institutional design for an effective acces to … design for an effective acces to information: new...

Institutional design for an effective acces to information: new developments in LatinAmerica

NataliaTorres

PaperpreparedfortheFirstGlobalConferenceonTransparencyResearch,RutgersUniversity,May19‐20,2011

AbstractThe paper aims to describe the institutional designs of the agencies in charge of theimplementationof access to public information (AI) regulation in LatinaAmerica. Thepaperwill based onMoe (1989)´s idea of structural politics and the Carpenter (2001) andWilson(1989)´ conceptsofbureaucraticautonomy.The studywillbeconductedunderaqualitativemethodology and through a multiple case study strategy where five countries will beevaluated:Argentina,Chile,UruguayandMexico.Asadescriptivecasestudy,theresearchwilldepicttheinstitutionaldesignandautonomyoftheagenciesinchargeoftheimplementationconsidering a) external aspects such as the undisputed jurisdiction of the abovementionedagencies, b) internal aspects such as their organizational capacity and c) their politicaldifferentiationandinstitutionalidentity.1.Introduction

TheinstitutionaldesigntoimplementAIappearedasanewobjectofstudy.Afterdecadesoflegal discussions over this right andwithmore than 80 countries legally recognizing it1, theneed to assess the advances in the implementation emerged as a key challenge for AI´sadvocators.ThisresearchaimstocontributetothestudyofAIbyparticularlyconsideringtheinstitutional designs applied to implement AI legislation. The study uses a descriptiveframework to portray and compare the units of analysis based on the quantitative andqualitativeevidencegatheredinapreviousresearch2andthroughnewmaterialreviewed.

1http://www.freedominfo.org/2010/09/80‐countries‐have‐foi‐laws‐tally‐by‐vleugels‐shows/2http://www.opengovjournal.org/article/view/5167

2.Literaturereviewandframework

2.1Accesstopublicinformation

AI has been granted in human rights conventions3 and included in anti‐corruptionconventions4.Asacollectiverightresultsfromtheprinciplesofpublicityofgovernment’sactsandaccountability. Thescholarsagreeand identifyAIasakey instrument toexerciseotherrights,toencourageparticipationandcitizenoversight,topromotetransparency,toimproveefficiencyanddecision‐making,tobettertherelationshipwiththecitizenry,to increasetrustand responsiveness, and toenhanceeconomicdevelopment (Foxet al, 2007;Banisar, 2004;Blanton, 2002; OAS, 2004; Mendel, 2003; Banisar, 2006; Darbishire and Carson, 2008). Tosecure these benefits AI must be regulated: according to a study of over 14 countries,governments provide more information if they have a specific regulation on the matter(DarbishireandCarson,2008).

In the last decades an intense movement around the world promoted AI and as a result,around 80 countries have legally recognized it (Banisar, 2006; Vleugel, 2010) and manymultilateralorganizationsadvancedinthedevelopmentofmodellegislationfortheirmembercountries(BelfastGoodFridayAgreement19991999North/SouthBodiesFOICodeofPracticeEuropean Union 2001 2001 FOI Regulation and OAS Model Law). These processes werecomplementedwith legaldiscussionsthatenabledtheformationof internationalstandards5,butnotalwaysaccompaniedbyan in‐depthanalysisofthe institutionaldesignto implementthe regulation. Consequently, particular contexts and institutional designs led to differentresults(DarbishireandCarson,2008).Sincemostofthestudiesfocusedalmostexclusivelyonthe legal contents6, the assessment of the institutional design emerged as a new object ofstudy.Itwasonlyinthelastcoupleofyearsthatthisissueappearedasmorecrucial.Agoodexample of this recent consideration is the OAS model law on access to information: itsimplementationguidededicatesacompletesubjectonthematter.

2.2Delegationandbureaucraticautonomyortherationaleofinstitutionaldesign

Thepositivetheoryofinstitutionshasfocusedonthestudyoftwoconcepts:delegationanditsreverseside,politicalcontrol(Majone,1996).Whenauthority isdelegatedprincipalsneedtocontrol if agencies are accomplishing their goals and following the enacting coalition´sinterests7. Structural politics (Moe, 1989) describes the process of creating a bureaucratic

3AmericanConventiononHumanRights;UniversalDeclarationofHumanRight;InternationalCovenantonCivilandPoliticalRights,DeclarationonFreedomofExpression.4InterAmericanConventionAgainstCorruption,UNConventionAgainstCorruption.5 Article 19´s principles, “Principios de Lima”, The Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom ofExpressionandAccesstoInformation,JointdeclarationsignedbyUN,OSCE,andOAS.6“Therighttoinformationcanonlybeeffectivelyexercisedandimplementedonthebasisoflaws,regulatingthisrightinaccordancewithinternationalstandards”(http://www.foiadvocates.net/documents.php)7Scholarsidentifiedtherationaleofdelegationintheinteractionbetweeninterestgroups(Moe,1989),inthetradeoffbetweentechnicalandproceduraluncertainty(Bawn,1995),intheinteractionbetweensalienceandcomplexityof the policy issue (Rinquist, Eisner andWorsham, 2003; Epstein and O´Halloran, 1999), in the transaction costassessed by principals in their legislative choice (Horn, 1995), and/or in the interaction between congress andexecutivebranchaccordingthedistributionofpolitical forces (EpsteinandO´Halloran,1999).Ontheotherhand,politicalcontrolisjustifiedinthepossibilityofdeparturefromprincipals´interests.Politicalcontrolisperformedinordertoreducetechnical,politicalorPAuncertainty(Potoski,1999)orcanresultfromthepoliticalindifferencetocertainissues(HammondandKnot,1996).Itcanbeperformedaspresidentialoversight(Moe,1989),congressionaldominance(McCubbinsandSchwartz,1984)–whichmaybedependantonthetypeofregimeanddistributionofpreferences (HuberandShipan,2000)‐orasa tugofwarbetweenmultipleprincipals (Whitford,2005). Itcanbeestablishedbyadministrativeprocedures(Potoski,1999)anddeckstacking(McCubbins,NollandWeingast,1987;Bawn,1995).Alsoitcouldbetriggeredbyindependentpoliticalevents(WoodandWaterman,1998),resultingfrom

structure to isolate agencies from political interference and to protect it from politicaluncertainty (Moe, 1989). By bureaucratic structureMoe understands the rules for decision‐making, the incentives established to reward or sanction public officers, and the oversightmechanismstocontrolthem(Moe,1989).Thisstructure,alongwithscopeofdelegationandagency´sgovernancestructure, isdefinedbyprincipalsaccordingtotheinstitutionalfeaturesavailableinthelegislativechoice(Horn,1995).

Structural politics explains what happened, for example, in México –where the Congresscreated an independent agency to regulate information within the Federal PublicAdministration (FPA)‐,andwhathappened inArgentinawhereCongress failedtoregulateAIandlostthepossibilityofdelegatingoversighttoanindependentbody.

Atthispoint:whyisitsoimportanttodelegateauthoritytoautonomousbodiesifwewanttoregulate access to information? Why is this design better than a simple adjudication offunctions to an executive department? But first, what do we understand for autonomousbodies?

Majone (1996) and Demarigny (in Majone, 1996) define an agency as independent if itoperates outside of the administrative hierarchy, if its authorities cannot be removed fordisagreement with presidential policy, if it is created by and its programmes are definedthrough “congressionally enacted statutes” and if its independence is guaranteed by clearrulesontheircomposition.

Based on a socio‐administrative approach, Carpenter (2001) identifies three conditions forautonomy:politicaldifferentiation,ownorganizationalcapacity,andownpolitical legitimacy.Wilson(1989)differentiatestwofeaturesthatcouldenhanceindependence:external‐relatedtoaformallydefinedjurisdiction‐,and internalaspects–relatedtotheorganizationalculturethat distinguishes an agency‐. Therefore, autonomy is understood “…as a condition ofindependence sufficient to permit a group to work out andmaintain a distinctive identity”(Wilson,1989:182).

So,whyitissoimportanttodesignautonomousbodiesfortheregulationofAI?Itisimportantbecauseweareconsideringtheregulationoftheprovisionandprotectionofinformationheldbypublicagenciesorcreatedbypublicfunds.ToregulateAIimpliescreatingmechanismsthatwill control the political decisions regarding information disclosure, which explains whyprincipalsareextra‐careful indelegationsincetheyneedtosecurehowtheyaregoingtobemonitored.Thisiswhyindependentagenciesaresoimportant:theysecurepolicycontinuity,enhancegovernmental credibility (Gilardi,2002),overcomepoliticaluncertainty (Moe,1989)and protect citizens from administrative reticence to release information. Additionally, andbecauseof their insulation frompartisanpoliticsandbecauseof theirexpertise todealwithcomplexissues,theyareinabetterpositiontorespondtosocialdemands(Majone,1996).Inhis analysis of France´s AI independent agency, Demarigny explains that it was established“…partly to diffuse the power of interest groups, and in part to combat the dominance ofpoliticalpower”(inMajone,1996:165).

public service bargains (Hood, 2002), and can be performed through different oversight mechanism –rewards,sanctions, appointments, intervention on budget or staffing, overruling of agencies´ decisions, modification oforganizational structure (Thatcher, 2005)‐ or different strategies –ex ante, ex post, fire alarms, police patrol(Potoski,1999;Rinquist,EisnerandWorsham,2003;McCubbinsandSchwartz,1984)

But before continuing with the analysis of the country cases, which are the institutionaldesignsavailableforthelegislativechoicetoguaranteeAI?

