from differences to dialogue

FROM DIFFERENCES TO DIALOGU E:

U.S. & FRENCH VIEWS ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

For the Fondation Charles Léopold Mayer pour le Progrès de l’Homme

Priyanka Bhalla Catarina Fabiansson Maria Gonzalez Solis

Berthilde Goupy Corinna Jentzsch

Irene Menendez Gonzalez Maurice Nsabimana

Carole Vereerstraeten

From Difference to Dialogue: US and French Perspectives on Global Governance

1

Interim report, final report to be presented in June 2005 Contents Preface: Why Global Governance Matters: US and French Perspectives .................. 2 I. Executive Summary ...................................................................................................... 3 II. Our Client: The Charles Leopold Mayer Foundation for the Progress of Humankind........................................................................................................................ 6 III. Our Project: A joint Columbia University-Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences-Po) Integrated Team Project: ......................................................................... 7

Project Objectives ........................................................................................................... 7 Deliverables of Project.................................................................................................... 7 Project Methodology....................................................................................................... 8 Challenges....................................................................................................................... 9

IV. LAYING THE GROUNDWORK........................................................................... 12 Alternative Perspectives on Global Governance .......................................................... 12 US & French Views ...................................................................................................... 16 Identifying Policymakers (DC) – Practitioners – Academics....................................... 17 US Foreign Policy Centered vs. International Organizations centered aka "Condi vs. Kofi".............................................................................................................................. 18

V. CORE ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 19 Sovereign States............................................................................................................ 19 American Exceptionalism............................................................................................. 21 International Law, ICJ, ICC.......................................................................................... 23 Security ......................................................................................................................... 26 Economic Governance .................................................................................................. 28

VI. THE MISSING LINK(s) .......................................................................................... 31 Democratic Deficits of Global Governance.................................................................. 31 Civil Society................................................................................................................ 344 The Generational Gap............................................................................................... 3838

VII. IDEAS FOR REFORM .......................................................................................... 40 American UN support and the High Level Panel Report ............................................. 40 Regionalism .................................................................................................................. 43

VIII. Conclusion The Need for Dialogue: Team Recommendations........................................................ 46

ANNEX ............................................................................................................................ 48 Executive Summary of UN High Level Panel Report………………………………...49 Framework for the different fiches..……………………………………………………...….57 Fiches: Sample Fiche Document; Sample Fiche Analyse and, Fiche Debat Outline... 58 Sample Questionnaire for Interviews.…………………………………………………66 Working Bibliography on Global Governance………………………………………..68 Joint Biographical Sketches of Interviewees.………………………………………....76 Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………....88


2

Preface: Why Global Governance Matters: US and French Perspectives In a world, where multilateralism and cooperation are becoming an increasing necessity, the definition of who holds power and who has the capacity to engage on a global level is changing at a rapid pace; non-state actors are gaining more significance; states are increasingly interacting with multiple stakeholders and the responsibility to protect is a burning issue in the collective security arena. Why is Europe, in this new world, at the vanguard of global governance, with the creation of the European Union? Why is the US that is well known for creating the blueprint of the League of Nations and mistrusting its own government, so protective about its sovereignty? The need to answer the above mentioned questions; the growing international sentiment that international institutions such as the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF) and United Nations (UN) need to be reformed; the publication of the UN High Level Panel Report (HLPR); increasing interdependence among countries; a need for increased collective action, not just in areas of security, but health, the environment, etc. motivated the Charles Leopold Mayer Foundation to commence this project. In addition, the current American political climate has allowed for the transatlantic rift between the US and France to deepen. Being two major, international actors, it is important to foster dialogue between the two countries, in order to gain more international cooperation and consensus on global collective action.

The research has been interesting; highlighting, as it did, the transatlantic divide between European and American Policy circles in regards to global governance and multilateralism. In addition, we also learned about the domestic divide within the United States between those who wish to centre their opinions on global governance within the framework of US foreign policy, and those who are more centrally focused on the international organizations framework.

Is there a need to study global governance: “Sadly, the answer is yes… The costs to the United States reduced constitutional autonomy, impaired popular sovereignty, reduction of our international power, and limitations on our domestic and foreign policy options and solutions - are far too great…”

John Bolton, 2000


3

I. Executive Summary As part of the Applied Workshop in International Development in the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University, a joint, integrated SIPA-Institut des Etudes Science Politiques team was appointed by the Swiss Charles Leopold Mayer Foundation to conduct an eight-month long investigation on American and French perspectives towards global governance and its reform. Starting in November 2004, the SIPA sub-team conducted two principal activities: (1) numerous interviews with American policy makers, practitioners and academics in New York City and Washington DC; and (2) a literature review. After reviewing many books and articles, the SIPA sub-team wrote a number of book reviews, op-eds and debate papers on topics connected to global governance, e.g. “the impact of trade liberalization on economic governance.” The Science Po sub-team commenced its part of the integrated project in February 2005 and is engaging in similar activities in France. This report includes primary findings by the SIPA sub-team with preliminary additions by the Sciences-Po sub-team. Our main findings are as follows:

• Our principal finding is that there are not as many differences between the US and France on global governance as we assumed at the beginning of this project. After comparing interview and literature review findings, we realized the following: (1) Neither the US nor France has one, comprehensive definition for global governance. In both countries, global governance remains a vague, often hard to define, area of scholarship and political action. Similarly, there is not one US or French perspective on global governance, but rather multiple perspectives. For example, in the US, many citizens hold dual nationalities or are recent immigrants to the country, however, they too, hold an “American” perspective; (2) Both the US and France (within the EU context) have a tradition of being both internationally engaged, when convenient, or being isolationist, when convenient (American and French exceptionalism?). Therefore, there are factions who uphold and guard national sovereignty (John Bolton and Moreau DeFarges) and there are factions who fully support international organizations (League of Nations blueprint and European idea of “common good needs to be governed collectively.”) There are additional points of commonality in areas of civil society, security and economic governance, which have been further described in the report.

• Other primary findings have been divided into the following sections: (1)

Laying the Groundwork; (2) Core Issues; (3) The Missing Link(s); (4) Ideas for Reform and (5) Need for Dialogue.


4

• Laying the Groundwork identifies challenges in the study of global governance, such as the difficulty in finding a definition. In addition, it identifies practitioners, policy makers and academics who work on global governance, in a broad sense, as either “Americanists” (those promoting American interests and values globally) or “Internationalists” (those committed to multilateral cooperation and strengthening or revamping global governance.

• Core issues have been identified as “Sovereign States,” “American

exceptionalism,” “International Law,” “Security” and “Economic Governance.” Among the group of individuals we interviewed both in France and the US, most agreed that sovereign states are still the main and, often, most important actors in today’s international arena. Important non-state actors such as segments of civil society, e.g. non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and their increasing influence, were acknowledged. Within the US tradition of American exceptionalism (tradition of mistrust in government; US isolationist vs. US internationalist stance), our team found a Washington DC-New York City dichotomy. Some of our interview contributors’ answers were more US foreign policy centered, emphasizing that the term “global governance” would not be acceptable in Washington DC policy circles. “Global governance” within US policy circles would imply threatening national sovereignty or be confused with the term “global government.” When trying to engage US policy makers in multilateral cooperation, it is important to use phrases such as “global policy solutions,” or “global management.” Other interview contributors’ answers were more international organization centered, supportive of global governance and the United Nations. However, support for institutions such as the United Nations did not come without a healthy dose of criticism. In the “security” sector, the most pressing need is to devise more collective security strategies (as suggested in the UN High Level Panel Report) and recognizing the responsibility to protect rather than the responsibility to wage war. The final core issue, economic governance, addresses concepts of international trade and human development; the distinct possibility of G7 expanding into G20; effective ways of including workers’ rights in international trade agreements; the efficiency within the WTO and proposals for changing the whole international financial architecture, such as Ariel Buria’s ideas on how to change IMF voting shares.

• What are the missing links-when trying to bridge the aforementioned

theoretical ideas and practice? We divided this section into the following three categories: “Democratic Deficits,” “Civil Society,” and “Generational Gap.” Both the US and France call for increased transparency, accountability and broader participation in the global decision-making process. Richard Falk’s idea on a “global parliament” is discussed in terms of more democratic global governance. Michael Doyle proposes ideas for more democratic representation in the UN General Assembly. The danger of efficiency loss in


5

institutional functionality with more democratization and representation is mentioned. “Civil Society”, one of the non-state actors, with increasing participation and influence globally addresses the role of NGOs in the global governance world, their effectiveness and, often, positive impact, but also their “undemocratic” nature, by virtue of not having elected representatives. The “Generational Gap” observes some of the differences between younger generations working on global governance and older generations working on global governance. There are exceptions in every generation, however, generally speaking, the older generation does not believe in dynamic change as much as the younger generation does. The older generation is more skeptical about sovereign states’ involvement in global governance and believes the younger generation will be catalysts for change.

• Ideas for Reform highlight two current reform proposals for international

institutions: (1) the UN High Level Panel Report and (2) Increased efforts towards regionalism. The UN High Level Panel Report is a UN reform proposal appearing after a long line of UN reform proposals. The report heavily concentrates on security issues, proposes reform of the Security Council, is UN specific, does not touch on internal bureaucratic reform and focuses on increased collective action.

• Our final recommendation is that there is a need for dialogue. Dialogue is

needed on the domestic, transatlantic and global level between practitioners, policymakers, academics and lay persons. Specific recommendations include: (1) Increase linkage between similar global governance database projects around the world, e.g. between the Charles Leopold Mayer Foundation’s “Réseau International de Recherche Comparative et de Débats sur la Réforme de la Gouvernance” (IRG) project and the Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs’ Global Policy Innovations Project in New York City; (2) Facilitate worldwide exchanges between policy makers, practitioners and academics with yearly follow-up reunions; (3) A document which showcases culturally appropriate terms for global governance, e.g. suggesting alternative terms such as “global policy solutions” for Washington DC policy circles; (4) Continuation of the project, not only inclusive of other US and European geographical areas, but also of other world regions, e.g. Asia and Africa; (5) Engaging youth in different areas, e.g. creating materials on global governance to be included in school curriculums.

It is important to mention that this is an interim report and not the final version of our findings. In June, 2005 the SIPA sub-team will be traveling to Paris in order to create the final, integrated report with the Science Po sub-team. By this time, the Science Po sub-team would have finished their interviews and literature review, therefore allowing American and French findings to be fully integrated.


6

II. Our Client: The Charles Leopold Mayer Foundation for the Progress of Humankind The Charles Léopold Mayer Foundation for the Progress of Humankind (FPH) is a Swiss foundation set up in 1982 with its Executive office in Paris. The Foundation divides its work in multi-annual stages. Currently, it is in its third stage (2004-2010). The Foundation’s means are provided through the Charles Leopold Mayer endowment. The Foundation sees itself as an actor contributing to the emergence of a global community through its interest in the relationship between different governmental levels (local to global governance) and in proposals for reforms in this field. The Foundation works as a forum to study the need for global governance reform in a world that is constantly changing. Over the past ten years, the Foundation has significantly contributed to the creation of new capacities for dialogue, exchange and expertise across different regions of the world, with an emphasis on:

– a new conception of governance or the need for new social, political, and institutional regulations from the local to the global to manage a profoundly interdependent world, society and the relations between world society and the biosphere; – alternative forms of development, other lifestyles, other ways of producing, consuming, and exchanging to build a fair and sustainable society; – common ethical principles, in connection with the two previous mutations, which are indispensable for managing our common planet.

The Foundation is particularly known for the following two endeavors: its publishing arm, the Éditions Charles Léopold Mayer (ECLM) and its meetings, among them the most important one, the World Citizens Assembly organized in Lille in December 2001. It has links with more than ten thousand persons and organizations across the world. “They are from very different spheres: family farmers, fish workers, community residents, researchers, financiers, company executives, union leaders, journalists, philosophers, publishers, artists, civil servants, etc. ... These contacts have been established in all continents although, however, they remain sparse in Asia, North America, and in the Arab countries.”1 In this context, the Charles Leopold Mayer Foundation has been keen to have an integrated team from Columbia University’s School of International and Public Affairs and a partner institution, L’Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences-Po) to help them with this long-term research project. As leading institutions with outstanding reputations, these two academies are especially well positioned to take leadership on global policy issues of this magnitude.

1 Source: http://www.clmayer.net/fph/en/presentation.html

http://www.clmayer.net/fph/en/presentation.html


7

III. Our Project: A joint Columbia University-Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences-Po) Integrated Team Project: Individuals working on this project include students from both Columbia University in New York City and students from L’Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences-Po) in Paris. The project is included in the Applied Workshop in International Development (EPD Workshop) and l’Atelier and is part of the degree requirement in both schools. The EPD workshop was built up over a period of nine years by Coralie Bryant. Students have conducted amazing and fascinating projects over the past years from evaluating the cashew industry in Mozambique to aiding the Landless Farmers Movement in Brazil. Historically, the teams have consisted of SIPA students concentrating in economic and political development. In the fall of 2003, a similar initiative was started at Sciences-Po. 2004/2005 has brought about a fundamental change within the EPD workshop: the Columbia University-Institut d’Etudes Politiques (Sciences-Po) Integrated Team. Being an integrated team has made use of all forms of transatlantic communication: from email, exchange visits, and conference calls to achieve integrated input on both the American and French final presentations. The experience has been challenging yet rewarding. We, as an integrated team recommend that this process be repeated in the coming years.

Project Objectives In support of the Charles Léopold Mayer Foundation’s efforts to foster the dialogue and exchange of ideas between the various actors working on global governance, this Workshop project aims to contribute to the Foundation’s IRG network initiative in two ways. At its outset, the team had the following two objectives: (1) to identify the intellectual landscape of scholars and professionals in the United States and France that are engaged in research, formulation and implementation of models of global governance. The data is included in the present report and formatted; (2) the team aimed to formulate the findings and provide recommendations to the Foundation on how to strengthen dialogue on the topic of global governance, both among practitioners in each respective country, as well as on a transatlantic level. These findings can be found in the last section of the present report.

Deliverables of Project At the conclusion of our project in June 2005, we expect to be able to provide the following deliverables for the Leopold Mayer Foundation:


8

• A report on the findings of the research conducted. • A database utilizing the formal framework structure (outlined in “Typology

and Writing Guidelines paper for IRG Database”) to reflect the key actors influencing ideas and work on global governance in the United States and France. Specifically, the database will be divided into the following sections: (1) Fiches Documents (2) Fiches Analyses (3) Fiches Debats.

• A supplemental document listing all the individuals interviewed for this

project and key points concerning global governance raised by interviewees. • A list of recommendations for future Leopold Mayer Foundation endeavors

in connection to global governance, particularly for conference series, seminars and colloquia.

Project Methodology Research and Interview The team identified individuals and institutions currently working on issues related to global governance through extensive Internet and library resources as well as by seeking recommendations from academics and practitioners. An initial framework for the different fiche has served as a working base for the research and focus during interviews2. The main method used during the project was that of in-depth interviews. Once organizations and institutions were identified, the teams contacted these in order to conduct a 30-120 minute interview that used the following line of inquiry: how their work is related to global governance; what possible US views on global governance are; reactions to the UN High Level Panel Report in relation to global governance in general, and; on what their views are on the need for reform within the field of global governance.3 Questions then followed on to probe specific issues related to the interview contributor’s involvement in global governance. In some cases, this specific sub topic was the WTO or opinions on the role of civil society or commentaries on Paul Wolfowitz’s appointment as head of the World Bank, etc. Both teams will provide the Charles Leopold Mayer Foundation with a power point presentation including findings and recommendations for future steps to be undertaken by the Foundation, in its efforts to foster dialogue between organizations and individuals working within the field of global governance. A database listing relevant organizations, individuals and documents available on global governance will also be presented and

2 See annex “Framework for the different fiches” 3 See annex “Sample Questionnaire for Interviewees”


9

placed on the Foundation’s website. It is however important to mention that this integrated project has encountered unique challenges.

Challenges Coordinating our joint efforts on each side of the Atlantic has mainly been a logistical challenge. Conference calls and internet have been of great aid, but the actual meetings in person have been the time where we have become most integrated. Meeting to put together this report and presentation in New York in April 2005, was a challenge of its own, not only to figure out how to best integrate our findings in writing, but also to find out that perceptions we had had about the evolution of the project prior to sitting down together, were now altered and took new interesting turns. Apart from the challenge of coordinating our efforts, the definition and the scope of the project were two topics needing specific attention:

“What is global governance?” Another challenge encountered by the sub-team in New York at an early stage, was that of finding a working definition on ‘global governance’. When starting the interviews, the team was often asked how they would define global governance themselves. Based on its research, the sub-team had initially chosen Elke Krahmann’s definition of global governance as:

…the structure and processes that enable governmental and non-governmental actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making and implementation of policies in the absence of a unifying political authority.4

According to Krahmann’s view, governance and government5 can therefore be understood as the ideal-typical poles of a continuum that differentiates centralized and fragmented authority along seven dimensions at the domestic, regional, and international levels: geography, function, distribution of resources, interests, norms, decision-making, and policy implementation.

As Fleur Johns points out, “work on ‘global governance’ is being undertaken in the fields of international law, corporate and securities law, human rights law, political theory, international relations, sociology, public policy, international institutional studies,

4 Krahmann, Elke. “National, regional, and global governance: One phenomenon or many?” Global Governance. 2003 (9:3) at 331. 5 The “policymaking arrangements and processes that centralize political authority within the state and its agencies” (Idem) .


10

international environmental policy, international economic policy, international trade law and in many other disciplines, departments and fora around the world.” 6 In the introductory chapter of his classic, Governance without Government, James Rosenau defined governance as a set of regulation mechanisms in a sphere of activity, which function effectively even though they are not endowed with formal authority.7 Later, in the first issue of Global Governance, James Rosenau specified his definition: “global governance refers to more than the formal institutions and organizations through which the management of international affairs is or is not sustained … It is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity – from the family to the international organization – in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions.”8 Lawrence Finkelstein defines “global governance [as] governing, without sovereign authority, relationships that transcend national frontiers”9 Marie-Claude Smouts10 points out that “the literature on international relations has as yet failed to transcend the traditional framework of thinking to make governance a specific tool for new issues. Governance is presented either as established practice, a set of locatable rules and control mechanisms, in which case it duplicates regimes and merely pays a little more attention to non-public actors,11 or else as an activity, in which case it is defined in terms of functions which for decades have been the sphere of multilateral activity (G-7, G-5, World Bank, etc.) and overlaps with multilateralism.”12 Joel Richard Paul defines global governance as “the whole constellation of international norms and relationships that affect public and private actors.”13 For Paul, global governance is “distinguishable from supranational government, and it has developed in tandem with globalization.”

6 Johns, Fleur E. “Global Governance: An Heretical History Play.” Global Jurist Advances. Vol. 4, Iss. 2, 2004, at 2. 7 Rosenau, James N., and Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (eds). Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge University Press, NY: 1992, at 5. 8 Rosenau, James. “Governance in the Twenty-first Century.” Global Governance. 1995 (1:1), pp. 13–14. 9 Finkelstein, Lawrence S. “What is global governance?” Global Governance. 1995 (1:1), p. 368. 10 Smouts, Marie-Claude. “The Proper use of governance in international relations .” International Social Science Journal. Vol. 50, Iss. 155, March 1998; pp. 81-89. 11 This is, for instance, the case of Krasner, Stephen D. “Power Politics, Institutions, and Transnational Relations.” pp. 257-279, in Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed) Bringing Transnational Relations Back In : Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions. Cambridge University Press, 1995. 12 See Ruggie, John G. (ed.) Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983. 13 Paul, Joel Richard. "Cultural Resistance to Global Governance." Michigan Journal of International Law. Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2000; p. 2.


