The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 12 | Issue 50 | Number 3 | Article ID 4236 | Dec 14, 2014

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Japan’s Resilient, Decarbonizing and Democratic SmartCommunities 燃料脱炭する日本のレジリエントで民主的なスマートコミュニティ

Andrew DeWit

On December 1, 2014 the rapidly expandingdomain of renewable energy burst through astubborn bottleneck of vested interests andoutmoded ideas. Germany’s biggest utility, E.ON, announced it would abandon fossil fuel andnuclear power to create “a new business modelbased on renewables, intelligent grid systems,energy management and other services.”2 If itsplans go forward as proposed, E. ON’s portfolioin what it calls “the new energy world” willinclude about 20 gigawatts of renewablegeneration in operation or in the pipeline, over1 mil l ion ki lometers of transmissioninfrastructure, and 33 million customers on thesales end.3 In an era of paradigmatic changes inenergy technology and business models, andparticularly in all aspects of electricity (i.e.,from generation through distribution and toconsumption), E. ON’s announcement stillcame as a surprise even to the Germanauthorities. Experts are struggling to grasp theenormity of the implications of E. ON’s movefor power systems, climate policy, financialmarkets, regulatory regimes, and otherimportant aspects.

E. ON’s radical move is yet another wake-upcall for Japanese energy policymakers. The E.ON shock seems potent evidence thatelectricity’s paradigm shift is indeed towardsresilient, decentralized and renewablegeneration and distribution, as well as otherintelligent systems that comprise smartcommunities. At the same time, E. ON’simmensity portends yet another threat that bigcapital might dominate and define thetrans i t ion as wel l as monopol ize i ts

considerable opportunities. As one observerwarns, “the determined entry of such a bigplayer into the market will likely happen at thecost of Germany's decentralized, small-scaleproducers - the backbone of the Energiewende[“energy shift”] until now.”4

E . O N G o e s G r e e n(http://www.sustainablebrands.com/news_and_views/leadership/sustainable_brands/eon_announces_shift_renewables_part_bold_new_corporate_)

E. ON’s decision will certainly influence theJapanese debate and policymaking choices onpower reform and smart communities. As weshow below, Japanese mainstream energytechnocrats have for years been diligentlyexamining Germany. Their attention predatesJapan’s March 11, 2011 (3-11) natural andnuclear disasters. And even prior to E. ON’sstartling declaration, they had deemed thefeed-in tariff (FIT), distributed generation, andother key elements of the Energiewende useful.The institutions through which Japan’s energytechnocrats are unfolding what they have

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learned, adapting Germany’s lessons toJapanese circumstances, are potentially verypowerful.

Though this declaration may seem a grossoverstatement, it is indeed possible that Japancould overtake Germany as a model for rollingout renewables while bolstering inter-regionaland interpersonal equity. This potential existsbecause of Japan’s manifold incentives andcapacities. In Japan as in Germany, the role ofnuclear versus renewable, and centralizedversus distributed energy, has long been astumbling block due to sunk costs and politicalcoalitions. But the dominance of vested energyinterests in Japan’s political economy is rapidlyeroding, while the post-3-11 imperative ofresilience continues to rise higher on theagenda and reshape options in the powereconomy. Japan is certainly disadvantaged bythe lack of adept political leadership and acredible opposition. But in the face of amultifaceted crisis, technocratic vision andaction appear to be creating a productive andrapid route to green and resilient smartcommunities, using some of the mechanismsthat were key to Japan’s startling postwarrecovery. The concluding section offerssuggestions on how to accelerate and amplifyJapan’s smart community paradigm throughgreater external engagement.

Learning the Stadtwerke Business fromGermany

Japan’s smart-energy technocrats – anexpanding stream of intellectuals andbureaucrats – is in fact implementing astructural reform for diffusing a new paradigmof smart communities. The smart communityparadigm is centred on distributed energy, butalso encompasses other utility services,mobility, communications, governance, healthcare, and myriad elements of modern urbanlife. The most recent summary statement of theJapanese project is outlined (in Japanese) inSmart Communities: A Smart Network Design

for Local Government Infrastructure. Thisimportant new book was organized by Japan’stop mainstream energy intellectual KashiwagiTakao and published October 15, 2014.5 Itsinitial chapter, written by Kashiwagi, describeshow Japan’s energy technocrats are using theFIT, stadtwerke (municipal business), power-sector deregulation and other key elements ofGermany’s green energy transition as enginesfor something much more ambitious. TheJapanese are linking the project to fiscal andfinancial policy, with the potential to revitalizeindustry, build resilience, and bolster localdemocracy.

