The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 10 | Issue 31 | Number 2 | Article ID 3804 | Jul 29, 2012

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From a 'Dysfunctional Japanese-Style Industrialized Society'to an “Ordinary Nation”?　　「なりたたなくなる」日本式工業社会から「普通の国」へ？

Oguma Eiji, David H. Slater

From a "Dysfunctional Japanese-Style Industrialized Society" to an“Ordinary Nation”?

Oguma Eiji with an introduction by DavidH. Slater

Oguma Eiji, a sociologist from Keio University,has emerged as one of the most astutecommentators on the shifts that have occurredsince the 3.11 cr ises. As an engagedintellectual with a respected history of solidscholarship, he has repeatedly done two thingsfew others have: link the events since 3.11 tolarger patterns of political and economictransformation in post-war Japan, and situatethis moment in Japan in relation to similarmoments of political crisis beyond Japan.

Perhaps best known to English-speakingaudiences is his volume on A Genealogy ofJapanese Self-Images(Trans-Pacific Press) 単一民族神話の起源―「日本人」の自画像の系譜 (新曜社). Relevant here is also his twovolume study of youth revolt. 1968: 叛乱の終焉とその遺産 (新曜社). Both of these worksprovide useful background to the events since3.11, but especially to the broad shifts that ledup to this moment.

On April 22-23, 2012, Oguma spoke atBerkeley’s Institute of East Asian Studiesconference, Towards Long-term Sustainability:In Response to the 3/11 Earthquake and theFukushima Nuclear Disaster. His talk wastranslated by Beth Cary under the title,“Historical Background of the Fukushima

Accident and the Anti-nuclear Movement inJapan.” Both English and Japanese papers, aswell as those by other participants can bed o w n l o a d e d h e r e(http://ieas.berkeley.edu/events/2012.04.20w.html) under Abstracts.

While much of the mainstream press hasfocused on the immediate causes of nucleardisaster (miscalculation in design, negligenceof maintenance, vacuum of political leadership,etc.), Oguma shows how the rise of the nuclearindustry is linked to much longer-termshifts—the shifts in industrialized society thatushered in a glut of construction and energyexpansion as supported by the convergence ofcorporate, bureaucratic and political interest, ashift he sums up as the “Japan as Number One”syndrome of the postwar decades. Ogumaexplains that this was followed by a lapse into a“post-industrial society” that saw thepopulation and energy use fall, along with theburst of the bubble and the decline in Japan’snational economic trajectory, which led to theunraveling of these vested interests. Within thisfamiliar narrative, Oguma shows how stronggovernmental backing of the nuclear industry,linked to the monopoly by electric utilitycompanies as providers of consumer energy,gave rise to a structural conflict of interest thatprevented robust safety regulation.

The choice to locate nuclear power plants indepopulated rural areas from the 1950sforward was strategic. It benefited from cheaplocal labor, and while the wages were oftenexploitative, these jobs were still valued in theface of a regional labor shortage. Government

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subsidies to deficit-ridden communities couldbuy local support and quell opposition.Economic decline, labor shift and demographicshrinkage, brought what Oguma calls“’Japanese Style Industrialized Society’ inDysfunctional Mode” in a period when the LDPcould no longer secure the same degree ofsupport among rural populations and small andmedium sized businesses everywhere.

Perhaps especially interesting in light of thepast year’s events are his comments on thedeterioration of support among women(Compare David H. Slater, "Fukushima womenagainst nuclear power: finding a voice fromT o h o k u(https://apjjf.org/admin/site_manage/details/3804/Fukushima women against nuclear power:finding a voice from Tohoku)"). As regularemployment deteriorated, men’s allegiance tothe firm fell away, more women were workingoutside the home, and younger irregularworkers found some common cause with olderanti-nuclear activists in ways that allowed newforms of political involvement. Oguma lays outthe links between economy and labor, genderand demographics that, he argues, provided anew social, and class terrain, for the rise ofsocial movements of today. (See also HasegawaK o i c h i ’ s e s s a y(http://ieas.berkeley.edu/events/pdf/2012.04.20_sustainability_hasegawa.pdf) in the sameexcellent collection of Berkeley conferencepapers.)

