THIRD DIVISIONOFELIA C. CAUNAN,Petitioner,- versus -PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINESand SANDIGANBAYAN,Respondents.X - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - XJOEY P. MARQUEZ,Petitioner,- versus -THE SANDIGANBAYAN-FOURTH DIVISION and PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,Respondents.G.R. Nos. 181999 & 182001-04G.R. Nos. 182020-24Present:YNARES-SANTIAGO,J.,Chairperson,CHICO-NAZARIO,VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA, andPERALTA,JJ.Promulgated:September 2, 2009

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------xDECISIONNACHURA,J.:At bar are consolidated petitions for review oncertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which assail the Decision[1]dated August 30, 2007 and Resolution[2]dated March 10, 2008 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 27944, 27946, 27952, 27953, & 27954, finding petitioners Joey P. Marquez (Marquez) and Ofelia C. Caunan (Caunan) guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.Marquez and Caunan, along with four (4) other local government officials ofParaaqueCity[3]and private individual Antonio Razo (Razo), were charged under five (5) Informations, to wit:The Information in Criminal Case No. 27944 states:That on January 11, 1996 or thereabout, in Paraaque City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Public OfficersJOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the City Mayor of Paraaque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with the members of the aforesaid Committee, namely:SILVESTRE DE LEON, being then the City Treasurer,MARILOU TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26),FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget Officer (SG 26),OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services Office (SG 26) andAILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff, Office of the Mayor(SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and with the accused private individualANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZARO Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions, through personal canvass, with said ZARO Trading, for the purchase of 5,998 pieces of walis ting-ting atP25 per piece as per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-96-12-8629 in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY-NINE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS (P149,950.00), without complying with the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on Procurement and Public Bidding, and which transactions were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the walis ting-ting was onlyP11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a difference, therefore, ofP14.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO PESOS (P83,972.00), thus, causing damage and prejudice to the government in the aforesaid sum.The Information in Criminal Case No. 27946 states:That on June 30, 1997 or thereabout, inParaaque City,Philippinesand within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Public OfficersJOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the City Mayor of Paraaque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with members of the aforesaid committee, namely:SILVESTRE DE LEON, being then the City Treasurer,MARILOU TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26),FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget officer (SG 26),OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services Office (SG 26) andAILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff, Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and with accused private individualANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZAR[O] Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions, through personal canvass, with ZAR[O] Trading for the purchase of 23,334 pieces of walis ting-ting atP15.00 per piece as per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-98-02-447 in the total amount of THREE HUNDRED FIFTY THOUSAND TEN PESOS (P350,010.00), without complying with the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on Procurement and Public Bidding, and which transactions were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the walis ting-ting was onlyP11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a difference, therefore, ofP4.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of NINETY THREE THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED THIRTY SIX PESOS (P93,336.00), thus causing damage and prejudice to the government in the aforesaid sum.The Information in Criminal Case No. 27952 states:That [in] September 1997, or thereabout, in Paraaque City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Public OfficersJOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the City Mayor of Paraaque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with members of the aforesaid committee, namely:SILVESTRE DE LEON, being then the City Treasurer,MARILOU TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26),FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget officer (SG 26),OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services Office (SG 26) andAILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff, Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and with accused private individualANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZAR[O] Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions, through personal canvass, with ZAR[O] Trading for the purchase of 8,000 pieces of walis ting-ting atP15.00 per piece as per Disbursement Voucher No. 101-98-02-561 in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P120,000.00), without complying with the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on Procurement and Public Bidding, and which transactions were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the walis ting-ting was onlyP11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a difference, therefore, ofP4.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of THIRTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P32,000.00), thus causing damage and prejudice to the government in the aforesaid sum.The Information in Criminal Case No. 27953 states:That during the period from February 11, 1997 to February 20, 1997, or thereabout, in Paraaque City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Public OfficersJOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the City Mayor of Paraaque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with members of the aforesaid committee, namely:SILVESTRE DE LEON, being then the City Treasurer,MARILOU TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26),FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA,the City Budget officer (SG 26),OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services office (SG 26) andAILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff, Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advance of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and with accused private individualANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZAR[O] Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions, through personal canvass, with ZAR[O] Trading for the purchase of 10,100 pieces of walis ting-ting on several occasions atP25.00 per piece without complying with the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on procurement and Public Bidding and which purchases are hereunder enumerated as follows:Date of TransactionVoucher No.AmountQuantity

February 20, 1997101-97-04-1755P3,000.00120 pcs.

February 12, 1997101-97-04-1756P100,000.004,000 pcs.

February 11, 1997101-97-04-1759P149,500.005,980 pcs.

in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED FIFTY TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P252,000.00), and which transactions were clearly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the walis ting-ting was only P11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a difference, therefore, ofP14.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of ONE HUNDRED FORTY ONE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED PESOS (P141,400.00), thus, causing damage and prejudice to the government in the aforesaid sum.The Information in Criminal Case No. 27954 states:That during the period from October 15, 1996 to October 18, 1996 or thereabout, inParaaque City,Philippinesand within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Public OfficersJOEY P. MARQUEZ, a high ranking public official, being the City Mayor of Paraaque City and Chairman, Committee on Awards, together with members of the aforesaid committee, namely:SILVESTRE DE LEON, being then the City Treasurer,MARILOU TANAEL, the City Accountant (SG 26),FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, the City Budget officer(SG 26),OFELIA C. CAUNAN, the OIC General Services Office (SG 26) andAILYN ROMEA, the Head Staff, Office of the Mayor (SG 26), acting as such and committing the offense in relation to their official duties and taking advantage of their official positions, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another and with accused private individualANTONIO RAZO, the owner and proprietor of ZAR[O] Trading, a business entity registered with the Bureau of Domestic Trade and Industry, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality (or at the very least, with gross inexcusable negligence), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into manifestly and grossly disadvantageous transactions, through personal canvass, with ZAR[O] Trading for the purchase of 8,000 pieces of walis ting-ting on several occasions atP25.00 per piece without complying with the Commission on Audit (COA) Rules and Regulations and other requirements on procurement and Public Bidding and which purchases are hereunder enumerated as follows:Date of TransactionVoucher NumberAmountQuantity

October 15, 1996101-96-11-7604P100,000.004,000 pcs.

October 18, 1996101-96-11-7605P100,000.004,000 pcs.

in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), and which transactions were clearly grossly overpriced as the actual cost per piece of the walis ting-ting was onlyP11.00 as found by the Commission on Audit (COA) in its Decision No. 2003-079 dated May 13, 2003 with a difference, therefore, ofP14.00 per piece or a total overpriced amount of ONE HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P112,000.00), thus, causing damage and prejudice to the government in the aforesaid sum.[4]The five (5) Informations were filed based on the findings of the Commission on Audit (COA) Special Audit Team that there was overpricing in certain purchase transactions ofParaaqueCity. In March 1999, a Special Audit Team composed of Fatima Bermudez (Bermudez), Carolina Supsup, Gerry Estrada, and Yolando Atienza, by virtue of Local Government Audit Office Assignment Order No. 99-002, audited selected transactions ofParaaqueCityfor the calendar years 1996 to 1998, including thewalis tingtingpurchases.In connection with thewalis tingtingpurchases audit, the audit team gathered the following evidence:1.Documents furnished by the Office of the City Mayor of Paraaque City upon request of the audit team;2.Samplewalis tingtingwith handle likewise submitted by the Office of the City Mayor of Paraaque City;3.Samples ofwalis tingtingwithout handle actually utilized by the street sweepers upon ocular inspection of the audit team;4.Survey forms accomplished by the street sweepers containing questions on thewalis tingting;5.Evaluation by the Technical Services Department[5]of the reasonableness of thewalis tingtingprocurement compared to current prices thereof;