Kashiwagi’s chapter depicts smart communitiesas the key item in Japan’s growth strategy. Thisis not the first time Kashiwagi has made thisassertion. He has been making the argumentfor well over a year, in previous books as wellas numerous articles and smart-communityevents. Kashiwagi is not a mere academicscr ibb ler , awai t ing a dar ing po l icyentrepreneur to put his ideas into action.Rather, he is himself an enormously influentialfigure in Japanese energy policymaking circles.In addition to his academic role as speciallyappointed professor at Tokyo Institute ofTechnology, Kashiwagi is also chair of Japan’sHydrogen/Fuel Cell Strategy Council,6 chair ofthe Ministry of Economy Trade and Industry’s(METI) new energy subcommittee of itsCommittee for Natural Resources and Energy,Project Leader of Tokyo Inst i tute ofTechnology’s Advanced Energy Systems forSustainability,7 to name a few of his positions ofinfluence in policymaking. Through thesepositions, Kashiwagi appears to have helpedrealize Japan’s June 14, 2013 New GrowthStrategy’s explicit commitment to ICT-ledgrowth. He also had a hand in coordinating theexpansion of smart-community projects and theincreasing streams of finance flowing fromvarious ministries of the central governmentplus their allied quangos (Quasi AutonomousNon-Governmental Organization) such as theNew Energy and Industrial Technology

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Development Organization (NEDO).

K a s h i w a g i T a k a o(http://www.nec.co.jp/seminar/110719energy/)

Kashiwagi’s vision, as articulated in his bookchapter, puts the motive force for rolling outJapan’s smart communities in a vehicle akin tothe German stadtwerke of municipally ownedutilities. Germany's 900 or so stadtwerke thatoperate in energy - out of a total of 1420 thatoperate in water supply, sewage, wastemanagement and other community functions8 -were among the major winners from Germanpower deregulation. They are also increasinglyrecognized as key to that country's ability todiffuse renewable energy, whose role inGermany’s power mix has risen from about 6%in 2000 to 30% in 2014. The stadtwerke havehelped drive this impressive progress becausethey have organizational, financial and otherheft together with a central role in servicing

community demand for power.9 And their roleappears set to increase further in quantitativeas well as qualitative terms. For example,influenced by an “energy avant-garde,”Dessauer Stadtwerke in Saxony-Anhalt ispoised to replace its ageing coal-firedgeneration fleet with decentralized andrenewable power, together with an innovativethermal-storage system.10

It is unclear at this point whether E. ON’saggressive move into renewable energy, smartgrids and other elements of the new paradigmwill weaken the expanding role of the Germanstadtwerke in the energy shift. The latter aregenerally popular with residents and are linkedto the powerful community movements thathave succeeded in renationalizing (or, moreaccurately “re-municipalizing”) the power gridsof such urban centres as Hamburg.11 Thesegrids and other assets, such as gas and districtheating networks, are largely held by the big 4energy giants, E. ON, RWE, EnBW andVattenfall that dominate Germany. It remainsto be seen how far remunicipalization reaches,but in some German communities the projectaims at bringing not just power but also gasand distr ict heat ing into communityownership. 1 2

Old Dessau Mine Now a Festival Site ForDigging Rock (Music) Rather than Coal(http://www.dw.de/the-energy-avant-garde-when-coal-mining-goes-green/a-18105345)

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Stadtwerke and Japan’s Local PublicCorporations

The above is part of what Japanese energytechnocrats have been watching. Their use ofthe stadtwerke as the engine for rolling outJapanese smart communities is important. TheJapanese vision appears to be more ambitiousthan that of their German counterparts: whileGermany is a leader in diffusing renewablepower per se, it appears to be rather a laggardon the EU rollout of smart cities, perhapsbecause it can export and import power.13

