IN  RE:  Petition  to  Approve  the  Will  of  Ruperta  Palaganas  with  Prayer  for  the  Appointment  of  Special  Administrator,  Manuel  Miguel  Palaganas  and  Benjamin  Gregorio  Palaganas,  Petitioners,  v.  Ernesto  Palaganas,  Respondent,  -­‐  WALA  G.R.  No.  169144,    26  January  2011  

Vda. De Perez vs. Tolete

FACTS: - Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife).

-Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills. -The Petitioner herein, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. RTC issued an order, directing the issuance of letters of special administration in favour of the petitioner making her administrator of the estate.

- Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give. RTC at first agreed with the Petitioner that the Cunanan’s heir were collateral heir that are deliberately excluded; but upon opposition by the said heirs wherein they make mention of a prior agreement to settle and divide the estate among all the parties, petitioner is now stopped to lay claim as a sole heir. The case was later reassigned where probate was denied and the case should have been given finality.

- Petitioner filed a motion to resume proceedings on account of the final settlement and termination of the probate cases in New York. Then after, the petitioner herein filed a motion praying for the reconsideration of the previous decision on the strength of the Order granting her a period of 15 days upon arrival in the country within which to act on the denial of probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses;

- The other heirs filed a motion for reconsideration based on lack of notice to their lawyer, to which the RTC denied but however, respondent Judge said that the documents did not establish the law of New York on the procedure and allowance of wills that further evidence was needed. Petitioner filed a motion to allow her to present further evidence on the foreign law. After the hearing of the motion, respondent Judge issued an order wherein he conceded that insufficiency of evidence to prove the foreign law was not a fatal defect and was curable

by adducing additional evidence. He granted petitioner 45 days to submit the evidence to that effect.

- However, without waiting for petitioner to adduce the additional evidence, respondent Judge later ruled in another order that he found "no compelling reason to disturb its ruling of March 31, 1986" but allowed petitioner to "file anew the appropriate probate proceedings for each of the testator"

- This prompted petitioner to file a second motion for reconsideration stating that she was "ready to submit further evidence on the law obtaining in the State of New York" and praying that she be granted "the opportunity to present evidence on what the law of the State of New York has on the probate and allowance of wills"

- RTC denied the motion holding that to allow the probate of two wills in a single proceeding "would be a departure from the typical and established mode of probate where one petition takes care of one will." He pointed out that even in New York "where the wills in question were first submitted for probate, they were dealt with in separate proceedings"

- Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration to which the RTC denied on the grounds that "the probate of separate wills of two or more different persons even if they are husband and wife cannot be undertaken in a single petition”

- Hence, petitioner instituted the instant petition, arguing that the evidence offered at the hearing proved the laws of the State of New York on the allowance of wills, and that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses need not be probated in separate proceedings.

ISSUES: 1. W/N notice must be given. 2. W/N Joint probate of the wills be allowed.

HELD: This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party. The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required. The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to

notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative. The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills; Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them

Thus the SC cited that there is merit in petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly. RTC’s view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be "liberally construed in order to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."

Thus order is set aside and the Petitioner may present her evidence.

 

 

 

 

 

 

ANCHETA  v.  GUERSEY-­‐DALAYGON  

FACTS:  

1) Spouses  Audrey  O’Neill  (Audrey)  and  W.  Richard  Guersey  (Richard)  were  American  citizens  who  have  resided  in  the  Philippines  for  30  years.    

2) They  have  an  adopted  daughter,  Kyle  Guersey  Hill  (Kyle).    3) On  July  29,  1979,  Audrey  died,  leaving  a  will  bequeathing  her  entire  estate  to  Richard,  who  

was  also  designated  as  executor.  4) The  will  was  admitted  to  probate  before  the  Orphan’s  Court  of  Baltimore,  Maryland,  U.S.A,  

which  named  James  N.  Phillips  as  executor  due  to  Richard’s  renunciation  of  his  appointment.2    

5) The  court  also  named  Atty.  Alonzo  Q.  Ancheta  (petitioner)  of  the  Quasha  Asperilla  Ancheta  Pena  &  Nolasco  Law  Offices  as  ancillary  administrator.3    

6) In  1981,  Richard  married  Candelaria  Guersey-­‐Dalaygon  (respondent)  with  whom  he  has  two  children,  namely,  Kimberly  and  Kevin.    

7) On  October  12,  1982,  Audrey’s  will  was  also  admitted  to  probate  by  the  then  CFI  Rizal.  8)  On  July  20,  1984,  Richard  died,  leaving  a  will,  wherein  he  bequeathed  his  entire  estate  to  

respondent,  save  for  his  rights  and  interests  over  the  A/G  Interiors,  Inc.  shares,  which  he  left  to  Kyle.  

9)  The  will  was  also  admitted  to  probate  by  the  Orphan’s  Court  of  Ann  Arundel,  Maryland,  U.S.A,  and  James  N.  Phillips  was  likewise  appointed  as  executor,  who  in  turn,  designated  Atty.  William  Quasha  or  any  member  of  the  Quasha  Asperilla  Ancheta  Pena  &  Nolasco  Law  Offices,  as  ancillary  administrator.  

10) Richard’s  will  was  then  submitted  for  probate  before  the  RTC  of  Makati.  11) On  October  19,  1987,  petitioner  filed  a  motion  to  declare  Richard  and  Kyle  as  heirs  of  

Audrey,  and  a  project  of  partition  of  Audrey’s  estate.  12)  The  motion  and  project  of  partition  was  granted  and  approved  by  the  trial  court.    13) Consequently,  the  Register  of  Deeds  of  Makati  issued  TCT  in  the  names  of  the  Estate  of  W.  

Richard  Guersey  and  Kyle.13    14) Meanwhile,  the  ancillary  administrator  in  Special  Proceeding  No.  M-­‐888  also  filed  a  project  

of  partition  wherein  2/5  of  Richard’s  ¾  undivided  interest  in  the  Makati  property  was  allocated  to  respondent,  while  3/5  thereof  were  allocated  to  Richard’s  three  children.    

15) This  was  opposed  by  respondent  on  the  ground  that  under  the  law  of  the  State  of  Maryland,  "a  legacy  passes  to  the  legatee  the  entire  interest  of  the  testator  in  the  property  subject  of  the  legacy."14    

16) The  trial  court  found  merit  in  respondent’s  opposition,  and  disapproved  the  project  of  partition  insofar  as  it  affects  the  Makati  property.    

17) On  October  20,  1993,  respondent  filed  with  the  Court  of  Appeals  (CA)  an  amended  complaint.  

18)  Respondent  contended  that  petitioner  willfully  breached  his  fiduciary  duty  when  he  disregarded  the  laws  of  the  State  of  Maryland  on  the  distribution  of  Audrey’s  estate  in  accordance  with  her  will.    

19) Respondent  argued  that  since  Audrey  devised  her  entire  estate  to  Richard,  then  the  Makati  property  should  be  wholly  adjudicated  to  him.  

20)  On  March  18,  1999,  the  CA  rendered  the  assailed  Decision  annulling  the  trial  court’s  Orders.    

21) Petitioner  filed  MR,  but  this  was  denied  by  the  CA.  22)  Hence,  the  herein  petition  for  review  on  certiorari  under  Rule  45  of  the  Rules  of  Court.  

ISSUE:  Whether  it  is  the  national  law  of  the  decedent  that  is  applicable  in  this  case,  hence,  petitioner  should  have  distributed  Aubrey’s  estate  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  her  will  

RULING:  YES.  Petitioner’s  failure  to  proficiently  manage  the  distribution  of  Audrey’s  estate  according  to  the  terms  of  her  will  and  as  dictated  by  the  applicable  law  amounted  to  extrinsic  fraud.  Hence  the  CA  Decision  annulling  the  RTC  Orders  dated  February  12,  1988  and  April  7,  1988,  must  be  upheld.  

It  is  undisputed  that  Audrey  Guersey  was  an  American  citizen  domiciled  in  Maryland,  U.S.A.  During  the  reprobate  of  her  will  in  Special  Proceeding  No.  9625,  it  was  shown,  among  others,  that  at  the  time  of  Audrey’s  death,  she  was  residing  in  the  Philippines  but  is  domiciled  in  Maryland,  U.S.A.;  her  Last  Will  and  Testament  dated  August  18,  1972  was  executed  and  probated  before  the  Orphan’s  Court  in  Baltimore,  Maryland,  U.S.A.,  which  was  duly  authenticated  and  certified  by  the  Register  of  Wills  of  Baltimore  City  and  attested  by  the  Chief  Judge  of  said  court;  the  will  was  admitted  by  the  Orphan’s  Court  of  Baltimore  City  on  September  7,  1979;  and  the  will  was  authenticated  by  the  Secretary  of  State  of  Maryland  and  the  Vice  Consul  of  the  Philippine  Embassy.  

Being  a  foreign  national,  the  intrinsic  validity  of  Audrey’s  will,  especially  with  regard  as  to  who  are  her  heirs,  is  governed  by  her  national  law,  i.e.,  the  law  of  the  State  of  Maryland,  as  provided  in  Article  16  of  the  Civil  Code,  to  wit:  

Art.  16.  Real  property  as  well  as  personal  property  is  subject  to  the  law  of  the  country  where  it  is  situated.  

However,  intestate  and  testamentary  succession,  both  with  respect  to  the  order  of  succession  and  to  the  amount  of  successional  rights  and  to  the  intrinsic  validity  of  testamentary  provisions,  shall  be  regulated  by  the  national  law  of  the  person  whose  succession  is  under  consideration,  whatever  may  be  the  nature  of  the  property  and  regardless  of  the  country  wherein  said  property  may  be  found.  (Emphasis  supplied)  

Article  1039  of  the  Civil  Code  further  provides  that  "capacity  to  succeed  is  governed  by  the  law  of  the  nation  of  the  decedent."  

As  a  corollary  rule,  Section  4,  Rule  77  of  the  Rules  of  Court  on  Allowance  of  Will  Proved  Outside  the  Philippines  and  Administration  of  Estate  Thereunder,  states:  

SEC.  4.  Estate,  how  administered.—When  a  will  is  thus  allowed,  the  court  shall  grant  letters  testamentary,  or  letters  of  administration  with  the  will  annexed,  and  such  letters  testamentary  or  of  administration,  shall  extend  to  all  the  estate  of  the  testator  in  the  Philippines.  Such  estate,  after  the  payment  of  just  debts  and  expenses  of  administration,  shall  be  disposed  of  according  to  such  will,  so  far  as  such  will  may  operate  upon  it;  and  the  residue,  if  any,  shall  be  disposed  of  as  is  provided  by  law  in  cases  of  estates  in  the  Philippines  belonging  to  persons  who  are  inhabitants  of  another  state  or  country.  (Emphasis  supplied)  

While  foreign  laws  do  not  prove  themselves  in  our  jurisdiction  and  our  courts  are  not  authorized  to  take  judicial  notice  of  them;37  however,  petitioner,  as  ancillary  administrator  of  Audrey’s  estate,  was  duty-­‐bound  to  introduce  in  evidence  the  pertinent  law  of  the  State  of  Maryland.38    

Petitioner  admitted  that  he  failed  to  introduce  in  evidence  the  law  of  the  State  of  Maryland  on  Estates  and  Trusts,  and  merely  relied  on  the  presumption  that  such  law  is  the  same  as  the  Philippine  law  on  wills  and  succession.  Thus,  the  trial  court  peremptorily  applied  Philippine  laws  and  totally  disregarded  the  terms  of  Audrey’s  will.  The  obvious  result  was  that  there  was  no  fair  submission  of  the  case  before  the  trial  court  or  a  judicious  appreciation  of  the  evidence  presented.    

The  record  reveals,  however,  that  no  clear  effort  was  made  to  prove  the  national  law  of  Audrey  O’Neill  Guersey  during  the  proceedings  before  the  court  a  quo.  While  there  is  claim  of  good  faith  in  distributing  the  subject  estate  in  accordance  with  the  Philippine  laws,  the  defendant  appears  to  put  his  actuations  in  a  different  light  as  indicated  in  a  portion  of  his  direct  examination.  

Well-­‐intentioned  though  it  may  be,  defendant  Alonzo  H.  Ancheta’s  action  appears  to  have  breached  his  duties  and  responsibilities  as  ancillary  administrator  of  the  subject  estate.  While  such  breach  of  duty  admittedly  cannot  be  considered  extrinsic  fraud  under  ordinary  circumstances,  the  fiduciary  nature  of  the  said  defendant’s  position,  as  well  as  the  resultant  frustration  of  the  decedent’s  last  will,  combine  to  create  a  circumstance  that  is  tantamount  to  extrinsic  fraud.  Defendant  Alonzo  H.  Ancheta’s  omission  to  prove  the  national  laws  of  the  decedent  and  to  follow  the  latter’s  last  will,  in  sum,  resulted  in  the  procurement  of  the  subject  orders  without  a  fair  submission  of  the  real  issues  involved  in  the  case.41    

The  trial  court  in  its  Order  dated  December  6,  1991  in  Special  Proceeding  No.  M-­‐888  noted  the  law  of  the  State  of  Maryland  on  Estates  and  Trusts,  as  follows:  

Under  Section  1-­‐301,  Title  3,  Sub-­‐Title  3  of  the  Annotated  Code  of  the  Public  General  Laws  of  Maryland  on  Estates  and  Trusts,  "all  property  of  a  decedent  shall  be  subject  to  the  estate  of  decedents  law,  and  upon  his  death  shall  pass  directly  to  the  personal  representative,  who  shall  hold  the  legal  title  for  administration  and  distribution,"  while  Section  4-­‐408  expressly  provides  that  "unless  a  contrary  intent  is  expressly  indicated  in  the  will,  a  legacy  passes  to  the  legatee  the  entire  interest  of  the  testator  in  the  property  which  is  the  subject  of  the  legacy".  Section  7-­‐101,  Title  7,  Sub-­‐Title  1,  on  the  other  hand,  declares  that  "a  personal  representative  is  a  fiduciary"  and  as  such  he  is  "under  the  general  duty  to  settle  and  distribute  the  estate  of  the  decedent  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  the  will  and  the  estate  of  decedents  law  as  expeditiously  and  with  as  little  sacrifice  of  value  as  is  reasonable  under  the  circumstances".43    

In  addition,  the  other  appellants,  children  of  the  testator,  do  not  dispute  the  above-­‐quoted  provision  of  the  laws  of  the  State  of  Nevada.  Under  all  the  above  circumstances,  we  are  constrained  to  hold  that  the  pertinent  law  of  Nevada,  especially  Section  9905  of  the  Compiled  Nevada  Laws  of  1925,  can  be  taken  judicial  notice  of  by  us,  without  proof  of  such  law  having  been  offered  at  the  hearing  of  the  project  of  partition.  

In  this  case,  given  that  the  pertinent  law  of  the  State  of  Maryland  has  been  brought  to  record  before  the  CA,  and  the  trial  court  in  Special  Proceeding  No.  M-­‐888  appropriately  took  note  of  the  same  in  disapproving  the  proposed  project  of  partition  of  Richard’s  estate,  not  to  mention  that  petitioner  or  any  other  interested  person  for  that  matter,  does  not  dispute  the  existence  or  validity  of  said  law,  then  Audrey’s  and  Richard’s  estate  should  be  distributed  according  to  their  respective  wills,  and  not  according  to  the  project  of  partition  submitted  by  petitioner.  Consequently,  the  entire  Makati  property  belongs  to  respondent.  