6.A separate canvass by the audit team on the prices of thewalis tingting, including purchases thereof at various merchandising stores;[6]and7.Documents on the conduct and process of procurement ofwalis tingtingby the neighboring city ofLas Pias.Parenthetically, to ascertain the prevailing price ofwalis tingtingfor the years 1996 to 1998, the audit team made a canvass of the purchase prices of the different merchandise dealers ofParaaqueCity. All, however, were reluctant to provide the team with signed quotations of purchase prices forwalis tingting. In addition, the audit team attempted to purchasewalis tingtingfrom the named suppliers ofParaaqueCity. Curiously, when the audit team went to the listed addresses of the suppliers, these were occupied by other business establishments. Thereafter, the audit team located, and purchased from, a lone supplier that soldwalis tingting.As previously adverted to, the audit team made a report which contained the following findings:1.The purchase ofwalis tingtingwas undertaken without public bidding;2.The purchase ofwalis tingtingwas divided into several purchase orders and requests to evade the requirement of public bidding and instead avail of personal canvass as a mode of procurement;3.The purchase ofwalis tingtingthrough personal canvass was attended with irregularities; and4.There was glaring overpricing in the purchase transactions.Consequently, the COA issued Notices of Disallowance Nos. 01-001-101 (96) to 01-006-101 (96), 01-001-101 (97) to 01-011-101 (97), and 01-001-101 (98) to 01-004-101 (98) covering the overpriced amount ofP1,302,878.00 for the purchases of 142,612walis tingting, with or without handle, by Paraaque City in the years 1996-1998.[7]Objecting to the disallowances, petitioners Marquez and Caunan, along with the other concerned local government officials ofParaaqueCity, filed a request for reconsideration with the audit team which the latter subsequently denied in a letter to petitioner Marquez.Aggrieved, petitioners and the other accused appealed to the COA which eventually denied the appeal. Surprisingly, on motion for reconsideration, the COA excluded petitioner Marquez from liability for the disallowances based on our rulings inArias v. Sandiganbayan[8]andMagsuci v. Sandiganbayan.[9]On the other litigation front, the criminal aspect subject of this appeal, the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioners and the other local government officials ofParaaqueCityfor violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. Consequently, the five (5) Informations against petitioners,et al. were filed before the Sandiganbayan.After trial and a flurry of pleadings, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment finding petitioners Caunan and Marquez, along with Silvestre de Leon and Marilou Tanael, guilty of violating Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019. As for accused Flocerfida Babida, Ailyn Romea and private individual Razo, the Sandiganbayan acquitted them for lack of sufficient evidence to hold them guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged. The Sandiganbayan ruled as follows:1.The prosecution evidence, specifically the testimony of Bermudez and the Special Audit Teams report, did not constitute hearsay evidence, considering that all the prosecution witnesses testified on matters within their personal knowledge;2.The defense failed to question, and timely object to, the admissibility of documentary evidence, such as the Las Pias City documents and the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) price listing downloaded from the Internet, which were certified true copies and not the originals of the respective documents;3.The Bids and Awards Committee was not properly constituted; the accused did not abide by the prohibition against splitting of orders; and Paraaque City had not been afforded the best possible advantage for the most objective price in the purchase ofwalis tingtingfor failure to observe the required public bidding;4.The contracts for procurement ofwalis tingtingin Paraaque City for the years 1996-1998 were awarded to pre-selected suppliers; and5.On the whole, the transactions undertaken were manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.Expectedly, the remaining accused, Caunan, Marquez and Tanael, moved for reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan decision. Caunan and Tanael, represented by the same counsel, collectively filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Written Notice of Death of Accused Silvestre S. de Leon). Marquez filed several motions,[10]including a separate Motion for Reconsideration.All the motions filed by Marquez, as well as Caunans motion, were denied by the Sandiganbayan. However, with respect to Tanael, the Sandiganbayan found reason to reconsider her conviction.Hence, these separate appeals by petitioners Marquez and Caunan.Petitioner Caunan posits the following issues:1.[WHETHER] THE PROSECUTIONS PROOF OF OVERPRICING [IS] HEARSAY.2.[WHETHER THE] RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN [ERRED] IN ADMITTING WITNESS FATIMA V. BERMUDEZ TESTIMONY DESPITE THE FACT THAT ITS SOURCES ARE THEMSELVES ADMITTEDLY AND PATENTLY HEARSAY.3.[WHETHER THE] RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY [ERRED] IN APPLYING AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE[.] UNDER THIS EXCEPTION, PUBLIC DOCUMENTS CONSISTING OF ENTRIES IN PUBLIC RECORDS, ETC., x x x ARE PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF THE FACTS STATED THEREIN.4.CONSEQUENTLY, [WHETHER] RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING [CAUNAN].[11]For his part, petitioner Marquez raises the following:1.WHETHER [MARQUEZ] MUST BE ACQUITTED FROM THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES BASED ON THE DOCTRINES LAID DOWN IN THE ARIAS AND MAGSUCI CASES EARLIER DECIDED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT AND THE PERTINENT PROVISIONS OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE AND OTHER EXISTING REGULATIONS[;]2.WHETHER [MARQUEZ] MUST BE ACQUITTED FROM THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES SINCE HE WAS ALREADY EXCLUDED FROM LIABILITY BY THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT[;]3.WHETHER THE ACQUITTAL OF CO-ACCUSED 1) SUPPLIER ANTONIO RAZO WHO WAS THE OTHER PARTY TO, AND RECEIVED THE TOTAL AMOUNT OF, THE QUESTIONED CONTRACTS OR TRANSACTIONS, 2) CITY ACCOUNTANT MARILOU TANAEL WHO PRE-AUDITED THE CLAIMS AND SIGNED THE VOUCHERS, 3) CITY BUDGET OFFICER FLOCERFIDA M. BABIDA, AND 4) HEAD OF STAFF AILYN ROMEA CASTS A BIG CLOUD OF DOUBT ON THE FINDING OF [MARQUEZS] GUILT BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN FOURTH DIVISION[;]4.WHETHER [MARQUEZ] CAN BE CONVICTED ON PLAIN HEARSAY, IF NOT DUBIOUS EVIDENCE OF OVERPRICING OR ON MERE CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE THAT DO NOT AMOUNT TO PROOF OF GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT IN THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES[;]5.WHETHER THE ALLEGED OVERPRICING WHICH WAS THE BASIS FOR CLAIMING THAT THE CONTRACTS OR TRANSACTIONS ENTERED INTO BY [MARQUEZ] IN BEHALF OF PARAAQUE CITY WERE MANIFESTLY AND GROSSLY DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT WAS ASCERTAINED OR DETERMINED WITH REASONABLE CERTAINTY IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OR PROCEDURES PRESCRIBED UNDER COA MEMORANDUM NO. 97-012 DATED MARCH 31, 1997[;]6.WHETHER THE QUANTUM OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE HAS OVERCOME THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE WHICH [MARQUEZ] ENJOYS IN THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES[;]7.WHETHER THE RIGHT OF [MARQUEZ] TO DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED WHEN THE CHAIRMAN (JUSTICE GREGORY ONG) OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN FOURTH DIVISION REFUSED TO INHIBIT DESPITE SERIOUS CONFLICT OF INTEREST[;]8.WHETHER [MARQUEZ] IS ENTITLED TO THE REOPENING OF THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES[;]9.WHETHER THE RIGHT OF [MARQUEZ] TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM WAS VIOLATED WHEN INSTEAD OF ONLY ONE OFFENSE, SEVERAL INFORMATION HAD BEEN FILED IN THE TRIAL COURT ON THE THEORY OF OVERPRICING IN THE PROCUREMENT OF BROOMSTICKS (WALIS TINGTING) BY WAY OF SPLITTING CONTRACTS OR PURCHASE ORDERS[; and]10.WHETHER [MARQUEZ] IS ENTITLED TO NEW TRIAL SINCE HIS RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL TRIAL WAS VIOLATED IN THE SUBJECT CRIMINAL CASES WHEN THE CHAIRMAN (JUSTICE GREGORY ONG) REFUSED TO INHIBIT DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF SERIOUS CONFLICT OF INTEREST RAISED BY THE FORMER BEFORE THE JUDGMENT BECAME FINAL.[12]In a Resolution dated February 23, 2009, we directed the consolidation of these cases. Thus, we impale petitioners issues for our resolution:1.First and foremost, whether the Sandiganbayan erred in finding petitioners guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.2.Whether the testimony of Bermudez and the report of the Special Audit Team constitute hearsay and are, therefore, inadmissible in evidence against petitioners.3.Whether petitioner Marquez should be excluded from liability based on our rulings inArias v. Sandiganbayan[13]andMagsuci v. Sandiganbayan.[14]Both petitioners insist that the fact of overpricing, upon which the charge against them of graft and corruption is based, had not been established by the quantum of evidence required in criminal cases,i.e.,proof beyond reasonable doubt.[15]Petitioners maintain that the evidence of overpricing, consisting of the report of the Special Audit Team and the testimony thereon of Bermudez, constitutes hearsay and, as such, is inadmissible against them. In addition, petitioner Marquez points out that the finding of overpricing was not shown to a reliable degree of certainty as required by COA Memorandum No. 97-012 dated March 31, 1997.