Germany’s FIT-driven energy shift in theworld’s fourth largest economy has had aprofound impact on the global public debateand policymaking. Yet if Japan’s incipientmodel finds traction, it may have an even largerimpact. Japan is the third-largest economy, wellover USD 1 trillion larger than Germany, andnow in the midst of an unprecedentedly largetechnological experiment. Japan’s unparalleledneed for sustainable economic growth dovetailswith an increasingly powerful role of innovativelocal governments working in tandem withsmart elements of key central agencies. Thestadtwerke approach not only puts the localcommunity in charge of smart communitydeployment; it also institutionalizes thatleadership in a vehicle with the financial,administrative and other means to takeeffective action. Japan’s model may help turnus away from building smart communities ledby behemoths of the private sector. Properlyfinanced and incentivized local governmentsseem unlikely to allow large corporate actorssimply to siphon income from core urbaninfrastructures and do as they will with data onthe residents’ consumption, movements andother interactions in the smart community.

Japan’s history of local public corporations alsooffers a fertile basis for the insertion of energy-centred stadtwerke. Japan’s 1700-plus localgovernments have long had their utility

functions, especially water, serviced by localpublic corporations. Japan’s local specialcorporations numbered only 45 in 1953, butgrew to 3000 in the wake of the high-growth1960s.14 Japan has seen waves of expansion oflocal public corporations’ roles and numbers,as the need arose. Their ranks swelled rapidlyin the postwar years of high growth, due to theimpera t i ve o f d i f fus ing such bas i cinfrastructure as waterworks and sewerage incities and towns undergoing what was then anunprecedented pace of urbanization. The publiccorporations’ welfarist role grew between1975-1984, and their role in industrialpromotion between 1985 and 1995.15

The total number of Japan’s local governmentssharply declined over those decades.Amalgamations between 1953 and 1955 sawtheir count more than halved from 10,520 inOctober of 1945 to 3,975 in September of 1956.They continued to merge afterwards, reaching3,229 in 2000, and then dropped to 1,718 inApril of 2014.16 That decline in the number oflocal governments, even as the number of localpublic corporations increased, underscores thesignificance of the latters’ role.

As of fiscal year 2012 (FY 2012), Japan’s 1,718local governments boast a total of 8,843 publiccorporations, of which 3,637 (41.1%) managethe sewer systems and 2,152 (24.3%) the watersupply. The value of these businesses total (FY2012) YEN 17.6 trillion in operations, and aremanaged through special accounts that areseparate from Japan’s local governmentgeneral-budget (whose spending on sanitation,education, public works, and other categoriesis just under YEN 95 trillion). Of the publiccorporations’ YEN 17.6 trillion in operations,the sewerage-works represent YEN 5.8 trillion(33%) and the water-works YEN 4.4 trillion.Local public corporations also operate in theblack, earning a total of YEN 4.6 trillion (FY2012), of which sewerages earn YEN 1.2 trillionand waterworks YEN 2.2 trillion.17 These are, inshort, significant local public service business

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operations that contribute to the economicactivity of the local area as well as to therevenue base of the local governments.

It is interesting that Kashiwagi and others lookto Germany with scant reference to their owncountry’s developmental history. Certainly, theproliferation of public corporations in Japan,both local and national, became a focus ofadministrative reforms, especially duringformer PM Koizumi Junichiro’s (2001-2006)assault on wasteful spending and governmentfinances. There is no denying that the moneysquandered on unneeded roads and bridgestruly was prodigious, and reform essential. Butat the same time, there are good reasons localpublic corporations remain in place. And it maybe instructive to recall how linking finance tothese vehicles can get important things done,and done well.18

Japan’s local public corporations have almostno presence in electricity and gas, representingonly 0.9% of the power supply and 2.6% of gassupply. These are key infrastructures forgrowing the smart community, as well asdiffusing economic opportunity to nearbycommunities that could supply larger areaswith power and energy. When it comes topower, postwar Japanese prefectures, citiesand towns have been passive consumers ofcentralized privately-owned power delivered by10 monopoly firms that also dominated theirrespective catchment areas’ politicaleconomies. Going distributed, and fast, throughsmart public agency, is the surest way todisrupt the old business model of the powerutilities. The E. ON example is just the latestevidence of how vulnerable old-line utilities areto distributed and renewable energy. Japan’sprivate utilities know this, which is why theyare desperate to water-down the power-sectorderegulation slated for 2016 as well as placetheir people in charge of the Organization forCross-regional Coordination of TransmissionOperators (OCCTO), the new agency to policethe grid.19

