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R.L. Ground. INTL 750. 9 May 2008.

Challenges to Peacemaking:

Case Studies in

Colombia, Sudan, & Kosovo

Maureen Didde, Joanna Fewins, Shana Kreikemeier

University of Kansas2008

Throughout the globe, hundreds of nations seem to be perpetuallylocked in civil conflict. Within these wars, similar causes and costs ofconflict occur among nations that seemingly have nothing else incommon. Likewise, challenges to peacemaking can manifest themselvessimilarly in different countries. This paper will present three case studiesof civil conflicts in Colombia, Sudan, and Kosovo. In each case, we willpresent a historical background and a brief look at the challenges topeacemaking. Within these challenges, we will consider drivers and costs

of conflict as well as effortssuccessful and failedfor peacemaking.All three of these nations are prone to what Collier refers to as theconflict trap. The conflict trap is the perpetuation of civil war. A conflictcountry is 44% likely to fall back into conflict within five years of its lastconflict. There are a number of factors that can lead to this repeatedconflict, including decreased gross domestic product (GDP) growth, lossof social capital, and warring neighbors. Collier et. al., 2003 explains,Conflict weakens the economy and leaves a legacy of atrocities. It alsocreates leaders and organizations that have invested in skills andequipment that are only useful for violence (4).

Conflict can be a domino effect. It brews in one low income,

economically stagnated country. It falls back into conflict time after time,stressing its neighbors the entire time. Eventually, they fall into conflict,and the cycle continues until the entire region is destabilized. Onceconflict is entrenched, its difficult to stop, making prevention a vital focusof world policy.

Other aspects of the conflicts of Colombia, Sudan, and Kosovo thatwill be discovered here are their proneness to civil war, economic drivers,


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and rent seeking. While each case reveals anomalies among this list, theyare important concepts to understand. Each of these cases contains at leastone of the following factors that render a country prone to civil war: lowincome (per capita), geographical location, and ethnic dominance orpolarization. The central argument presented by Collier, et.al., in their

2003 report is that ...the key root cause of conflict is the failure ofeconomic development. They note that countries with low, stagnant, andunequally distributed per capita incomes...face dangerously high risks ofprolonged conflict (Collier, et.al., 2003: 53). Additionally, The presenceof ethnic dominance and polarization can create an environment prone toconflict, as we see clearly in Kosovo and Sudan. In Collier et. al., theynote that a completely polarized society, divided into two equal groups,has a risk of civil war around six times higher than a homogenous society(2003: 58). Diverse societies face much less risk of ethnically based strifebecause there is less chance for a political leader to take advantage of hisethnic group in opposition to the other ethnic groups. Likewise,

geographical location such as having bad neighbors, being landlocked, orlocated in a mountainous region can contribute to a countrys proneness toconflict.

Also within these pages will be examples of economic drivers suchas GDP decrease due to conflict, commodity rents, and rent-seeking.According to Collier, each year of conflict will decrease a countrys GDPgrowth by 2.2% per annum (17). Over the course of the average seven-year civil war, that results in a 15% loss in GDP from the pre-conflictyear. Low income and economically stagnant or declining countries aremore likely to fall into conflict. High unemployment and low opportunitycosts can make young men susceptible to the steady paychecks offered bymilitias. War creates poverty, and poverty creates war.

In the same way, this poverty can lead to rent seeking throughviolent or oppressive means, especially when a nation is rich in resourcesor commodities, such as in Colombia (cocaine) and Sudan (oil). Rentseeking describes the means by which individuals or groups collect fundsby manipulating individuals or a system instead of by trade or production.Those who seek and collect rents, whether from the government or fromindividual citizens, do not produce anything economically valuable.Rather, they divert the resources that are meant to be used properly, andmanipulate them to be used for their own purposes or good.

This paper will represent many of these issues and more within theconflicts of Colombia, Sudan, and Kosovo. While these nations are variedin geography, culture and history, they share many of the factors ofconflictdrivers, costs, and attempts at peacemaking. Each case studyhere will provide an overview of the region, historical background of theconflict, a description of efforts for peacemaking, challenges to peace, anda future outlook or forecast for that region or nation.

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militia groups were established, including the leftist Revolutionary Armed Forces of

Colombia (FARC) currently the largest rebel organization and the primary organization

discussed here.

Although many of the rebel organizations will still espouse political rhetoric, the

rebel organizations have long since lost their idealism and mission as a driving force.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the drug trade became their primary focus along with

extortion and kidnapping. This can be seen in the case of Pablo Escobar, a drug lord

running a cartel out of Medellin. Escobar had a policy of plata o plomo (gold or lead)

he used to gain wealth and influence. Officials that could not be bribed were killed and

replaced with those that could be bribed. This approach made Colombia the worlds

source for cocaine and made Escobar one of Forbes magazines twenty richest man in the

world in 1989 (Sun Times 1989). The United States government, facing mountingproblems with cocaine use at home, demanded the Colombian government deliver

Escobar. In return, Escobar, who had a loyal following, put a bounty on the head of any

policemen, and his followers killed hundreds of officials. The U.S. finally killed Escobar

as he tried to flee them (McDermott 2003).

The rebel groups continue to fight among each other and with the government to

maintain control of the lucrative drug trade. This has been the driving factor of U.S.

involvement in the country.

Efforts for Peacemaking

The current Colombian president, lvero Uribe was elected into office after the

latest peace negations with the FARC dissolved. His platform focused on aggressively

confronting the FARC, corruption reduction and economic growth. He first won the

presidency in 2002 and was re-elected in 2006 with relative ease. Uribes administration

is center-right in a region with many leftist neighbors (Oxford Analytica 2007). During

his term, Colombia has worked closely with the United State, both in regards to fighting

drugs and terrorism and working to establish a free trade agreement.

Colombia has tried multiple times to broker peace with the rebels, but they all

collapsed in under five years. Each attempt has damaged the relationship between the

government and the rebels. The most recent attempt with the FARC gave the rebels a safe

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zone in southern Colombia, which many feel gave the rebel organization the time and

space it need to regain strength. Negotiations collapsed when rebels kidnapped the

French-Colombian senator Ingrid Belcourt during her presidential campaign (Markey

2007).

Kidnappings have proven to be an effective bartering tool for the rebel organizations.

Currently, the FARC is in the process of negotiating the release of incarcerated rebel

using three U.S. contractors and over thirty Colombian politicians, including Ingrid

Belcourt (ibid). The Colombian government released 180 FARC prisoners as a goodwill

gesture in May of 2007. Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez became involved in August

of 2007 to work as a liaison between the FARC and the Colombian government, but the

relationship was short-lived due to complaints of a bias toward the FARC (International

Crisis Group 2008:1).The Colombian government struck a damaging blow against the FARC in a raid on a

rebel camp located just within the Ecuador border. Raul Reyes, a member of the

secretariat and the chief liaison with governments, was killed. In addition, the Colombian

government recovered a laptop with rebel information. It included evidence suggesting

that FARC was interested in obtaining the material needed to create a nuclear bomb. It

appears that the intent was not to use the bomb but to profit from selling components and

nuclear materials needed. Other files refer to FARCs attempts to assassinate Uribe

during his first run for the presidency (Sequera 2008). Also included on the laptop were

files suggesting that Venezuelas President Hugo Chavez had made offers to help fund

the rebel organization.

The Colombian government attacked the rebel camp without first seeking the

approval of the Ecuador government. This has resulted in a lot of tough rhetoric and

tension between Colombia and its neighbors. Hugo Chavez in Venezuela and Rafael

Correa in Ecuador were outraged that Colombia infringed on Ecuadors sovereignty by

attacking the FARC camp without permission. In reaction, Chavez ordered troops to the

Venezuela-Colombian border in a theatric stunt during his weekly address. Ecuador

recalled their political envoy to Bogota (BBC News 2008).

This saber rattling is disconcerting for the long-term stability of the region. Tensions

between the countries can lead to inter-state conflict. There are strong suspicions that

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neighboring countries have financed or had relationships with the rebel organizations

operating within Colombia. The participation of the neighboring state is a powerful force

in negotiations. A good relationship between the Colombian government and its

neighbors could result in more difficulty for rebels to find safe havens, financing, and to

moved drugs and arms. On the other hand, if the neighboring states are working with the

rebels, the organizations could find enough support to make themselves more intractable.

The Colombian borders are not sufficient for containing the rebel organizations.