Testate Estate of Idonah Slade Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated FACTS:

Idonah Slade Perkins died in NYC on 27 March 1960. Her domiciliary administrator was the County Trust Company of NY. Her ancillary administrator was Renato Tayag. Renato Tayag requested that the domiciliary administrator surrender the

decedent's stock certificates in a Philippine corporation, Benguet Consolidated, to satisfy the legitimate claims of local creditors.

The TC then issued an order compelling the domiciliary administrator to comply.

Benguet Consolidated appealed therefrom to the SC, challenging the order compelling the domiciliary administrator to surrender the aforementioned stock certificates. ISSUE:

Whether or not the TC erred in ordering the domiciliary administrator to surrender the stock certificates in the corporation, Benguet Consolidated. HELD: NO.

The SC explained the scope of power afforded the ancillary administrator by referring to previous jurisprudence. Citing Justice Malcolm, the SC pointed out that where a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries.

The administrator located in the decedent's last domicile is the PRINCIPAL ADMINISTRATOR.

The one located in the Philippines is the ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR.

This distinction is important because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore (i.e. “by its own force”) have any effect beyond the limits of the JD of the country in which it is granted.

Hence, a principal administrator cannot act beyond the confines of the decedent's last domicile; the ancillary administrator shall act in all matters concerning the property of the decedent's estate located in the Philippines.

In this case, appellant Benguet Consolidated is a domestic corporation. As such, the principal administrator (located in NY) must respect the ancillary administrator's right to the corporation's stock certificates, for the reason that the latter's scope of power covers the decedent's property located in the Philippines. Hence, the TC did not err in ordering the principal administrator to surrender the stock certificates in Benguet Consolidated.  

     

In  re:  Testate  Estate  of  the  deceased  JOSE  B.  SUNTAY.  SILVINO  SUNTAY,  petitioner-­‐appellant,    vs.  In  re:  Intestate  Estate  of  the  deceased  JOSE  B.  SUNTAY,    FEDERICO  C.  SUNTAY,  administrator-­‐appellee.  G.R.  Nos.  L-­‐3087  and  L-­‐3088                        July  31,  1954    FACTS:  

1. Jose  Suntay,  Filipino  and  resident  of  the  Philippines,  died  in  the  city  of  Amoy  Fookien,  China  leaving  real  and  personal  properties  in  the  Philippines  and  Amoy  Fookien  China  and  children  from  first  marriage  with  the  late  Manuela  and  a  child  Silvino  by  2nd  marriage.  

2. Intestate  proceedings  were  instituted,  letters  of  administration  were  instituted  in  Bulacan  and  after  hearing  they  were  issued  to  Apolonio  Suntay  (child  1st  marriage)  

3. The  surviving  widow  filed  a  petition  in  CFI  Bulacan  for  the  probate  of  the  last  will  and  testament  claimed  to  have  been  executed  and  signed  in  the  Philippines  by  the  deceased.  

a. This  petition  was  denied  because  the  loss  of  said  will  after  the  filing  of  the  petition  and  before  hearing  and  insufficiency  of  evidence  to  establish  the  loss.  

4. This  is  an  appeal  from  a  decree  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Bulacan  disallowing  the  alleged  will  and  testament  executed  in  Manila  on  November  1929,  and  the  alleged  last  will  and  testament  executed  in  Kulangsu,  Amoy,  China,  on  4  January  1931,  by  Jose  B.  Suntay.  The  value  of  the  estate  left  by  the  deceased  is  more  than  P50,000.  

ISSUE:  WoN  the  loss  of  the  will  was  sufficiently  established  by  evidence  

HELD:  NO  

As  to  the  alleged  will  and  testament  executed  in  Manila  -­‐  

• The  witnesses  who  testified  to  the  provisions  of  the  lost  will  are  Go  Toh,  an  attesting  witness,  Anastacio  Teodoro  and  Ana  Suntay.  

o Go  Toh    testifies  that  he  was  one  of  the  witnesses  to  the  lost  will  consisting  of  twenty-­‐three  sheets  signed  by  Jose  B.  Suntay  at  the  bottom  of  the  will  and  each  and  every  page  thereof  in  the  presence  of  Alberto  Barretto,  Manuel  Lopez  and  himself  and  underneath  the  testator's  signature  the  attesting  witnesses  signed  and  each  of  them  

signed  the  attestation  clause  and  each  and  every  page  of  the  will  in  the  presence  of  the  testator  and  of  the  other  witnesses;    

! At  any  rate,  all  of  Go  Toh's  testimony  by  deposition  on  the  provisions  of  the  alleged  lost  will  is  hearsay,  because  he  came  to  know  or  he  learned  to  them  from  information  given  him  by  Jose  B.  Suntay  and  from  reading  the  translation  of  the  draft  (Exhibit  B)  into  Chinese.  

o Ana  Suntay  testifies  that  she  saw  her  brother  Apolonio  Suntay  read  the  document  in  her  presence  and  of  Manuel  and  learned  of  the  adjudication  made  in  the  will  by  her  father  of  his  estate,  On  cross-­‐examination,  she  testifies  that  she  read  the  part  of  the  will  on  adjudication  to  know  what  was  the  share  of  each  heir  

• The  testimonies  fall  short  of  the  legal  requirement  that  the  provisions  of  the  lost  will  must  be  "clearly  and  distinctly  proved  by  at  least  two  credible  witnesses."  Credible  witnesses  mean  competent  witnesses  and  those  who  testify  to  facts  from  or  upon  hearsay  are  neither  competent  nor  credible  witnesses.  

As  to  the  will  claimed  to  have  been  executed  on  4  January  1931  in  Amoy,  China,  the  law  on  the  point  in  Rule  78.    

o The  fact  that  the  municipal  district  court  of  Amoy,  China,  is  a  probate  court  must  be  proved.  The  law  of  China  on  procedure  in  the  probate  or  allowance  of  wills  must  also  be  proved.  The  legal  requirements  for  the  execution  of  a  valid  will  in  China  in  1931  should  also  be  established  by  competent  evidence.  There  is  no  proof  on  these  points.  

o The  unverified  answers  to  the  questions  propounded  by  counsel  for  the  appellant  to  the  Consul  General  of  the  Republic  of  China  are  inadmissible,  because  apart  from  the  fact  that  the  office  of  Consul  General  does  not  qualify  and  make  the  person  who  holds  it  an  expert  on  the  Chinese  law  on  procedure  in  probate  matters,  if  the  same  be  admitted,  the  adverse  party  would  be  deprived  of  his  right  to  confront  and  cross-­‐examine  the  witness.  

o Moreover,  it  appears  that  all  the  proceedings  had  in  the  municipal  district  court  of  Amoy  were  for  the  purpose  of  taking  the  testimony  of  two  attesting  witnesses  to  the  will  and  that  the  order  of  the  municipal  district  court  of  Amoy  does  not  purport  to  probate  the  will.  In  the  absence  of  proof  that  the  municipal  district  court  of  Amoy  is  a  probate  court  and  on  the  Chinese  law  of  procedure  in  probate  matters,  it  may  be  presumed  that  the  proceedings  in  the  matter  of  probating  or  allowing  a  will  in  the  Chinese  courts  are  the  a  deposition  or  to  a  perpetuation  of  testimony,  and  even  if  it  were  so  it  does  not  measure  same  as  those  provided  for  in  our  laws  on  the  subject.  It  is  a  

proceedings  in  rem  and  for  the  validity  of  such  proceedings  personal  notice  or  by  publication  or  both  to  all  interested  parties  must  be  made.  The  interested  parties  in  the  case  were  known  to  reside  in  the  Philippines.  The  evidence  shows  that  no  such  notice  was  received  by  the  interested  parties  residing  in  the  Philippines    

o In  view  thereof,  the  will  and  the  alleged  probate  thereof  cannot  be  said  to  have  been  done  in  accordance  with  the  accepted  basic  and  fundamental  concepts  and  principles  followed  in  the  probate  and  allowance  of  wills.  Consequently,  the  authenticated  transcript  of  proceedings  held  in  the  municipal  district  court  of  Amoy,  China,  cannot  be  deemed  and  accepted  as  proceedings  leading  to  the  probate  or  allowance  of  a  will  and,  therefore,  the  will  referred  to  therein  cannot  be  allowed,  filed  and  recorded  by  a  competent  court  of  this  country.  

Edgar Y. Teves, Petitioner, vs. The Commission on Elections and Herminio ���G. Teves, Respondents - WALA G.R. No. 180363 28 April 2009.

Republic of the Philippines vs. Ferdinand Marcos II and Imelda R. Marcos - WALA ���G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855 04 Aug. 2009  

 

 

 

 ROMAN  OZAETA,  ROSA  GONZALES  VDA.  DE  PALANCA,  JUSTO  G.  PALANCA,  LEONARDA  PALANCA  DE  ARANAS,  SEVERINA  G.  PALANCA,  CARLOS  PALANCA,  JR.,  ANTONIO  G.  PALANCA,  MACARIO  G.  PALANCA,  MILAGROS  PALANCA  DE  FURER,  and  RAMON  G.  PALANCA,  petitioners,  vs.  HONORABLE  POTENCIANO  PECSON,  Judge  of  First  Instance  of  Manila,  and  BANK  OF  THE  PHILIPPINE  ISLANDS,  respondents  

Facts:  

• Carlos  Palanca  died  on  September  2,  1950;  leaving  a  will  executed  by  him  o petitioner  Roman  Ozaeta,  former  associate  justice  of  this  Court,  was  

named  executor  if  General  Manuel  A.  Roxas  fails  to  qualify  o General  Roxas  having  died  previously,  petitioner  presented  a  petition  

for  the  probate  of  the  will,  at  the  same  time  praying  that  he  be  appointed  special  administrator  

• Some  of  the  heirs  of  the  decedent  opposed  this  petition  o the  court  appointed  the  Philippine  Trust  Company,  a  non-­‐applicant  and  

a  stranger  to  the  proceedings,  special  administrator  • Philippine  Trust  Company  presented  a  petition  to  resign  as  special  administrator  

on  the  ground  of  incompatibility  of  interest,  as  it  had  granted  a  loan  to  heir  Angel  Palanca,  who  had  pledged  to  it  shares  of  the  Far  Eastern  University  allegedly  belonging  to  the  estate  of  the  deceased  

o the  court  appointed  Sebastian  Palanca,  one  of  the  heirs,  to  take  the  place  of  the  Philippine  Trust  Company  

• But  on  October  23rd,  the  court  rendered  an  order  admitting  the  will  to  probate  and  appointing  petitioner  as  administrator  

• And  on  October  25,  1951,  the  court  allowed  the  Philippine  Trust  Company  to  resign,  reconsidered  its  order  appointing  Sebastian  Palanca  special  administrator,  and  appointed  instead  the  Bank  of  the  Philippine  Islands  

o Petitioner  moved  to  reconsider  the  order,  but  his  motion  was  denied  

Issue:   W/N  the  court  has  discretion  to  choose  the  special  administrator  and  is  not  bound  to  appoint  the  person  named  therein  as  executor,  because  the  order  had  been  appealed  

Held:  

The  writ  prayed  for  is,  therefore,  granted,  the  appealed  order  reversed,  and  the  temporary  injunction  issued  by  the  court  made  absolute.  Let  temporary  letters  of  administration  be  

issued  in  favor  of  petitioner  during  the  pendency  of  the  appeal  from  the  order  admitting  the  will  to  probate  

Ratio:  

It  should  be  noted  at  the  outset  that  Rule  81  of  the  Rules  of  Court,  under  the  provisions  of  which  the  order  appealed  from  was  made,  grants  discretion  to  the  probate  court  to  appoint  or  not  to  appoint  a  special  administrator.  It  is  silent  as  to  the  person  that  may  be  appointed  as  special  administrator,  unlike  section  6  of  Rule  79,  which  expressly  gives  the  order  of  preference  of  the  persons  that  may  be  appointed  regular  administrator.  

We  have  held  in  the  case  of  Roxas  vs.  Pecson,  however,  that  the  appointment  of  special  administrators  is  not  governed  by  the  rules  regarding  the  appointment  of  regular  administrators.  But  we  further  held,  however,  that  while  the  choice  of  the  person  lies  within  the  court's  discretion,  such  discretion  should  not  be  a  whimsical  one,  but  one  that  is  reasonable  and  logical  and  in  accord  with  fundamental  legal  principles  and  justice.  The  fact  that  a  judge  is  granted  discretion  does  not  authorize  him  to  become  partial,  or  to  make  his  personal  likes  and  dislikes  prevail  over,  or  his  passions  to  rule,  his  judgment.  Such  discretion  must  be  based  on  reason  and  legal  principle,  and  it  must  be  exercised  within  the  limits  thereof.  

Under  these  circumstances,  it  would  seem  unreasonable  to  refuse  to  appoint  the  petitioner  as  special  administrator.  To  do  so  would  be  delaying  the  fulfillment  of  the  wishes  of  the  testator  and  subjecting  the  estate  to  unnecessary  expense  

The  case  of  In  re  Erlanger's  Estate,  242  N.Y.S.  249,  also  reiterates  the  same  principle.    The  courts  have  always  respected  the  right  to  which  a  testator  enjoys  to  determine  who  is  most  suitable  to  settle  his  testamentary  affairs,  and  his  solemn  selection  should  not  lightly  be  disregarded.  After  the  admission  of  a  will  to  probate,  the  courts  will  not  name  a  better  executor  for  the  testator  nor  disqualify,  by  a  judicial  veto,  the  widow  or  friend  or  other  person  selected  in  the  will,  except  upon  strict  proof  of  the  statutory  grounds  of  incompetency  

 

         

Cynthia  Nittscher,  Petitioner  vs.  Dr.  Werner  Karl  Johann  Nittscher  (deceased),  Atty.  Rogelio  P.  Nogales  and  the  RTC  of  Makati  (Branch  59),  Respondents  

Facts:  

-­‐ On  January  31,  1990,  Dr.  Werner  Karl  Johann  Nittscher  filed  with  the  RTC  of  Makati  City  a  petition  for  the  probate  of  his  holographic  will  and  for  the  issuance  of  letters  testamentary  to  herein  respondent  Atty.  Rogelio  P.  Nogales  

-­‐ On  September  19,  1991,  the  probate  court  allowed  the  probate  of  the  will  

-­‐ On  September  26,  1994,  Dr.  Nittscher  died.  Hence,  Atty.  Nogales  filed  a  petition  for  letters  testamentary  for  the  administration  of  the  estate  of  the  deceased  

-­‐ However,  herein  Petitioner  moved  for  the  dismissal  of  the  petition.  This  was  denied  by  the  court  and  thus,  granted  Respondent’s  petition  for  issuance  of  letters  testamentary  

-­‐ MR  was  denied  for  lack  of  merit  -­‐ Petitioner  appealed  to  the  CA  arguing  that  the  RTC  had  no  jurisdiction.  