2.3Institutionaldesignforaccesstopublicinformation

Theinstitutionaldesignsavailablecanbedescribedaccordingtwofeaturesrequiredtoenforcelegislation: the implementation of policies promoting the right (internally, within theadministration; and externally, among the population) and the resolution of controversies,whichisakeyfeaturetodistinguishbetweenregulatorymodels.Basically,thedifferenceliesin which is the institutional instance in charge of solving a controversy and deciding thedisclosureofinformation(Saba,2008).AccordingtoBanisar(2006)itispossibletodrawfrominternational experience the following institutional arrangements (see Appendix II formoredetail):

- Internal review: this is a common feature in almost all countries ‐ even if they haveother review mechanisms‐ and it is associated with pre‐existent administrativemechanisms, such as the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). Here, those deniedinformationcanappeal toahigher instance in theagency that refusedtoprovide it.ExemptionstothismodelareBulgaria,JapanandTurkeywithnointernalmechanisms.Othercountriesonlyhavethiskindofreview,sometimescombinedwiththepossibilityofappealing tocourts:Austria,DominicanRepublic,Georgia,Netherlands,Tajikistan,UkraineandUS(Banisar,2006).

- Review by Ombudsmen: the review attribution of ombudsmen results from adelegation decision (an explicit recognition inAI legislation) or an extension of theirgeneralattributionstodefendpublicinterestfromgovernmentalabuses.Ombudsmenare generally independent officers appointed by the legislative and may have thepower to issue binding decisions.Generally the possibility of complaint requires theprevious use of the administrative mechanism. Ombudsman can review agencies´decisions in Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Belize, Bosnia and Herzegovina,CzechRepublic,Denmark,Ecuador, Finland,Greece,Kosovo,Moldova,NewZealand,Norway,Pakistan,Philippines,Poland,Romania,Spain,SwedenandTrinidadyTobago(Banisar,2006).

- ReviewbyInformationCommission:thisspecificinstitutionaldesignwasestablishedbydifferent legislation to guarantee its enforcement and to secure independence (Diazand Valdivia, 2006). The position within the organizational chart varies: “Thecommissions can be part of the Parliament, an independent part of anothergovernmentbodyor thePrimeMinister´sOffice (suchas in Thailand)or a completeindependentbody”(Banisar,2006:23).Angola,Antigua&Barbuda,Belgium,Canada,Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Macedonia, Mexico,Portugal, Serbia, Slovenia, Switzerland, Thailand and UK have created informationcommissions. They vary in terms of their budget (Diaz andValdivia, 2006) and theirattributions: “In some countries such as Canada and France, the commission haspowers similar to an ombudsman. In Slovenia, Serbia, Ireland and the UK, thecommission can issue binding decisions, subject to limited appeals or overrides byMinistersinspecialcases”(Banisar,2006:24).

- Reviewbyspecialtribunal:toenforcethelegislationAustralia,Jamaica,JapanandUKhave delegated the resolution of controversies to a special tribunal specialized inAI(Banisar, 2006), which –as other tribunals‐ are generally insulated from theadministrationbeingreviewed(Shapiro,2002).Thesebodiesaregenerallyestablishedtoreducetheworkloadofgeneralizedcourtsanddevelopexpertiseanduniformityintheresolutionofcases(Hansenetal,1995).

- Review by national courts: the possibility to appeal to courts has been granted inalmostallcountries.OnceAIhasbeenrecognizedasaright,anypersonshouldhavetherighttocomplain.Here,thelegislation–explicitlyorimplicitly‐havedelegatedthepowerofsolvingthecontroversiestothejudgesandsomepolicy‐makingpowersincetheywillinterpretthecontentofstatutes(Shapiro,2002).Inalmostallthecases,theSupreme Court remains as the final reviewing instance. Bulgaria, Israel, US, andUzbekistan have only this institutional instance (Banisar, 2006). This situation couldbring some problems. First, appeals require that the requestors formalize theirpresentation, which may exclude people with no economic or legal resources.Secondly, in countries with continental judicial systems it may be more difficult toachieveacommonpatternofresolutions,anddelimitjudges´discretion.Thirdly,sincecourts lack the capacity of implementation (Rosenberg, 1991), their ability to causebureaucraticpolicychangegenerallydependsonthecost‐benefitanalysisofagencies(Spriggs II, 1996). Finally, in systems with a persistent culture of secrecy it may bedifficulttoovercomeitthroughtheonlyactionofjudges.

Inmanycases,legislatorshavedelegatedthedecisiononcontroversiestoindependentbodiesor institutions thathaveadifferent legitimacy fromthegovernment.Theonlyexemption tothis general trend is the use of the sole internal and administrative review where theadministrationassessesitsowndecisions.

2.4Casesunderanalysis

The Americas faced an important transformation regarding the regulation on access toinformation.Nowadays17countrieshaveadoptedFOI legislations:Antigua/Barbuda (2004),Belize (1994), Canada (1982), Chile (2008), Colombia (1985), Dominican Republic (2004),Ecuador(2004),Guatemala(2008),Honduras(2006),Jamaica(2002),Mexico(2002),Nicaragua(2007), Panama (2001), Peru (2002), Trinidad & Tobago (1999), United States of America(1966),Uruguay(2008).Thevarianceintermsofinstitutionaldesignisimportant:whilesomeof them choose to delegate the resolution of controversies to internal reviewmechanisms(Dominican Republic), or to the Ombudsman (Ecuador, for instance), or courts (Uruguay),othershavechosentocreateanewagency(Mexico,Chile,Antigua/Barbuda,forexample),oraspecializedtribunal(Jamaica).

An interesting case is Peru. The Law of Transparency and Access to Public Informationwasapproved in August 2002 andwent into effect in January 2003.Opposite to the rest of thecases that will be presented in this article, Peru has no specific agency in charge of theimplementationofthelegislationorinthemonitoringoftheimplementationofthelegislation.The resolution of controversies follow the internal review mechanism depicted before.According to the Banisar: “Appeals can bemade to a higher department. Once appeals arecompleted, the requestor can appeal administratively to the court under Law N° 27444 orunderLawN°26301fortheconstitutionalrightofhabeasdata”(Banisar,2006).ControversiescanalsobesolvedbyOmbudsmanwhocaninvestigatenon‐complianceandissuenon‐bindingopinions.

A previous researchwas conducted as amultiple case studywith two units of analysis: thesystemsestablished toprovideAI inArgentinaandMexico. These countrieshave thenbeenselectedbecauseoftheirsimilarity intermsofthepoliticaladministrativeregime(PollittandBouckaert,2004)andalsobecausetogethertheyconstitutea“twotailcasestudy”(Yin,2003)withextremevarianceregarding institutionaldesign: inArgentina,theSRIyFD–theagency incharge of the implementation of the decree that regulates AI‐ shares with the specializedbodies the attributions to promote the right but cannot issue binding decisions. is located

withintheExecutiveBranchandfunctionsasaninternalreviewmechanismbutdiffersfromitinthattheadministrativereviewmechanismisgrantedinadifferentregulation;inMexicoontheotherhand,theIFAI isan independentagency Asthisstudywasconductedin2008,theinformation is not updated. Unfortunately, some important developments happened after2008 (mainly in Mexico) have not been considered but open a crucial agenda for futureresearch.

For this conference I choose to add thedescriptionof threemore cases:Uruguay andChilesincebothhaverecentlypassedAIlegislation.Thesecaseshavebeendepictedwithlesslevelofdetailsincetherewasnofieldworkresearchtocomplementthedesktopresearch.

3.Onautonomy

To portray the different cases, I have deductively operationalized the concept of autonomybasedinCarpenter(2001)andWilson(1989)´sdefinitions.Thesedefinitionsaimtoapprehendnot only the objective conditions under which an agency works but also the dynamic thatdistinguish it. Those dimensions were then broken down into indicators that helped toorganizethematerialanalyzed:

- Externalaspects.Undisputejurisdictionevaluatedifanagencyhasbeengrantedinthedelegationprocesswithacleardefinitionof itsdomainandattributions.This impliedtheevaluationof attributionsnotonly in termsofwhathasbeenestablished in thelegislationbutalsoiftheyhadtofaceanyjurisdictioncontroversywithpotentialrivalagencies (Wilson, 1989). As many scholars define independent agencies as thoselocated in a distinctive position within the administration hierarchy (Demarigny, inMajone, 1996; Majone, 1996; Diaz and Valdivia, 2006), this dimension alsocontemplatedthepositionofbothagencieswithintheorganizationalchart.

- Internalaspects.Organizationalcapacitiesaredefinedasthe“…capacitiestoanalyze,to create new programs, to solve problems, to plan, to administer programs withefficiency and to ward of corruption” (Carpenter, 2001: 14). To perform thesecapacities, agencies need capital, qualified human resources and entrepreneurs thatmightbringinnovationtogainpoliticalsupport(Wilson,1989;Carpenter,2001;EvansandRauch,1999).Basedonthis framework, theresearchassessedagencies´budget,staffandsystems.

- Politicaldifferentiationand identity: anotherdefinitional aspect is thedifferentiationof theagency from theprincipals that createdand control it (Carpenter, 2001). Thisdimensionwasevaluatedintermoftherulesofappointmentsincetheyhelptoshieldtheagencyfrompoliticalinterferenceandtheconstitutionofadistinctiveidentitythatmayhelptoincreasethenetworkofsupporters(Wilson,1989).