11

Leon Gordenker and Thomas Weiss describe global governance as “efforts to bring more orderly and reliable responses to social and political issues that go beyond capacities of states to address individually.”14 Given the multitude of definitions on global governance, it was hard for the New York team to settle on one for its interviews. Finally, both teams’ advisors, Coralie Bryant and Michel Doucin, provided their own definitions: Coralie Bryant We see global governance as the structure and processes that enable sovereign governmental actors to coordinate their interdependent needs and interests through the making and implementation of policies. Nongovernmental and other civil society actors also participate via advocacy work to influence those sovereign governments and their policies. Given the absence now of a sovereign international governing authority, many of these processes currently go through a wide variety of international organizations. The power and authority of those organizations is based upon their Articles of Agreement or international treaties. In our work, we envision a strengthening of the governing capacities of international organizations, recognizing that the specific shape, structure and sovereign reach of future global governance will need to be carefully defined and agreed upon to be well articulated from the bottom up, - from local governments through national governments to the international level, in order to have legitimacy. Michel Doucin According to the classical conception, global governance can be conceived as the structure and processes that enable sovereign governmental actors to coordinate their independent needs and interests through the making and implementation of policies. Other actors interact in the diplomatic stands of the States, with a non-governmental status, via advocacy work to influence those sovereign governments and their policies. Some of the actors, notably international firms, have a direct role in the production of “soft law” but also in the creation of new relationship with the emerging States. In addition, local authorities, religions and ideologies interfere with global governance. This different dimension leads to the necessity to take into account the articulation from the bottom-up to the international level including the regional and national ones, be they institutional or not. The project of building a sovereign international governing authority has failed until now and a wide variety of international organizations has attempted to endorse this role. In our work, we envision not only the strengthening and the reform of the governing capacities of international organizations but also the actual and potential role of civil societies in establishing new forms of social contracts, influencing the world rules of the game. These definitions were shown to interview contributors at the beginning of most interviews in order to elicit their comments and alternative definitions.

Narrowing the topic 14 Weiss, Thomas G., and Gordenker, Leon (eds). NGOs, the United Nations and Global Governance. New York: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, p. 17.


12

When initiating research on topics and actors relevant to this project, the sub-team at SIPA discovered early on that the topic ‘global governance’ and ‘global governance reform’ still needed to be further narrowed and disaggregated into focused parts of the broad subject. Suggestions were made to narrow the comparative review and analysis (using Krahmann’s framework of analysis for instance) to those individuals and institutions producing ideas and policy proposals towards institutional reform of international governance, for instance by focusing on the United Nations (UN) System, including the International Financial Institutions, a very timely subject for transatlantic debate, especially with the publication of the UN Secretary General’s High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. Once our team had crossed these two hurdles: (1) agreeing on which global governance definitions to use for our interviews and (2) deciding which topic areas to focus on within the scholarship of global governance, we would be ready to lay the groundwork for the whole project.

IV. Laying the Groundwork Alternative Perspectives on Global Governance Language matters significantly on this subject, as does the framing of the inquiry. The diversity and size of the United States, its federal structure, and its political culture based on constitutionalism, results in there being no single opinion that could be called “the American Perspective” on global governance. We mainly interviewed in New York City and in Washington DC. Even though, these two centers are important within the policy determining community—readers need to remember that given cultural differences between regions in the United States, middle America might well be even more conservative in their views than this East Coast sample, while California (especially given Berkeley, Stanford, and Southern California universities) is likely to be more diverse in views. Similarly, based on early findings of our French counterpart team, there is no principal opinion considered to be the "French perspective" on global governance. When their interview team asked their interviewees about such a French view of the matter, they all either dismissed the idea or evoked a "European perspective" rather than a specifically French one. A number of academics emphasized the weak tradition of International Relations theorizing in French academic circles; from which to address governance models. Moreover, François de Bernard, President of the GERM (groupe d’etudes et de recherche sur les mondialisations), mentioned that national perspectives on global governance were actually more developed in countries such as Germany than in France.15

15 Interview with François de Bernard (April 14, 2005).


13

However, a number of individuals pointed to the existence of a tradition of ‘solidarity’ underlying the French discourse on global governance; it is such a concern with social equity (both formally and substantially) that underlies French positions on governance.16 In this perspective, the need for a common interest of humanity to address is underlined by French president Jacques Chirac: Global governance is to humanise and control globalization. It is time to acknowledge that there are global public goods17 that we should manage together. It is time to assert and insist upon the greater interest of humanity over and above that of each country.18 Indeed, although there is no consensus among French academics, there is a clear governmental position on the issue which privileges multilateralism and the strengthening of the UN approach.19 In our interview findings in the US, however, there were few confident nods towards “privileging multilateralism and strengthening of the UN approach.” The mere mention of ‘global governance’ as a research agenda elicited skeptical responses, particularly among the practitioners and policymakers we interviewed in Washington, D.C. It soon became apparent that advocacy, policy-making, and research around ‘global governance’ in the United States uses an altogether different terminology, such as American foreign policy. Also, except for academics, work on global governance tends to focus on specific aspects of global governance. According to Walter Russell Mead, the Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow in U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, this is so: Partly because our overall role in the world is so complex and so little subject to conscious control of any single person, when Americans think about foreign policy, we usually think about specific issues rather than the broad general shape of America’s place in the world.20

Mead describes America’s approach to the world as by no means perfect, yet reasonably moral and reasonably practical on the whole. Over the long term,

we can see patterns and structures in America’s encounters with the world – both in the foreign policy of the government and when we consider the broader engagement of the nation as a whole. Security interests and economic interests have a way of making themselves felt, and American society continually tries to express certain values and ideas through its interaction with the rest of the world.21

16 Interview with Bertrand Badie, (April 21, 2005) 17 On the subject of global public goods and their provision, see Kaul, Inge, Grunberg, Isabelle, and Stern, Marc A. (eds). Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999; and Kaul, Inge, et al (eds). Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 18 Statement by His Excellency Mr. Jacques Chirac President of The French Republic at the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg, South Africa, 2nd September 2002 (http://www.un.org/events/wssd/statements/franceE.htm) 19 Speech at Johannesburg World Summit, 2002 20 See Mead, Walter Russell. Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a World at Risk. New York: Knopf, 2004, at p. 18. 21 Ibid, p. 19.

http://www.un.org/events/wssd/statements/franceE.htm


14

Therefore, exploring perspectives towards global governance in the American context would be better served by studying the diverse actors and institutions shaping what Mead characterizes as the American project: “the overall nature and impact of American society (including the United States government) on the rest of the world.”22 As much as careful phrasing of the term “global governance” mattered within the American context, it was also relevant within the French context. Generally, the word "governance" is considered as a broad concept. Although governance is seen as an adequate/essential concept to address reform in a number of sectors, the concept of "global governance" spurred greater skepticism. It was said to be a concept in which almost everything could be included. In addition, and crucially, the concept is used variously according to different ‘sectors’. Conceptions of global governance coming from the security sector are predominantly strategic and emphasize the operational dimension of governance (disregarding conceptual weaknesses Dominique David, researcher at IFRI-Institut Francais des Relations International). In contrast, views representing sectors relevant for the inclusion of civil society inclusion tended to emphasize a more substantial concept of global governance, based on traditional conceptions of ‘government’ such as participation, representation and accountability.23 Most interviewees in New York and Washington, D.C. stressed the unique role of the United States in shaping the international agenda since World War II. This unique role arises from America’s distinctive political culture, which is characterized by both a high degree of individualism and of antistatism, and by public distrust towards governance and government in general.24 In France, however, there does not seem to be a direct link between public attitudes towards domestic governance and perceptions towards global governance. Far from this, public attitudes towards European integration contrast with the general consensus on the need for reform at the global level. Also, in reaction to our working definitions (discussed in the methodology section), several interviewees proposed alternative definitions reflecting their own deep engagement with global issues. For example, Michael Doyle at Columbia University defined global governance as the “attempt to create the kinds of rules that an increasingly interdependent world needs.”25 In a similar manner, Pascal Lamy, former EU Commissioner for Trade, and Zaki Laïdi, Professor at Sciences-Po Paris, define global governance as the overall process whereby collective rules are defined, decided upon, legitimised, implemented and supervised.26 New procedures in addition to the rules of representative democracy thus emerge, emphasising consultation and contractual agreement.

22 Ibid, p.18 23 Interview with Henri Rouillé d’Orfeuil (April 14, 2005) 24 Interviews with John Sewell (March 8, 2005), and Edward Luck (April 15, 2005). 25 Interview with Michael Doyle (April 13, 2005). 26 See Laïdi, Zaki/Lamy, Pascal. “La gouvernance ou comment donner sens à la mondialisation” www.laidi.com/papiers/laidilamy.pdf


15

Colin Bradford, Visitng Fellow at the Brookings Institution, provided his own definition during our interview with him: 27 Yet, as in Ann Florini’s view, global governance is not necessarily about governmental interactions. Florini, Brookings Institution Senior Fellow: “I would never use the phrase global governance in Washington—[it is the] Kiss of death. I talk about global problem solving; initiatives related to specific issues and institutions…”28 American views on the need for reform of global governance are as diverse as the perspectives on the matter. The range of proposals we identified ranges from piecemeal adjustments of the current state-based framework as in Michael Doyle’s proposal for increased representation in intergovernmental bodies, to calls for deep reform towards democratizing global governance as in Richard Falks’ proposal for a global parliament (discussed below). Worth mentioning are also calls towards making UN institutions more efficient as in the forthcoming report of the Congressional Task Force on UN Reform initiated by Republican Senator Frank Wolf.29 This report will have a significant impact in shaping the American response to the set of proposals for UN reform contained in the latest HLPR, which interviewees familiar and sympathetic to the United Nations such as Edward Luck at Columbia University and Thomas Weiss, Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute in New York City, criticized as untimely and off-target (see below). While already having highlighted some of the differences and similarities between US and French views on global governance in general, the next section explores whether there is primarily difference between the US and French perspectives on global governance, primarily dialogue, or whether the two countries might be moving towards a more stable medium: from difference to dialogue.

27 Interview with Colin Bradford (March 8, 2005) 28 Interview with Ann Florini (March 8, 2005). 29 Both Ann Florini and Edward Luck are working closely in or with this Task Force.

Global governance embraces the informal processes and formal institutions through which national government officials develop modalities for collaboration, coordination and in some cases common standard-setting in which they both assert national interests and adjust them to reach agreements and mutually beneficial outcomes, which also often involve private sector and civil society leaders.

Colin Bradford


16

US & French views Our research to date suggests that contrasting American and French perspectives on global governance is highly problematic. In spite of the apparent consensus around state sovereignty and U.S. power there is little consensus on global governance. Neither is there a unified perception or knowledge among most interviewees of French perspective(s) on global governance. Among preliminary findings by the French team, perceptions of global governance reflect seemingly contradictory elements; emphasizing traditions of national sovereignty apparent in French studies and practice, the same individuals pointed to a tradition of ‘solidarity’ and social justice rooted in French history and ideas.30 However, a broad consensus is apparent on the need for greater representation (inclusion of state and non-state actors) and coordination between different actors and institutions.31 Still, in broad terms, most interviewees highlighted two essential factors informing the diverging American and French perspectives on global governance: the political structure as well as historical and cultural contexts specific to each country. On the one hand, the political structure of the state (unitary vs. federalist) yields diametrically opposed attitudes across the Atlantic towards “governance” both in the public opinion and among the intellectual and political elites. The theory and practice of federalism and of the separation of powers in the United States starts with the presumption that power is to be shared, local communities need to have serious roles, and thus that the central government is to be constrained. This view is very different from the French view (since the Revolution) that nothing should come between the citizen and the state. Therefore, French people are surprised that some states and even some cities will, upon occasion, proclaim that they have a foreign policy too. Often it is nothing more than a partner city abroad with whom they undertake exchanges—or a proclamation that they are a “nuclear free zone” or some other locally derived perspective. All this is valued as part of the US democratic tradition. (And, it must be added, the European concept of subsidiarity is very similar to some of the tenets of federalism.) Frenchmen upon hearing such views wonder at the chaos that can happen in such localized democracy; Americans, however, express wonder at the centralized and large presence of the state in the French political system valued, and democratic tradition. On the other hand, the unique historical and cultural contexts of the United States as a country of immigrants, where citizenship matters less than the creed in the “American dream,” and where public preferences towards keeping government out of the private sphere combined with voluntarism and philanthropy, constitute core values of American polity. 30 Interview with Bertrand Badie (April 21, 2005) 31 Interviews with Christian Chavagneux (April 20, 2005), Pierre de Senarclens (April 21, 2005), Bertrand Badie (April 21, 2005), Marc Giacomini (April 15, 2005)


17

Even if Americans ever do come to support global government—it will only be with states’ sovereignty well protected—and local control for local concerns residing at the local level. The center must be small—lean and effective as well as accountable. Apart from describing divergent views between the US and France, which emerged during our interviews, it is important to describe the profile of individuals we interviewed and why they perceive global governance in a certain way.

Identifying Policymakers (DC) – practitioners – academics As discussed in the methodology section, we conducted in-depth interviews that ranged from thirty to hundred and twenty minutes with individuals who are currently engaged in the research, formulation and implementation of new modes of global governance. We also conducted intensive research of books and articles. These individuals, institutions and organizations currently involved in the field of global governance in the United States can be grouped in two categories both informed by “American exceptionalism” (see p.21): Internationalists or those committed to multilateral cooperation and strengthening or revamping global governance, and Americanists, or those promoting American interests and values around the globe. Proponents of the internationalist perspective emphasize that states are intricately linked by shared problems requiring multilateral solutions. In contrast, actors in the latter group, tend to articulate their policy research, advocacy, academic research, and public debates in terms of America’s national interest. Americanists also acknowledge a multiplicity of actors and institutions in international affairs, though they generally minimize the impact and/or need to engage non-state actors such as civil society organizations. According to Ann Florini, both strands are grounded in the creed that America is the exceptional nation on Earth: “[one strand believes that] we are so exceptional that we should ignore everyone else, the other strand [believes that] we are so exceptional that we need to export our ideas to others, we do not focus on how to get along with other people…”32 Such a clear distinction between Americanists and internationalists does not seem to apply in the French context. A majority of French interviewees were generally committed to reinforcing global governance through multilateral cooperation. In this perspective, multilateralism was seen as the preferred framework of relations between states, to be improved through increased representation and accountability. However, one difference was apparent between academics and the sphere of policy research and practitioners. Most academics saw global governance as well underway, while the latter two say that there is no such thing as global governance today.33 32 Interview with Ann Florini (March 8, 2005). 33 Interview with Thérèse Gastaut (April 11, 2005), Philippe Moreau Defarges (April 6, 2005)


18

In the American context, we heard within both groups of policymakers, practitioners and scholars, a broad awareness of their peers’ work, yet we also noticed a demand for multi-disciplinary dialogue within the United States. Many interviewees expressed their concern over the lack of public understanding in the United States of the challenges and opportunities addressed by strengthening global governance. Nearly all interviewees welcomed and/or advocated opportunities for increased dialogue and knowledge sharing among interested parties working on global governance in the United States. Most welcomed such initiatives as Carnegie Council on International Ethics’ Global Policy Innovations initiative at the domestic level or the Charles Leopold Mayer foundation’s efforts to increase the dialogue on global governance internationally. A striking observation shared by John Sewell, Ann Florini, Michael Doyle, and Edward Luck for instance was that framing this dialogue around “global governance” would be a non-starter in the United States. Rather, they suggested that discussions in the American context be framed in terms of “global problem solving”34 or “global management.” Apart from policymakers, practitioners and academics being Internationalists vs. Americanists (both not being mutually exclusive in every scenario), within our group of interviewees, we discovered two more specific categories that could describe out interviewees in a more nuanced and detailed way: US foreign policy centered vs. International organizations centered.

US foreign policy centered vs. International Organizations centered aka Condi vs. Kofi When we were first analyzing the findings of our research, it was tempting to make a crude dichotomy between Washington DC vs. New York opinions on global governance; to state that in reality it is all about “Condi vs. Kofi.”35 However, it is not this simple as there are opponents, supporters and middle of the line thinkers on global governance related issues in both Washington DC and New York and, for that matter, in the whole United States. For the purposes of our findings, it would be more apt to say that certain individuals were in favor of, or expressed more on US foreign policy centered issues, whereas others chose to share more international organization centered views. During the majority of our interviews, we were constantly reminded of the “national sovereign interest” of the United States juxtaposed with global cooperation; the influence of American exceptionalism; the uneasiness to deal with topics such as the ICC (International Criminal Court) or any other endeavor that “threatens” American sovereignty, or American political values, in Washington based policy circles; the ongoing support and faith in the United Nations as an institution; the narrow understanding some individuals have of the United Nations and its functions within policy circles; and the varying degrees of willingness all over the United States to actually talk about global governance. 34 Interview with Ann Florini (March 8, 2005) 35 ‘Condi’ refers to Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice; ‘Kofi’ refers to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan


19

For example, John Sewell, Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars in Washington DC expressed how Congress is more concerned with social security issues than global governance and that “…nobody is thinking about anything else than representation of sovereign states. Policy makers are, however, getting hit by NGOs and civil society. (e.g. pro-life groups are members of civil society).36” Jerry Maldonado, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs commented on having to present his Global Policy Innovations Project in policy circles a little differently vs. in arenas that believe in global inter-state cooperation, without worrying about the threat it could cause to American sovereignty. The fact that it is called the “Global Policy Innovations Project” and not “The Global Governance Innovations Project” is testimony enough37. There is a constant see-saw of pro-and con-global governance opinions and scholarship that pervade American political thought. After having summarized some of the more general, broad-based issues, debates and discussions within the scholarship of global governance, the following section of “Core Issues” will attempt at tackling some of the deeper issues and aspects of global governance today, e.g. American exceptionalism, security, the role of civil society, etc. V. Core Issues

Sovereign States In all our talks about global governance, it was commonly agreed, both in the US and in France that the idea of the sovereign state still remains and is strongly reaffirmed as being the most important actor in global governance. Most agree that international organizations are built on the notion of state sovereignty. The UN, respondents said, is the main forum for global issues to be discussed, but those taking part in these discussions are all, as stated in the Charter, sovereign member-states. The idea of strong sovereign states using the UN as a field for cooperation and discussion to reach multi-lateral agreements is very much preferred by nearly all our interviewees. The UN provides a smorgasbord of multi-lateral agreements to sovereign states for them to pick from and sign according to their own interests and agendas. In France, Moreau-Defarges38 reiterated that for global governance to develop, the state has to be involved. Indeed, if there are new actors emerging on the international level, which must be taken into account, the state remains the main player in the international field. Reinforcing global government has to occur with the state’s consent. In particular, Moreau Defarges conceived of global governance as resting mainly on improved regulation mechanisms between states. 36 Interview with John Sewell (March 8, 2005) 37 Interview with Jerry Maldonado (March 4, 2005) 38 Interview with Philippe Moreau Defarges (April 6, 2005)


20

Another common trend is that our respondents, when discussing global governance, immediately prefer to talk about the role of sovereign states, not mentioning other actors such as civil society. Civil Society is in place to move public opinion and influence policy makers, but the actual decisions need to be made by the actual governments, respondents both in the US and France believed. Edward Luck, when referring to Richard Falk’s debate on global parliament (see under Democratic Deficits of global governance below), emphasized that there need to be strong building blocks when making global decisions, and these building blocks are the sovereign states39. The European Union’s Parliament, used by many of the US interviewees as an example of good global governance, (and by Richard Falk as a model for a global parliament), is built on strong independent sovereign democratic states that first were in place to then jointly come together to create the Parliament. In order to integrate on a higher level, Schlesinger from the World Policy Institute argues, there first needs to be strong sovereign states. Thomas Weiss from the Ralph Bunche Institute, reminds us that there however has been a big change since 1945. Domestic affairs are no longer exclusively domestic. More decisions need to be taken outside the sovereign state boundaries with the importance of global governance this way increasing40. Here we have the discussion of subsidiarity within the EU. The idea of subsidiarity is not considered a loss of sovereignty. It conveys the idea that when you can implement the policy at a local level, better than at a central level, it is more efficient because it is closer to the people. Thérèse Gastaut from the UN Department of Public Information suggested that subsidiarity (in a similar way to federalism) should be used at a global level as well in order to improve effectiveness without having to diminish on sovereignty. Accepting to delegate state sovereignty in this sense is not a loss of sovereignty, it is simply another way of interpreting sovereignty in an adequate manner.41 Her opinion is echoed by T. Brugvin.42 Jeremy Rabkin, strong promoter of national sovereignty in the United States, however points out that state sovereignty“…is a concept deeply embedded in America’s political institutions and political culture43. He implies that all decisions need to be taken at a state level and not at a global level by any international organizations. “To believe that international organization can substitute for sovereignty, one must believe that international organizations can respond as promptly and reliably as sovereign states44.”