The  appeal  was  dismissed.  MR  of  the  dismissal  of  the  appeal  was  likewise  denied  

-­‐ Hence  the  present  motion  o Petitioner  contends  that  respondent’s  petition  for  the  issuance  of  

letters  testamentary  lacked  a  certification  against  forum-­‐shopping  

o Further  argues  that  the  RTC  had  no  jurisdiction  because  the  deceased  was  not  a  resident  of  the  Philippines  nor  did  he  leave  real  properties  in  the  country  

o Lastly,  she  argues  that  the  properties  listed  for  disposition  belong  to  her  and  she  was  denied  due  process  

Issue/Held:  

-­‐ W/N  the  letters  testamentary  was  validly  issued  /  YES  

Ratio:  

-­‐ 1st  argument:  

o The  petition  for  the  issuance  of  letters  testamentary  is  not  an  initiatory  pleading,  but  a  mere  continuation  of  the  original  petition  for  the  probate  of  Dr.  Nittscher’s  will.    Hence,  respondent’s  failure  to  include  a  certification  against  forum-­‐shopping  in  his  petition  for  the  issuance  of  letters  testamentary  is  not  a  ground  for  outright  dismissal  of  the  said  petition  

-­‐ 2nd  argument:  o SECTION  1.    Where  estate  of  deceased  persons  settled.  –  If  the  

decedent  is  an  inhabitant  of  the  Philippines  at  the  time  of  his  death,  whether  a  citizen  or  an  alien,  his  will  shall  be  proved,  or  letters  of  administration  granted,  and  his  estate  settled,  in  the  Court  of  First  Instance  (now  Regional  Trial  Court)  in  the  province  in  which  he  resides  at  the  time  of  his  death,  and  if  he  is  an  inhabitant  of  a  foreign  country,  the  Court  of  First  Instance  (now  Regional  Trial  Court)  of  any  province  in  which  he  had  estate.  …  (Emphasis  supplied.)  

o In  this  case,  the  RTC  and  the  Court  of  Appeals  are  one  in  their  finding  that  Dr.  Nittscher  was  a  resident  of  Las  Piñas,  Metro  Manila  at  the  time  of  his  death  

o Hence,  applying  the  aforequoted  rule,  Dr.  Nittscher  correctly  filed  in  the  RTC  of  Makati  City,  which  then  covered  Las  Piñas,  Metro  Manila,  the  petition  for  the  probate  of  his  will  and  for  the  issuance  of  letters  testamentary  to  respondent  

-­‐ 3rd  and  4th  argument:  o We  note  that  the  deceased  asked  for  the  allowance  of  his  own  

will.  ! SEC.  4.  Heirs,  devisees,  legatees,  and  executors  to  be  

notified  by  mail  or  personally.  –  ...  If  the  testator  asks  for  the  allowance  of  his  own  will,  notice  shall  be  sent  only  to  his  compulsory  heirs  

o In  this  case,  records  show  that  petitioner,  with  whom  Dr.  Nittscher  had  no  child,  and  Dr.  Nittscher’s  children  from  his  previous  marriage  were  all  duly  notified,  by  registered  mail,  of  the  probate  proceedings  

o Petitioner  even  appeared  in  court  to  oppose  respondent’s  petition  for  the  issuance  of  letters  testamentary  and  she  also  filed  a  motion  to  dismiss  the  said  petition  

o We  are  convinced  petitioner  was  accorded  every  opportunity  to  defend  her  cause.    Therefore,  petitioner’s  allegation  that  she  was  denied  due  process  in  the  probate  proceedings  is  without  basis  

-­‐ As  a  final  word,  petitioner  should  realize  that  the  allowance  of  her  husband’s  will  is  conclusive  only  as  to  its  due  execution.  Thus,  petitioner’s  claim  of  title  to  the  properties  forming  part  of  her  husband’s  estate  should  be  settled  in  an  ordinary  action  before  the  regular  courts  

-­‐ Petition  is  DENIED  

 

Testate  Estate  of  the  late  Gregorio  Ventura  v.  Ventura  (1988)  

Case  Doctrine:  In  case  a  named  executrix  and/or  administratix  is  found  to  be  incompetent,  then  the  surviving  husband  or  wife,  as  the  case  may  be  should  be  the  new  administrator  OR  the  nearest  of  kin  OR  both.    

Facts:  

This  is  an  appeal  from  the  order  of  the  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Nueva  Ecija,  Guimba,  Branch  V  in  Special  Proceedings  No.  812,  Testate  of  the   late   Gregorio   Venture,   dated   October   5,   1965,   removing   the  appellant  Maria  Ventura  as  executrix  and  administratrix  of  the  estate  of  the   late   Gregorio   Ventura,   and   in   her   place   appointing   the   appellees  Mercedes  Ventura  and  Gregoria  Ventura  as  joint  administratrices  of  the  estate.    

 

The   paternity   of  Maria   and  Miguel  were   denied   by  Gregorio   in  his  will.    

In   1953,   Gregorio   filed   a   petition   for   the   probate   of   his   will,  which  did   not   include  Maria   and  Miguel.   In   the  will,  Maria  was   named  and  appointed  by  Gregorio  (testator)  to  be  the  executrix  of  his  will  and  administratix   of   his   estate.   Gregorio’s   will   was   admitted   probate   on  January  14,  1954,  and  he  died  on  September  26,  1955.  Maria  then  filed  a  motion  for  her  appointment  as  executrix  and  for  the  issuance  of  letters  

COMMON  LAW    or  2nd  MARRIAGE  

 Gregorio  Ventura  † + Juana Cardona  

Maria  Ventura  (appellant,  "illegit  child")  

Miguel  Ventura  (illegit  child)    

1ST  MARRIAGE  Gregorio  Ventura  †

+ Paulina Simpliciano  

Mercedes  (appellee,  legit  

child)  

Gregoria  (appelle,  legit  

child)  

testamentary   in   her   favor.   She   was   then   appointed,   and   the   letters  testamentary  were  issued  in  her  favor.    

  Maria  then  submitted  an  inventory  of  Gregorio’s  estate,  she  filed  her   accounts   of   administration   from   1955-­‐1960.   The   accounts   were  oppsed   by  Mercedes   and   Gregoria   (legitimate   children).   They   assailed  the  veracity  of  the  report,  as  it  is  not  the  true  income  of  the  estate,  and  such  expenses  are  not  administration  expenses.    

But  on  January  25,  1961,  Maria  Ventura  filed  a  motion  to  hold  in  abeyance   the   approval   of   the   accounts   of   administration   or   to   have  their  approval  without  the  opposition  of  the  spouses  Mercedes  Ventura  and   Pedro   Corpuz   and   Gregoria   Ventura   and   Exequiel   Victorio   on   the  ground   that   the   question   of   the   paternity   of   Mercedes   Ventura   and  Gregoria   Ventura   is   still   pending   final   determination   before   the  Supreme   Court   and   that   should   they   be   adjudged   the   adulterous  children  of  testator,  as  claimed,  they  are  not  entitled  to  inherit  nor  to  oppose  the  approval  of  the  counts  of  administration.    

Mercedes   filed   an   opposition,   stating   that   their   legitimacy   as  children  of  Gregorio  has  already  been  declared  by   court,   as   such,   they  have  the  right  to  protect  their  interests.  It  appears  that  on  July  12,  1963,  the  Court  set  the  case  for  pre-­‐trial  on  August  7,  1963  in  connection  with  the  accounts  of  the  executrix  Maria  Ventura  dated  June  17,  1960  and  the  Motion   to   Annul   Provision   of   Will   dated   July   14,1962   of   Mercedes  Ventura  .    

On   October   22,   1963,   four   motions   were   filed   by   Mercedes  Ventura   and   Gregoria   Ventura,   namely:   (1)   motion   to   remove   the  executrix  Maria  Ventura  which  was  supplemented  on  April  27,  1965;  (2)  motion   to   require   her   to   deposit   the   harvest   of   palay   of   the   property  under   administration   in   a  bonded  warehouse;   (3)  motion   to   render   an  accounting   of   the   proceeds   and   expenses   of   Administration;   and   (4)  motion   to   require  her   to   include   in   the   inventory  of   the  estate   certain  excluded   properties.   An   opposition   to   said   motions   was   filed   by   the  heirs   Juana   Cardona   and   Miguel   Ventura   and   by   the   executrix   Maria  Ventura  herself.    

The  grounds  of  aforesaid  joint  motions  to  remove  the  executrix  Maria  Ventura  are:      (1)  that  she  is  grossly  incompetent;    (2)  that  she  has  maliciously  and  purposely  concealed  certain  properties  of  the  estate  in  the  inventory;    (3)   that   she   is   merely   an   illegitimate   daughter   who   can   have   no  harmonious  relations  with  the  appellees;  (4)  that  the  executrix  has  neglected  to  render  her  accounts  and  failed  to  comply  with  the  Order  of  the  Court  of  December  12,  1963,  requiring  her  to  file  her  accounts  of  administration  for  the  years  1961  to  1963  and  the  Order  of  June  11,  1964,  reiterating  aforesaid  Order  of  December  12,  1963;  and    (5)   that   she   is   with   permanent   physical   defect   hindering   her   from  efficiently  performing  her  duties  as  an  executrix.  

  In   1965,   Maria   submitted   her   accounts   of   administration   from  1961-­‐1965   which   were   again   opposed   by   Gregoria   and   Mercedes  (together  with  their  husbands).  On  June  2,  1965,  the  executrix  filed  her  supplemental  opposition  to  the  aforesaid  four  motions,  and  prayed  that  the   joint   supplemental   motion   to   remove   the   executrix   be   denied   or  held   in   abeyance   until   after   the   status   of   Mercedes   and   Gregoria  Ventura  as  heirs  of   the   testator   is   finally  decided.  On  June  3,   1965,   the  Court,   finding   that   the   estate   taxes   have   not   been   paid,   ordered   the  administratrix  to  pay  the  same  within  thirty  (30)  days.    

On  September   13,   1965,   the   lower  court  denied   the  suspension  of   the   proceedings   and   deferred   the   resolution   of   the   joint  motion   to  remove   executrix   Maria   Ventura   until   after   the   examination   of   the  physical  fitness  of  said  executrix  to  undertake  her  duties  as  such.  Also,  it  ordered  the  deposit  of  all  palay  to  be  harvested  in  the  next  agricultural  year  and  subsequent  years   to  be  deposited   in  a  bonded  warehouse   to  be   selected   by   the   Court   and   the   palay   so   deposited   shall   not   be  withdrawn  without  the  express  permission  of  the  Court.  Gregoria  then  AGAIN  opposed  the  accounts  of  administration,  Mercedes  too!  Because  they  claim  that  expenses  are  fake,  exhorbitant  and  speculative.    

The  court  then  decided  that  Maria  has  squandered  the  funds  of  the   estate,  was   inefficient   and   incompetent   and  was   thus   removed   as  

executrix  and  administratix  of  the  estate.  Mercedes  and  Gregoria  were  made  joint  administrators.    

BASIC  ISSUE:  Whether  or  not  removing  Maria  as  executrix  and  administratix  is  legally  justified?  (I  just  put  all  related  issued  below,  just  in  case  Sir  asks)  –  funny  thing  is,  the  case  doesn’t  answer  this  question  directly,  it  just  stated  codal  provisions  to  qualify  the  assignment  of  a  new  administratrix.  

ISSUES:  

1. The  lower  court  erred  in  removing  Maria  as  executrix  and  administratix  without  giving  her  full  opportunity  to  be  heard  

2. The  lower  court  erred  in  finding  that  the  executrix  Maria  Ventura  had  squandered  and  dissipated  the  funds  of  the  estate  under  her  administration.  

3. The  lower  court  erred  in  finding  that  the  executrix  Maria  Ventura  was  inefficient  and  incompetent.  

4. That,  considering  the  circumtances  surrounding  the  case,  the  lower  court  erred  in  finding  that  the  failure  of  Maria  Ventura  to  submit  her  periodical  account  had  justified  her  removal  as  executrix.  

5. The  lower  court  erred  in  considering  as  an  established  fact  that  the  appellees  Mercedes  Ventura  and  Gregoria  Ventura  are  the  legitimate  daughters  of  the  deceased  Gregorio  Ventura.  

6. The  lower  court  erred  in  appointing  (even  without  a  proper  petition  for  appointment  and  much  less  a  hearing  on  the  appointment  of)  the  appellees  Mercedes  Ventura  and  Gregoria  Ventura  who  have  an  adverse  interest  as  joint  administratrices  of  the  estate  of  the  deceased  Gregorio  Ventura.  

HELD:  YES,  it  is  legally  justified.    

  Basically,  both  sets  of  children  are  claiming  that  the  other  are  illegitimate,  so  there  was  another  case  pending  with  respect  to  Gregoria  and  Mercedes’  legitimacy.  Then,  there  was  also  another  case,  also  involving  Gregoria  and  Mercedes,  brought  by  their  cousins,  saying  that  they  are  the  illegitimate  children  of  Gregorio  and  Paulina,  and  that  Gregoria  and  Mercedes  were  actually  children  of  another  man,  Teodoro  

Ventura.  The  court  settled  this  issue  and  declared  Mercedes  and  Gregoria  as  the  legitimate  children  of  Gregorio  and  Paulina.1  

Under  Article  854  of  the  Civil  Code,  "the  pretention  or  omission  of  one,  some,  or  all  of  the  compulsory  heirs  in  the  direct  line,  whether  living  at  the  time  of  the  execution  of  the  will  or  born  after  the  death  of  the  testator,  shall  annul  the  institution  of  heir;  but  the  devises  and  legacies  shall  be  valid  insofar  as  they  are  not  inofficious,"  and  as  a  result,  intestacy  follows,  thereby  rendering  the  previous  appointment  of  Maria  Ventura  as  executrix  moot  and  academic.  This  would  now  necessitate  the  appointment  of  another  administrator,  under  the  following  provision:  

Section  6,  Rule  78  of  the  Rules  of  Court:  

When  and  to  whom  letters  of  administration  granted.-­‐If  no  executor  is  named  in  the  will,  or  the  executor  or  executors  are  incompetent,  refuse  the  trust,  or  fail  to  give  bond,  or  a  person  dies  intestate,  a  petition  shall  be  granted:  

(a)  To  the  surviving  husband  or  wife,  as  the  case  may  be  or  next  of  kin,  or  both,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  or  to  such  person  as  such  surviving  husband  or  wife,  or  

                                                                                                                         1  WHEREFORE,  judgment  is  hereby  rendered  declaring  Mercedes  Ventura  and  Gregoria  Ventura  to  be  the  ligitimate  daughters  of  Paulina  Simpliciano  and  Gregorio  Ventura;  declaring  that  as  such  ligitimate  daughters  of  Paulina  Simpliciano  they  are  entitled  to  1/2  of  the  properties  described  in  paragraph  six  of  the   complaint;  ordering   the   defendant  Maria   Ventura,   as   administratrix   of   the   estate   of  Gregorio  Ventura  to  pay  to  Mercedes  Ventura  and  Gregorio  Ventura  the  amount  of  P  19,074.09  which  shall  be  divided  equally  between  Mercedes  and  Gregoria  Ventura  declaring  Mercedes  Ventura  and  Pedro  Corpuz  are  the  exclusive  owners  of  the  property  describe  in  the  certificate  of  Title  Nos.  T-­‐1102,  212,  T-­‐1213,   T-­‐1214,   Exhibits   32,   33,   34   and   35,   respectively;   ordering   Mercedes   Ventura   and   Pedro   D.  Corpuz  to  pay  to  the  conjugal  partnership  of  Gregorio  Ventura  and  Paulina  Simpliciano  the  sum  of  P100,000.00,  one-­‐half  of  which  shall  pertain  to  the  estate  of  Gregorio  Ventura  and  the  other  half  to  the  estate  of  Paulina  Simpliciano  to  whom  Mercedes  and  Gregoria  Ventura  have  succeeded,  to  be  divided   between  Mercedes   and   Gregoria   in   equal   parts;   and   dismissing   Civil   Case   No.   1476.   The  parties   are   urged   to   arrive   at   an   amicable   partition   of   the   properties   herein   adjudicated   within  twenty   days   from   receipt   of   this   decision.   Upon   their   failure   to   do   so,   the   Court   shall   appoint  commissioners   to   divide   the   properties   in   accordance   with   the   terms   of   the   decision.   Without  pronouncements  as  to  costs.    

both,  in  the  discretion  of  the  court,  or  to  such  person  as  such  surviving  husband  or  wife,  or  next  of  kin,  requests  to  have  appointed,  if  competent  and  willing  to  serve;"  

xxx  xxx  xxx  

In  the  case  at  bar,  the  surviving  spouse  of  the  deceased  Gregorio  Ventura  is  Juana  Cardona  while  the  next  of  kin  are:  Mercedes  and  Gregoria  Ventura  and  Maria  and  Miguel  Ventura.  The  "next  of  kin"  has  been  defined  as  those  persons  who  are  entitled  under  the  statute  of  distribution  to  the  decedent's  property.  It  is  generally  said  that  "the  nearest  of  kin,  whose  interest  in  the  estate  is  more  preponderant,  is  preferred  in  the  choice  of  administrator.  'Among  members  of  a  class  the  strongest  ground  for  preference  is  the  amount  or  preponderance  of  interest.  As  between  next  of  kin,  the  nearest  of  kin  is  to  be  preferred."    