[16]In all, petitioners asseverate that, as the overpricing was not sufficiently established, necessarily, the last criminal element of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019a contract or transaction grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the governmentwas not proven.Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 provides:Section 3.Corrupt practices of public officersIn addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:x x x x(g)Entering on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction, manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper, the following elements must be present: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.[17]The presence of the first two elements of the crime is not disputed. Hence, the threshold question we should resolve is whether thewalis tingtingpurchase contracts were grossly and manifestly injurious or disadvantageous to the government.We agree with petitioners that the fact of overpricing is embedded in the third criminal element of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019. Given the factual milieu of this case, the subject contracts would be grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government if characterized by an overpriced procurement. However, the gross and manifest disadvantage to the government was not sufficiently shown because the conclusion of overpricing was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven. Thus, we grant the petitions.In criminal cases, to justify a conviction, the culpability of an accused must be established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.[18]The burden of proof is on the prosecution, as the accused enjoys a constitutionally enshrined disputable presumption of innocence.[19]The court, in ascertaining the guilt of an accused, must, after having marshaled the facts and circumstances, reach a moral certainty as to the accuseds guilt. Moral certainty is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.[20]Otherwise, where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted.In finding that thewalis tingtingpurchase contracts were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COAs finding of overpricing which was, in turn, based on the special audit teams report. The audit teams conclusion on the standard price of awalis tingtingwas pegged on the basis of the following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples ofwalis tingtingwithout handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey forms on thewalis tingtingaccomplished by the street sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team purchasedwalis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (5) documents relative to thewalis tingtingpurchases of Las Pias City. These documents were then compared with the documents furnished by petitioners and the other accused relative toParaaqueCityswalis tingtingtransactions.Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out, the evidence of the prosecution did not include a signed price quotation from thewalis tingtingsuppliers ofParaaqueCity. In fact, even thewalis tingtingfurnished the audit team by petitioners and the other accused was different from thewalis tingtingactually utilized by theParaaque City streetsweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the prosecution, in order to substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have been identical to thewalis tingtingpurchased in 1996-1998.Only then could it be concluded that thewalis tingtingpurchases were disadvantageous to the government because only then could a determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest and gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.On the issue of hearsay, the Sandiganbayan hastily shot down petitioners arguments thereon, in this wise:We find no application of the hearsay rule here. In fact, all the witnesses in this case testified on matters within their personal knowledge. The prosecutions principal witness, Ms. Bermudez, was a State Auditor and the Assistant Division Chief of the Local Government Audit Office who was tasked to head a special audit team to audit selected transactions ofParaaqueCity. The report which she identified and testified on [was] made by [the] Special Audit Team she herself headed. The disbursement vouchers, purchase orders, purchase requests and other documents constituting the supporting papers of the teams report were public documents requested from the City Auditor of Paraaque and from the accused Mayor Marquez. Such documents were submitted to the Special Audit Team for the specific purpose of reviewing them. The documents were not executed by Ms. Bermudez or by any member of the Special Audit Team for the obvious reason that, as auditors, they are only reviewing acts of others. The Special Audit Teams official task was to review the documents of thewalis tingtingtransactions. In the process of [the] review, they found many irregularities in the documentations violations of the Local Government Code and pertinent COA rules and regulations. They found that the transactions were grossly overpriced. The findings of the team were consolidated in a report. The same report was the basis of Ms. Bermudezs testimony. x x x.[21]The reasoning of the Sandiganbayan is specious and off tangent. The audit team reached a conclusion of gross overpricing based on documents which, at best, would merely indicate the present market price ofwalis tingtingof adifferent specification,purchased from anon-supplierofParaaqueCity, and the price ofwalis tingtingpurchasesin LasPiasCity. Effectively, the prosecution was unable to demonstrate the requisite burden of proof,i.e.,proof beyond reasonable doubt, in order to overcome the presumption of innocence in favor of petitioners.As pointed out by petitioner Caunan, not all of the contents of the audit teams report constituted hearsay. Indeed, as declared by the Sandiganbayan, Bermudez could very well testify thereon since the conclusions reached therein were made by her and her team. However, these conclusions were based on incompetent evidence. Most obvious would be the market price ofwalis tingtingin Las Pias City which was used as proof of overpricing inParaaqueCity. The prosecution should have presented evidence of the actual price of the particularwalis tingtingpurchased by petitioners and the other accused at the time of the audited transaction or, at the least, an approximation thereof. Failing in these, there is no basis to declare that there was a glaring overprice resulting in gross and manifest disadvantage to the government.We are not unmindful of the fact that petitioners failed to conduct the requisite public bidding for the questioned procurements. However, the lack of public bidding alone does not automatically equate to a manifest and gross disadvantage to the government. As we had occasion to declare inNava v. Sandiganbayan,[22]the absence of a public bidding may mean that the government was not able to secure the lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and corruption. However, this does not satisfy the third element of the offense charged, because the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. After all, penal laws are strictly construed against the government.With the foregoing disquisition, we find no necessity to rule on the applicability of our rulings inAriasandMagsucito petitioner Marquez. Nonetheless, we wish to reiterate herein the doctrines laid down in those cases.We call specific attention to the sweeping conclusion made by the Sandiganbayan that a conspiracy existed among petitioners and the other accused, most of whom were acquitted, particularly private individual Razo, the proprietor of Zaro Trading.Our ruling inMagsuci, citing our holding inArias, should be instructive,viz.:The Sandiganbayan predicated its conviction of [Magsuci] on its finding of conspiracy among Magsuci, Ancla and now deceased Enriquez.There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together, however, the evidence therefore must reasonably be strong enough to show a community of criminal design.x x x xFairly evident, however, is the fact that the actions taken by Magsuci involved the very functions he had to discharge in the performance of his official duties. There has been no intimation at all that he had foreknowledge of any irregularity committed by either or both Engr. Enriquez and Ancla. Petitioner might have indeed been lax and administratively remiss in placing too much reliance on the official reports submitted by his subordinate (Engineer Enriquez), but for conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of intentionality on the part of cohorts.InArias v. Sandiganbayan, this Court, aware of the dire consequences that a different rule could bring, has aptly concluded:We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problemsdishonest or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetenceis suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority.x x x xx x x. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. x x x. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger offices or department is even more appalling.[23]WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated August 30, 2007 and Resolution dated March 10, 2008 of the Sandiganbayan inCriminal Case Nos. 27944, 27946, 27952, 27953, & 27954 areREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. Petitioners Joey P. Marquez in G.R. Nos. 182020-24 and Ofelia C. Caunan in G.R. Nos. 181999 and 182001-04 areACQUITTEDof the charges against them. Costsde oficio.SO ORDERED.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Republic of thePhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaFIRST DIVISIONJOSE R. CATACUTAN,G.R. No. 175991

Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA,C.J., Chairperson,

- versus -LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

BERSAMIN,

DELCASTILLO,and

VILLARAMA, JR.,JJ.

PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,Promulgated:

Respondent.August 31, 2011

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - xD E C I S I O NDELCASTILLO,J.:It is well within the Courts discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand.Before us is a Petition for Review onCertiorarifiled by petitioner Jose R. Catacutan seeking to set aside and reverse the Decision[1]dated December 7, 2006 of theSandiganbayanwhich affirmed the Decision[2]dated July 25, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 30, Surigao City convicting him of the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.Factual AntecedentsThe antecedent facts are clear and undisputed.Private complainant Georgito Posesano was an Instructor II with Salary Grade 13 while private complainant Magdalena Divinagracia was an Education Program Specialist II with Salary Grade 16, both at the Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT).[3]On June 2, 1997, the Commission on Higher Education (CHED) Caraga Administrative Region, appointed and promoted private complainants as Vocational Instruction Supervisor III with Salary Grade 18 at SNSAT.[4]These promotional appointments were duly approved and attested as permanent by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on June 3, 1997.[5]Being then the Officer-In-Charge of SNSAT, the approved appointments were formally transmitted to the petitioner on June 6, 1997,[6]copy furnished the concerned appointees.Despite receipt of the appointment letter, the private complainants were not able to assume their new position since petitioner made known that he strongly opposed their appointments and that he would not implement them despite written orders from CHED[7]and the CSC, Caraga Regional Office.[8]Thus, on August 2, 1997, private complainants lodged a formal complaint against petitioner for grave abuse of authority and disrespect of lawful orders before the Office of the Ombudsman forMindanao.[9]In an Information dated February 27, 1998, petitioner was charged before the RTC of Surigao City with violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 as amended, committed in the following manner, to wit:That in June 1997 or sometime thereafter, in Surigao City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN, OIC Principal of Surigao del Norte School of Arts and Trades (SNSAT), Surigao City, with salary grade below 27, while in the performance of his official duties, thus committing the act in relation to his office, willfully, feloniously and unlawfully did then and there, with grave abuse of authority and evident bad faith, refuse to implement the promotion/appointments of Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Supervisors III notwithstanding the issuance of the valid appointments by the appointing authority and despite the directive of the Regional Director of the Commission on Higher Education and the Civil Service Commission in the region, thereby causing undue injury to complainants who were supposed to receive a higher compensation for their promotion, as well as [to] the school and the students who were deprived of the better services which could have been rendered by Georgito Posesano and Magdalena A. Divinagracia as Vocational Instruction Supervisors [III].CONTRARY TO LAW.[10]During arraignment on September 22, 1998, petitioner pleaded not guilty.For his defense, petitioner admitted that he did not implement the promotional appointments of the private complainants because of some procedural lapses or infirmities attending the preparation of the appointment papers.According to him, the appointment papers were prepared by SNSAT Administrative Officer, Crispin Noguera, using blank forms bearing the letterhead of SNSAT and not of the CHED Regional Office who made the appointments.He also averred that the appointment papers cited the entire plantilla[11](1996 Plantilla-OSEC-DECSB-VOCIS3-19, Pages 1-16)instead of only the particular page on which the vacant item occurs.He likewise claimed that he received only the duplicate copies of the appointments contrary to the usual procedure where the original appointment papers and other supporting documents are returned to his office.Finally, he asserted that the transmittal letter from the CHED did not specify the date of effectivity of the appointments. These alleged infirmities, he contended, were formally brought to the attention of the CHED Regional Director on June 20, 1997[12]who, however, informed him that the subject appointments were regular and valid and directed him to implement the same.Still not satisfied, petitioner sought the intercession of CHED Chairman Angel C. Alcala in the settlement of this administrative problem[13]but the latter did not respond.Petitioner alleged that his refusal to implement the appointments of the private complainants was not motivated by bad faith but he just wanted to protect the interest of the government by following strict compliance in the preparation of appointment papers.Ruling of the Regional Trial CourtOn July 25, 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision[14]holding that the act of the petitioner in defying the orders of the CHED and the CSC to implement the subject promotional appointments despite the rejection of his opposition, demonstrates his palpable and patent fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will.The trial court ruled that petitioners refusal to implement the appointments of the private complainants had caused undue injury to them.Thus, it held petitioner guilty of the crime charged and accordingly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month and perpetual disqualification from public office.The RTC disposed of the case as follows:WHEREFORE, finding the accused JOSE R. CATACUTAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt [of] VIOLATION OF SECTION 3(e) of R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, this Court hereby imposes upon him the penalty of imprisonment [of] SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH and PERPETUAL DISQUALIFICATION FROM PUBLIC OFFICE, and to pay the costs.The aforementioned accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainants Georgito Posesano and Magdalena Divinagracia the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each, for moral damages.SO ORDERED.[15]Petitioner moved for reconsideration[16]but it was denied in an Order[17]datedOctober 13, 2005.Ruling of the SandiganbayanOn appeal, petitioners conviction was affirmedin totoby theSandiganbayan.[18]The appellate court ruled that the Decision of the trial court, being supported by evidence and firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, is correct.It held that petitioner failed to show that the trial court committed any reversible error in judgment.Hence, this petition.In the Courts Resolution[19]dated February 26, 2007, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file its Comment.The OSG filed its Comment[20]on June 5, 2007 while the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed the Comment[21]for respondent People of thePhilippineson February 22, 2008.IssueThe sole issue for consideration in this present petition is:Whether the [petitioners] constitutional right[s] to due process x x x and x x x equal protection of [the] law x x x were violated x x x [when he was denied] the opportunity to present [in] evidence [the Court of Appeals] Decision dated April 18, 2001 x x x in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 entitled Jose R. Catacutan, petitioner, versus Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, et al., respondents.[22]Invoking the constitutional provision on due process,[23]petitioner argues that the Decision rendered by the trial court is flawed and is grossly violative of his right to be heard and to present evidence.He contends that he was not able to controvert the findings of the trial court since he was not able to present the Court of Appeals (CAs) Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 which denied the administrative case filed against him and declared that his intention in refusing to implement the promotions of the private complainants falls short of malice or wrongful intent.Our RulingThe petition lacks of merit.Petitioner was not deprived of his right to due process.Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard.[24]Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy.[25]Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.