39 Interview with Edward Luck (April 15, 2005) 40 Interview with Thomas Weiss (March 31, 2005) 41 Interview with Therese Gastaut (April 11, 2005) 42 Brugvin, Thierry “Gouvernance globale contre régulation citoyenne internationale” Pensée, No. 333 (2003), pp 147-156 43 Rabkin, Jeremy A. The Case for Sovereignty: Why the World Should Welcome American Independence. American Enterprise Institute, 2003, P. 12 44 Ibid, p.21


21

In contrast to this, Anne-Marie Slaughter instead argues: If sovereignty were still understood as exclusive and impermeable rather than relational, strengthening the state would mean building higher walls to protect its domestic authority. Yet in a world, in which sovereignty means the capacity to participate in cooperative regimes in the collective interest of all states, expanding the formal capacity of different state institutions to interact with their counterparts around the world means expanding state power.45 French respondents seemed more in line with Slaughter’s arguments when they tended to support the idea that sovereign states will be strengthened, not weakened, by international cooperation. Multilateralism, they argued, is the concept guiding policy in order to secure French national interests in an increasingly interdependent world46. Our findings through both our interviews and readings were thus that the role of state sovereignty still is strong and seen by most respondents and academics to be the basis for any kind of global governance. Variation however does exist in the role that the sovereign state plays in the increasingly global world, whether that of stronger closed borders emphasizing sovereignty, or that of more cooperation between sovereign states through international organizations. In the American case, however, there is an added historical element to deciding whether the US wants to engage internationally or remain isolationist; it is its own, special tradition of American exceptionalism.

American exceptionalism American exceptionalism-a term first made famous by a twenty-five year old French aristocrat, Alexis de Tocqueville, in 1831. When he wrote his first book “Democracy in America,” he defined principal American, political values as: (1) liberty, (2) egalitarianism, (3) individualism, (4) populism and (5) laissez-faire.47 According to Senior Policy Advisor at Brookings, Ann Florini, these political values have developed into the two following historical, yet contradictory, strands, pervading American political thought: ‘America is exceptional’ 1. We’re so exceptional that we should not care about the world, 2. That we should export our view onto others. We don’t think enough on ‘how do you get along with other people’. We look more into ‘how do you keep others from messing us up’ and ‘how do we let others do as we want’48

45 Slaughter, Anne-Marie. A New World Order. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, 2004, pp.269-

270 46 Interview with Dominique David, (April 21, 2005) 47 Source: http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/american-exceptionalism.htm 48 Interview with Ann Florini (March 8, 2005)

http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/american-exceptionalism.htm


22

On a similar note, Seymour Martin Lipset, Public Policy Professor at George Mason University refers to American exceptionalism as a “double-edged sword” and describes it as “Americans do not feel obligations, other than familial, if these conflict with the requirements of efficiency or income.” They are more disposed than other people to expect individuals to do their best for themselves, not for others.”49 The concept of American exceptionalism is one that is rarely understood outside of the United States. For example, when our team met with the Charles Leopold Mayer Foundation in Paris, France this past March, our client, Michel Sauquet asked in a surprised manner: “What do you mean ‘global governance’ is the ‘kiss of death’ in Washington DC?” Coming from the European community, which has had a historical openness and multi-layered scholarship towards global governance, it was more than suprising to Sauquet that such an oppositional view existed in American policy circles. The simple answer to his question was: American exceptionalism.

http://www.economist.com/surveys/displayStory.cfm?Story_id=1188839

As already mentioned, we first noticed the contradictions among American perspectives towards global governance, when we went back and forth between New York City and Washington DC, conducting interviews with policy makers, practitioners and academics connected to international cooperation in different ways: via the UN, World Bank, IMF, think tanks (Brookings Institution, Carnegie Endowment for Peace), American universities, etc. Without trying to over generalize, there seemed to be more familiarity with and support for the concept of global governance in New York City, rather than in Washington DC. It turned into a Condi vs. Kofi, a “I support and respect the UN” vs. “Remind me again what exactly the UN’s purpose is again” syndrome. Many of the individuals we interviewed in Washington DC expressed that one can forget even using the term “global governance” in the American capital, it is important to rephrase it into a term that is non-threatening to national sovereignty, such as “global policy solutions,” “global policy innovations” or “global management.” Political scientist, Edward Luck, writes in his book on American exceptionalism “Mixed Messages”50 that the US has had a history of mistrust in government, yet “jealously guards its national sovereignty.” It is, therefore, even harder to think of governance in different areas on a global level. Former senator and presidential candidate, Bob Dole,

49 Source: http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/american-exceptionalism.htm 50 Luck, Edward. Mixed Messages, Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press, 1999.

“Subcontracting American foreign policy and subordinating American sovereignty encourage and strengthen isolationist forces at home-and embolden our adversaries abroad”.

Bob Dole

http://www.economist.com/surveys/displayStory.cfm?Story_id=1188839

http://www.gseis.ucla.edu/courses/ed253a/american-exceptionalism.htm


23

comments on America’s contradictory history towards engaging with and believing in international organizations: International organizations will, at best, practice policymaking at the lowest common denominator-find a course that is the least objectionable to the most members. Too often, they reflect a consensus that opposes American interests or does not reflect American principles or ideals. Even gaining support for an American position can involve deals or tradeoffs that are not in America’s long-term interests…Subcontracting American foreign policy and subordinating American sovereignty encourage and strengthen isolationist forces at home-and embolden our adversaries abroad.51 However, just because the US has had such a contradictory history in terms of multilateral engagement, it does not mean that there are two strictly defined, isolated political poles. For example, the political right does not necessarily oppose multilateral agreements all the time and the political left does not want to abandon American values of national sovereignty for the sake of international cooperation. Republican senator Frank Wolf recently appointed a UN Reform Task Force, headed by former senators Newt Gingrich and George Mitchell, and including involvement from the American Enterprise Institute, the Heritage Foundation, the Hoover Institute, CSIS and Brookings Institution. Florini, who is part of the UN Reform task force, emphasized that this is not a “UN bashing exercise,” but a helpful exercise for both the UN and Congress; helping the UN with recommendations for internal bureaucratic reform and further educating Congress what the UN is all about and where it can be most effective. There is certainly an interest on the American political conservative front, to use international organizations, such as the United Nations, for numerous effective functions, e.g. in forming international coalitions; conducting international negotiations; supporting agreements which would be popular with American voter constituencies, etc. At times, such efforts are not to better understand the international organization in question, but rather, for opportunistic reasons for satisfying political vested interests. This is not to discount genuine efforts by the far political right to understand “the camp of multilateral engagement,” however, it becomes hard to distinguish, when all one is receiving is “mixed messages.” The tension between preserving national sovereignty and being involved in multilateral cooperation is well exemplified by the varied notions towards the legitimacy and use of international law.

International law, ICJ, ICC Legal agreements and law provide the framework in which international society balances its inconsistent and conflicting interests. In an interdependent world there are limits to the extent that any group can determine its own destiny. A legal system that allows the parties to interpret the law as they see fit is unworthy of respect because it is no system at all. Until all people are secure in their rights no people will be secure. – Benjamin Ferencz52

51 Cited in Luck, Edward. Mixed Messages, Washington, D.C. Brookings Institution Press, 1999, p.52. 52 Ferencz , Benjamin B. “The Coming of International Law and Order,” Whole Earth Papers, No. 14, (Nov. 1980), Global Education Associates.


24

There is a large and growing body of international law on issues ranging from child rights, environment protection, the International Criminal Court, and Humanitarian law. Both Peter Danchin and Ann Florini53 stressed the role of transnational networks of civil society activists in informing and leading the agenda of reform, as in the campaign on the ban of landmines. However, these reforms still occur under the auspices of sovereign states. Similar assumptions were echoed by a number of French interviewees. In particular, Bertrand Badie emphasized the role of non-state actors as going beyond advocacy activities to encompass the formulation of international law – as reflected by the Ottawa Convention on the ban of landmines and the statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). At the European level, non-governmental actors are legally and fully integrated in the formulation of policy – through the European Round Table of Industrialists for example. European industrial policy is thus a product of consultations between the European Commission and those actors involved in the policy domain.54 When it comes to the rules, and norms governing world affairs, there is a consensus among our interviewees and in the publications we surveyed that today’s world order rests on cooperative arrangements between sovereign states as the sole legitimate actors providing global public goods.55 However, the emphasis on states as the sole actors in the formulation of rules was contested by French journalist at Alternatives Economiques, Christian Chavagneux, who likened global governance to the definition of Pascal Lamy and Zaki Laïdi, as a process by which different actors (state and non-state in nature) determine rules and practices of governance that are not necessarily translated into written law.56 International Law and world order were established by states, for states, under the strong guidance of the United States in the aftermath of World War II. That said many of these treaties and covenants have not been ratified by the United States. Here again, two competing perspectives on managing world order emerge between Internationalists and Americanists. Internationalists point to the evolution of norms and principles of international law as a slow, yet steady process, which is cooperatively driven by states willing to yield part of their national sovereignty to international institutions for the common good.57 Both Edward Luck,58 and Thomas Weiss59 stressed the preeminence of the United States as the country that created the United Nations. From the Internationalist perspective, the United States government should uphold its commitment to strengthening and protecting world

53 Interviews with Peter Danchin (November 18, 2004), Ann Florini (March 8, 2005) 54 Interview with Bertrand Badie (April 21, 2005) 55 See Kaul, Inge, Grunberg, Isabelle, and Stern, Marc A. (eds). Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999; and Kaul, Inge, et al (eds). Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 56 Interview with Christian Chavagneux (April 20, 2005) 57 Interview with Benjamin Rivlin (March 23, 2005) 58 Interview with Edward Luck (April 15, 2005) 59 Interview with Thomas Weiss. (March 31, 2005)


25

order, and comply with validly ratified international treaties. However, many stress that the United Nations cannot place itself above member states, and certainly not antagonize its largest contributor, the United States.60 For Americanists in general, international law cannot be used to curtail American domestic and foreign policy, given the United States’ preponderant status of as the world’s only superpower.61 Americanists thus reject the transfer of U.S. sovereignty to worldwide institutions and norms, which are increasingly set by international civil servants, civil society organizations, and other non-states actors. The American exceptionalist strand further emphasizes the threats to national sovereignty and power arising from global governance. For instance, John R. Bolton -- who is seeking confirmation as the next U.S. ambassador to the United Nations -- asked his audience a few years ago “should we take global governance seriously?” In Bolton’s view, Sadly, the answer is yes, not only today but far into the foreseeable future. It is well past the point when the unrestrained and uncritical acceptance of Globalist slogans ("global solutions for global problems") can be allowed to proceed. The costs to the United States -- reduced constitutional autonomy, impaired popular sovereignty, reduction of our international power, and limitations on our domestic and foreign policy options and solutions -- are far too great, and the current understanding of these costs far too limited to be acceptable.

Whether we are ready or not, the debate over global governance, fought out at the confluence of constitutional theory and foreign policy, is the decisive issue facing the United States internationally.62 Bolton's views on the international order are to be taken seriously. Before he joined the U.S. State Department as Under-Secretary for Disarmament Affairs of the Bush Administration, John Bolton was the senior vice president of the American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), one of America’s most influential conservative think tanks. Either way, the United States needs to be engaged constructively for any reform of global governance to succeed. This is further discussed in our findings on the responses to the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. One of the major tools the international law framework provides support for is for collective action among states, whether it be via the International Criminal Court or the signing of a treaty. Today’s world poses many proposals for collective action, one of the most relevant being collective security.

60 Interview with Edward Luck (April 15, 2005) 61 See Bolton, John R. “Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?” Chicago Journal of International Law. Vol. 1 No. 2, (Fall 2000). P. 221. 62 See Bolton, John R. “Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?” Chicago Journal of International Law. Vol.1 No.2, (Fall 2000): pp.205-221


26

Security If there is one burning issue, apart from poverty reduction, that countries are focusing on the world over and that is heavily emphasized in the recently published UN High Level Panel Report, it is security-and more than ever collective security. The concept of collective security has its origins in the League of Nations blue print, which included a secretariat arm concentrating on security. However, one of the most accepted symbols of collective security today is the UN Security Council. Despite its undemocratic origins, political manipulation via veto power during the Cold War, consensus building during the time period of “glasnost and perestroika” and current confusion over what will happen with its infrastructure-the Security Council remains one of the primary examples of an attempt to respond to international crisis situations collectively. It is important to state, that it was easier to envision a collective security response in 1945, when UN membership was a mere fifty-one countries. Today, UN membership has expanded to 191 countries.63 Increased “international and domestic political will” is needed in order to make such decisions, comments Thomas Weiss64, Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute in New York City. As already mentioned, the HLPR suggests Security Council reform, attempts to define terrorism, suggests a Peace-building commission, recommends for an Undersecretary General of Peace and Security to be appointed, promotes collective security in a “changing world order” and gives a flexible re-interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter(the right to self-defence); an interpretation even the US was not complaining too much about. Aside from eliciting interview contributors’ opinions on emerging security norms within global governance, we attended numerous events in New York City, which discussed, in particular, collective security. One of these events was organized by the New York Bar Association, a day after the HLPR was released. Former foreign minister of Australia, Gareth Evans, and Norwegian Prime Minister, Gro Harlem Brundtland, were the key speakers, with Edward Luck as a commentator. There were numerous questions regarding Article 51 of the UN Charter and the use of preventive force vs. preemptive force. “Are you trying to change the definition of article 51?” one worried lawyer asked. The writers of the HLPR panel have not changed the definition or interpretation of article 51 per se, however, they have implied that there is room to maneuver. In the report, it says: However, a threatened State, according to long established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate. The problem arises where the threat in question is not imminent but still claimed to be real: for example the acquisition, with allegedly hostile intent, of nuclear weapons-making capability.65 Reactions during our interviews were not necessarily HLPR centric. Francesco Mancini, Senior Program Officer for the Security and Development Nexus at the International Peace Academy in New York expressed the view that the US and Europe must “stress

63 See http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm 64 Interview with Thomas Weiss (March 31, 2005) 65 See http://www.un.org/secureworld/

http://www.un.org/Overview/growth.htm

http://www.un.org/secureworld/


27

their common interests” especially in terms of security66. Once Turkey officially becomes a part of the EU, Europe will be sharing borders with Iraq and Syria-two international security concerns for the United States. Presently, the US is already using Europe as a communication channel towards Iran, such arrangements will only increase in the future. Mancini’s colleague, Senior Associate Waheguru Pal Singh Siddhu67, stressed the importance of regional cooperation in the area of peace and security. Regional cooperation would be a valuable alternative, especially when there is no consensus among great powers; between great powers and developing countries; or not a quick enough international response towards the situation in question. There are still regions in the world, which do not have strong enough security coalitions. For example, ASEAN continues to function as an economic coalition, however, there needs to be continued advocacy for a collective security focus, e.g. SAARC and ASEAN could form a security centric coalition. One of the comments interview contributors made repetitively when speaking of the need for more collective security strategies, is that the “world order has changed” and that new security threats, e.g. the proliferation of terrorism, need to be dealt with in a different way. French perceptions also reflected a consensus on the need to embrace collective security in the context of a changed world order and the rise of new security threats. In particular, Dominique David, researcher at the IFRI, emphasized how the UN security system has been unable to adapt to these new challenges, thus acknowledging the need for reform.68 Edward Luck feels that having a multi-polar power arrangement in this evolving world is not necessarily a good proposal. The only time the world order was close to a multipolar arrangement was in the 1930s, which, according to Luck, proved “disastrous.”69 It should be recognized that the US is here to stay as a great power and that we are moving towards a “unipolar world” he says. Therefore, it is in the UN’s interest to increase engagement with the US, rather than detract from it. It is also in the US’s interest to engage with the UN and use it for its advantages; e.g. a forum for member states to communicate with each other on numerous issues. In addition, Luck also advocated for the Security Council structure not to be changed in order to retain the current efficiency and level of agreement between P-5 members. Finally, not being as interested in the norms of intervention, Luck felt that the HLPR should have focused more on conceptual strategic issues and security issues as such, rather than restarting the much had discussion on Articles 51 and 2(4) of the UN Charter and concentrating too much on institutional reform. With the creation of more countries in the post-colonial world order; with the onslaught of varied ethnic groups around the world vying for sovereignty or self-determination, and with the increased desire of representation by all these countries in the “one country-one vote” international organization arena; norms, values, as well as ideologies have evolved

66 Interview with Francesco Mancini (November 22, 2004) 67 Interview with Waheguru Pal Singh Siddhu (December 8, 2004) 68 Interview with Dominique David (April 21, 2005) 69 Interview with Edward Luck (April 15, 2005)


28

and, therefore, how we deal with collective security. For example, former Canadian Prime Minister, Paul Martin, was the main advocate of the “Responsibility to Protect,” a report which deals with the changing role of the Canadian military; a military which no longer wages war against other nations, but helps to protect them by intervening responsibly and aiding in keeping the peace. Is this yet another way of responding collectively, outside of the Security Council arena? We cannot ignore the new, long-term security threats, which have resulted out of new technology developments, nuclear proliferation, arms sales and increased economic and social grievances around the world. However, it is important to note that this increased need for collective response, does not come without its tensions. For example, India feels it is an Asian stronghold next to China and wants to expand its voice by possibly becoming part of the UN Security Council. Similarly, Brazil feels it can “represent” multiple Latin American voices. Germany and Japan also want to make their suggestions heard on the grounds of having lucrative (or once lucrative) economies. An evolution of norms and values and an increased cry for representation, has created a need for more collective action, but also new tensions among states that want their power and influence to be based on the size of their economies, rather than other criteria. With rapidly increasing cross-border financial flows and elimination of trade barriers, countries are struggling to develop effective economic governance collectively.