As   decided   by   the   lower   court   and   sustained   by   the   Supreme  Court,   Mercedes   and   Gregoria   Ventura   are   the   legitimate   children   of  Gregorio  Ventura   and  his  wife,   the   late  Paulina  Simpliciano.   Therefore,  as  the  nearest  of  kin  of  Gregorio  Ventura  they  are  entitled  to  preference  over   the   illegitimate   children   of   Gregorio   Ventura,   namely:   Maria   and  Miguel   Ventura.   Hence,   under   the   aforestated   preference   provided   in  Section   6   of   Rule   78,   the   person   or   persons   to   be   appointed  administrator  are  Juana  Cardona,  as  the  surviving  spouse,  or  Mercedes  and  Gregoria  Ventura  as  nearest  of  kin,  or  Juana  Cardona  and  Mercedes  and   Gregoria   Ventura   in   the   discretion   of   the   Court,   in   order   to  represent  both  interests.  

MELENCIO-­‐HERRERA,  J.,  Disenting:  

Consistent  with  my  "concurrence  in  the  result"  in  Acain  vs.  IAC,  et  als.,  G.r.  No.  72706,  October  27,  1987,  preterition  results  in  total  intestacy  if  it  was  mistakenly  made  or  through  inadvertence.  In  this  case  there  was  no  mistake  nor  oversight  whatsoever.  The  testator  himself  sought  the  probate  of  his  Will  during  his  lifetime  wherein  he  not  only  excluded  his  "forced  heirs"  but  even  denied  paternity.  

Under  the  circumstances,  the  omission  being  obviously  intentional,  the  effect  is  a  defective  disinheritance  covered  by  Article  918  of  the  Civil  Code  under  which  the  institution  of  heir  is  not  wholly  void  but  only  in  so  far  as  it  prejudices  the  ligitimes  of  the  persons  disinherited.  The  nullity  is  partial  unlike  in  true  preterition  where  the  nullity  is  total.  

This  conclusion  further  finds  support  in  the  prevailing  spirit  in  the  codal  provisions,  which  is  to  make  the  intention  of  the  testator  prevail.  

 

 

 

 

 

NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL, ROSEMARIE GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATO GABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GABRIEL and FELICITAS JOSE-GABRIEL, petitioners, vs. HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, and ROBERTO DINDO GABRIEL, respondents. G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992 FACTS

• Respondent, Roberto Dindo Gabriel, filed with the RTC a petition for letters of administration alleging, among others, that he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in business, and is fully capable of administering the estate of the decedent

• respondent mentioned eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and heirs of the decedent.

• the probate court issued an order respondent as administrator

• petitioners filed their opposition praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued to respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased alleging that the latter should be preferred over private respondent

• the probate court denied the opposition of petitioners on the ground that (1) there was no evidence submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a legitimate daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that respondent is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to make his appointment inadvisable under these circumstances

• on appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court which may not be interfered with unless abused

• petitioners contended that under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the appointment of an administrator and it is petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow and legal surviving spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel who should be preferred over private respondent who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent by claimant

• they also claim that assuming that the widow is incompetent, the next of kin must be appointed. As between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is preferred, hence petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over private respondent who is an illegitimate son

• respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be appointed administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days from the death of her husband, as required under the rules

ISSUE: Who should be appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent

HELD:

• we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabrie

→ the purpose of having co-administrators is to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented, especially considering that in this proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate.

• we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as administrator.

→ The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error

→ In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private respondent. Removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may also exercise its discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply therefor within a given time. 21

• on the other hand, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less.

→ Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator

→ The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly

→ Failure of petitioner to failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days from the death of her husband is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration and there is none in the instant case.

In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay; Emilio ���A.M. Suntay III, Petitioner, vs. Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, Respondent - WALA G.R. No. 183053 16 June 2010.

ISABEL V. SAGUINSIN vs.DIONISIO LINDAYAG

Facts:

- Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo, Zambales. Her sister Isabel V. Saguinsin filed with the CFI a petition for the issuance in her favor of letters of administration over the estate of said deceased.

- Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, in his behalf and in representation of the legally adopted minors Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground lack of interest in the estate, claiming Maria was neither heir nor a creditor of the deceased. In opposing the motion to dismiss Maria the petitioner argued that only the facts alleged in the petition should be considered in determining its sufficiency.

- After due hearing on the motion, the CFI issued the order of dismissal based on the fact that the herein petitioner is obviously not an heir and has no interest in estate; and that the surviving heirs oppose the instant petition on the ground that they want to settle the estate extra-judicially among them to avoid unnecessary expenses in prosecuting this case, the Court finds the Dionisio opposition to be well taken. Petitioner submitted a motion for reconsideration but was denied thus appealed it to the SC.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is "an interested person" in the estate of deceased Maria V. Lindayag.

Held:

According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be filed an "interested person". An interested party has defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a credito. And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent.

Petitioner's interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was disputed, through a motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on the ground that said deceased was survived by him and by three legally adopted children — thus excluding petitioner as an heir. In the course of the hearing held in connection with said motion, evidence was introduced in support thereof which, according to the lower court, established that said deceased was survived not only by her husband but by three legally adopted children.

Upon these facts — which petitioner does not dispute — it is manifest that she is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate.

Petitioner's view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint or a petition is filed, only the facts alleged in the complaint or petition may be taken into account is not entirely correct. To the contrary, the rule is that at said hearing said motion may be proved or disproved in accordance with the rules of evidence, and it has been held that for that purpose, the hearing should be conducted as an ordinary hearing; and that the parties should be allowed to present evidence, except when the motion is based on the failure of the complaint or of the petition to state a cause of action. In the present case, the motion to dismiss the petition was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which, as already stated heretofore, was fully substantiated by the evidence presented during the hearing. Thus CFI is affirmed.

 

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION vs. FIDEL P. DUMLAO

Facts:

- Ricardo M. Gonzalez, District Manager of Shell Philippines, Inc. for Mindanao, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration in the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Regino Canonoy with the CFI now RTC of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, praying therein that he be appointed judicial administrator of the estate. Judge Vicente B. Echavez, Jr. issued an Order requiring that all requirements be done at cost of the petitioner in order for the petitioner to become the administrator.

- Respondents, who are heirs of Regino Canonoy, opposed such alleging that: Gonzalez is neither heir nor creditor of the estate; that his residence which is in Davao would make him an inefficient administrator being that the properties are in Butaan and he as an employee of Shell Philippines, an alleged creditor of the estate, would make him unable to properly and effectively protect the interest of the estate in case of conflicts. They, further propose that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of Regino's sons, who enjoys preference in appointment pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, be appointed administrator of the said intestate estate and be issued the corresponding letters of administration.

- The trial court (TC) appointed Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator of the intestate estate of Regino Canonoy. None of the parties moved to reconsider this order or appealed such. Petitioner Shell, filed its claim against the estate to which Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator, filed a Motion to Dismiss the claim of Shell. Shell interposes compulsory counterclaims for the estate in the amount of P659,423.49 representing rentals for land occupied by the Shell Service Station, lighting allowances, allowances for salaries and wages of service attendants,

sales commission due the deceased Regino Canonoy and reasonable attorney's fees. Petitioner filed an answer to the Counterclaim.

- Upon joinder of the issues on Shell's claim, the trial court, this time presided over by respondent Judge Fidel P. Dumlao, set the pre-trial. At the pre-trial, counsel for the administrator requested for time to file a Motion to Dismiss the case. In an Order issued on that date, the court granted him ten (10) days to file the motion; opposing counsel was likewise given ten (10) days from receipt of the same to file whatever pleading he may deem proper to file, after which the motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution.

- The motion was filed alleging that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature thereof because the petitioner here, Mr. Gonzalez, is not the "interested person" contemplated by Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court; To which Shell filed its Opposition to the Motion on the ground that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case to issue letters of administration as the interest of Gonzalez in the estate is not a jurisdictional fact that needs to be alleged in the petition. If at all, Gonzalez' lack of interest in the estate of the deceased only affected his competence to be appointed administrator.

- RTC dismissed the case and denied the motion for reconsideration.

- Shell filed the instant petition which it denominated as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

- CA reversed citing that the trial court clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the case after having set for pre-trial petitioner's amended claim against the estate. That said dismissal was predicated solely on the ground that petitioner therein, Ricardo Gonzalez, is not an "interested person," and that, since such interest is a jurisdictional requirement, thus the TC acquired no jurisdiction over the case is absolutely wrong.

Issues:

1) Whether or not the jurisdictional facts that need to be stated in a petition for letters of administration under Section 2(a), Rule 79 of the Rules of Court include the specific assertion that the petitioner therein is an "interested person," ; and

2) Whether or not the administration court may properly and validly dismiss a petition for letters of administration filed by one who is not an "interested person" after having appointed an heir of the decedent as administrator of the latter's intestate estate and set for pre-trial a claim against the said estate

Held:

In answering the first issue, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition of letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed. But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

In Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, where the dismissal of a petition for letters of administration was affirmed because the petitioner is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate. In the said case, this Court defined an interested party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent. The Saguinsin doctrine is not, however, without exception. An objection to a petition for letters of administration on that ground may be barred by waiver or estoppel.

Private respondents herein did not file a motion to dismiss the petition filed by Gonzalez on the ground of lack of capacity to sue; they instead filed an Opposition which, unfortunately, did not ask for the dismissal of the petition but merely opposed the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Gonzalez because, among other reasons, he is a stranger to the estate. The Opposition also proposed that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of the children of the deceased Regino Canonoy, be appointed administrator of the latter's intestate estate. The failure to move for a dismissal amounted to a waiver of the above-mentioned ground. Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides that:

“A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.”

However, if a motion to dismiss is not filed, as what obtains in this case, any of the grounds available for such a motion, except for improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing thereon may be had as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. Excepted from the above rules are the following grounds: (1) failure to state a cause of action which may be alleged in a later pleading if one is permitted, or by a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits; and (2) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, subject to the exception as seen in Insurance Company of North America vs. C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., wherein this Court ruled:

“Finally, appellant would contend that plaintiff has no capacity to sue and is not the real party in interest. It is now too late to raise these objections here. These should have been asserted in the motion to dismiss filed by defendant below. Not having been included therein, they are now barred by the rule on omnibus motion.”

Thus, by proposing that Bonifacio Canonoy be appointed as administrator instead of Mr. Gonzalez, private respondents have in fact approved or ratified the filing of the petition by the latter.

On the 2nd issue, there can be no dispute that the TC had acquired jurisdiction over case immediately after its filing, the trial court complied with Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court by issuing the Order dated 27 January 1973. At the initial hearing, petitioner Gonzalez

established the jurisdictional requirements by submitting in evidence proof of publication and service of notices of the petition. Thereafter, it heard the evidence on the qualifications and competence of Bonifacio Canonoy, then appointed him as the administrator and finally directed that letters of administration be issued to him, and that he takes his oath of office after putting up a surety or property bond in the amount of P5,000.00.

It is be presumed that Bonifacio Canonoy immediately qualified as administrator because in that capacity, he filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's claim against the estate, 33 a Reply to the Opposition to the motion to dismiss 34 and an Answer to the petitioner's amended claim against the estate wherein he interposed a counterclaim.

Clearly, therefore, not only had the administrator and the rest of the private respondents voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, they even expressly affirmed and invoked such jurisdiction in praying for reliefs and remedies in their favor, namely: (a) denial of Gonzalez' prayer to be appointed as administrator, (b) appointment of Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator, (c) denial of petitioner Shell's amended claim against the estate, and (d) the granting of the counterclaim. Hence, they cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction of the trial court. While it may be true that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a party who has affirmed and invoked it in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief cannot be allowed to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Order of the RTC is set aside Costs against private respondents.

 

 

VDA.  DE  CHUA  v.  CA  

FACTS:  

1) During  his  lifetime,  Roberto  Lim  Chua  lived  out  of  wedlock  with  private  respondent  Florita  A.  Vallejo  from  1970  up  to  1981.    

2) Out  of  this  union,  the  couple  begot  two  illegitimate  children,  namely,  Roberto  Rafson  Alonzo  and  Rudyard  Pride  Alonzo.  

3) On  28  May  1992,  Roberto  Chua  died  intestate  in  Davao  City.  4) On  2  July  1992,  private  respondent  filed  with  the  RTC  a  PETITION  FOR  DECLARATION  OF  

HEIRSHIP,  GUARDIANSHIP  OVERTHE  PERSONS  AND  PROPERTIES  OF  MINORS  ROBERT  RAFSON  ALONZO  SP.  PROC.  NO/  331  and  RUDYARD  PRIDE  ALONZO,  and  ISSUANCE  OF  LETTERS  OF  ADMINISTRATION.  

5) The  trial  court  issued  an  order  setting  the  hearing  of  the  petition  and  directed  that  notice  thereof  be  published  in  a  newspaper  of  general  circulation  in  the  province  of  Maguindanao  and  Cotabato  City  and  or  Davao  City.  