In a series of editorials in the Asahi, Ogumaaddressed readers more directly. On March 9,2012, he exhorted his readers to “think forthemselves” in deciding whether nuclear poweris appropriate for Japan, pointing out theimportance of an informed citizenry and thepossibility of protest as a viable and evennecessary tool of social change, albeit, one thatrequires more of each individual than they areused to giving. On May 9, 2012, he points tothe impossibly high economic and social costsrequired to somehow minimize or even manage

the risk that nuclear power poses to society andhumanity. Oguma points to the need for“courage” in facing up to entrenched interestso f banks and insurance companies ,corporations and bureaucrats, in a Japanesestate that is still authoritarian, even indysfunction.

Anti-nuclear protesters, wearing gas-masks, beat metal drums as they marchnear Japan's Parliament in Tokyo on July29. Photo: AP/Shizuo Kambayashi

In the interview below, Oguma sums up theconvergences of what he sees as providing theconditions for political engagement: lack ofexpectation or faith in politics in general hasturned into a lack of faith that politicians areable or even interested in providing the sorts ofleadership that is required to pull Japan out ofprolonged recession. Since 3.11, we have seenthis disillusionment compounded by the lack ofconfidence in politicians’ motives and ability torespond effectively to a national crisis. Be itincompetent mismanagement of economicrecovery, or intentional, even duplicitousrevealing of selective pieces of informationregarding energy policy and danger, thebureaucrats and politicians have revealedthemselves to no longer be worthy of theimplicit trust that the Japanese people havegiven them for much of the postwar period.Along with industrial high growth, middle-classmembership and income doubling plans, theperiod of assumed political faith is gone, never

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to return, and, Oguma points out, those inpower have yet to notice this. But those in thestreet have noticed. This is an important framefor understanding what is going on today in thestreets and through Twitter.

In one of the most salutary moments, Oguma’sreminds us that the Japanese protests of the1960’s Security Treaty, the largest of thepostwar era, lasted only about a month. Indeed,even the May 1968 Paris protests lasted lessthan two months. Since 3.11, in the face of aseries of autonomous popular protests (that is,protests that are not dependent upon theinstitutional structure of corporate unions orpolitical parties) have lasted almost a year,going back to September 2011. To Oguma, thisis evidence that we are witnessing atransformation away from indifference orhopelessness to engagement and investment.

With what he called the ‘Ancien Régime’,(complete with scattered references to thechaotic attempts to preserve aristocraticprivilege) or the ‘political-bureaucratic-business complex’ (with echoes of the “military-industrial complex”?), two images that point tothe possibility of overthrow through popularresistance, Oguma resituates these post 3.11events beyond Japan, thereby providing animportant point of reference but also perhapsthe start of a template of action for what hecalls new social movements.

Oguma’s argument that Japan is becoming an“ordinary nation” comes from the observationthat any other nation, facing these sorts ofcrises— of economic stagnation, politicalindifference, and now crisis mismanagement—would lose faith, trust, and be forced to act. Infact, he points out that it would be a “weirdersituation” if the Japanese people retained faithin politics as usual in the face of crisis. DHS

The following interview with Oguma Eijia p p e a r e d i n t h e A s a h i S h i m b u n(http://ajw.asahi.com/article/0311disaster/opinion/AJ201207190080) on July 19, 2012.

In a country long considered lacking a cultureof protest, thousands of people are gatheringevery Friday night in Tokyo's Nagatachopolitical district to protest nuclear energy andthe government’s decision to restart reactors.

July 16, 2012 demonstration in Tokyo’sHibiya Park. Organizers estimated that170,000 people participated

Question: It had been said that people just donot demonstrate in Japan. Now, however, alarge number of people are participating. Whatdid you notice about the demonstrations beingheld near the Prime Minister's OfficialResidence?

Oguma: While there are young people, seniorcitizens and couples with their children, thereare also many in their 30s and 40s who happento be men not wearing suits and womenwithout children.

About a decade or so ago, that would have beenthe age bracket that would be least likely totake part in demonstrations because theywould be either working at a company or busytaking care of their children.

I believe the shift is a reflection of structuralchanges in industry and society that has seenan increase in those working in non-regularjobs as well as a greater tendency to havefewer children and marry later in life.

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Q:Protest organizers have said that more than100,000 people are attending each protest.Whydo you think that is so?