Militias, drugs and weapons easily cross the borders. The FARC has established borders

within the neighboring state of Ecuador, and the reaction of Ecuador and Venezuela to

the events raise questions about their roles with the FARC.

Challenges and Opportunities for Peace

Drugs

The production of cocaine is a major revenue stream for the FARC and other rebel

organizations. The drug production primarily takes place in the Andes, as seen in Figure

####. The drug trade is one of the largest challenges for the Colombian government in

establishing peace. Cocaine provides the revenue needed for the rebel organizations to

support themselves. Significant reductions in drug trafficking have an impact on the

finances of the rebel groups.

The production of cocaine and the domestic impacts of the drug trade are of special

interest to the United States. Up to 90% of the cocaine found on American streets was

grown in Colombia (BBC News 2008). As a result, large amounts of aid have been sent

to the region to stop drug production at the source. The United States Congress approved

plan Colombia on July 13, 2000 as an initiative to reduce the drug production in

Colombia and the impact of the drug trade on Americans. Approximately $600 million in

aid per year has been delivered to Colombia, primarily in the form of military assistance

and aerial eradication of drug plantations. The results of this program are debatable. In

2005, the area used for cultivation was reduced nearly in half from the 2000 numbers, as

we can see in Figure 1. In 2004, the region actually saw an increase in cocaine

production, as the damage to the Colombian fields resulted in the cartels shifting

production to Peru and Bolivia. There is also outcry from the locals that aerial spraying

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are excessive damaging legitimate crops and making the locals ill (Shields 2005).

The effects of the combined efforts against the cocaine trade were not noticeable on

the streets of the United States until the second quarter of 2007. The Office of National

Drug Control Policy reports over a 40% increase in cocaine prices on US streets, after an

extended period of stability, as seen in Figure 2. The purity of the cocaine available in the

United States also decreased over the same period. Thirty-eight U.S. cities reported

cocaine shortages in the first half of 2007, including Kansas City and Witchita (Office of

National Drug Control Policy 2007:35). The Office of National Drug Control Policy

attributes the positive results to the interdiction and organizational attack efforts in the

source zone, the transit zone, and Mexico, as well as the cooperation of the U.S.,

Colombian, and Mexican governments (Office of National Drug Control Policy 2007:36).

The eradication of coca growth does have implications for the people that live in theareas where the drugs are being cultivated. Although most people would be glad to be rid

of the violence and fear caused by the rebel groups, local farmers can also become

financially dependant upon the drug trade. Growing cocaine is more lucrative than legal

crops, and very poor people can find themselves aiding the rebels in order to survive.

This could be an opportunity to use aid to increase the economic options for these people.

President Uribe has mentioned this when discussing the currently stagnant U.S. free trade

agreement - The free-trade agreement is a way to bring much more investment to

Colombia. Therefore, it is an alternative for my citizens to eliminate illicit drugs

(Weymouth 2008).

Corruption and Rent-seeking

After decade of conflict, Colombia has deeply ingrained corruption and rent-seeking.

It regularly happens in conflict countries that as the rebel organization become more

powerful, they can start to put their people into positions in the government. Over the

years, employees will only advance by serving the interests of the rebel organization. As

a result, good employees are driven away and replaced with the cronies of the rebel

groups. This leads to governments that are corrupt and ineffective to the people they are

supposed to serve.

Colombia has a long, challenging road ahead to clean up the government. There have

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been regular incidents of government scandals, at all levels of governance including some

tied to President Uribes political allies (Bronstein 2008). Bringing an end to the

Colombian conflict and maintaining peace will be difficult without increasing the

effectiveness of the government to serve the people and reducing the barriers and rent-

seeking opportunities currently embedded in the cost of doing business.

Government effectiveness

Colombia has been making steady improvements in governance, as measured by the

Worldwide Governance Indicators (Kaufmann 2007). There has been substantial

improvement in controlling corruption and government effectiveness. More modest, but

still notable improvements have been made in regards to rule of law and voice and

accountability. Regulatory quality and political stability have not enjoyed the sameimprovements. Regulatory quality is, relatively speaking, fairly good. Colombia has

earned a score in the third quintile for the past decade, which is an impressive rating for a

country so long in conflict.

Political stability, on the other hand, is among the worst in the world. Colombia has

been in the bottom 10% since measurement started and has not seen much improvement.

In fact, the situation actually deteriorated during the first half of this decade. The lack of

political stability will continue to be a challenge when it comes to brokering peace. The

impression that the central government is strong and will remain so gives rebel

organizations more incentive to negotiate. If a rebel group thinks the system is temporary,

they may be more inclined to wait for the government to fail. The greatest impact in this

area could be achieved by negotiating peaceful agreements with rebel organizations,

however. As a result, Colombia is in a sticky situation they need to reduce the militant

and terrorist activities within their borders in order to be perceived as more stable, yet

their lack of stability makes negotiations less likely to take place. International aid

Ease of Doing Business

The correlation between low-growth, stagnant, and recessing economies and

occurrences of conflict does not suggest an optimistic future for Colombia. A growing

legal economy is beneficial to Colombia in many ways and will play a key role in the

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countrys transition out of conflict. Additionally, unless there are viable alternatives to

the lucrative drug cartels, Colombians with few alternatives to make a living will

continue to join the rebel groups. The chemicals used to eradicate the coca plants have

been accused of killing all crops, ruining the alternatives for many of Colombias poor

(Shields 2005). In order to grow a vibrant legal economy, Colombia must facilitate those

wanting to operate a business.

Colombia has been working to reform the business laws to make doing business

easier. As represented by Bogota, the country was among the top ten reformers inDoing

Business 2008 for improvement made to protecting investors, paying taxes, and trading

across borders (World Bank 2007:2). The Anti-Red Tape Law which aims to eliminate

unnecessary bureaucracy is sorely needed, as it takes fourteen procedures to start a

business and 422 days to enforce a contract (World Bank 2007:3).Despite the recent advancements in this area, there is still plenty to be done. The ease

of doing business varies widely from city to city and tax collection is inefficient and

confusing. Increasing efficiency and reducing costs and confusion for all elements of

doing business will make Colombia increasingly attractive for business, both locally and

internationally.

Recommendations

Although good policies and better opportunities for the Colombian people are vital

for bringing about change, none of it will be possible without trust between the rebel

organizations and the government. It is going to be incredibly difficult for either side to

relent. After numerous failed peace treaties, there is little reason to put faith in future

negotiations. Both sides are faced with a huge challenge how do you negotiate with

people who want you and your organization destroyed? There are no easy answers to this

challenge.

President Uribe has not kept it a secret that he thinks a military defeat of the FARC is

the only permanent solution to the situation. He could be right. The FARC shows little

interest in participating in the government. Their primary motivators have long since

shifted from political ideal to money and power. The objectives of the FARC are contrary

to the interests of the people, so concessions made for the rebel group could be contrary

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to the long-term well-being of Colombians. With the de-militarization of the ELN under

way, a military defeat of the FARC would give a window of opportunity to negotiate a

peace with other armed groups in the country. Following the death of Raul Reyes,

National Public Radio reported record numbers of FARC deserters (Forero 2008).

Perhaps the FARC rank and file are as exhausted by the fighting as the Colombian

people.

Figure 1 (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi2007/sc_chart.asp):

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Data. (Nov 2007).

Bibliography

BBC News. 2008. Venezuela send tanks to the border.British Broadcasting

Company. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2 /hi/americas/7274038.stm (2 March 2008).BBC News. 2008. Q&A: Colombias civil conflict.British Broadcasting

Company. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1738963.stm (27 February 2008).

Bronstein, Hugh. 2008. Colombias Uribe hit by political scandal.Reuters.http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN2141899520080421 (21 April2008).

Forero, Juan. 2008. FARC Desertions Hit Record High.National Public Radio.http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=89186915 (28 March

2008).Kaufmann, Daniel, Kraay, Aart and Mastruzzi, Massimo. 2007. "Governance

Matters VI: Governance Indicators for 1996-2006" World Bank Policy ResearchWorking Paper No. 4280. (July 2007).

International Crisis Group. 2008. Colombia: Making Military Progress Pay Off.http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/getfile.cfm?id=3413&tid=5410&l=1 (29 April2008).

Markey, Patrick. 2007. France restarts bid to free Colombia FARC hostages.Reuters. http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSN2818139820080429

(28 April 2008).

