getting serious about meeting the millennium development goals

ACRONYMS

AFRISTATAfDBADBCDFCGCIDACPIACSODfIDDACEBRDECEUGDPGERHIPCHIV/AIDSIDAIDBIDGsIMFIPRSPLICUSMDBsM&EMDGsMTEFNGOOECDOEDPERPETSPRSCPRSPPRSRTSMESWApsUNUNDP

iii

Observatoire Economique et Statistique d’Afrique SubsaharienneAfrican Development BankAsian Development BankComprehensive Development FrameworkConsultative groupCanadian International Development AgencyCountry Policy and Institutional AssessmentCivil society organizationDepartment for International DevelopmentDevelopment Assistance CommitteeEuropean Bank for Reconstruction and DevelopmentEuropean CommunityEuropean UnionGross Domestic ProductGross enrollment ratioHeavily indebted poor countriesHuman immunodeficiency virus/Acquired immunodeficiency syndromeInternational Development AssociationInter-american Development BankInternational Development GoalsInternational Monetary FundInterim poverty reduction strategy paperLow-income countries under stressMultilateral Development BanksMonitoring and evaluationMillennium Development GoalsMedium-term expenditure frameworkNon-governmental organizationOrganization for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOperations Evaluation DepartmentPublic expenditure reviewPublic expenditure tracking systemPoverty reduction support creditPoverty reduction strategy paperPoverty reduction strategyRoundtableSmall and medium enterprisesSector-wide approachesUnited NationsUnited Nations Development Program

*This report has been prepared by the CDF Secretariat.

ABSTRACT

This report reviews the implementation of theComprehensive Development Framework(CDF) principles in 48 low-income countries.

Overall, it shows that countries that are makingprogress in implementing the CDF principles gener-ally perform better and are more likely to achieve theMDGs by 2015 than those making less CDF imple-mentation progress.

The main implication of the report is that GettingSerious about Meeting the MDGs requires a concertedeffort by the Bank and other development partners togive increased and explicit attention to the implemen-tation of the CDF principles in supporting the strength-ening of national strategies through the PRS process.This support coupled with implementation of theeighth MDG—increased aid, debt relief, and opentrade—is essential for reaching the MDGs. The reportidentifies six areas for increased attention:

• A long-term development perspective guidingshorter-term actions is often missing. The Bankand partners should support countries in tak-ing a long-term view, including helping coun-tries formulate and integrate their long-termdevelopment goals, for example MDGs, intotheir visions. To help with priority setting, theyshould help strengthen the links between thelong-term vision, medium-term strategy andbudget.

• It can take years to achieve a strong dialogueamong stakeholders on the definition andimplementation of a national strategy, andmany countries have not yet been able to doso. Therefore, the Bank and partners shouldencourage national dialogue at an early stageof strategy development, with explicit link-ages between stakeholder consultations andpermanent institutions responsible for

v

decision making in the executive, legislatureand local governments.

• Analytical work is key to improving the knowl-edge basis for the development and implemen-tation of a national strategy. At present this worktends to be produced with limited country lead-ership. To increase the impact of analyticalwork on national decisions and outcomes, andto build capacity, the Bank and partners shouldundertake analytical work jointly, with activecountry stakeholder involvement.

• Investment projects are likely to continue toplay a significant role in development, but of-ten remain outside of strategy processes. Toscale up their impact, the Bank and partnersneed to encourage the convergence of coun-try processes for planning investment projectswith those for PRSs, and focus their supporton sector-wide approaches. This can help focusinvestment projects not only on narrow projectobjectives but also on results toward long-termgoals, for example MDGs.

• Few countries have adequate data and M&Esystems to monitor progress toward their long-term goals, for example MDGs. Countries needcoherent and concerted support to bring vari-ous data gathering initiatives into single, in-tegrated and transparent systems. The Bankand partners should provide this support, andrely on country-led data and M&E systemsrather than create parallel ones.

• While the CDF principles are widely recog-nized as underpinning development work, sup-port for their implementation is uneven. TheBank and partners should adapt and imple-ment operational and personnel policies ex-plicitly to the CDF principles, as evidencedby operational, behavioral and cultural changes.

CONTENTS

Acronyms iiiAbstract v

1 Overall Assessment and Main Implications 1Overall Assessment 2Main Implications 4

2 CDF: Key To Achieving the Millennium Development Goals 7The Relationship between the CDF principles and the MDGs 7CDF Implementation and Country Performance 8

3 Long-term Holistic Vision 11Progress at a Glance 11Vision and Strategy Development Process 12Linking to the Budget 13Capacity Constraints 14Conclusions 14

4 Country Ownership 15Progress at a Glance 15Government Leadership: Crucial to Ownership 15Stakeholder Consultation in Practice 16Consulting Partners During Strategy Development 17

External Partners 17Civil society organizations and the poor 17Parliaments 17Private sector 18

Political or Economic Events 18Capacity Constraints 19Conclusions 19

5 Country-Led Partnership 21Progress at a Glance 21Government Leadership and Coordination 22Alignment with Poverty Reduction Strategies 22

External Partners 22Internal Partners 23

Financial and non-Financial Support 24Financial support 24Joint analytical work 25Support for capacity development 26

vii

viii Contents

Harmonization of Operational Policies and Procedures 26Partnership Behaviors 26Conclusions 26

6 Focus on Development Results 29Progress at a Glance 29Availability of Information on Results 29Stakeholders’ Access to Results Information 30Results Information and Strategy Adjustment 31

Participation in government-led monitoring and evaluation 31CSO initiatives in monitoring and evaluation 32Role of Parliaments 32

Conclusions 32

Annexes1. Countries Covered by the Analysis 352. CDF Implementation Progress by Country and Group 363. CDF Implementation Tracking and Assessment Methodology 404. Country Development Goals and the MDGs 425. Country Profiles 43

Boxes1.1 Recommendations from the Multi-Partner Evaluation of the

Comprehensive Development Framework 22.1 Millennium Development Goals 84.1 Parliamentary Involvement as a Multi-faceted process 184.2 Making the Private Sector a Development Partner: Ethiopia 195.1 The Changing Role of Consultative Groups: Towards Integrated Country Strategies 235.2 The Role of Civil Society Organizations 245.3 The Role of Sector-Wide Approaches 25

Figures1.1 CDF Implementation Progress Overall Assessment 32.1 CDF Implementation and Country Performance 93.1 Long-term Holistic Vision 124.1 Country Ownership 165.1 Country-Led Partnership 226.1 Focus on Development Results 30

1OVERALL ASSESSMENT

AND MAIN IMPLICATIONS

This report assesses progress being made in 48low-income countries in implementing theCDF principles. The assessment covers the 48

countries that had completed poverty reduction strat-egy papers or IPRSPs by October 2002, and one othercountry (Eritrea), and provides indicative examples ofprogress in specific countries.1 This Chapter providesan overall assessment of CDF implementation progressand, based on this progress, the likelihood of differentgroups of countries achieving the first seven Millen-nium Development Goals (MDGs) to which they havecommitted. 2 It outlines the main implications of thisassessment, highlighting six main areas for increasedattention from the Bank and other development part-ners. Chapter 2 explains the relationship between theCDF principles and the MDGs, as well as the correla-tion between CDF principles and country performance.Chapters 3–6 examine implementation progress ofeach of the four CDF principles in turn.

The assessment is based on information availableas of January 2003 supplemented by information de-rived from PRSPs issued since then. Its main findingswere discussed in summary form with the Bank Boardof Executive Directors at a CDF Learning Group Meet-ing on January 29, 2003. It builds on the 2001 CDFprogress report.3 The resulting implications build onand reinforce those of the recent multi-partner evalu-ation of the CDF, prepared by the Bank’s OperationsEvaluation Department and the Development Econom-ics Research Group under the aegis of a 30-membermulti-partner steering committee4 (Box 1.1), and onthose of the last joint Bank-IMF review of progress inPRSP implementation.5

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

There is at least some element of progress in CDFimplementation in all 48 countries covered by this re-port, however progress is uneven. Countries can bedivided into three groups with respect to implementa-tion of the CDF principles and, because CDF imple-mentation is correlated with stronger countryperformance and has a crucial bearing on a country’s

1

chance of achieving country-owned MillenniumDevelopment Goals, their likelihood to reach thesegoals by 2015 (Figure 1.1):

• Group 1. A relatively small leading group of12 countries has made good progress in imple-menting CDF principles and faces a reason-ably good chance of achieving the MDGsdefined in their poverty reduction strategies,provided that they stay the course. These coun-tries have put in place the processes needed toachieve success, and have defined relativelyclearly the goals they are pursuing. Most havetaken action to align government and part-ners’ actions with those goals, and to trackdevelopment outcomes.

• Group 2. An intermediate group of 11 coun-tries is making selective progress in implement-ing the CDF principles. With concertedinternal actions and focused external partnersupport, they may more firmly embark on theroad to achieving the MDGs.

• Group 3. At the other end of the spectrum, agroup of 25 countries—more than half ofwhich have features of low-income countriesunder stress (LICUS)6 or are affected by con-flict or both—has made little progress inimplementing the CDF principles. They areunlikely to reach the 2015 poverty reductiongoals or related country goals under presentcircumstances. Closer adherence to the CDFprinciples can help these countries get on theright track.

Poverty reduction strategy papers have been an ef-fective instrument to consolidate commitment to CDFprinciples, especially in Group 1 countries.

All of the 12 countries in Group 1 have completedfull PRSPs with the CDF principles more or less un-derlying their preparation and initial implementation.Their progress in implementing the CDF principles isgood, in view of the time constraints imposed eitherinternally or externally on PRSP preparation, capacity

2 Getting Serious About Meeting the Millennium Development Goals

shortfalls, and the difficulty of engaging in sometimesunprecedented participatory processes. In these coun-tries, the focus is now on implementing poverty re-duction strategies through partnerships among nationalactors and between national and external partners; oncreating stronger links between strategy and budget,which are scarce and imperfect even when they exist;and on measuring and communicating results.

Many of the 11 countries in Group 2 have com-pleted PRSPs or are close to doing so; over time thesecountries can be expected to make better CDF imple-mentation progress. In these countries, the focus is onhelping them maintain a steady course, with carefulattention to the CDF principles to avoid backsliding.

Most of the 25 countries in Group 3 have com-pleted IPRSPs but not PRSPs; indeed, in many of them,

Box 1.1 Recommendations from the Multi-partner Evaluation of theComprehensive Development Framework

Long-term holistic vision

All donors: provide long-term assistance for capacity strengthening; provide predictable and reliable financing.

Bank: improve cross-sectoral programming and implementation.

Recipient countries: strengthen the link between long-term frameworks and budgets.

Country ownership

All donors: work with the government in devising an approach for consultations with elected officials and non-government representatives.

Bank: clarify the Bank’s openness to alternative PRSP-consistent development strategies, and differentiate moreclearly the Board’s roles vis-à-vis the PRSP and the Country Assistance Strategy.

Recipient countries: government and parliament should consult among diverse interest groups.

Country-led partnership

All donors: step back from micro-managing the aid process at the country level; give the recipient country voice andoversight over aid quality; decentralize staff and delegate more authority to the field; plan for phase out of projectimplementation units.

Bank: continue decentralization and delegation of authority to field offices; select, train, and reward staff in part fortheir partnership performance; practice what the Bank preaches regarding harmonization and simplification, pro-gram or budget support, selectivity and stepping back.

Recipient countries: put responsibility for aid coordination at a high level of government, and implement and enforceprocurement and other rules that will engender the confidence of donors.

Results focus

All donors: strengthen and use country-led M&E systems.

Bank: enhance the capacity of the Bank to track and analyze the implementation of CDF principles and their impacts.

Recipient countries: adopt a results orientation through greater accountability to the public.

The road ahead

The report identifies several important areas that would benefit from expanded learning efforts:

• establish country-owned monitoring and evaluation systems that bring stakeholders together, building from infor-mation and monitoring initiatives in government and among civil society, donors, and the private sector.

• expand involvement in CDF processes by marginalized groups in civil society and the private sector.• start a debate in donor countries about changing incentives, pooling resources and pooling results, public atti-

tudes to aid and the role of audit offices and treasuries in compounding the problem.• expand learning between recipient countries—e.g. Uganda’s experience with the Medium-Term Expenditure

Framework (MTEF) and hard budget constraints.

Overall Assessment and Main Implications 3

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Figure 1.1 CDF Implementation Progress Overall Assessmenta

(percent of observations falling in each assessment category)

GROUP 1BoliviaBurkina FasoEthiopiaGhanaGuineaKyrgyz RepublicMauritaniaRwandaSenegalTanzaniaUgandaVietnam

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Long-TermHolistic Vision

CountryOwnership

Country-LedPartnership

Focus onDevelopment Results

13%

52%

3%

32%

GROUP 2AlbaniaCape VerdeGambiaGuyanaHondurasMalawiMozambiqueNigerPakistanYemenZambia

GROUP 3ArmeniaAzerbaijanBeninCambodiaCameroonCARChadCongo DRCote d’IvoireDjiboutiEritreaGeorgiaGuinea Bissau

Long-TermHolistic Vision

CountryOwnership

Country-LedPartnership

Focus onDevelopment Results

Long-Term Holistic Vision

Country Ownership

Country-Led Partnership

Focus on Development Results

KenyaLaosLesothoMadagascarMaliMoldovaMongoliaNicaraguaSao Tome e PrincipeSerbia/MontenegroSierra LeoneTajikistan

a. Annex 2 shows implementation progress by country and group.