Economic governance Underlying the problems of the IMF and other international economic institutions is the problem of governance: who decides what they do. The institutions are dominated not just by the wealthiest industrial countries but by commercial and financial interests in those countries, and the policies of the institutions naturally reflect this. The choice of heads for these institutions symbolizes the instutions’ problem, and too often has contributed to their disfunction. Joseph Stiglitz, “Globalization and Its Discontents”70 During the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s, why did the IMF not accept the bid by Japan to bail out the countries in trouble by establishing an Asian Monetary Fund? Why was there significant disparity between the IMF and WB during this time period? While the WB was suggesting that lending privileges should only be extended to countries where “governance has been improved” the IMF was on to its next victim: Argentina. Why do “green room” negotiations, including only great power traders, still take place within the WTO framework, when the WTO is supposed to be the “most democratic” of the international institutions, providing each nation with one vote and, in theory, equal representation? How is the US connected to such events and claims? Is there a so called “American perspective” on the US’s role in trade liberalization or in the promotion of the WTO? Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution, Ralph C. Bryant emphasizes the importance of collective governance in cross-border financial interactions and trade in his book

70 Stiglitz, Joseph. “Globalization and Its Discontents.” Norton Press: 2002, p.109


29

“Turbulent Waters: Cross-Border Finance and International Governance.” He mentions numerous journalists and writers who have portrayed this increasingly interdependent world to have a well-integrated financial system for all these cross-border interactions. Bryant, however, feels that there is not a well-integrated financial system between countries keeping pace with the increasingly easier flow of trade and money across borders. Therefore, it is even more important to further develop collective governance issues within the area of international trade and finance. Bryant comments: Within an individual nation, the critical features of this infrastructure include standards for accounting, auditing, and information disclosure; legal procedures for enforcing contracts and adjudicating disputes; prudential supervision and regulation of private financial institutions; an effective but limited potential for crisis management and crisis lending (“lender-of-last-resort” provisions); and, not least, sound and predictable macroeconomic policies that shape the general environment within which the financial system and the wider economy operate. Although a few details of the collective-governance financial infrastructure within nations remain controversial, the general need for such an infrastructure is universally accepted. If a well-functioning collective-governance infrastructure is a precondition for a domestic financial system to operate smoothly, why isn’t an analogous infrastructure needed on a world scale for the smooth operation of the conglomeration of all national financial systems? One’s intuition wants to respond that the same logic does apply at the world level. And the economic aspects of the logic are, indeed, persuasive. If there could exist, above the level of nation states, analogues to the functions carried out within domestic financial systems by nations’ central banks and supervisors of financial institutions, the global economy and financial system could evolve in a smoother and more stable manner.71 When developing a framework for such increased collective governance, it is important to apply “pragmatic incrementalism” says Bryant. Steps do not necessarily have to be small, but they should be implemented gradually and incrementally. Should one of the incremental steps include increased transparency and accountability across borders, providing for a more “democratic” framework? How “democratic” are international financial institutions today? Co-Director of the Centre for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR) in Washington DC, Marc Weisbrot72, points out that the WTO, for example, is not the most “democratic” international institution, but rather the “least undemocratic” when compared to the World Bank, IMF and United Nations. Weisbrot says: I don’t think it’s [WTO] democratic at all. Decisions are still being made by rich countries. They have the ‘green room’ where the G-7 countries do the work, and most of the results lead to a net loss to developing countries. A whole set of non-trade issues, affecting the environment for instance, are all being decided from a commercial perspective, and not from commercial perspective of the developing countries.73 These views were shared by most French academics, who emphasized the undemocratic nature of economic governance institutions and specifically the lack of equitable representation. Pierre de Senarclens, Professor of International Relations at the University of Lausenne/Suisse, pointed out that the structures of economic governance were dominated by memberstates of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and

71 Bryant, Ralph C. “Turbulent Waters: Cross-Border Finance and International Governance.” Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press; 2003. P.14 72 Interview with Mark Weisbrot (April 14, 2005) 73 Interview with Mark Weisbrot (April 14, 2005)


30

Development (OECD).74 Sandra Polaski, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, stated: “No one would say that the WTO and ILO are well functioning organizations…”75 It all comes down to consensus building, in Polaski’s opinion. Since the 1970s, developing countries had not leveraged their coalition power, however, at the WTO protests in Seattle and Cancun it happened. Polaski points out that increased coalition building gives developing countries more collective bargaining and negotiation power, resulting in an increased chance of consensus. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr76, former Director and lead editor of the UNDP Human Development Report and current Research Fellow in the Science, Technology and Globalization Project at the Belfer Centre for Sciences and International Affairs at Harvard University exclaimed: “What matters when you want to have real change is how you negotiate and what is negotiated…What is more important are not so much the structural changes [of international institutions], but more of an active part on developing countries…to take collective action and realize they have more power…building government delegations and strengthening civil society.” Fukuda-Parr also advocated for TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights) to become national legislation and “what is important is the advocation of a clause…in cases of situations when there is public interest, protection of patents should not be applied (this provision exists but is never applied.” Finally, she observed the increasing powerful connection between developing countries and the NGO sector within the WTO arena. Randall Henning77, Visiting Fellow at the Institute for International Economics, made similar comments of how the “green room” negotiations are unfair towards developing countries and that they need to form more caucuses and coalitions of their own to have a stronger voice. The majority of our interview contributors did not talk in detail about the WTO. This is partly due to the individuals we interviewed, there are no trade experts among them and partly because their expert knowledge lies in other relevant fields of global governance, namely the UN. American perspectives on the WTO, agricultural subsidies (especially around cotton production) and trade liberalization in general need to be investigated further. Keeping the aforementioned opinions in mind, what is one of the main factors impeding from change occurring within the global financial architecture? Chair of the “New Rules for Global Finance” coalition, Jo-Marie Griesgraber78, describes current IMF opinions on recommendations which suggest a change in voter share within the IMF: The constraints that are involved have to do with the reduction of the representation of Europe and that gets into the intra tension of countries in Europe, e.g. Belgians says why should we get rid of our seat to let France have our seat…the middle income countries have been quite difficult to work with a lot of times, we are beginning to see a different role by Brazil because of the High Level Panel Report. Germany does not want to antagonize anyone, so Germany has not said much. Brazil is not being pushy even thought they

74 Interview with Pierre de Senarclens (April 21, 2005) 75 Interview with Sandra Polaski (April 21, 2005) 76 Interview with Sakiko Fukuda-Parr (November 23, 2005) 77 Interview with Randall C. Henning (March 8, 2005) 78 Interview with Jo-Marie Griesgraber (April 21, 2005)


31

chair the G11…the US does not care, in any reallocation, the US would get more votes…other resistance comes from Saudi Arabia, which gained excessive votes the time of the oil crisis, they would have to give up a lot of votes [if the IMF voter share were to be changed]…anyone getting money from Saudi Arabia does not want to say anything, the Africans are screwed no matter what, no one is leading the pack.79 In addition, when the New Rules for Global Finance Coalition wants to get their proposals heard in Washington DC, they have to phrase it in terms of “increasing IFI democracy,” (e.g. reforming voter share within the IMF; increased transparency in what IMF Executive Directors discuss; better publicized documentation fulfilling need of the right to information) instead of directly addressing governance issues. Finally, it was disappointing not to have more interview contributors question the status quo within the WTO framework, mention the link between trade and human development or come up with more specific and well-developed reform measures for the WTO. However, both Polaski80 and Griesgraber did mention that the G20 would be an alternative negotiating forum for developing countries, outside of the international institution framework. We, as a team, were surprised that nowhere in American or international trade literature was there mention of the movement of persons across borders. If goods are supposed to move and be exchanged freely, does this not require for the barriers of human movement to be gradually decreased as well? The answer of this question lies outside of our project’s scope, however, it is an important international trade issue that needs to be addressed. If there are increased proposals for collective action in numerous areas of concern, and a plethora of ideas for reform of international institutions, what are the missing links to bridge action and ideas together in order to catalyze relevant change? VI. The Missing Link(s)

Democratic Deficits of Global Governance In both the US and France, calls are being heard for increased transparency, accountability and broader participation in the global decision-making process, particularly by developing countries, but also by civil society. As interviewees in France reiterated, it is essential to take into account the “demos” and not only focus on the centralized established powers (one state/one vote). Still, there are conflicting arguments on whether increased participation would actually alleviate the democratic deficit within global governance or instead make the decision-making process less efficient.

79 Ibid. 80 Interview with Sandra Polaski (April 21, 2005)


32

Global parliament The most radical solution to the democracy deficit comes from proposals by Richard Falk81 who suggests that there is a need to establish a global parliament. Such a parliament would be building on the positive experience from the EU Parliament that evolved through the support from the Europeans in a credible union of cooperation while still wishing to address the democratic deficit within it. Falk suggests that the same argument would hold at a global level. The idea of the European Union being a model for global governance is not entirely supported by the interviewees in French. Pascal Lamy, former Commissioner to the European Union, argues that the European Union is the most elaborated form of a system of “alternational democratic government”.82 He draws on the European experience to advance specific principles for an ‘alternational democratic global governance’ – such as common preferences, subsidiarity and improved representation. Kristin Dawkins83 supports this idea of a global parliament, seeing it as a body that would advise such institutions as the UN, WTO, IMF and World Bank. She also advocates for further decentralization of the global decision-making process with an increased regional planning for global policies that are to be implemented on a local level. Dawkins, like so many others, promotes more transparency from the already existing institutions. National governments still need to be accountable and responsible to their citizens and there needs to be more of a networking across borders among local actors. Regional associations should be given more attention as providers of information and global institutions need to be more alert to information provided to them from the different stakeholders84. Ann Florini85 does not find the idea of a world parliament feasible. The size of the constituency would be so large that it would be far too remote from any kind of meaningful representation. The result, she says, would just be a General Assembly with no authority. Attempts to be more accountable and to increase participation would only become more remote in such a situation. “It would be pragmatically undoable,” she says. Thérèse Gastaut86 in Paris, like Florini, dismissed the idea of a global parliament as unfeasible. Bertrand Badie87 saw limitations to the idea. He acknowledges that participation needs to expand at a global level, but however emphasizes the need for a strong central power in order for such participation to be unified, something that will be difficult to achieve. 81 During a talk at the Columbia Law School on 12 April 2005 82 Lamy, Pascal, La démocratie-monde: pour une autre gouvernance mondiale. Paris: Seuil, 2004. 83 Dawkins, Kristin, Global Governance: The Battle Over Planetary Power. New York: Open Media Book, Seven Stories Press, 2003. 84 From Catarina Fabiansson’s fiche document on Kristin Dawkins 85 Interview with Ann Florini (March 8, 2005) 86 Interview with Therese Gastaut (April 11, 2005) 87 Interview with Bertrand Badie (April 21, 2005)


33

Michael Doyle88 supports the idea of a global parliament, but does however not see it happening in the near future, “Falk’s global parliament is two steps too far over the horizon,” he says. Comparing it to the EU Parliament, he points out that with the EU, there was already a ‘Europe’ in place before there could be an EU Parliament. At a global level, there is no moral foundation for such solidarity, no “demos”. Doyle’s own suggestion is to move in modest steps from multilateral sovereignty to improved, multiple legislation coordinating norms:

1. A more democratic representation at the General Assembly (GA), opening up or encouraging every government to appoint two elected representatives out of the five national delegates that they can put on the GA floor. This procedure would also apply to governments who themselves are not democratically representative nationally, thus spreading the idea of democratic representation. Real elections should be held with candidates having to explain why they want to represent their country in the GA.

2. Holding a pre-GA consultative session in late August where NGOs from around the world would be given the opportunity to discuss the issues that are on the GA agenda.

It could be that the second proposal only produces more disagreement than consensus, Doyle says, but it would still be useful for the inclusion of NGOs in the exchange of opinions on the GA topics of discussion prior to the GA meetings89. Doyle also acknowledges that this forum would encounter logistical problems in for instance funding transportation costs for NGOs in the southern regions. Criticism also exists against NGOs as not fully representative and accountable since their members are not democratically elected, a point Doyle acknowledges. This underscores the problem of knowing which NGOs to invite to such a GA pre-session90. Efficiency-loss A main critique towards democratizing global governance is that of efficiency being lost if too many voices were to be heard. Strong arguments have come from Edward Luck91 who shows how the High Level Panel Report and its discussions on an extended membership of the Security Council only resembles the League of Nations in place before the current United Nations was established.

88 Interview with Michael Doyle (April 13, 2005) 89 Doyle also discusses this in “Imagining Tomorrow, Rethinking the global challenge” Collected and compiles on the occasion of the United Nations Millennium Assembly, Merill Corporation, 2000 90 See more on the “blue-ribbon panel” established to establish the role of NGOs in the UN under “Increased role of civil society?” below. 91 Interview with Edward Luck (April 15, 2005)


34

At the League of Nations last meeting in 1946, participants reflected on how the new United Nations system was going to be better than the old League of Nations. Two things that were mentioned were on the one hand the importance of tying the US into the system and on the other hand the efficiency of the Security Council through its reduced size. The League of Nations was larger and more democratic, but also less efficient since more voices had to be heard before decisions could be made. In contrast to what people had experienced at the time, the Security Council would have “real teeth with possibilities of economic and military enforcement”. The High Level Panel Report, Luck argues, therefore very much suggests a return to the old League’s Council. Laurence Tubiana emphasizes the need to focus more on the objectives of democracy, rather than seeing it merely as a form of political organization. More focus on a substantial approach (political and philosophical basis of governance) is needed, rather than concentrating on strictly procedural issues. Thérèse Gastaut92, French Spokeswoman to the United Nations, emphasizes the need to have a long-term vision for future generations. With this regard, she points out that the problem with more democratic global governance is that democracies rely on elections and that elections in turn rely on short-term agendas rejecting unpopular ideas, even those that would be more sustainable to “the greater good”. The calls for accountability, representative organizations and increased participation in global governance are hence countered with concerns over loss of efficiency in the decision-making process. Will more voices in the Security Council lead to increased representation and more democratic global governance, or will the extended number of voices slow down the decision-making, leading to future frustrations? Have we reached an era, where we have to increasingly rely on non-state actors with sometimes “undemocratic” ways of functioning, e.g. segments of civil society, in order to “get things done” and make our voices heard?

Civil society The Global Civil Society Yearbook defines civil society as ‘…a variety of groups, organizations and individuals who [try] to get around the state blockage at local, national and global levels.93” This therefore includes philanthropic institutions, non-profit organizations and other organized social participation. John Ruggie94, referred to civil society at a domestic level as “…the space between market and state, providing checks and balances to both.” Ruggie, together with others, among them Peter M. Haas, also talk about ‘epistemic communities’ as a “…network of knowledge-based experts or groups with an

92 Interview with Therese Gastaut (April 11, 2005) 93 Global Civil Society Yearbook, 2004: Global Civil Society in an uncertain world 94 Transcript of speech at the International Institute, 23 April 2001 http://www.intl-institute.wisc.edu/public/papers/ruggie.htm

http://www.intl-institute


35

authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within the domain of their expertise. Members hold a common set of causal beliefs and share notions of validity based on internally defined criteria for evaluation, common policy projects, and shared normative commitments.”95 With the increased influence that civil society has on global governance, by influencing national governments and international organizations on specific issues through joint efforts across borders, we decided to proceed to find out what US and French perspectives were towards this role. We asked our interviewees and researched on literature to find answers to civil society’s role within global governance, whether this role needs to be strengthened, and whether civil society can be considered to be democratic, here referring to the calls for more democratic global governance. The focus on NGOs and their role in global governance When conducting our interviews, it was interesting how most respondents in the US had a tendency to talk mainly about NGOs, giving less attention to the other above mentioned actors within civil society such as multinational corporations. Respondents in France however referred to the private sector as well, including multinational firms and trade unions. This focus on NGOs may be due their increasingly important role, for instance in alleviating the debt of poor countries and the attention that their work has been given through media as well as through official recognitions such as the Nobel Peace Prize, provided to among others the International Campaign to Ban Land-mines; Médecines Sans Frontières, and; the International Red Cross96. Worldwide, the number of NGOs has increased by 25% the past ten years97. Part of this large increase is due to the ‘…changed ideological climate of the new era’ after the end of the Cold War with the fall of the Berlin Wall, when ‘…development theory and practice shook loose as well.98’ Most of this growth situated in the northern part of the world with less in the south. One essential reason to this increase can be explained through the improved communication-tools that are used between civil society in different countries. This was most strongly proven during the world-wide demonstrations against the war in Iraq with more than 10 million people participating, a protest that was organized mainly through internet and text-messaging, with worldwide cries echoing “The world says no to war”.

95 Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination" IO, 46:1, Winter 1992. 96 See http://nobelprize.org 97 Global Civil Society Yearbook 2004, Global Civil Society in an uncertain world 98 Marc Lindenberg and Coralie Bryant, Going Global: Transforming Relief and Development NGOs, p.213

http://nobelprize.org


36

The main perception among interview respondents was that NGOs do good work and deliver where states and international organizations fail to provide their corresponding services. There was a general consensus that these organizations play an important role, need to be integrated more in global governance even though mainly through advocating and lobbying for ideas; generating public opinion and influencing governments and policymakers in making decisions. None of the respondents saw civil society reaching the capacity to more directly be part of the decision-making process that still needs to lie in the hands of sovereign states. Michael Doyle99 summarizes the interviewees’ thoughts well: NGOs do wonderful stuff, by implementing public policy, taking risks, by being more sensitive to local circumstances. They don’t have agendas driven by governmental concerns but instead represent the voiceless and find people that have no ability to penetrate the class structures and their own governments. Many times governments become upset about the NGOs, since they tend to come to meetings with more expertise on topics than their own governmental representatives have the possibility to achieve. If these NGOs, however, weren’t there to counterbalance the stronger states, Michael Doyle reminds us together with Mark Weisbrot100 from the Center for Economic and Policy Research, every meeting would be run by these individual states according to their own agendas with less attention given to the important issues that NGOs highlight. Specific topics on a global level that may otherwise not lie in the immediate interest of national governments, such as the environment, health or the rights of indigenous peoples, have been given attention, thanks to NGOs, by lobbying through different forums; bringing government attention to the issues so that they do get placed on their agendas. The different environmental forums, the banning of land-mines and the initiatives to fight Aids were the most frequent topics discussed by our interviewees. One of the main topics dealt with where Civil Society play an essential role is that of poverty reduction and inequalities where voices are needed and mobilization of broader public support an imperative. The Human Development Report presented in 1999101, edited by the Director of Research, Ms. Sakiko Fukuda-Parr102, discusses these issues, pushing for global governance with a “human face”, where reforms need to be driven by concerns for people rather than capital. Through their emphasis on poverty reduction and human rights, member-states of the United Nations in 2000 signed the Millennium Development Goals to be achieved by 2015. These documents – with their targets, deadlines, and indicators, have been subsequently a major focus for the work of the UNDP, multilateral development banks,

99 Interview with Michael Doyle (April 13, 2005) 100 Interview with Mark Weisbrot (April 14, 2005) 101 Reinventing global governance for humanity and equity. Not an option but an imperative for the 21st century 102 Interview with Sakiko Fukuda-Parr (November 23, 2004)


37

as well as bilateral national development agencies and seen worldwide as the results from the response from civil society in combating poverty. Increased role of civil society?

In 1948, forty-one NGOs were given ‘consultative status’ by the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), today there are more than 2000 NGOs with this status. The Department of Public Information also provides access to UN information and arranges DPI-NGO conferences103. During the UN global conferences in the 1990s, civil society participation increased further, covering topics ranging from environment, human rights, population, sustainable development, poverty reduction and HIV/Aids104.

Since 1997, Security Council members also invite NGO experts to an informal meeting outside the Council Chambers to brief the Council on specific topics. The UN agencies also work closely with NGOs, including in the field operations where emphasis is given to humanitarian and development.

On February 13, 2005, the UN Secretary-General established a ‘blue-ribbon panel on relations with civil society’. Within twelve months, this panel will present recommendations on how to engage civil society more in the UN processes, particularly civil society from the developing countries.

Paralleled to the increased demands on more NGO participation are the complaints from member-states on the ‘…constant pressure to make room for NGOs in their deliberations..’. It is also becoming technically difficult to accommodate the large number of NGOs that wish to take part in the UN meetings and more effort needs to be placed on defining the terms of accreditation of NGOs to participate105.