[26]Guided by these established jurisprudential pronouncements, petitioner can hardly claim denial of his fundamental right to due process.Records show that petitioner was able to confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, argue his case vigorously, and explain the merits of his defense.To reiterate, as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been denied due process of law for the opportunity to be heard is the better accepted norm of procedural due process.There is also no denial of due process when the trial court did not allow petitioner to introduce as evidence the CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795.It is well within the courts discretion to reject the presentation of evidence which it judiciously believes irrelevant and impertinent to the proceeding on hand.This is specially true when the evidence sought to be presented in a criminal proceeding as in this case, concerns an administrative matter.As theSandiganbayanaptly remarked:The RTC committed no error in judgment when it did not allow the Accused-appellant to present the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51795 (Jose R. Catacutan vs. Office of the Ombudsman). The findings in administrative cases are not binding upon the court trying a criminal case, even if the criminal proceedings are based on the same facts and incidents which gave rise to the administrative matter.The dismissal of a criminal case does not foreclose administrative action or necessarily gives the accused a clean bill of health in all respects. In the same way, the dismissal of an administrative case does not operate to terminate a criminal proceeding with the same subject matter.x x x[27]This action undertaken by the trial court and sustained by the appellate court was not without legal precedent.InParedes v. Court of Appeals,[28]this Court ruled:It is indeed a fundamental principle of administrative law that administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or omission. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution, or vice versa. One thing is administrative liability; quite another thing is the criminal liability for the same act.x x x xThus, considering the difference in the quantum of evidence, as well as the procedure followed and the sanctions imposed in criminal and administrative proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.Notably, the evidence presented in the administrative case may not necessarily be the same evidence to be presented in the criminal cases. x x xInNicolas v. Sandiganbayan,[29]the Court reiterated:This Court is not unmindful of its rulings that the dismissal of an administrative case does not bar the filing of a criminal prosecution for the same or similar acts subject of the administrative complaint and that the disposition in one case does not inevitably govern the resolution of the other case/s and vice versa. x x xOn the basis of the afore-mentioned precedents, the Court has no option but to declare that the courts below correctly disallowed the introduction in evidence of the CA Decision.Due process of law is not denied by the exclusion of irrelevant, immaterial, or incompetent evidence, or testimony of an incompetent witness.It is not an error to refuse evidence which although admissible for certain purposes, is not admissible for the purpose which counsel states as the ground for offering it.[30]At any rate, even assuming that the trial court erroneously rejected the introduction as evidence of the CA Decision, petitioner is not left without legal recourse.Petitioner could have availed of the remedy provided in Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court which provides:Section 40.Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.As observed by the appellate court, if the petitioner is keen on having the RTC admit the CAs Decision for whatever it may be worth, he could have included the same in his offer of exhibits.If an exhibit sought to be presented in evidence is rejected, the party producing it should ask the courts permission to have the exhibit attached to the record.As things stand, the CA Decision does not form part of the records of the case, thus it has no probative weight.Any evidence that a party desires to submit for the consideration of the court must be formally offered by him otherwise it is excluded and rejected and cannot even be taken cognizance of on appeal.The rules of procedure and jurisprudence do not sanction the grant of evidentiary value to evidence which was not formally offered.Section 3(e) of RA 3019, as amended, provides:Section 3.Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful.x x x x(e)Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.Under said provision of law, three essential elements must thus be satisfied,viz:1.The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;2.He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or inexcusable negligence; and3.His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[31]All the above enumerated elements of the offense charged have been successfully proven by the prosecution.First, petitioner could not have committed the acts imputed against him during the time material to this case were it not for his being a public officer, that is, as the Officer-In-Charge (Principal) of SNSAT.As such public officer, he exercised official duties and functions, which include the exercise of administrative supervision over the school such as taking charge of personnel management and finances, as well as implementing instruction as far as appointment of teachers.[32]Second, petitioner acted with evident bad faith in refusing to implement the appointments of private complainants.As theSandiganbayanaptly remarked:The records clearly indicate that the refusal of Catacutan to implement the subject promotion was no longer anchored on any law or civil service rule as early [as] the July 14, 1997 letter of the CHED Regional Director addressing the four issues raised by the Accused-appellant in the latters protest letter. x x xIn light of the undisputed evidence presented to the trial court that Catacutans reason for not implementing the appointments was a personal dislike or ill feelings towards Posesano, this Court believes that Catacutans refusal was impelled by an ill motive or dishonest purpose characteristic of bad faith. x x xx x x xIn the August 1, 1997 [m]emorandum issued by the CHED Regional Director, Catacutan was once again directed, in strong words, to cease and desist from further questioning what has been lawfully acted upon by competent authorities.Catacutan deliberately ignored the memorandum and even challenged the private complainants to file a case against him.Such arrogance is indicative of the bad faith of the accused-appellant.Yet again, the [CSC] Regional Director wrote the Accused-appellant on September 5, 1997, clarifying with finality the validity of the appointment.Still, Accused-appellant failed to implement the subject promotions.This stubborn refusal to implement the clear and repeated directive of competent authorities established the evident bad faith of Catacutan and belies any of his claims to the contrary.[33]While petitioner may have laudable objectives in refusing the implementation of private complainants valid appointments, the Court fails to see how he can still claim good faith when no less than the higher authorities have already sustained the validity of the subject appointments and have ordered him to proceed with the implementation.It is well to remember that good intentions do not win cases, evidence does.[34]Third, undue injury to the private complainants was duly proven to the point of moral certainty.Here, the private complainants suffered undue injury when they were not able to assume their official duties as Vocational Supervisors III despite the issuance of their valid appointments.As borne out by the records, they were able to assume their new positions only on November 19, 1997.So in the interregnum from June to November 1997, private complainants failed to enjoy the benefits of an increased salary corresponding to their newly appointed positions.Likewise established is that as a result of petitioners unjustified and inordinate refusal to implement their valid appointments notwithstanding clear and mandatory directives from his superiors, the private complainants suffered mental anguish, sleepless nights, serious anxiety warranting the award of moral damages under Article 2217 of the New Civil Code.At this point, the Court just needs to stress that the foregoing are factual matters that were threshed out and decided upon by the trial court which were subsequently affirmed by theSandiganbayan.Where the factual findings of both the trial court and the appellate court coincide, the same are binding on this Court.In any event, apart from these factual findings of the lower courts, this Court in its own assessment and review of the records considers the findings in order.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIEDand the assailed Decision of theSandiganbayanpromulgated on December 7, 2006 isAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