4.Casestudies:Mexico,Argentina,UruguayandChile

4.1Mexico

TheLawofTransparencyandAccesstoGovernmentalInformation(LFTAIG)guaranteesAIandpersonaldatainMexico.Itwasunanimouslyapprovedin2002byCongresswiththesupportofa strong coalition. The Federal Institute on Access to Information (IFAI) is in charge ofpromotingtheregulationandsolvingcontroversieswithbindingdecisions:“…isanagencyofthe federal public administration, with autonomy on operations, budget and decisions, incharge of promoting and spread the exercise of the right of access to information andprotectingthepersonaldatainhandsoftheagencies”(LFTAIG,S.33).

Eachpublicagencywithin theFPAappointsa“LiaisonUnit” inchargeofmanagingrequests,assisting petitioners and organizing the information (LFTAIG, S.28). The agencies must alsocreate a Committee of Information, responsible of the general application of the legislation(LFTAIG,S.29).

4.1.1Institutionaldesignanddegreeofautonomyofagency

4.1.1.AExternalaspects:undisputedjurisdiction

Typeoflegislationthatcreatesdeagency

The lawwas promoted by a group of NGOs, journalists, newspapers and universities called“OaxacaGroup” thatbuilt an important coalition in theCongress (Willian and FloraHewlettFoundation8,2006;Haightetal,2007;Fox,2008)andbypresidentVicenteFox,whoexpressedhis commitment with the issue. As a result of these joint efforts and an unprecedenteddelegationprocess,thelawwasapprovedunanimouslyin2002.

IssaLunaPla(2008)expressedhersatisfactionwiththelawthat“…considerstwofundamentalaspectsofAI: itsrecognitionasaconstitutionalrightanditsguaranteeasandadministrativeprerogative”, and Jonathan Fox (2008) agreed: “The Mexican legislation was distinctivebecause of its combination of procedural comprehensiveness and institutional backing by anewagencydedicatedtothetask”.

Oneof thecriticismsexpressedbythe interviewees is theregulationofpersonaldatawithinthis legislation (Luna Plaa, 2008; Pacheco Luna, 2008). Another criticism is the poorimplementation in both the legislative and judicial powers. Regarding this issue, theCommissionerMaríaMarván(2008)argues:“…noneoftheseorganizationshasappointedanauthority independentenoughtopromotetransparency”. Inrelationwiththisweakness,Fox(2008) explains: “The main constraint imposed by this legislative process was the narrowmandateofthelawingeneral(limitedtothefederalgovernment)andtheevenmorenarrowmandate of the IFAI (limited to executive agencies)”. This research focused on theimplementationwithintheFPAforcomparisonwiththeexperienceinArgentina.

Positionoftheagencywithintheorganizationalchart

The IFAI is an independent agencywithin the FPA. Its constitution responds to the politicalcommitment with the enacting coalition´s interests: “following the individuals´ demand ofimpartiality of the agency in charge of implementing the law and to avoid that it wouldbecomepart and judge, thedecisionwasnot to createa traditionalnot‐concentratedbody,butanagencyseparatedfromthepoliticaldecisionsofthecentralizedadministration”(Billoflaw,2002:10).

As a result, the LFTAIG states: “The Institute, in order to issue decisions, will not besubordinatedtoanyauthority,willadoptitsdecisionswithcompleteindependency”(LFTAIG,S.34). Concerning this issue, Marván (2008) says: “the actual configuration of the Instituteprovidesa relativedegreeofautonomy thatenabled it tobecomeaneffectiveauthority fortheFPA”.Asregardthis,Fox(2008)argues:“TheIFAIoccupiesanintermediatelevelintermsofitsautonomywithintheexecutivebranch–lessthantheelectionsorhumanrightsagency,yetmorethanlineagency”.

Enforcementattributions8ReferredasHewlettFoundationforquotation.

There is an agreement among the interviewees that the attributions were clearly stated.According to the classification made by the Hewlett Foundation´s report (2006), the IFAI´sattributionscanbeorganizedinfourgroups:

- Asanadministrativetribunalitreceivescomplaintsandissuebindingdecisionsontheprovisionofinformation.Itcanreviewtheagencies´decisionsandorderthereleaseofinformation.ItsdecisionscannotbeappealedbytheagenciesbutindividualshavetherighttoappealtotheSupremeCourt.

- Personal Data protection: the IFAI shares with other institutions in the world –Germany,SwitzerlandandSlovenia(Banisar,2006)‐theattributiontoregulatebothAIandpersonaldata.

- Training of public officers: IFAI is in charge of training public officers onAI personaldata,andtheirresponsibilitiesintheimplementation.

- Promotionoflegislationandtransparency.

Existenceofrivalorganizations

According to the information collected there is no rival organization thatmaydispute IFAI´sjurisdiction.

4.1.1.B:Internalaspects:Organizationalcapacities

Budget

IFAI´s budget represents the 0.03380% of Mexico´s GDP, one of the largest proportions incomparisonwithsimilarinstitutionsaroundtheworld(DiazandValdivia,2006).Marván(2008)agreeswiththisdiagnosticbutexpressesherconcern:“…wearetheinstitutionwiththelargestannual budget but the workload is increasing in a way that the staff started to not beingenough”.ThistabledepictsIFAI´sannualbudget:

Accordingtoonlineinformation,thebudgetfor2009wasU$S22,663,257.15.IFAIhasbudgetautonomy and the attribution to prepare its annual budget proposal (LFTAIG, S.33). Thisimpliesthat“…thePresidentcannotpresentobjectionstothebudgetpresentedbytheIFAI”(Hewlett Foundation, 2006: 19). However, the IFAI´s budget proposal is appraised to theTreasuryDepartment,whichhasbeenpointedoutasanimportantlimitationofindependencyandeventualconflictofinterests:“IFAIneedstonegotiateitsannualbudgetwiththeTreasuryDepartment therefore it is verydifficult that itwould revokea Treasury´sdecisionabout aninformationrequest”(LunaPla,2008).

Staff

IFAI´soperativeautonomyenabled itto issue itsowninternalregulation(InternalRegulationofIFAI)andestablishitsstructureandfunctioningrules.ThisisthegeneralstructureoftheIFAIalthoughitcanbesubdividedintoothersubordinatedunits:

Additionally,thisisthehumanresources´structureuntilSeptember2006:

According to online information, until 2009 the IFAI has 236 guaranteed positions,incrementingin41thepositionsinformedin2006.

Expertiseofstaffers

MarvándescribedIFAI´spersonnelashighlyprofessional,predominantlyyoungandwellpaid.ShealsopointedoutthatthreeofthecommissionershaveamasterdegreeandtwoofthemaPhd(MarvánandHill,2008).

TheInstituteisworkinginthecreationofaProfessionalServiceSystemthatwillregulatetheconditions for appointment and promotion, professional development, performanceevaluation and incentives (IFAI, 2006b). Ackerman questioned the selection of the staffers:“..howcanitbethattheappointmentsareconductedinsuchdiscretionalmannerthattherearenopubliccallstocoverthepositions”(AckermaninPachecoLuna,2008a:15)

Systemsavailable/developedtomonitorregulatedagencies

IFAIdevelopedanimpressiveelectronicsystemforprocessingtheinformationrequests(SISI).This system centralizes all the requests presented electronically through IFAI´s website,forwardstherequeststothecompetentdepartment,andsendstheanswertothepetitioner.Even when the requests can be presented personally, more than 95% are presentedelectronically:

4.1.1.C:Politicaldifferentiation

Rulesforappointment

ThecommissionersareappointedbythePresidentbutthecandidatescanbeobjectedbytheSenate (LFTAIG, S.34). To shield the Institute from political interference there is a specificrequirement: the candidates should not have filled political positions throughout the yearbeforetheirappointment(LFTAIG,S.35).

Theplenaryhaveapresident commissioner, electedby the rest of his/her colleagues in theplenary (IFAI´s InternalRegulation,S20).Fox (2008)expresseshisdisappointmentwith theserules:“IFAI´scommissionersarenamedbythepresident,withamodestroleforCongress.(…)…thede facto ruling coalitionof twoof the threeprincipal political parties has limited theirautonomy and effectiveness”. At the moment this research was conduct there was animportant controversy over the independencyof the President Commisioner of the Plenary,whichwasopenlyaddressedinaplenarymeetingbytheCommissionerJuanPabloGuerrero:“…thedoubtovertheobjectivityofthePresidentCommissionerhasunderminedthetrustontheIFAIasawhole”(IFAI,2008).

In terms of the political differentiation of the agency, themechanisms of dismissal are alsoimportant. Commissioners cannot be removed unless they violate in serious terms or in areiteratedmanner theConstitutionor theLFTAIG,whenhis/heractsoromissionsaffect theInstituteorwhenhe/shehasbeenfoundguiltyofacriminaloffence(LFTAIG,S.34).Accordingto Marván (2008), this gives autonomy to their duties: “…neither the President nor theSecretariescan removeus.ThePresidentmay receivecomplaints fromhis secretariesaboutour jobbuthecannot removeuson thataccountandthisgivesusautonomy.Thesecretofautonomy lies in this impossibility of dismissal, which of course is limited by any abuse ofpower”.

