j. l. gonzález, athens and jerusalem revisited: reason and authority in tertullian

8/8/2019 J. L. Gonzlez, Athens and Jerusalem Revisited: Reason and Authority in Tertullian

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Athensand JerusalemRevisited:Reasonand Authorityin Tertullian

JUSTO L. GONZaLEZQuid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis?quid academiae et ecclesiae? quidhaereticis et christianis?

De prasecriptione haereticorum 7.9Very few ancient Christian writers have been as maligned by posterity asTertullian has been. This is understandable, for Tertullian made little effort toendear himself to either his contemporaries or his future readers. His conversion

to-many still say "lapse into"-Montanism was not calculated to make himpopular with Catholic historians. His so-called legalism has become a favoritestraw man for Protestant writers. The disappearance of both Montanism and theancient African church destroyed the two logical communities where his namemight have been venerated. In the sixteenth century a number of scholars becamesufficiently interested in him to produce editions of his works; but although hisrhetorical ability attracted some attention from the humanists, they found hismanner and spirit too uncouth. Protestant rigorists who ought to have welcomedhis stringency rejected him because of his emphasis on tradition. Catholic pole-micists who could be expected to welcome such an emphasis ignored him because ofhis apparent denial of the authority of tradition in becomeing a Montanist. Ra-tionalist scholars who ought to have enjoyed his wit and his unflinching logicwere unable to sympathize with the seemingly illogical consequences of that logic.The result of these various biases has been a surprising agreement on a generallynegative evaluation of Tertullian as a thinker and as a person.

At no point has Tertullian been more maligned than in that which has to dowith the issues of faith and reason. This may be seen in the fact that the oftquoted phrase credo quai absurdum-I believe because it is absurd-usually at-tributed to him is nowhere to be found in his works. Although this is usuallyrecognized by modern scholars, many still insist that the phrase, while not his, isa correct summary of his attitude.' According to this view, Tertullian was stauch-ly opposed, not only to philosophy, the mother of all heresies, but also to reason,her handmaiden. This supposed opposition to reason has been pictured as an at-1. F. Loofs, Leitfaden zum Studiurn der Dogmengeschichte, 6th ed. (Tiibingen: MaxNiemeyer, 1959), p. 118: "Das ihm nachgesagte 'credo, quia absurdum' ist zwar apok-ryh; aber Tertullian hat ahnlich sich ausgesprochen: Crucifixus . . . [then follows thecrucial text of De Came Christi 5]." G. Bardy, "Tertullien," Dictionnaire de TheologieCatholique (Paris: Letouzey et Ane 1903-1946), "Ce n'est pas litt6ralement leCredo quia absurdum, mais c'en est 1 quivalent." G. J. de Vries, Bijdrage tot depsychologievan Tertullianus (Utrecht: Kemink en zoon, 1929), p. 50: "Het 'credo quia

absurdum' moge dan legendair zijn, het geeft den inhoud van het bovenstaande [credibleest, quia ineptum est] goed weer." H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fa-thers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 1:102-106, interprets Tertullianalong the same lines, and then proceeds to show how Tertullian contradicts himself.This could well be an indication not of contradiction in Tertullian, but of an error ininterpretation,Mr. Gonzdlez is associate professor of world christianity in Candler School of The-ology, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia.

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CHURCH HISTORYtempt to make faith more meritorious by making it more unreasonable,2 or tomake it stronger by forcing it to strive to accept the rationally unbelievable.3As a result of this common interpretation of Tertullian's stance on the issuesof reason and authority, he has been depicted as a flashy but superficial thinker,incapable of systematic thought: ". . . he never created any system. In fact, helacked the essential qualification, a balanced mind, which would enable him to ar-range the different articles of faith in logical order and to assign to each of themits proper place."4

Given this vantage point, Tertullian's entire contribution to the developmentof western theology is seen as consisting mostly in a number of fortunate formulaeand felicitous phrases. One is reminded of the ancient fable about the donkeythat was eating grass and unwittingly happened to play a flute that was lying inthe pasture. The problem with applying such an image to Tertullian is that hesomehow managed to play the flute much too often!

