gladius vs sarissa

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Anistoriton, Issue E991 of 6 January 1999

GLADIUS VERSUS SARISSA:

ROMAN LEGIONS AGAINST GREEK PIKE PHALANX

by Dimitrios KitsosB.A. (Hist.) M.A. (War Stud.)

During the first half of the 2nd century BC the Roman legion confronted the Macedonian phalanx. In

most of the engagements - including the major ones at Cynoscephalae, Magnesia and Pydna - the Romans

prevailed over their opponents and the Republic emerged as the indisputable Mediterranean power. Thisessay deals with the causes of the Roman military successes by examining briefly the Macedonian and

Roman systems of war and searching for possible other factors that contributed to the defeat of the phalanx.

The focus of this effort will be the battles of Cynoscephalae and Pydna. For a number of reasons, Magnesia

is not going to be treated here. The ancient accounts are considered to be completely fantastic and it is

argued that the army of Antiochus III did not have a pure sarissa phalanx formation.1

It is also suggested that

the outcome was determined mostly by the action of the Pergamene cavalry of king Eumenes, a Roman ally,

and not by an actual clash between the legion and whatever kind of phalanx Antiochus employed at

Magnesia.2

Besides, the study of the Roman victories against Philip V and Perseus is more than sufficient for

our purpose, given also the space limitation.

First of all, let's have a look at the effectiveness of the weapons and tactics used by the phalanx and the

legion during the period of their confrontation. The main weapon of the phalangite was the sarissa, a spear

which by that time extended up to 21 feet and it was held with both hands. According to Polybius, all thesarissae had the same length.

3Still, it has been suggested that the first four ranks of the phalanx were

equipped with shorter spears of various lengths, from 9 to 18 feet, and that the 21-foot sarissae were carried

by the additional twelve ranks.4

At any rate, the fact remains that the sarissa had a really long reach and

could pierce the shields and breastplates of the legionaries who stood on its way, as it happened at Pydna.5

On the other hand, the sarissa was obviously a heavy and unwieldy weapon, unsuitable for fighting man to

man;6

for this purpose the phalangites had a small sword.7

The men on the front lines carried shields but

those at the rear most probably had either no shields at all or small and light ones slung across their chests;8

however, they proved to be inadequate protection against the Roman sword.9

This brings us to the next issue,

Roman weaponry.

The main weapon of the legionary was the so-called Spanish sword (gladius), excellent for thrusting

and hacking since its double-edged blade was very strong and firm.10

Livy describes very vividly the horrible

wounds inflicted by the gladius and the shock of Philip's troops when they saw the maimed bodies of their

dead comrades.11

The Roman soldier was armed also with a couple of special javelins (pila), a light and a

heavy one; both of them were thrown against the enemy before contact was made. If it did not kill, the pilum

could pierce a shield and, due to its design and construction, render it virtually useless.12 Concerning

defensive equipment, the most important piece for the legionary was his large rectangular shield (scutum).

The scutum left no parts of the body exposed and offered a high degree of protection against Macedonian

arrows and short swords but not against sarissae, as it has been mentioned.13

According to Plutarch, the Roman consul Aemilius Paulus was terrified by the sight of the phalanx

charging and sweeping everything before it at Pydna.14

It appears that the phalanx of the 2nd century BC was

tightened up more than the original Macedonian phalanx and it was equipped with longer sarissae. The

Macedonian battle formation was usually 16 men deep; the first five ranks had their sarissae levelled while

the rest held them elevated so as to keep off the incoming missiles. In the close battle order of this laterphalanx each man occupied half the width of a Roman soldier in formation. Thus, in a frontal attack one

legionary had to face two phalangites and ten sarissae simultaneously;15

'... and it is both impossible for a

single man to cut through them all in time once they are at close quarters and by no means easy to force their


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points away'.16

Another advantage of the phalanx was that - apart from the first and the rear ranks - it could

be composed of half-trained men who just held their sarissae and pushed.17

So, it is obvious that the sarissa

phalanx was a tight formation based on mass shock action and not on individual fighting. On the other hand,

the Romans relied on tactical flexibility and skilled swordsmanship.