Durationofterms

Thecommissionersareappointedforsevenyearsandcannotbere‐elected(LFTAIG,S.34).Theplenary´s president serves for two years and can be re‐elected (IFAI´s Internal Regulation,S.21). A staggering system was established: two of the commissioners were appointed forseven years and the rest for four. Thiswas established to shield the Institute from politicalinterference: “As the President (of Mexico) serves for six years –with no possibility of re‐election‐, (this system) guarantees that no president has the chance to appoint the fivecommissionersduringhisgovernment. (…) IFAIachieves itsautonomymostlybecauseofthisprocessofappointmentofthecommissioners”(HewlettFoundation,2006:19).

Finally,howgoodwastheIFAIincreatingadistinctiveidentity?AccordingtoLunaPlaaithasdifferentiateditselffromtherestoftheFPA“…thankstoitsownmeritsandthelaw.Thelawhaspositioned the Institute in a privileged instancewith respect to the rest of the agenciesbecauseithastheattributiontosupervisethem.ThelawguaranteesaseriesofprinciplesthatneedtobepromotedbytheIFAItoaccomplishitsmandate”(LunaPlaa,2008).Coincidently,Haight and Fox argue “…the IFAI has established a significant degree of public credibility,especiallyinthemediaandintelligentsia.Incontrasttotherestofthefederalgovernment,theIFAI was built from scratch after Mexico´s historic 2000 elections, and therefore it did notinherittheburdenofthelegacyofthepast”(inFoxetal,2007:55).

4.2Argentina

ThesystemthatprovidesinformationinArgentinaisorganizedbytheDecree1172/03,whichregulatesAIwithin theExecutiveBranch.Thedecreeassigns the responsibility toapply it totheUnder‐Secretary of Institutional Reform and Strengthening of Democracy (SRIyFD)whilethe Anti‐Corruption Office (OA) is in charge of receiving complaints for non‐compliance.ControversiesaresolvedbySRIyFD,whichissuesnon‐mandatoryrecommendations.

Anyperson canask for information to any agencywithin the scopeof theexecutive,whereliaisonsareinchargeofprocessingtherequests.ThosedeniedinformationcaneitherpresentacomplainttotheAnti‐Corruptionoffice,askforinternalreviewintheagencythatdeniedtheinformation,orappealtojustice.


4.2.1.A.Externalaspects:undisputedjurisdiction


ThelegislationonAIarisesfromacompletelydifferentdelegationprocessthantheMexican.Congressfailedtopassthelegislationafteralmost5yearsofdebateinbothchambers.Thebilloflaw–elaboratedunderaparticipativemechanismpromotedbytheOAin2001‐wassenttoCongress in2002.Thisversionof the lawwasapprovedbydeputies in2003andcompletelymodifiedintheSenatebytheinitiativeofCristinaFernandezdeKirchner,thefirstladyinthosedays.In2004,Senatepassedthisversion‐thatviolatedsomeinternationalstandards‐andsentitbacktothelowerhouseforapproval,whereitfinallylostitsparliamentarystatusin20069.

Meanwhile,inDecember2003,PresidentKirchnerissuedtheDecree1172/03thatregulatesAIwithintheExecutiveBranch,mainlybasedonthefirstversionsenttoCongress.It´sdifficulttoexplainwhytheprojectwasmodifiedbytheincumbentpartyintheSenatewhilethedecreewasissuedbytheExecutive.

MartaOyhanarte,formerUnder‐SecretaryofSRIyFDandakeyactorfortheelaborationofthedecree, describes theprocess thatmade it possible as follow: “I agreewith Jordi Borjawhosaysthat institutionsarereached,whichmeansthatthere isalwaysa longpathtowalkwithdifferenttoolsthatmay“walkalong”withus.Itisgoodtousethetoolsavailableinacertainsituationandaftertheseriouscrisisof2001whatwecouldhavewasadecree.Weconsideredimportanttotakeadvantageoftheopportunity”(Oyhanarte,2008).

ThefactthatCongressfailedtoregulateAIgeneratedafewconsequences.Theabsenceofalawistheoriginofmanycontroversiessincethedecreeresultsfromanadministrativeactandnot from a legislative debate. However, Stalker, former public officer of the SRIyFD, (2008)argues:“Toimplementapolicyalawisnotnecessarilyneeded.I´mkindofscepticalabouttopdownmodels that require a law to set people thinking of what is needed to do after it ispassed.Therearemanyimportantissuestoaddresswithlesslevelofformalization.”

ThedecreeisagoodregulationsinceitfollowsinternationalstandardsandreachesalltheFPA.However,Stalker(2008)consideredthatitcanbeimproved:“…theonlythingthatI´dincludenow is the transparency obligations –following LFTAIG‐ and a specific recognition of theLiasions”.


ThecreationoftheSRIyFDresultedfromthere‐organizationoftheChiefofCabinetMinistry(CCM)formalizedbytheDecree78/02.Thisdecreewas laterrevokedbytheDecree624/03,which ordered a new organizational structure of the CCM. This regulation positioned theSRIyFD within the scope of the CCM as dependent on the Secretary of Cabinet andParliamentaryRelations(SCPR).Theorganizationalchartcanbedepictedasfollow:

9 At the momento this article was written, there was a bill of law awaitng for the lower chamber for its approval.

Later the Decree 1172/03 transformed the SRIyFD into its application authority (Decree1172/03, S18). Regarding the SRIyFD´s position, Stalker (2008) argues, “…if we think in anexternalbody,thecreationofanagencyoutsidetheExecutiveBranchshouldhaveneededalaw. The point is what can be done with a decree. In this context, I think that the bestorganizational space to place the authority of application is the CCM since it facilitates atransversal policy”. Oyhanarte (2008) gives her opinion when she still was in charge of theagency:“…evidently,inanidealsituationtheauthorityofapplicationshouldbeliketheoneinMexico. An independent body improves the accomplishmentwith the regulation. However,ouractivityasauthorityofapplicationisovertimemoreandmorerecognizedandrespected”.

Concerning this issue, Saba (2008) argues: “I think that is important to distinguish twoattributions:oneaddressedtoimprovetheinformationmanagementandasecondtocontrolthe accomplishment of government´s duties. I think that the SRIyFD is well positioned toperform the first attribution but not the second. (…) It is institutionally limited by itsdependencytotheCCM”.

Enforcementattributions

The attributions assigned by theDecree 624/03 bear only an indirect relationwithAI. TheyvaryfromstrengtheningtherelationbetweenStateandCivilSociety,tosuggestingreformsonelectoralprocessesandpoliticalpartiesand toelaborating tools for citizenparticipationandmonitoring.OnlythethirdattributionhasanindirectrelationwithAI.SRIyFDwasnotcreatedtoperformthisdutyandwasprobablytheparticularleadershipofOyhanartethatre‐definedthe institutional objectives to pursue. Oyhanarte acted as amezzo‐level officer (Carpenter,2001),promotedthedecree,searchedforthesupportoftheNGOsandbecameanimportantadvocatoroftheagendaofAI.Incertainway,shechosetobureau‐shape(Dunleavy,1991)theSRIyFD.

TheDecree1172/03assignedtheUnder‐Secretarythespecificattributiontoenforcethelaw.However, there is no thorough description of it “…(SRIyFD) shall be in charged with thecompliance,verificationandenforcementoftheobligationssetforthherein”(Decree1172/03,S.18).Atthemomentthisarticlewaswritten,maintransformationsoccurred:OyhanarteandmostoftheteamresignedandthereisanewUnder‐Secretaryinchargeoftheagency.Allthevulnerability of the agency has been showed in this new appointment: the agency barelyenforcethelegislation.


Oneof the first conflicts that emerged from the regulationwas its ambiguity in termsof itsattributiontosolvecontroversies,since itempoweredthe involvementofanotheractor, theOA:“…isthebodyinchargeofreceiving,makingandinformingtheresponsibleauthoritiesof

theclaimsmaderegardinganoncomplianceoftheseregulations”(Decree1172/03,S.19).Thisambiguity persisted during the first years of implementation andwas not solved until 2008whenfinallybothorganizationsissuedaspecificproceduretoprocessthecontroversies.

One particular information request revealed a turf discussion, or better, a new rivalry. TheMinistry of Social Development (MSD) denied information on subsidies´ beneficiaries to anNGOs based on the personal data restriction regulated by pre‐existent regulation. Personaldatahasitsownregulationandagency,theNationalDirectionofPersonalData(DNPD).BoththeSRIyFDandDNPDhadattributionstoissuerecommendationstotheMSDandtherewasnoinstitutionalmechanismtodefinewhichofthemhasthedefinitiveword.Regardingthiscase,Saba (2008) argues: “…imagine that theagencies issue contradictory recommendations. Thiscannot be solved between two administrative agencies. There is a need of an independentcontrolbodytosolveit.(…)Initsabsencetheonlyalternativeistoappealtojustice”.

Thisisanexemplarycaseofwhatcanhappenwithotherissues.Thearticulationofthedecreewith pre‐existent legislations ultimately defines what we understand by public information.Regardingthis issueAlonso(2008)argues“…maybeallthesediscussionshavetodowiththefactthattheregulationisadecreeandhasalowerlegalstatusthananylaw”.

4.2.1.B.Internalaspects:Organizationalcapacity

Budget

SRIyFD has no budget autonomy and no own SAF, the financial administrative system thatmanages Argentinean agencies´ budget. This has many consequences: the SRIyFD cannotexecuteitsownfundswithouttheinterventionofitssuperioranditisimpossibletoknowitsbudget since the National Budget does not disaggregate the data at this level of sub‐jurisdiction.Regardingthisissue,oneofitsformerofficersexplained:“IfIhavetochoose,I´dprefertohavemyownbudgetratherthanachangeinthehierarchyoftheagency.EveryyeartheUnder‐Secretarypresentsitsbudgetproposalbutwhatitfinallygetsisnotcertainandit´scompletelyexecutedbytheCCMthatcentralizesanyprocurement”(Stalker,2008).