McDermot, Jeremy. 2003. Legacy of a Colombian drug lord.British BroadcastingCompany.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/from_our_own_correspondent/3301901.stm (9 December 2003).

Office of National Drug Control Policy. 2008. National Drug Control Strategy.2008 Annual Report.http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/publications/policy/ndcs08/ch3.pdf (1March 2008).

Oxford Analytica 2006. Colombia Race Affirms Uribes Popularity.Forbes,http://www.forbes.com/2006/05/30/colombia-election-uribe-cx_np_0531oxford.html (31 May 2006).

Sequera, Vivian. 2008. Colombia: Rebels tried to kill Uribe.Associated Press.http://ap.google.com/article/ALeqM5hVQ5CCgZmk3pD4yfO8o9Q8oez19QD906I7D81 (21 April 2008).

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Shields, Elinor. 2005. US weighs costs of Plan Colombia.British BroadcastingCompany. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4627185.stm (5 July 2005).

Sun Times. 1989. Drug lord joins list of worlds wealthiest. Chicago Sun Times.http://nl.newsbank.com/nl-search/we/Archives?

p_product=CSTB&p_theme=cstb&p_action=search&p_maxdocs=200&p_topdoc=1&p_text_direct-0=0EB36E68ED475D50&p_field_direct-0=document_id&p_perpage=10&p_sort=YMD_date:D (9 July 1989).

Weymouth, Lally. 2008. Look at the Alternatives.Newsweek.http://www.newsweek.com/id/132857 (28 April 2008).

World Bank. 2007. Colombia at a glance. World Bank.http://devdata.worldbank.org/AAG/col_aag.pdf (28 September 2007).

World Bank. 2007. The Cost of Doing Business in Colombia. World Bankand

International Finance Corporation.http://www.doingbusiness.org/documents/subnational/DB08_Subnational_Report_Colombia.pdf

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Case Study 2: SUDAN

Introduction

The East African nation of Sudan has become notorious for the genocide and

human rights violations that have taken place within its borders. Presently, a conflict in

the Western region of Darfur has compounded former mass violence throughout the

southern and central regions. In spite of a peace agreement signed in 2005, there are

threats and predictions of war sparking once again in those regions that are considered

peaceful. Because Sudan is so vast in geography, people groups, and conflict issues, I

will be narrowing this research down to a specific area in Central Sudan known as the

Nuba Mountains.

In this paper, I will take a look at the history of the Sudanese conflicts, tracking

back to their first conflict in the 1960s. Specifically, I will describe the case of the people

of Nuba during the second civil war as framework for the challenges happening

throughout all of Sudan. I will then explore the efforts that have been made for peace

making and the obstacles to that peace. Finally, I will give a brief future outlook and

forecast for peace in Sudan. The purpose of this research is to understand the conflict in

Sudan and consequently its implications and challenges for peace.

Country & Regional Overview

Sudan is geographically the largest country in Africa. With a population of over

38 million people, Sudan is broken into two main populations: the Arab-speaking

Muslim peoples of the North and the Christian, Animist, and indigenous peoples of the

South.

The Nuba are a people who live in Central Sudan in a region known as the NubaMountains. This central region is rich in resources, including oil, and is fertile for

agriculture. Consequently, it is one of the most inherently valuable regions of Sudan and

so has likewise been a key target for the Northern Sudanese governments attempts to take

over the land.

The word Nuba refers to more than eighty small hill communities of indigenous

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people in the Kordofan Province of Central Sudan. The Nuba are well known for their

strong physiques, intelligence, traditions, and fighting skills. They also produce many

crops, and do not commonly raise livestock in mass quantity. According to Nadels

anthropological study of 1947, Every Nuba man and woman is, first and foremost, a

farmer. Proficiency in farming is the hallmark of a valuable member of the community

(Nadel, 1947: 15). With this importance placed on farming, severe damage is done to a

people and their economic life by civil war, and especially methods like the scorched-

earth policy.

Marked seasons of rainfall between June and October (although often starting

much earlier) in the Nuba region lead to a severe dry season in the other months of the

year. Yet, the Nuba people excel in agriculture and irrigation methods. The main crops

produced in Nuba are sorghum, beans, sesame, and millet (African Rights, 1995: 14).The Nuba Mountains are located between longitude 29 and 31E and latitude 10

and 12 30N, and covers about 30,000 square miles, inhabiting about 1 million people (5%

of the Sudanese population) (Rahhal, 2001: 7). The Nuban population numbers have

been volatile although, due to civil war. In 1989 the estimated Nuba population was 1.3

million. But deaths, lower birth rates, and displacement due to conflict has decreased the

population.

The geography of this region plays a significant role in the culture and economic

life of the Nuba people. The mountains rise between 500-1000 meters above sea level,

and are rocky but still cultivable. Some areas are formed in long ranges, while other

areas are spotted with single massifs. While the mountains are spread wide across the

entire region, they only cover 30% of the land. The rest of the land is plains, forests, and

farmland and is well known for its richnesssome of the most fertile land in all of Sudan

(African Rights, 1995: 12).

The linguistic multiplicity of the people of the Nuba Mountains forms the

framework for their cultural diversity as well. According to Roland Stevenson, a notable

linguist of the Nuba, there are ten primary language groups among the Nuba that are all

broken down further into as many as fifty different languages. The main ten groups are:

Koalib-Moro, Talodi-Mesakin, Lafofa and Amira, Tegali-Tagoi, Kadugli-Korongo,

Temein, Katla, Nyimang, Hill Nubian, and Daju (Rahhal, 2001: 9).

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Historical Background of Conflict in Sudan

By the nineteenth century, the Arab-Islamic population of the north dominated

the northernmost two-thirds of Sudans land and population, while the Southern third was

populated by non-Muslim black Africans. Over the course of history, these indigenous

blacks had been considered inferior to the Arab-Muslims and the targets of slavery. In

1956, Sudan gained independence after being an Anglo-Egyptian colony, which

immediately led to conflict within the country. Fighting between the Anya Nya of the

North and the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (SSLM) that had occurred for 17

years ended in 1972 with the Addis Ababa Agreement. The agreement allowed

autonomy for the Southern region of Sudan as well as a separate legislature and executivebody.

Eleven years after this agreement, in 1981, the conflict broke out once again. The

war was over regional autonomy and implementation of the Islamic Shariah law. It was

fought this time between the Arab government of the North and rebel groups of the

South, who were ultimately known as the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), as

well as the aforementioned political group SPLM. The deployments of armies and

perpetual conflict mixed with drought led to poverty and famine in southern Sudan. Until

1989, political instability and indecisiveness among the Northern government led to

failed attempts for peace agreements with the SPLA. But in 1989, Umar Hasan Ahmad

al-Bashir took over power of the Northern government, and the political uncertainty came

to an end. Al-Bashir reintroduced Islamic law and the war led to severe economic

deterioration, however he was unable to defeat the SPLA rebels in the South. Due to this

pressure, the government moved on to wage war against the traditional ethnic people, the

Dinka, and denied humanitarian relief to its own people. The Dinka and Southern people

fled, seeking refuge in northern cities or in neighboring Ethiopia. Thousands lost their

lives due to hardship and starvation during this exodus. Throughout this civil war, from

1983 to 2005, an estimated 2 million Sudanese were killed and 4 million displaced (Patey

2006, 7). In 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, also known as the

Naivasha Agreement) was signed between the North and the South, which allows six

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years of autonomy with a referendum on secession to be determined in 2011.

While the North-South civil war has come to a relatively peaceful end for now,

Sudan is far from conflict resolution. In 2003, rebels within the western region of Darfur

protested the Northern governments disregard for the non-Arab population of the land.

The Janjaweed rose up out of the Arab militias to fight in Darfur, and have killed

civilians and prevented international aid from entering the region. Over the course of

only four years, in Darfur alone, as of 2006, the United Nations suggests that over

400,000 Sudanese in Darfur have been killed and 2 million displaced (UN News Centre

2007).

While the CPA was the first lasting peace agreement between North and South,

with the continued tensions and small outbreaks of violence that occur between the two

groups, many Sudanese and Western writers have predicted that the peace will not holduntil 2011.

An Early History of the Nuba

The Nuba are a people with a long, deep history. They can be traced back to

peoples who lived as early as 2500 B.C., while more specific records of their life and

culture begin in the 1st century. It is believed that the Nuba were spread far across

Anglo-Egyptian Sudan in these years, from the Nile Valley to Dar-Fur to the Kordofan

Highlands. A series of empires and regime changes in early Sudan caused migration of

the Nuba and resulted in their settlement primarily in Kordofan (Keane, 1885: 102).