SECOND DIVISIONVICTOR R. REYES, G.R. No. 152243Assistant City Assessor,Department of Assessment, Present:City of Manila,Petitioner, PUNO,ChairmanAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,- versus - CALLEJO, SR.,TINGA, andNAZARIO,JJ.HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA,Mayor, City of Manila,ATTY. EMMANUEL R. SISON,Secretary to the City Mayor, Promulgated:and THE COURT OF APPEALS,Respondents. September 23, 2005x--------------------------------------------------------------------xD E C I S I O NTINGA,J.:The petitioner in this case, Victor R. Reyes (Reyes), identifies himself as the Assistant City Assessor of the City of Manila. The very appropriateness of the nomenclature is crucial to the present petition. Petitioner ultimately hinges the favorable action on his cause on the recognition that he still is the Assistant City Assessor of Manila, a post to which he was appointed in 1989, but which function he has not effectively held since 1994.The case originated from a complaint filed by petitioner Reyes before the Office of the Ombudsman against respondents Jose L. Atienza, the Mayor of the City of Manila, and Atty. Emmanuel R. Sison, Secretary to the City Mayor. The respondents were charged with violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corruption Practices Act.[1]The particular act complained of was the appointment by Mayor Atienza of Hernando B. Garcia as Assistant City Assessor on 1 July 1998. According to Reyes, such appointment was illegal, for as of even date, he remained the incumbent Assistant City Assessor of Manila, by virtue of his appointment to the office, on a permanent status, on 3 August 1989.Reyes had originally been designated as Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the City Assessor on 16 January 1987 by then acting Mayor Gemiliano Lopez, Jr.[2]Upon the recommendation of Mayor Lopez, Reyes was appointed on a permanent status as Assistant City Assessor effective 3 August 1989 by then Acting Secretary of Finance Victor C. Macalincag.[3]He remained in office upon assumption of office by then Manila Mayor Alfredo C. Lim[4]in 1992.In a letter dated 1 October 1993, Reyes requested Mayor Lim for a transfer in Quezon City Hall.[5]In the said letter, Reyes further stated [i]f I ever could not transfer until December 31, 1993, then eventually, I would be applying for a retirement effective January 1, 1994.[6]He also requested therein for the approval of sick leave for the months of August and September of 1993, and such request was duly approved.[7]It appears from the record that since then, Reyes has never been able to actually reassume the functions of Assistant City Assessor. By his own admission, Reyes was prevented from reporting back to work[8]due to the pendency of three complaints[9]filed against him before the Office of the Ombudsman. Notably, an administrative complaint was also pending with the Office of the City Legal Officer against Reyes.[10]The complaints against Reyes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman were all dismissed by March of 1994.There is no certainty as to the status of Reyess appointment as Assistant City Assessor after 1994. However, the following facts from the record are telling.In a letter dated 8 April 1994 addressed to Carlos C. Antonio, City Assessor of Manila, Reyes stated as follows:I would like to request for Clearances needed for my Retirement, be [sic] informed that last October 1993 uponmy request to his Honor Mayor ALFREDO S. LIM approved my retirement effective January 1, 1994including my clearances [sic], but to my surprise the Legal Department of Manila file [sic] a case which was dismissed by the Ombudsman.Hoping for your kind consideration on this matter.[11]Moreover, it is also undisputed that Mayor Lim made two subsequent appointments to the post of Assistant City Assessor. Angel R. Purisima was appointed to the position on26 July 1995, and his appointment was approved by the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on18 September 1995. Purisima resigned on31 October 1996, and in his stead, Mayor Lim appointed Senen D. Tomada on26 March 1998. However, the CSC disapproved the appointment of Tomada, it having been made in violation of the Commission on Elections ban on appointments during the election period.[12]Interestingly, the CSC disapproval was made only on27 July 1998, or 26 days after the appointment of Garcia to the same post by the newly elected Mayor Atienza.In the meantime, it appears that Reyess application for retirement could not be cleared due to the pending administrative complaint filed with the Office of the City Legal Officer. In April of 1994, Reyes filed a demurrer to the evidence in the said administrative proceeding. Despite repeated urgings, the demurrer remained unresolved by October of 1995, thus causing Reyes to file a petition for mandamus with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, praying that the demurrer be acted upon by the Office of the City Legal Officer. Pertinently, Reyes alleged the following under oath in his petition:13. Meanwhilepetitioner [Reyes],who retired from the service as City Assessor ofManila, cannot get his retirement pay because he cannot submit a clearance from the office of the public respondent.[13]The petition for mandamus was dismissed in anOrderdated 29 October 1996.[14]It was only on 28 August 1998 when the administrative complaint against Reyes was dismissed in a decision penned by Mayor Atienza. Still, Reyes alleged that he was never furnished a copy of the decision and that he learned of the dismissal of the complaint only on 5 May 1999. He likewise claimed that his requests for a certified copy of the decision from Manila City Hall have been ignored.[15]Then, on 20 March 2000, Reyes filed the aforementioned criminal complaint against Mayor Atienza and Sison before the Ombudsman. In the complaint, Reyes characterized as illegal the appointment of Garcia as Assistant City Assessor, noting that he was then and still is actually occupying the said position on the premise that his retirement was never approved or cleared due to the pending administrative case. Reyes also alleged that the appointment smacked of nepotism, as Garcia was the brother-in-law of Sison, the Secretary to Mayor Atienza.From the record, the allegation also appears that Reyes had filed charges against Atienza and Sison before the CSC,[16]although there is no indication as to the actual nature of the complaint, or its present status.In aResolution[17]dated 10 October 2000, the Office of the Ombudsman ordered the dismissal of the complaint for insufficiency of evidence. The Ombudsman concluded that the inferences made by Reyes did not suffice to establish clearly and convincingly that there was a deliberate action on the part of respondents to violate existing rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in the conduct of their official duties by reason of the inducement, persuasion or influence by another or allowing themselves to be persuaded, induced or influenced to commit such offense or violation, in contravention of Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices.[18]The Ombudsman likewise ruled that the requisites for liability under Section 3(e) of the same law had not been established. It was noted that the element of causing undue injury in the discharge of respondents official and/or administrative functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence was not sufficiently established. This conclusion was derived from the fact that there were two prior appointments made by Mayor Lim to the position of Assistant City Assessor, which fact refutes the claim of Reyes that he had not yet vacated the post.[19]Finally, the Ombudsman concluded that the allegation of nepotism was without merit.[20]AMotion for Reconsiderationfiled by Reyes was denied for lack of merit by the Ombudsman in aResolutiondated 23 November 2000, which also noted that the motion was not timely filed.[21]The rulings of the Ombudsman were assailed by Reyes in a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure filed with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals Fourteenth Division dismissed the petition in aDecision[22]rendered on 21 August 2001. The appellate court again reiterated the finding that Mayor Lim had made two appointments to the position of Assistant City Assessor prior to the designation of Garcia to the same post by Mayor Atienza in 1998. Thus, it was concluded that Reyes had been terminated or separated from his position as of 26 July 1995, or when Mayor Lim appointed Purisima to the position, as the CSC would not have approved the said appointment had there actually been no vacancy.The Court of Appeals further noted that Garcias appointment was approved by the CSC on 31 August 1998, and that nothing in the record indicated that said appointment was recalled or subsequently declared void and set aside.A few days prior to the promulgation of the Court of AppealsDecision, Reyes filed aSupplement to Replywith two documents attached thereto. The first was a letter from former Mayor Alfredo Lim, wherein Lim averred that he had not approved any formal retirement application of Reyes. The second document was a certification from the Integrated Records Management Office of the CSC, which noted that there was no record with that office of any notice of separation of service for Reyes. The conclusiveness of these documents was espoused by Reyes in hisMotion for Reconsiderationbefore the Court of Appeals, but for naught. In itsResolution[23]denying Reyes motion for reconsideration, the appellate court reiterated its finding that the position of Assistant City Assessor was vacant as of 26 July 1995, when Purisima was appointed to the position.Hence, the present petition for certiorari under Rule 65, imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals in denying Reyess petition and motion for reconsideration. The Court notes that the resort to the special civil action is patently erroneous, the plain speedy and adequate remedy of a petition for review under Rule 45 being clearly available to Reyes. On this score alone, the present petition is dismissible. Nonetheless, the Court resolves to examine the petition on the merits, with due regard to the precedental value a full-length decision would provide.Before this Court, Reyes reiterates that his complaint filed with the Ombudsman sufficiently establishes the liability of respondents under Section 3(a) and (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The violation of Section 3(a) was established by the appointment of Garcia as Assistant City Assessor, despite the fact that there was no vacancy by reason of Reyess continuous holding of the position. Reyes also claims that his repeated attempts to follow up the status of his administrative cases were ignored. Even though he was subsequently exonerated of the administrative charges, his requests for a copy of the decision have been ignored. Reyes argues that the acts/omissions and nonfeasance committed by the respondents directly violate Section 5(a) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees.Reyes also claims that the elements of the offense defined in Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act have likewise been established. In that regard, he claims that he had not known of the appointment of Purisima in 1995, and had he known, he would have filed the appropriate case for usurpation. Reyes imputes that the real reason behind Purisimas resignation in 1996 was the knowledge that his appointment was irregular and illegal. Reyes also claims that Garcias appointment by Atienza was made on 1 July 1998, or twenty-six (26) days before the CSC had disapproved Tomadas appointment to the same post.The precise issue to be resolved by this Court is whether the Ombudsman was correct in concluding there was no probable cause to charge respondents with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Ombudsman's determination of the existence or absence of probable cause.