Just toprovide some indication about the agency´s budget, this officer provided thebudgetinvestedinpersonnelfor2008:AR$271,400(approximatelyU$S89,600),whichrepresentsthe0,035%oftheCCM´sannualbudget.

Staff

Whenthepreviousresearchwasdeveloped(2008),SRIyFDcountswithonly9peopleworkingonAI´spolicy.Regardingthesufficiencyof thehumanresources,Stalker (2008)argues:“Thehumanresourcesarenotenough. Inan idealworld I´dprobablyaskformorepersonnel,butnomore than the double because the implementation of the decree is decentralized in theagencies”.

Regardingtheresourcesavailableattheregulatedagencies,ithasbeenpointedoutthattheyare not enough since the liaisons were not appointed as new position but as a new duty.However, the liaison at the Ministry of Health argues: “…we have only a few informationrequestssowehaveenoughhumanresources”(L´Ielsi,2008)

Expertiseofstaffers

There is no official information regarding the qualification of SRIyFD´s staff, however,Oyhanarte(2008)argued:“Onethingthatdistinguishesusisthequalityofthepeopleworkingwithus.Noonehasbeenhiredbecauseofapoliticalrecommendation.Wehaveopencallstocover the available positions recruiting people from universities, centres of study”. Stalker(2008)considered:“Probablythereisaneedofmoreseniorityinthestaff”.

Systemsavailable/developedtomonitorregulatedagencies

SRIyFDwasworkingontheimplementationofINFORM.AR,anelectronicsystemforprocessingtheinformationrequestswiththecollaborationoftheWorldBankandIFAI.


The decree does not establish any particular procedure to appoint the top positions at theauthorityofapplication,whichisbasedonthesamerulesappliedtotherestoftheFPA.Inthissense,thereisnoshieldoftheagencyfrompoliticalinterference.However,andaccordingtoitspublicofficers,theSRIyFDhasbeenabletodifferentiateitselffromtherestoftheagencies:“TheSRIyFDhas itsown stylewithin theadministrationprobablybecauseof itsobjective tostrengthen the relation between state and society. This aspect is expressed in every action:fromthewayithirespersonneltoitscommitmenttoworkcollaborativelywiththeregulatedagencies” (Stalker,2008).Coincidently,Oyhanarte (2008)expressesheropinion: “Wehaveadistinctivestyleprobablybecausewepromotedacollectivedynamicamongus”.

However,anddespite these (once)hopeful comments, the resignationofagency´sauthoritywasa firmexpressionof itsvulnerability since themotives the formerUnder‐Secretarygaveforherresignationwereallrelatedtothepoliticalinterferencethattheagencysuffered.

4.3Uruguay

TheCongressofUruguayapprovedtheLaw18.381onAccesstoInformationin2008.Thelawwas promoted by the Group on Archives and Access to Public Information (Grupo GAIP), acoalitionformedbythefollowingorganization:APU,SERPAJ,AMARC,TransparenciaUruguay,IELSUR, Escuela de Bibliotecología de la Udelar, Asociación Uruguaya de Archivólogos,Archiveros sin Fronteras, Amnistía Internacional capítulo Uruguay, y el Grupo AcciónCiudadana.ThelawcreatesaUnitofAccesstoInformation,atechnicallyindependentbodyoftheGovernment Development and Information and Knowledge Society depending from theExecutivePower.ThisUnitisdirectedbyanExecutiveCouncil‐advisedbyaConsultingCouncil‐andisinchargeoftheimplementationofthelegislation.Theresolutionofcontroversieswasdelegated to the judiciary that should intervene in the cases of an “action on access toinformation”.




The Law 18381 on Access to Information is a national law approved by the NationalCongress.


TheUnit of Access to Information (UAIP) is technically independent body of the Agency forGovernmentDevelopmentandInformationandKnowledgeSociety(AgenciaparaelDesarrollodel Gobierno de Gestión Electrónica y la Sociedad de la Información y el Conocimiento,AGESIC),dependingfromthePresidencyoftheRepublic.ItisdirectedbyanExecutiveCouncilwith three members: AGESIC Executive Director and two members designed by ExecutivePowerwith renownedexperienceon thematter. ThePresidencyof theCouncil is a rotatingpresidencybetweenthemembersappointedbytheExecutivePower.ThecouncilworkswiththesupportoftheConsultingCouncilformedbyfivemembers.


The UAIP is in charge of the implementation of the legislation and it should assess theExecutive Power on AI issues, monitor the implementation of the legislation, assess thecitizens on the use of the law, promote policies on access to information and transparencyamongotherattributions.

TheUAIPisnotinchargeoftheresolutionofcontroversiessincethejudiciaryisaccordingtoarticle23on“Actiononaccesstoinformation”.


Since therewas no fieldwork specifically conducted for this case, the study does not countwithinformationregardingthisissue.


Budget

According to the information of UAIP´s website, the Unit does not has its own budget anddepends from the AGESIC. The law gives the unit “technical autonomy” but no budgetautonomy.

Staff

ApartfromtheinformationontheExecutiveCouncilandtheConsultingCouncilwefoundnoinformationregardingthestaffoftheunit.


TheUAIPItisdirectedbyanExecutiveCouncilwiththreemembers:AGESICExecutiveDirectorandtwomembersdesignedbyExecutivePowerwithrenownedexperienceonthematter.Themembersremain intheirfunctionforfouryearswiththesoleexceptionofAGESICExecutiveDirector and can be re‐elected. They can be dismissed by the Executive Power in casesspecificallyestablishedinthelegislation.

TheConsultingCouncil is formedbyfivemembers:apersonwitharenownedexperienceonthematter appointed by the Legislative Power, a representative from the Judicial Power, arepresentativefromthePublicProsecutionOffice,arepresentativefromtheacademicarena,arepresentativefromtheprivatesector.Allofthemremainattheirpositionforfouryears.

4.4Chile

In 2008 Chile promulgated its Law on Transparency of Public Functions and Access toInformationoftheAgenciesofState("LeysobreTransparenciadelaFunciónPúblicayAccesoalaInformacióndelosÓrganosdelaAdministracióndelEstado".ThelegislationwassignedbyPresidentMichelle Bachelet on August 11 as a culmination of amajor campaign by Chileanfreedomof informationgroupssuchasPro‐AccesoandChileTransparente. InOctober2006,theInter‐AmericanCourtruledinthecaseClaudeReyesandOthersv.Chileandpromptedaseries of reform at the local level. The Chilean government withheld information fromenvironmental groups without justification and was ordered to adopt legal measures "toguarantee theeffectivenessofanadequateadministrativeprocess fordealingwith requestsfor information,whichsetsdeadlinesforprovidingtheinformation."10ThelegislationcreatestheCouncilforTransparency,anautonomouspubliccorporationwithitsownpatrimonywithfourmembersandarotatingpresidency.




Aswementionedbefore,theCouncilofTransparencywascreatedbythenationallawenactedbytheNationalCongress.


TheCouncilofTransparencydependsdirectlyfromthePresidentoftheRepublic.


The Council, generally speaking, is in charge of promoting the transparency,monitoring theimplementation of the legislation and guarantee the right to information, among otherattribution stated in the article 33. Most importantly, the council is in charge of solvingcontroversiesanditsdecisionsarebindinganddefinitive.


Since therewas no fieldwork specifically conducted for this case, the study does not countwithinformationregardingthisissue.


It was not possible to find information regarding budget and/or human resources at theCouncil,buttheorganizationalchartoftheagency leadusto imagineawell resourcedstaff.Theorganizationhasthefollowingstructure.

10 http://www.freedominfo.org/2008/08/chile-becomes-latest-latin-american-nation-to-enact-foia-law/


FourcounsellorsappointedbythePresidentwithaccordfromtheSenateformtheExecutiveCounciloftheCouncil.Councellorsremainattheirpositionsforsixyearsandcanbere‐electedonly once. Article 37 established the requirements for the appointment of councellors.Basically it prohibits senators, member of the Constitutional Tribunal, Supreme Courtministers,councellorsofCentralBankamongotherpublicofficers.Theserequirementsshieldtheagencyfrompoliticalinterference,somethingthatisstrengthenedbytheestablishmentofspecificrulesfordismissalofthecouncellors.TheSupremeCourtcanonlyremoveCouncelorsbydemandofthePresidentoftheRepublic,thelowerchamberorbypetitionofatleasttenlegislatorsorunderspecificcircumstancesstatedinthelegislation.

5.Mainfindings

Intheprevioussectionadescriptiveframeworkwasappliedtoportraytheunitsofanalysis.Tosumup,Mexico´sinstitutionaldesigncanbedescribedashighlyautonomous.Itcountswithanundisputed jurisdiction based on a comprehensive law –granted by an unprecedenteddelegation process‐, which establishes an autonomous status for the IFAI and clearattributions. IFAI counts with enough organizational capacities to perform its goals: animpressive budget (approximately U$S 23 million for 2006), enough personnel (195 publicofficers) and an efficient system to process the requests (the SISI). The institutional designencouragesIFAI´spoliticaldifferentiationfromtherestoftheFPAsinceitcountswithspecificrulesofappointmentanddismissalandlimitedtermsthatcontributetoshieldtheagencyfrompoliticalinterference–evenwhenthesemechanismshavebeencriticizedbytheintervieweesasdeficient‐.