Such a simplistic interpretation could not long remain unchallenged. Tertul-lian's works are too unflinching in their own kind of logic to allow for it. Althoughhe rejected the authority of philosophy to correct the "rule of faith"-whatever thatmay have been-he nevertheless argued that the soul has a natural knowledge ofsome elements of Christian truth,5 and he made use of Stoic and even Platonicelements in constructing his own theology. Therefore, in recent times severalscholars have pointed to the rational elements in Tertullian's theology.6 Othershave shown that he borrowed extensively from the very philosophers whom heblamed for having given rise to heresy.7 There have been numerous studies ofparticular aspects of Tertullian's theology, and they usually show the coherencewhich rules his thought on whatever happens to be the subject of the study.8

What I shall attempt to do here is to go one step further and show, notmerely that Tertullian has what Tillich calls "a sharp rational mind", but ratherthat he has a clear understanding of reason-of its nature, function and limits-and that within that understanding of reason he remains strictly rational andsystematic. Hopefully, this will then serve to clarify the relationship betweenreason and faith as sources of authority for Tertullian. To do this I shall first ex-2. A. C. McGiffert, A History of Christian Thought (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,1954), 2:16: "The more unreasonable it appears to us, so Tertullian seems to think,the greater the merit of our faith." As iources for this assertion, MeGiffert mentionsAdv. Marcionem2.2 and 5.5. But to draw such a conclusion from these texts wouldrequire a great deal of unreasonable (and meritorious) faith in McGiffert!3. J. L. Neve, A History of Christian Thought (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1946), 1:93:"Faith is consent in a state of absolute obedience. The more unreasonable the articlesof faith are, the more opportunity there is for faith to develop its strength."4. J. Quasten, Patrology (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1953), 2:320.5. De testimonio animae passim. See also the excellent discussion by J. Lortz, Tertullianals Apologet (Munster: Aschendorff, 1927), 1:224-248.6. For instance, Paul Tillich, A Complete History of Christian Thought (New York:Harper & Row, 1968), Pt. 1, p. 38, credits Tertullian with "a sharp rational mind."7. C. de L. Shortt, The Influence of Philosophy on the Mind of Tertullian (London: ElliotStock, 1933); F. Refoul1, "Tertullien et la philosophie," Revue des Sciences Religieuses30 (1956): 42-45, argues-as I shall in this paper-that Tertullian is not an anti-ra-tionalist. He does not seem to think, however, that this argument can be made whileinsisting on the coherence of Tertullian's thought. For the influence of Platonism onTertullian, see J. H. Waszink, "Observations on Tertullian's Treatise Against Hermo-genes," Vigiliae Christianae 9 (1955):129-147.8. Two excellent examples of this are Th. Brandt, Tertullians Ethik: Zur Erfassung dessystematischen Grundanschauung (Gutersloh: Bertelsmann, 1928) and V. Nauman,"Das Problem des Bosen in Tertullians zweiten Buch gegen Marcion: Ein Beitrag zurTheodizce Tertullians," Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie 58 (1934):311-363.