[24]As the Court is not a trier of facts, it reposes immense respect to the factual determination and appreciation made by the Ombudsman. In this case, the Ombudsman characterized Reyess claims as mostly inferential.Many of the allegations now before us are unsubstantiated by evidence and cannot be accorded merit by this Court. These would include the imputations of malice on the part of respondents in impeding Reyes attempts in following up his clearance for retirement, in refusing to release a certified copy of the decision exonerating him from administrative charges, that nepotism attended the appointment of Garcia to the post of Assistant City Assessor, or that Garcias appointment under re-employment status violated the Rules on Appointment of the Civil Service Commission since he was previously a contractual and not a permanent employee. Even assuming that there is truth to any of these charges, they have not been substantiated to the extent of convincing the Ombudsman that there is probable cause to file criminal cases against respondents. Owing to this paucity in substantiation, we have no reason to disturb the Ombudsmans refusal to lodge a criminal case arising from these premises.Any possible culpability on the part of respondents hinges on a finding of probable cause that Garcia was appointed with the knowledge that such appointment was illegal, given that there was no vacancy in the post of Assistant City Assessor. Both the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals upheld respondents argument that the post was indeed vacant at the time of Garcias appointment, and supreme reliance was placed on the fact that Atienzas predecessor had made two appointments to the post after Reyess presumed retirement.There is wrinkle, however, to the unhesitating dismissal of this case. There is no definitive proof or smoking gun which decisively establishes when Reyes vacated his position, as concluded by the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals. Assuming that Reyes had resigned his position, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public officer to be operative and effective. Without acceptance, resignation is nothing and the officer remains in office.[25]The Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions promulgated by the CSC requires that in case of resignation, the voluntary written notice of resignation by the employee and the acceptance of resignation in writing by the appointing authority be submitted to the CSC.[26]If, on the other hand, Reyes had retired from his position as he had previously claimed, such retirement must be understood as in concordance with the GSIS Law, which provides for either compulsory retirement at the age of sixty-five (65)[27]or optional retirement for employees over sixty (60) years of age and with more than fifteen (15) years of government service.[28]In such a case, there is no general demand that retirement meet the approval of the appointing authority, although retirement may be precluded under other circumstances provided by law.[29]However, the applicable Civil Service rules require that a notice stating the date of such retirement be submitted to the Commission.It is uncertain from the record whether Reyes is entitled under the law to apply for retirement, which would generally not require any approval from the appointing authority in order to become effective. Respondents do not make any allegations that Reyes has reached the age of compulsory retirement.The record is similarly bereft of any proof that Reyes had equivocally resigned his position, or that said resignation was accepted by the appointing authority. Before this Court, respondents rely, as proof of Reyes separationfrom service, on the letter dated 1 October 1993, wherein Reyes informed Mayor Lim that [i]f I ever could not transfer [to Quezon City Hall] until December 31, 1993, then eventually, I would be applying for a retirement effective January 1, 1994.[30]Respondents narrate in their Comment, [E]ffective January 1, 1994, the petitioner has finally retired from the service because the then Mayor Alfredo S. Lim approved his retirement on October 1993.[31]Yet it is clear from the letter that the option of retirement was not actually exercised then, but merely mentioned as a possibility, requiring further action on the part of Reyes. What Reyes had sought approval in the said letter was his application for sick leave and it was only such sick leave, and not retirement, which was approved by then Mayor Lim in October of 1993.In essence, if indeed Reyes had applied for retirement or submitted his resignation following the normal processes, it would have been easy for respondents to present the countervailing documents which would have conclusively refuted Reyess claims that he still was the incumbent Assistant City Assessor. The fact that no such documents were presented makes us refrain from concluding that the legal processes pertaining to resignation or retirement were observed in this case.Still, the vitality of Reyess claim of incumbency, crucial to the cause of action in his complaint, is severely undercut by his prior statements, which are not disputed and even at times averred under oath, that indicate that starting 1994, he had considered himself as having been separated from service as Assistant City Assessor. To recapitulate, Reyes had informed the City Assessor of Manila as early as 8 April 1994 that Mayor Lim approved my retirement effective January 1, 1994.[32]Reyes also averred under oath in his petition for mandamus filed in 1995 that he retired from the service as City Assessor of Manila.[33]Reyes had even spent considerable energy since 1994 following up on his clearances for retirement. There is no showing that he has attempted to perform the functions of Assistant City Assessor since 1994. It is extremely disingenuous on the part of Reyes to suddenly claim that all this time, he actually still was the Assistant City Assessor, a position whose functions has since been assumed by three other persons, the appointments of the first two never having been challenged by him.[34]Still, it must be kept in mind that the central issue in this case is not the viability of Reyess claim to continued incumbency, but the existence of probable cause for respondents criminal culpability by reason of the appointment of Garcia. On that point, we certainly are unable to attribute any malice aforethought or criminal intent of respondents on account of the appointment of Garcia. As the Ombudsman and the Court of Appeals noted, Atienzas predecessor, Mayor Lim, had issued two appointments to the position of the CSC. The first was approved by the CSC, and while the second was disapproved, it was due to the violation of the COMELEC ban on appointments, and not because of any finding that Reyes had not been validly separated from the office.[35]The fact that the appointment of Purisima in 1995 was approved by the CSC gives rise to a presumption that the body was aware that the position was vacant and that the appointment was valid. We are unable to share the absolute belief of the Court of Appeals that this approval of Purisimas appointment isipso factoconclusive that the position had already been vacated by Reyes. However, given that nobody appears to have challenged the validity of that appointment or of the subsequent appointment of Tomada on the grounds now alleged by Reyes, we can conclude that Mayor Atienza had every right to assume in good faith that Reyes no longer held the post of Assistant City Assessor.Section 3(a) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act requires a deliberate intent on the part of the public official concerned to violate those rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority, or to commit an offense in connection with official duties. On the other hand, Section 3(e) poses the standard of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence before liability can be had on that paragraph. Manifest partiality has been characterized as "a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other."[36]Evident bad faith connotes a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage.[37]Gross inexcusable negligence has been defined as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected.[38]Clearly, the standard of culpability imposed by Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is quite high, and in this case, insufficiently quantified by the evidence presented by Reyes. Moreover, the conduct of respondents in this case hardly meets these standards, guided as it was, in presumptive good faith by the two previous unchallenged appointments made by Mayor Lim to the same post.There are troubling circumstances that attend the facts of this case, and nothing in this decision should preclude Reyes from pursuing through the proper legal avenues, whatever rights and claims he may have under law, emanating from his permanent appointment as Assistant City Assessor of Manila and his possible separation from the service. Nonetheless, what the Court is called upon to adjudge is probable cause for criminal culpability of respondents, and under the circumstances, we cannot find such probable cause.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED, the assailedDecisionnot being tainted with grave abuse of discretion. No costs.SO ORDERED.xxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Republic of thePhilippinesSupreme CourtManilaTHIRD DIVISIONPEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES,Petitioner,-versus-ARISTEO E. ATIENZA, RODRIGO D. MANONGSONG, CRISPIN M. EGARQUE, and THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION),Respondents.G.R. No. 171671Present:PERALTA,J.,ActingChairperson,*BERSAMIN,**ABAD,VILLARAMA, JR.,***andPERLAS-BERNABE,JJ.Promulgated:June 18, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -xD E C I S I O NPERALTA,J.:This is a petition for review oncertiorariassailing the Resolution[1]dated February 28, 2006 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) granting the Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents Aristeo E. Atienza and Rodrigo D. Manongsong, which effectively dismissed Criminal Case No. 26678 for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:In an Information[2]filed on June 19, 2001, respondents Aristeo E. Atienza (Mayor Atienza), then Municipal Mayor of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, Engr. Rodrigo D. Manongsong (Engr. Manongsong), then Municipal Engineer of Puerto Galera and Crispin M. Egarque (Egarque), a police officer stationed in Puerto Galera, were charged before the SandiganbayanviolationofSection3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019), ortheAnti-GraftandCorrupt Practices Actin Criminal Case No. 26678. The Information alleged:That on or about 04 July 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Puerto Galera, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ARISTEO E. ATIENZA, Municipal Mayor of Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, conspiring and confederating with co-accused RODRIGO MANONGSONG, Municipal Engineer, and CRISPIN EGARQUE, PNP Officer, while in the performance of their official functions, committing the offense in relation to their offices, and taking advantage of their official positions, acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally destroy, demolish, and dismantle the riprap/fence of the new HONDURA BEACH RESORT owned by complainant EDMUNDO A. EVORA located at Hondura, Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro, causing undue injury to complainant in the amount ofP8,000.00CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]Duly arraigned, respondents entered their respective pleas ofnot guiltyto the crime charged against them.