To increase the voice of civil society, Michael Doyle introduces the idea of creating a General Assembly (GA) Forum that would allow NGOs to discuss the GA agenda prior to the Annual GA meeting itself, this way generating public opinion on issues before they are decided upon by the member-states’ governmental officials106. Critique and the question of democracy Criticism towards the work of different NGOs include the lack of evaluation of their work where they would present their results in ways that would provide an opportunity for others, and themselves, to learn from previous lessons. Larger international NGOs are more efficient in this regard, but more emphasis needs to be given to this.

103 See http://www.unausa.org/site/pp.asp?c=fvKRI8MPJpF&b=383863 104 See full list under http://www.un.org/ga/president/55/speech/civilsociety1.htm 105 See http://www.unausa.org/site/pp.asp?c=fvKRI8MPJpF&b=383863 106 See more under Democratic Deficits of Global Governance above.

http://www.unausa.org/site/pp.asp?c=fvKRI8MPJpF&b=383863

http://www.un.org/ga/president/55/speech/civilsociety1.htm

http://www.unausa.org/site/pp.asp?c=fvKRI8MPJpF&b=383863


38

The important role of the Civil Society (mainly NGOs) has also been discussed when talking about increased democratic global governance. Including the voice of NGOs and Civil Society, in general, will include the idea of the voiceless and increase their participation in the decision-making process. NGOs do have a tendency to be transparent in their activities, mainly since their efforts depend on support and funding which they will only continue to receive if they are able to present their activities openly. Critiques, however, include comments on other democratic deficits lying with many organizations themselves for not having been elected nor directly represent anyone but themselves. Groups may claim to be ‘…interpreting and advocating on behalf of others. They are taking up a cause on behalf of the poor, but cannot be elected representatives of the poor.107” Certain groups are even considered elitist in searching for individual benefits by lobbying for donor money or IMF and World Bank support. NGOs are, in this regard, not more democratic than the institutions they often criticize. Giacomini, together with respondents in the United States, raised the concern over Governmental NGOs (GONGOs), whose independence in reflecting civil society interests is somewhat contested.108 Nevertheless, responses to this critique take into account comments by individuals such as Weisbrot, from the Center for Economic and Policy Research, claiming that it doesn’t matter if NGOs are not democratic since they still constitute a countervailing force, influencing debates and public opinion, and in the end, their governments. “NGOs provide information and counter other unaccountable institutions that have enormous power to affect millions of people’s lives”, he says. To sum it up, despite the democratic deficit within NGOs, we found that there was a general consensus that civil society is an important actor within global governance that needs to be heard and plays an important part in influencing policy-makers and governments who make decisions on global issues. Another missing link, which often stagnates or stops the attempted fusion between the need for collective action and the ideas of reform on the ground, is the generational gap. Age, in this context, does make a difference, in terms of knowledge sharing, communication and pursuing collective action. The Generational gap Stereotypically, one tends to have the notion that members of the older generation are unlikely believers in change towards the latter part of their lives, whereas, members of the younger generation tend to be more open to change and have a range of ideas on how to implement it. The individuals we interviewed did not always neatly fit into these two groups. However, at the end of our interviewing process, it was undeniable that many of the older interview contributors (above the age of fifty) tended to be more skeptical about 107 Lindenberg, Marc and Bryant, Coralie, Going Global: Transforming Relief and Development NGOs 108 Interview with Marc Giacomini (April 15, 2005)


39

the reform of international institutions or further implementation of global governance than the younger set of our interview contributors. The latter, who openly talked about the newly devised projects they were working on or about past examples which had succeeded in bringing about even minimal change in American policy circles. John Sewell109, Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington DC shared with us that it is the younger generation that will bring about the change, not his generation. According to Sewell, younger people travel more, forge more contacts and, most importantly, still believe in change. In addition, it was the spirit, dynamism and persistence of the younger generation post-WWII that brought about the creation of the UN. Similarly, Michael Doyle110 is skeptical, yet makes suggestions for small steps that can “move from multilateral sovereignty to multiple legislation, coordinating norms better.” An example of one of these small steps would be suggesting to governments to appoint two out of five elected representatives who genuinely want to be involved in relations between their government and the United Nations. Currently, government representatives do usually attend GA (General Assembly) sessions, however, they do not have to undergo a special screening process, which measures how much they want to engage in national government-UN relations. It would be, in Doyle’s opinion, a “very modest step in representation,” taking into account that certain governments are undemocratically elected. From skeptics like John Sewell to partial skeptics like Michael Doyle, it would be important to include those who do believe in faster, more broad-based change and are actually doing something about it. Two individuals we interviewed, who belong to the younger generation and had dynamic past and future examples of “how to reform” international institutions are Jerry Maldonado111, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs in New York and Marc Weisbrot112, Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington DC. Maldonado is currently heading the Global Policy Innovations Project, which aims to bring together policy makers, academics and practitioners, in order to create policy alternatives in the field of international development. According to Maldonado and Project Co-Manager, Nadia Roumani: Poverty and social inequity continue to undermine the creative and productive potential of communities throughout the world, and standard, one-size-fits-all policies simply don’t work well…A more sophisticated range of choices, tools and strategies is required for developing economies to gain legitimacy113. Activities planned for the coming year include a web portal, a “globalization and development” forum, a series of dialogue meetings among practitioners, policy makers, activists and academics and a series of publications dealing with policy alternatives.

109 Interview with John Sewell (March 8, 2005) 110 Interview with Michael Doyle (April 13, 2005) 111 Source: http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/page.php/prmID/261 112 Interview with Mark Weisbrot (April 14, 2005) 113 Interview with Mark Weisbrot (April 14, 2005)

http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/page.php/prmID/261


40

Weisbrot cites his own organization, CEPR, and Argentina’s past actions towards the IMF as examples catalyzing change. CEPR exists to provide developing countries with information on trade, finance and policy, which they would otherwise not read or hear about. Weisbrot comments: [One needs to] give votes to the developing countries. Have other representation besides their treasury and finance ministers and include labor and environment to represent their countries. This is however not going to happen even though it would help. What instead may happen is that they will go around the institutions, like for instance the case with Argentina that has gotten out of its IMF commitment114. Whether it is about finding loopholes in the system, circumventing the existing institutional framework, creating new policy alternatives or simply being content with the status quo, important lessons can be gained from both generations: the careful cautioning, historical knowledge, nuanced criticism and valid reasons for why the status quo works from the older generations and dynamism, a continuing array of emerging ideas, room for experimentations and faith in effective change from the younger generations. Finally, it is important to mention that there are always exceptions in both generations, which do not fit the above mentioned categories - Thomas Falk, promoter of the global parliament for over thirty years now, is a perfect example. Despite the missing links, there are valuable, proposed ideas for reform of international institutions that have potential to have an impact. In the section below, we have outlined the current patterns in reform proposals, what the American perspectives are and how our interview contributors have reacted towards them; especially towards the recently published and hotly debated UN High Level Panel Report. VII. Ideas for Reform

American UN support and the High Level Panel Report Since the 1950s, the UN has faced a constant barrage pf management studies, policy reviews, reform proposals and actual reforms. Secretary Generals have carried out substantial changes in the Secretariat roughly every eight years—1953-56; 1964-66; 1974-77, 1985-86; and 1992-present. Many reforms had hidden political agendas: they had policy goals cloaked by technocratic jargon or universal principles.115 Judging from the recent oil-for-food scandal and the negative American Press on the UN, e.g. David Brook’s fiery New York Times op-ed which claims: “…we [the US] will never accept global governance because it inevitably devolves into corruption. The panoply of U.N. scandals flows from a single source: the lack of democratic accountability. These supranational organizations exist in their own insular, self-indulgent aerie,”116 one would think that Americans are losing faith in one of the historic emblems of global governance and multilateral cooperation, the United Nations.

114 ibid 115 Source: http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/analysis.htm 116 Brooks, David. “Loudly, With a Big Stick.” New York Times Op-Ed Section. April 14, 2005, p.A27.

http://www.globalpolicy.org/reform/analysis.htm


41

Reading Brooks’ op-ed and the fervently debate over John Bolton’s nomination, are part of the American love-hate relationship with the United Nations. On the French side, as well, a limited number of French interviewees contested the role of the UN as an effective decision-making institution having an impact on the regulation of the global issues. Thus, Christian Chavagneux, journalist at Alternatives Economiques, and Pierre de Senarclens, Professor at the University of Lausanne, attribute the UN’s shortcomings to the lack of representation and coordination mechanisms.117 During our interviews, we came across some very supportive individuals, who have believed in the United Nations since its birth and continue to do so. One of these remarkable individuals is Steven Schlesinger, director of the World Policy Institute at the New School and author on a book about UN history. Schlesinger responded to Brooks’ op-ed by saying: To the Editor: It is astonishing that David Brooks can write a column about the perils of global governance regarding the United States' participation in the United Nations and never mention the one defense this country has against any matters it opposes in that body: the veto. All the fears that Mr. Brooks raises about possible United Nations interference with American sovereignty were dealt with at the 1945 San Francisco conference that created the United Nations. In enshrining the veto there for five states, including the United States, the conference allayed all Congressional qualms about possibly encumbering United States dominion over its own national concerns. Stephen Schlesinger New York, April 14, 2005 During our interview with Schlesinger118, he remarked that the UN, in his opinion, is the central regulating body when it comes to global governance; that the IMF and the World Bank are affiliates yet spin-offs and that the US tends to be the “big elephant in the room.” Similar comments for UN support were expressed during our interviews with Thomas Weiss of the Ralph Bunch Institute; Jerry Maldonado of the Carnegie Council on International Ethics and Michael Doyle and Edward Luck at Columbia University. It is important to mention that, during the interviews, faith in the UN as an institution was usually balanced with a healthy dose of criticism. UN critiques invariably led to detailed conversations on the recently published UN High Level Panel Report. Especially since numerous unimplemented, but highly hyped, UN Reform proposals have already been put on the table, most recently in 1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001, we felt it especially pertinent to ask our interview contributors, what they think about the High Level Panel Report; whether it is a stepping stone towards global governance and if “the whole package” or parts of it have chances of being implemented.

117 Interview with Christian Chavagneux (April 20, 2005) and Pierre de Senarclens (April 21, 2005) 118 Interview with Stephen Schlesinger (February 23, 2005)


42

Some of our interview contributors said that the HLPR is more comprehensive than past UN reforms, especially the sections on a proposed definition for terrorism; collective security initiatives and the peace-building commission. Some also lauded the Security Council Reform proposals within the report, however, most agreed that they would never be implemented. In fact, there was little faith in any type of implementation, except for the peace-building commission. Individuals we interviewed in Washington DC often brought up the point that every UN reform proposal, including the HLPR, is too UN-centric and forget to include other institutions “part of the system” e.g. World Bank, IMF and the WTO. In addition, those members of the Washington DC-initiated UN Reform task force felt that the HLPR did not include any proposals for UN internal bureaucratic reform (issues of personnel management, logistics for employees, etc.), a surprising fact since “Kofi Annan used to be in charge of Human Resources at the UN” commented Thomas Weiss119 of the Ralph Bunche Institute in New York City. Along the same lines, both Ann Florini120 and Randall Henning121, Visiting Fellow at the Institute for International Economics said that the World Bank and IMF are considered as “well organized” institutions, whereas the UN is perceived to be the one with the bureaucratic mess. Colin Bradford122, Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, exclaimed: “The UN is a mess, there are too many players!! It gets very complicated, thus [creates] a lot of constraints…the UN provides the single site in the world where all nations have some voice. One voice, one vote. One nation, one vote. It’s both its blessing and its curse.”123 Michael Doyle recently called the HLPR “the return of global governance,” however, concentrated on the fact that the only facet of the report likely to be implemented is the Peace-building Commission. During a candid interview, Edward Luck124 who referred to the HLPR as the UN claiming “My house is on fire, now please remodel it,” criticized that there is currently no political climate for even parts of the report to be implemented and that he was surprised at both the coverage the Security Council Reform proposals were getting and that Kofi Annan has repetitively been presenting his recent report “In Larger Freedom,” which is based on HLPR recommendations, as a “whole package deal” rather than concentrating on two or three reform efforts. The “whole package deal” phenomenon has not occurred before and this makes implementation “even more unlikely” says Luck. It is good to know that there are still staunch supporters of the UN in the American political spectrum, however, the prospects for reforms, not only of the UN, but any international institution, remain limited, especially for those who have tried to recommend reform numerous times and been disappointed due to individual, political nation-state interests.

119 Interview with Thomas Weiss (March 31, 2005) 120 Interview with Ann Florini (March 8, 2005) 121 Interview with Randall C. Henning (March 8, 2005) 122 Interview with Colin Bradford (March 8, 2005) 123 Ibid. 124 Interview with Edward Luck (April 15, 2005)


43

As the increase in collective security is one of the main recommendations made within the HLPR, it would be wise to explore some models suggesting or describing how such collective action would be taken. One of the main proposals on the reform table is increased formation of regional groups.

Regionalism A suggested option for improved global governance is strengthening regional organizations by giving them more authority to decide on issues that affect their region. Regional expertise can be voiced and decisions made be closer to the ideas of the people involved. As an example of such regional organization, many of the interviewees used the European Union (EU) as a model, while others also mentioned African Union (AU), and the Organization of Americas (OAS). Former EU Commissioner for Trade Lamy pointed out that regionalism in general does not oppose the construction of global governance, but rather reinforces it (cf. discussion on subsidiarity).125 The EU was often mentioned also as a model of global governance, for instance by Falk who uses the EU parliament as a basis to describe his theory of a global parliament, something Dawkins also discusses126. Luck is against the EU as a model, saying it is not going to work on a global level nor in other regions, but has been working the way it has in Europe based on the circumstances and history of that specific region. Bertrand Badie127, together with other French respondents, does not support the idea of the European Union serving as an institution transferable to a global level either. Their argument is that the European Union is one of its kind (sui generis) in its structure. The European Union, in his view, is too institutionalized and regulated to be useful as a global level where countries have given up parts of their sovereignty for an integrationist model. The idea of subsidiarity, supporting decisions to be made at the lowest level possible, emerged as a reaction against this integrationist trend in 1992. Transforming the EU model to the global level would resemble the idea of a global government rather than global governance. As with global governance in general, certain issues that affect neighboring countries need to be dealt with at a regional level and decisions made where state capacity does not suffice for such deliberations. Co-Director for the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington D.C., Mark Weisbrot128 emphasizes this option, preferring it to an expansion of memberships in e.g. the G-7. ‘Regional integration is a much more 125 Lamy, Pascal. La démocratie-monde: pour une autre gouvernance mondiale. Paris : Seuil, 2004 126 Dawkins, Kristin, Global Governance: The Battle Over Planetary Power. New York: Open Media Book, Seven Stories Press, 2003. 127 Interview with Bertrand Badie (April 21, 2005) 128 Interview with Mark Weisbrot (April 14, 2005)


44

viable option,’ he says, ‘one that makes much more sense politically as well.’ Certain topics need to be dealt with by those who have specific interest and knowledge in them in order for efficient results to be achieved. Weisbrot uses the Environmental legislation and public health legislations in Latin America as an example to illustrate decisions made that in some cases worked against the public health and environmental regulations at a local level. Criticism has been raised against industrial countries for excluding developing countries from the decision making processes. As a response to this critique, Randall Henning129, affiliated with IIE and American University, suggests that developing countries should attempt to take their own initiative to create caucuses where topics of their own immediate concern can be discussed. Only including them in meetings at for instance the WTO would not strengthen their voices. “I don’t think it works to give developing countries a voice, simply initiating them to meetings where you would usually need a smaller group to create a deal”. Instead of having the WTO provide an institutional framework, own initiatives to meet based on their specific needs would be more beneficiary. In addition, instead of increasing participation by more member-states in different already existing groups, such as the G-7, new regional forms of decision-making should be created, Henning concludes. John Sewell130, Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, also supports the idea of providing more support to regional problem solving, such as the African Peace Keeping Force, or the Brazilian component army in Haiti. There needs to be a strategy created for governments to back this up, like a Development Fund for Africa. According to Evan O’Neil, from the Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs, regionalism would be more of an effective way to deal with post-colonial fall outs around the world. There is a need for innovation and alternatives and sustainability as a balance and generator of policy also in terms of peace and human security. Waheguru Pal Sing Siddhu131 at the International Peace Academy is a strong promoter of regionalism, particularly of peace and security. “The world order today is radically different from the bipolarity during the Cold War,” Siddhu explains, showing how there with the end of the Cold War has been a trend of multiplicity of forums taking place. Among governments, there is an emergence of ‘forum shopping’ where they try to identify what they are looking for, depending on the different specializations out there. “When one cannot find consensus among the bigger players, it is more efficient to find consensus on a regional level”. Such responses on the regional level include the EU, ASEAN, AU. Regional organizations are also more likely to ‘know their neighbors’. In situations where the international community does not respond quickly enough, regional organizations will be more efficient. One example of this is the civil war in Liberia, erupting out of

129 Interview with Randall C. Henning (March 8, 2005) 130 Interview with John Sewell (March 8, 2005) 131 Interview with Waheguru Pal Sing Siddhu (December 8, 2004)


45

economical purposes. The 15 members of ECOWAS solicited troops in 1999 since the international community was not responding to their cries for help. Multi-lateral agreements at a regional level are this way more in touch with local perspectives. Still, Siddhu is concerned that there are regions around the world that do not have a collective or regional structure, like the Middle East. There is also a risk of regional organizations being dominated by powerful countries, such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone in the African Union, or Japan in ASEAN. Yet, these regional organizations could be seen as potential building blocks to represent a system of global governing decision-making. Problems One of the main problems discussed around regionalism, is the lack of resources. Ann Florini132, agrees that regional organizations do play a big role dealing with many issues. In certain cases however, there is a need for legitimacy of endorsement by an international community. Placing too much responsibility in the hands of regional organizations may instead create a situation where the international community dumps its responsibilities on to regional organizations that then are not able to act due to lack of resources. In order for regionalism to work, the international community, or global world, needs to ensure that the regional organizations will have resources to work. Stephen Schlesinger133, Director of the World Policy Institute at the New School University, instead sees regionalism as a way to relieve the UN of responsibilities and assets it doesn’t have at the moment. On a general basis, there seems to be an increasing trend emerging of suggestions of decentralization of decision-making, giving more authority and increased political and economical strength to regional organizations. This seems by many to be a preferred way to increase the voices of countries not represented in the international organizations, rather than including them in already existing bodies. In order to make this feasible, the weaker regional organizations however need assistance from stronger parts of the world in order to have the capacity to work as efficient institutions. Among all the topics discussed, this seemed like one of those that may develop most in the future. Finally, after summarizing the general issues in global governance scholarship; explaining the profile and thought process within our interviewee group, both within the American and French context; introducing divergent US-French views on global governance; providing suggestions for the missing links between theory and practice and presenting the most recent reform proposals for international institutions, with potential---our team has, in concluding this report, devised a list of recommendations for the Charles Leopold Mayer Foundation and those who support the long-term research, study and exploration of global governance 132 Interview with Ann Florini (March 8, 2005) 133 Interview with Stephen Schlesinger (February 23, 2005)


46

VIII. Conclusion

www.cstm.qc.ca/.../ ASP2/showtext.asp?target=1309

• Increase linkage between similar global governance database projects around

the world, e.g. between the Charles Leopold Mayer Foundation’s IRG project and the Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs’ Global Policy Innovations Project. For example, databases can be exchanged to strengthen the transatlantic connection.

• Facilitate worldwide exchanges between policy makers, practitioners and

academics on this topic. If one group meets for a one-week seminar, there needs to be a yearly reunion with the same group in order to monitor follow-up progress. Dialogue needs to occur on a domestic, transatlantic and global level and needs to include policy makers, practitioners, academics and lay persons.

• Outreach to youth should occur in different capacities. For example, education materials on global governance should be developed for inclusion in school curriculums across the country.