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ATHENS AND JERUSALEMamine the crucialtext in De carne Christi5, from which the myth of the credoquia absurdumhas arisen. Then, taking Adversus Praxean 10 as my startingpointandsupportingmyinterpretationn a numberof othertexts, I shallattempt oclarify Tertullian'sunderstandingof reason. Finally, I shall attemptto outlinewhat this means for the issue of authority n Tertullian,especiallyas it relates tohis conversion o Montanism.The text which has given rise to the "credoquiaabsurdum"s clear and con-cise: "Crucifixus st dei filius; non pudet, quia pudendum st. Et mortuusest deifilius; credibleest, quia ineptumest. Et sepultus resurrexit; certum est, quiaimpossible."9From this text it is clearthat, althoughTertulliannever literallysaid "credo,quia absurdum",he did say its equivalent:"credibileest, quia ineptum",10nd"certumest, quia impossibile."Therefore, f one is to claimthat the common n-terpretationof Tertulliantypified by the "credo,quia absurdum" s incorrect,this must be done, not by simplyassertingthat he never did say such a thing-as a matter of fact, he practicallydid-but by showing,to begin with, that thistext, placed in its proper context and correctlyunderstood, ntends to conveyneithera sweepingcondemnationf reason,nor a generalpraiseof absurdity.Let us thenplacethis text within its propercontext. The purposeof De carneChristiis to refutethose who disparage he flesh, and especially ts resurrection.In a sense, it is the first part of a whole whose secondpart is De resurrectionemortuorum.1 Tertullian'sopponentshere are Marcion,Apelles, Basilides andValentinus.However, in the first five chaptersof De carne Christi-which arethe center of our concern here-he is basicallyrefutingthe views which he as-signs to Marcion.This is significant, or this means that the main thrust of theentiresectionis not, as has often been assumed, owardthe discontinuitybetweencreationand redemption,natureand grace, reasonand revelation,but ratherto-wardtheir continuity.Here Marcion s the championof discontinuity.Tertullianis arguingthat the God revealedin Jesus is also the God revealed in creation,and that the flesh of Jesus is the same as human createdflesh. It would indeedbe strangeif he were tryingto provethis point by claiming hat Christianreasonis opposed o naturalreason,andthatthis oppositions suchthatnaturalabsurdityconstitutesChristianproof! This is preciselywhathe is not doing in spite of themany opinions o the contrary.After two chaptersof introduction ull of the pathosand ethos which Aris-totle commendedand other authoritieson rhetoricclaimed were specially fittingin the introduction,Tertulliangets down to business n chapter3.12 Therehe out-9. De carne Christi 5.4. "The son of God was crucified; it shames one not, because it isshameful. And the son of God died; it is believable, because it is foolish (absurd). Andhaving been buried he resurrected; it is certain, because it is impossible." (A numberof manuscripts include "prorsus" before "credibile", but this does not appear inthe best manuscripts. In any case, it wouldn't affect my argument in any significantmanner.)10. "Ineptum," although not quite the equivalent of "absurdum", comes close to it. Itdoes not carry the connotation of logical impossibility; but it does mean foolish orinappropriate.11. E. Evans, Tertullian's Treatise on the Incarnation (London: S.P.C.K., 1956), p. x,and Tertullian's Treatisc on the Besurrection (London: S.P.C.K., 1960), p. xiv, showsthat what we have here is an actio prima and an actio secunda, as was commonin for-ensic practice. He also shows how each of these two treatises follows the prescribedrules of rhetoric, although in a very imaginative fashion. On the same issue, see R. D.Sider, Ancient Rhetoric and the Art of Tertullian (London: Oxford University Press,1971). On pp. 27-28, Sider examines the rhetorical structure of De carne Christi.12. Sider, pp. 13-14.

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CHUKCHHISTORYlines his refutation of Marcion by suggesting that the latter rejects the incarna-ion because he believes it to be either impossible or unbefitting the nature of God.'3He then devotes that entire chapterto proving that the incarnation is not impossible.