6) On  21  July  1992,  herein  petitioner  Antonietta  Garcia  Vda.  de  Chua,  representing  to  be  the  surviving  spouse  of  Roberto  Chua,  filed  a  Motion  to  Dismiss  2  on  the  ground  of  improper  venue.    

7) Petitioner  alleged  that  at  the  time  of  the  decedent's  death  Davao  City  was  his  residence,  hence,  the  RTC  of  Davao  City  is  the  proper  forum.  

8) On  6  August  1992,  private  respondent  Vallejo  filed  a  Motion  for  Admission  of  an  Amended  Petition.  

9) On  21  August  1992,  the  trial  court  issued  an  Order  7  denying  the  motion  to  dismiss  for  lack  of  merit.  

10)  The  court  ruled  that  Antonietta  Garcia  had  no  personality  to  file  the  motion  to  dismiss  not  having  proven  her  status  as  wife  of  the  decedent.  

11) Further,  the  court  found  that  the  actual  residence  of  the  deceased  was  Cotabato  City,  and  even  assuming  that  there  was  concurrent  venue  among  the  Regional  Trial  Courts  where  the  decedent  had  resided,  the  R.T.C.  of  Cotabato  had  already  taken  cognizance  of  the  settlement  of  the  decedent's  estate  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others.    

12) Thereafter,  petitioner  filed  a  Motion  dated  25  October  1993  10  praying  that  the  letters  of  administration  issued  to  Vallejo  be  recalled  and  that  new  letters  of  administration  be  issued  to  her.    

13) She,  likewise,  filed  a  Motion  dated  5  November  1993  11  to  declare  the  proceedings  a  mistrial.    

14) Both  motions  were  denied  by  the  trial  court  in  its  Order  dated  22  November  1993.    15) Petitioner's  MR  was  likewise  denied,  hence  this  petition.  

ISSUE:  WHETHER  THERE  IS  A  NEED  TO  PUBLISH  THE  AMENDED  PETITION  FOR  ADMINISTRATION  OF  THE  INTESTATE  ESTATE  IN  THIS  CASE  

RULING:  NO.  The  SC  held  that  the  jurisdictional  facts  required  in  a  petition  for  issuance  of  letters  of  administration  are:  (1)  the  death  of  the  testator;  (2)  residence  at  the  time  of  death  in  the  province  where  the  probate  court  is  located;  and  (3)  if  the  decedent  was  a  non-­‐resident,  the  fact  of  being  a  resident  of  a  foreign  country  and  that  the  decedent  has  left  an  estate  in  the  province  where  the  court  is  sitting.  19  

While  paragraph  4  of  the  original  petition  stating:  

(4)  That  Roberto  Lim  Chua,  father  of  the  above  mentioned  minors,  died  intestate  on  May  28,  1992  in  Davao  City.  

failed  to  indicate  the  residence  of  the  deceased  at  the  time  of  his  death,  the  omission  was  cured  by  the  amended  petitions  wherein  the  same  paragraph  now  reads:  

(4)  That  Roberto  Lim  Chua,  father  of  the  abovementioned  minors  is  a  resident  of  Cotabato  City  and  died  intestate  on  May  28,  1992  at  Davao  City.    

All  told  the  original  petition  alleged  substantially  all  the  facts  required  to  be  stated  in  the  petition  for  letters  of  administration.  Consequently,  there  was  no  need  to  publish  the  amended  petition  as  petitioner  would  insist  in  her  one  of  the  assignment  of  errors.  

Be  that  as  it  may,  petitioner  has  no  legal  standing  to  file  the  motion  to  dismiss  as  she  is  not  related  to  the  deceased,  nor  does  she  have  any  interest  in  his  estate  as  creditor  or  otherwise.    

Only  an  interested  person  may  oppose  the  petition  for  issuance  of  letters  of  administration.  An  interested  person  is  one  who  would  be  benefited  by  the  estate  such  as  an  heir,  or  one  who  has  a  claim  against  the  estate,  such  as  a  creditor;  his  interest  is  material  and  direct,  and  not  one  that  is  only  indirect  or  contingent.  21  

Petitioner  was  not  able  to  prove  her  status  as  the  surviving  wife  of  the  decedent.  The  best  proof  of  marriage  between  man  and  wife  is  a  marriage  contract  which  Antonietta  Chua  failed  to  produce.  The  lower  court  correctly  disregarded  the  photostat  copy  of  the  marriage  certificate  which  she  presented,  this  being  a  violation  of  the  best  evidence  rule,  together  with  other  worthless  pieces  of  evidence.    

G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992

NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL, ROSEMARIE GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATO GABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GABRIEL and FELICITAS JOSE-GABRIEL, petitioners, vs. HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, and ROBERTO DINDO GABRIEL, respondents.

FACTS

• Respondent, Roberto Dindo Gabriel, filed with the RTC a petition for letters of administration alleging, among others, that he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in business, and is fully capable of administering the estate of the decedent

• respondent mentioned eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and heirs of the decedent.

• the probate court issued an order respondent as administrator

• petitioners filed their opposition praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued to respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased alleging that the latter should be preferred over private respondent

• the probate court denied the opposition of petitioners on the ground that (1) there was no evidence submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a legitimate daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that respondent is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to make his appointment inadvisable under these circumstances

• on appeal, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari on the ground that the appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court which may not be interfered with unless abused

• petitioners contended that under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the appointment of an administrator and it is petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow and legal surviving spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel who should be preferred over private respondent who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent by claimant

• they also claim that assuming that the widow is incompetent, the next of kin must be appointed. As between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is preferred, hence petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over private respondent who is an illegitimate son

• respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be appointed administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days from the death of her husband, as required under the rules

ISSUE: Who should be appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent

HELD:

• we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabrie

→ the purpose of having co-administrators is to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented, especially considering that in this proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate.

• we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as administrator.

→ The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error

→ In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private respondent. Removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may also exercise its discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply therefor within a given time. 21

• on the other hand, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less.

→ Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator

→ The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly

→ Failure of petitioner to failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days from the death of her husband is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration and there is none in the instant case.

G.R.  No.  74769  September  28,  1990

BEATRIZ  F.  GONZALES,  petitioner,    vs.  HON.  ZOILO  AGUINALDO,  Judge  of  Regional  Trial  Court,  Branch  143,  Makati,  Metro  Manila  and  TERESA  F.  OLBES,  respondents.  

FACTS:  

1. Special  Proceedings  No.  021,  pending  before  the  court  a  quo,  is  an  intestate  proceeding  involving  the  estate  of  the  deceased  Doña  Ramona  Gonzales  Vda.  de  Favis.  Doña  Ramona  is  survived  by  her  four  (4)  children  who  are  her  only  heirs,  namely,  Asterio  Favis,  Beatriz  F.  Gonzales,  Teresa  F.  Olbes,  and  Cecilia  Favis-­‐Gomez.  

2. The  court  a  quo  appointed  petitioner  Beatriz  F.  Gonzales  and  private  respondent  Teresa  Olbes  as  co-­‐administratices  of  the  estate.  

3.  While  petitioner  Beatriz  F.  Gonzales  was  in  the  United  States,  private  respondent  Teresa  Olbes  filed  a  motion  to  remove  Beatriz  F.  Gonzales  as  co-­‐administratrix,  on  the  ground  that  she  is  incapable  or  unsuitable  to  discharge  the  trust  and  had  committed  acts  and  omissions  detrimental  to  the  interest  of  the  estate  and  the  heirs.    

4.  Respondent  Judge  cancelled  the  letters  of  administration  granted  to  Beatriz  F.  Gonzales  and  retained  Teresa  Olbes  as  the  administratrix  of  the  estate  of  the  late  Ramona  Gonzales  based  on  the  following  grounds:  

a. the  two  administrators  have  not  seen  eye  to  eye  with  each  other  and  most  of  the  time  they  have  been  at  loggerheads  with  each  other  to  the  prejudice  of  the  estate.    

b. Gonzales  has  been  absent  from  the  country  and  has  not  returned.  Olbes  has  been  left  alone  to  administer  the  estate.  

5. Petitioner  moved  to  reconsider.  Her  motion  was  opposed  by  private  respondents.    6. Respondent  judge  denied  petitioner’s  MR  -­‐  cancelling  the  appointment  and  the  

letters  of  administration  issued  to  Beatriz  F.  Gonzales  and  it  reiterates  the  same  for  the  best  interest  of  the  estate  of  the  deceased.    

7. Petitioner  contends  before  this  Court  that  respondent  Judge's  Order  dated  15  January  1985  should  be  nullified  on  the  ground  of  grave  abuse  of  discretion,  as  her  removal  was  not  shown  by  respondents  to  be  anchored  on  any  of  the  grounds  provided  under  Section  2,  Rule  82,  Rules  of  Court.  

ISSUE:  WoN  Petitioner  was  correctly  removed  as  co-­‐adminstratix  of  estate  

HELD:  NO  

• The  rule  is  that  if  no  executor  is  named  in  the  will,  or  the  named  executor  or  executors  are  incompetent,  refuse  the  trust,  or  fail  to  give  bond,  or  a  person  dies  intestate,  the  court  must  appoint  an  administrator  of  the  estate  of  the  deceased  5  who  shall  act  as  representative  not  only  of  the  court  appointing  him  but  also  of  the  heirs  and  the  creditors  of  the  estate.  6  In  the  exercise  of  its  discretion,  the  probate  court  may  appoint  one,  two  or  more  co-­‐administrators  to  have  the  benefit  of  their  judgment  and  perhaps  at  all  times  to  have  different  interests  represented.  

• In  the  appointment  of  the  administrator  of  the  estate  of  a  deceased  person,  the  principal  consideration  reckoned  with  is  the  interest  in  said  estate  of  the  one  to  be  appointed  as  administrator.  

o This  is  the  same  consideration  which  Section  6  of  Rule  78  takes  into  account  in  establishing  the  order  of  preference  in  the  appointment  of  administrators  for  the  estate.  The  underlying  assumption  behind  this  rule  is  that  those  who  will  reap  the  benefit  of  a  wise,  speedy,  economical  administration  of  the  estate,  or,  on  the  other  hand,  suffer  the  consequences  of  waste,  improvidence  or  mismanagement,  have  the  highest  interest  and  most  influential  motive  to  administer  the  estate  correctly.    

• Administrators  have  such  an  interest  in  the  execution  of  their  trust  as  entitle  them  to  protection  from  removal  without  just  cause.  10  Hence,  Section  2  of  Rule  82  of  the  Rules  of  Court  provides  the  legal  and  specific  causes  authorizing  the  court  to  remove  an  administrator.  

• While  it  is  conceded  that  the  court  is  invested  with  ample  discretion  in  the  removal  of  an  administrator,  it  however  must  have  some  fact  legally  before  it  in  order  to  justify  a  removal.  There  must  be  evidence  of  an  act  or  omission  on  the  part  of  the  administrator  not  conformable  to  or  in  disregard  of  the  rules  or  the  orders  of  the  court,  which  it  deems  sufficient  or  substantial  to  warrant  the  removal  of  the  administrator.  In  making  such  a  determination,  the  court  must  exercise  good  judgment,  guided  by  law  and  precedents.  

• In  the  present  case,  the  court  a  quo  did  not  base  the  removal  of  the  petitioner  as  co-­‐administratrix  on  any  of  the  causes  specified  in  respondent's  motion  for  relief  of  the  petitioner.  Neither  did  it  dwell  on,  nor  determine  the  validity  of  the  charges  brought  against  petitioner  by  respondent  Olbes.  The  court  based  the  removal  of  the  petitioner  on  the  fact  that  in  the  administration  of  the  estate,  conflicts  and  misunderstandings  have  existed  between  petitioner  and  respondent  Teresa  Olbes  which  allegedly  have  prejudiced  the  estate,  and  the  added  circumstance  that  petitioner  had  been  absent  from  the  country  since  October  1984,  and  up  to  15  January  1985,  the  date  of  the  questioned  order.  

• Certainly,  it  is  desirable  that  the  administration  of  the  deceased's  estate  be  marked  with  harmonious  relations  between  co-­‐administrators.  But  for  mere  disagreements  between  such  joint  fiduciaries,  without  misconduct,  one's  removal  is  not  favored.    

•  The  court  a  quo  failed  to  find  hard  facts  showing  that  the  conflict  and  disharmony  between  the  two  (2)  co-­‐administratrices  were  unjustly  caused  by  petitioner,  or  that  petitioner  was  guilty  of  incompetence  in  the  fulfillment  of  her  duties,  or  prevented  the  management  of  the  estate  according  to  the  dictates  of  prudence,  or  any  other  act  or  omission  showing  that  her  continuance  as  co-­‐administratrix  of  the  estate  materially  endangers  the  interests  of  the  estate.  

• Petitioner  had  never  abandoned  her  role  as  co-­‐administratrix  of  the  estate  nor  had  she  been  remiss  in  the  fullfilment  of  her  duties.  Suffice  it  to  state,  temporary  absence  in  the  state  does  not  disqualify  one  to  be  an  administrator  of  the  estate.  

• As  the  appointment  of  petitioner  Beatriz  F.  Gonzales  was  valid,  and  no  satisfactory  cause  for  her  removal  was  shown,  the  court  a  quo  gravely  abused  its  discretion  in  removing  her.  Stated  differently,  petitioner  Beatriz  F.  Gonzales  was  removed  without  just  cause.  Her  removal  was  therefore  improper.  