• A document, which showcases culturally appropriate terms for global

governance. For example, in American policy circles, the term “global governance” is not highly regarded, whereas “global management” is. In China, one might find a different culturally appropriate term for global governance.

• The Charles Leopold Mayer Foundation needs to continue this project on a

US domestic, transatlantic and global level. During a brief span of time, we have managed to conduct interviews in both Washington DC and New York. However, there are important domestic American perspectives in the Midwest, the south and on the West Coast of the United States, which might differ from policy making and international organization settings. The same recommendation might be given for the French sub-team: that the interviewing needs to be conducted throughout Europe-is there a “European perspective” towards global governance? US and French findings need to me

The Need for Dialogue: Team Recommendations


47

merged in order to ameliorate shared, transatlantic perspectives on global governance. Finally, the Charles Leopold Mayer Foundation is currently building links in China, it would be important to establish links in other Asian countries, Africa and Latin America to build a global network of those working on and thinking about issues related to global governance. Additional research topics to be taken into consideration in the Foundation’s work would be topics such as the increase of individuals who grow up in multiple countries and, therefore, have a more cosmopolitan outlook on the world; the noted generational gap in our findings-is this a worldwide phenomenon and what can be done to bridge it?

• Continuation of the Integrated team format. It would be helpful to have more

staff support from the Foundation, in terms of logistics for integrated team visits and balancing of work schedules.


48

Annex


49


50


51


52


53


54


55


56


57

Framework for the different fiches The SIPA team agreed that 2-3 fiche document (literature research) would create the basis for a fiche analyse (including the student’s own thoughts around a topic). These fiche analyse, together with input from the interviews, would then serve as the basis for the fiche debat where a specific topic would be debated between different thinkers. Fiche document Fiche Analyse Fiche document Fiche document Fiche Analyse Fiche Debat Fiche document Fiche document Fiche Analyse Fiche document


58

Sample Fiche Document Key-words: Poverty, Environment; Bretton Woods institutions; Reform of existing institutions

Dawkins, Kristin, Global Governance: The Battle Over Planetary Power. New York: Open Media Book, Seven Stories Press, 2003.

“Strong democratic institutions are needed at all levels to regulate corporations, protect public and human rights, eliminate poverty, and manage markets – all components of a just and sustainable model of development134.”. “Localization is not a philosophy of isolationism, but of integrated decentralization in which strong local institutions from the base, with national and regional and international institutions – governmental as well as non-governmental – networking across the hemispheres, horizontally, as well as from local to global, vertically135.”

On the author: Senior fellow at the Institute of Agriculture and Trade Policy in Minneapolis,

USA. Prior to this she worked for “sixteen years in community development and public policy research in Philadelphia, including nine years as the executive director of the Philadelphia Jobs in Energy Project.”

Dawkins suggests a reform of global governance including more horizontal cooperation among local actors. “Global policies can be a stimulus for reform, but any global solution requires widespread local support…136”. She argues that there is a need for a “…peaceful, just, democratic, and sustainable reorganization of the global governance framework..137”, in order for it to become more democratic and sustainable. Policies are needed for national governments in order to “…facilitate the development of strong communities with locally embedded social responsibilities and the capacity to share and care globally138.” Specifying the different levels of responsibility, national governments are still to be held both responsible and accountable to their citizens. On a regional level, associations will “serve as the transmission belts of information, planning, and policy making – within nations as well as across national boundaries”. Global institutions and decisions on the other hand, need to obtain their authority from an “effective system of communication

134 149 135 160 136 106 137 117-118 138 161


59

amongst stakeholders.139” Global decisions, such as corporate regulations on labor, safety, health and environment, could then be regulated on a regional level. Dawkins does not support a globalized government, but instead emphasizes integrated decentralization with regional planning for global policies that are to be implemented on a local level. Another option would be to create a global parliament with elected regional representatives that would advise such institutions as the UN, WTO, IMF and World Bank. For a more democratic global governance, suggestions from civil society propose reform of the already existing international institutions. As part of such reform, debates among civil society should be facilitated at community level across the world; existing institutions should be convinced to “self-correct within the existing framework”; democratic mechanisms of coherence should be designed “..between and amongst the institutions of society at every level.”; “…create new global mechanisms for creating, managing, and redistributing transnational wealth that are just and democratic, reaching local communities.140” Stakeholders at all levels should be held accountable to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as to other social and environmental treaties. Reforms of business/trade Dawkins criticizes the negative effects the business of large-scale corporations have when exploiting their markets globally. Corporate influence on politics is also criticized: “governments are led by an elite class with the resources to influence and dominate the political process.141” The Bretton Woods institutions have been criticized for causing more damage than development in less developed countries, and have developed in to elite based organizations where the richer countries make decisions on behalf of poorer countries who find themselves giving up valuable national resources that in the end benefit the richer countries. The UN on the other hand lacks a strong enforcement mechanism and support from the most powerful country, the US, something that has prevented the UN from maximizing its efficiency. More transparency is needed from the already existing institutions. National governments still need to be accountable and responsible to their citizens and there needs to be more of a networking across borders among local actors. Regional associations should be given more attention as providers of information and global institutions need to be more alert to information provided to them from the different stakeholders.

139 160 140 157-158 141 75


60

“Strong democratic institutions are needed at all levels to regulate corporations, protect public and human rights, eliminate poverty, and manage markets – all components of a just and sustainable model of development.142” Knowing that the general understanding is that poverty, inequality and violence tend to increase with deregulation of financial and trade markets Dawkins provides a thorough research on the structures of the Bretton Wood institutions and highlights that the reforms suggested already resemble the policies that were set out at these institutions creation. In the case of the WTO, the Havana Charter 1948 for the establishment of the International Trade Organization had as its policy to support labor standards, defend “..protectionism to promote economic development; limiting subsidies so as to fairly allocate world markets; managing supplies as well as prices through negotiated commodity agreements; and prohibiting monopolies or cartels, whether public or private.143” Acts that are suggested by many as reforms to these financial and trade institutions today. One thing that however was not included and which Dawkins brings up is the introduction of the Tobin tax on currency exchange, airfares, commodity grains, oil, and scarce minerals. Poverty needs to be alleviated and development improved. Debt relief and new aid and loans are urgently needed. Democratic decision-making, suggested on a regional level, should be part of the distribution of such aid. The “..international community and leaders of the richer countries must take responsibility for stabilizing the global financial system and redirecting capital flows strategically to invest in equitable development throughout the world” Dawkins also shows concerns with the privatization of public goods, such as air, water, sanitation systems, education, health, public parks, police and fire protection and pollution prevention, leading to the poorer not being able to access these. Rights to these public goods are stipulated in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights as well as Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as well as the labor rights established through the ILO and should be respected by all nations. “Public policies are needed to establish and enforce the provision of public services, and the protection of public goods, from the community level to the international level.144” “Localization is not a philosophy of isolationism, but of integrated decentralization in which strong local institutions from the base, with national and regional and international institutions – governmental as well as non-governmental – networking across the hemispheres, horizontally, as well as from local to global, vertically.145”

142 149 143 121-122 144 141 145 160


61

Sample Fiche Analyse

Sovereignty Revisited and UN Reform By Priyanka Bhalla

Is “The Case for Sovereignty” by Jeremy Rabkin the reality of what lies in store for global governance or is it yet another pessimistic view of international law without enforcement and too much American power sharing due to increased international cooperation ? Is the recently published UN High Level Panel Report “the return of global governance”146 or is it Kofi Annan saying “my house is on fire, but please remodel it.”147 Rabkin certainly makes some valid points in his ode to “the threat of global governance,” such as mixed consensus on questions of security and human rights; the sometimes questionable “postmodern construction” of the EU; the danger of imposing values of global governance that do not cross cultural lines; the sometimes shaky UN structure in terms of security and its repetitive resistance to use force or apply “peace enforcement;” the problematics of “collective security” and numerous countries signing treaties and conventions with reservations and, thereby, not upholding the fundamental idea of the treaty or convention in question. However he misses some fundamental points. Similarly, the UN High Level Panel Report, while more realistic in its recommendations than the 1997 UN Reforms and the 2001 Brahimi Report, only contains a handful of recommendations that will actually be implemented. More specifically, only the changes that the Secretary General can make himself, are bound to take place, e.g. the Peace Building Commission. It is interesting to juxtapose Rabkin’s book and the UN Report, as in certain instances one document’s statement is the counter argument for the other. For example, Rabkin does not wholly agree with the concept of collective security or involvement of international organizations in collective security, whereas the High Level Panel Report emphasizes collective security as the greatest action to be taken in response to current and future threats and challenges. This analysis will address three tension-filled key aspects: sovereignty, the EU and the UN. Sovereignty: Rabkin strives to clear up the common misconception that national sovereignty controls every aspect of society, he wants to make it clear that “sovereignty is fundamentally about the authority to establish what law is binding-or will be backed by coercion-in a particular territory. It is no a guarantee of total control over everything that happens.” However, he fails to take into account changing historical needs and growing interdependence among countries during the 1990s. For example, Kofi Annan challenges Rabkin’s traditional notion of sovereignty by expressing in 1999: “We need to adapt our international system better to a world with new actors, new responsibilities, and new possibilities for peace and progress. State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined-not least by the forces of globalization and international cooperation. States are now widely understood to be instruments at the service of their peoples, and not vice versa. At the same time individual sovereignty-by which I mean the fundamental

146 Michael Doyle 147 Edward Luck


62

freedom of each individual…has been enhanced by a renewed and spreading consciousness of individual rights.” The EU is striving to comprehend this new meaning of sovereignty, however, the US prefers to stick to the traditionalist way. There has been no transitional phase between what is regarded Rabkin style sovereignty and Kofi style sovereignty-a mixture of traditionalist and new. Perhaps this is what most of the world should be striving towards in deciding whether they are ready for this new sense of sovereignty or not. European Union, “Euro-governance” and Human Rights Rabkin rightfully points out that Europe’s “postmodern” structure is obfuscate, based on a certain value system and loosely defined in terms of citizenship, taxation, pension funds and the electorate. He elaborates that Europe does not have a common police, army and has not chosen a state structure. However, the point of a “postmodern” structure is that it is experimental and in the long-term a learning experience. For example, European state formation took hundreds of years; how can the EU be expected to be up an running within a couple of years of its inception as smoothly as states which have had hundreds of years to develop, experiment, learn and implement state policies as they please. I think it is more helpful to compare the EU to a loose, federalist structure rather than a strict state structure. If regarded as a federalist structure, it is much easier to understand and accept that each EU member has its own individual policies mixed with general policies that are the same for each EU member. In addition, the way each EU member adapts to these new policies, will reflect which policy works and which one does not. As far as citizenship is concerned, more and more members of the younger generation are starting to consider themselves “European” and their original nationality. It is valuable to make a comparison to India, which is arguably based on a loose federalist system, where each state implements both different and similar policies. Many citizens consider themselves “Indian” and e.g. “Punjabi” reflecting the region they are originally from. It has worked this way since Indian independence in 1947. Arguably, the United States itself was similar to the EU at its founding and has developed into what it is today Rabkin also describes the tension between what, today, is European and what is not. I think he brings up a vital point in the sometimes idealistic cloud of the EU: the dispute over Turkey-should it become an EU member or not? Even though it is a modern Islamic state, is it veering too far away from what are traditionally referred to as “European values?” Turkey is now on its way to membership, however, the main question is how much Turkish citizens will have to sacrifice and compromise their identity in order to forge forward economically and become more “European.” In addition, it is not quite clear yet what “being European” is supposed to mean. Are values of growing immigrant population, e.g. significant Arab population in France, taken into account when referring to “being European?” Examining US domestic politics, it is easy to divulge the disadvantages of the current administration and how policies such as the Patriot Act have forced especially Muslims from Middle Eastern and South Asian regions to compromise their identities and fear for their rights as citizens under the domestic, sovereign law which is supposed o protect them. Rabkin fails to address the inequality of rights domestically within the US,


63

especially among immigrant and minority populations. One reason, international human rights have proven to be effective and useful in the past is because they protect specifically those who receive no support from their sovereign governments. Even though he refers to the US as setting an example for the rest of the world, he does not adequately address whether the US administration has dealt with this rights gap effectively or not. International Law as “Binding”---“Almost all nations follow international law almost all of the time” – Louis Henkin Rabkin addresses three interesting tensions within the field of international law: a)What are human rights? b)How should they be implemented, addressed? c)If countries are signing on to many treaties and conventions, but doing so with reservations, is there any point in them signing at all? I agree with Rabkin that human rights are culturally relative and that it is often difficult to say they are “Universal” when they were borne out of post-WWII Europe. Within the field of international law, there has also been some fruitful debate on whether human rights are a jus cogens norm or not. According to the Fawaz Yunis case, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is considered legally binding and, therefore, falls under the “hard law” category and not the, at times, vague category of “soft law” (e.g. declarations and proclamations that cannot be considered binding.) When speaking of signing treaties and conventions with reservations, it is important to take into account that some signatories put in a one sentence reservation, whereas other signatories put in numerous paragraphs. It does not take away from the fact that numerous countries have signed on and, therefore, often (not always) support the essence of the treaty or convention. Crumbling UN architecture or remodeling? It is true that the UN has been disappointing in many security and peacekeeping endeavours in the post-Cold War era. However, looking at its so called failures, e.g. Somalia, Rwanda, Srebenica, is only scratching the surface and forgetting about a) some of its successes, e.g. Cambodia and El Salvador including its growing pains and b) the fact that the UN is well aware of its deficits. As Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore express in their new book “Rules for the World,” the UN suffers from a deep institutional sickness experienced by many large bureaucracies. They write: “yet not all undesirable IO[international organization] behaviour can be blamed on states. IOs often generate their own mistakes, perversities, even disasters. In fact, it is often the very features that make bureaucracies authoritative and effective that can encourage bureaucratic dysfunction…We call ‘pathologies’ those dysfunctions which that are attributable to bureaucratic culture and internal bureaucratic processes and that lead the IO to act in a manner that subverts its self-professed goal.” There have been numerous attempts at reform, including the 1997 UN Reforms, the 2001 Brahimi Report and most recently, the UN High Level Panel Report. The High Level


64

Panel Report is the most realistic in terms of realistically setting goals for change within the UN structure. Frankly speaking, there will probably never be a UN volunteer army as former Under Secretary-General Brian Urqhart suggested, as there are not enough incentives. “UN troops” will continuously be made up of some well-trained and some non-well-trained as long as member states are the ones who voluntarily send in their troops. Rapid deployment will continue to be problem. Perhaps the UN should not be dealing with peace enforcement, but concentrating more on peace building and the creation of a strong UN Police Force. Two helpful suggestions within the High Level Panel Report are more a) collective security—not necessarily member states working with each other under the guise of the UN, but working towards fighting new threats and challenges as individual governments as well and b) the creation of a Peacebuilding Commission, where it can be documented and discussed what has occurred during past peace building projects, e.g. Cambodia, what went wrong, what did not and what can be learned for the future. The Future of Global Governance International Cooperation and the promotion of multilateralism will continue, despite what authors such as Rabkin proclaim. Rabkin, himself, admits at the end of the book that the US cannot go it alone, that it does need to cooperate with other countries. Such a statement is all that is needed to have continuous faith in increased international cooperation and, therefore, further progress within global governance. However there are numerous pressing issues that need to be addressed before global governance can progress; Rabkin sheds light on some of these tensions. For example, there needs to be more debate on the increasingly emerging field of “international human rights.” There need to be more mechanisms such as the Appelate Body within the WTO, which holds countries accountable for their trade agreements (the ICC does not work as well on these grounds).


65

Fiche Debats outline

1. UN Reform “ The way forward?”

- Pro-, con- UN - Need for reform? - What is different with the UN HLPR compared to previous calls for reform?

John Bolton, Rabkin vs. Ralph Bunche (2), Stephen Schlesinger And Ann Florini, Ed Luck and Michael Doyle as intermediary

2. Trade Liberalization “Alternatives to globalization?”

- How trade is governed - Regionalism - What is fair trade? Barriers? - Immigration of goods and people (Baghwati)

Weisbrot, Stiglitz, Bagwhati, Bryant, John Williams,

3. Civil Society “Democratizing global governance”

- Private sector and NGOs and the evolution of the definition of Civil Society - UN opening up to Civil Society (non-state actors) - Increased participation both from top and bottom

Ann Florini, Michael Edwards, Castells, Dawkins, Richard Falk


66

Sample questionnaire for interviews

conducted in the United States Finding out: a. what the interviewer believes is the current situation; b. what she or he would like to see happen over time, why, and; c. how they think that might happen, as well as; d. get more names and sources and literature citations from them.

1. On Citizenship

- Since the U.S. is historically (except for Native Americans) a nation of immigrants, we need to know, are you a US citizen, or a holder of a green card?

- Do you hold dual citizenship as well? - If a holder of a green card, or other visa, do you identify yourself as speaking as a

resident or citizen of the United States? - How do you think your origins influence global governance policy making in the

US?

2. On Definitions of global governance When asked what we mean with global governance, - provide the two definitions from Corky Bryant and Michel Doucin as point of opening up discussions. Create a debate around the definition and seek a definition from the respondent him/herself.

3. Global governance and its need for reform

- Given your interest in global governance148, what do you think are the major

obstacles to further progress in that direction? - What needs to happen in order to move towards the kinds of preferred future

outcomes you would like to see on the global level?

- As this is a large research project—we would like to hear your ideas about where (which organizations or practitioners or scholars) are doing some of the best work being done towards the kinds of changes you would like to see in the current global context?

- Among the many characteristics people talk about wanting to see in any

government—accountability, transparency, equity, widespread participation, predictability—which one or two of these do you think are most important?

148 The team experienced difficulties in finding interviewees who were directly opposed to global governance. The questions included here therefore resemble those asked to those in favor of or in acknowledgement of the existence of “global governance”.


67

- How do you see the work you are doing as having some impact upon the changes

you would like to see happen in global governance? - What kinds of changes in the near term could help put in place the enabling

environment for improving global governance?

- If someone or agency wanted to help move towards more accountable and equitable global governance, what 2 or 3 steps would you recommend?

4. Questions on the UN High Level Panel Report The High Level Panel Report states: “But in the twenty-first century, more than ever before, no State can stand wholly alone. Collective strategies, collective institutions and a sense of collective responsibility are indispensable.”

- Do you agree? Why or why not? Could the High Level Panel Report also be considered a stepping stone towards a global governance reform? How so?

- What do you think of it and how do you think in compares to past UN reform

initiatives, specifically the 1997 UN Reform Proposal and the 2001 Brahimi Report? Is it “the return of Global Governance” as distinguished scholar Michael Doyle recently labeled it?

- The Report suggests the strengthening of the UN, mainly through a reform of the

Security Council, what are your views on this?

- What is your opinion on the state sovereignty and non-cooperation as discussed in the HLPR where it says that “State sovereignty, today it clearly carries with it the obligation of a State to protect the welfare of its own peoples and meet its obligations to the wider international community. But history teaches us all too clearly that it cannot be assumed that every State will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own people and avoid harming its neighbors”. Do you think the international community is capable of taking on such responsibility, especially since international organizations such as the UN have had failures in the past – how would this increased responsibility be taken on?

- Do you feel that any part of the report reflects American perspectives towards

global governance? How so?


68

Working Bibliography on Global Governance United States "A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility" Report of the High-level Panel on

Threats, Challenges and Change. New York: UN Department of Public Information, 2004.