The core of the argument against the impossibility of the incarnation is sum-marized in the sentence which follows the text quoted above: "But nothing is im-possible for God, except that which he does not will."14 After a discussion onwhether or not God did in fact will to be incarnate, Tertullian has Marcion raisethe objection of the divine immutability. To be incarnate, God would have tochange, and change implies an end to what was formerly. Therefore God, whohas no end, is incapable of change, and could not have become incarnate.15 In-terestingly enough, Tertullian does not attempt to refute this argument-as mostlater theologians would-by claiming that the divine immutability is somehow com-patible with the incarnation. On the contrary, he argues that God can change ifhe wills to change, and that one must assert this if one is not to deprive him of hisomnipotence. "Otherwise he would be on a parity with those things which inchanging lose what they were."'6 In conclusion, the incarnation is not impossible.Chapter 4 then turns to the objection that the incarnation is unbefitting God.By the very nature of the case, the argumentation here is more of what Aristotlewould call pathos and ethos than what he would call logos, and need not detain ushere. What is significant is that Tertullian is arguing that the incarnation is notshameful, for human nature is not shameful.As the chapter proceeds, it becomes increasingly clear that what is meant by"unbefitting" (inconveniens in 3.1; indignus in 4.1) is actually "shame" (eru-bescentia in 4.4) and "folly" (stultitia in 4.5ff.). This in turn leads Tertullian toquote a text which the Marcionites presumably accept as Scriptural, for it comesfrom Paul: "God has chosen the foolish things of the world to confound thewise."17 Tertullian then turns to a lengthy commentary of this text, whose climaxis the famous "certum est, quia impossibile."18

What then, asks Tertullian, are the "foolish things" to which Paul refers?Certainly, they cannot be such things as the one true God and the practice of vir-tue.19 They are rather the nativity, passion and resurrection of Christ. "If wejudge God according to our own understanding",2 these things are indeed folly.Yet they are not foolish, but rather true, because God has willed to them to takeplace, and they have indeed taken place. And then, in a typical rhetorician's cli-max to this argument, comes the crescendo of paradoxes: "non pudet, quia pu-dendum est ... credibile est, quia ineptum est ... certum est, quia impossibile."It is hardly believable that, after writing an entire chapter to prove that theincarnation is not impossible, Tertullian would have made its impossibility thecriterion for its certitude, or that after devoting one and a half chapters to show13. De came Christi 3.1 "Necesse est, quatenus hoc putas arbitrio tuo licuisse, ut aut im-possibilem aut inconvenientemdeo existimaueris nativitatem." Italics are mine.14. Ibid.: "Sed deo nihil impossibile nisi quod non vult."15. Ibid., 3.4-5: " 'Sed ideo', inquis, 'nego deum in hominemuere conuersum, ta ut et nas-ceretur et came corporaretur,quia qui sine fine est etiam inconuertibilis sit necesse est.Converti enim in aliud finis est pristini. Non competit ergo conversio eius, cui noncompetit finis. '16. Ibid., 3.6: "Alioquin par erit eorum, quae conversa amittunt quod fuerunt. . ."17. Ibid., 4.5: "Stulta mundi elegit deus, ut confundat sapientia."18. A point which has been very well made by V. D6carie, "Le paradoxe de Tertullien,"Vigiliae Christianae15 (]961):23-31.19. De carne Christi 4.6. In numerousplaces, especially in De testimonio animae, Tertullianhas shownthat any wise man can know these.20. Ibid., 4.5.

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ATlEkNS AND JERUSALEMthat it is neither shameful nor foolish, he would have made its shame and itsfolly the reason for its acceptance. This is not what Tertullian is doing in thispassage. What he is saying is simply that these things, which seem impossible,are not really such, because God willed them to happen. In other words, he is notsaying that the criterion for truth is impossibility. He is saying that the criterionof natural reason, usually valid, is not always ultimately valid, for that reason itselfshows that God, who is the ultimate deciding factor, does not have to subject him-self to it. He is also saying that in such cases the criterion of truth is not some in-ner logic which one can discover by purely rational investigation, but rather whetherGod did or did not will the event in question-in this case the incarnation and itssequel-to happen.

