is not appropriate for Americans todiscuss the problem with China directly. Instead,it was indicated, the problem should be discussedby the Chinese on the two sides of the strait. Bushemphasized that America’s arms sales to Taiwanare related to changes in military power in theStrait. If China takes the initiative to withdrawits missiles, ridding Taiwan of the need for rel-evant weapons, naturally America would reduceor cease relevant arms sales to Taiwan.24 Althoughso far there have only been exchanges of viewsbetween the two countries, they mark the begin-ning of an important approach toward solving thiscomplicated key problem.

As mentioned above, Beijing is pleased to talkwith Taipei to prevent a military confrontationbetween the two sides. Nevertheless, one prob-lem cannot be evaded before the political dialogueis resumed and that is the nature of the politicaldialogue: Is it a dialogue between two parts ofa country or a dialogue between two coun-tries? Since Lee Teng-hui initiated the “two-states theory” and Chen Shui-bian initiated the“one-side, one-country” theory (he has neverwithdrawn this theory), the need to clarify this

problem has become unavoidable. Actually thesetwo men have set a prerequisite for the resump-tion of the dialogue between the Association forthe Relationship Across the Taiwan Straits(ARATS) and the Strait Exchange Foundation(SEF). If Beijing agrees to resume the dialoguewithout requesting Taipei to recognize the one-China principle so as to clarify this problem, thatwould equal Beijing’s acceptance of the two-statestheory (or the one-side, one-country theory). Ob-viously, that is impossible. Then, in the currentsituation, how to break the vicious cycle? Also, asmentioned above, one of Beijing’s new approachesis to differentiate economic issues from politicalissues. If the Taiwan authorities can take somesubstantial steps to improve the Cross-Strait re-lationship—for example, to solve the three directlinks problem—Beijing might take initiatives tofreeze or reduce missile deployment. If not, howcan the Chinese leadership convince the peopleand the PLA to loosen preparations against per-fidious separatist activities?

The Chinese government has made very clearthat China will not challenge the American mili-tary presence in the Asia–Pacific region. From ahistorical perspective, the American military inAsia and the Pacific has played both positive andnegative roles. China hopes the United States willplay a more positive, constructive role in the re-gion. China does not expect the United States tohelp realize its reunification. But since 1950, theUnited States has been involved deeply in theTaiwan question. China hopes America will playa constructive role, for instance, in encouragingeconomic cooperation and integration and theflow of people between the two sides; supportingthe settlement of the three direct links problem;helping to defuse Cross-Strait tensions; limitingand reducing arms sales to Taiwan and restrain-ing military ties with Taiwan’s military; usingits influence to check the separatists’ provocativeactivities in order to prevent new Cross-Straitcrises; and fostering an environment favorableto political reconciliation between the two sides.If America can make some contributions to helppromote a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan ques-

524 Chen Qimao


tion, it surely would be welcomed by Chinese onboth sides of the Strait, and its interests in Chinaas well as in East Asia would be better served.

About the Author

Chien Qimao, a member of the NationalCommittee’s Roundtable on U.S.–China–TaiwanRelations, is the president of the Shanghai Soci-ety for International Relations and the presidentof the Shanghai Center for RIMPAC Strategic andInternational Studies. He served as the presidentof the Shanghai Institute for International Stud-ies from 1981 to 1991. He is a specialist on politi-cal and security issues in the Asia–Pacific regionin general and a specialist on the Taiwan issue inparticular.

Notes

1. Jian Zemin, Report to the 16th NationalCongress of the Communist Party of China,Beijing Review, Document, December 12, 2002,vi.

2. Hu Jintao’s remarks, People’s Daily, March11, 2003, l.

3. The “ROC Constitution Amendments”state that China now covers two parts, the freeregion (Taiwan) and the mainland. See Collec-tion of Laws and Regulations Regarding theMainland, published by Taipei’s Committee ofMainland Affairs, 1–35.