[4]After pre-trial,[5]trial on the merits ensued.To establish its case, the prosecution presented the testimonies of Mercedita Atienza (Mercedita), Alexander Singson (Alexander), Edmundo Evora (Edmundo), and Acting Barangay Chairman Concepcion Escanillas (Escanillas).Mercedita testified that she was the caretaker of Hondura Beach Resort, a resort owned by Edmundo in Puerto Galera, Oriental Mindoro.She narrated that onJuly 3, 2000, Edmundo caused the construction of a fence made of coco lumber and G.I. sheets worthP5,000.00 on his resort.OnJuly 4, 2000, she found out that the fence that was just recently built was destroyed. Upon the instruction of Edmundo, she reported the incident to the barangay authorities. OnJuly 5, 2000, Edmundo again caused the construction of a second fence on the same property worthP3,000.00. However, on the day following, the fence was again destroyed.Mercedita stated that she was informed by some people who were there that a policeman and Engr. Manongsong were the ones who destroyed the fence.[6]Mercedita further testified that Edmundo instructed her to report the matter to the police. When she inquired at the police station, Egarque admitted that he destroyed the fence upon the order of Mayor Atienza.When she asked Mayor Atienza about the incident, the latter informed her that the fence was not good for Puerto Galera since the place was a tourist destination and that the land was intended for the fishermen association. Mercedita added that Engr. Manongsong admitted that he destroyed the fence upon the order of the mayor for lack of municipal permit and that the land was intended for the fishermen.Mercedita also stated that she reported to acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas that it was Engr. Manongsong and Egarque who destroyed the fence upon the order of the mayor.[7]Alexander testified that he and a certain Reynaldo Gumba constructed the fence twice on the subject property.On the morning of July 6, 2000, he saw the fence being destroyed by Engr. Manongsong and Egarque.He said that he informed Mercedita about the incident and he accompanied the latter to the police station and the offices of Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong.They eventually reported the incident to acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas.[8]Private complainant Edmundo corroborated the testimony of Mercedita and further stated that due to the incident, he requested the barangay chairman for a meeting.OnJuly 24, 2000, acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas, the barangay secretary, Engr. Manongsong, Mercedita, Alexander, and a certain Aguado attended the meeting at the barangay hall.Edmundo stated that when Engr. Manongsong was asked why Edmundo was not notified of the destruction of the fence, Engr. Manongsong replied,Sino ka para padalhan ng Abiso?Edmundo said that they eventually failed to settle the case amicably.[9]Acting Barangay Chairman Escanillas testified that Mercedita and Alexander went to her onJuly 4, 2000andJuly 6, 2000to report that the fence constructed on the property of Edmundo was destroyed by Engr. Manongsong and Egarque upon the order of Mayor Atienza.She added that upon the request of Mercedita, she wrote Engr. Manongsong for a meeting with Edmundo, but the parties failed to settle the dispute on the scheduled meeting.All the exhibits offered by the prosecution were marked in evidence and were admitted onSeptember 21, 2005, which consisted of, among others, machine copies of transfer certificates of title, affidavits, and barangay blotters.[10]Meanwhile, onSeptember 22, 2004, petitioner filed a Motion to Suspend AccusedPendente Lite,[11]which was opposed by Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong.OnAugust 4, 2005, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion.Mayor Atienza then filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[12]which petitioner opposed.Thereafter, onOctober 11, 2005, Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Motion to Acquit by WayofDemurrer to Evidence,[13]which petitioner opposed.OnDecember 6, 2005, the courta quoissued a Resolution[14]which granted the motion. In the same resolution, the courtaquoalso held in abeyance the resolution of Mayor Atienzas motion for reconsideration of the resolution granting his suspension from office.On January 9, 2006, Mayor Atienza and Engr. Manongsong filed a Demurrer to Evidence (Motion to Acquit),[15]which was anchored on the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution.Respondents maintain that the evidence presented were not sufficient to hold them guilty of the offense charged.OnJanuary 19, 2006, petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition.[16]On January 23, 2006, albeit belatedly, Egarque filed a Manifestation[17]that he was adopting the Demurrer to Evidence filed by his co-accused.OnFebruary 28, 2006, the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) issued the assailed Resolution which, among other things, granted the Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the case.The decretal potion of which reads:WHEREFORE, for lack of sufficient evidence to prove the guilt of all the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the Demurrer to Evidence is hereby GRANTED.This case is hereby ordered DISMISSED.The bail bonds posted by all accused is hereby ordered CANCELLED and RETURNED to them, subject to the usual accounting rules and regulations.The Hold Departure Order issued by this Court against all of the accused in this case are hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE.Let the Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation be notified accordingly.Consequently, the Motion for Reconsideration, datedAugust 31, 2005, filed by accused Atienza regarding his suspension from officependent lite, is hereby rendered moot and academic.SO ORDERED.[18]In granting the Demurrer to Evidence, the Sandiganbayan ratiocinated that not all the elements of the crime charged were established by the prosecution, particularly the element of manifest partiality on the part of respondents.The Sandiganbayan held that the evidence adduced did not show that the respondents favored other persons who were similarly situated with the private complainant.Hence, the petition assigning the following errors:I.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURTAQUOGRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE PEOPLE DUE PROCESS WHEN IT RESOLVED ISSUES NOT RAISED BY RESPONDENTS IN THEIR DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE, WITHOUT AFFORDING THE PROSECUTION AN OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD THEREON.II.WHETHER OR NOT THE COURTAQUOGRAVELY ERRED IN DECIDING A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT CONSIDERED MATTERS OF DEFENSE.[19]Petitioner contends that the prosecution was not afforded due process when the Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrer to Evidence based on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish bad faith on the part of the respondents.Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan should have resolved the Demurrer to Evidence based on the argument of the respondent questioning the credibility of petitioners witnesses and the admissibility of their testimonies in evidence, not upon an issue which petitioner was not given an opportunity to be heard, thus, effectively denying the prosecution due process of law.Petitioner maintains that contrary to the conclusion of the courtaquothere was evident bad faith on the part of the respondents.Petitioner insists that the act itself of demolishing a fence erected upon private property without giving notice of the intended demolition, and without giving the owner of the same the opportunity to be heard or to rectify matters, is evident bad faith.Petitioner also contends that the element of manifest partiality was sufficiently established when the fence was destroyed on the rationale that they do not have a permit to erect the fence; the place was intended for the benefit of fishermen; and it was a tourist spot.Moreover, the demolition was allegedly done in the guise of official business when the fence was demolished on the basis of the above-stated purpose.Finally, petitioner argues that the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy does not apply in the present case.On their part, respondents argue that the Sandiganbayan was correct in granting the Demurrer to Evidence and dismissing the case.Respondents allege that the prosecution was not denied due process of law.Respondents maintain that the prosecution was given every opportunity to be heard.In fact, the assailed resolution was issued after the prosecution has rested its case.Moreover, respondents insist their right against double jeopardy must be upheld.The petition is bereft of merit.Respondents are charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, which provides:SEC. 3.Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:x x x x(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.This crime has the following essential elements:1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions;2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and3.His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.[20]In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the Demurrer to Evidence on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the second element of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.The second element provides the different modes by which the crime may be committed, that is, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence.[21]InUriarte v. People,[22]this Court explained that Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 may be committed either bydolo,as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or byculpa,as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence. There is manifest partiality when there is a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. Evident bad faith connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. Evident bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.Gross inexcusable negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.[23]As aptly concluded by the Sandiganbayan in the assailed resolution, the second element of the crime as charged was not sufficiently established by the prosecution, to wit:I.The presence of thefirst elementof this offense was not disputed.The prosecution established that accused-movants were public officers, being then the Mayor, Municipal Engineer, and member of the PNP, at the time alleged in the information.II.Anent thesecond element, did the act of destroying the subject fences on July 4, 2000 and on July 6, 2000 allegedly by accused Manongsong and Egarque, without giving any notice to the private complainant, amount tomanifest partialityand/orevident bad faithas indicated in the information?Manifest partiality and evident bad faith are modes that are separate and distinct from each other so that the existence of any of these two modes would be sufficient to satisfy the second element. x x xx x x xManifest partialitywas not present in this case.The evidence adduced did not show that accused-movants favored other persons who were similarly situated with the private complainant.Eyewitness Alexander Singson categorically pointed accused Manongsong and Egarque as the persons who destroyed/removed the second fence.Private complainant lamented that he was not even given notice of their intent to destroy the fence.However, the same could not be considered evident bad faith as the prosecution evidence failed to show that the destruction was for a dishonest purpose, ill will or self interest.In fact, the following testimonial evidence presented b