Perhaps it would be useful to show how this criterion works in a differentand less debated text. In Adversus Praxean 10 Tertullian finds that the argu-ment of God's omnipotence is being used against him. Praxeas claims that theFather and the Son are the same. After the typical exordium, narratio and par-titio, Tertullian moves in chapter 2 to the more positive confirmatio. As had be-come common in his time, he doesn't separate clearly between the confirmatio,where he makes his own case, and the reprehensio, where he refutes his opponent'sarguments. These two are rather combined, although it is true that the earlierpart of this section is more like a confirmatio, and the latter part more like areprehensio. Part of the reason for this combination is Tertullian's frequent useof the praemunitio, where the rhetor attempts to forestall his opponent's case byraising an objection which that opponent might otherwise raise, and then respond-ing to it. In one such praemunitio Tertullian acknowledges that the argumentfrom divine omnipotence can be adduced against all the logical arguments whichhe has offered hitherto. Granted that it is not reasonable for the Father to be hisown Son, as Tertullian has been arguing, this still does not prove that it isimpossible.

But "nothing is difficult for God"; who does not know that? And "the thingswhich are impossible with the world are possible with God"; who is ignorantof it? And "the foolish things of the world God chose to confound the wise."All these things we have read [in scripture].21This is actually the same sort of argument which Tertullian used against Mar-cion in De came Christi, and which is now used against him. His response to itwhen used against him is fully consistent with the use we have seen him make of it inDe came Christi. On the basis of divine omnipotence, one could imagine aboutGod anything which he pleases, as if God did things simply because he can dothem: "We are not to believe that because he can do all things he has done eventhose things which he has not done. We must ask rather whether he has donethem."22 God was able to give wings to man, just as he has given them to kites.But he didn't. God could have destroyed Praxeas and all heretics. But he didn't.The fact that he was able does not prove that he actually did it. In a way thereare certain things which even God cannot do, although not because he lacks thepower, but rather because he does not wish to do them. Therefore, Praxeas must

21. Adversus Praxean 10.7: "Sed nihil Deo difficile, quis hoc nesciatt Et: Impossibiliaapud saeculum possibilia apud Deum, quis ignoret? Et: Stulta mundi elegit Deus, utconfundat sapientia. Legimus omnia."22. Ibid., 10.8: "Non autem, quia omnia potest facere, ideoque credendumest illum fecisseetiam quod non fecerit sed an fecerit requirendumn."talics are mine.

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CHIURCH ISTORYprove, not only that God can theoretically become his own Son, but also that heactually has done so.28Once again, Tertullian is not arguing against the use of reason. Rather he ismaking use of reason as far as he believes it will go and clearly stating the limitsof rational argument.

What, then, does Athens have to do with Jerusalem? In De praescriptionehaereticorum this question is purely rhetorical. The answer is obvious from thecontext: nothing. However, in order to gain a clear picture of Tertullian's attitude,one must first understand what he seems to mean here by "Athens" and "Jeru-salem." He certainly is not claiming to reject philosophy in toto, for a short timebefore penning these lines he had written De testimonio animae, where he makesuse of Stoic philosophy to show that the very soul of man witnesses to Christiantruth. He never seems to have wavered from that position, even in his most rigor-istic Montanist moments. Towards the end of his literary career, in De anima, heis still unabashedlyemploying Stoic materials. Nor can one claim that "philosophy"here means only Platonic and Aristotelian thought, and that Stoicism is exemptfrom the rejection of "Athens", for in the very next sentence Tertullian refersto the "porch of Solomon" in clear contrast to the Stoa.24 Finally, he cannot besaid to be giving free rein to this supposed anti-rationalism,as if he were claiming,in a credo quia absurdum fashion, that a doctrine is to be accepted precisely be-cause it is opposed to philosophy.