Argentinean institutional design lacks this autonomy,whichmay be attributed to the faileddelegationprocessinCongress,whichledtotheregulationoftherightthroughadecree.Theresultingdesigndoesnotgrantanundisputed jurisdiction since it transformedapre‐existent

under‐secretary of 4th level11 within the FPA into the authority of application, whose newattributions need to co‐exist with the previous ones. Since the attributions were notthoroughlydefined, theSRIyFDhad to face“turf” controversieswith rivalorganizations.TheSRIyFDlackstheorganizationalcapacitiestoperformtheirduties:ithasnoSAFtomanageitsbudget–whichfor2008roundedU$S90,000forpersonnel‐,andhasonly9publicofficers.TheauthorityofapplicationhasnotbeenpoliticallydifferentiatedfromtherestoftheFPAandhasnot been shielded from any political interference since its officers are appointed under thesamerulesastherestoftheadministration.

Uruguay´s institutional design has amixture nature.On one hand countwith an technicallyautonomous body for the implementation of the legislation and a pre‐existent body –thejudiciary‐ to solve controversies. Even when we didn´t conduct a fieldwork to assess theinstitutionaldesign, itseemsthattheUAIPcountswithanundisputedjurisdictionbasedonacomprehensivelawandclearattributionsfortheimplementationoflegislation.Regardingtheresolution of controversies, an area where the political differentiation result crucial, it isdifficulttoassesswithoutconsulting localactors.Wemay imaginethatanydeficiencyatthejudiciary,anyvulnerability topolitical interference in theexecutionof justicemayerode thecredibilityofthenewlycreatedmechanismtodemandfortheappropriaterecognitionoftherightonow.

Finally,Chile´sinstitutionaldesigncanalsobedescribedashighlyautonomous.Itcountswithan undisputed jurisdiction based on a comprehensive law –granted by an unprecedenteddelegationprocesspromptedbythe ICHRcase‐,whichestablishesanautonomousstatus forthe Council for Transparency and clear attributions. It is difficult to asses Council´sorganizationalcapacitieswithouttheappropriatefieldwork,buttheorganizationchartshowsthat there is a large amount of resource to perform its goals. The institutional designencourages Council´s political differentiation from the rest of the FPA since it counts withspecific rules of appointment and dismissal and limited terms that contribute to shield theagencyfrompoliticalinterference.

BothArgentineanandMexicansystemshavenotonlytheattributiontopromotetherightandassist the public agencies in the implementation but also a regulatory role in reviewingagencies´ decisions. There is a tension between these two attributions basically for tworeasons:

‐First,becauseasregulatoryagenciesbothmayhavetoreviewtheirowndecisions.Thiscanhappen when a lineament set out by them is object of a complaint. In these cases, bothinstitutionsmayneedtoreviewtheirowncriteria.

‐Secondly,thisdoublerolemayhaveanegativeimpactontherelationshipwiththeagenciesregulated. While they try to empower liaisons to properly implement the legislation, asreviewerstheymayquestiontheirdecisions.

ThisresearchassessedthelevelofautonomyoftheagenciesfollowingCarpenter(2001)andWilson (1989) definitions of the concept. According to them, agencies with undisputedjurisdiction, organizational capacities andpolitical differentiation are autonomous.But, afterthe analysis of the units, one question appeared insistently. Are these features definitionalaspects of autonomy or conditions for its emergence? Are these aspects requirements forachievingindependencyordoesautonomyfacilitatetheirexistence?

11 SRIyFD can be described as 4th level if we consider that it depends directly to the Secretary of Cabinet andParliamentaryRelations (3rd level), thento theChiefCabinetMinistry (2nd level)andultimately to thePresident(1stlevel).

Structuralpoliticstakesplacenotonlyinthedelegationprocessbutalsointhedailyactivityofpublic agencies. Autonomy can be established and jeopardized, promoted and attacked.Institutionsarehumanconstructionsandthereforecouldbedisarticulated.Somesystemsaremore protected than others from contingent situations. Others are completely exposed topoliticalinfluenceandconstantlyredefined.IFAIwascreatedasanautonomousinstitutionbutits autonomy was not granted constitutionally: “…the IFAI lacks the constitutionally‐baseddegree of official autonomy held by several other federal institutions, (but) it hasdemonstratedasignificantdegreeofindependencefromexecutiveauthority”(Haight,L.,andFox,J.inFoxetal,2007:55).

At the moment the previous research was conducted, a few discussions regarding thedefinitivecharacteroftheIFAI´sdecisionsweretakingplace.ThefactthatFPAcannotappealIFAI´sdecisionsstimulatedsomepublicdependenciestopromotetheinterventionoftheFiscalandAdministrativeTribunal.While IFAIdefends itsautonomy,manydependencies lobby fortribunal intervention. This scenario opened another “structural” moment since differentinterestsandactorsarepromotingtheirownideasabouthowaninstitutionthatregulatesAIshouldbe.Moeisright:“thegameofstructuralpoliticsneverends”(Moe,1989,284)

Argentina´s agency is even more exposed to “structural politics” since its design is notshielding the agency from political interference and any political event is visualized as apossible threat towhathasbeenachieved:“…wesurvivedonepresidential turnoverandwehopethatinthenextone,with8yearsofimplementationofthedecree,ourworkwillsurviveagain.(…)Ihopethatwesoonhavealawandthatinthenextturnovertherewillbeastrongerauthority of application with more budget and structure and better institutional design”(Stalker, 2008). Three years later, regretfully, the agency has barely survived: only its nameremainswhileitsattributionsandagendawerecompletelytransformed.Today,thereisalmostnoagencyinchargeoftheimplementationofthedecreewhilelawwaitsforitsapprovalattheNationalCongress,wheredelegationbegins.

AppendixI

Informationlegislationandregulatoryauthoritiesaroundtheworld

ThefollowingtablewasconstructedbasedontheinformationpublishedintheannualreportofPrivacyInternational(Banisar,2006).

Country Type oflegislation

Year Authority ofapplication

Resolutionofcontroversies/Oversightattributions

Albania Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

1999 Ombudsman“Itistaskedwiththeoversightofthelaw.(…)Theadvocatecanreceive complaints and conduct investigations. Once he hascompleted the investigation the advocate can recommend acriminal investigation, court action or dismissal of officials forseriousoffencesbutthedecisionsarenotbinding.(…)Appealscanalsobemadetoacourt.”(Banisar,2006,33)

Angola Law 2002 MonitoringCommission

“Itcanexaminecomplaints,provideopinionsonaccess,reviewpractices and decide on classification of documents. Thosedeniedcanappealinternallyortoacourt.”(Banisar,2006,35)

Antigua&Barbuda

Law 2004 Independentinformationcommissioner

“Ithearscomplaintsandcan issuebindingdecisionsonpublicauthoritiesandprivatebodies”(Banisar,2006,37)

Argentina Decree 2003 UnderSecretary ofInstitutionalReform andDemocraticStrengthening

Itcanexaminecomplaintsbutitsdecisionsarenotmandatory,just recommendations. Those denied can appeal internally ortoacourt.

Armenia Law 2003 HumanRightsOmbudsman

“AppealscanbemadetotheHRO.Appealscanalsobemadetoacourt”(Banisar,2006,40)

Australia Law 1982 CommonwealthOmbudsmanandAdministrative AppealsTribunal

“Applicants have a number of different appeal avenues. Theycanappeal internallyunlesstheoriginaldecisionwasmadebythe Minister or the head of the public authority, and thenrequest a merits review by the AAT which can issue bindingdecisions followed by appeals on possible errors of law thefederalcourtorhighcourt.Inadditionanapplicantcanmakeacomplaint at any time to the CO. The Ombudsman decisionsarenotbinding.”(Banisar,2006,42)

Austria Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

1987 “Appealsfordenialsaremadetotheadministrativeagencyfirstand then to the administrative court. The court can rule thatthedecisionwasnotjustifiable.”(Banisar,2006,45)

Azerbaijan

Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2005 Authority onInformationIssues(Ombudsman)

“Itcanreviewtheproceduresofthebodiesandmakedecisionson the legality on the limits on access. A requester can alsocomplaintoacourt.”(Banisar,2006,46)

Belgium Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

1994 Commissionon access toadministrativedocuments

“Citizens can appeal denials of information requests to theadministrative agency, which ask for advice from theCommission.Thecommissionissuesadvisoryopinionsbothonrequestandonitsowninitiative.”(Banisar,2006,48)

Belize Law 1994 Ombudsman“Denials can be appealed to the Ombudsmen who can forcethedisclosureofsomedocumentsbutcannotexamineororderthe disclosure of documents in the exempted categories. ThelosingpartymayappealtotheSupremeCourt.”(Banisar,2006,50)

Bolivia Decree 2004 N/A N/A

BosniaandHerzegovina

Law 2001 Ombudsman“Those who have been denied information can also appealinternallyandchallengethedecisions incourt.TheFederationOmbudsmanandtheOmbudsmanofRepublicSrpskacanalsohearappeals.”(Banisar,2006,51)

Bulgaria Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2000 “Thereisnointernalappealsmechanism.Denialscanbeappealto the regional court or the Supreme Administrative Court”(Banisar,2006,53)

Canada Law 1983 TheOfficeoftheInformationCommissionerofCanada

“Appeals of withholding are made to the OICC. Thecommissioner receives complaints and can investigate andissue recommendationsbutdoesnothave thepower to issuebinding orders. It can ask for judicial review if itsrecommendation is not followed. The commissioner mustinvestigate all complaints even if the government seeks toblockhimfromdoingsoonthegroundsthatthecomplaintsaremadeforanimproperpurpose.”(Banisar,2006,55)

Colombia Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

1985 “If a document request is denied, appeals canbemade to anadministrativetribunal.”(Banisar,2006,58)

Croatia Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2003 Administrativecourtandombudsman

“Appealsofwithholdingaretotheheadofthecompetentbodyofthepublicauthority.Ifthatisunsatisfactory,complaintscanbefiledwiththeadministrativecourt. (…)Complaintscanalsobemadetotheombudsman.Hisdecisionsarenotbindingandthe office has a broad mandate with many other issues.”