The legion of the Macedonian wars had a strength of 4,200 infantry and 300 cavalry. The light-armed

troops (velites) numbered about 1,200. The heavy infantry was deployed in three successive lines, each one

composed of a different kind of legionary. The 1,200 men on the front were the less heavily armored hastati;

next came the 1,200 principes who were the best swordsmen of young age while the older soldiers, the 600triarii, were placed at the back. The legion was broken up into smaller tactical units, the maniples, each one

consisting of 120 men - except the maniples of the triarii which were 60 men strong. There were 30 maniples

of heavy infantry in every legion positioned with intervals between them and arranged in a chequerboard

formation; thus, each maniple covered the gap of the line in front of it. Usually, the legion marched into

battle in this way.18

After skirmishing, the velites withdrew through the intervals between the maniples and regrouped

behind the triarii. Then, the 10 maniples of the hastati came forward and formed a solid line; the legionaries

hurled their pila, drew their swords and came to grips with their opponents, trying to exploit gaps in the

enemy formation. If the hastati failed to breakthrough, they disengaged and retired through the 10 maniples

of the principes. In their turn, the principes formed a solid line and attacked with pila and swords. If the

enemy still held its ground, the principes were relieved similarly by the 10 maniples of the triarii. So, the

legion kept its adversary under constant pressure by fresh troops. Depending on the circumstances this

standard procedure, as well as the width, depth and disposition of the maniples, could be modified.19

Finally, both Macedonians and Romans used cavalry and/or allied troops to cover their flanks, as it is

reported by the ancient accounts.

After this basic outline of the Macedonian and Roman fighting methods, a summary of the two great

battles which virtually ended the effective military history of the phalanx is necessary. After some minor

operations, the decisive battle of the 2nd Macedonian war took place in May 197 BC in Thessaly. King

Philip V of Macedon had an army of approximately 16,000 phalangites, 7,500 other infantry and 2,000

cavalry. The Roman side, under the command of consul Titus Quinctius Flamininus, numbered about 18,000

Roman and Italian troops, 8,000 Greek allies - most of them Aetolians - 2,400 Roman, Italian and Aetolian

cavalrymen and 20 elephants.

In a thick mist, the advanced forces of the opposing armies met each other unexpectedly on theCynoscephalae hills. Both commanders sent reinforcements and the reconnaissance skirmish soon developed

into a full-scale engagement. Philip, despite the unfavourable terrain and the fact that he had sent many of his

men to collect fodder, accepted battle after receiving encouraging messages from the front line. The king,

leading on the right wing the half of his phalanx that had formed up, charged downhill and pushed back the

Roman left. Yet, Flamininus saw that most of the Macedonians on the left were still in marching order uphill

or trying to deploy and immediately launched an attack with his right flank and the elephants against them.

The disordered Macedonian left broke easily and fled pursued by Romans and Aetolians. In the meantime,

the Roman left was being hardly pressed by the advancing phalanx. Then, an unknown tribune took 20

maniples from the victorious right flank and attacked the Macedonian right from the rear; the exposed

phalangites suffered heavy casualties and they were finally routed. The Macedonians lost about 8,000 dead

and 5,000 prisoners while the Roman side had 700 killed.20

This was the first time that the sarissa phalanx

was defeated by the legion in a pitched battle.Concerning the battle of Pydna not much is known from our ancient sources but possibly things

happened as follows. The strength of king Perseus' army is estimated at 20,000 phalangites, 17,000 other

infantry, an elite agema of 3,000 men and 4,000 cavalry. On the other side, consul Lucius Aemilius Paulus

had at his disposal a force of about 37,000 Romans, Italians, Pergamenes and Numidians plus 34 elephants.

In June 168 BC the two armies were met at Pydna in southern Macedonia and the fighting began accidentally

over a stream. Initially, the charge of the phalanx was irresistible. The Macedonians advanced swiftly and

after some fierce fighting the Romans made an orderly retreat towards rough ground. When the pursuing

phalanx entered that area, it started to lose its cohesion and gaps were created in its long line. Realising this,

Paulus ordered his legionaries to infiltrate in small groups wherever possible and fight many single combats

at close quarters; thus, the phalanx gradually disintegrated. In the meantime, the Roman right had managed

with a counter-attack supported by elephants to break the enemy left. On the other wing, Perseus with the

main body of his cavalry had already fled. The remaining phalangites, being attacked now by all sides, wereslaughtered; the 3,000 picked troops of the agema fell fighting to the last man. Within an hour everything

was over. According to the sources the Macedonian losses were enormous, 20,000 killed and 11,000


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ANCIENT SOURCES

Titus Livius: Books XXXI-XLV.Plutarch: Flamininus.Plutarch: Aemilius Paulus.

Polybius: The Histories.