To claim that "Athens" here is a synonym of reason, and that "Jerusalem"stands for faith or for revelation, is again to make Tertullian into an anti-rationalist. I have already shown that, even in the seemingly outrageous text inDe carne Christi, he is not arguing that faith is opposed to reason. Here again,the rejection of reason would undercut Tertullian's entire argument, which istightly woven with a series of logical arguments. What he is really arguing for isthe use of reason in a "reasonable"fashion, so that it does not lose its bearingsand arrive at senseless conclusions. To him, then, the question is not one of rea-son versus faith as sources of authority but is rather a question of two differentsorts of reason. One is the reason of "Athens"; the other is the reason of "Jeru-salem." One could be called "dialectical reason"; the other would then be "his-torical reason." The former turns to itself, and achieves nothing because it is ap-plied to and ruled by nothing but itself.25 The latter turns to given facts-in thiscase, the historical "disciplina" of Jesus, as summarized in the "rule of faith"-and arrives at conclusions on the basis of such facts.26 Dialectical reason askswhether or not God can do a certain thing; historical reason asks whether or nothe in fact has done it, and then applies itself to that given fact.

"Athens" and "Jerusalem" stand here as symbols, not of the opposition be-tween faith and reason-"faith" was one of the main categories employed by theheretics whom Tertullian is attacking-but rather of the opposition between amode of thought which believes that fact conforms to reason, and another whichbelieves that reason must conform to fact. If fact conforms to reason, as "Athens"23. Ibid., 10.8-9.24. De praesc. haer. 7.10.25. Ibid., 7.6: "Miserum Aristotelen! qui illis dialectican instituit, artificem struendi etdestruendi, uersipellem in sententiis, coactam in coniecturis, duram in argumentis,operariamcontentionum,molestam etiam sibi ipsam, omnia retractantemne quid ominotractaverit." Italics are mine.26. See my comments on Adv. Prax., above.

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A'HJENS AND JERUSALEMwould have it, only that which can be understoodand logically stated can befactual. Thus, Achilles nevercatchesup with the turtle;only Being is; God can-not becomeincarnate. If reason conformsto fact, as "Jerusalem" laims, onlythat which is factual can be understood.Movement s demonstrated y walking;Becomingis; God has becomeincarnate."Athens" s spatialand static reason;"Jerusalem"s temporaland dynamicreason.AlthoughTertullian s not concernedhere with the "Athens" ypifiedby theclassicalhistorians,I would ventureto say that, had the issue been broughtup,he would have foundpoints of contactwith them,but also points of clear diver-gence. Indeed,betweenthe logos of Elea, whichled to ontology,and the logos ofIonia, which led to physics and history,Tertullianwould probablyhave chosenthe latter.But still both of these approaches eek after logos, which is for themthe final criterionof truth. Tertullian,on the other hand, seeks after the will ofGod as it has been actualized n historicalfact. Therefore,both Elea and Ioniamay be included n the global symbol"Athens."This does not mean that "Jeru-salem" is not concernedabout logos, nor that "Athens" s not concernedabouttemporal act; Tertulliantakes great pains to make sure that his variousrefuta-tions of heresiesmakeas much sense as possible,and Socrateswants to makesurethat the rooster which he owes is paid. It does mean that the final criteria oftruth are different."Athens"and "Jerusalem"hus implytwo differentapproacheso authority.If "Athens" s right,there is no bettersource of authority han universalreason,especiallyas it is purifiedfrom the imperfectionswhich it has in historicalman.If "Jerusalem"s right,there is no better sourceof authority han an ocularwit-ness, although hat witness must still make sense-and here one must rememberthat Tertullian s constantlyblendingapostolicJerusalemwith forensicRome.His blendingof Jerusalemwith Rome gives Tertullian'sunderstanding f au-thority a flavor which it is difficultto understandapart from that background.Authority s not opposedto reason. On the contrary, here are cases whereTer-tullianseems to use the two as synonyms.27Auctoritas s the capacity hat a per-son has to standas an auctor,that is, as a guarantor,and that capacitymust bebased on givenreasons.The best auctor s the one who can claim that title also inthe sense of "author",or originator,and to him belongs the highest authority.Others can serve as auctoresif there is reasonto believethat their guarantee svalid. When Cicerorefers to Polybiusas bonus auctor,he does not mean thatPolybiusis a "goodauthor",but that his wordis good.28In jurisprudence,whichseems to have been Tertullian'sbackground,he term auctoritaswas used in atechnical sense to indicate the right of possession,and was appliedalso to theauctoresof the past who were quotedas havingauctoritas,not because hey were"goodauthors" n the sense that their style was good, nor in the sense that theyhad createdsomethinggood, but in the sense that they knew what they were talk-ing about.29That is the essentialcharacteristic f an auctor: to know first-handwhat he is talkingabout.If we now return to Tertullian's"Jerusalem", nd to what authoritymeansfromits standpoint,we shallbe ableto understandhow Tertullian'snotionof au-27. De Pud. 22.11: "quaecumque auctoritas, quaecumque ratio." If these two are notsynonymous,at least they are two parallel ways in which the act of restoring murderersand fornicators could be justified by Tertullian's opponents.28. Cicero De Off. 3.113.29. Ibid., 1.37; Cicero Topica 23.