The slave trade played a major role in the history of the Nuba people. Powerful

states of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan as well as Arab pastoralists continually raided the black

Africans for slaves from the 7th century up to the sixteenth. These slave raids continued

to influence migration within Sudan, locating many black Africans in the Nuba

Mountains

Throughout this early history, the Nuba were continually targeted and persecuted.

By the late 19th century, the Mahdist regime, which had been in power for 300 years, was

in full force, fighting and killing in order to rule over the land. The Nuba suffered during

these years and were continually attacked even by Mahdis successor, Khalifa

Abduhhalhi. The Nuba put up strong resistance, however death and destruction were still

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overwhelming in their region.

By the 20th century, the Nuba were fending for themselves against the British,

using skills and training learned during captivity as slave soldiers to defend and protect

their people. Their defense was for the purpose of remaining their own people, instead of

being integrated into the North as a lesser, unequal people.

This fight for equality and, in essence, to be left alone and maintain their culture

continued and still does today. Their relations with Arabs continued to be tense, even

with the Baggara Arabs who resided near the Nuba and also lived in under developed,

impoverished settings. The British attempted to determine the majority in the region

between the Nuba, the Baggara Arabs, the Daju, and a more organized, well-known Arab

group known as the Misiriya Zurug, who dominated the region. Still, there was no clear

majority, and they willfully chose to favor the Arabs. Consequently, the Arabs receivedimproved education, economic opportunities, and were given a more equal representation

of power within the government. The years that followed increased the severity of these

tensions and ultimately led to civil war, which will be discussed in the following pages.

War in the Nuba Mountains

Several factors among the Nuba and the Arabs increased the tensions between

them and led to the civil war breaking out heavily in the Nuba Mountains. Those factors

include discrimination in education, land rights (leading to natural resource rights),

political roles, and ethnic discrimination against the Nuba people. I will briefly describe

education and land reform issues leading up to the official outbreak of conflict in 1985.

Education played a significant role in the history of discrimination against the

Nuba and growth of the Sudan Peoples Liberation Army (SPLA), which fights against

the army of the Northern Sudanese Government. Arabic was the official language of

instruction throughout the Nuba Mountains, and Nubans were made to feel that they were

only being educated to be servants and laborers, not professionals or academics. It was

this discrimination in the mid-20th century that led many Nubans to join the SPLA. Elyas

Ismail Gorab, a seventeen year old Moro (one of the tribes within Nuba) student from

Um Dulu, described his experience with discriminatory education pushing him to join the

SPLA:

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I joined the SPLA in 1987. I was at school in Um Sirdiba, insecond year intermediate (grade eight).

Our school was eighty students, with just three teachers. The headteacher and one other were Nuba, and the administrator an Arab. TheNuba teachers were sympathetic, but the policy was dictated from above.

The teachers implemented a new policy, that if you fail two subjects, youare not allowed to repeatyou have to leave school. We saw this as astrategy for denying us. They also made Islam a compulsory subject.[The Islam teacher] came to the class and when the Christians askedpermission to leave, he said that no one should leave, and we must studyIslam. We complained but no one listened. In our class, the majority wereChristians.

Also, in May 1987 a militia centre was set up in Aggab that startedattacking the Moro people. That month, they burned Um Dulu. Onlywhen the SPLA reached Achiron was the militia camp withdrawn. Wesaw that the Arab policy was to wipe out the Moro. Lupa was the first

village to be burned, in April, also by the militia. Um Dulu was thesecond. But the Moro had been assembling guns, and resisted.We left for the SPLA in a group of seven (African Rights, 1995:

37-38).

Gorabs description of his experience with education in the Nuba Mountains reveals a

significant part of Nuba history, especially in the recent years and the factors leading into

war and resistance.

Another factor I will describe that led up to the war is the issue of land

entitlement. For years, the Nuba and Arabs had clashed over land use regarding cattlegrazing and water holes. But as war drew near, these small tensions blew up and led to

violence. As mechanized farming techniques entered Nuba by the 1970s, Arab traders

and government officials began to manipulate the agricultural system, causing great

losses for Nuba farmers. Due to the 1970 collapse in cotton prices, sorghum became a

strong commodity. But the introduction of large-scale mechanized sorghum farms

likewise led to economic disaster for many Nuba, as it was the investors in the equipment

that made the most profit. Additionally, local Nuba farmers would receive small plots of

leased land, but only the wealthiest of local farmers were allotted it. The leases were a

basic form of bribery to get Nuba farmers to participate in the government scheme and to

show their support for it.

Finally, much of the takeover of farm land by large-scale farms had implications

for many beyond the farmers themselves, according to African Rights, [The Nuba

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Meanwhile, fifteen thousand Murahaliin were armed and organized by the Sudanese

government as a means of legitimizing them as part of the Sudanese army. This army

was known as the Popular Defense Force (PDF). More massacres occurred, with 98 dead

in Lagowa. As the Arab militias strengthened in weaponry and strategy, village raids

continued on a frequent basis. Eventually, they encountered resistance in Daju villages,

but the resistance only increased their violent motives.

In 1990 and 1991, the conflict escalated and became all-out war. The SPLAs

forces had grown stronger so their ability to fight back increased. Likewise, the more

civilians encountered the attacks of the Murahaliin, the more likely they were to join the

SPLA. By this time, the SPLA was permanently present among the Nuba Mountains.

They too committed severe human rights abuses, looting, and killing of civilians.

Additionally, they forced many young men to join the army, threatening to kill them ifthey didnt help fight.

When the SPLA showed up on the map in various locations throughout Nuba, the

government fought back with their scorched-earth policy. According to African Rights,

It was a simple and brutal method of counter-insurgency. The aim was to destroy the

rural economy by burning the villages, devastating the crops, stealing the livestock, and

driving the people out. It was a massive over-reaction to the military threat of the SPLA,

and unleashed unprecedented sufferings on Nuba civilians (African Rights, 1995: 81).

In 1990, this policy was matched with drought, resulting in a severe famine. Due to the

looting and burning of homes, and villages, civilians no longer had the means to sell their

livestock or work in nearby towns to sustain themselves during drought. From 1990-

1993, over ten thousand people died due to this famine that many considered a war crime

in and of itself.

The following years saw the removal of Nuba leadership, a declaration of Jihad

(Holy War), and the use of aerial bombardment, most famously by Antonov bombers.

Large offensives were launched by the government against areas where the SPLA were

located, including the Southern Jebels and Heiban. Thousands of civilians were killed

and innumerable villages looted and burnt to the ground. By late 1993, the Government

of Sudan chose a new approach in order to tone down the appearance of violence due to

the huge massacres and direct assaults. They modified the holy war and ethnic cleansing

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methodology to a slower, steadier and therefore less obvious removal of the SPLA,

including the Nuba society.

In 1994-95, a strategy known as Salaam min al Dakhal(Peace From Within) was

implemented to relocate prominent Nuba people into the government both as leaders in

politics and in the military. Likewise, it attempted to win SPLA commanders over to the

government armies. Meanwhile, the warfare switched to low-intensity. The government

attacked and captured Buram, Kauda, and Fariang, posing them all to appear as if they

were negotiated surrenders of the SPLA.

This low-intensity take over persisted for the next twelve years leading up to

the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between North and South in 2005. The

seventeen-year conflict brought human rights violations against civilians and soldiers by

both parties. Bradbury summarizes these years as:a campaign of terror and persecution in the Nuba Mountains.Government military strategy has followed a pattern familiar to thatemployed against southern political movements and populations: thearming of surrogate tribal militia (Murahaliin), buying off political andreligious leaders, the systematic abuse of civilian populationsincludingrape, the military conscription of children, mass arrests and selectivekilling of Nuba intellectualsand attacking the social structure of Nubasociety through the forced separation of families, the relocation ofpopulations to government protected peace villages, and an aggressivepolicy of Islamicization which includes the prohibition of culturalexpressions of identity. The systematic nature of the persecution againstNuba people since 1989 has led some to describe the campaign asgenocide by attrition (Bradbury, 1998: 464).

Prior to the lasting peace agreement in 2005, there were numerous cease-fires and

other peace discussions that occurred throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, but never

held. As previously mentioned, in 2005, the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA)

was laid out by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and was signed

between the two regions, including power-sharing measures, a separate government insouthern Sudan (GoSS), and plans for a election in 2011 that would allow for the South

to secede.