(Banisar,2006,59)

CzechRepublic


1999 Ombudsman“Appealsaremadetothesuperiorbody inthestateauthorityconcerned. (.,.) The decision can then be appeal to a courtunderaseparatelaw.(…)ComplaintscanalsobemadetotheOmbudsman.”(Banisar,2006,61)

Denmark Law 1985 Ombudsman“The ombudsman can review decisions and issue opinionsrecommending that documents be released or that theauthority justify its decisions better. The ombudsman cannotorder public authorities to act but its recommendations aregenerallyfollowed.”(Banisar,2006,63‐64)

DominincanRepublic

Law 2004 “Appealsofdecisionscanbemadetoasuperiorbodyandthentotheadministrativecourt.”(Banisar,2006,65)

Ecuador Law 2004 Ombudsman“Theombudsmanisinchargeofmonitoringandpromotingthelaw. It canhear complaintsormake investigationson its owninitiative.Complaintsaboutwithholdingcanbemadetoacourtby individual requestors. Theombudsman canalso take casesto court. The court can order the release of information.Appeals of court decisions can bemade to the constitutionalcourt.”(Banisar,2006,67)

Estonia Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2001 DataProtectionInspectorate

“It can review the procedures of the public authorities andreceive complaints. The inspectorate can order a body tocomply with the act and release documents.” (Banisar, 2006,69)

Finland Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

1999 ParliamentaryOmbudsman

“Appeals toanydenialcanbemadetoahigherauthorityandthen toanadministrativecourt.TheChancellorof JusticeandtheparliamentaryOmbudsman can also review thedecision.”(Banisar,2006,71)

France 1789declarationoftherightofmanandlaw

1978 Commissiond´access auxdocumentsadministratifs

“Itischargedwithoversight.Itcanmediatedisputesandissuerecommendations but its decisions are not binding. (…) Acomplaint must be decided by the CADA before it can beappealedtoanadministrativecourt.”(Banisar,2006,73)

Georgia GeneraladministrativeCode

1999 “Thosewhoserequestshavebeendeniedcanappealinternallyorcanaskacourttonullifyanagencydecision.”(Banisar,2006,76)

Germany Law 2005 FederalCommissioner for dataprotectionandfreedomofinformation

“Requestors can appeal denials internally. They can thencomplain to the FCDTFI. The commissioner also has theauthoritytomonitorcompliance,issuecomplaints,recommendimprovements in law and practice and submit a bi annualreport.Appealscanalsobemadetocourts.”(Banisar,2006,77)

Greece Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

1999 Ombudsman“Appeals are made internally. The ombudsman can receivecomplaints on violation of the right of access andmediate orissueopinions.”(Banisar,2006,80)

Guatemala

Decree 2005 N/A N/A

Honduras Law 2006 N/A N/A

HongKong

Code 1998 N/A N/A

Hungary Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

1992 Parliamentarycommissioner for dataprotectionandfreedomofinformation

It acts “ …as an ombudsman for both data protection andfreedom of information, (and) maintains the data protectionregister,providesopinionsondataprotectionandinformationaccess‐related draft legislation as well as each category ofofficial secret. (…) Those denied access can appeal to thecourts.”(Banisar,2006,81)

Iceland Law 1996 InformationCommittee

“DenialscanbeappealedtotheIC,whichrulesonthedisputes.Governmentbodiesarerequiredtocomplywiththedecisionsbutcanappealtothecourts.”(Banisar,2006,83)

India Law 2005 InformationCommissions

“An internal appeal can be made against decisions to anominatedpersonwho is senior in rank to thePIO.A secondappeal can be made to newly established InformationCommissionsat theCentralandState levelsoralternatively,acomplaint can be made directly to these Commissions.Information Commissions have a broad remit to hear casesrelated to any matter relating to access under the Act. Theyhave investigative powers and can make binding decisions.Information Commissions can make any order necessary toensure compliance with the Act (including requiring a publicauthoritytopublishinformation,appointPIOs,produceannualreports and make changes to record management), and canalso order compensation and impose penalties. The Actattempts to bar appeals to the courts, but as the right toinformation is a constitutional right, it would appear thatcitizensstillhavetherighttogototheHighCourtorSupremeCourtiftheyfeeltheirrighthasbeeninfringed.”(Banisar,2006,85)

Ireland Law 1997 Officeof theInformationCommissioner

“There is a right of internal appeal. There is also a right ofexternalappealtotheOfficeoftheInformationCommissionerwho also oversees and enforces the Act. Decisions of theCommissionerarebindingandcanbeappealedonlyonapointoflaw.”(Banisar,2006,87)

Israel Law 1998 “Thosedeniedinformationmayappealtothecourts,whichcanreviewallinformationthatiswithheldandorderthereleaseofinformation if it finds that the public interest in disclosure isgreater than the reason forwithholding and the disclosure isnotprohibitedbyanotherlaw.”(Banisar,2006,90)

Italy 1990 CommissiononAccess toAdministrativeDocuments

“Appeals canbemade to a regional administrative court. Thedecision of the court can be appealed to the Council of theState.(…)(TheCommission)monitorstheworkingofthelaw.”(Banisar,2006,92)

Jamaica 2002 AppealTribunal;Access toInformationUnit

“Appeals are heard internally by the Permanent Secretary orprincipalofficerof theMinistryortheMinister fordocumentssubject to a certificate. Second appeals then go to an AppealTribunal set up specifically to hear complaints under the Act.(…)TheAccesstoInformationUnitoftheJamaicaArchivesandRecords Department in the Office of the PrimeMinister wasformed in January 2003 to overseeing the implementation oftheAct.”(Banisar,2006,93)

Japan Law 1999 InformationDisclosureReviewBoard

“There is no internal appeal. Appeals are referred by theagency to the Information Disclosure Review Board, acommitteeintheOfficeofthePrimeMinstermadeofpanelsofthree persons from outside government including lawprofessorsandretiredpublicofficials.(…)Thedecisionsarenotbindingbutaregenerallyfollowed.”(Banisar,2006,95)

SouthKorea

Law 1996 “Those denied can appeal to public agencies; further appealcanalsobemadetotheheadofthecentralagencyundertheAdministrative Appeals Act. Judicial review is provided undertheAdministrativeLitigationActincaseswhereanindividual’slegal interest is violateddue to thedispositionoromissionofpublicagencies.TheMinistryofGovernmentAdministration isinchargeofoversightandplanningfortheActandcaninspectandreviewtheactivitiesofstateagencies”(Banisar,2006,97‐98)

Kosovo Law 2003 Ombudsman“Appeals of denial are first back to the body asking it toreconsider and then can be made to a court or to theOmbudspersonInstitution.”(Banisar,2006,99)

Kyrgyzstan

2006 N/A N/A

Latvia Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

1998 State DataInspectorate

“Thereisarightofinternalappealtotheheadoftheinstitutionor a higher authority. The State Data Inspectorate was givenoversightauthority.(…)Appealscanalsobemadetoacourt.”(Banisar,2006,100)

Liechtenstein

Law 1999 “Appealscanbemadetoacourt.”(Banisar,2006,102)

Lithuania Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2000 “Appeals can be made to an internal Appeals DisputeCommission and then to and administrative court.” (Banisar,2006,103)

Macedonia


2006 Commissionfor theProtectionof the Rightto FreeAccess toInformationof PublicCharacter

“DenialscanbeappealedtotheCommissionfortheProtectionoftheRighttoFreeAccesstoInformationofPublicCharacter.TheCommissioncandecideoncomplaints. It isalsotaskedtoensurethe law is implemented,publishthe listof informationholders, issueopinionsonother laws,trainpublicofficialsandcompileanannualreportofallthestatisticsforrequestsinthepreviousyear.(…)AppealsofdecisionsoftheCommissioncanbefiledinacourt.”(Banisar,2006,105)

Mexico Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2002 IFAI “Itcancarryoutinvestigationsandordergovernmentbodiestoreleaseinformation.(…)Individualsbutnotgovernmentbodiescanappealthedecisionstofederalcourts.”(Banisar,2006,106)

Moldova Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2000 Ombudsman“Appealsaboutrefusals,delays,feesanddamagescanbemadeto the top management of the department that holds theinformationor itssuperiorbody. Iftheyarenotsatisfied,theycan appeal directly to the courts. (…) Requestors can alsoappealtotheOmbudsman.”(Banisar,2006,108)

Montenegro

Law 2005 Ministry ofCulture andMedia

“It is in charge of the implementation. (…) Appeals for denialaretothesupervisorybodyoftheagency.Appealscanthenbemadetoacourt.”(Banisar,2006,110)

Netherlands


1991 “Appealscanbemadeinternallyandthentoanadministrativecourtwhichhasthefinaldecision.”(Banisar,2006,111)