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CHURCH HISTORYthority, as set forth in De praescriptione, still allowed him to abandon the churchwhich could claim apostolic succession.30 In that treatise, the argument is basicallythat the apostles are the auctores-not in the sense of originators, but in the senseof guarantors-of the Christian faith,81and that the church is their heir.32 Thus,authority strictly belongs to the apostles, and the bishops of the church can claimapostolic authority only because they can show themselves to be the legitimateheirs of the apostles. The apostles stand as auctores, not only through the suc-cession of bishops, but also through their writings and through the rule of faith.The apostles, and not the bishops, are the auctores, and theirs is the auctoritas.They speak through Scripture, through the rule of faith, and through their suc-cessors in the episcopacy. Therefore, the authority of the bishops does not derivefrom the physical succession, but from the fact that they hold the faith of theapostles. Their ability to show a direct line of succession from the apostles is notwhat makes them authoritative, but is rather one more proof-together with theiragreement with Scripture and with the rule of faith-that they are indeed apostolic,and can thus claim the apostles as their auctores. This is why even those churcheswhich cannot show a line of succession from the apostles, if they hold to the faithof the church, can be accepted as apostolic on the basis of their kindred faith-proconsanguinitate doctrinae.33 What Tertullian does not say in this treatise is thatthe counterpart is also true: that if a bishop who can show a direct line of suc-cession from the apostles departs from the true faith he is to be no longer countedas apostolic. At the time when he was writing De praescriptione haereticorum,arguing as he was for the Church which could show this succession, he did notmake this particular point. Later, when as a Montanist he became convincedthat the bishops had departed from the apostolic faith, he could make this furtherpoint without contradicting what he had said in De praescriptione haereticorum,or invalidating its argument.

In becoming a Montanist Tertullian claimed for himself the conservative posi-tion, over against what he declared to be the innovations of the bishops-especial-ly the bishops of Rome. In De praescriptione Tertullian could refer to Rome andits episcopacy as the place where authority was at hand.84 But soon a series ofdevelopments showed that the Roman episcopacy was particularly vulnerable towhat Tertullian took to be moral and doctrinal decay. The history of the Romanchurch during the reigns of Victor, Zephyrinus and Callistus Tertullian saw as30. In A History of Christian Thought (Nashville: Abingdon, 1970), 1:181, I affirmedthat Tertullian's conversionto Montanism invalidated his argument in De praesc. haer.,and that it was for this reason that he felt compelledto write refutations of individualheresies. My uneasiness with that assertion was suggested at that time in a footnote,showing that in De praesc. haer. Tertullian had already promised such further refuta-tions. I now have come to the conclusion that I must retract my earlier affirmation,for I find no evidence that Tertullian felt that there was any contradiction betweenhis argument in De praesc. haer. and his having become a Montanist. On the contrary,in De carne Christi,which is clearly a Montanist work, he explicitly refers to De praesc.haer. as having refuted all heresies (De carne Christi 2.6).31. De praesc. haer. 6.4: "Apostolos Domini habemus auctores qui nec ipsi quicquam ex-suo arbitrio quod inducerent elegerunt, sed acceptam a Christo disciplinam fideliternationibus adsignaverunt."32. Ibid., 37.3-4: habeo origines firmas ab ipsis auctoribus quorum fuit res. Ego sumheres apostolorum."33. Ibid., 32.6.34. "Authority", however, in the sense that the presence of the apostles Peter, Paul andJohn, the auctores, can be felt there, both in their "thrones", and in their writings."At hand", because Tertullian has been suggesting various places where such authoritymay be found, and Rome is the nearest one (ibid., 36.1-6).