4. Ibid, 1–54.5. The Outline of National Unification published

by the Taiwan authorities in 1991 states, “Both themainland and Taiwan are China’s territory.

6. Jiang Zemin’s Report, Beijing Review,Document, December 12, 2002, vii.

7. Ibid.8. Qian Qichen’s remarks, People’s Daily, July

6, 2002, 4; vii.9. Qian Qichen’s remarks made on the seventh

anniversary of the issuance of Jian Zemin’s eight-point proposal, People’s Daily, January 25, 2002.

10. Ibid.

11. Jiang Zemin’s Report, Beijing Review,Document, December 12, 2002, vii.

12. All figures are from the Chinesegovernment’s relevant Work Reports and the sta-tistics issued by the Statistics Bureau of the Tai-wan authorities.

13. As the Taiwan authorities can imposesome limits on Taiwan’s investments on themainland, many Taiwan enterprises have in-vested on the mainland through third coun-tries or regions. Therefore, it is hard to make anaccurate calculation of the total amount ofTaiwan’s investments on the mainland. Mostinternational financial institutions estimatethat the toal amount is $80–$100 billion.

14. Xinmin Evening News, January 18,2003, 4.

15. According to a poll sponsored by Taiwan’sCultural University, Xinmin Evening News, Feb-ruary 5, 2003, 11.

16. According to a poll sponsored by TVBS inJune 2001, 31 percent of the people of Taiwansaid they could accept the one-country, two-sys-tems principle, whereas polls sponsored by ChinaTimes and United Daily in the same month reported29 percent and 33 percent, respectively. In April2001, a poll sponsored by the Mainland AffairsCommittee of the Taiwan authorities said that16.1 percent of the people had expressed their sup-port for the one-country, two-systems principle.

17. David M. Lampton and Richard DanielEwing, U.S.–China Relations in a Post–Septem-ber 11th World.

18. Jiang Zemin’s Report, Beijing Review,Document, November 28, 2002, xii.

19. It was reported by various news media inTaiwan and Hong Kong. For example, accordingto the poll published by China Times on June 29,2003, the support rate for the Lian–Soong coali-tion was 44 percent, whereas the rate of supportfor Chen Shui-bian and his possible partner was31 percent. According to the poll published byTVBS in the same month, the rate of support forthe Lian–Soong coalition was 53 percent, whereasthe support rate for Chen and his partner was 31percent.



20. President Bush’s remark on April 21,2001, China Online, April 26, 2001.

21. In private talks between the two presi-dents, President Bush used the term “standagainst.” But in the open report, the White Housespokesperson used the term “not support.” TheAmerican side, however, did not deny the XinhuaNews Agency’s report, which stated that Presi-

dent Bush said the United States stands againstTaiwan independence.

22. Jiefang Daily, June 3, 2003, l, 5.23. U.S. Department of State, International

Information Programs, Transcripts, Bush, HuJintao Discuss North Korea, SARS, Taiwan.

24. According to information provided bysome senior American officials.

526 Chen Qimao




The National Committee on American Foreign Policy’s Track I½, Five-Delegation Talkson Northeast Asia Security New York, September 29–30, 2003

H.E. Minister Ri Gun of the People’sRepublic of Korea

H.E. Minister Ri Gun with Donald W. Keyser, principal deputyassistant secretary for East Asia

Seated from left to right: H.E. Minister Ri Gun, Dr. Henry Kissinger, Dr.George D. Schwab, William J. Flynn, the Hon. Paul A. Volcker, ProfessorDonald S. Zagoria Photographs: courtesy DSR

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528 Chen Qimao


Dr. Henry A. KissingerNational Committee Chairman WilliamJ. Flynn giving a Tiffany crystal apple toH.E. Minister Ri Gun

From right to left: Dr. George D. Schwab, H.E. Minister Ri Gun, William J. Flynn, surrounded by members ofthe five delegations from North Korea,China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States

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