 

PEDRO  DE  GUZMAN,  petitioner,    -­‐versus-­‐  THE  HONORABLE  JUDGE  ZOSIMO  Z.  ANGELES,  RTC  BRANCH  58,  MAKATI,  METRO,  MANILA;  DEPUTY  SHERIFFS  JOSE  B.  FLORA  and  HONORIO  SANTOS  and  ELAINE  G.  DE  GUZMAN,  respondents  

Facts:  

• On  May  5,  1987,  private  respondent  Elaine  G.  de  Guzman  filed  a  petition  for  the  settlement  of  the  intestate  estate  of  Manolito  de  Guzman,  before  the  Regional  Trial  Court  of  Makati  

• The  petition  alleges,  among  other  things,  that:  o the  properties  left  by  the  decedent  were  acquired  after  the  marriage  of  

the  petitioner  to  the  decedent  and  therefore  are  included  in  their  conjugal  partnership  

o after  diligent  search  and  inquiry  to  ascertain  whether  the  decedent  left  a  last  will  and  testament,  none  has  been  found  and  according  to  the  best  knowledge  information  and  belief  of  the  petitioner,  Manolito  de  Guzman  died  intestate  

o the  petitioner  as  the  survey  surviving  spouse  of  the  decedent,  is  most  qualified  and  entitled  to  the  grant  of  letters  of  administration  

• On  May  22,  1987,  the  private  respondent  filed  a  motion  for  writ  of  possession  over  five  (5)  —  vehicles  registered  under  the  name  of  Manolito  de  Guzman,  alleged  to  be  conjugal  properties  of  the  de  Guzman's  but  which  are  at  present  in  the  possession  of  the  private  respondent's  father-­‐in-­‐  law,  herein  petitioner  Pedro  de  Guzman.  

o respondent  must  have  the  possession  of  said  vehicles  in  order  to  preserve  the  assets  of  her  late  husband  

• In  the  meantime,  on  May  28,  1987,  the  private  respondent  filed  her  "Ex-­‐Parte  Motion  to  Appoint  Petitioner  as  Special  Administratrix  of  the  Estate  of  Manolito  de  Guzman."  

o However,  no  notice  of  the  order  was  given  to  the  petitioner.  o the  lower  court  granted  the  private  respondent's  motion  to  be  

appointed  as  special  administratrix  • Trouble  ensued  when  the  respondents  tried  to  enforce  the  above  order.  The  

petitioner  resisted  when  Deputy  Sheriffs  Jose  B.  Flora  and  Honorio  Santos  tried  to  take  the  subject  vehicles  on  the  ground  that  they  were  his  personal  properties  

Issue:   W/N  the  court  appoint  a  special  administrator  even  before  the  court  has  caused  notice  to  be  served  upon  all  interested  parties  pursuant  to  section  3,  Rule  79  of  the  Revised  Rules  of  Court  

Held:   No  

Ratio:  

The  petitioner  contends  that  the  June  5,  1987  order  is  a  patent  nullity,  the  respondent  court  not  having  acquired  jurisdiction  to  appoint  a  special  administratrix  because  the  petition  for  the  settlement  of  the  estate  of  Manolito  de  Guzman  was  not  yet  set  for  hearing  and  published  for  three  consecutive  weeks,  as  mandated  by  the  Rules  of  Court.  The  petitioner  also  stresses  that  the  appointment  of  a  special  administratrix  constitutes  an  abuse  of  discretion  for  having  been  made  without  giving  petitioner  and  other  parties  an  opportunity  to  oppose  said  appointment  

Santos  v.  Castillo  (64  Phil.  211)  we  ruled  that  before  a  court  may  acquire  jurisdiction  over  the  case  for  the  probate  of  a  will  and  the  administration  of  the  properties  left  by  a  deceased  person,  the  application  must  allege  the  residence  of  the  deceased  and  other  indispensable  facts  or  circumstances  and  that  the  applicant  is  the  executor  named  in  the  will  or  is  the  person  who  had  custody  of  the  will  to  be  probated  

In  the  instant  case,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  respondent  court  acquired  jurisdiction  over  the  proceedings  upon  the  filing  of  a  petition  for  the  settlement  of  an  intestate  estate  by  the  private  respondent  since  the  petition  had  alleged  all  the  jurisdictional  facts,  the  residence  

of  the  deceased  person,  the  possible  heirs  and  creditors  and  the  probable  value  of  the  estate  of  the  deceased  Manolito  de  Guzman  pursuant  to  Section  2,  Rule  79  of  the  Revised  Rules  of  Court  

But…  Sige,  banat  Supreme  Court!  

We  must,  however,  differentiate  between  the  jurisdiction  of  the  probate  court  over  the  proceedings  for  the  administration  of  an  estate  and  its  jurisdiction  over  the  persons  who  are  interested  in  the  settlement  of  the  estate  of  the  deceased  person.  The  court  may  also  have  jurisdiction  over  the  "estate"  of  the  deceased  person  but  the  determination  of  the  properties  comprising  that  estate  must  follow  established  rules.    

Section  3,  Rule  79  of  the  Revised  Rules  of  Court  provides:    

Court  to  set  time  for  hearing.  —  Notice  thereof.  —  When  a  petition  for  letters  of  administration  is  filed  in  the  court  having  jurisdiction,  such  court  shall  fix  a  time  and  place  for  hearing  the  petition,  and  shall  cause  notice  thereof  to  be  given  to  the  known  heirs  and  creditors  of  the  decedent,  and  to  any  other  persons  believed  to  have  an  interest  in  the  estate,  in  the  manner  provided  in  sections  3  and  4  of  Rule  76.  

It  is  very  clear  from  this  provision  that  the  probate  court  must  cause  notice  through  publication  of  the  petition  after  it  receives  the  same.  The  purpose  of  this  notice  is  to  bring  all  the  interested  persons  within  the  court's  jurisdiction  so  that  the  judgment  therein  becomes  binding  on  all  the  world.  

Where  no  notice  as  required  by  Section  3,  Rule  79  of  the  Rules  of  Court  has  been  given  to  persons  believed  to  have  an  interest  in  the  estate  of  the  deceased  person;  the  proceeding  for  the  settlement  of  the  estate  is  void  and  should  be  annulled.  The  requirement  as  to  notice  is  essential  to  the  validity  of  the  proceeding  in  that  no  person  may  be  deprived  of  his  right  to  property  without  due  process  of  law  

Verily,  notice  through  publication  of  the  petition  for  the  settlement  of  the  estate  of  a  deceased  person  is  jurisdictional,  the  absence  of  which  makes  court  orders  affecting  other  persons,  subsequent  to  the  petition  void  and  subject  to  annulment  

DALISAY  E.  OCAMPO,  VINCE  E.  OCAMPO,  MELINDA  CARLA  E.  OCAMPO,  and  LEONARDO  E.  OCAMPO,  JR.,  Petitioners  -­‐  versus  –  RENATO  M.  OCAMPO  and  ERLINDA  M.  OCAMPO,  Respondents  

Facts:  

-­‐ Petitioners  Dalisay  E.  Ocampo  (Dalisay),  Vince  E.  Ocampo  (Vince),  Melinda  Carla  E.  Ocampo  (Melinda),  and  Leonardo  E.  Ocampo,  Jr.  (Leonardo,  Jr.)  are  the  surviving  wife  and  the  children  of  Leonardo  Ocampo  (Leonardo),  who  died  on  January  23,  2004  

-­‐ Leonardo  and  his  siblings,  respondents  Renato  M.  Ocampo  (Renato)  and  Erlinda  M.  Ocampo  (Erlinda)  are  the  legitimate  children  and  only  heirs  of  the  spouses  Vicente  and  Maxima  Ocampo,  who  died  intestate  on  December  19,  1972  and  February  19,  1996,  respectively  

o Vicente  and  Maxima  left  several  properties,  mostly  situated  in  Biñan,  Laguna.    Vicente  and  Maxima  left  no  will  and  no  debts  

-­‐ On  June  24,  2004,  five  (5)  months  after  the  death  of  Leonardo,  petitioners  initiated    a  petition  for  intestate  proceedings  

o The  petition  alleged  that,  upon  the  death  of  Vicente  and  Maxima,  respondents  and  their  brother  Leonardo  jointly  controlled,  managed,  and  administered  the  estate  of  their  parents.    Under  such  circumstance,  Leonardo  had  been  receiving  his  share  consisting  of  one-­‐third  (1/3)  of  the  total  income  generated  from  the  properties  of  the  estate.      

o However,  when  Leonardo  died,  respondents  took  possession,  control  and  management  of  the  properties  to  the  exclusion  of  petitioners.      

o The  petition  prayed  for  the  settlement  of  the  estate  of  Vicente  and  Maxima  and  the  estate  of  Leonardo.    It,  likewise,  prayed  for  the  appointment  of  an  administrator  to  apportion,  divide,  and  award  the  two  estates  among  the  lawful  heirs  of  the  decedents    

-­‐ Respondents  filed  their  Opposition  and  Counter-­‐Petition  dated  October  7,  2004,  contending  that  the  petition  was  defective  as  it  sought  the  judicial  settlement  of  two  estates  in  a  single  proceeding.    They  argued  that  the  settlement  of  the  estate  of  Leonardo  was  premature,  the  same  being  dependent  only  upon  the  determination  of  his  hereditary  rights  in  the  settlement  of  his  parents’  estate  

o In  their  counter-­‐petition,  respondents  prayed  that  they  be  appointed  as  special  joint  administrators  of  the  estate  of  Vicente  and  Maxima  

-­‐ RTC  denied  respondents’  opposition  to  the  settlement  proceedings  but  admitted  their  counter-­‐petition  

o It  appointed  Dalisay  and  Renato  as    special  joint  administrators  of  the  estate  of  the  deceased  spouses,  and  required  them  to  post  a  bond  ofP200,000.00  each  

-­‐ Respondents  filed  a  Motion  for  Reconsideration  insisting  that  Dalisay  was  incompetent  and  unfit  to  be  appointed  as  administrator  of  the  estate,  considering  that  she  even  failed  to  take  care  of  her  husband  Leonardo  when  he  was  paralyzed  in  1997  

o In  their  Supplement  to  the  Motion  for  Reconsideration,  respondents  asserted  their  priority  in  right  to  be  appointed  as  administrators  being  the  next  of  kin  of  Vicente  and  Maxima,  whereas  Dalisay  was  a  mere  daughter-­‐in-­‐law  of  the  decedents  and  not  even  a  legal  heir  by  right  of  representation  from  her  late  husband  Leonardo  

-­‐  Pending  the  resolution  of  the  Motion  for  Reconsideration,  petitioners  filed  a  Motion  to  Submit  Inventory  and  Accounting  praying  that  the  RTC  issue  an  order  directing  respondents  to  submit  a  true  inventory  of  the  estate  of  the  decedent  spouses  and  to  render  an  accounting  thereof  from  the  time  they  took  over  the  collection  of  the  income  of  the  estate  

o Respondents  filed  their  Comment  and  Manifestation  claiming  that  they  could  not  yet  be  compelled  to  submit  an  inventory  and  render  an  accounting  of  the  income  and  assets  of  the  estate  inasmuch  as  there  was  still  a  pending  motion  for  reconsideration  

-­‐ In  its  Order  dated  February  16,  2007,  the  RTC  revoked  the  appointment  of  Dalisay  as  co-­‐special  administratrix,  substituting  her  with  Erlinda.      

o The  RTC  took  into  consideration  the  fact  that  respondents  were  the  nearest  of  kin  of  Vicente  and  Maxima.    Petitioners  did  not  contest  this  Order  and  even  manifested  in  open  court  their  desire  for  the  speedy  settlement  of  the  estate  

-­‐ On  October  15,  2007,  or  eight  (8)  months  after  the  February  16,  2007  Order  appointing  respondents  as  special  joint  administrators,  petitioners  filed  a  Motion  to  Terminate  or  Revoke  the  Special  Administration  and  to  Proceed  to  Judicial  Partition  or  Appointment  of  Regular  Administrator  

o Petitioners  contended  that  the  special  administration  was  not  necessary  as  the  estate  is  neither  vast  nor  complex,  the  properties  of  the  estate  being  identified  and  undisputed,  and  not  involved  in  any  litigation  necessitating  the  representation  of  special  administrators.    

o Petitioners,  likewise,  contended  that  respondents  had  been  resorting  to  the  mode  of  special  administration  merely  to  delay  and  prolong  their  deprivation  of  what  was  due  them.      

o Petitioners  cited  an  alleged  fraudulent  sale  by  respondents  of  a  real  property  for  P2,700,000.00,  which  the  latter  represented  to  petitioners  to  have  been  sold  only  for  P1,500,000.00,  and  respondents’  alleged  misrepresentation  that  petitioners  owed  the  estate  for  the  advances  to  cover  the  hospital  expenses  of  Leonardo,  but,  in  fact,  were  not  yet  paid  

-­‐ In  its  Order  dated  March  13,  2008,  the  RTC  granted  petitioners’  Motion,  revoking  and  terminating  the  appointment  of  Renato  and  Erlinda  as  joint  special  administrators,  on  account  of  their  failure  to  comply  with  its  Order,  particularly  the  posting  of  the  required  bond,  and  to  enter  their  duties  and  responsibilities  as  special  administrators,  i.e.,  the  submission  of  an  inventory  of  the  properties  and  of  an  income  statement  of  the  estate  

o The  RTC  also  appointed  Melinda  as  regular  administratrix,  subject  to  the  posting  of  a  bond  in  the  amount  ofP200,000.00,  and  directed  her  to  submit  an  inventory  of  the  properties  and  an  income  statement  of  the  subject  estate  

-­‐ Aggrieved,  respondents  filed  a  petition  for  certiorari  under  Rule  65  of  the  Rules  of  Court  before  the  CA  

-­‐ On  December  16,  2008,  the  CA  rendered  its  assailed  Decision  granting  the  petition  based  on  the  finding  that  the  RTC  gravely  abused  its  discretion  in  revoking  respondents’  appointment  as  joint  special  administrators  without  first  ruling  on  their  motion  for  exemption  from  bond,  and  for  appointing  Melinda  as  regular  administratrix  without  conducting  a  formal  hearing  to  determine  her  competency  to  assume  as  such.      

-­‐ Petitioners  then  filed  a  MR  but  was  denied  -­‐ Hence  this  petition  

Issue/Held:  

-­‐ W/N  the  revocation  of  Respondents’  appointment  as  special  administrators  was  proper  /  YES  

 

Ratio:  

-­‐ A  special  administrator  is  an  officer  of  the  court  who  is  subject  to  its  supervision  and  control,  expected  to  work  for  the  best  interest  of  the  entire  estate,  with  a  view  to  its  smooth  administration  and  speedy  settlement  

o When  appointed,  he  or  she  is  not  regarded  as  an  agent  or  representative  of  the  parties  suggesting  the  appointment  

o The  principal  object  of  the  appointment  of  a  temporary  administrator  is  to  preserve  the  estate  until  it  can  pass  to  the  hands  of  a  person  fully  authorized  to  administer  it  for  the  benefit  of  creditors  and  heirs,  pursuant  to  Section  2  of  Rule  80  of  the  Rules  of  Court  

-­‐ While  the  RTC  considered  that  respondents  were  the  nearest  of  kin  to  their  deceased  parents  in  their  appointment  as  joint  special  administrators,  this  is  not  a  mandatory  requirement  for  the  appointment  

o It  has  long  been  settled  that  the  selection  or  removal  of  special  administrators  is  not  governed  by  the  rules  regarding  the  selection  or  removal  of  regular  administrators  

-­‐ The  probate  court  may  appoint  or  remove  special  administrators  based  on  grounds  other  than  those  enumerated  in  the  Rules  at  its  discretion,  such  that  the  need  to  first  pass  upon  and  resolve  the  issues  of  fitness  or  unfitness  and  the  application  of  the  order  of  preference  under  Section  6  of  Rule  78,  as  would  be  proper  in  the  case  of  a  regular  administrator,  do  not  obtain  

o As  long  as  the  discretion  is  exercised  without  grave  abuse,  and  is  based  on  reason,  equity,  justice,  and  legal  principles,  interference  by  higher  courts  is  unwarranted  

o The  appointment  or  removal  of  special  administrators,  being  discretionary,  is  thus  interlocutory  and  may  be  assailed  through  a  petition  for  certiorari  under  Rule  65  of  the  Rules  of  Court  