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ATHEN' AND JERUSALEMone of theological wavering and moral relaxation. With Praxeas and Sabellius,patripassianism gained the ear of the bishops, and it took the schismatic Hip-polytus to refute it. With the famous "edict of Callistus", the traditional moralrigor of the Christian faith was forsaken. Even Hippolytus, who had no sympathyfor Callistus, but who was no Montanist either, claims that at this time new andunacceptable practices were introduced.35Referring to the power which Praxeasseemed to have in Rome, and to his efforts to introduce patripassianism have theprophecies of the Montanists condemned, Tertullian says that Praxeas has servedthe Devil in Rome in two ways: by expelling prophecy, and by introducing heresy;by sending away the Paraclete, and by crucifying the Father.36This conservative self-understanding on the part of Tertullian is significant,for it is fully consistent with his notion of authority as described above. Indeed,when authority is seen as depending, not on logical coherence, nor even on moralrectitude, but on the ability to attest to historical accuracy, it necessarily leads toa conservative attitude. What is important is to determine what was the word ofthe original auctores. Therefore, Tertullian insists that the Paraclete revealsnothing new.37He simply shows more clearly what was implicit in the writings ofthe apostles, and what the bishops have now abandoned. The fact that this claimwas not quite true, and that a number of Montanist "revelations" were actuallyinnovations, is something which modern scholars can show, but to which Tertul-lian had to remain blind.

Given this understanding of the manner in which the recent history of thechurch had perverted the original "disciplina" of the apostles, one can see howTertullian could become a Montanist without repudiating the entire argument inDe praescriptione. The Montanists were the true heirs of the apostles, of the auc-tores. Abandoning the apostolic discipline, the bishops had lost the right to claimthese auctores and therefore had no authority. In De praescriptione strict apostolicsuccession was not required for apostolicity; now that succession is not sufficientto guarantee true apostolicity. Scriptures and the rule of faith still hold as the twobasic criteria for being able to claim the auctoritas of the apostles; but to thesenow is added the Paraclete, while apostolic succession is left aside.Tertullian would say, however, that the Paraclete is no new addition, for hispromise is included in the texts of the auctores and in the rule of faith. What isnew is that the bishops have departed from the true tradition, and that they nowfind themselves in conflict with the Paraclete who has been sustaining the church

throughout its history. And once again, in a series of treatises which I cannotreview here, Tertullian sets out to show, by means of logical argument, that theMontanist position is faithful to the faith delivered at Jerusalem.Thus, when he became a Montanist as well as when he was a catholic, Ter-tullian did not use the "Jerusalem" principle as a means to excuse himself from

rigorous thought. Nor did he simply appeal to the revelations given to theMontanist prophets-which he could logically have done. Rather, he applied hisunusual logical abilities to prove the consistency between his beliefs and the his-torical facts of Christianity, or, as he would have put it, to show that the apostolicauctores of the Christian faith lent their auctoritas to the Montanist position.35. Philosophumena9.6-7.36. Aidv. Praz. 1.5: "Ita duo negotia diaboli Praxeas Romae procuravit: prophetiam.expulit et haeresin intulit, Paracletum fugavit et Patrem crucifixit."37. De monogamia 2, 3.

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j. l. gonzález, athens and jerusalem revisited: reason and authority in tertullian

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