A:With dissatisfaction and distrust of politicianshaving accumulated over 20 years of economicstagnation, the distrust of government reachedcriticality after the accident at the FukushimaNo. 1 nuclear power plant and the decision toresume operations at the Oi nuclear powerplant in Fukui Prefecture.

If nothing had happened even after suchdevelopments, that would have been an evenweirder situation. That is accepted wisdom inthe international community.

Foreigners who looked like they worked atforeign embassies as well as foreign mediacame to observe the demonstrations. It wouldbe no surprise if they saw the confrontation asone between "an Asian democracy movement"and "an insensitive authoritarian state."

The reason such a large demonstration did notoccur over the past few decades is because, onthe one hand, people had never seen or takenpart in demonstrations and because, on theother hand, people's lives and jobs were stable.

Even today, the least sensitive are those withstable jobs and college students. Looking at thetypes of people who are organizing the latestprotests, they are a 25-year-old providing careto the elderly and a 31-year-old who works ininterior decoration. Because they feelsomething through the course of their dailylives, they likely believe they cannot allow thepolitical and business worlds to continue actingin the way they have.

Q: What are the differences in the mood withthe period in 1968, when student protests weremuch more prominent?

A: The 1960 protests against the Japan-U.S.Security Treaty were centered on organizedlabor and college students. In 1968, it was

fundamentally only college students. That wasa time when college students were the onlyones with free time, outside of those mobilizedby organizations.

Now, however, there has been a large increasein those with more freedom to act because ofthe nature of their jobs and working hours. Ofcourse, that freedom also has the doublemeaning pointed out by Karl Marx, that peoplewho have such freedom also have the freedomto die from starvation.

The Security Treaty protest was settled afterthe government came out with an income-doubling plan. In 1968, the economy was stillexpanding so the protests ended after thestudents found jobs in companies.

Now, the government cannot come up with anincome-doubling plan, and those at the centerof the demonstrations are not college studentswho would leave once they graduated.

It will not be easy to overcome the structuraldissatisfaction and political distrust.

Q: What do you feel is pushing people to takepart in the demonstrations?

A: There is, of course, the nuclear accident andfears about radiation.Anger is also intensebecause the people feel that politicians areignoring them.

Some people may feel, "It was enjoyable once Itried it." With so many people of similaropinions gathering together, there is also anattraction in being able to meet withacquaintances for the first time in a while or toshake hands with total strangers.

Q: What do you think "nuclear power" and"resumption of operations" represent for theprotesters?

A: In the Occupy Wall Street demonstrations inthe United States, many protesters had high

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educational backgrounds but were working innon-regular jobs. When they thought about whowas responsible for putting them in the positionthey were in, their anger became directed atWall Street and Washington, or, in other words,the financial elite and government.

In Egypt, there were many young people withhigh educational backgrounds and withFacebook skills, but with no jobs. Their angerwas directed at the Hosni Mubarak regime.

What was it in Japan? It was not the primeminister, nor those who lived and worked in theRoppongi Hills area.

With the nuclear accident, i t becameincreasingly clear there was a political-bureaucratic-business complex in play.Peoplelooked at those in the complex as makingdecisions while ignoring the general public, asnot having any intention to protect the public'ssafety and as having gained vested intereststhrough their insider status.

I believe behind the protests against resumingthe Oi plant operations are a protest againstthe entire current state of Japan.

Q: What do you think about the commentattributed to Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko,who complained the protesters were making aloud racket?

A: I recalled the diary of Louis XVI during theFrench Revolution. On the day a mob attackedthe Bastille, the king wrote in his diary thatnothing happened. Because he went huntingalmost daily, the entry meant that he didn’tcatch anything. There was no recognition thatsociety was being shaken from its very roots.

Attacking the Bastille

When politicians and reporters in the politicalnews sections of major newspapers work in asort of village society, they are unaware ofwhat is occurring in the outside world. Theybegin to feel that an issue cannot be a majorproblem as long as it does not affect thatvillage society. Or they may look at everythingthrough the filter of that village society by, forexample, saying something was instigated bythose close to Ozawa Ichiro or someone else.

That form of politics and political reporting is acharacteristic of what has transpired since the1970s.

Q: What is the difference with what occurredbefore that period?

A: Before 1970, i f there was a majordemonstration in front of the Diet, there wouldhave been a response that it represented a"communist threat" or "a crisis of the state."