-­‐ It  is  worthy  of  mention  that,  as  early  as  October  11,  2005,  in  their  Motion  for  Appointment  as  Joint  Special  Administrators,  respondents  already  prayed  for  their  exemption  to  post  bond  should  they  be  assigned  as  joint  special  administrators  

o However,  the  RTC  effectively  denied  this  prayer  when  it  issued  its  June  15,  2006  Order,  designating  Renato  and  Dalisay  as  special  administrators  and  enjoining  them  to  post  bond  in  the  amount  of  P200,000.00  each.    This  denial  was,  in  effect,  reiterated  when  the  RTC  rendered  its  February  16,  2007  Order  substituting  Dalisay  with  Erlinda  as  special  administratrix  

o Consequently,  the  RTC  revoked  respondents’  appointment  as  special  administrators  for  failing  to  post  their  administrators’  bond  and  to  submit  an  inventory  and  accounting  as  required  of  them,  tantamount  to  failing  to  comply  with  its  lawful  orders  

-­‐ Pursuant  to  Section  1  of  Rule  81,  the  bond  secures  the  performance  of  the  duties  and  obligations  of  an  administrator  namely:  (1)  to  administer  the  estate  and  pay  the  debts;  (2)  to  perform  all  judicial  orders;  (3)  to  account  within  one  (1)  year  and  at  any  other  time  when  required  by  the  probate  court;  and  (4)  to  make  an  inventory  within  three  (3)  months.    More  specifically,  per  Section  4  of  the  same  Rule,  the  bond  is  conditioned  on  the  faithful  

execution  of  the  administration  of  the  decedent’s  estate  requiring  the  special  administrator  to  (1)  make  and  return  a  true  inventory  of  the  goods,  chattels,  rights,  credits,  and  estate  of  the  deceased  which  come  to  his  possession  or  knowledge;  (2)  truly  account  for  such  as  received  by  him  when  required  by  the  court;  and  (3)  deliver  the  same  to  the  person  appointed  as  executor  or  regular  administrator,  or  to  such  other  person  as  may  be  authorized  to  receive  them  

-­‐ Hence,  the  RTC  revoked  respondents’  designation  as  joint  special  administrators,  especially  considering  that  respondents  never  denied  that  they  have  been  in  possession,  charge,  and  actual  administration  of  the  estate  of  Vicente  and  Maxima  since  2002  up  to  the  present,  despite  the  assumption  of  Melinda  as  regular  administratrix  

o Respondents  had  already  been  distributing  the  incomes  or  fruits  generated  from  the  properties  of  the  decedents’  estate,  yet  they  still  failed  to  post  their  respective  administrators’  bonds  despite  collection  of  the  advances  from  their  supposed  shares  

o What  is  more,  respondents’  insincerity  in  administering  the  estate  was  betrayed  by  the  Deed  of  Conditional  Sale  dated  January  12,  2004    

-­‐ On  the  other  hand,  the  Court  finds  the  RTC’s  designation  of  Melinda  as  regular  administratrix  as  improper  and  abusive  of  its  discretion  

o Admittedly,  there  was  no  petition  for  letters  of  administration  with  respect  to  Melinda,  as  the  prayer  for  her  appointment  as  co-­‐administrator  was  embodied  in  the  motion  for  the  termination  of  the  special  administration  

o Thus,  the  capacity,  competency,  and  legality  of  Melinda’s  appointment  as  such  was  not  properly  objected  to  by  respondents  despite  being  the  next  of  kin  to  the  decedent  spouses,  and  was  not  threshed  out  by  the  RTC  acting  as  a  probate  court  in  accordance  with  the  above  mentioned  Rules  

-­‐ However,  having  in  mind  the  objective  of  facilitating  the  settlement  of  the  estate  of  Vicente  and  Maxima,  with  a  view  to  putting  an  end  to  the  squabbles  of  the  heirs,  we  take  into  account  the  fact  that  Melinda,  pursuant  to  the  RTC  Order  dated  March  13,  2008,  already  posted  the  required  bond  of  P200,000.00  

-­‐ These  acts  clearly  manifested  her  intention  to  serve  willingly  as  administratrix  of  the  decedents’  estate,  but  her  appointment  should  be  converted  into  one  of  special  administration,  pending  the  proceedings  for  regular  administration  

G.R. No. L-3039 December 29, 1949

VICTORIA REYNOSO and JUAN REYNOSO, petitioners, vs. VICENTE SANTIAGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, PIA REYNOSO, AGUSTINA REYNOSO, MELITON PALABRICA, LEONCIO CADIZ, ET AL., respondents

FACTS

• Leoncio Cadiz and the other heirs of Salvadora Obispo presented an application in the CFI for the administration of the property of the deceased

• Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso, Salvadora Obispo's surviving spouse and eldest son respectively, opposed the application and filed a document, which purported to be the last will and testament of Salvadora Obispo, with a counter petition for its probate

• The trial court rejected that instrument as a forgery, but on the appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the court below, found the will authentic and drawn with all the formalities of Law.

• Thereafter Victorio Reynoso And Juan Reynoso filed two petitions, one in special proceeding No. 2914 and another under a separate and new docket number (3107) and with a different title

→ The first prayed that the special administrator, Meliton Palabrica, who had theretofore been appointed in special proceeding No. 2914, be ordered to turn over the properties of the deceased and the proceeds of coprax, nuts and other agricultural products to Victorio Reynoso, and to render an accounting within a reasonable time, It also asked for the closing of the intestate proceeding

→ The other petition prayed that the estate be administered and settled in special proceeding No. 3107 and that Victorio Reynoso be appointed executor of Salvadora Obispo's last will and testament. It also contained a prayer for an accounting by Palabrica and delivery by him to the new executor of the properties that came into possession including the proceeds from the sales of coprax, nuts, etc.

• The two petitions were decided separately

→ With respect to the opening of another expediente, the lower court believed that the proposed change or substitution was " not only unnecessary but inconvenient and expensive.

→ As to the appointment of the deceased's husband as executor or administrator the court said that action on the petition should be withheld for the time being, because of the pendency on appeal of a case in which the special administrator in special proceeding No. 2914 is plaintiff and appellee and Victorio Reynoso defendant and appellant.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Reynoso should be appointed administrator in the separate action filed

HELD:

• The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will or some other cause

→ The Court of Appeals having decreed the probate of the will and the appointment of analbacea, there is no valid reason for the further retention of a special administrator.

• The appointment of a regular administrator is necessary for the prompt settlement and distribution of the estate.

→ There are important duties devolving on a regular administrator which a special administrator can not perform, and there are many actions to be taken by the court which could not be accomplished before a regular administrator is appointed

• But whether or not Victorio Reynoso should be appointed as administrator we do not and cannot of course decide in a petition for mandamus

→ While the surviving spouse is entitled to preference in the appointment (section 6, Rule 79), circumstances might warrant his rejection and the appointment of someone else.

→ Mandamus lies where the duty is specific and ministerial. It does not lie where judgment or discretion is exercised in the performance of the act. Applying the rule to this case, it is proper to command the court below to appoint a regular administrator, but it is not proper to tell it whom to appoint

 

                                           

Heirs  of  Belinda  Dahlia  A.  Castillo  v.  Lacuata-­‐Garbiel  (2005)    Facts:        

        This   is   a  petition   for   review  on  certiorari  of   the  decision  of   the  CA  denying  the  MR.         On  January  25,  1989,  Crisanta  Yanga-­‐Gabriel,  wife  of  Lorenzo  B.  Almoradie,  died  in  Malabon  City,  Metro  Manila,  leaving  behind  a  sizable  inheritance   consisting   mostly   of   real   estate   and   shares   of   stock.  Cristina’s   mother,   Cristina   Santiago   Vda.   De   Yanga   commenced   an  intestate  proceeding  before  the  RTC  Malabon  City.  She  alleged  that  her  daughter   left  an  estate  worth  P1.5M  and   it  was  being  managed  by  her  son-­‐in-­‐law  Lorenzo  and  by  two  other  equally  incompetent  persons.  She  prays   that   her   son,   Mariano   Yanga,   Cristina’s   brother   be   given   the  letters  of  administration.  This  prayer  was  eventually  granted.      

Meantime,   the   marriage   between   Crisanta   Yanga-­‐Gabriel   and  Lorenzo  Almoradie  was  declared  void  for  being  bigamous.  The  RTC  then  removed   Lorenzo   as   administrator   and   appointed   Mariano,   Jr.   in   his  stead.    

   

Cristina  Santiago  Vda.  De  Yanga  

Crisanta  Yanga-­‐Gabriel  † + Lorenzo Almoradie

(marriage void and bigamous)  

Belinda  †    (claiming  to  be  the  legitimate  child)  

Bena  Jean,  Daniel,  Melchor,    Michael,    and    Danibel,    all    surnamed  Castillo  

Roberto  Y.  Gabriel  †  (claiming  to  be  an  adopted  

child  of  Crisanta)    +  Dolores  

Mariano     Francisco  †  

On  October   16,   1989,   one   Belinda   Dahlia   Y.   Almoradie   Castillo,  claiming  to  be  the  only   legitimate  child  of  Lorenzo  and  Crisanta,  filed  a  motion  for   intervention.  Resolution  on  this  motion  was,  however,  held  in  abeyance  pending  some  incidents  in  the  CA.  

   On   November   3,   1989,   Roberto   Y.   Gabriel,   the   legally   adopted  

son  of  Crisanta  Y.  Gabriel,  filed  before  the  RTC  of  Malabon  City  a  petition  for   probate   of   an   alleged   will   and   for   the   issuance   of   letters  testamentary   in   his   favor.  He   alleged   that   he   discovered   his  mother’s  will  on  October  25,  1989  in  which  he  was   instituted  as  the  sole  heir  of  the   testatrix,   and   designated   as   alternate   executor   for   the   named  executor   therein,   Francisco   S.   Yanga,   a   brother   of   Crisanta,   who   had  predeceased  the  latter  sometime  in  1985  or  1986.    

   On  June  2,  1990,  Belinda  Castillo  died.      The  two  (2)  special  proceedings  were  consolidated.  On  May  15,  

1991,   the  RTC  issued   an   Order   dismissing   the   intestate  proceedings.     Mariano     Yanga,   Jr.     questioned     the     dismissal     of     the  intestate   proceedings   before   the   appellate   court  via  a   petition  for  certiorari.   On   July   8,   1991,   the   probate   court   appointed  Roberto   Y.  Gabriel  as  special  administrator  of  his  mother’s  estate.  On  May  23,  2001,  the   heirs   of   Belinda,   namely,   Bena   Jean,   Daniel,  Melchor,     Michael,     and     Danibel,     all     surnamed   Castillo,   filed   a  Motion  praying  that  they  be  substituted  as  party-­‐litigants  in  lieu  of  their  late  mother  Belinda,  who  died  in  1990.  

   On  April   16,   2001,   Roberto  Gabriel   died.     His  widow,  Dolores   L.  

Gabriel,   filed   a   “Manifestation   and   Motion”  where   she   informed  the  probate   court   of   her   husband’s   death   and   prayed   that   she   be  admitted  as  substitute  in  place  of  her  late  husband,  and  be  appointed  as  administratrix  of  the  estate  of  Crisanta  Gabriel  as  well.    She  alleged  that  she  had  a  bachelor’s  degree  in  law  and  had  worked  for  several  years  in  a  law   office.    On   August   14,   2001,   the   heirs   of   Belinda   opposed   Dolores’  manifestation  and  motion.  They  averred   that  Dolores  was  not  Crisanta  Gabriel’s  next  of  kin,  let  alone  the  lawful  wife  of  the  late  Roberto.  

   On  August  24,  2001,  Bena  Jean  filed  a  “Motion  for  Appointment  

as  Administrator  of  the  Estate  of  Crisanta  Y.  Gabriel”  praying  that  she  be  

appointed  administratrix  of  the  estate  of  her  grandmother  Crisanta.  On  October   11,   2001,   Dolores   opposed   the  motion   of   Bena   Jean,   claiming  that  the   latter  has  neither  proven  her  kinship  with  Crisanta  Gabriel  nor  shown  any  particular  qualification  to  act  as  administratrix  of  the  estate.    

                                                                                               On   November   28,   1991,   the   CA   dismissed   the   petition  

for  certiorari  of   Mariano   Yanga,   Jr.   in   CA-­‐G.R.   SP   No.   25897.   In   a  Resolution  dated  December  5,  2001,  the  lower  court  appointed  Dolores  as   special   administratrix   upon   a   bond   of  P200,000.00.     The   probate  court   merely   noted   the   motion   for   substitution   filed   by   the   heirs   of  Belinda,  stating   that   they  were   “mere   strangers   to   the   case.”   Dolores  was   then   appointed   as   Special   Administrator   of   Crisanta’s   estate.   The  heirs  of  Belinda  moved  to  reconsider  but  the  same  was  denied.      Issue:   Whether   or   not   the   CA   erred   in   ruling   that   Dolores  Lacuata-­‐Gabriel   is   entitled   to   administration   of   the   estate   of  Crisanta,   she   being   the   heir   of   her   deceased   husband   whose  estate   is   the   former   estate   of   his   adopting  mother   Crisanta   as  the   same   is   contrary   to   the   law   on   succession?   SO,   easily   put,  whether   or   not   it   was   proper   to   appoint   Dolores   as   special  administratix  of  the  estate  of  Crisanta  Yanga-­‐Gabriel?    

   Held:  Yes,  it  was  proper.                                          The  petitioners  argue  that  since  the  respondent  does  not  have  any  right  to   inherit   from  their  grandmother,  either  by  her  own  right  or  by   the   right   of   representation,   she   is   not   qualified   to   be   appointed   as  administratrix  of  the  estate;  in  contrast,  they  are  Crisanta  Gabriel’s  only  compulsory   heirs.     They   insist   that   the   respondent’s   late   husband,  Roberto,  was  just  a  nephew  of  the  decedent  and  not  a   legally  adopted  son   as   he   claimed   to   be.       Even   assuming  this   claim  was   true,   the   fact  that  the  respondent  is  not  naturally  related  to  the  decedent  by  blood  in  the  direct  descending   line  makes   it  unfair   to  appoint  her  as  the  special  administratrix.        

In  ruling  against  the  petitioners  and  dismissing  their  petition,  the  CA  ratiocinated  as  follows:    

   

The  appointment  of  a  special  administrator   lies  entirely   in   the   discretion   of   the   court.   The   order   of  preference   in   the   appointment   of   a   regular  administrator   under   Section   6,   Rule   78   of   the   Rules   of  Court   does   not   apply   to   the   selection   of   a   special  administrator.     In   the   issuance   of   such   appointment,  which   is  but  temporary  and  subsists  only  until  a   regular  administrator  is  appointed,  the  court  determines  who  is  entitled   to   the   administration   of   the   estate   of   the  decedent.    On  this  point,  We  hold  that  the  preference  of  private   respondent   Dolores   Gabriel   is   with   sufficient  reason.                              The  facts  of  this  case  show  that  Roberto  Gabriel  –  the   legally   adopted   son   of   Crisanta   Yanga-­‐Gabriel   –  survived   Crisanta’s   death.     When   Crisanta   died   on  January   25,   1989,  her  estate  passed  on   to  her   surviving  adopted  son  Roberto.    When  Roberto  himself   later  died  on  April  16,  2001,  pursuant  to  the  law  on  succession,  his  own  estate  which  he   inherited   from  Crisanta  passed  on  to  his  surviving  widow,  private  respondent.      