However, the Nuba Mountains are not specifically part of either regionNuba,

along with the Blue Nile region and Abyei, are considered the Three Areas which lie

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south regarding the principles of and right to humanitarian assistance, the Northern

government was resistant. OLS was not given access to the Nuba Mountains due to the

governments claims to control over the area. Over time, the government adjusted the

amendment to allow assistance to war-affected regions instead of populations,

significantly limiting the boundaries within which the OLS might move. Within this

change, the government claimed that Nuba was not in a war zone since it was under

Northern control. Consequently, the OLS has been of benefit in the south, but has been

restricted from assistance in Nuba and the other disputed central regions (Bradbury,

1998: 469).

A second effort for peacemaking includes the CPA and its amendments. While

the CPA included many referendums based on the Nuba Mountains, many in the region

claim that the agreements are not only breaking down, but were not equally written out inthe first place. The Protocol on Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile States contains

general principles for the agreement, stated in the following:

The Parties agree on the following, as the basis for political,administrative, economic and social solution to the conflict in SouthernKordofan/Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile:1.1. Human rights and fundamental freedoms shall be guaranteed to allindividuals in the State as prescribed in the Interim National Constitution;1.2. The diverse cultural heritage and local languages of the population ofthe State shall be developed and protected;1.3. Development of human resources and infrastructure shall be the maingoal of the State. It shall be conducted to meet human needs in accordancewith the best-known practices of sustainable development within atransparent and accountable framework (UNMIS, 2005: 73).

It is overarching principles such as these that the people of Nuba have already found to be

untrue in their relations with the National government. The Nuba Mountains Democratic

Forum claims:

The Naivasha Agreement falls short as it did not meet the aspirations of

the Sudanese people. The agreement up to now is merely ink on paper, asfar as the Nuba clauses are concerned. This explains the failure of theNational Unity Government to carry out its implementation. This has ledmany people who had been waiting patiently for so long for a just peace tobe realized to come out protesting against the CPA (Nuba MountainsDemocratic Forum, 2007).

The CPA also outlines for half of the souths oil revenues to be given to the

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revenues that the South will receive, and consequently the NCP is not easy to negotiate,

because it has significant interest in keeping as much oil and other natural resources as

possible in North, irrespective of historical documentation, and it considers it has already

lost once, on the ABC report, due to international experts (International Crisis Group,

2008: 13).

Between the census and disputed border demarcations, elections meant to be held

in late 2008 may be pushed back into 2009. Regardless of the date, the Sudanese people

will be voting for the President of the country, members of two houses of Parliament,

state governors, state assemblies, county commissioners, payams administrators, and city

council members. Additionally, the people of Southern Sudan will elect a president and

members of the assembly (Costa, 2007).

Challenges to Peace

As can be seen in the above efforts towards peace, significant challenges have

arisen above the efforts that have been made. Many obstacles to peace that arise in

conflict-ridden countries are found throughout Sudan and especially in the Nuba

Mountains. Many of the same drivers of conflict are now impeding the peace processes,

including lack of international pressure, dispute over natural resources (including

dependence on commodity rents), and ethnic dominance.

According to Collier, civil war causes a nations GDP to drop significantly over

the course of the conflict. While that is clearly true in most cases, Sudan is an anomaly

on this issue. In 2006, it had an 11.8% GDP growth rate, with recent years averaging at

around 8.5% (World Bank, 2007). This growth rate is one of the highest among the

entire African continent. Therefore, one could assume that other nations looking in on

Sudan from the outside might think it is doing just fine. It is growing economically and

has foreign investment (also quite unique among many African nations). However, as

Sullivan stated above, international pressure may very well be the key to pushing the

peace process along, solving the border demarcation problems, and assuring all entities

that the oil revenues are split up fairly, and ultimately attempting a free and fair election.

While the US and other Western nations have been involved in the peace process, as well

as the nations that form IGAD, many have called for their policies towards Sudan to be

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tougher. A bipartisan US caucus was formed in 2001 and advocated for the following:

Advocates of a tough Sudan policy favor additionalsanctions, appointment of a high-profile Special Envoy, andactive U.S. engagement in peace efforts. They oppose thestaffing of the U.S. embassy in Sudan and some favor

support for opposition forces. These advocates would likethe United States government to take specific measures toaddress slavery and aerial bombardment of civilian targets.Some who favor a policy of engagement argue that thepolicy of containment and isolation has failed to producetangible results and that the United States itself is nowisolated (Dagne, 2002: 14).

It is evident presently in 2008 that the White House and the United Nations are on

the move to assist with the crisis in Darfur. However, their lack of attention towards the

rest of the country is a great challenge to the peace in Sudan.

Another obstacle to peace is the massive amounts of oil revenue coming out of

Sudan. I have explained above the implications this has within the CPA and regarding

the border demarcations in Abyei and between North and South Sudan. These oil related

issues are a major obstacle in peace right nowthey have blatantly brought peace talks

and negotiations to a screeching halt. The Northern government has experienced years of

gain through commodity rents as many international investors come to them for oil.

Now, they are unlikely to easily give up even a portion of those rents. These veryinvestors can also be considered an obstacle to peace. For example, showing little

concern for the problems extant in Sudan, Chinese businesses have entered the country

for the export of various resources, primarily oil. In fact, China maintains 64% of

Sudans oil exports (Harman 2007), the rest being split among nations such as Malaysia,

France, Sweden, and Austria (and of course Sudan itself) (Switzer 2002).

Finally, ethnic dominance within Sudan continues to be a challenge. While the

Arab-Muslims of the North are not necessarily the demographic majority (which will be

determined through the current census), due to colonial favor, they have long ruled Sudan

as the ethnic group with the most power and influence throughout the country. One can

simply look at the history of Sudans conflict to understand the depth of this ethnic

discrimination. The imposition of Shariah law in the early 1980s still rings in the ears of

non-Muslim Sudanese. A recent New York Times article states that in spite of the work

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for peace in Central Sudan, it is common for Khartoums newspaper to carry false reports

of attacks on Arabs in order to increase tensions between the ethnic groups (Kristoff, 2

March 2008).

Future Outlook

Sudans second civil war lasted for two decades, the second-longest continuous

conflict second to Angola in regards to intractability, according to Johnson (Johnson,

2003: 167). Previously, immediately upon independence they entered a civil war that

lasted for sixteen years, with only a nine-year interim between the two wars. According

to Collier, the end of a war often is not the end of a conflict; once over, a conflict is

alarmingly likely to restart. Furthermore, the experience of having been through a civil

war roughly doubles the risk of another conflict (Collier, 2007: 27). In the same way, astensions are high in Sudan in spite of a peace agreement and ceasefire, many predict that

the peace will not hold, and conflict will occur once again.

Nicolas Kristoff, a renowned journalist with the New York Times, has recently

turned his attention from Darfur to this region in Central Sudan as well as growing

tensions in the South. Unfortunately, Kristoffs findings on a visit to Abyei revealed

strong forecasts of war:

With international attention distracted by Darfur and the UnitedStates presidential race, the Sudanese government now is chipping away atthe 2005 peace treaty that ended the north-south war in Sudan. If warerupts, as many expect, the flash point will probably be here in Abyei,where the northern government is pumping oil from wells it refuses togive up.

War is going to take place, Joseph Dut Paguot, the actinggovernment administrator in the Abyei region, said bluntly.

Chol Changath Chol, a representative of South Sudan in Abyei,agreed: If there are no changes, war will come. It will break out here andspread everywhere. (Kristoff, 2 March 2008).

As tensions grow in Sudan, negotiations over borders remain in a deadlock, and

opposing forces do little to calm each others tensions, it seems inevitable that war might

come to Central and Southern Sudan again. However, throughout all of Sudan, thousands

who fled during the war have returned, rebuilding their social, economic, and cultural

lives. According to the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), at the

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end of 2006, 42,258 out of over 686,000 refugees had returned to Sudan. Additionally,

almost 12,000 internally-displaced persons (IDPs) out of over 1.3million have likewise

come back to their homes (UNHCR, 2006). While these percentages may seem small,

their return to a volatile land is a good sign of peace to come.