However, from about the mid-1970s, when thepolitical world became much more stable, itbecame possible to understand all aboutpolitics by simply pursuing faction leaders ofthe ruling Liberal Democratic Party. That wasbecause the social system was almost like theone in which approval of the faction leadermeant that the LDP, the Diet, the local

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assembly members and even the neighborhoodassociations and labor unions further belowwould also give their approval.

Although only men were active members of allthose groups, everyone felt that women wouldvote according to what their husbands toldthem to do.

That social structure has completely changed.Under that old system, only about 30 percent ofthe population would be covered. Methods usedin the past no longer apply with more than halfof the population having no party loyalty.

Those in the higher ranks of the ancientregime, namely the political-bureaucratic-bus iness complex and ma jor med iaorganizations, are the ones who leastunderstand that change.

Q: Why have politicians and political partieslost the trust of the people?

A: It is because the social system that was builtup since the end of World War II has reachedits limits.

That system was led by the manufacturing andexporting sector, with regular male companyemployees providing for their families throughstable jobs and the central government handingout subsidies and public works projects to localgovernments.

While some people may hold nostalgia for sucha framework, there is no way of going back tosuch a system.

Between 1998 and 2008, the public worksproject budget was cut in half due to fiscalproblems. The large number of municipalmergers in the Heisei Era (1989-present) led toa major decrease in the number of localassembly members.

A simple way of explaining why the LDPgovernment was toppled is because it could no

longer distribute money. Although theDemocratic Party of Japan took over, nothingchanged.

Q: Is it possible that the framework forrepresentative democracy no longer matchesthe needs of the times?

A: That is possible.

But looking at the process by which Oi plantoperations were resumed, I believe there areother issues. I never thought the governmentwould bungle things so badly. I can only thinkthat it has lost all ability to deal with reality.

It would have been a different matter if thegovernment had publicized everything aboutthe actual situation and then presented aspecific timeline for moving away from nuclearenergy, deciding which reactors would bedecommissioned and allowing only those thatpassed strict appraisals to resume operations.

However, not even that was possible due toresistance from some business sectors. That ledto increased distrust of the overall system.

A favorable interpretation of the decision toresume operations might have the followinglogic: Unless restarts were carried out, electricpower companies would record losses one afteranother and a financial depression might betriggered if banks could not collect on loansmade to electric power companies.

However, we do not know if the entire Japaneseeconomy would fall into a crisis. The mattermight be resolved if Tokyo Electric Power Co.and the banks took responsibil ity formanagement and investment mistakes. At thevery least, the argument about an electricityshortage is not convincing because there issufficient electricity in all of Japan by havingonly two nuclear reactors of Kansai ElectricPower Co. in operation.

It is the government itself that has brought

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about the crisis in the representative system.

There is the sense that those taking part in thedemonstrations no longer want lawmakers torepresent them.

Did people expect anything from Louis XVI?

There are many people who feel aboutlawmakers, "If you want to come here, youshould come on your own."

Q: Is it not dangerous to have a situation inwhich various social organizations andframeworks have lost the people's trust?

A: It is true that there has been a loss ofstability.

Whether that represents a dangerous situationor an opportunity for change will depend on theresponse that is made.

But, I believe that change is inevitable.

There is no way of returning to a society inwhich everyone is a member of the middleclass. But I do not believe there is anyone whoknows in what way society will change.

Q: Many people feel there is no political partythey can vote for. In what direction willunaffiliated voters move?

A: The term unaffiliated voter can only be usedin relation to party support.

The bureaucracy has also lost trust.

People are beginning to feel that membercompanies of Keidanren (Japan BusinessFederation) are only concerned about profitsfor their own companies.

Media organizations have become insensitive toan extent that people are beginning to suspectsome form of censorship. That is why morepeople are turning to the Internet.

When jobs, families and politics becomeunstable and traditional parties are unable togain votes, a common phenomenon found inadvanced nations is for populists to garnersupport. At the same time, another commontrend is for new forces to gain support, such asthe Greens in Germany.

Q: What is the new trend that may now beemerging in Japan?

A: I am focusing on how this new movementwill evolve.

Since April 2011, I have participated in someform of demonstration on several occasionsevery month. While the organizers andlocations have changed, it has continued muchlonger than I expected and it has gone beyonda temporary boom.