Archibugi, Daniele. Debating Cosmopolitics. New York: Verso, 2003. Bhagwati, Jagdish. In the Defense of Globalization. Oxford University Press, 2004. Bolton, John R. “Should We Take Global Governance Seriously?” Chicago Journal of

International Law. Vol. 1 No. 2, (Fall 2000). pp 205 Brown, Mark Malloch. “Democratic Governance: Toward a framework for Sustainable

Peace.” Global Governance. Vol. 9, Iss. 2, Apr-June 2003; pp. 141-146. Bryant, Ralph C. Turbulent Waters: Cross Border Finance and International

Governance. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2003. Castells, Manuel. “Global Governance and Global Politics.” Political Science and

Politics. Vol. 38, No. 1 (January 2005); pp. 9-16. Cochrane, Feargal, Duffy, Rosaleen, and Jan Selby (eds). Global Governance,

Conflict and Resistance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Commission on Global Governance. Our Global Neighbourhood: the Report of the

Commission on Global Governance. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995. Critical perspectives on Global Governance Reader. 2003.

(http://www.cpogg.org/reader.html) Dawkins, Kristin. Global Governance: The Battle Over Planetary Power. New York:

Seven Stories, 2003. Edwards, Michael. Future Positive. Earthscan Publications, 2000. 304 pages. Falk, Richard. “Humane Governance for the World: Reviving the Quest,” Review of

International Political Economy. Vol. 7, No. 2 (Summer 2000); pp. 317–334.

http://www.cpogg.org/reader.html


69

Finkelstein, Lawrence S. “What is global governance?” Global Governance. Vol. 1, Iss.

1; pp. 367-372. Florini, Ann The Coming Democracy: New Rules for Running a New World, Island

Press, 2003 Gardner, Hall, and Stefanova, Radoslava. The New Transatlantic Agenda: Facing the

Challenges of Global Governance. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001. Gordenker, Leon, and Weiss, Thomas G. “Pluralising Global Governance: Analytical

Approaches and Dimensions.” Third World Quarterly. Vol. 16, No. 3 (1995); pp. 795–814.

Global Governance: a Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations.

Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Hagel, Chuck, “A Republican Foreign Policy.” Foreign Affairs. July/August 2004. Hall, Rodney Bruce, and Biersteker, Thomas J (eds). The Emergence of Private

Authority in Global Governance. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Hardt, Michael, and Negri, Antonio. Multitude: War and Democracy in the Age of

Empire. New York: Penguin Press, 2004. Harrison, Ewan. The Post-Cold War International System: Strategies, Institutions, and

Reflexivity. New York ; London: Routledge, 2004. Heimans, Jeremy. “Reforming Global Economic and Social Governance: a Critical

Review of Recent Programmatic Thinking.” [Working Paper No. 26, World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization] International Labour Office: Geneva, May 2004.

Held, David, and Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias (eds). Taming Globalization: Frontiers of

Governance. Cambridge, UK : Polity Press in association with Blackwell Pub., Oxford, UK, Malden, MA, 2003.

Held, David, et al. Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture.

Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1999.


70

Held, David, and McGrew, Anthony (eds). Governing Globalization: Power, Authority, and Global Governance. Cambridge, UK : Polity Press in association with Blackwell Pub., Oxford, UK, Malden, MA, 2002.

Hewson, Martin, and Sinclair, Timothy J. (eds). Approaches to Global Governance

Theory. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999. Hobsbawm, Eric J. On the Edge of the New Century. New York: New Press, 2000. Joxe, Alain. The Empire of Disorder. Cambridge, Mass: Semiotext(e), 2002. Johns, Fleur E. “Global Governance: An Heretical History Play.” Global Jurist

Advances. Vol. 4, Iss. 2, 2004. <http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol4/iss2/art3> Kaul, Inge, Grunberg, Isabelle, and Stern, Marc A. (eds). Global Public Goods:

International Cooperation in the 21st Century. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Kaul, Inge, et al. (eds). Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization. New

York: Oxford University Press, 2003. Kennedy, David. “New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and

International Governance.” Utah Law Review. (1997); pp. 545-638. Kirton, John J. and Von Furstenberg, George M. (eds). New Directions in Global

Economic Governance: Managing Globalisation in the Twenty-First Century. Aldershot, Hants, England; Burlington, USA: Ashgate, 2001.

Krahmann, Elke. “National, Regional, and Global Governance: One Phenomenon or

Many?” Global Governance. Vol. 9, Iss. 3, Jul-Sep 2003; pp. 323-346 Lindenberg, Marc and Bryant, Coralie. Going Global: Transforming Relief and

Development NGOs. Kumarian Press, USA, 2001 Luck, Edward C. Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization 1919-1999. Brookings Institution Press, 1999. Mead, Walter Russell. Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a

World at Risk. New York: Knopf, 2004.

http://www.bepress.com/gj/advances/vol4/iss2/art3


71

Mendes, Errol, and Mehmet, Ozay (eds). Global Governance, Economy and Law: Waiting for Justice. New York: Routledge, 2003.

Monbiot, George. The Age of Consent: a Manifesto for a New World Order. London:

Flamingo, 2003. Murphy, Craig N. “Global Governance: Poorly done and Poorly Understood,”

International Affairs. Vol. 76, Iss. 4; pp. 789-804. Nye, Joseph S., and Donahue, John D. (eds). Governance in a Globalizing World.

Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000. Nye, Joseph S. Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics. New York : Public

Affairs, 2004. Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. Governance in the 21st

Century. Paris: OECD, 2001. Osiander, Andreas. “Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth,”

International Organization. Vol 55, No. 2, Spring 2001; pp. 251-287. Paul, Joel Richard. "Cultural Resistance to Global Governance." Michigan Journal of

International Law. Vol. 22, Iss. 1, 2000; pp. 1-84. Paolini, Albert J., Jarvis, Anthony P. and Reus-Smit, Christian (eds). Between

Sovereignty and Global Governance: the United Nations, the State and Civil Society. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1998.

Rabkin, Jeremy A. The Case for Sovereignty: Why the World Should Welcome American Independence. American Enterprise Institute, 2003. Risse-Kappen, Thomas et al (eds). Bringing Transnational Relations Back In : Non-

State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Institutions. New York : Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Rosenau, James. “Governance in the Twenty-first Century.” Global Governance. Vol. 1,

Iss. 1, 1995; pp. 13-43. Rosenau, James N., and Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (eds). Governance without Government:

Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge University Press, NY: 1992.


72

Ruggie, John G. (ed). Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

Ruggie, John G. Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International

Institutionalization. New York: Routledge, 1998. Ruggie, John G. "American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism and Global Governance"

(February 2004) in Ignatieff, Michael (ed). American Exceptionalism and Human Rights. (Princeton University Press, forthcoming) <http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP04-006/$File/rwp04_006_Ruggie.pdf>

Sewell, James, and Salter, Mark. "Panarchy and Other Norms for Global Governance:

Boutros-Ghali, Rosenau, and Beyond." Global Governance. Vol. 1, Iss. 3, 1995; pp. 373-382.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie. A New World Order. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University

Press, 2004. Smouts, Marie-Claude. The New International Relations: Theory and Practice.

(translated from the French by Jonathan Derrick). London: C. Hurst, 2000. Smouts, Marie-Claude. "The Proper Use of Governance in International Relations."

International Social Science Journal. Vol. 50, Iss. 155, March 1998; pp. 81-89. Spaeth, Konrad. "Inside Global Governance, New Border of Concept" Stiglitz, Joseph. “The Future of Global Governance.” Initiative for Policy Dialogue.

New York: Columbia University, 2004. <http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/Barcelona-FutureofGlobalGovernance11_8.pdf

Stiglitz, Joseph. Globalization and Its Discontents. New York City: Norton 2002. Symposium. "Globalization and Governance: The Prospects for Democracy." Indiana

Journal of Global Legal Studies. Vol. 10, Iss. 1, Winter 2003; pp. 1-466. Wallach, Lori. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/int_loriwallach.html Weisbrot, Mark. http://www.cepr.net/pages/weisbrot.htm

http://ksgnotes1.harvard.edu/Research/wpaper.nsf/rwp/RWP04-

http://www0.gsb.columbia.edu/ipd/pub/Barcelona-

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/commandingheights/shared/minitext/int_loriwallach.html

http://www.cepr.net/pages/weisbrot.htm


73

Weiss, Thomas G. “Governance, Good Governance and Global Governance: Conceptual and Actual Challenges.” Third World Quarterly. Vol. 21, No. 5 (2000); pp. 795–814.

Weiss, Thomas G., and Gordenker, Leon (eds). NGOs, the United Nations and Global

Governance. Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996. Williams, Michael. Introductory paper on “Global Governance: Scenarios for the

Future.” (conference held on 21-29 October 2004) Woods, Ngaire (ed). The Political Economy of Globalization. New York: St. Martin's

Press, 2000. Young, Oran R. (ed). Global Governance: Drawing Insights from the Environmental

Experience. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1997. Young, Oran R. Governance in World Affairs. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,

1999. UNDP Human Development Report 1999, Reinventing global governance for humanity and equity. Not an option but an imperative for the 21st century Imagining Tomorrow, Rethinking the global challenge Collected and compiles on the occasion of the United Nations Millennium Assembly, Merill Corporation, 2000 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ France Andréani, Gilles, “Gouvernance globale : origines d’une idée” Politique étrangère, 3/2001, juillet-septembre 2001. pp 549-568 Bayart, Jean-François. Gouvernement du monde : une critique politique de la globalisation. Paris : Fayard, 2004. Berthod-Wurmser/Gauron/Moreau. La régulation sociale : Le rôle des organisations européennes et internationales. Paris : Presse de Sciences-Po, 1997 Bianco Jean-Louis /Severino, Jean-Michel. Un autre monde est possible. Globalisation, gouvernance, développement. Notes de la Fondation Jean Jaurès, no. 20, 2001. Brugvin, Thierry “Gouvernance globale contre régulation citoyenne internationale” Pensée, No. 333 (2003), pp 147-156


74

Chavagneux , Christian “Le grand bazar de la mondialisation” Alternatives économiques, No. 59 (1e trimestre 2004) Constantin, François (dir.). Les biens publics mondiaux. Un mythe légitimateur pour l'action collective ? Paris : L'Harmattan, 2002. Delas, Olivier/Deblock, Christian (dir.). Le bien commun comme réponse politique à la globalisation. Bruylant, 2003. De Senarclens, Pierre (dir.). Maîtriser la mondialisation. La régulation sociale internationale. Paris : Presses de Sciences-Po, 2000. Ghebali, Victor-Yves “Les efforts d’organisation mondiale au XXe siècle” Politique étrangère, No. 3-4 (automne-hiver 2000) Hermet, Guy/Kazancigil, Ali/Prud'homme, Jean-François. La gouvernance. Un concept et ses applications. Paris : Karthala, 2005. Higgott, Richard “Mondialisation et gouvernance” Politique étrangère, No. 2 (été 1997) Jacquet, Pierre /Pisani-Ferry, Jean/Tubiana, Laurence. Gouvernance mondiale. Rapport du Conseil d’analyse économique, No 37. Paris : La Documentation Française, 2002. Jacquet, Pierre /Pisani-Ferry, Jean/Tubiana, Laurence “A la recherché de la gouvernance mondiale” Revue d’Economie financière, No. 70 (2003), pp 161-173 Jacquet, Pierre “Gouverner l’économie mondiale” RAMSES 2000, 1999 Jacquet, Pierre “La gouvernance globale à l’épreuve des contestations” RAMSES 2002, 2001 Jacquet, Pierre “L'aide au développement dans la gouvernance globale” RAMSES, 2003, pp123-139 Lamy, Pascal/Laïdi, Zaki “La gouvernance ou comment donner sens à la démocratie“ (2002) http://www.laidi.com/papiers/laidilamy.pdf Laïdi, Zaki “Les enjeux de la gouvernance mondiale” Annuaire français de relations internationales, Vol. 3 (2002), pp 262-278 Laïdi, Zaki “Gouvernance contre souverainisme. Les origines et les conséquences du conflit euro-américain“ Cahiers européens: No. 4 (2003) Lamy, Pascal “Pour une vision européenne de la mondialisation” Commentaire, Vol. 26 No. 102 (été 2003)

http://www.laidi.com/papiers/laidilamy.pdf


75

Lamy, Pascal. La démocratie-monde: pour une autre gouvernance mondiale. Paris : Seuil, 2004. Lamy, Pascal “La gouvernance, utopie ou chimère ?” Etudes, No. 2 (2005), pp 153-162. Laroche, Josepha. Mondialisation et gouvernance mondiale. Paris : Iris/Puf 2003. Manier, Bruno, Revolution libérale et gouvernance mondiale. Nice : Fasal, 2005. Milani, Carlos/Arturi, Carlos/Solinis, German (dir.). Démocratie et gouvernance mondiale : quelles régulations pour le XXIe siècle ? Paris : Karthala : Ed. Unesco, 2003. Moreau-Defarges, Philippe. La communauté internationale. Paris : PUF, 2000 (collection " Que sais-je ? ") . Moreau-Defarges, Philippe “Gouvernance. Une mutation du pouvoir ?” Le Débat, No. 115 (mai-août 2001). Moreau-Defarges, Philippe “Mondialisation et gouvernance” Les Cahiers français, No. 305 (novembre-décembre 2001). Moreau Defarges, Philippe. La gouvernance. Paris, 2003 (collection « Que sais-je ? »). Rogalski, Michel “Gouvernement mondial, "global governance", ou anomie ? : les enjeux des réponses aux défis planétaires” Mondes en développement, Vol. 22 No. 88 (1994), pp 11-24 . Ruano-Borbalan, Jean-Claude “La gouvernance mondiale : Nécessité ou idéologie ?” Sciences Humaines. Hors série (Auxerre), No. 44, 2004. Smouts, Marie-Claude “La construction équivoque d'un 'agenda' mondial” Revue TiersMonde, No. 151 (juillet-septembre 1997), pp 677-693. Smouts, Marie-Claude “Du bon usage de la gouvernance en relations internationals” Revue internationale des sciences sociales, No. 155 (mars 1998), pp 88. Zuma, Nkosazana Clarice “Mondialisation et gouvernance” Politique étrangère, No. 4 (hiver 1999-2000).


76

Joint Biographical Sketches of Interviewees United States The Brookings Institution (Washington, D.C.) Ann Florini, Senior Fellow Ann Florini is senior fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., where she directs the Global Governance Initiative (GGI) of the World Economic Forum, which aims to monitor progress in the global effort to implement the ambitious social, economic and environmental goals set forth in the United Nations Millennium Declaration and other documents. Previous Position(s): Senior Associate and Director, Project on Transparency, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Director, Project on Transnational Civil Society, Japan Center for International Exchange; Adjunct Professor, School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University; Research Director, Project on World Security, Rockefeller Brothers Fund; Senior Researcher, Center for International and Strategic Affairs, UCLA; Research Director, Project on Multilateral Issues and Institutions, United Nations Association of the USA. Colin I. Bradford, Visiting Fellow, Governace Studies Colin Bradford is a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C., where he focuses on Global economic governance; G-20 / G-8; Prioritizing growth in economic policy; Global economic instability; Financing and implementing the Millennium Development Goals; Identity, culture and development. Bradford is the adviser to the Global Economy Track of the Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy. Previous Position(s): Research Professor of Economics and International Relations at American University; Chief Economist, United States Agency for International Development; Head of Research of the Development Centre of the OECD; Senior Staff of the Strategic Planning Unit of the World Bank; Associate Professor in the Practice of International Economics and Management at the School of Organization and Management at Yale University. Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs (New York) Jerry Maldonado, Senior Associate, Global Policy Innovations Jerry Maldonado is a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. Prior to joining CCEIA, Maldonado was a consultant at the United Nations Non-Governmental Liaison Service Unit where he spearheaded a strategic planning exercise aimed at enhancing UN-NGLS’s strategic programming in the area of


77

economic development, international cooperation and civil society engagement. Prior to joining the UN he was project director for the International Economic Policy Working Group where he conceptualized, designed, managed and implemented a one year strategic planning initiative aimed at facilitating linkages between scholars, activists, and practitioners. Before launching this project, Maldonado was the program associate for the international economic policy portfolio at the Ford Foundation. Maldonado received his Masters degree in International Affairs from Columbia’s School of International and Public Affairs, and his Bachelors degree from Brown in international relations and Latin American studies. Evan O’Neil, Program Assistant, Global Policy Innovations Evan O’Neil has most recently assisted Andrew Kuper on the “Empire and Democracy” project at the Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs. He is currently a Program Assistant at CCEIA and is working with Jerry Maldonado on the Global Policy Innovations project. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (Washington, D.C.) Sandra Polaski, Senior Associate and Director, Trade, Equity and Development Project Sandra Polaski joined the Carnegie Endowment in 2002. Her work focuses on international labor policy in the context of trade and development. Until April 2002, she served as the U.S. Secretary of State’s special representative for international labor affairs, the senior State Department official dealing with such matters. In that capacity she played a leading role in the development of U.S. government policy and strategies on international labor issues, and integrated those issues into U.S. foreign policy. Among other responsibilities at the State Department, Polaski served as the lead negotiator in establishing labor provisions in the U.S.–Jordan Free Trade Agreement, considered a model for future agreements. She also represented the U.S. government on labor policy issues at United Nations and International Labor Organization meetings and conducted dialogues on labor matters with numerous developing and transitional country governments. Polaski was responsible for the State Department’s innovative “Partnerships to Eliminate Sweatshops” program, which provides $4 million annually in grants to private sector groups to promote corporate social responsibility and good labor standards in workplaces around the globe. Previously, Polaski was the director of economic and labor law research for the Secretariat of the North American Commission on Labor Cooperation, a NAFTA-related intergovernmental body. Prior to her work in the international labor field, she held leadership roles in several unions in the manufacturing and service sectors, with responsibilities as a strategist, chief negotiator, and organizer.


78

Center for Economic and Policy Research (Washington, D.C.) Mark Weisbrot, Co-Director Mark Weisbrot received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Michigan. He is a co-author, with Dean Baker, of "The Scorecard on Globalization: Twenty Years of Diminished Progress", which examines performance of countries on indicators of health and education outcomes during the era of globalization. He is also a co-author, with Dean Baker, of Social Security: The Phony Crisis (University of Chicago Press, 2000), and has written numerous research papers on economic policy. He is currently Co-Director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, in Washington, D.C. He writes a weekly column on economic and policy issues that is distributed to over 550 newspapers by Knight-Ridder/Tribune Information Services. His opinion pieces have appeared in the Washington Post, the Los Angeles Times, the Boston Globe, and almost all other major U.S. newspapers. He appears regularly on national and local television and radio programs. Columbia University (New York) Peter Danchin, Lecturer in International and Public Affairs, Director, Human Rights Program Peter Danchin is a lecturer in the Department of International and Public Affairs and the director of the MIA concentration in Human Rights. His research interests include international human rights law and theory, international law, and legal and political philosophy. Danchin is the editor of Protecting the Human Rights of Religious Minorities in Eastern Europe (with Elizabeth Cole, Columbia University Press, 2002). He has also written a number of articles addressing U.S foreign policy and human rights, including “U.S. Unilateralism and the International Protection of Religious Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative,” Columbia Journal of Transnational Law (2002). Prior to coming to Columbia University, Danchin was a foreign associate at the New York law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom and a law clerk to Justice Arthur Chaskalson, president of the Constitutional Court of South Africa. Danchin holds a BA and LLB (first class honors) from the University of Melbourne (1994) and an LLM from Columbia Law School (1998). He is currently pursuing a JSD at Columbia Law School. Michael Doyle, Harold Brown Professor of United States Foreign and Security Policy SIPA and Columbia School of Law


79

Michael Doyle is the Harold Brown Professor of U.S. Foreign and Security Policy in the Department of International and Public Affairs and at Columbia Law School. He specializes in international relations theory, international security, and international organizations. Prior to his arrival at Columbia, Doyle served as assistant secretary-general and special adviser to United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan from 2001 to 2003. His responsibilities included strategic planning, outreach to the international corporate sector (the “Global Compact”), and relations with Washington. His recent publications include The Globalization of Human Rights (ed. with Jean-Marc Coicaud and Anne-Marie Gardner, 2003) and International Law and Organization: Closing the Compliance Gap (ed. with Edward Luck, 2004). Doyle has been a member of the Council on Foreign Relations since 1992 and is currently the chair of the Academic Council of the United Nations Community. He has also been a senior fellow and a member of the Board of Directors of the International Peace Academy since 1996. In 2001, he was elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. Doyle holds a BA from Harvard College (1970) and an MA and PhD from Harvard University (1972, 1977). Edward Luck, Professor in the Practice of International Affairs, Director of the Center on International Organization Dr. Edward Luck is the Director of the Center on International Organization of the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University. A frequent media commentator, Dr. Luck has published and testified before Congress on arms control, defense, foreign policy, Russian and East Asian affairs, as well as on United Nations reform and peacekeeping. He is the co-editor of International Law and Organization: Closing the Compliance Gap (with Michael W. Doyle, Boulder, Colo.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004) and author of its concluding chapter, “Gaps, Commitments, and the Compliance Challenge.” Dr. Luck also published Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization: 1919-1999. He has edited two other books and published scores of articles in Foreign Policy, The Washington Quarterly, Current History, Disarmament, and other scholarly journals, as well as in the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, Christian Science Monitor, International Herald Tribune, USA Today, Newsday, and other newspapers. Dr. Luck holds a BA from Dartmouth College, and a series of graduate degrees from Columbia University, including an MIA from the School of International Affairs, the Certificate of the Harriman Institute, and MA, MPh, and PhD degrees in Political Science from the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences.