Conclusion

Sudan has faced years of conflict and is still amidst a seemingly endless list of

obstacles to both peacemaking and peacekeeping. While limits of this paper restricted

me from going into detail on the war-ridden region of Darfur, one must also recognize the

dire, perpetual war that is going on there in spite of a peace agreement signed in May

2006 (WFP 2008). Amidst the varied regions of the North, South, Central and Three

Areas, and Darfur, Sudan has a deep complexity worth of issues to deal with.In this paper, I have considered the history of Sudans conflict as well as taken a

closer look at the Nuba Mountains located in Central Sudan as a more focused picture of

what is going on throughout the nation. I have described some of the main efforts for

peacemaking, such as OLS, the CPA, the attempts at border demarcations for the fair

split of oil revenues and the census for a free and fair election. The challenges towards

this peacemaking are seen in many of the same issues as caused the conflict in the first

placeoil rents, ethnic dominance, and weakening international pressure. Finally, I have

considered forecasts for what may happen in Sudan in the future if the above obstacles

persist.

Sudan is a rich and beautiful land in spite of its violent history. Amidst all of

these seemingly failed attempts at peacemaking, Sudan has once again become a vibrant

land of culture and cultivation. May the hope of its people increase and become an

obstacle to further violence.

Bibliography

African Rights. 1995.Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan. London: African Rights.

Bradbury, Mark. 1998. Sudan: International Responses to War in the Nuba Mountains,Review of African Political Economy, Vol. 77: 463-474.

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Collier, Paul. 2007. The Bottom Billion. New York: Oxford University Press.

Costa, Maker. 2007. Sudans 2008 Elections: What are the Scenarios Awaiting Us?The Sudan Tribune. http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article19582 (21April 2008).

Dagne, Ted. 2002. Sudan: Humanitarian Crisis, Peace Talks, Terrorism, and U.S.Policy,Issue Brief for Congress,Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.

Harman, Danna. 2007. In Sudan, China focuses on oil wells, not local needs,Christian Science Monitor, http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0625/p11s01-woaf.html (16 October 2007).

International Crisis Group. 2008. Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement: Beyondthe Crisis. http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5329&l=1(31 March2008).

Johnson, Douglas H. 2003. The Root Causes of Sudans Civil Wars. Kampala: FountainPublishers.

Keane, A.H. 1885. Ethnology of Egyptian Sudan, The Journal of AnthropologicalInstitute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. 14: 91-113.

Kristof, Nicholas D. 2008. Africas Next Slaughter, The New York Times,http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/02/opinion/02kristof.html(30 March 2008).

Matus, Jason. 2006. The three areas: A template for regional agreements. ConciliationResources. http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/sudan/three-areas.php (16 April2008).

Nadel, S.F. 1947. The Nuba: An Anthrpological Study of the Hill Tribes in Kordofan.London: Oxford University Press.

Nuba Mountains Democratic Forum. 2007. A Brighter Future for Nuba Mountains.http://www.nubasurvival.com/ (21 April 2008).

op t Ende, Nanne. 2006. Nobody wants go to back to war, buthttp://home.planet.nl/~ende0098/Articles/20060420.htm (16 April 2008).

op t Ende, Nanne. 2008. Personal Interview (email). 16 April 2008 and 21 April 2008.

Patey, Luke A. 2006. A Complex Reality: The Strategic Behaviour of MultinationalOil Corporations and the New Wars in Sudan, Danish Institute for InternationalStudies Annual Report, Vol. 2: 1-60.

Rahhal, Suleiman Musa. 2001. The Right to be Nuba: The Story of a Sudanese Peoples

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Struggle for Survival. Eritrea: First Red Sea Press.

Rahhal, Suleiman Shaza. 2007. The Prospect for Peace and Sustainable Developmentin the Nuba Mountains, The Nuba Mountains Democratic Forum.http://www.nubasurvival.com/ (21 April 2008).

Salih, Mohamed. 1991. Generation and Migration: Identity Crisis and Political Changeamong the Moro of the Nuba Mountains, GeoJournal, Vol 25: 51-57.

Stedman, Stephen J., Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Couseens, Eds. 2002.EndingCivil Wars: the Implementation of Peace Agreements. London: Lynne Riener.

Sullivan, Daniel P. 2006. Sudans Comprehensive Peace Agreement at One Year ofAge, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Working Paper.

Switzer, Jason. 15 April 2002. Oil and Violence in Sudan, African Centre for

Technology Studies, Canadian Centre for Foreign Policy Development, CanadianDepartment of Foreign Affairs and International Trade.

United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). 2007. 2006 StatisticsReport. http://www.unhcr.org/statistics.html (20 February 2008).

United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). 2005. Comprehensive Peace Agreement.http://www.unmis.org/english/cpa.htm(30 April 2008).

UN News Centre. 2007. Annan welcomes extension of African Union mission inDarfur. http://www.un.org/apps/news/storyAr.asp?NewsID=19948&Cr=sudan&Cr1=&Kw1=darfur&Kw2=&Kw3 (20 November 2007).

World Bank. 2007. Sudan Data Profile. http://devdata.worldbank.org/external/CPProfile.asp?PTYPE=CP&CCODE=SDN(7 May 2008).

World Food Program (WFP). 2008. Where we work-Sudan.http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/indexcountry.asp?country=736(31 March2008).

Young, John. 2005. Sudan: A Flawed Peace Process Leading to a Flawed Peace,Review of Political Economy, Vol. 32: 99-113.

Case Study 3: KOSOVO

Country Overview

Kosovo is in the heart of the Balkans, an ancient land of Slavs, Muslim Turks,

Albanians, and Serbs. As the worlds newest state, Kosovo successfully declared its

independence in the eyes of a majority of the international community on February 17,

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2008. Although much of the strife experienced by the newly-formed nation over the

course of its history has been a result of Serbian domination, the current demographic

drastically reflects another ethnic group. Kosovo, comprising an area slightly larger than

Delaware, is a nation of two million people, of whom 90 percent are ethnic Albanians.1

Albanian and Serbian are the official languages and its peoples, although primarily

Muslim, also practice Serbian Orthodox and Roman Catholic religions.

With an average annual per capita income of roughly $1,800, Kosovos citizens

are the most poverty-stricken in Europe (this is one-third that of nearby Albania, which is

also struggling economically). According to the World Bank, Over the course of the

1990s, poor economic policies, international sanctions, weak access to external trade and

finance, and ethnic conflict severely damaged the economy.2 Lack of available jobs has

also plagued Kosovars ability to prosper. Some sources place the unemployment rate,especially prevalent among Kosovos youth population, at 40 percent. As a recent article

from The Economistobserved, if the unemployment were actually that high, and they had

no other means of making money, ... everyone would be starving. They are not.

Kosovo looks and feels like a poor part of Europe, not a part of the Third World or parts

of the former Soviet Union.3 Foreign support, through the form of remittances and

funding from organizations such as the World Bank, have aided in keeping Kosovo afloat

economically. This dependence, however, will be a major hurdle for the nations future

development into a peaceful and economically-stable sovereign nation.

Kosovo is not entirely bankrupt of economic opportunities. It does have access to

natural resources such as lignite, magnesite, lead, zinc, nickel, and chrome. It also has

factories and the added benefit of its proximity to the wealthy nations of the European

Union (EU). The EU has actively taken on a primary role in restructuring Kosovos

weak economic infrastructure, as well as its peace-keeping missions, for a politically-

1 The worlds newest state, The Economist, 21 February 2008. Available from Economist.com,http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10727947. Accessed 15 April

2008.

2 Country brief 2006: Kosovo, The World Bank, updated February 2008. Available from

www.worldbank.org/kosovo. Accessed 1 May 2008.

3 The worlds newest state, The Economist, 21 February 2008. Available from Economist.com,

http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10727947. Accessed 15 April

2008.

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valid reason. What the EU will not say, but thinks privately, is this: We are supporting

Kosovos independence because of the chance that it will become more like us, and

hence a better neighbour. We oppose independence for Transdniestria et al because it

would make them more like Russia, and therefore worse for Europe. 4

There are numerous factors working in Kosovos favor, but its history will create

challenges along the road to a peaceful future. At the heart of its ability to sustain peace

and prosperity is its question of legitimacy and Serbian opposition to its declaration of

independence. Kosovars hopes for sovereignty extend back to the early 20th century

with Serbian defeat of the Ottoman Turks, as well as during the more recent dissolution

of Yugoslavia in the early 90s. At the heart of its conflict is the distinction between

Kosovos status as a province of Serbia rather than a republic of the failed Yugoslav

federation. To understand its recent conflicts, its past tied deeply into Serb nationalconsciousness, must be explored.