Substantially in PlaceLargely DevelopedAction Has Been or Being TakenElements Exist or Being ConsideredLittle or No Action

ASSESSMENT CATEGORIES

4%

44%

7%

44%

13%

60%

28%

8%

28%

61%

3%

29%

62%

9%

14%

64%

3%

20%

30%

8%

62%

33%

3%

64%

14%

23%

62%

19%

26%

55%

3%

39%

57%

12%

41%

47%


PRSP preparation or implementation has stalled or iscontinuing without a strong grounding in the CDFprinciples, creating a credibility gap. The focus in thesecountries is to support capacity building, learning bydoing, and the sharing of good practice on CDF pro-cesses from more experienced countries, recognizingthat improved CDF implementation can only beachieved over the long-term.

MAIN IMPLICATIONS

In its continuing support for the development, imple-mentation, monitoring and updating of poverty reduc-tion strategies, the Bank and its partners in otherdevelopment assistance agencies should give increasedand explicit attention to CDF principles as their un-derlying basis,7 particularly in Group 2 and 3 coun-tries, to have the best hope that low-income countriescan achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Evenin Group 1 countries, Bank support consistent withthe CDF principles continues to be important to en-sure it is in tune with the processes these countrieshave institutionalized for implementing the CDFprinciples.

The assessment shows that the Bank—in coordi-nation with other external partners and client coun-tries—should give increased attention to six main areas.

(1) Encourage a long-term perspective to anchorthe strategy and budget. PRSs need to take a long-term perspective, using the CDF principles as theirunderlying framework. The Bank should encouragecountries to take such a perspective in preparing PRSsand in their progress reports on implementation. Indeveloping this long-term perspective, countries shouldtake a holistic view by putting all elements importantto poverty reduction, including macroeconomic andsocial issues, for consideration by policy makers at thesame time. However, they should be careful to focustheir strategies on what is realistic and not try to takeon all development issues at once. Particularly inGroup 1 countries, the Bank should emphasize capac-ity building and cross-country learning to strengthenthe links between long-term visions, medium-termstrategies and expenditure frameworks, and budgets.Particularly in Group 2 and 3 countries, given thatvision and strategy formulation through participatoryprocesses takes time, the Bank should support thedevelopment of participatory mechanisms, linkedearly on to existing institutions in the executive,legislature and local governments, and the budget pro-cess, that can be sustained over time. In all low-in-come countries that have not defined PRS-based

long-term goals, the Bank should make it a priority tohelp countries formulate these goals, including thoserelated to the MDGs.

(2) Encourage national dialogue early in strat-egy formulation and during implementation. Manycountries have not managed to achieve a genuine andsustained national dialogue. The Bank can help buildcapacity for stronger participatory processes throughseveral types of action. It can help countries learn fromone another’s experiences in conducting and sustain-ing consultation processes and incorporating the resultsinto government decision-making. In Group 1 coun-tries, it can help extend and deepen the involvementof government and of country stakeholders in strategyimplementation and review. Tasks needed here mayinclude helping improve coordination between gov-ernment agencies, e.g. planning, sector, and financeministries (when the strategy process is coordinatedby one without strong collaboration with the others);strengthening mechanisms to involve line ministriesand local governments in the strategy process; sup-porting involvement of a broad cross-section ofstakeholders in systematic and transparent participa-tory mechanisms; and strengthening the capacity ofparliaments.

Many of the Group 2 and 3 countries lack stronghistories of consultation and need to gain familiaritywith participatory processes. The Bank should encour-age these countries to develop homegrown processesearly at the IPRSP stage, and help them mobilizefinancing for participatory processes. It should facili-tate coordinated and targeted capacity building in theexecutive, legislature, local governments and civil so-ciety, including direct exchange of experience amongdeveloping countries. Reaching out early is the bestway for countries to build capacity in interactive dia-logue, and can also help to prevent a perception of theBank or other development partners dominating thedevelopment of PRSs. The Bank should also encour-age countries to build on existing processes that aregrounded in the CDF principles, and to merge parallelstrategy-development processes, rather than to adopta new process for the PRSP in each case. When pos-sible, it should encourage countries that embark onnew processes to start by involving organizations thatrepresent a broad segment of the population and thatare chosen transparently, encourage collective owner-ship of the dialogue itself so that the process is notassociated with any one organization, and encourage asignificant investment in preparation and dissemina-tion of pre-meeting and follow-up materials for eachconsultation.

Overall Assessment and Main Implications 5

(3) Facilitate country leadership of analyticalwork and the preparation of comprehensive capacitybuilding strategies. More and more analytical work isbeing undertaken to support the development andimplementation of poverty reduction strategies, but ittends to be produced by the Bank jointly with otherexternal partners, with limited leadership or commit-ment from within the country. As a result, the recom-mendations of many studies are easily ignored by peoplewho are best placed to act on them. One key elementto improving the outcome orientation of analyticalwork, and to build capacity overtime within countries,is to encourage it to be led by governments and to cap-ture local expertise while at the same time reinforcingcloser cooperation among external partners. Givencapacity shortfalls, the Bank should continue and in-tensify its efforts to help build analytical capacitywithin all countries. It should encourage governmentsto incorporate a comprehensive capacity building strat-egy in PRS efforts, including at the progress reportingstage. In the short-term, the Bank should support andtrack the success of country-led analytical work, fol-lowing its use and impact on policy and capacity, anddrawing lessons for wider dissemination and adoption.

(4) Ensure that CDF principles underpin invest-ment projects. Even with the trend toward program-matic budget support aligned with PRSs, manyinvestment projects still remain outside of the PRSframework. To scale up the impact of investmentprojects, the Bank and its partners should focus on in-cluding all projects in government budget processesand move toward sector-wide approaches. They shouldencourage countries to incorporate investment projectswithin PRSs, ensuring stakeholder participation and afocus on the country’s long-term goals in addition toproject specific objectives.

(5) Tailor country-level data systems to moni-tor country-specific MDGs. Few countries have ad-equate data or analytical capacity to monitor theirprogress toward their long-term goals. The Bank shouldscale up its efforts to help countries develop cost effec-tive and easy to use data and M&E systems that focuson long-term goals, with a realistic and manageableset of indicators that can measure progress toward themand inform the adjustment of policy or goals based onintermediate results. This will require developing rel-evant expertise and building institutions, in and out-side of government, and strengthening governmentcapacity to consolidate existing disparate initiativesin support of one integrated country system. It will re-quire strengthening the flow of information betweendifferent organizations, and supporting the collection

and analysis of household survey data based on anagreed methodology that is comparable overtime andacross countries. Efforts to harmonize support for sta-tistical capacity building, such as “Paris 21,” a globalpartnership program,8 might usefully be built upon.Countries should be encouraged to monitor the PRSPprocess for its adherence to CDF principles.

(6) Mainstream the CDF principles throughoutall operational development work. While someprogress is evident within development assistance agen-cies, the Bank and other external partners are still farfrom fully adapting operational policies to the CDFprinciples, and systematically supporting their imple-mentation in programs at the country level. Insuffi-cient policy alignment with the CDF principles openstoo many opportunities for pursuing inconsistent ap-proaches, which can cause confusion about the role ofexternal partners vis-à-vis governments and countrystakeholders. Similarly, staff behaviors associated withsound partnership practices should be encouragedthrough incentives, including recruitment, rewardand promotion policies, to help ensure a consistentapproach by all external partners. These policy andcultural adjustments can take time, but should be ex-pedited and monitored.

The Bank Group faces strategic, operating, finan-cial, and reputational/stakeholder risks. Supporting theimplementation of CDF principles when assisting thePRS process helps the Bank minimize these risks. TheCDF Guidance issued to staff in 19999 will be updatedto reflect the lessons from PRSP implementation ex-perience and the changed environment since the Mil-lennium Declaration. This update will help the Bankto better assist countries to meet the Millennium De-velopment Goals.

NOTES

1. Of the 48 countries, 29 are in Africa, eight in EasternEurope and Central Asia, four in Latin America and theCaribbean, four in East Asia, one in South Asia, and two inthe Middle East and North Africa. Eritrea was one of thecountries that was monitored for a pilot period followingthe introduction of the CDF. As of May 2003, 27 of thesecountries had completed a PRSP, and 20 an IPRSP. Annex1 lists the 48 countries covered. Annex 3 describes how theCDF Secretariat tracks and assesses CDF implementation.

2. The Bank, other development assistance agencies anddeveloped countries have a responsibility to implement theeighth MDG—to establish a global partnership for devel-opment by increasing aid, providing debt relief and reduc-ing trade barriers. The use of the acronym MDGs in this


report refers to the seven MDGs of developing country re-sponsibility tailored to country circumstances through a par-ticipatory process, unless otherwise noted.

3. Comprehensive Development Framework: Meeting thePromise? Early Experience and Emerging Issues, Sec M2001-0529/1, September 27, 2001.

4. Multi-partner Evaluation of the Comprehensive Devel-opment Framework, Operations Evaluation Department, TheWorld Bank, May 16, 2003, Report No. 25882.

5. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs)—Progressin Implementation, DC2002-0016, September 13, 2002, TheWorld Bank/IMF. This review stressed the challenges of 1)alignment by partners, including the Bank and Fund, in sup-porting PRSP implementation; 2) shifting beyond process,to content and implementation, and greater understandingof the linkages between policies and poverty outcomes; and3) realism in the setting of goals and targets, as well as inmanaging expectations, both within countries and amongtheir development partners.

6. The Bank has recently stepped up its engagementwith LICUS countries, notably by using knowledge instru-ments to help them promote change toward better policies

and institutions. See Report on the World Bank Group TaskForce on Low-income Countries Under Stress (Sec. M2002-0367), July 8, 2002.

7. The PRSP was introduced as an instrument for imple-menting CDF principles. See Development CommitteeCommuniqué, September 1999, CD/99-29, and The Com-prehensive Development Framework (CDF) and PovertyReduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). Joint note by James D.Wolfensohn and Stanley Fischer, April 5, 2000, (SecM2000-474, Annex 6).

8. The Paris 21 Consortium—Partnership in Statisticsfor Development in the 21st Century—was set up inNovember 1999, by the UN, OECD, The World Bank, IMFand EC. Its membership is worldwide. It aims to build statis-tical capacity as the foundation for effective developmentpolicies by helping to develop well-managed statisticalsystems that are appropriately resourced. In the longer term,Paris 21 aims to help to promote a culture of evidence-basedpolicy making and monitoring in all countries, but especiallyin poor developing countries.

9. CDF Internal Guidance Note, The World Bank, April26, 1999.

2CDF: KEY TO ACHIEVING THE

MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS

The Millennium Development Goals now guidemuch of the interaction between developingand developed countries, and between devel-

oping countries and development assistance agencies(Box 2.1). These goals are a compact among all mem-bers of the international community to reduce pov-erty in its many dimensions and to promote sustainabledevelopment. The aim of all parties is that the sevengoals for which developing countries are responsiblebe attained not only at a global level—which could bedone for many of the goals if just a few highly popu-lated countries reach them—but also at the individualcountry level—a much more difficult objective. Theeighth goal must be implemented by all developedcountries and development assistance agencies.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE

CDF PRINCIPLES AND THE MDGS

The MDGs are targets that can galvanize countries andcommunities into action and help them to achievegreater accountability for development results, but theyare not in themselves a strategy on how to achievegoals. Translating them into action requires an opera-tional framework at the national level. In more than70 low-income countries, this operational frameworkis increasingly being provided by a country-led pov-erty reduction strategy.1 In designing these strategies,individual countries incorporate those aspects of theMDGs that fit their own situations (indeed, severalcountries have already achieved some of the MDGs).Experience underlines that in order to have the besthope of success, poverty reduction strategies need toembody the four Comprehensive Development Frame-work principles—long-term holistic vision, countryownership, country-led partnership, and focus on de-velopment results. Each CDF principle has a crucialbearing on a country’s achievement of the MDGs.

The MDGs are goals that require parallel and well-sequenced actions in many interdependent areas. Toachieve them, countries must thus set them in the con-text of a long-term holistic vision for national develop-ment. For example, to reduce infant mortality,

7

countries may need to take action beyond the healthsector, particularly in improving education for girls be-fore they become mothers. This may involve address-ing gender issues as well as improving physical accessto schools through rehabilitating and maintaining orextending rural roads. Other supporting interventionssuch as extending access to clean water may also beneeded. Similarly, to improve primary school enroll-ment in general, countries may need to go beyond edu-cation investments and into the spheres of institutionalchange, infrastructure investments, and other areas ofhuman development. And crucially, to reach goals vi-sions need to be linked to precise strategies which inturn must be prioritized, fully costed and be linked tobudgets to ensure adequate funding to implement them.

Country ownership is crucial. Countries have al-ready committed to attain the MDGs at the Millen-nium Summit. Even so, the MDGs will have the mosthope of being met if they are tailored to country cir-cumstances, emerging from an informed national dia-logue and reflecting the aspirations of a broad range ofthe country’s citizens. In defining their national goals,the challenge that all countries face is to capture theseaspirations, ensuring that citizens and their institutions,formal and informal, play a role in defining the long-term vision that frames the goals.