NewZealand


1982 Ombudsman “It reviews denials of access. (…) The ombudsman’s decisionsarebinding.”(Banisar,2006,113)

Norway Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

1970 Ombudsman “Ifaccessisdenied,individualscanappealtoahigherauthorityband then to the ombudsman or a court. The ombudsman’sdecisionsarenotbindingbutaregenerallyfollowed.”(Banisar,2006,115)

Pakistan Ordinanceandconstitutionalrecognition

2002 Ombudsmen “Appeals of denials can be made to the Wafaqi Mohtasib(Ombudsman) or for tax‐related matters, to the Federal TaxOmbudsman.”(Banisar,2006,118)

Panama Constitutionrecognition

2001 “Appealscanbemadetoacourt.”(Banisar,2006,120)

andlaw

Peru Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2003 “Appeals can bemade to a higher department.Once appealsare completed, the requestor can appeal administratively tothecourtunderLawN°27444orunderLawN°26301 for theconstitutionalright

of habeas data. (…) The Ombudsman can investigate non‐compliance and issue non‐binding opinions.” (Banisar, 2006,121)

Philippines

Code ofconduct

1987 Ombudsman “Complaints against public officials and employees who filedwith the Civil Service Commission or the Office onceadministrativeremedieshavebeenexhausted.”(Banisar,2006,123)

Poland Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2001 “Appeals of denials of access are made under the Code ofAdministrative Procedure initially internally and then to acourt. The Office of the Commissioner for Civil RightsProtection(Ombudsman)hasalsobeenactiveinpromotingthelawasameansforimprovinglegalstructures.”(Banisar,2006,124)

Portugal Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

1993 Commissionof access toadministrativedocuments

“Those denied can appeal to the CADA, an independentparliamentary agency. The CADA can examine complaints,provide opinions on access, review practices and decide onclassification of systems. Public employees have a duty tocooperate with the CADA or face discipline. Its decisions arenot binding so if an agency continues to deny access furtherappeal can bemade to administrative court.” (Banisar, 2006,127)

Romania Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2001 Ombudsman “Those denied can appeal to the agency concerned or to acourt. Public employees can be disciplined for refusing todiscloseinformation.ThePeople’sAdvocate(Ombudsman)canalso hear complaints and make recommendations.” (Banisar,2006,128)

StVincentand theGrenadines

Law 2003 N/A N/A

Serbia Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2004 Commissionforinformationof publicimportance

“AnappealcanbemadetotheCommissionforInformationofPublic Importance. The Commission is an autonomous andindependent public body. The Commissioner can hear casesrelating to denial of access to information, delays, excessivefees, and refusal to provide the information in the form orlanguagerequestbytheapplicant.Hisdecisionsarebindingonpublicauthorities. If thebody fails to release the information,the Commissioner can ask the government to enforce thedecision.TheCommissionerexpressedconcern inMarch2006thatthereareanumberofdecisionsthathavenotbeenacted

onbythebodiesandthattheMinistryofCulturedidnothaveany ability to enforce sanctions for non‐compliance. TheMinistry of Culture informed the Commissioner that anamendment to transfer thatauthority to theMinistryofStateAdministrationwasbeingdeveloped.

TherequestorcanappealdecisionsoftheCommissionertothecourts. Appeals of denials relating to the National Assembly,President, Cabinet, the Supreme Court, the ConstitutionalCourt and thePublic Prosecutor, arenot allowed tobeheardbytheCommissionerbecausetheyhaveahigherconstitutionalstanding than the Commissioner. Appeals in those cases canonlybemadedirectlytoanadministrativecourtandthecourtcan only review the reasonableness of the procedure ratherthanthemerits.”(Banisar,2006,131)

Slovakia Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2000 “Appealsaremadetohigheragenciesandcanbereviewedbyacourt.”(Banisar,2006,133)

Slovenia Law 2003 InformationCommissioner

“There is a right to appeal to the IC who can issue bindingdecisions. Its decisions can be appealed to a court.” (Banisar,2006,135)

SouthAfrica


2000 SouthAfricanHumanRightsCommission

Itoversees the functioningof theact. “Forpublicbodies suchas national government departments, provincial governmentdepartments and local authorities, the internal review ishandled by the responsible Cabinet minister. It can then bereviewed by a High Court. Decisions of private bodies areappealed directly to the court. The courts can review anyrecord and can set aside decisions and order the agency toact.”(Banisar,2006,137)

Spain Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2002 Ombudsman “Denials can be appeal administratively‐ The ombudsman canalsoexaminecasesoffailuretofollowthelaw.”(Banisar,2006,140)

Sweden Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

1766 ParliamentaryOmbudsman

“Decisions by public authorities to deny access to officialdocuments may be appealed internally. They can then beappealedtogeneraladministrativecourtsandultimatelytotheSupremeCourts.Complaintscanalsobemadeto thePO.Theombudsman can investigate and issuenon‐bindingdecisions.”(Banisar,2006,142)

Switzerland


2004 Federal DataProtectionCommissioner

“Iftherequestforinformationislimited,changedordenied,ordelayedbeyond thedeadlines, requesters canask theFederalDataProtectionandInformationCommissionertomediate.TheCommissionermustissuearecommendationwithinthirtydays.The Commissioner (formerly the Federal Data ProtectionCommissioner)alsocanconductoversightofpublicbodiesandcomment on federal legal projects and measures of the

nationalgovernmentthataffecttransparency.”(Banisar,2006,144)

Tajikistan Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2002 “Denialsmustincludethenameoftheofficialandthereasonsfordenial.Appealsaretoahigher‐levelbodyintheMinistryororganizationandtothecourts.Courtshavetherighttoaccessall of theofficial documents and canorder the releaseof theinformation if it is withheld without cause.” (Banisar, 2006,145)

Thailand Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

1997 InformationDisclosureTribunal;OfficialInformationBoard,Officeof theOfficialInformationCommission

“Those denied information can appeal to the IDT whosedecisions are deemed final except for appeals to theadministrativecourtbycitizenswhobelievethatthedecisionsof the tribunal was unjust. (…) The OIB supervise and giveadvice on implementation, recommends enactment of royaldecrees, receives complaintson failure topublish informationandsubmitreports.”(Banisar,2006,147)

Trinidad yTobago

Law 1999 Ombudsman “ThosedeniedcanappealtotheOmbudsmanwhomayissuearecommendation, which is not binding on the agencyconcerned.(…)AppealscanalsobemadetotheHighCourtforjudicialreview.”(Banisar,2006,148‐149)

Turkey Law 2003 Board ofReview ofthe AccesstoInformation

“There is no internal appeals mechanism. Appeals ofwithholdings are to the Board of Review of the Access toInformation. Its jurisdiction was originally limited to casesrelating to national security and state economic interests butthelawwasamendedinNovember2005toallowappealsinallcases. Prior to the amendment, the Board still heard casesrelating to the other issues. It can set u commissions andworking groups and invite government representatives andoutside organizations to participate. Its secretariat is handledby the PrimeMinistry. (…) Appeals can then bemade to theadministrativecourt.”(Banisar,2006,149)

Uganda Constitutionrecognitionandlaw

2005 “Appeals for denials of information are to the ChiefMagistrates.Followingthat,requestorscanappealtotheHighCourt,which can set aside decisions and order the release ofrecords.”(Banisar,2006,152)

Ukraine Law 1992 “Denials can be appeal to a higher level at the agencyconcernedandthentoacourt.”(Banisar,2006,153)

UnitedKingdom

Law 2000 Informationcommissioner andinformationtribunal

“TheICoverseesandenforcesthelaw.TheIChasthepowertoreceivecomplaintsand issuebindingdecisions. (…)Appealsofthe commissioner’s decisions are made to the IT” (Banisar,2006,155)

UnitedStates

1966 “Appeals of denials or complaints about extensive delays canbemadeinternallytotheagencyconcerned.Thefederalcourtscan review de novo (without respect to agency decision) andoverturnagencydecisions.”(Banisar,2006,159)

Uzbekistan


2002 “Refusal of information can be appealed to the courts.”(Banisar,2006,163)

Zimbabwe

Law 2002 Media andInformationCommission

“IndividualscanasktheCommissiontoreviewthedecisionsoractions of an agency. The commission can conduct inquiriesinto the act and order release of documents. Appeals can bemadetoanadministrativecourt.”(Banisar,2006,165)

AppendixII

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- Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression,http://www.iachr.org/declaration.htm

- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm

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- UniversalDeclarationofHumanRights,http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html

Interviews

- Alonso,L.(2008)interviewconductedthe22/07/08- Baragli,N.(2008)interviewconductedthe14/07/08- Fox,J.(2008)answeredquestionnairesentthe16/07/08- Gadano,J.(2008)interviewconductedthe23/07/08- Hill,B.(2008)answeredquestionnairereceivedthe25/08/08- Hill,B.,andMarván,M.,(2008)interviewconductedthe9/04/08- L´Ielsi,P.(2008)interviewconductedthe23/07/08- LunaPlaa,I.(2008)interviewconductedthe24/07/08- Marván,M.(2008)interviewconductedthe18/07/08- O´Donnell,M.(2008)interviewconductedthe16/07/08- Oyhanarte,M.(2008)interviewconductedthe23/07/08.- PachecoLuna,C.(2008)interviewconductedthe15/07/08- Saba,R.(2008)interviewconductedthe14/07/08- Stalker,G.(2008)interviewconductedthe10/07/08

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