Historical Background

(...)Sultan Murad fell on level Kosovo!And as he fell he wrote these few brief wordsSent them to the castle at white Krushevats

To rest on Lazars knees in his fine city.Lazar! Tsar! Lord of all the Serbs,What has never been can never be:One land only but two masters,A single people who are doubly taxed;We cannot both together rule here,Therefore send me every tax and key,Golden keys that unlock all the cities,All the taxes for these seven years,And if you do not send these things at once,Bring your armies down to level Kosovo

And well divide the country with our swords ...When these words have come to Lazars eyesHe sees them, weeping cruel tears

4 The case for clarity: Why does the EU support independence for Kosovo? The Economist, 21

February 2008. Available from Economist.com,

http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10717378. Accessed on 15

April 2008.

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(...)5

Folk tales and ballads are at the heart of the conflicts arising in the Balkans, as

ethnic strife continues to disrupt peace in the region. The modern-day battle over Kosovo

stems from lore passed on for centuries. This particular epic poem describes part of theBattle of Kosovo (Blackbird field), which molded Kosovo into the emotional cradle

of Serbian civilization. In 1389, the Orthodox Christian Serbs were defeated by the

Ottoman Turkish Empire on the Kosovo Field. This marked the beginning of five

centuries of Ottoman rule. Despite the battle being a stunning blow to the Serbs, Kosovo

and the surrounding region grew into ...a holy land in the hearts of the Serbs and have

deep meaning in their national consciousness, as the tales were passed down generation

to generation.6

Here is how the prominent sculptor Ivan Mostrovic, ironically aCroat, rendered the Kosovo myth way back in 1915: Kosovo is a crownof thorns borne by the suffering Yugoslav nation... There, on Kosovo, itsTsar spoke to God the night before the battle and chose the heavenlykingdom as the only eternal empire, thus making himself and hence alsohis people eternal... Only one soldier of this holy army remained, his eyesgouged out by the Turks. This farsighted blind gusle-player... set offamong his enslaved people, preaching to them that justice is gained not byarms but by sacrifice and repentance... and the whole of the Yugoslavnation has become Tsar Lazars soldiers.7

The Serbs historical attachment to the region would be at the root of conflict

brewing six centuries after the Turks fell the Serbs at the Battle of Kosovo. Another

important event deeply ingrained into the Serbs connection with the region as their

sacred land is the so-called Great Migration following the 17th century German-

Turkish fighting in Kosovo. According to Stephen Schwartz, Like the first battle of

5 The Battle of Kosovo: Serbian Epic Poems, John Matthias and Vladeta Vuckovic, trans.,

(Swallow Press/Ohio University Press, Athens: 1987). Available from

http://www.rastko.org.yu/knjizevnost/usmena/battle_of_kosovo.html#songs. Accessed 1 May2008.

6 Bonnie C. Marshall, Tales from the Heart of the Balkans, Vasa D. Mihailovich, ed. (Englewood,

Colo.: Libraries Unlimited, Inc., 2001), xxi.

7 Branka Magas, The curse of Kosovo, New Internationalist, issue 247, September 1993.

Available from http://www.newint.org/issue247/curse.htm. Accessed 2 May 2008.Quoted in

Miroslav Krieza, Desect krvavih godina (Ten bloody years), Zagreb 1957. During the War,

Mestrovic actively campaigned for the federation of Yugoslavia.

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Kosovo, Serb memory of this later conflict with the Turks emphasizes the theme of

territories being brutally wrested from Christians, to be reclaimed in a fiery

resurrection.8 Territorial battles between the Ottoman and Germanic empires came to a

head in 1689 when a Germanic regiment, assisted by a largely local Serbian population,

drew into Kosovo. Their successful taking of Prishtina (the capital) led to the successful

recruitment of another 20,000 local troops. The continued mission was later defeated,

and the Serbs felt the wrath of their occupiers as, ...the Ottomans exacted retribution on

their disloyal subjects throughout Kosovo by burning houses, massacring residents,

attacking Orthodox monasteries, and slaying their clergy, including those at Pe.9

As a result of the Turks retaliation, Serbs made a mass exodus to Hungary.

According to Serb mythology, the primary importance of the event was not the brutality

of the Turks but of the consequence of Serbian departure from Kosovo: the allegedlyoverwhelming influx of Albanians onto Kosovo soil in the Serbs wake, supposedly

altering forever the ethnic balance of the land.10 This was, indeed, the turning point at

which Kosovo departed from being a Christian Serbian region to one primarily populated

by an Islamized Albanian one.

Turkish rule persisted in the Balkans until Austria and Hungary invaded in the

late 19th century. The Austro-Hungarian Empire attempted to assimilate all the ethnic

groups of the Balkans, which resulted in the movement came to be called Yugoslavism.11

With the 1914 assassination of Austrian Archduke Francis Ferdinand in Bosnias capital,

Sarajevo, not only was the First World War sparked, but so also was the formation of

what would be officially named Yugoslavia in 1929. The newly-formed country was

made of the South Slavic territories of Serbia, Montenegro, Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and

Herzegovina, and a divided Macedonia.

An attachment to the European continent did not, of course, leave Yugoslavia

untouched by World War II. The Axis powers swiftly took control of the country in

1941, partitioning it into sections for Germany, Italy, Bulgaria, and Hungary. When

8 Stephen Schwartz, Kosovo: Background to a War, (Interpress, Hungary: 2000), 39.

9 Ibid., 40.


11 Bonnie C. Marshall, Tales from the Heart of the Balkans, Vasa D. Mihailovich, ed.

(Englewood, Colo.: Libraries Unlimited, Inc., 2001), xxiii.

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Hitler breached the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact by invading the Soviet Union, Josip Broz, a

Croat-Slovene Communist who would later be known as Tito, gained Stalins and hence

the Red Armys support to expel the occupiers. Tito created a communist state made up

of the same six regions, including the addition of two autonomous areas within Serbia,

Vojvodina and Kosovo. Despite being expelled from the Soviet bloc for his independent

views in June 1948, Titos Yugoslavia remained communist up until the collapse of

communism in the Soviet Union and its bloc nations in the early 1990s.

As a consequence of the end of communism, Yugoslavia splintered when most of

the republics declared their independence from the disintegrating nation. Only Serbia

and Montenegro remained under the auspices of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

The strength of nationalist movements was reaching a precipice as Yugoslavian President

Slobodan Miloevi led a Serbian resistance against the further dividing of his country,when ethnic Albanians wanted to establish their own rule of law in Yugoslav Kosovo. In

the second half of the last century, the Albanian population in Kosovo had exploded as a

result of high birth rates, concurrent with the mass departure of Serbs. This had resulted

in Albanians making up 90 percent of the total population.12 The Serbs residing in the

region felt that their economic well-being and national identity were being threatened as a

result of the Albanian ethnic dominance in the region.

Miloevi made it well known that he had no intentions of letting Kosovo split

from the republic and created ethnic fervor among the Serbian population, promoting

hatred of the Albanian majority. According to Branka Magas:

The crowning event was a mass rally organized in June 1989 tocelebrate the 600th anniversary of Kosovo Field and held on the originalsite of the battle. Miloevi, flanked by generals dressed in the uniformsof the Yugoslav Peoples Army an army born in a national liberationwar meant to liberate Serbs and Yugoslavs from the Kosovo curse announced his readiness for war against other Yugoslavs.13

As a result of Miloevis actions, Albanians were forced out of their homes and fromtheir jobs, which was only the beginning of ethnic tensions in the region.

As the various nations split from the Yugoslavian Republic, conflicts broke out

12 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell, (Harper Perennial, New York: 2003), 445.

13 Branka Magas, The curse of Kosovo, New Internationalist, issue 247, September 1993.

Available from http://www.newint.org/issue247/curse.htm. Accessed 2 May 2008.