80

For 10 years (1984-1994), Dr. Luck served as the President and CEO of the United Nations Association of the USA (UNA-USA), America's principal center for public education on the world organization, and he subsequently served for four years as the President Emeritus of the organization (1994-1998). From December 1995 through July 1997, Dr. Luck played a key role in the United Nations reform process as a Senior Consultant to the Department of Administration and Management of the United Nations and as a Staff Director of the General Assembly's Open-ended High-level Working Group on the Strengthening of the United Nations System. Prior to joining Columbia faculty, he served as the Founder and Executive Director of the Center for the Study of International Organization, a research center jointly established by the School of Law of New York University and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs of Princeton University. Institute for International Economics (Washington, D.C.) C. Randall Henning, Visiting Fellow; Associate Professor at the School of International Service, American University. C. Randall Henning, visiting fellow, has been associated with the Institute for International Economics since 1986. He is an associate professor at the School of International Service, American University. He is the author of East Asian Financial Cooperation (2002), The Exchange Stabilization Fund: Slush Money or War Chest? (1999), Cooperating with Europe’s Monetary Union (1997), and Currencies and Politics in the United States, Germany, and Japan (1994); coauthor of Transatlantic Perspectives on the Euro (2000), Global Economic Leadership and the Group of Seven (1996) with C. Fred Bergsten, and Dollar Politics: Exchange Rate Policymaking in the United States (1989); and coeditor of Reviving the European Union (1994), and Governing the World’s Money (Cornell University Press, 2002). International Peace Academy (New York) Francesco Mancini, Senior Program Officer, Security and Development Nexus Francesco Mancini joined IPA in May 2004 as Program Officer for the Security-Development Nexus Program. Prior to joining IPA, he was Program Associate for the Worldwide Security Initiative at EastWest Institute, New York. From 1996 to 2001, Mr. Mancini served as a Senior Consultant at the Charles Riley International Consultants Group. He specialized in Strategy and Management of Change and worked in Paris, Milan, Rome, Brussels and Rabat. He currently serves as member of the Center for International Conflict Resolution at Columbia University. He co-teaches a graduate seminar on conflict assessment at the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. Mr. Mancini obtained his B.S. in Business Administration from Bocconi University in Milan, Italy, his hometown. He also holds a Master of International Affairs from the


81

School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University where he concentrated on International Security Policy and Conflict Resolution. He was awarded the 2002-2003 Program Assistantship in the Institute for War & Peace Studies. At Columbia University he coordinated a graduate student task force to assemble an annotated bibliography in fifteen languages on terrorism for the UN Secretary-General's Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism. He has also worked at the University of Cyprus in Nicosia, researching the peace negotiations in Cyprus. Waheguru Pal Singh Siddhu, Senior Associate Dr. Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu joined IPA in October 2000 and became Senior Associate in October 2002. He is presently co-directing a project on Iraq and World Order (along with the United Nations University) and directing a project on Kashmir: New Voices, New Approaches, as well as a project on the International Presences in the Middle East Peace Process. He had previously led two other IPA projects on Regional Approaches to Peace Operations and The UN, NATO and Other Regional Actors in the 21st Century: Partners in Peace? Prior to joining IPA, Dr. Sidhu has been MacArthur Fellow, Centre for International Studies, University of Oxford (1999-2000); Visiting Research Scholar, Cooperative Monitoring Center (CMC), Albuquerque (1999); Visiting Scholar, Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University (1998); the Warren Weaver Fellow for International Security, Rockefeller Foundation (1997-98); and a Research Associate with the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (1996-97). He has researched and written extensively on multilateralism, regionalism and non-proliferation and disarmament issues in general, and on confidence-building measures in Southern Asia, including: “A languid but lethal arms race,” Disarmament Forum, India and Pakistan: Peace by Piece, no. 2 (2004), available at: http://www.unidir.org/html/en/disarmament_ forum.php; “Managing Missiles: Blind Spot Or Blind Alley?” with Christophe Carle, Disarmament Diplomacy, No. 72 (August-September 2003); and “Terrible Tuesday and Terrorism in South Asia,” South Asian Survey 10 no. 2 (December 2003). Dr. Sidhu has also co-edited The United Nations and Regional Security: Europe and Beyond (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), with Michael Pugh, and co-authored China and India: Cooperation or Conflict? (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003), with Jing-Dong Yuan. Dr. Sidhu is also co-editor of International Peacekeeping and a member of the Editorial Board of Global Governance. He was also a member of the Resource Group set up to assist the United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, 2004. He earned his Ph.D. from the University of Cambridge, and holds a Master’s in International Relations from the School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, and a Bachelor’s degree in History from St. Stephen's College, Delhi University, India.

http://www.unidir.org/html/en/disarmament_


82

New Rules for Global Finance Jo Marie Griesgraber, Chair Jo Marie Griesgraber is the chair of the New Rules for Global Finance Coalition in Washington DC, seeking to create a new financial architecture by e.g. pushing for more transparency in the appointments of Executive Directors at both the World Bank and IMF. She was previously Director of Policy at Oxfam America. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Washington, D.C.) John Sewell, Senior Scholar John Sewell is the former President of the Overseas Development Council (ODC) and the author of numerous articles and analyses of globalization, development and US national interests. Howard Wolpe, Director, Africa Program Howard Wolpe, a former seven-term Member of Congress and former Presidential Special Envoy to Africa’s Great Lakes Region, is currently Director of the Africa Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. A specialist in African politics, for ten of his fourteen years in the Congress, Wolpe chaired the Subcommittee on Africa of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He also chaired the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee of the House Science, Space and Technology Committee. His other roles in the Congress included the co-chairmanship of the bipartisan Northeast-Midwest Congressional Coalition and the Congressional Energy and Environmental Study Conference. Prior to entering the Congress, Wolpe served in the Michigan House of Representatives and as a member of the Kalamazoo City Commission. Wolpe has taught at Western Michigan University (Political Science Department) and the University of Michigan (Institute of Public Policy Studies), and has served as a Visiting Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program of the Brookings Institution and as a Woodrow Wilson Center Public Policy Scholar. Wolpe received his B.A. degree from Reed College, and his Ph.D. from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Wolpe is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of the Board of Directors of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED). He co-directed (with Ambassador David C. Miller, Jr.) the Ninetieth American Assembly on “Africa and U.S. National Interests” held in March 1997. He has written extensively on Africa, American


83

foreign policy, and the management of ethnic and racial conflict. He is the co-author (with David F. Gordon and David C. Miller, Jr.) of The United States and Africa: A Post-Cold War Perspective (The American Assembly, 1998), and (with David Gordon) of “The Other Africa: an End to Afro-Pessimism,” printed in the Spring 1998 volume of the World Policy Journal. He co-edited (with Robert Melson), Nigeria: Modernization and the Politics of Communalism (Michigan State University Press, 1971) and is the author of Urban Politics in Nigeria (University of California Press, 1973) and of “The Great Lakes Crisis: An American View,” (South African Journal of International Affairs, Summer 2000.) He is the recipient of the African-American Institute’s Star Crystal Award for Excellence, of the Michigan Audubon Society’s Legislator of the Year Award and the Sierra Club’s Lifetime Achievement Award. Currently, Wolpe is working on a book based on his diplomatic experience with the Burundi peace process, and is directing a major post-conflict leadership training program in Burundi. World Policy Institute, New School University (New York) Stephen Schlesinger, Director Stephen Schlesinger is Director of the World Policy Institute at the New School University in New York City since 1997. The World Policy Institute is a foreign policy think-tank that hosts twenty-five Senior Fellows, publishes the quarterly magazine, World Policy Journal, and sponsors lectures and panel discussions. Schlesinger received his BA from Harvard University and his JD from Harvard Law School. His family has long been associated with Harvard, where his father, Arthur Schlesinger Jr. and his grandfather, Arthur Schlesinger Sr., both eminent American historians, taught, as well as his uncle, China historian John Fairbank and his maternal grandfather, Dr. Walter Bradford Cannon (at the Medical School). In the early 1970s, Schlesinger edited and published The New Democrat Magazine and also served as speechwriter for George McGovern during his campaign for the presidency in 1972. Thereafter he spent four years as a staff writer at Time Magazine. In the next twelve years, he served as Governor Mario Cuomo’s speechwriter and foreign policy advisor. In the mid 1990s, he worked at the United Nations at Habitat, the agency dealing with global cities. Schlesinger is the author of three books, including Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations, which won the 2004 Harry S. Truman Book Award; Bitter Fruit: The Story of the U.S. Coup in Guatemala (with Stephen Kinzer), and The New Reformers. Schlesinger is a specialist on foreign policy of the Clinton and Bush Administrations and a frequent contributor to magazines and newspapers, including The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The Nation Magazine, and The New York Observer. In 1978 he was a finalist for the National Magazine Award.


84

Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (Cambridge, MA) Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, Research Fellow in the Science, Technology and Globalization Project Sakiko Fukuda-Parr is a Research Fellow in the Science, Technology and Globalization Project, an activity of the Science, Technology and Public Policy Program. As a development economist, her work focuses on policies for equitable development using a multidisciplinary approach. Between 1995 and 2004, Fukuda-Parr was director of the annual Human Development Reports commissioned by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). These research-based publications are known for their innovative measurement, concepts and policy proposals on emerging development challenges, covering diverse themes such as Deepening Democracy in a Fragmented World (2002), Making New Technologies Work for Human Development (2001); Human Rights (2000); Globalization (1999). She is coeditor of Readings in Human Development: Concepts, Measures and Policies for a Development Paradigm. She is founding editor of the Journal of Human Development: Alternative Economics in Action and is on the editorial board of Feminist Economics. Fukuda-Parr spearheaded UNDP's policy work on technical cooperation effectiveness and capacity building. She led the 1993 publication Rethinking Technical Cooperation, Reforms for Capacity Building in Africa one of the most comprehensive reviews of the subject, and the 2002 revisit, Capacity for Development; Old Problems, New Solutions. She has held management positions in UNDP in Africa and worked at the World Bank as agricultural economist. Fukuda-Parr is a Japanese national, and graduated from universities of Cambridge, Sussex, and the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies (New York) Benjamin Rivlin, Co-Director, Ralph Bunche Centenary Commemoration Project, Director Emeritus, RBI, and Professor Emeritus, Political Science Benjamin Rivlin is Co-Chair of the Ralph Bunche Centenary Commemoration Committee. He is Director Emeritus of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies and Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the City University of New York (CUNY), Graduate School and University Center (Graduate Center). Dr. Rivlin, on assignment from the US Army, first worked with Dr. Bunche in the Africa Section of the Research and Analysis Branch of the in Office of Strategic Services in 1943 and 1944. He later served under the direction of Dr. Bunche in the Trusteeship Division of the United Nations Secretariat. In 1986, Dr. Rivlin organized and directed a three-day retrospective conference on Ralph Bunche at the CUNY Graduate Center . This led to the publication of Ralph Bunche: The Man and His Times (N.Y.: Holmes & Meier), edited by Professor Rivlin.


85

Thomas G. Weiss, Co-director, United Nations Intellectual History Project; Director, Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies and Presidential Professor, Political Science; outgoing editor of Global Governance Thomas G. Weiss is Presidential Professor of Political Science at The CUNY Graduate Center, where he is co-director of the United Nations Intellectual History Project, Director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies, editor of Global Governance, and research director of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty. As Research Professor at Brown University’s Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies (1990-98), Weiss also held university administrative posts (Director of the Global Security Program, Associate Dean of the Faculty, Associate Director), was the Executive Director of the Academic Council on the UN System, and co-directed the Humanitarianism and War Project. He was the Executive Director of the International Peace Academy (1985-89) and conducted seminars for diplomats and military officials on regional conflicts and third-party roles in the peaceful resolution of international disputes. He was a Senior Economic Affairs Officer at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva, Switzerland (1975-85), where he researched the aid, trade, and transit problems of the poorest developing countries and administered technical assistance projects. He had previously served in the Office of the UN Commissioner for Namibia, the University Program at the Institute for World Order, the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, and International Labour Organisation. Weiss has also been a consultant for numerous intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations as well as foundations. His PhD and MA are from Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School and his BA from Harvard University. He pursued advanced graduate studies at the Institut Universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales and has an honorary MA from Brown. He has written extensively about international organization, conflict management, peacekeeping, humanitarian action, and North- South relations. Weiss was a Visiting Professor at Colgate and Princeton Universities and also taught at New York University, the New School for Social Research and Brown University, before going to The Graduate Centre where he teaches international relations. Weiss has written or edited seventeen books and numerous articles on aspects of development, peacekeeping, humanitarian relief, and international organizations. His article have appeared in Foreign Policy, Current History, The Washington Quarterly, Ethics & International Affairs, Security Studies, Disasters, World Policy Journal, Survival, Third World Quarterly, World Development, International Affairs, World Politics, International Peacekeeping, Journal of Peace Research, Contemporary Security Policy, Security Dialogue, Journal of Human Rights, Global Social Policy, Canadian Journal of Foreign Policy, and Global Governance. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, International Institute for Strategic Studies, Academic Council on the UN System, and International Studies Association; the editor of the Routledge “Global Institutions Series”; and currently on the editorial boards


86

of the Third World Quarterly and Journal of Global Social Policy and of the Foreign Policy Association. ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ France Zaki Laïdi Former advisor to Pascal Lamy (former European commissioner for Trade), Zaki Laïdi is a researcher at CERI (Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales) and a professor at Sciences-Po in Paris. Philippe Moreau Defarges Professor at Sciences-Po Paris and former plenipotentiary Secretary of State, P. Moreau Defarges has occupied many administrative functions during his career (European construction, European Law, immigration etc). He is currently Co-director of the yearly RAMSES Report project of the Institut Français de Relations Internationales (IFRI) since 2002. Laurence Tubiana Consultant to the World Bank and member of the consultative forum of the EU on sustainable development to the European Commission, Laurence Tubiana is founder of the Solagral Association dealing with North-South relations. She is a former member of the French Council of Economic Analysis (Conseil d’Analyse Economique) and director of the magazine ‘Courrier de la planète’. She is currently director of the IDDRI (Institute for Sustainable Development and International Relations) in Paris, professor in and of the Sustainable Development Department at Sciences-Po (Paris). Bertrand Badie Professor at Sciences-Po Paris, Bertrand Badie is in charge of Sciences-Po’s Graduate Program of International Relations as well as of the Rotary Center for International Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution. He is a member of the council of the French Association for Political Sciences and of the Executive Committee of the international Association for Political Sciences. Thérèse Gastaut Thérèse Gastaut is the Director of the Strategic Communications Division of the United Nations Department of Public Information (DPI) since September 1999. Formerly Director of the United Nations Information Service at Geneva, she was also seconded to


87

the World Health Organization as Chief of its information programme. Ms. Gastaut was Spokeswoman for the Secretary-General of the United Nations based in Geneva as well as spokeswoman for a number of UN global conferences such as the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, and the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995. Christian Chavagneux Journalist at Alternatives économiques, C. Chavagneux is a member of the scientific committee of Attac. He is also Chief editor of L’économie politique and researcher at the Center for Global Political Economy, University of Sussex (UK). Francois de Bernard President of the GERM Association (Groupe d’Etudes et de Recherche sur les Mondialisations), de Bernard is in charge of the Observatory on globalizations. This Observatory focuses on the different globalization processes from a triple point of view: analysis, watch (geopolitical, cultural, economical, social, scientific). Pierre de Senarclens Professor of International Relations at the University of Lausanne, Pierre de Senarclens is also a member of the Conseil de l'Institut pour le Dialogue Humanitaire. He was Head of the Human Rights and Peace Division at UNESCO. He is Vice-President of the Swiss Red Cross and a member of the Red Cross Council and of the Humanitarian Red Cross Foundation. Henri Rouille d’Orfeuil Currently President of Coordination SUD (French NGO), Rouille d’Orfeuil was former advisor to the World Bank and Head of mission for the GRET (Groupe de Recherche et d’Echanges Technologiques) as well as for the Fondation pour le Progrès de l’Homme (FPH). Director of Public relations at the Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement (CIRAD), he also directs the journal Options Méditerranéennes of the Centre International des Hautes Études Agronomiques Méditerranéennes (CIHEAM). Marc Giacomini Deputy permanent representative at the French mission to the UN in Geneva, Marc Giacomini was the former Head of the International Affairs Department of the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development.


88

Dominique David Professor of International Relations and Strategic Studies at the Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr (Coëtquidan), Sorbonne (Paris I) and Marne-la-Vallée, Dominique David is a member of the Scientific Council of Defense.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the following organizations and individuals: The Charles Leopold Mayer Foundation for assigning this

extremely interesting project to us. Our Advisors and mentors, Coralie Bryant, Michel Doucin and Jackie Klopp for their amazing

support and advice. Columbia University

Sciences-Po

And all our contributors to this report: The Brookings Institution

Carnegie Council on Ethics in International Affairs Centre for Economic and Policy Research

Institute for International Economics International Peace Academy

Carnegie Endowment for Peace New Rules for Global Finance

Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars World Policy Institute

Harvard University Ralphe Bunche Institute for International Studies

United Nations NGO Section, Department of Economic and Social Affairs Coordination Sud

Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI) Institut Français des Relations Internationales (IFRI)

Alternatives Economiques Groupe d’Etude et de Recherche sur les Mondialisations (GERM)

Mission française Mission permanente de la France auprès de l'Office des Nations Unies à Genêve

Pierre Calame Michel Sauquet Martin Vielajus Jackie Klopp


89

Fida Adely Ann Florini

Colin Bradford Jerry Maldonado

Evan O’Neil Mark Weisbrot Peter Danchin Michael Doyle Edward Luck

C. Randall Henning Francesco Mancini

Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu John Sewell

Howard Wolpe Stephen Schlesinger Sakiko Fukuda-Parr

Sandra Polaski Benjamin Rivlin Thomas G.Weiss

Jo-Marie Griesgraber Laurence Tubiana

Zaiki Laïdi Philippe Moreau Defarges

Bertrand Badie Therese Gastaut

Christian Chavagneux François de Bernard Pierre de Senarclens

Henri Rouillé d'Orfeuil Marc Giacomini

Dominique David