While   it   is   true,   as   petitioners   submit,   that  private   respondent   is   neither   a   compulsory   nor   a   legal  heir   of   Crisanta   Yanga-­‐Gabriel   and   is   considered   a   third  person   to   the   estate   of   Crisanta,   nonetheless,   private  respondent   is   undeniably   entitled   to   the   administration  of  the  said  estate  because  she  is  an  heir  of  her  husband  Roberto,   whose   estate   is   the   former   estate   of   his  adopting  mother  Crisanta.        The   ruling   of   the   CA   is   correct.     The   Court   has   repeatedly   held  

that   the   appointment   of   a   special   administrator   lies   in   the   sound  discretion   of   the   probate   court.  A   special   administrator   is   a  representative   of   a   decedent   appointed  by   the   probate   court   to   care  for  and  preserve  his  estate  until  an  executor  or  general  administrator  is  appointed.  When  appointed,  a  special  administrator   is  regarded  not  as   a   representative   of   the   agent   of   the   parties   suggesting   the  appointment,  but  as  the  administrator   in  charge  of  the  estate,  and,   in  

fact,   as   an   officer   of   the   court.     As   such   officer,   he   is   subject   to   the  supervision  and  control  of  the  probate  court  and   is  expected  to  work  for   the   best   interests   of   the   entire   estate,   especially   its   smooth  administration   and   earliest   settlement.  The   principal   object   of  appointment  of  temporary  administrator   is  to  preserve  the  estate  until  it  can  pass  into  hands  of  person  fully  authorized  to  administer  it  for  the  benefit   of   creditors   and   heirs.     In  many   instances,   the   appointment   of  administrators  for  the  estates  of  decedents  frequently  become  involved  in  protracted   litigations,   thereby  exposing  such  estates   to  great  waste  and  losses  unless  an  authorized  agent  to  collect  the  debts  and  preserve  the   assets   in   the   interim   is   appointed.   The   occasion   for   such   an  appointment,   likewise,   arises   where,   for   some   cause,   such   as   a  pendency   of   a   suit   concerning   the   proof   of   the   will,   regular  administration  is  delayed.      

Section  1,  Rule  80  of  the  Revised  Rules  of  Court  provides:      Section   1.    Appointment  of  Special  Administrator.  

–  When  there  is  delay  in  granting  letters  testamentary  or  of  administration  by  any  cause  including  an  appeal  from  the   allowance   or   disallowance   of   a   will,   the   court  may  appoint   a   special   administrator   to   take   possession   and  charge  of  the  estate  of  the  deceased  until  the  questions  causing   the   delay   are   decided   and   executors   or  administrators  appointed.    

       The   new   Rules   have   broadened   the   basis   for   the   appointment   of   an  administrator,  and  such  appointment  is  allowed  when  there  is  delay  in  granting   letters   testamentary   or   administration   by   any   cause,  e.g.,  parties  cannot  agree  among  themselves.    Nevertheless,   the  discretion  to  appoint  a  special  administrator  or  not  lies  in  the  probate  court.  In  De  Guzman  v.  Guadiz,  Jr.,  the  Court  further  elucidated  –  

         Under   the   above   rule,   the   probate   court   may  

appoint  a  special  administrator    should  there  be  a  delay  in   granting   letters   testamentary   or   of   administration  occasioned   by   any   cause   including   an   appeal   from   the  

allowance   or   disallowance   of   a   will.   Subject   to   this  qualification,  the  appointment  of  a  special  administrator  lies   in   the   discretion   of   the   Court.   This   discretion,  however,   must   be   sound,   that   is,   not   whimsical,   or  contrary  to  reason,  justice,  equity  or  legal  principle.        

The   basis   for   appointing   a   special   administrator  under  the  Rules  is  broad  enough  to  include  any  cause  or  reason  for   the  delay   in  granting   letters   testamentary  or  of   administration   as   where   a   contest   as   to   the   will   is  being   carried   on   in   the   same   or   in   another   court,   or  where   there   is   an  appeal  pending  as   to   the  proceeding  on   the   removal   of   an   executor   or   administrator,   or   in  cases   where   the   parties   cannot   agree   among  themselves.     Likewise,   when   from   any   cause   general  administration  cannot  be  immediately  granted,  a  special  administrator  may  be  appointed  to  collect  and  preserve  the  property  of  the  deceased.      

It   is   obvious   that   the   phrase   “by   any   cause”  includes   those   incidents  which   transpired   in   the   instant  case  clearly  showing  that  there  is  a  delay  in  the  probate  of  the  will  and  that  the  granting  of  letters  testamentary  will   consequently   be   prolonged   necessitating   the  immediate  appointment  of  a  special  administrator.    

                                       As   enunciated  above,   the  probate   court  has   ample   jurisdiction  to  appoint   respondent  as  special  administratrix.  The  deceased  Crisanta  Yanga-­‐Gabriel   left   a   document   purporting   to   be   her   will   where   her  adopted  son,  Roberto,  was  named  as  the  sole  heir  of  all  her  properties.  However,  pending  probate  of  the  will,  Roberto  died  leaving  his  widow,  the  respondent  herein,  as  his  sole  heir.    Thus,  the  respondent  has  much  stake   in  Crisanta’s   estate   in   case   the   latter’s  will   is   allowed  probate.   It  needs   to   be   emphasized   that   in   the   appointment   of   a   special  administrator   (which   is  but   temporary  and  subsists  only  until   a   regular  administrator  is  appointed),  the  probate  court  does  not  determine  the  shares  in  the  decedent’s  estate,  but  merely  appoints  who  is  entitled  to  administer   the  estate.  The   issue  of  heirship   is  one  to  be  determined   in  

the   decree   of   distribution,   and   the   findings   of   the   court   on  the  relationship  of  the  parties  in  the  administration  as  to  be  the  basis  of  distribution.  Thus,   the   preference   of   respondent   is   sound,   that   is,   not  whimsical,  or  contrary  to  reason,  justice,  equity  or  legal  principle.                                      The   petitioners’   strenuous   invocation   of   Section   6,   Rule   78   of  the   Rules   of   Court   is  misplaced.    The   rule   refers   to   the   appointment   of  regular   administrators   of   estates;   Section   1,   Rule   80,   on   the   other   hand,  applies   to   the  appointment  of  a   special   administrator.       It  has   long  been  settled  that   the  appointment  of  special  administrators   is  not  governed  by  the  rules  regarding  the  appointment  of  regular  administrators.  Thus,  in  Roxas  v.  Pecson,  this  Court  ruled:    It  is  well  settled  that  the  statutory  provisions  as  to  the  prior  or  preferred  right  of  certain  persons  to  the  appointment  of  administrator  under  Section  1,  Rule  81,  as  well  as  the  statutory  provisions  as  to  causes  for  removal  of  an  executor  or  administrator  under  section  653  of  Act  No.  190,  now  Section  2,  Rule  83,  do  not  apply  to  the  selection  or  removal  of  special  administrator.  ...  As  the  law  does  not  say  who  shall  be  appointed  as  special  administrator  and  the  qualifications  the  appointee  must  have,  the  judge  or  court  has  discretion  in  the  selection  of  the  person  to  be  appointed,  discretion  which  must  be  sound,  that  is,  not  whimsical  or  contrary  to  reason,  justice  or  equity.  

 

ROWENA  F.  CORONA,  petitioner,    vs.  THE  COURT  OF  APPEALS,  ROMARICO  G.  VITUG,  AVELINO  L.  CASTILLO,  NICANOR  CASTILLO,  KATHLEEN  D.  LUCHANGCO,  GUILLERMO  LUCHANGCO,  JR.,  ANTONIO  LUCHANGCO,  RODOLFO  TORRES,  REYNALDO  TORRES  and  PURISIMA  T.  POLINTAN,  respondents.    

Facts:  

- Dolores  Luchangco  Vitug  died  in  New  York,  U.S.A.,  leaving  two  Wills:  one,  a  holographic  Will  which  excluded  her  husband,  and  

the  other,  a  formal  Will  which  expressly  disinherited  her  husband  Romarico  "for  reason  of  his  improper  and  immoral  conduct  amounting  to  concubinage,  which  is  a  ground  for  legal  separation  under  Philippine  Law";  bequeathed  her  properties  in  equal  shares  to  her  sisters  and  her  nieces;  and  appointed  Rowena  F.  Corona,  herein  petitioner,  as  her  Executrix.    

- Rowena  filed  a  petition  for  the  probate  of  the  Wills  and  for  the  appointment  of  Nenita  P.  Alonte  as  Administrator  because  she  (Rowena)  is  presently  employed  in  the  United  Nations  in  New  York  City.    

- The  surviving  husband,  Romarico  Vitug,  filed  an  opposition  praying  for  his  appointment  as  Special  Administrator  because  the  Special  Administratrix  appointed  is  not  related  to  the  heirs  and  has  no  interest  to  be  protected,  besides,  the  surviving  spouse  is  qualified  to  administer.    

- The  Probate  Court  set  aside  its  Order  appointing  Nenita  as  Special  Administratrix,  and  appointed  instead  the  surviving  husband,  Romarico  as  Special  Administrator  essentially  for  the  reasons  that  under  Section  6,  Rule  78,  of  the  Rules  of  Court,  the  surviving  spouse  is  first  in  the  order  of  preference  for  appointment  as  Administrator  as  he  has  an  interest  in  the  estate;  that  the  disinheritance  of  the  surviving  spouse  is  not  among  the  grounds  of  disqualification  for  appointment  as  Administrator;  that  the  next  of  kin  is  appointed  only  where  the  surviving  spouse  is  not  competent  or  is  unwilling  to  serve  besides  the  fact  that  the  Executrix  appointed,  is  not  the  next  of  kin  but  merely  a  niece,  and  that  the  decedent's  estate  is  nothing  more  than  half  of  the  unliquidated  conjugal  partnership  property.    

- Petitioner  moved  for  reconsideration  with  an  alternate  Motion  for  the  appointment  of  co-­‐Special  Administrators  to  which  private  respondents  filed  their  Opposition.  Reconsideration  having  been  denied,  petitioner  resorted  to  a  Petition  for  certiorari  before  the  Court  of  Appeals.  The  Court  of  Appeals  dismissed  the  Petition  stating  that  the  Probate  Court  strictly  observed  the  order  of  preference  established  by  the  Rules  

Issue:  Whether  Nenite  Alonte,  a  stranger  to  the  estate,  can  be  appointed  as  the  administrator?  

Ruling:  Yes.    

- The  Court  is  of  the  considered  opinion  that  petitioner's  nominee,  Nenita  F.  Alonte,  should  be  appointed  as  co-­‐Special  Administrator.  The  executrix's  choice  of  Special  Administrator,  considering  her  own  inability  to  serve  and  the  wide  latitude  of  discretion  given  her  by  the  testatrix  in  her  Will,  is  entitled  to  the  highest  consideration.  Objections  to  Nenita's  appointment  on  grounds  of  impracticality  and  lack  of  kinship  are  over-­‐shadowed  by  the  fact  that  justice  and  equity  demand  that  the  side  of  the  deceased  wife  and  the  faction  of  the  surviving  husband  be  represented  in  the  management  of  the  decedent's  estate.    

- En  passant,  it  is  apropos  to  remind  the  Special  Administrators  that  while  they  may  have  respective  interests  to  protect,  they  are  officers  of  the  Court  subject  to  the  supervision  and  control  of  the  Probate  Court  and  are  expected  to  work  for  the  best  interests  of  the  entire  estate,  its  smooth  administration,  and  its  earliest  settlement.    

 

Vda. De Dayrit v. Ramolete - WALA G.R. No. L-59935 30 September 1982  

Co.  vs  Hon.  Rosario  

Facts:  

RTC  of  Makati  appointed  Luis  Co  as  a  special  administrator  of  the  estate  of  his  father,  Co  Bun  Chun.    However,  the  other  heirs  of  the  deceased,  filed  a  motion  to  set  aside  the  appointment  of  Co,  and  this  was  acted  upon  by  the  trial   court.   Consequently,   Co   nominated   his   son   Alvin   to   be   a   co-­‐administrator  of   the  estate.  The  trial  court  then,  appointed  Alvin  as  a  co-­‐administrator.  

Almost   four  years   thereafter,   the  RTC,  acting  on  a  motion  filed  by  one  of  the  heirs,  issued  its  January  22,  2002  Order  revoking  and  setting  aside  the  appointment   of   Alvin.   The   trial   court   reasoned   that   Alvin   had   become  unsuitable  to  discharge  the  trust  given  to  him  as  special  co-­‐administrator  because  his  capacity,  ability  or  competence  to  perform  the  functions  of  co-­‐administrator   had   been   beclouded   by   the   filing   of   several   criminal   cases  against  him,  which,  even  if  there  was  no  conviction  yet,  had  provided  the  heirs  ample  reason  to  doubt  his   fitness   to  handle  the  subject  estate  with  utmost  fidelity,  trust  and  confidence.  

Aggrieved,  petitioner  moved  for  the  reconsideration  of  the  said  Order,  but  this  was  denied  in  the  RTC  Order.  Subsequently,  petitioner  brought  the  matter  to  the  CA  on  petition  for  certiorari  under  Rule  65.  In  the  aforesaid  challenged  Decision,  the  appellate  court  affirmed  the  revocation  of  the  appointment  and  dismissed  the  petition.  Thus,  the  instant  petition  for  review  on  certiorari  under  Rule  45.  

 

Issue:  W/N  the  trial  court  acted  with  grave  abuse  of  discretion  in  revoking  the  appointment  and  if  can  be  reviewable  under  petitions  for  review  on  certiorari.  

Held:  No.  the  trial  court  did  not  act  with  grave  abuse  of  discretion  in  revoking  Alvin's  appointment  as  special  co-­‐administrator.  Settled  is  the  rule  that  the  selection  or  removal  of  special  administrators  is  not  governed  by  the  rules  regarding  the  selection  or  removal  of  regular  administrators.  Courts  may  appoint  or  remove  special  administrators  based  on  grounds  other  than  those  enumerated  in  the  Rules,  at  their  discretion.  As  long  as  the  said  discretion  is  exercised  without  grave  abuse,  higher  courts  will  not  interfere  with  it.  This,  however,  is  no  authority  for  the  judge  to  become  partial,  or  to  make  his  personal  likes  and  dislikes  prevail  over,  or  his  passions  to  rule,  his  judgment.  The  exercise  of  such  discretion  mustbe  based  on  reason,  equity,  justice  and  legal  principles.    Thus,  even  if  a  special  administrator  had  already  been  appointed,  once  the  court  finds  the  appointee  no  longer  entitled  to  its  confidence,  it  is  justified  in  withdrawing  the  appointment  and  giving  no  valid  effect  thereto.  The  special  administrator  is  an  officer  of  the  court  who  is  subject  to  its  

supervision  and  control  and  who  is  expected  to  work  for  the  best  interest  of  the  entire  estate,  especially  with  respect  to  its  smooth  administration  and  earliest  settlement.  

In  this  case,  we  find  that  the  trial  court's  judgment  on  the  issue  of  Alvin's  removal  as  special  co-­‐administrator  is  grounded  on  reason,  equity,  justice  and   legal   principle.   It   is   not   characterized   by   patent   and   gross  capriciousness,  pure  whim  and  abuse,  arbitrariness  or  despotism,  as  to  be  correctible  by  the  writ  of  certiorari.