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across the Balkans. On June 27, 1991, Serbia invaded Slovenia, only to pull out a week

later, but a war between Serbia and Croatia would soon begin in July. Bosnia was the

next to declare independence, on February 29, 1992, which quickly sparked a war with

the Serbs, even though the European Community and the United States both officially

recognized Bosnia in April.14 The war in Bosnia came to an end in December 1995 with

the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord.15 Having not recognized Kosovos predicament,

the agreement left many Kosovars bitter and ...paved the way for the rise of a shadowy

band of Albanian fighters who called themselves the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).16

Kosovars had avoided violent protest for independence and had witnessed the

awards that Bosnian aggression had reaped as a result of the Dayton Accord. The KLA

was formed to commit various forms of terrorist attacks against the Serb minority in

Kosovo, in retaliation to their denial of independence. Sporadic attacks took place fromthe groups beginnings in 1993 for the next several years without gaining strong support

among Kosovos citizens. It was not until early 1998 when the KLA killed several Serb

policemen, did Miloevis retaliation truly spark the beginnings of a major conflict.

Serbian forces massacred some fifty-eight people related or involved with KLA organizer

Adem Jashari, among them women and children. Each attack from Miloevis forces

stirred greater resistance among the Kosovo population, resulting in the deaths of some

3,000 Albanians and 300,000 more forced to leave their homes in the dead of the

winter.17

Images the entire world would find startling arose when thousands fled from

Serbian violence. Whether or not to get involved in the brewing conflict was a question

the international community would now have to ask itself. One image that author

Stephen Schwartz found particularly moving was taken by photographer Wade Goddard

whose photograph was published in the October 8, 1998, issue ofThe New York Times.

The picture is of Elfije Kadriaj, 13, paralyzed most of her life from an early illness.

Goddards caption read: Thousands of ethnic Albanians have fled to Kosovos forests

14 Miron Rezun, Europes Nightmare: The Struggle for Kosovo, (Praeger Publishers, Westport,

Conn.: 2001), 39.

15 Ibid., 42. The Bosnian War resulted in the deaths of 250,000 people and 2.7 million refugees.

16 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell(Harper Perennial, New York: 2003), 445.

17 Ibid., 445.

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after Serbian attacks. A paralyzed girl sat in a refugee camp south of Stimlje [Shtimje]

yesterday.18

Pictures such as this one of Elfije did not go unnoticed by the international

community, as measures of debating intervention were taken to dissuade Miloevi

from committing any further atrocities. The United States was still reeling from the

Srebrenica Massacre in Bosnia, as well as a guilty conscious from choosing not to

intervene in the Rwanda genocide. Alex J. Bellamy, Senior Lecturer in Peace and

Conflict Studies at the University of

Queensland, described the political

challenges the growing violence caused

for Western Europe and North America.

The Bosnia syndrome. A fear that

Kosovo could witness a repeat of the

bloodshed in Bosnia, which many of

the leaders had criticized their

predecessors for not responding

more decisively to.

The refugees syndrome. In 1998 it came to be believed that violent conflict in

Kosovo would cause massive refugee flows and that steps were therefore needed

to prevent an escalation of violence.

The Balkan Wars syndrome. A pervasive (though misguided) perception

during the Bosnian war was that conflict in the southern Balkans would spread

uncontrollably, drawing in Macedonia, Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, and

probably Russia as well.19

In February 1999, a meeting of the United States and its European allies was held

at Rambouillet, a French chteau outside of Paris. The result of their conference was a

take-it-or-leave-it proposal which required Miloevi to evacuate a majority of his


19 Alex J. Bellamy, Kosovo and International Society, (Palgrave Macmillan, Great Britain: 2002),

69.

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troops from Kosovo, give back autonomy to the Albanians, and permit 25,000 armed

peacekeepers to enter Serbia. If Belgrade refused the proposal, it was made clear NATO

would be pressured to use appropriate measures with an aerial attack.20 When Serb

leaders refused to consider the proposition, NATO was forced to follow through with its

threat. On March 24, 1999, General Wesley Clark, supreme allied commander for

Europe, issued the deployment of NATO bombers on Serbia.

What NATO allies had not expected was the Serbian reaction to the bombings.

The level of Albanian ethnic cleansing was magnified as Serbs initiated Operation

Horseshoe. They forced still more Albanians from their homes, killing many of the men.

All told, Miloevis forces drove more than 1.3 million Kosovars from their homes,

some 740,000 of whom flooded into neighboring Macedonia and Albania. It was the

largest, boldest single act of ethnic cleansing of the decade, and it occurred while the

United States and its allies were intervening to prevent further atrocity.21 This outcome

has spawned much critical debate on the validity and effectiveness of humanitarian

intervention, but NATOs bombing did eventually lead to a Serbian surrender. On June

9, after seventy-eight days of bombing, Miloevi signed an agreement that forced

Serbian troops and police to leave Kosovo and permitted the deployment of 50,000

NATO peacekeepers to the area.

Efforts of Peacemaking

Of the hundreds of thousands of refugees who had fled the Serbian violence, most

returned on the heels of the NATO peacekeeping force, which entered in the summer of

1999. Many of them returned to severely damaged or completely destroyed homes,

which was a reflection of the entire social and economic infrastructure of Kosovo. As

Serbs pulled out of the region, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) had ceased

funding municipal governments, causing schools, public transport, the courts, and other

vital services essentially to shut down.22 On top of this, relations between remaining

Serbs and the returning Albanians was tense, at best, and with no functioning law

20 Samantha Power, A Problem from Hell, (Harper Perennial, New York: 2003), 447-448.

21 Ibid., 450.

22 Michael J. Matheson, United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies, The American

Journal of International Law, Vol. 95, No. 1, (Jan. 2001), 78.

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enforcement or legal system, the NATO peacekeepers had quite a few challenges facing

their future success in sustaining peace in the area.

An organized approach was taken by the United Nations, as the following

guidelines were set forth June 10, 1999, with the Security Councils adoption of

Resolution 1244.

Decided on the deployment in Kosovo under United Nations auspices, of

international civil and security presences;

Authorized member states and relevant international organizations to establish

the international security presence with substantial North Atlantic Treaty

Organization participation and under unified command and control, and

empowered the security presence to use all necessary means to establish a safe

environment and facilitate the safe return of all displaced persons;

Authorized the Secretary-General to establish an international civil presence

in Kosovo in order to provide an interim administration for Kosovo under which the

people of Kosovo can enjoy substantial autonomy within the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional administration

while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic

self-governing institutions; and

Enumerated the main responsibilities of the international civil presence, which

included promoting the establishment, pending a final settlement, of

substantial autonomy and self-government; performing basic civil

administrative functions; supporting economic reconstruction; maintaining

civil law and order; and facilitating a political process designed to determine

Kosovos future status.23

The mission assigned to the Kosovo Force (KFOR) was to carry out the

guidelines set forth by UNSCR 1244, which was primarily to maintain security in the

region, and they have been present there since June 1999. There are currently 15,000

NATO troops on the ground today, with no plans to evacuate, at least as of a December

7, 2007, meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels where it was determined that



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KFOR shall remain in Kosovo on the basis of UN Security Council Resolution 1244,

unless the Security Council decides otherwise.24 While KFOR was initially helping

restore peace and order by assisting returning refugees or internally-displaced persons,

rebuilding and demining, providing medical assistance, etc., it was the task of the United

Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) to provide civil support.

Following the conflict, the civil structure of Kosovo was in complete ruins, which

created a desperate need to re-establish institutions. UNMIKs primary mission was to

do just that, utilizing various international organizations and efforts. The four major

components of their mission included civil administration and public affairs (led by the

UN organization), institution-building (led by the Organization for Security and

Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)), humanitarian (led by the UN High Commissioner for

Refugees), and reconstruction (led by the European Union (EU)).25

In a February 2003 message from President George W. Bush, a progress report

was given on the efforts of the international communities involvement in the peace

process of Kosovo. KFOR efforts have helped UNMIK to make substantial progress in

implementing UNSCR 1244: reconstruction is well-advanced; free and fair elections held

three times; more than 5,200 multi-ethnic Kosovo police trained and deployed; and a new

constitutional framework for provisional self-government promulgated.26

International society has also provided plenty of forces outside the auspices of

NATO in order to restore peace in the region. Organizations such as the World Bank

have provided grants to promote economic reconstruction. Non-profits, including PER

(Project on Ethnic Relations) and IREX (International Research & Exchanges Board),

24 Kosovo Force (KFOR), Topics: North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 15 February 2008.

Available from http://www.nato.int/issues/kfor/index.html. Accessed 3 May 2008.



26 U.S. President, Message from the President of the United States: Kosovo Benchmarks, 108th

Congress, 1st Session, House Document 108-33, (5 February 2003): 3.

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both based in the United States, have also played a role in the peace process. In early

intl 750 didde,fewins,kreikemeier

Documents