The Millennium Declaration stresses partnership.Since low-income country governments do not havethe resources or capacities they need to achieve theMDGs single-handedly, partners, under governmentleadership, play a key role. External partners need toalign their support with poverty reduction strategies,using grants, loans, analytical support, or technicalassistance designed to fit each country’s requirementsand capacities, and to harmonize their policies andprocedures for the sake of efficiency and lower trans-action costs. Public-private partnerships in, amongother things, the delivery of basic services, are alsoimportant.

To achieve the MDGs also requires the govern-ment and its partners to explicitly focus on developmentresults. The driver is “what gets measured gets done,”so the responsibility of government is to ensure that


the right goals get set, pursued, and assessed. Respon-sibility for the management of development resourcesrequires transparency in the handling of publicaccounts, and the ample disclosure of information withwhich to measure progress toward stated goals.

CDF IMPLEMENTATION AND

COUNTRY PERFORMANCE

There is a correlation between CDF implementationexperience and country performance. Figure 2.1 showsthat for the most part countries that have made goodprogress in implementing the CDF principles tend tobe those that rank higher in economic, social, and in-stitutional performance, as measured by growth, in-come, child mortality, primary school enrollment, andyouth literacy, and the country policy and institutionalassessment quintile ranking on public sector manage-ment and institutions. The countries where correla-tion is weakest, because of their relatively poor countryperformance but relatively good CDF implementationexperience, are typically countries that have recently

embarked on the PRSP process and where CDF imple-mentation progress is at an early stage. The countrieswith relatively good country performance but relativelypoor CDF implementation are for the most part formercommand economies that suffered a significant drop inGDP levels in the first half of the 1990s, boosting growthrates in the second half of the decade, and that gavehigh priority to social expenditures for many decades.

NOTES

1. For these countries, “the primary strategic and imple-mentation vehicle for reaching the MDGs will be the pov-erty reduction strategy paper (PRSP).” “Relationshipbetween MDGs and PRSPs”, joint letter from ShengmanZhang, Managing Director, World Bank and Mark MallochBrown, Chair, UN Development Program, to UN residentcoordinators and World Bank country directors, May 5, 2003.PRSPs, prepared by the government after broad consulta-tion, provide the basis for support to the country’s povertyreduction strategy from The World Bank and IMF, the UNagencies, and other development assistance agencies.

Box 2.1 Millennium Development Goals

The eight Millennium Development Goals, derived from the world summits and conferences of the 1990s, wereadopted by the 189 member states of the United Nations in the Millennium Declarationa at the Millennium Summitin September 2000. The Millennium Declaration, which resolves to pursue poverty reduction using the CDF prin-ciples, sets global targets for the year 2015 for reducing poverty and achieving sustainable development. b

Developing Country Responsibility

• To eradicate extreme poverty and hunger• To achieve universal primary education• To promote gender equality and empower women• To reduce child mortality• To improve maternal health• To combat HIV/AIDS, malaria, and other diseases• To ensure environmental sustainability

Developed Country and Development Assistance Agency Responsibility

• To establish a global partnership for development

The MDGs represent an unprecedented commitment from UN member states, the UN system, and the Bank, andhave subsequently been reaffirmed in the Monterrey Consensus and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.They are further defined through 18 targets and 48 monitorable performance indicators: the goals and targets areinterlinked and progress in the different areas is considered to be mutually reinforcing.

a. United Nations Millennium Declaration, Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, A/55/L.2, September 18, 2000.b. Roadmap Towards the Implementation of the United Nations Millennium Declaration, Report of the Secretary-General, A/56/326, September

6, 2001. Paragraphs 297–298 make explicit reference to support by UN agencies of the CDF and PRSP processes.

CDF: Key to Achieving the Millennium Development Goals 9

Zambia

Serbia and Montenegro

Yemen

VietnamUganda

Tanzania

Tajikisan

Sierra Leone

Senegal

Sao Tome e Principe

Rwanda

Niger

Nicaragua

Mozambique

Mongolia

Moldova

MauritaniaMali

Malawi

MadagascarLesotho

Laos

Kyrgyz Rep.

Kenya

Honduras

Guyana

Guinea Bissau

GuineaGhana

Georgia

Gambia

Ethiopia

Eritrea

Djibouti

Cote d’Ivoire

Congo DR

Chad

Central African Rep.

Cape Verde

Cameroon

Cambodia

Burkina Faso

Bolivia

Benin

Azerbaijan

Armenia Albania

R2 = 0.2479

0

1

2

3

CDF Implementation

Country Performance Ranking

AL E D S

Pakistan

a. The correlation shown summarizes the diamonds in Annex 5, which shows the implementation of CDF principles country by country. Both axes correspond to simple averages of the values observed in the axes of the diamonds for each country. The performance axis shows the ranking of each one of the countries in each aspect within the 48 countries. The four aspects are: (1) the five-year average rate of growth for 1995–2000; (2) the average of the latest social indicators on child mortality, primary enrollment, and youth literacy; (3) GDP per capita measured in US dollars at 1995 purchasing power parity; and (4) the quintile ranking of the country performance institutional assessment (CPIA) rating on public sector management and institutions. The values for CDF implementation correspond to the rating, on a scale from 1 to 5, of the degree of progress in implementing each of the CDF principles: long-term holistic vision, country ownership, country-led partnership, and focus on development results.

Figure 2.1 CDF Implementation and Country Performancea

4

5

3LONG-TERM HOLISTIC VISION

PROGRESS AT A GLANCE

To achieve significant, long-lasting development re-sults requires time and a consistent focus even underthe best of circumstances. Experience shows that a keycharacteristic of successful development is that coun-try goals remain anchored in a long-term vision.

One third of the 48 countries reviewed have a well-developed long-term vision. Of these, Bolivia, Uganda,and Vietnam can be said to have a robust process forlinking long-term vision to strategy and for develop-ing long-term goals. Nearly a third of the countries aretaking steps to develop a long-term vision, but just overone third—mostly conflict-affected or with LICUStraits—are still not taking action or have taken insuf-ficient steps in this area (Figure 3.1, Column 1).

To be actionable, a long-term vision needs to beembodied in a medium-term strategy that definesgoals—with associated roles for the private sector, civilsociety, local governments, and external partners—andis adequately budgeted. As a result of the introductionof the PRSP process, 60 percent of the countries havedeveloped medium-term development strategies or aretaking steps to do so (Figure 3.1, Column 2). Of thesestrategies, about half are well developed and almost allare anchored in a long-term vision; most are embod-ied in PRSPs, and a few in IPRSPs. Bolivia, Uganda,and Vietnam are the most advanced. In the remaining40 percent of the countries—more than half of themconflict-affected or LICUS—medium-term strategiesremain at early stages of development.

Thirty percent of the countries have well articu-lated development goals; they include three quartersof the countries that have a long-term vision. Theachievements of Uganda and Vietnam stand out in thisrespect. However, half the countries are not focusingsystematically on development goals or have not setdevelopment targets. In several countries, immediateworries preempt attention to long-term goals. The mostchallenging cases of countries without well-articulatedgoals are among those countries that are both conflict-affected and LICUS (Figure 3.1, Column 3).

11

In articulating development goals, most countriesadapt the pursuit of the Millennium DevelopmentGoals to their own circumstances. (Annex 4 showswhich countries have adopted at least some elementof each MDG at the country level as reflected in PRSPsand IPRSPs.) Among the countries that have com-pleted a full PRSP, the large majority have cast theirtargets in terms of achieving the MDGs. In a few coun-tries, notably Guinea, Mauritania, and Vietnam, ob-jectives are more ambitious than the MDGs. Someothers, notably Burkina Faso, Niger, and Yemen, haveset targets less ambitious than the MDGs, conditionedby their own starting points and needs. In the few cases,including Albania, Tanzania, and Zambia, where noexplicit reference is made to the MDGs, developmenttargets and indicators are consistent with these goals.

For countries with an IPRSP, the pattern is differ-ent. Among these countries, only seven have expressedsocioeconomic objectives in line with more than oneof the Millennium Development Goals, usually relatedto poverty, education, maternal health, child mortal-ity, AIDS, or the environment, but never all of them.Only a few of them have referred explicitly to thesegoals. Only two take the gender equality goal intoconsideration.

Some countries have explicitly identified gradua-tion from the group of least developed countries as anoverarching goal. In two cases, Albania and Serbia-Montenegro, the long-term vision is engulfed by ac-cession to the European Union, and the EUStabilization and Association Process programsstrongly shape the initial strategy.

Resource and capacity constraints force countriesto recognize tradeoffs and decide on priorities. In doingso, it is vital to work out what the long-term visionand the strategy imply for the country’s fiscal resourcesover the medium term. Medium-term expenditureframeworks need to give due regard to resource con-straints but also to set the fiscal stage so that govern-ment programs and budgets reflect the policies andactions that are required to meet long-term goals. Tenpercent of the countries show evidence of adequate


sequencing of priorities within the framework of aholistic strategy.1 Nearly a third of the countries aretaking action to improve selectivity and strengthentheir prioritization processes. But in the remaining 60percent of countries, inadequate prioritization of goalsis a major bottleneck (Figure 3.1, Column 4).

The holistic, comprehensive approach needed forsuccess with the MDGs is difficult in practice, givenresource/capacity constraints. Fewer than half thecountries have strategies that reflect their capacity toimplement and to manage public expenditures ad-equately (Figure 3.1, Column 5). Among those thatdo not, more than half are conflict-affected or haveLICUS traits. On the positive side, 10 percent of thecountries do have strategies that well reflect their ca-pacity to implement.2

VISION AND STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

Most of the national visions have been put forward bygovernment agencies, (typically the ministry in chargeof the economy or planning or the office of the presi-dent or prime minister), receiving some support from

the rest of government and from external and internalpartners. Some countries have a constitution or awritten legal text that establishes democratic, politi-cal, social, and economic rights that define elementsof a long-term vision. Some have maintained a steadydirection in development policies, accompanied by arather stable macroeconomic environment over a de-cade or more, despite changes in government. Suchstability can be interpreted as the reflection of an im-plicit long-term vision, albeit not a holistic one, thathas wide support across different social groups withregular and peaceful transitions in power as well aslimited military spending.

The PRSP process has been used to start develop-ing a long-term vision in a number of countries previ-ously without one. Perhaps the most importantcontributions of the PRSP process to the developmentof the long-term vision are that it brings out an ex-plicit awareness of the poverty issues confronted bythe country and that it promotes broader participa-tion by eliciting the views of different stakeholders.

In many countries with a history of a commandeconomy, the long-standing practice of planning has

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Figure 3.1 Long-term Holistic Vision(percent of countries falling in each assessment category)

Percent

Coherent long-term vision

Medium-termstrategy derived

from vision

Country-specificdevelopment

targets, eg MDGs

Holistic, balancedand well sequenced

strategy

6%

27%

17%

31%



6%

25%

40%

29%

10%

31%

15%

33%

15%

42%

10%

Capacity forimplementation,eg expendituremanagement

25%

15%

23%

4%

19%33%

44%

Long-term Holistic Vision 13

led governments to develop medium-term strategiesthat aim at directing the entire economy and are re-vised regularly against multi-year plans. Strategies de-veloped in this way may be understood as embodyinga long-term vision but they may not have broad-basedsupport within the country. Some countries have en-tered a PRSP process that is parallel to these existingplanning or strategy processes; most of them have even-tually brought the two together or plan to do so in thenext stage, but some have thus far maintained parallelprocesses causing confusion about what the nationalstrategy is, and which strategy will be implemented.

LINKING TO THE BUDGET

To create a real link between short-term fiscal man-agement and long-term poverty reduction policy ob-jectives typically requires predictable and realisticbudget allocations over several years. A country canonly forge this link if it has a well-sequenced medium-term expenditure framework. From the medium-termframework, in turn, it is important to define annualbudgets in which specific resource amounts are assignedto concrete programs. Having a working budget wellanchored in a medium-term expenditure frameworkmakes it much easier to prioritize goals.

To build a budget that is consistent with macro-economic stability, planners need to take account ofcontributions from external partners and the privatesector that have a bearing on the macroeconomic en-vironment. Contributions to the budget may take theform of loans and thus affect both the fiscal positionand the sustainability of the external balance. Even ifcontributions take the form of grants, their relative sizeand their uses may noticeably affect competitiveness.3

Only a few countries are managing their fiscal re-sources and setting up their medium-term expenditureplans in a formal framework that shapes their annualbudgets. Only ten of the countries with a PRSP andthree of the countries with an IPRSP have medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs) that are meantto shape their annual budgets.4 In only seven of these13 countries is the MTEF deliberately consistent withstrategy and long-term goals.5

In Ghana and Pakistan, an institutional settingfor budget management has facilitated the develop-ment of medium-term expenditure frameworks. InBurkina Faso, the medium-term fiscal frameworkfocuses on just the expenditure side, leaving the matchbetween resource availability and programmed spend-ing to the yearly budget exercises; here the MTEF is

being used as a tool to integrate the process of sectoraldecision making, facilitating the allocation of resourcesin accordance with priorities. In Benin and Cambo-dia, MTEFs are just being developed, with a firm com-mitment to using them to improve fiscal management.