When viewed against this background, thetechnocrats’ initiatives appear to have anunstated but potentially quite “political”dimension. As noted, the power stadtwerke inJapan offer a mechanism that puts theincentives to champion revolutionary change,leading smart communities, into the hands ofthe cities and towns. The Ministry of InternalAffairs and Communications (MIC), a fortuitousblend of ICT enthusiasm coupled withresponsibility for local fiscal health, has in factset a goal of establishing no fewer than 1000local energy firms over the five years from2015. The national government will not onlyallow local governments to finance investmentsin these firms, but it will pick up half theinterest payments.20 Moreover, Kashiwagi willhelp coordinate these initiatives as chair of anew MIC “Commission for Deploying a Local-Government-Led Community Energy System.”This Commission was created by MIC onNovember 4 of this year, and held its firstmeeting on November 7. It will have 3 moremeetings, seeking to devise a template forlocal-government decentralized energysystems, prior to the end of its tenure in Marchof 2015.21 These and other moves suggest thatsmart-energy bureaucrats in the MIC areacting quickly, using the Abe regime’sdesperation to ignite sustainable domesticgrowth via a focus on “local Abenomics” and“regional revitalization” since mid-2014.22

Making Choices

The technocratic manoeuvres are fast, but havea long background. As noted earlier, Kashiwagiand his cohort, having been looking at theGerman city-business model for some time,evidently determined that German stadtwerkewould make a handy vehicle for bundling post-deregulation expertise and institutional clout(e.g., to raise capital) without having to rely onunpredictable, distracted party politics or weakand fractious popular movements. In addition,the public-sector-led approach means that thesmart community is not a construct of Hitachi,

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IBM and the other market players that wouldlike to lead the smart city rather than be led.23

Reading through the past few years of thetechnocrats’ work (as well as work within theMIC24) suggests that their studies becameincreasingly detailed as they realized thepost-3-11 period offered an opportunity tobreak through the parasitism of the monopolyutilities and get the energy political economyfocused on "prosumer" (power producer andconsumer) cities.

Aside from the content of his recent activismand writing, what makes Kashiwagi especiallysignificant is that he is both a core member ofthe so-called “nuclear village” as well as anenthusiast for renewable energy.25

Kashiwagi thus straddles both Japan’s deeplydamaged paradigm of nuclear power as well asits rapidly emerging paradigm of distributedpower and smart communities. He is evidentlynot yet ready to dump nuclear, but does he nowwrite about its role in the smart community.This stance is a stark contrast to, for example,Hitotsubashi University Professor KikkawaTakao, a staunch supporter of nuclear powerwho has argued that Japan’s remaining andapproved nuclear reactors should be restartedand the sites made into smart communities.26

The severity of Japan’s economic and othercrises also puts a premium on making smartchoices in the midst of multiple constraints. Inthis context, Kashiwagi appears to have optedto side with the general interest rather than thesectoral interests that dominate Japan’spolitical economy. If so, this is hardly asurprise: Kashiwagi is the designer of Japan’sfirst smart community, a 100% renewablemicrogrid project, linking NEDO (New Energyand Industrial Technology Development) andother facilities, that went live at the 2005 AichiWorld’s Fair.27 He surely has a lot of emotionaland intellectual capital invested in theseinitiatives, and does not want to see themundermined by vested interests.The power

monopolies, with their focus on centralizedpower and control of the grid, as the core oftheir business model, stand in the way of anationwide diffusion of smart communities.Hence actual deregulation of the power sectoris key to Kashiwagi’s argument. So also is thediffusion of distributed renewable powersupported by the FIT. Kashiwagi argues that,for starters, Japan's local governments stand togain YEN 5 trillion of Japan’s YEN 15 trillionpower economy through distributed renewableenergy supported by the FIT. That would be ahuge boost for their finances as well as theirlocal economies.