In the 1960 Security Treaty protest, the heightof activity only lasted for about a month. TheMay 1968 revolution in Paris only lasted abouttwo months. A boom would not last for morethan six months. Even if the situation in front ofthe Prime Minister's Official Residence shouldbe settled, I think other protests will take placesomewhere else.

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Protesters surround the Diet in 1960 Ampodemonstration

Q:But aren't politicians taking these protestslightly?

A: That is what is making the crisis moreserious.

I f one person dec ides to j o in a f reeparticipation demonstration, there are likely100 people in the background. Politicianswould have to think about the meaning ofhaving 100,000 people gather in Tokyo alone.

Since 3/11, the political literacy of the publichas increased substantially.

It is a good thing for democracy to become asociety in which demonstrations are possibleand if there are more people who hold thesense that they can participate in politics.

While one example of trying to suppress such amovement by force occurred in China in 1989,

the economy continued to grow there.

If a similar attempt to suppress by force wasmade in Japan, dissatisfaction would emergeelsewhere in a different form.

Q: Are you saying we have entered a new era?

A: I believe so.

The first postwar era was the period ofconfusion after World War II that lasted until1955.

The second postwar era was until 1991, whenthe Cold War ended. That was an era ofeconomic growth.

The third postwar era that followed was one ofbeing unable to retreat from a framework thathad been constructed during the era of higheconomic growth and trying to forciblymaintain it by distributing more money. Ibelieve we have reached the limits of that lastera.

During the 1970s and 1980s, Japan was uniquebecause with the economy strong, jobs stable,and social movements stagnant, the politicalworld could afford to be a third-rate one inwhich the only concern was factional struggle.That was a time when Japan was considered astrange place.

Now, all those factors no longer exist.Unemployment has increased, economicdisparity has widened and social movementshave emerged.

I believe Japan will move toward becoming amore ordinary nation.

But will it be able to continue with a third-ratepolitical sector?

Q: For the sector of the population with morefree time, the most important value is no longermoney. I feel a change. Can that be consideredhope?

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A: Over the past year or so, I have met manypeople who are engaged in various newactivities. I am amazed at what they do. Whilethey are competent and intelligent, their livesare unstable because their income levels arelow. Despite that, there are many who continueto be active in providing support to disastervictims or protesting the government.

I believe they are the salt of the earth.

I believe a society that cannot adequately takeadvantage of the voices and abilities of suchpeople is not a good one.

(The interview was conducted by KazuakiHagi.)

Oguma Eiji is professor of Policy Management,Keio University and an historical sociologist.His book, A Genealogy of ‘Japanese’ Self-I m a g e s(http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss?url= s e a r c h - a l i a s % 3 D s t r i p b o o k s & f i e l d -keywords=oguma+eiji&x=0&y=0) is atranslation of Tan'itsu minzoku shinwa no kigen(http://www.amazon.com/Tanitsu-minzoku-shinw a - k i g e n -homogeneous/dp/4788505282/ref=sr_1_2?s=books&ie=UTF8&qid=1311864912&sr=1-2) (Theor ig in o f the myth o f J apanese as ahomogeneous ethnic group), which won theSuntory Culture Award. He is coeditor withKang Sangjung of Zainichi issei no kioku(Memories of the First Generation of Koreansin Japan) 在日一世の記憶 / 小熊英二, 姜尚中編.

David H. Slater is an Associate Professor ofCultural Anthropology at Sophia University,Tokyo, whose work involves youth culture,social class and urban space. He is the co-editor with Ishida Hiroshi of Social Class inContemporary Japan: Structures, Sorting andS t r a t e g i e s(http://www.amazon.com/Social-Class-Contemporary-Japan-Structures/dp/0415474752). Since3/11, he has been doing the ethnography of

disaster and relief in Tohoku, and was theGuest Editor of Hot Spots: 3.11 Politics inDisaster Japan: Fear and Anger, Possibility andHope, in Cultural Anthropology (2010) <link(http://www.culanth.org/?q=node/409)>

Recommended citation: Oguma Eiji with anintroduction by David H. Slater, "From aDysfunctional Japanese-Style IndustrializedSociety to an 'Ordinary Nation'?," The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol 10, Issue 31, No. 2, July 30,2012.

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