In Bolivia and Honduras, a formal conventionalframework is missing, but fiscal management is carriedout within a rough approximation of the projectedexpenditure pattern that is needed to attain long-termgoals. These countries have recognized the need to havea formal medium-term framework to shape their fiscalpolicies and are developing such frameworks. Hondurashas taken a first step by developing a three-year budget.In Guyana, the existence of a medium-term publicspending framework is only indicative, having little orno bearing on the yearly budget exercises and resultingin a medium-term program that may be unrealistic.

Benin and Cape Verde have started building aframework by developing medium-term expenditureplans for particular sectors. These plans allow someconsistency in expenditures within particular sectors,albeit without regard to allocations to other sectors oroverall resource constraints. Uganda has achieved somesuccess in aligning its sectoral frameworks with its over-all MTEF, but a key challenge is to ensure their consis-tency with a sustainable macroeconomic framework.

In some cases, budget management consistent withthe medium-term strategy has evolved prior to a PRSPprocess, and in others a medium-term expenditureframework has been developed as part of the PRSPprocess. In Uganda, prudent macroeconomic policieswere combined with long-term poverty reduction goals,and strong budget management consistent with over-all strategy had evolved even before a PRSP wasdeveloped. In both Uganda and Pakistan, the pre-ex-isting medium-term fiscal framework has shaped at leastpart of the poverty reduction strategy, and governmentsare making efforts to bring the two together. Tanzania’spoverty reduction strategy draws to a large extent on apre-existing medium-term fiscal framework. A num-ber of other countries have developed MTEFs with helpfrom external partners and as part of the PRSP process.Except for Kenya and Moldova, all of these countrieshave full PRSPs. All of them are using the MTEFs toshape their yearly budgets, notwithstanding the rela-tive newness of this instrument in these countries. Insome cases a preexisting medium-term fiscal frameworkhas been sidelined by political developments orexogenous shocks. But a number of countries have suc-cessfully adapted their frameworks to external eco-nomic shocks or changes in the political climate.


CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS

Implementation capacity is a major bottleneck in al-most all countries at both the central and local level,and many IPRSPs are ambitious given this weakness.Areas of particular difficulty are the collection andmanagement of data on poverty—crucial for design-ing, implementing, and monitoring strategies and pro-grams—and financial management capacity.Decentralization adds a particular challenge to capac-ity development. The implementation capacity of de-centralized governments is of concern, even incountries such as Bolivia, Ethiopia, or Ghana whosecapacity at the central level is relatively good.

Only a few countries have explicit capacity devel-opment priorities and strategies. In some, sector strat-egies and multi-sector programs are supportingimportant steps towards more coherent program-basedcapacity development.

CONCLUSIONS

• The PRSP process is influencing countries’focus on a balanced institutional and socio-economic agenda, by putting all elements im-portant to poverty reduction, includingmacroeconomic and social issues, for consid-eration by policymakers at the same time. Butof itself, a PRSP or IPRSP does not ensure thata long-term vision is in place or that one willeventually emerge. For this, the PRSP processmust be strongly grounded in CDF principles.

• IPRSPs in many countries tend to describeshort- to medium-term programs, seen asnecessary to get debt relief, rather than theholistic strategies to achieve longer-term devel-opment results that are a feature of most PRSPs.

• While most countries that have completedPRSPS have adapted the MDGs to theircircumstances, budget and capacity constraintsare real. Not all of the relevant goals andnecessary related actions are being pursuedcomprehensively.

• With notable exceptions, PRSPs do notaddress trade-offs well, nor do they explicitlyaddress the need to prioritize goals, given thelimits of budgets and capacity. In general, greateralignment is still needed between PRSPactions and overall budget cycle processes.

NOTES

1. Ethiopia, Malawi, Rwanda, Uganda, and Vietnam.2. Albania, Bolivia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Vietnam.3. The overall macroeconomic impact, of course, will

depend on the consistency of the entire set of policies, in-cluding those that affect absorptive capacity as defined bythe structural and institutional setting.

4. Albania, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritania,Moldova, Niger, Rwanda, Pakistan, Tanzania, Uganda,Yemen, and Zambia.

5. Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mauritania, Pakistan, Tanza-nia, Uganda, and Yemen.

4COUNTRY OWNERSHIP


Long-term visions can only hold when they reflect theaspirations of society about national goals. And thelessons of development show that change will succeedonly if carried out and fueled by the country involved.Accordingly, country ownership is key to the imple-mentation of successful poverty-reduction strategies.In nearly a third of the countries, the long-term visionand related medium-term strategy are consideredhomegrown, reflecting the aspirations of citizens (Fig-ure 4.1, Column 1).

One essential element of country ownership isstrong government leadership, usually with the presi-dent, prime minister or other senior minister guidingand supporting strategy development, and strong col-laboration and partnership across government, includ-ing in budget formulation. And, since the basic featuresof a long-term vision should be able to withstand theebbs and flows of political processes, a second essen-tial element of country ownership is the broadening ofconsensus, by proactively seeking and incorporatingthe views of country stakeholders. These consultationsshould be deeply rooted in cultural background andinvolve key institutions—both governmental, includ-ing parliaments, and non-governmental,—thus reach-ing out to all political forces. Participation should bewide and transparent, and give a voice to the poorestsegments of society as well as to the private sector, theengine of growth.

Governments in nearly two-thirds of the countriesare taking action to involve stakeholders in formulat-ing development strategy, and in nearly half of thesecases, they have managed to promote deeper andbroader involvement (Figure 4.1, Column 2). Thesecountries have made good progress in consolidating avision or in taking action towards producing a nationallong-term agenda. But in nearly one-third of the 48countries, the evidence shows at best initial steps. Ex-ternal partners can promote wider participation inpolicy processes and thus enhance the degree of coun-try ownership of development policies. But to avoid

15

the perception that poverty reduction strategies mustfit foreign straitjackets, external partners should takea facilitating role, providing advice or expertise, notleadership, in strategy formulation.

In practice, consultations have tended to involvecivil society—either citizens or their organizations—more than parliamentarians or the private sector. Theprocess of engaging civil society is quite advanced inseven of the countries studied,1 but only incipient orat a standstill in more than 40 percent of the countries(Figure 4.1, Column 3)—more than half of which areconflict-affected or with LICUS traits. The privatesector is only weakly involved in the strategy develop-ment process, although 35 percent of the countries aretaking action towards engaging it more strongly (Fig-ure 4.1, Column 4). Parliamentarians have been in-vited to play a role, often in a personal capacity, inmore than two-thirds of the countries, but in only sixcountries is the involvement of parliament as an insti-tution largely developed (Figure 4.1, Column 5).2

The internal processes that establish country own-ership are largely contingent on the government’s ca-pacity to take on a leadership role and formulatestrategy through interactive processes. In only 10 per-cent of the countries is government capacity in strat-egy and policy formulation largely developed (Figure4.1, Column 6).

GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP:CRUCIAL TO OWNERSHIP

Government ownership of long-term developmentgoals is often concentrated in a few central ministriesor agencies. It is often strongest within just one branch,usually the ministry of finance and/or planning, primeminister’s office, or office of the president, where moststrategy documents are produced. In many cases, lineministries and other key government bodies have par-ticipated fully in strategy formulation through inter-ministerial steering committees and/or working groups.Even when such collaborative structures exist, how-ever, achieving broad ownership within government


remains a challenge. It requires a well-established statesystem with functioning institutions and commitmentfrom top-level ministers, who in some countries changefrequently, as well as from civil servants, who are oftenunmotivated, given distorted incentive systems inmany civil services.

Within government, rivalries or insufficient toppolitical leadership sometimes inhibit ownership. Inseveral cases, more than one ministry is charged withformulating strategy, resulting in competing and some-times conflicting documents and causing internal con-fusion. Even when line ministries are involved andthere is one common strategy, poor collaboration be-tween finance and planning ministries may mean thatthe strategy is not affordable. Sometimes strategy docu-ments are still produced with little top political own-ership, simply to access donor funding or debt relief.

STAKEHOLDER CONSULTATION IN PRACTICE

The PRSP process has helped to reinforce countryownership, especially in countries without a stronghistory of consultation but also in others, by encour-

aging consultative processes within and outsidegovernment. Consultation with stakeholders is nowwidespread.

Although there is no one formula for involvingstakeholders, all countries that have completed a PRSPhave held national, regional, and local consultationswith a wide spectrum of stakeholders, as well as tech-nical workshops with experts. Almost all have set upactive technical—usually sectoral or thematic butsometimes process-oriented—working groups, some-times led by non-government players and sometimesinvolving representatives of civil society in drafting,as in Côte d’Ivoire, Lesotho, Mongolia, and Zambia.Some countries that have not yet prepared PRSPs haveheld consultations in the course of IPRSP preparationor another strategy development process, but most haverestricted involvement to government agencies whilemaking plans for broad consultations to feed into afull PRSP.

Consultations tend to have the most impact incountries that have a history of consultation prior tothe development of a PRSP. In developing a PRSP,many of these countries have relied on earlier poverty

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Figure 4.1 Country Ownership(percent of countries falling in each assessment category)

Percent

Vision and strategyhomegrown

Governmentinvolved

stake-holders

Civil societyinvolvement

Private sector involvement

6%

42%

8%

23%

27%

38%

8%

27%

35%

42%

23%

29%

17%

44%

10%

Capacity toformulate strategy

42%

10%

33%

15%

Parliamentaryinvolvement

21%29%

19%

40%

13%



Country Ownership 17

reduction strategies or initiatives developed in closeconsultation with stakeholders.

Many other countries have little tradition of con-sultation but are used to relying on centralized top-down leadership; some of these have introducedconsultative processes more successfully than others.Sometimes, as in Benin, Madagascar, Mali, orMozambique, consultations have had limited successin broadening consensus beyond government. To some,consultation has been perceived as a tool to solicit re-actions to existing programs and policies, or, simply asa vehicle for lectures on the government’s priorities—a perception that has often been exacerbated by in-consistent follow-up. Time pressures have affected thepace and depth of consultations (particularly in HIPCeligible countries), as has the inexperience of somegovernments with interactive and inclusive consulta-tion processes.

Consultations are sometimes partial, ad hoc, andinformal, and have not always collected systematicinformation. Several governments have not reflectedtransparently the results of workshops in their strate-gies. Sometimes consultations have raised expectationstoo high; the groups consulted have not participatedfully, for lack of capacity, or have not stated their pri-orities, and governments have not adequately ex-plained the budget constraints they face or even theirresponsibility for prioritizing. Some governments haveembarked on ambitious information campaigns butoften such campaigns have been poorly implemented.

CONSULTING PARTNERS DURING

STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT

External partners

Almost all the 48 countries have involved externalpartners in the PRSP process. Indeed in many cases,that process has started out as donor-driven, primarilyby the Bank, IMF, or UNDP, or has been reluctantlyembarked on to access HIPC debt relief or funds fromexternal partners. But many governments have increas-ingly embraced the process. External partners havebeen involved through inclusion in the consultationprocess or through ad hoc meetings with governmentsand other actors involved. In some cases, external part-ners have provided funding to set up the participatoryprocess, and in many cases they have also been calledto comment on early drafts of the PRSP. Sometimesexternal partners have built up strong coalitions withcivil society organizations in fostering participation,as in Albania, Azerbaijan, and Cote d’Ivoire.

In some of the cases, external partners have helpedby hiring consultants that then draft the PRSP. Thesedocuments tend to be technically robust. But experi-ence shows that a lead role for externally financed con-sultants in developing a long-term vision and strategycan lessen the degree of country ownership, and thatit may take a country several years to appropriate asignificant part of that vision. In some cases, it mayeven lead to the deferment of the document. In numer-ous countries, external partners have tried to changethe outcome of the consultation process; some havetried to have their own favored projects included in thestrategy; and some have intervened drastically to matchthe final draft PRSP with their own expectations.

Civil society organizations and the poor

CSOs have taken prominent roles during strategy de-velopment in some countries, especially those withmore developed and organized CSO sectors. In Ethio-pia, CSOs established an independent task force tocontribute to and monitor the consultative process. Insome countries, CSOs have participated actively inPRSP steering committees. In Bolivia and Honduras,they have been involved in developing indicators andtargets. Sometimes, as in Honduras and Zambia, theyhave produced their own PRSP.

Some countries have made strong efforts to en-gage the poor in the consultative process, largely byinviting them to workshops. Some have carried outparticipatory poverty assessments as part of the strat-egy development process, and incorporated their find-ings into the strategy.

Parliaments

Parliamentarians are often involved in strategy for-mulation, but their involvement has rarely beensystematic or institutionalized (Box 4.1). Individualparliamentarians have played a role as representativesof civil society at large, conveying views and ideas fromand to their constituencies, or in their personal capac-ity, and have taken part in consultations and workshopsleading to the elaboration of PRSPs. In some coun-tries, they have participated in formal PRSP structuressuch as steering committees, participation committees,or working groups. In some cases, such as Côte d’Ivoire,Kyrgyz Republic, and Senegal, leaders of parliamen-tary bodies have played a significant role.