MODERN WORKS

F. Adcock: The Roman Art of War Under the Republic (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd, 1963)

H. Delbruck:History of the Art of Wartrn. by W. Renfroe (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975)N. Hammond: 'The Campaign and Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC'Journal of Hellenic Studies 108 (1988)

N. Hammond: 'The Battle of Pydna'Journal of Hellenic Studies 104 (1984)D. Head:Armies of the Macedonian and Punic Wars (Wargames Research Publication, 1982)

A. Jones: The Art of War in the Western World(London: Harrap, 1988)G. Parker (ed): The Cambridge Illustrated History of Warfare (Cambridge University Press, 1995)

N. Sekunda:Republican Roman Army, 200-104 BC (London: Osprey, 1996)W. Tarn:Hellenistic Military & Naval Developments (Cambridge University Press, 1930)

J. Warry: Warfare in the Classical World(London: Salamander, 1980)

NOTES

1 H. Delbruck: History of the Art of War trn. by W. Renfroe (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1975) pp. 397, 399.2 F. Adcock: The Roman Art of War Under the Republic (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons Ltd, 1963) p. 110, A. Jones: TheArt of War in the Western World (London: Harrap, 1988) p. 33, W. Tarn: Hellenistic Military & Naval Developments

(Cambridge University Press, 1930) p. 29.3 Polybius: The Histories trn. by W. Paton (London: Heinemann, 1960) XVIII. 29.

4 Delbruck: History pp. 394 - 5, Jones: Art p. 33.5 Plutarch: Aemilius Paulus trn. by B. Perrin (London: Heinemann, 1928) 20.

6 Plutarch: Flamininus trn. by B. Perrin (London: Heinemann, 1921) 8.7 J. Warry: Warfare in the Classical World (London: Salamander, 1980) p. 125, D. Head: Armies of the Macedonian andPunic Wars (Wargames Research Publication, 1982) p. 111, N. Hammond: 'The Battle of Pydna' Journal of Hellenic Studies

104 (1984) p. 46.8 Jones: Art p. 33, Head: Armies p. 111.

9 Plutarch: Aemilius Paulus 20.10 N. Sekunda: Republican Roman Army (London: Osprey, 1996) pp. 9-10, G. Parker (ed): The Cambridge Illustrated

History of Warfare (Cambridge University Press, 1995) p. 45.11 Livy: Books XXXI-XLV trn. by H. Bettenson (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1983) XXXI. 34.

12 Sekunda: Republican p. 9, Head: Armies p. 157.13 Livy: XXXI. 39, Plutarch: Aemilius Paulus 20, Head: Armies p. 158. For a detailed description of Macedonian and

Roman infantry equipment see Sekunda pp. 4-10, Head pp. 47-8, 156-8.14 Aemilius Paulus 19.

15 Delbruck: History pp. 395-7, Jones: Art p. 33, Warry: Warfare p. 125.16 Polybius: XVIII. 30.17 Tarn: Hellenistic p. 28.

18 Sekunda: Republican pp. 14-15, 19, 35, Head: Armies pp. 39, 58.19 Parker (ed): Cambridge pp. 46-7, Head: Armies pp 58-9, Sekunda: Republican pp. 21-3, 34-5.

20 Polybius: XVIII. 18-27, Livy: XXXIII. 3-10, Plutarch: Flamininus 8, Head: Armies p. 81, N. Hammond: 'The Campaignand the Battle of Cynoscephalae in 197 BC' Journal of Hellenic Studies 108 (1988) pp. 72-6.

21 Livy: XLIV. 40-43, Plutarch: Aemilius Paulus 18-23, Hammond: 'Pydna' pp. 39-47, Head: Armies p. 83.22 Polybius: XVIII. 30.23 Polybius: XVIII. 31-32. See also Plutarch: Flamininus 8.

24 Parker (ed): Cambridge p. 47, Head: Armies pp. 47, 59, Warry: Warfare pp. 125-6.25 Sekunda:Republican p. 41, Tarn: Hellenistic pp. 27-9.

26 Polybius: XVIII. 22, Livy: XXXIII. 8.27 Polybius: XVIII. 25, Livy: XXXIII. 9, XLIV. 41.28 Polybius: XVIII. 22, Livy: XXXIII. 8, Hammond: 'Cynoscephalae' p. 76.

29 Polybius: XVIII. 25.30 Hammond: 'Cynoscephalae' p. 76.

31 Hammond: 'Pydna' pp. 46-7, Adcock: Roman p. 110

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