To a much lesser extent, parliament has been in-volved as an institution. Only in a limited number ofcountries have parliamentary bodies been important


partners by holding hearings on the poverty reductionstrategy or formally approving it. Different institutionalarrangements and constitutional traditions signifi-cantly affect the role parliaments play in different coun-tries, and full involvement of parliamentary bodies doesnot always imply transparency and participation of allpolitical actors in the PRSP process. Only in a fewcountries has the political opposition been expresslyinvolved. In some countries, parliaments and parlia-mentarians have not formally taken part in strategyformulation, or have played a limited role. In mostconflict-affected countries and those with LICUStraits, parliaments are either weak or non-existent—Rwanda being an exception.

Parliamentary committees are represented in PRSPsteering committees, and have taken part in consulta-tions and workshops in Cambodia, Ghana, Mongolia,and Yemen. In some countries, the PRSP has beendebated in plenary meetings. In others, there are plans

for such debates, or for the discussion of PRSP com-mitments in the context of national budget debates.

Private sector

In practice, the size of the private sector, presence of alarge informal private sector and of small producers,the role of foreign ownership, and the existence ofstate-owned enterprises all affect the involvement ofthe private sector in strategy formulation. In manycountries the private sector has played no significantrole in developing strategy and in some cases it hasshown little interest. In Georgia and Tajikistan, a for-mal private sector is only beginning to materialize, butthere is a growing interest on the part of both govern-ments and private enterprises to collaborate.

Most governments that have sought private sec-tor participation in strategy formulation have done sothrough formal consultations and workshops withumbrella business associations, and in many countriesprivate sector representatives have participated in for-mal structures overseeing or drafting strategies. InBolivia, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, and Uganda, gov-ernments have explicitly sought to ensure the partici-pation of small businesses and/or small farmers. Kenyaand Madagascar have held periodic consultations be-tween private sector representatives and governmenton policy matters. In Ethiopia, the Chamber ofCommerce established working groups whose conclu-sions were taken into account by the government (Box4.2). Private sector representatives also have been in-volved in PRSP review processes in Bolivia and BurkinaFaso. Private sector organizations in Benin, Honduras,and Senegal have taken the initiative through thechamber of commerce to comment on the PRSP or topresent proposals, thus motivating governments to askthem for more involvement. In Ghana, the privatesector participates in an annual national economicdialogue.

POLITICAL OR ECONOMIC EVENTS

Political and economic events can preempt the atten-tion of governments and stakeholders and affect theownership of long-term poverty reduction goals. Thecountry strategy process has helped to maintain conti-nuity of policy through government transitions inBolivia, Ghana, and Honduras, although not withoutsome influence of the new governments’ political plat-forms on existing policy. Ownership is being challengednow in Bolivia and Côte d’Ivoire where political un-rest and violence are eroding confidence in govern-

Box 4.1 Parliamentary involvementas a multi-faceted process

To be sustainable, long-term strategies and visions needto involve all the institutional actors of a polity. Aselective bodies representing a wide spectrum of opin-ions and ideas, parliaments can become an importantarena to broaden consensus. However, parliamentaryinstitutions are complex structures. Far from being sim-ply the collection of representatives of the electoralbody, parliaments comprise political groups, standingand select committees, ad hoc commissions, and theplenary. Individual parliamentarians can bring into theconsultation process the views of their constituents,who may often comprise the poorest strata of society,although in some parliamentary systems parliamen-tarians are elected through political party mechanismsthat are not entirely representative. Political groupscan become the institutional tool to involve all po-litical forces in the process. Parliamentary commit-tees can provide an informed and expert view on dif-ferent issues. Select committees and ad hoc commis-sions can focus on poverty in a structured and system-atic fashion. The plenary, whose proceedings are oftenbroadcast nationally, can become the arena where de-bate and consensus on poverty reduction builds up.To achieve real participation and ownership, theeffective involvement of parliamentary institutionsshould be as multi-faceted and wide-ranging as are par-liaments themselves.

Country Ownership 19

ments. In Guyana for a time, an increase in politicaland social tensions diverted attention away from long-term vision and strategy development, and in Mada-gascar an NGO-formed PRSP monitoring group wasdiscontinued during the crisis. In Zambia, the PRSPprocess stalled during the election, as it did in the Cen-tral African Republic in the aftermath of a coup d’état.In Eritrea, the political situation has limited debate.In Honduras and Nicaragua, Hurricane Mitch severelyaffected infrastructure and key exports, such as bananas,coffee, cane sugar, sesame and shrimp, resulting in ashort-term focus almost solely on reconstruction.

CAPACITY CONSTRAINTS

Capacity to formulate strategy is a necessary condi-tion for ownership. It is weak in most low-income coun-tries. Government’s ability to tap the capacity of civilsociety and the private sector is relatively strong in afew countries, but it needs significant improvement inmany others, particularly those with a limited historyof consultation. Several countries have relatively weak

institutions and weak regulations that are not ad-equately enforced. Public sector performance and ac-countability are crucial, and civil service reforms areunderway in several countries where policies and in-centives do not motivate staff or reward performance.Shortages of adequately motivated professionals inpublic service are a major difficulty in many countries.

Civil society and private sector capacity are se-verely limited in many countries. Skilled and capablepeople are the backbone of country capacity, but somecountries still face widespread illiteracy and low edu-cation levels. And in other countries a pervasiveplanned economy culture is still a limiting factor.

CONCLUSIONS

• Government leadership in involving stakehold-ers in strategy and policy formulation is increas-ing, but is sometimes exercised reluctantly.

• Even some countries that are making progressexpress uncertainty in embarking on the pro-cesses usually needed to build consensus forreforms.

• Citizens have increasingly been consultedabout their priorities for action, but, with no-table exceptions, inconsistent or weak followup raises doubts about the sincerity of govern-ment efforts.

• Systematic involvement of parliaments and ofthe private sector in vision and strategy de-velopment is vital but often missing.

• Country ownership is often affected by politi-cal or economic turmoil, but can help coun-tries continue to strive for shared long-termgoals even in difficult times, and especiallythrough successive political cycles in stablecountries.

NOTES

1. Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Senegal, Uganda, Viet-nam, Zambia.

2. Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea, Rwanda, Uganda,Zambia.

Box 4.2 Making the private sectora development partner: Ethiopia

In the process leading up to the completion of thePRSP, the Government of Ethiopia engaged in a se-ries of consultations with the private sector to discussimpediments to the establishment of an enabling busi-ness environment. Between March and May 2002,extensive discussions were held between governmentofficials and private sector representatives on capac-ity building, decentralization, and service delivery.Between June and July 2002, workshops were orga-nized in six different cities by the Government, theEthiopian Chamber of Commerce, and the donor com-munity, leading up to a two-day consultation on Pri-vate Sector Development and Pro-Poor Growth. Theresulting proposals for reform were to a large extentaccepted by the Government and incorporated intothe PRSP.

5COUNTRY-LED PARTNERSHIP


To be more effective, external assistance needs to bebetter aligned with poverty reduction strategies, anddepends on the harmonization of development assis-tance agencies’ policies, practices, and procedures.Country resource and capacity constraints require thatexternal partners take steps to help improve their col-lective efficiency, by reducing the costs of doing busi-ness and helping to strengthen country capacities tomeet accepted standards. The poverty reduction strat-egy implementation process creates an opening tochange traditional donor-recipient relationships byproviding a coherent framework for assistance to be-come recipient-driven, and by providing grounds forintegrating external assistance into the national bud-getary process as quickly as country standards permit.

Country ownership will be greater and last longerif those who help formulate policies and strategies be-come partners in implementation. Although the pri-vate sector sometimes plays a limited role in strategydevelopment or implementation in most of the 48 coun-tries, it has a clear and central role as a partner. So toodoes civil society, both to augment the government’simplementation capacity and to preserve social cohe-sion. Many governments have made plans to involveCSOs in implementing poverty reduction strategies.

Only three of the 48 countries—Rwanda, Uganda,and Vietnam—have managed to take material lead ofthe coordination process, particularly of external part-ners’ contributions but also increasingly internal part-ners. Another 30 percent of countries are takingpromising action, mainly in the context of the consul-tative group or roundtable processes. In most coun-tries, government leadership of the coordination ofexternal and internal partners remains an elusive goal(Figure 5.1, Column 1).

The alignment of partners’ assistance with povertyreduction strategies is well advanced in only 10 percentof the countries;1 and all of these countries have fairlywell-developed strategies (Figure 5.1, Column 2). Intwo-thirds of the countries, alignment is not happen-ing, in some because a unified well-developed national

21

strategy does not yet exist, although partners seem tobe sensitive to the evolving situation. Many partnerscannot extricate themselves quickly from programs oflong standing; hence a lag in alignment is to be expected.

Partly for the same reasons, the ways in which part-ners are delivering their financial and non-financialassistance has only started the process of change. Inone third of the countries, external partners are takingsteps to adopt instruments that are better suited to scal-ing up the impact of their assistance: they are increas-ing their support for sector-wide approaches, offeringsome general budget support, and rethinking how bestto deliver advice and analytical support. This changeis most advanced in Uganda. But in the remaining two-thirds of countries, many of them either LICUS orconflict-affected, little progress has been observed (Fig-ure 5.1, Column 3).

The great majority of external partners continueto provide technical assistance for strengtheningcapacity, mostly associated with the implementationof their operations. However, only in seven of the 48countries are external partners taking action to bringgreater coordination and coherence to the delivery ofsupport for capacity building.2 In only a few are exter-nal partners making a consolidated effort to addressthe major capacity bottlenecks that hinder develop-ment effectiveness as a whole (Figure 5.1, Column 4).

The harmonization of policies and procedures onprocurement, financial management, and safeguardshas received extraordinary attention in the past yearfrom the multilateral development banks and bilat-eral aid agencies,3 and the record of progress shows thatin more than 20 percent of the countries some harmo-nization is taking place, although no country standsout. In the remaining countries, harmonization is adistant goal (Figure 5.1, Column 5).

In addition to addressing the delivery of differentkinds of support, working toward country-led partner-ship also requires external partners to make organiza-tional and behavioral adjustments consistent with theCDF principles. Country-led partnership is impossibleif external partners are not prepared or not equippedto collaborate with a wide range of actors on the


ground. Encouraging learning and knowledge sharingto support in-country needs, recruiting staff with askills-mix that includes partnership and integrativeskills, or, most often, delegating decision-making tothe country level, are being considered in three quar-ters of the countries. However, action is being takenin only 20 percent of the countries, and in no countrycan it be said that such changes are largely developed(Figure 5.1, Column 6).

GOVERNMENT LEADERSHIP AND COORDINATION

Governments are increasingly coordinating the imple-mentation of poverty reduction strategies, particularlyin countries where country ownership is strongest. Formany years, consultative group (CG) meetings androundtables (RT) have been a cornerstone for country-level meetings of government and external partners,and in several countries they have been evolving intoa much more effective instrument for engaging andcoordinating the contributions of partners both exter-nal and internal. They are now increasingly held in-country, with an expanded range of participants that

include internal partners, are chaired or jointly chairedby the government, and are more interactive anddialogue-based (Box 5.1).

Effectively engaging partners is a continuous pro-cess that needs to go beyond CG/RT meetings andneeds clear government leadership. Building trustamong government, national stakeholders, and exter-nal partners is central to improving collaboration.Despite encouraging examples of governments takingthe lead in coordinating PRSP implementation, ex-ternal partners are still leading coordination in mostcountries. Several countries have institutionalized dif-ferent formats for engaging partners, but more thanhalf of the 48 countries have made little progress inthis area.

ALIGNMENT WITH POVERTY

REDUCTION STRATEGIES

External Partners

A growing number of external partners accept the PRSPas a framework that is owned and driven by developing

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Figure 5.1 Country-led Partnership(percent of countries falling in each assessment category)

Percent

Government leadership andcoordination

Partners’ assistancestrategy alignment

Financial andnon-financial

support alignment

Coherentcapacity support

6%

48%

17%

10%

23%

13%

54%

15%

56%

29% 23%

56%

21%

Appropriatepartnershipbehaviors

31%

17%

50%

2%

Harmonizationof policies and

procedures

29%

35%

42%

23%



Country-Led Partnership 23

Box 5.1 The changing role ofconsultative groups and roundtables:towards integrated country strategies

Changing objectives: Countries including Ethiopia,Ghana, Rwanda, and Vietnam are increasingly usingthe CG/RT mechanisms to formally present and dis-cuss their PRSPs; achieve consensus on PRSP priori-ties; call external partners to align their assistancebehind the PRSP priorities; and address issues of thebroader partnership and alignment agenda.

Changing venue and expanding the range of partici-pants: Many countries (Benin, Cambodia, Eritrea,Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos,Malawi, Mongolia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania,Uganda, Vietnam, and Zambia) are holding CG/RTmeetings in-country. This enables broad participationof national stakeholders, including representatives ofsectoral ministries, local private sector, and civil soci-ety. It contributes to a better understanding of devel-opment challenges, increases transparency and mu-tual accountability among national developmentstakeholders, and strengthens national ownership.

Changing roles: External partners, specifically theBank, UNDP, regional development banks, and theEU have traditionally played a convening role in pre-paring and chairing CG/RT meetings.a Within theframework of country ownership and government lead-ership, this is beginning to change. In some countries(Bolivia, Mali, Niger, Pakistan, and Rwanda), the gov-ernment now chairs CG/RT meetings. In other coun-tries (Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kyrgyz Repub-lic, Laos, Mongolia, Vietnam, Yemen, and Zambia), itis jointly chaired.

Changing format: With the expanding participationof national stakeholders, the design of CG/RT meet-ings becomes increasingly important. The meetingsare moving to a much more interactive, dialogue-baseddesign. For example, during the April 2002 GhanaCG meeting, six permanent government-externalpartners’ sector groups met to discuss the country’sPRSP at the sectoral level.

a. The World Bank traditionally (co-) chairs CG meetings forabout 60 countries, UNDP and partner countries traditionally con-vene and chair RT meetings for about 20 countries, and regionaldevelopment banks chair CGs for another five countries. See JohnEriksson, The Drive to Partnership: Aid Coordination and the WorldBank, Operations Evaluation Department, The World Bank, 2001.

countries and being used for aligning assistance strate-gies with countries’ priorities. In almost half of the 48countries, external partners have made progress instrengthening and better coordinating external assis-tance in one of several areas—institutionalized mecha-nisms for aid coordination, alignment of externalfinancing with the PRSP and/or budget process, moreflexible financing modalities, and initial steps in work-ing with other external partners on harmonizing poli-cies and procedures. In the other countries, politicalinstability, governance issues, and conflict have some-times stood in the way of better-coordinated externalassistance. Their public sector and fiduciary systemsneed significant support to develop the capacity toimplement the needed reforms. In many such situa-tions, external partners take wait-and-see positions.

Internal Partners

Local governments

Governments in a considerable number of countriessee decentralization and devolution as ways to empowerindividuals and foster ownership and participation, aswell as to implement poverty-reduction strategies.Countries still in the process of preparing a PRSP en-visage some form of devolution of power and compe-tencies to local authorities in order to enhance theparticipation process and tackle poverty at thegrassroots level; they include Armenia, Cameroon,Georgia, and Madagascar. In some cases, notablyYemen, central governments have transferred, or planto transfer, competencies in the area of health and edu-cation to local communities with a view to strength-ening the participation of civil society in managingthese sectors. In Kyrgyz Republic, stimulating thesystem of local self-government and budget decentrali-zation is regarded as a means to foster greater relianceon CSOs and community potential in resolvingregional issues.

Public-private partnerships

Public-private partnerships in the implementation ofstrategies and policies can enhance ownership and ef-fectively contribute to reducing poverty. Private sec-tor development is critical to raise productivity andallow the poor to secure jobs and start businesses. Todeliver better basic services for poor people may re-quire reliance on private actors, focusing the publicsector on improving regulations and on building insti-tutional capacity.4


Several countries that have already completed aPRSP envisage strong partnerships between the privateand the public sector in implementing policies andstrategies, but the role of the private sector in imple-mentation is still far from widespread and often lim-ited in scope. Most of the 48 countries have notenvisaged such partnerships.

Governments foresee a strong role for the privatesector in areas where private operators have alreadybeen active, often in infrastructure. Some PRSPsenvisage a role for private actors in education, withan exclusive or quasi-exclusive role in pre-primaryeducation and vocational training, health, and tour-ism. Private actors are increasingly seen as importantpartners in the development of agriculture and food-marketing systems. Honduras will seek private-sector support in the reform of the pension system.Mali foresees a greater involvement of the privatesector in economic policy decision-making.Cameroon, which encourages SMEs to produce thegoods and services most in demand by the poor, willurge large businesses to subcontract with SMEs toensure viability and transfer of technologies. However,few countries have established or plan to establishformal arrangements institutionalizing private-publicpartnerships.

Civil society—nongovernmental organizations

Implementation partnerships between the public andprivate sector should be complemented by a strongalliance between civil society and government. Indi-viduals need to be motivated to be fully involved, andtherefore be confident that policy implementationdirectly involves them. Involvement creates socialcapital, which has proven essential to reduce poverty,through the internal social and cultural cohesion ofsociety, norms, and values governing interactionsamong people. Social cohesion can be preserved anddeveloped only if civil society is actively involved inthe transformation of society that development alwaysimplies.

A number of governments envisage a role for civilsociety in implementing poverty reduction strategies(Box 5.2). Among countries that have completed aPRSP, several plan to involve civil society organiza-tions in policy implementation. Some governmentshave acknowledged that civil society could play a use-ful role but do not yet have solid plans for this pur-pose. Among the countries that are still preparingPRSPs, only a few do refer to the need to involve civilsociety in implementation.

FINANCIAL AND NON-FINANCIAL SUPPORT

Financial support

In countries with the most advanced poverty reduc-tion strategies, implementation support for these strat-egies is moving away from stand-alone projects towarda programmatic approach, typically at the sectoral level(Box 5.3). For a recipient country, programmatic sup-port has the advantage of improving the predictabilityof external financing; its prerequisites are a crediblestrategy that focuses on results, along with a soundpublic expenditure framework and appropriate stan-dards of transparency and governance in budgetaryprocesses and execution. The shift to more program-matic support reflects the commitment by developmentassistance agencies to align their assistance with pov-erty reduction strategies, and to harmonize their poli-cies, procedures, and processes.5 Using programmaticapproaches allows them to synchronize their assistancewith the country’s planning and review cycles for policydialogue, and to provide resources on a predictablemulti-year basis.

Box 5.2 The role of civil societyorganizations

Civil society organizations have been involved in ag-riculture, rural development, and water management,mainly through cooperation with government (inAlbania, Benin, Bolivia, Cambodia, Ghana, KyrgyzRepublic, Malawi, Mauritania, Nicaragua, Rwanda,and Uganda). In some cases CSOs are regarded asimportant players in micro financing and in provid-ing loans for SMEs (Bolivia, Cambodia, Guinea,Guyana, Honduras, and Nicaragua). Cooperation withuniversities, research institutions, parents’ associations,and CSOs has been planned in education and train-ing (Albania, Cambodia, Ghana, Honduras, theKyrgyz Republic, Malawi, and Rwanda). In Uganda,CSOs have been involved in the democratization pro-cess through formal monitoring of elections. In Benin,private think tanks and civil society organizations areexpected to be part of the Social Change ObservatorySystem, monitoring the effects of reform on society.In Albania, bar associations are expected to be amongthe institutions monitoring the protection of humanrights in legal and judicial procedures. In Bolivia, civilsociety organizations are expected to participate inthe National System for Risk Reduction and DisasterManagement.


In several countries, some external partners haveagreed to support the government’s overall approachand strategy, channeling more of their assistancethrough the national budget.6 For example, the Euro-pean Union and/or bilateral donors are providing bud-getary support to several countries. Agreed performanceindicators/benchmarks are used as criteria for disburs-ing budget support within a coordinated framework,with the aim of streamlining conditionality and re-ducing transaction costs (in Malawi and Tanzania), anddisbursements are to some degree linked with the bud-get cycle (in Malawi and Burkina Faso).

In many of the low-income countries that are justbeginning to implement poverty reduction strategies,some external partners remain cautious about program-matic support. While a number of external partnersare moving toward such support, mostly in the form ofsector-wide approaches, projects continue to play a sig-nificant role. Some development assistance agenciescite countries’ weak public expenditure and fiduciarymanagement systems and their shortage of capacity formanaging aid flows efficiently. Some argue that theirmandates preclude them from providing programmaticbudget support or harmonizing their policies and pro-cedures related to project lending; some face internalresistance to such reforms from within, and many havestaff and consultants in client countries who resist themove to programmatic support.

Experience indicates that project support can beas effective as budgetary support if it is provided underthe umbrella of agreed sector policies. Looking ahead,

a key factor in moving from project-based planningand implementation to programmatic approaches withcommon financing mechanisms is the strength of therecipient country’s budget processes and fiduciary sys-tems. Linking financial support to the performance ofthese systems is a difficult but important entry pointfor improving governance, as well as being essentialfor increasing the overall effectiveness of developmentpolicies and programs.

Joint analytical work

In a few cases, joint analytical work with external part-ners is being undertaken under country leadership. Inmost cases, collaboration between external partners hasbeen increasing but without leadership from withinthe country. Participatory poverty assessments involv-ing several external partners and civil society are be-coming increasingly common, and have underpinnedthe formulation of country strategies. In some coun-tries, the Bank and other agencies are undertakingpublic expenditure reviews jointly with the govern-ment. In Albania, the government is developing a ruralstrategy jointly with the Bank and other partners, whilein Ethiopia a whole range of joint assessments is beingcarried out with respect to the fiduciary and monitor-ing and evaluation systems. Increasingly, partners suchas the World Bank, UNDP, EU, or IMF together iden-tify knowledge gaps to be filled and jointly undertakethe necessary work. In Burkina Faso, strategies in keysectors (transport, education, health) are being pre-pared jointly with external partners.

In moving toward programmatic support, manycountries are undertaking annual public expenditurereviews in collaboration with external partners. InTanzania, a PER Working Group, including the gov-ernment, external partners, research and academicinstitutions, and NGOs, determines the agenda for theannual public expenditure process, guides and financesthe implementation of the agreed work program, andreviews all outputs. Elsewhere the Bank in collabora-tion with other external partners has completed, or ispreparing, country financial accountability assessmentsand country procurement assessment reports, to iden-tify gaps and constraints in the national financial andprocurement systems in order to build up capacity. Thistype of joint work has the following benefits: (1) trans-fer of knowledge and expertise, (2) effective use ofresources, and (3) better understanding of the budget-ary issues and the reform agenda by the wider public,which can help to improve the basis for consensus inselecting policy options. It is increasingly being brought

Box 5.3 The role of sector-wideapproaches

Almost 20 countries are receiving support using sec-tor-wide approaches in the health sector, and many ofthe same countries are also receiving such support ineducation, agriculture, or other sectors. The most suc-cessful sectoral programs have a relatively clear visionor theme for the sector, such as universal primary edu-cation in Uganda, or decentralization of funding tointegrated district health services in Ghana. A reviewof progress with sector-wide approaches has confirmedthat governments need a wide-ranging and high-levelcommitment to a strategy to which donors can broadlyagree. Linkage to a credible medium-term budget pro-cess and civil service reform process helps to ensurethe approach is realistic. Policy change happensthrough consultation, persuasion, and alignment overan extended period.


together under one framework with capacity buildingas its central objective.

Countries themselves need to step up their effortsto build capacity for undertaking analytic work, andfor fostering broad-based national ownership of thiswork and its policy implications.

Support for capacity development

External partners have made little progress in aligningand prioritizing their support for capacity development,and almost all the 48 countries continue to need morecohesive support in this area. There are a few examplesof donor-aligned capacity development support, suchas the Benin public expenditure review or the Boliviainstitutional reform program, where external partnershave been providing integrated technical and finan-cial assistance for implementation. In Ethiopia, GuineaBissau, Lao PDR, and Madagascar, external partnersare beginning to support and help coordinate effortsto assess capacity needs.

HARMONIZATION OF OPERATIONAL

POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

Progress has also been limited in harmonizing externalpartners’ financial management and procurement poli-cies, procedures, and practices. Harmonization effortsat the country level are just beginning. They can suc-ceed, if carried out simultaneously with efforts at theinstitutional level, in an environment of strong govern-ment leadership and commitment to improving publicsector management. By providing leadership and clearobjectives some developing countries are establishingfavorable conditions for harmonization.

Drawing on country financial accountability as-sessments, modifications to government and exter-nal partner policies, procedures, and practices can beidentified that make development assistance moreefficient, accountable, and transparent. In Cambo-dia, the Bank and ADB have collaborated to producejoint operational procedures and a joint financialmanagement manual designed to train local govern-ment staff managing development assistance. A fewcountries have made progress in harmonizing procure-ment procedures.7

PARTNERSHIP BEHAVIORS

While external partners’ changes in policies and struc-tures are important, the biggest challenge lies in staff

behavioral and organizational culture changes. In thepast, staff have tended to be recruited and promotedfor their technical competencies and skills. Whilethese competencies are still relevant, working in linewith the CDF principles requires additional compe-tencies and behaviors with a high premium onpartnering, relationship building, dialogue, and cross-sectoral work.

External partners’ staff have developed strong andeffective forms of collaboration, including monthlymeetings at the technical and sectoral level, in Hon-duras. This has been facilitated by significant institu-tional changes of some partners, including CanadianCIDA that has delegated all decision-making on thecountry budget to the country office. Another exampleis Uganda where, driven by the multi-sectoral require-ments of the PRSC, the Bank’s PRSC team developednew ways of cross-sectoral collaboration within theBank, with external partners and with the country.There is a single, integrated team that works on thePRSC, instead of a stream of missions to prepare sec-tor-specific projects.8 This collaboration has broughtto the forefront cross-cutting issues that affect all thesectors. Despite such promising examples, in severalcountries officials from development assistance agen-cies are still perceived as not supporting CDF prin-ciples. To counteract the risk of key staff not beingable to work in a partnership mode, institutions arebeginning to look at recruitment and promotion anew.An interesting example is provided by UNDG, whichin recent years has established an independent assess-ment system, where all prospective Resident Repre-sentatives are assessed on their ability to promote andwork in partnership.

External partners can be slow in adapting tocountry-level needs. Some partners are making effortsto decentralize their decision making process to thecountry level, while simplifying and modernizing poli-cies and procedures at the agency level. Reducing in-efficiencies and transaction costs has become a centralfocus for the Bank and other MDBs, as well as forbilaterals such as Canada, the Netherlands, Norway,Sweden, and the UK.

CONCLUSIONS

• External partners are increasingly seeking toalign their assistance with PRSPs. Yet manyPRSPs, particularly IPRSPs, are not sufficientlyspecific or comprehensive to allow for substan-tial alignment.


• Countries are receiving a lot of support for ca-pacity development from external partners, butthe scope for greater coherence is evident.There is great scope for more country-led andbetter-coordinated analytical support.

• Several external partners are adopting pro-grammatic budget support. But project financ-ing continues to play a significant role andlikely will continue to do so, given the predi-lections of some development agencies, andthe time that countries need to build up theirpublic expenditure and fiduciary managementsystems in readiness for programmatic support.Sector-wide approaches are proving effectivein these circumstances.

• Several harmonization initiatives are beingpursued to help low-income countries improvetheir accountability standards and overallmanagement of aid.

NOTES

1. Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Vietnam.2. Bolivia, Ethiopia, Ghana, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda,

Vietnam.3. High-Level Forum on Harmonization (Sec M 2003-

0088), February 28, 2003.4. Private Sector Development Strategy. Issues and Options.

A Discussion Document (June 1, 2001) and Private Sector De-velopment Strategy. Directions for the World Bank Group (April9, 2002).

5. Review of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP)Approach: Main Findings, DC 2002-0003, March 27, 2002.

6. Development Effectiveness and Scaling Up: Lessons andChallenges from Case Studies, DC 2002-0018, September 18,2002.

7. Country Level Harmonization: Emerging ImplementationLessons, OPCS, The World Bank, Washington, DC, 2003.

8. Aligning Assistance for Development Effectiveness, Prom-ising Country Experience, CDF Secretariat, The World Bank,February 2003.

6FOCUS ON DEVELOPMENT RESULTS


The fourth principle of the CDF approach is a focuson development results—monitoring developmentoutcomes and making information on progress widelyavailable. Strategies seldom escape the need for mid-course adjustment, either of targets or of the strategiesthemselves. To judge whether adjustments are neededto meet country goals, including those related to theMDGs, requires reliable information on inputs andoutcomes.

Both quantitative and qualitative data are key tothe effectiveness of development strategies. The de-sign of realistic budgets for these strategies depends onhaving accurate financial information on the programsthat the budget is to fund. And information on bud-geted expenditures must be complemented with infor-mation on how these expenditures are affecting povertyreduction and progress towards medium-term goals. Inpractice, however, insufficient statistical capacity, poorgovernance, and the presence of extra-budgetary pro-grams and unaccounted budgets of some parastatalentities often make it very difficult to generate reli-able data. More than 40 percent of countries are act-ing to improve their information systems to allowgovernments to manage and coordinate the develop-ment process. In the other 60 percent of countries,these capacities are only incipient, making develop-ment management and coordination fundamentallyweak (Figure 6.1, Column 1).

If the development process is to be a partnershipeffort between government and other stakeholders,then information must be publicly accessible. Govern-ments can only be accountable to civil society and tothe private sector if there is a way to gauge the costsand benefits of any given program. In addition, exter-nal partners need to be able to verify whether theircontributions have been used as intended, and theextent to which programs have attained the goals theybelieved they were supporting. Providing access todevelopment information to stakeholders also facili-tates their participation in strategy formulation andadjustment. Active measures are needed to make this

29

happen, breaking the potential barriers of illiteracy,distance to remote locations, and language differences.Relying on publications or internet-based systems alonemay not achieve the goal; the media can also play apivotal role. About one of four countries is taking ac-tion to make information available to the public (Fig-ure 6.1, Column 2).

To implement their strategies, countries need func-tioning monitoring and evaluation systems and a mecha-nism to translate the findings from M&E into correctiveactions to keep countries on the path to meeting theirgoals, including those related to the MDGs. More thanone fourth of the countries are taking action in this area,some of which have made strong progress (Figure 6.1,Column 3).1 As one might expect, none of the LICUSis making a lot of progress in this area.

Members of civil society and the private sector are,as direct stakeholders of poverty reduction strategies,well placed to monitor their implementation, and theirexplicit inclusion in monitoring and evaluation alsostrengthens the government’s accountability for results.Parliamentary bodies, for their part, have just as im-portant a role to play in monitoring and scrutinizingthe implementation of strategies as they have in for-mulating national goals and designing strategy.

AVAILABILITY OF INFORMATION ON RESULTS

The availability of information on development re-sults is limited. Such information is difficult to obtain,whether through household surveys, participatory pov-erty assessments, censuses, or other statistical ap-proaches, especially for countries with limited capacity.Not surprisingly, countries with former commandeconomies tend to have better information on programoutcomes; they carry out household surveys and cen-suses at regular intervals2 and their statistical systemshave better-defined ways for keeping track of the pro-vision of services. Certain other countries have a longstatistical tradition and carry out their own surveysregularly. Some countries have been working for sometime to build up their social indicators statisticalsystems, making significant progress and scheduling


surveys. Other countries are just beginning to plan orcarry out their first surveys.

Data gathering on results has improved with thedrive by the international community to reduce pov-erty. A number of initiatives, especially the Millen-nium Development Goals, the comprehensive povertydiagnostics that precede the preparation of povertyreduction strategy papers, and poverty and social im-pact analyses, have made available more data on pov-erty. The UNDP “poverty observatories,” as well asefforts by others such as AFRISTAT, and “Paris 21,” aglobal partnership program, are also boosting the avail-ability of information on the impact of developmentprograms on poverty although in some cases they arecreating duplication of efforts. In many countries, ex-ternal partners finance household surveys and censuses,although not at regular intervals and often with differ-ent methodologies.

STAKEHOLDERS’ ACCESS TO

RESULTS INFORMATION

Given the diversity of the groups that need access toinformation, the means by which information is trans-mitted are highly relevant. Explanatory publications

accessible to the public at large multiply the impact ofavailable information. The media plays a key role indisseminating development information, and unbiasedreporting can enhance transparency and increase theaccountability of all stakeholders. In many countries,illiteracy and language differences present barriers todisseminating information. Even for people who canread, print publications may be expensive and difficultto disseminate widely, while internet access is still quitenarrowly confined. Television or radio, depending oncountry circumstances, typically reaches more people.

Few countries widely disseminate information onresults. Uganda, more noticeably than the other coun-tries studied, has an active policy of disseminating in-formation about progress on its poverty reductionstrategy, through monthly press conferences of lead-ing government officials, regular publications, radio inmultiple dialects, special explanatory publications, andindicators to end-users even at the program level ineducational and health facilities. The policy allowsend-users of the programs to understand what is goingon and gauge the success or failure of the programs.

Some other governments have special commu-nication policies to help the public follow povertyreduction efforts. Several have a tradition of making

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

Figure 6.1 Focus on Development Results(percent of countries falling in each assessment category)

Percent

Developmentinformation systems

Stakeholders’ access todevelopment information

2%

40%

15%

44%

33%

40%

23%

Managing fordevelopment results

2%

25%

19%

54%

2%2%



Focus on Development Results 31

information available to the media and allowing con-siderable coverage of government activities, and some,including, Azerbaijan and Guinea, air regular televi-sion programs for discussion of the main issues. Manygovernments have opened websites for the discussionand eventual follow-up of their development strate-gies; some of these websites include information aboutspending, inputs and outcomes. Country Gateways, thecountry-level components of the Development Gate-way, are under construction in a number of countries.Chad, Tajikistan, and Yemen issue information in alltheir most widely used languages.

In a number of countries that have traditionallylimited access to information, some stakeholder groupsmay not get information on development strategies andimplementation progress. In some cases, informationis released gradually to different groups. In Armenia,Kyrgyz Republic, and Vietnam, governments are ex-ploring innovative ways of disseminating information,breaking with a more restrictive tradition.

RESULTS INFORMATION AND

STRATEGY ADJUSTMENT

On the whole, countries’ monitoring of progress to-ward the MDGs as adapted through PRSs needs moreattention.3 Despite the increased emphasis on quanti-tative targets, few PRSPs follow through with moni-toring and evaluation programs. Only a few countrieshave systems that monitor MDG indicators.

Attention to the monitoring and evaluation of out-comes remains largely insufficient and is mostly directedto projects funded by external partners. But some coun-tries are starting to put into place monitoring and evalu-ation systems that gather country-level resultsinformation related to achievement of the MDGs andother long-term goals defined in PRSPs, and that areuseful for reassessing strategy. These M&E efforts arebeing undertaken largely in a participatory fashion.

Participation in government-ledmonitoring and evaluation

Several governments consult different stakeholders,domestic and external, when the time comes to evalu-ate outcomes and reassess strategy. A number of coun-tries have established special units within governmentto track development outcomes, analyze them and, onthat basis, make recommendations for adjustment ofstrategies. However, continuing and deepening stake-holder involvement in the strategy monitoring pro-cess, after the initial consultations on vision and goals,

remains a challenge for all countries. Institutionaliz-ing frameworks for ongoing stakeholder involvementmakes continued participation more likely. Govern-ment efforts toward institutionalization have takenvarious forms:

• Continued broad consultation: Mauritania has ahighly participatory process for following upthe PRSP and preparing an implementationreport: an annual NGO workshop for morethan 100 NGOs and national conferences andinterregional consensus-building workshops toassess the implementation of the PRSP.Burkina Faso involves stakeholders in a PRSPreview process, involving a series of at leastfour regional workshops attended by more than450 representatives of civil society, the privatesector, development assistance agencies, andlocal and central government. In Bolivia andGhana, the governments are committed toregular review meetings with external partnersin order to gauge progress.

• Legal framework for the participatory process:Bolivia’s National Dialogue process, underwaysince 2000 among government, civil society,and private sector representatives, has definedthe priority programs in the PRSP and is de-veloping follow-up participatory mechanisms.The National Dialogue is now institutional-ized in a law that establishes periodic reviewsevery three years.

• Monitoring bodies that include stakeholder partici-pation: Tanzania has established a strategy formonitoring poverty reduction initiatives, in-tegrating a broad cross-section of internal andexternal partners in working groups.4 In Nica-ragua, a wide range of internal stakeholdersare involved in a strategic planning commit-tee created in the aftermath of Hurricane Mitch.This committee now provides follow-up to theNicaraguan PRSP. In Honduras, to monitorprogress on poverty reduction initiatives, thegovernment has set up a consultative commit-tee of representatives of civil society andNGOs. In Bolivia, civil society monitors PRSPprograms through local oversight committees.Uganda’s Poverty Action Fund, which usesdebt-relief proceeds to supplement thegovernment’s budgeted efforts in poverty re-duction, is administered in conjunction withUgandan CSOs, which monitor expendituresand outcomes at the district level.


CSO initiatives in monitoring and evaluation

Several cases show CSOs taking the initiative in moni-toring and evaluation activities independent from orparallel to government-led processes. These initiativescan make a significant contribution to the develop-ment of government accountability in achieving de-velopment results.

In some countries, CSOs are working to influencebudget processes, allocation decisions, and monitor-ing of expenditures, and are learning and adapting vari-ous methods for these purposes. In Ethiopia, forexample, CSOs are exploring other countries’ civilsociety programs for budget analysis and monitoring,CSO-administered report cards to evaluate govern-ment service, and assessment of PRSP outcomesthrough self-rated poverty surveys. They are consider-ing monitoring the Ethiopian PRSP for its adherenceto CDF principles. This area needs greater harmoniza-tion of external partner reporting and evaluation re-quirements, and greater and more coherentcapacity-building efforts. In Ghana, one CSO hasstarted to analyze and track budget decisions and ispreparing to monitor public service delivery with citi-zen report cards, as part of PRSP monitoring. CSOs inUganda have started to adapt methods such as thepublic expenditure tracking surveys (PETS) for CSOinput and budget tracking. In Albania, the city ofTirana has piloted a survey of the quality of serviceand user satisfaction through citizen report cards.

Role of Parliaments

Parliaments make an invaluable contribution to keep-ing development programs on track. They are the in-stitutions through which the people’s views are formallychanneled through elections and taken into accountin the country’s decision-making process. Parliamentscan determine whether poverty reduction policies areadequately reflected in national budgets; they canmonitor outcomes and decide whether a strategy needsadjustment.

The formal involvement of parliaments in moni-toring and discussing the results of poverty-reductionstrategies remains weak and limited in most of the 48countries. Among countries that have completedPRSPs, only a few have explicitly envisaged a formalrole for parliaments in monitoring and reviewing theimplementation of poverty-reduction strategies. InUganda, monitoring is embedded in the annual bud-get formulation, with the PRSP Progress Report sub-

mitted to parliament as background for the budget. InBolivia, the National Dialogue Law requires the gov-ernment to submit annual reports on strategy imple-mentation to the National Congress. In Ghana, aParliamentary Select Committee will monitor theimplementation of the PRSP. In Guinea, annual bud-get debates will include a special section on povertyreduction strategy results and achievements. In Beninand the Gambia, parliamentarians will sit in the moni-toring commissions beside other stakeholders. In Al-bania and Cambodia, governments intend to fullyinvolve parliamentary bodies in the implementationprocess. In Mozambique, Parliament is expected toevaluate outcomes and recommend adjustments tostrategy.

CONCLUSIONS

• For most low-income countries, weak publicsector management systems and other capac-ity shortfalls make managing for results a dis-tant aim.

• Information on budget and country level out-comes is inadequate, and when available it isoften gathered using different methodologies,producing data that are not always comparableover time.

• With notable exceptions, the flow of publicinformation on results is limited.

• Almost no countries have adequate monitor-ing and evaluation efforts at the country level,jeopardizing meaningful adjustment of povertyreduction strategies.

• Very few of the countries with PRSPs give par-liament a formal role in monitoring and re-viewing progress toward development goals.Strengthening the role of parliaments is justas important as strengthening that of the ex-ecutive branch of power.

NOTES

1. Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Hon-duras, Malawi, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda,Vietnam.

2. The emphasis of household surveys is defined by theobjectives of individual country strategies. These surveys mayfocus on poverty, household expenditure, demographics,health, education, or a combination.

3. See also the 2002 Annual Review of Development Ef-fectiveness: Achieving Development Outcomes: The Millennium

Focus on Development Results 33

Challenge. Operations Evaluation Department, The WorldBank, Washington, DC, 2002.

4. Tanzania was one of the first countries to publish areport (with UNDP) on progress toward the MDGs, and in2002 it produced a report on costing the achievement of

the MDGs. See Aligning Assistance for Development Effective-ness: Promising Country Experience, CDF Secretariat, TheWorld Bank, Washington, DC, February 2003, and IDAResults Measurement System: Progress and Proposals, IDA/SecM2003-0060, February 20, 2003.

ANNEXES

35

ANNEX 1. COUNTRIES COVERED BY THE ANALYSIS

(Status as of end-October 2002)

Date of PRSP Conflict AffectedCountry Document or LICUS Traits

AfricaBenin IP – Jun 2000*Burkina Faso P – May 2000Cameroon IP – Aug 2000 LTCape Verde IP – Jan 2002CAR IP – Dec 2000 CA and LTChad IP – Jul 2000 LTCongo DR IP – May 2002 CA and LTCote d’Ivoire IP – Jan 2002 CAEritrea CAEthiopia P – Jul 2002 CAGambia P – Apr 2002Ghana IP – Jun 2000*Guinea P – Jan 2002Guinea-Bissau IP – Sep 2000 CA and LTKenya IP – Jul 2000Lesotho IP – Dec 2000Madagascar IP – Nov 2000 CAMalawi P – Apr 2002Mali P – May 2002Mauritania P – Dec 2000Mozambique P – Apr 2001Niger P – Jan 2002Rwanda P – Jun 2002 CASao Tome e Principe IP – Apr 2000Senegal IP – May 2000*Sierra Leone IP – Jun 2001 CA and LTTanzania P – Nov 2000Uganda P – Sep 2001Zambia P – Mar 2002

Date of PRSP Conflict AffectedCountry Document or LICUS Traits

East Asia and PacificCambodia IP – Oct 2000* CA and LTLaos IP – Mar 2001 LTMongolia IP – Jun 2001Vietnam P – May 2002

Europe and Central AsiaAlbania P – Nov 2001Armenia IP – Mar 2001Azerbaijan IP – May 2001* CA and LTGeorgia IP – Nov 2000 CAKyrgyz Rep. IP – Jun 2001* LTMoldova IP – Apr 2002Serbia and Montenegro IP – Aug 2002Tajikistan P – Jun 2002 CA and LT

Latin America and the CaribbeanBolivia P – Mar 2001Guyana P – May 2002Honduras P – Sep 2001Nicaragua P – Jul 2001

Middle East and North AfricaDjibouti IP – Dec 2001 CA and LTYemen P – May 2002 LT

South AsiaPakistan IP – Nov 2001

IP = Interim PRSPP = PRSPCA = Conflict AffectedLT = LICUS traits

Note: The dates listed in the table correspond to the date published on the document. Countries shown with an asterisk (*) have produced PRSPdocuments since November 1, 2002: Azerbaijan (PRSP, 5/2003), Benin (PRSP, 12/2002), Cambodia (PRSP, 12/2002), Ghana (PRSP, 2/2003), Senegal(PRSP, 11/2002), and Kyrgyz Republic (PRSP 1/2003).


ANNEX 2. CDF IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS BY COUNTRY AND GROUP



LONG-TERM HOLISTIC VISION


Medium-term strategy derived from vision

Country-specific development targets, eg MDGs

Holistic, balanced and well sequenced strategy

Capacity for implementation, eg expenditure management

BoliviaBurkina

Faso Ethiopia Ghana GuineaKyrgyz

RepublicMaur-itania Rwanda Senegal Tanzania Uganda

Viet-nam

COUNTRY OWNERSHIP

Vision and strategy homegrown

Government involved stakeholders

Civil society involvement


Parliamentary involvement

Capacity to formulate strategy

COUNTRY-LED PARTNERSHIP

Government leadership and coordination

Partners’ assistance strategy alignment

Financial and non-financial support alignment

Coherent capacity support

Harmonization of policies and procedures

Appropriate partnership behaviors

FOCUS ON DEVELOPMENT RESULTS

Development information systems

Stakeholders’ access to development information

Managing for development results

GROUP 1

Annexes 37










AlbaniaCapeVerde Gambia Guyana

Hon-duras Malawi

Mozamb-ique Niger Pakistan Yemen Zambia

COUNTRY OWNERSHIP


















GROUP 2











Azer-baijan Benin

Cam-bodia

Cam-eroon CAR Chad

CongoDR

Coted’Ivoire Djibouti Eritrea Georgia

Guinea-Bissau

COUNTRY OWNERSHIP


















GROUP 3

Armenia

Annexes 39










Kenya Laos LesothoMada-gascar Mali Moldova

Mon-golia

Nicar-agua

Sao Tome ePrincipe

Serbia & Montenegro

SierraLeone

Taji-kistan

COUNTRY OWNERSHIP


















GROUP 3 (continued)


ANNEX 3. CDF IMPLEMENTATION TRACKING AND ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

The CDF Secretariat uses a CDF tracking system to track and assess countries’ progress in implementing CDFprinciples.

Tracking

Through various sources, including publicly available documentsa such as PRSPs and joint staff assessments,World Bank country department staff, bilateral and multilateral partners in the field, and developing countryofficials, it tracks progress on 20 criteria (previously 16) to capture information on action taken in individualcountries toward implementing each of the four CDF principles:

I. Long-term holistic vision1. Coherent long-term vision2. Medium-term strategy, derived from vision.3. Country-specific development results, drawing on MDGs.4. Holistic, balanced, and well-sequenced strategy.5. Capacity for implementation, including expenditure management.

II. Country ownership6. Vision and strategy home grown.7. Government involved stakeholders.8. Civil society involvement.9. Private sector involvement.10. Parliamentary involvement.11. Capacity to formulate strategy.

III. Country-led partnership12. Government leadership and coordination.13. Partners’ assistance strategy alignment.14. Financial and non-financial support alignment.15. Coherent capacity support.16. Harmonization of policies and procedures.17. Appropriate partnership behaviors.

IV. Focus on Development Results18. Development information systems.19. Stakeholders’ access to development information.20. Managing for development results.

a. The most recent assessment of CDF implementation progress also relied on these references:

Addai, E., and Gaere, L. (2001), Capacity-building and Systems Development for Sector-wide Approaches (SWAps): The Experience of theGhana Health Sector. Prepared for the UK DFID Health Systems Resource Centre.

Annan, Joe (1999), Ghana Health Sector-wide Programme, a Case Study Prepared for DAC I/CD Network and Policy Branch of CIDA.Brown, A., et al. (2002), Aid Transaction Costs in Vietnam, Report prepared for the Ministry of Planning and Investment, financed by

DFID, managed by UNDP.DAC Task Force on Donor Practices (2002), Harmonizing Donor Practices for Effective Aid Delivery—Good Practice Papers: A DAC

Reference Document.Franz, Brian, and Komich, Carla (2003), A Donor Coordination Assessment for USAID/Mozambique, (processed).World Bank Operations Evaluation Department (2003), Multi-partner Evaluation of the Comprehensive Development Framework.“Poverty Working Group/Poverty Task Force in Vietnam: The Drive to Partnership—An Informal Report for the Consultative Group

Meeting for Vietnam,” Hanoi, December 10–11 2002 (processed).Zeballos, Marianella (2002), “Country Strategy Workshop—Coordination Government-International Cooperation—Bolivia,”

Stockholm.

Annexes 41

Assessment

Based on the tracking information, CDF Secretariat staff make qualitative directional assessments of the ex-tent of action taken in individual countries toward implementing each of the four principles. The assessmentsdo not reflect absolute progress, but the direction in which individual countries are moving.

L Little or no action: Due to a wide variety of circumstances, including political developments, capacitylimitations, unforeseen events, action has remained at a virtual standstill.

E Elements exist/being considered: There is some basis for making progress, either through what alreadyexists, or definite plans.

A Action being taken: Progress is being made, although not yet enough, and the basis exists for even moresubstantive progress.

D Largely developed: Significant action taken already, although some further action is needed.S Substantially in place: The activity is virtually accomplished.

CDF Progress and Performance Rating Diamonds (Annex 5)

CDF Progress Diamonds:

The assessment overall for each axis is the simple average of the component individual assessments. A countrywhich has all criteria “Substantially in Place”, for a given axis, would therefore be marked at the boundary ofthe diamond for that axis.

Performance Rating Diamond:

The ratings cover four criteria intended collectively to provide a sense of a country’s overall socioeconomicprogress and the balance within it. The criteria are:

1. GDP Growth 1995–2000.2. GDP per Capita 2000 (Purchasing Power Parity; 1995US$)3. Progress on selected Human Development MDGs. This rating is based on progress against three indi-

cators, used as a proxy for social development, in “Achieving the Millennium Development Goals inAfrica, Progress, Prospects, and Policy Implications, Global Poverty Report 2002,” June 2002, AfDB incollaboration with the World Bank, with contributions from the ADB, EBRD, IMF and IDB. Theseindicators are:• Net primary enrollment ratio (percent of relevant age group); target 100%.• Youth literacy rate (percent ages 15–24); target 100%.• Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000); target reduced to 1/3 of 1990 figure. Where data is not avail-

able for a given indicator, or that indicator had been substantially achieved by 1990, the indicatoris ignored. The overall figure is then the simple average of progress on the relevant indicators.

4. Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA). This rating reflects the 2002 CPIA assessments,allocated by quintile.

For the first three of these criteria, the figures are converted into a ranking among the 48 countries in oursample, so that the best performing country for any given axis is marked at the boundary of the diamond. Forthe last criteria ranking is by actual quintile, with the best performing countries on this axis nearest the bound-ary of the diamond.


ANNEX 4. COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND THE MDGS

GOAL 1 GOAL 2 GOAL 3 GOAL 4 GOAL 5 GOAL 6 GOAL 7Eradicate Achieve Promote Combat Ensureextreme universal gender equality Reduce Improve HIV/AIDS, environ-poverty primary and empower child maternal malaria and mental

and hunger education women mortality health other diseases sustainability

Countries that have completed PRSPsAlbania PRSP 2001 ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Azerbaijan PRSP 2003 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Benin PRSP 2002 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Bolivia PRSP 2001 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓

Burkina Faso PRSP 2000 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Cambodia PRSP 2002 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Ethiopia PRSP 2002 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Gambia PRSP 2002 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Ghana PRSP 2003 ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Guinea PRSP 2002 X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Guyana PRSP 2002 ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Honduras PRSP 2001 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓

Kyrgyz Republic PRSP 2003 ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Malawi PRSP 2002 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Mali PRSP 2002 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Mauritania PRSP 2000 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Mozambique PRSP 2001 X ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Nicaragua PRSP 2001 ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ X ✓

Niger PRSP 2002 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Rwanda PRSP 2002 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Senegal PRSP 2002 ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Tajikistan PRSP 2002 X ✓ X ✓ ✓ X ✓

Tanzania PRSP 2000 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Uganda PRSP 2001 ✓ ✓ X X X ✓ ✓

Vietnam PRSP 2002 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Yemen PRSP 2002 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Zambia PRSP 2002 X ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Countries that have not completed PRSPsArmenia IPRSP 2001 ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ X XCameroon IPRSP 2000 X X X X X X XCape Verde IPRSP 2002 X X X X X X XCAR IPRSP 2000 ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ X XChad IPRSP 2000 X X X X X ✓ XCongo DR IPRSP 2002 ✓ X X X X X XCote d’Ivoire IPRSP 2002 ✓ ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Djibouti IPRSP 2001 X ✓ X X X X XGeorgia IPRSP 2000 X ✓ X X X X XGuinea Bissau IPRSP 2000 X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ XKenya IPRSP 2000 X ✓ X ✓ ✓ X XLao PDR IPRSP 2001 X X X X X X XLesotho IPRSP 2000 X X X X X X XMadagascar IPRSP 2000 X ✓ X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓

Moldova IPRSP 2002 X X X X X X XMongolia IPRSP 2001 ✓ X X X X X XPakistan IPRSP 2001 X ✓ ✓ ✓ X X ✓

Sao Tome & Principe IPRSP 2000 X ✓ X X X X XSerbia & Montenegro IPRSP 2002 X X X X X X XSierra Leone IPRSP 2001 X ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ X ✓

✓ Some element of goal recognized within PRSP or IPRSP.X No element of goal recognized in PRSP or IPRSP.

Annexes 43

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54

getting serious about meeting the millennium development goals

Documents