K o m i y a m a H i r o s h i(http://www.nikkeibp.co.jp/aging/article/report2011/20120402/08/01.html)

Another potentially very important agent in thisshi f t is Komiyama Hiroshi 's expl ic i t

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commitment to a 100% renewable goal by2050. Komiyama is another top energy-policyintellectuals. He is not only former President ofthe University of Tokyo, but also Chairman ofthe Mitsubishi Research Institute and isnetworked throughout Japanese mainstreamenergy and environmental institutions. Before3-11, Komiyama was vague on the role ofnuclear in the energy mix to achieve hisemphasis on 70% energy self-sufficiency by2050.28 But in the mid-October “Great EnergyChallenge” debate in Tokyo hosted by NationalGeographic and Shell Oil, Komiyama presentedhis vision as 100% renewable by 2050 anddismissed former IEA-chief Tanaka Nobuo'sproposal to focus energy R&D on next-generation nuclear.29

Japan's two top mainstream intellectuals ofenergy, Komiyama Hiroshi and KashiwagiTakao, are thus explicitly on the same pageconcerning the importance of green smartcommunities.30 The two are most prominentamong the thought leaders of Japan’smainstream technocratic energy expertise.Their stress on the role of local governmentsbrings inst i tut ional ized democrat icrepresentation into the smart communityconcept. Japan’s smart community concept isthus evolving into a city-led paradigm in thewake of 3-11 and the initial set of projectsundertaken in Kitakyushu and elsewhere.31

Distributed Power Versus Vested Interests

Japan’s growth agenda has long sought todevelop smart communities, with many of theideas developed by Kashiwagi and his cohort.Even before the March 11, 2011 (3-11) multiplenatural and nuclear disasters at Fukushima andthe larger Tohoku (“Northeast”) region, Japan’sgrowth strategies emphasized smart grids,renewable energy and related innovations.These innovations were focused on the cities inwhich over half of the world’s population andover 90% of the Japanese population alreadylive, and which are growing apace, because the

Japanese recognized them as a massivebusiness opportunity. For example, on June 18,2010, the DPJ government of Hatoyama Yukioapproved a New Growth Strategy thatemphasized green innovation, centred on smartcommunities, in order to build YEN 50 trillionin new green business and 1.4 million new jobsby 2020.32 The METI “smart city” elite wereclearly prominent among the technocratsdesigning this approach, as is evident fromtheir very deta i led December, 2010presentation (in Japanese) “Policy EvolutionT o w a r d s t h e R e a l i z a t i o n o f S m a r tCommunities.”

Pre-3-11 METI documents of course includenuclear in the centralized baseload power mixfor the smart community. Japan’s explicitenergy policy at the time, embodied in the“Strategic Energy Plan” of June 2010, was tosecure 50% of electricity (24% of primaryenergy) from nuclear power by 2030, up from acapacity of about 30% in 2010.33 But thedocuments were even then clearly moreenthusiastic about distributed generation,smart grids, power storage, smart meters andother devices that comprised the fast-emergingsmart community paradigm. The smart-energybureaucrats, keenly aware of developments inGermany and elsewhere, were also concernedthat Japan might build yet another “galapagos”of over-engineered and uncompetitivetechnologies. Their 2010 “Policy EvolutionT o w a r d s t h e R e a l i z a t i o n o f S m a r tCommunit ies” pointed to this r isk inelectronics, energy, and automotivetechnology, and highlighted the smartcommunity as an export platform and a contextfor smart technologies that affords innovativeengagement with global markets.34

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Nuc lear and Other Large -Sca leConventional Power in the pre-3-11 SmartC o m m u n i t y(http://www.navigantresearch.com/blog/articles/an-ambitious-endeavor-to-create-green-society-in-japan)

Pre 3-11 Japanese technocrats were working inan archipelago with minimal reserves ofconventional fossil fuels. They wanted tomaximize domestic energy independence,decarbonize much of the power mix, andachieve these goals at a reasonable cost. Theysought to expand nuclear and renewables asmuch as possible, but with an emphasis onnuclear. They had to work, after all, in acontext where the powerful electricitymonopolies’ business models privilegedcentralized power. Hence, prior to 3-11,designs for smart communities had large-scalethermal and nuclear generation arrayed ontheir outskirts as baseload power. TheFukushima disaster appears to have taken thenuclear role off the drawing board so far assmart communities are concerned. Indeed,after 3-11 nuclear reactors tend to disappearfrom the smart-community power schemes,while distributed generation – especiallythrough renewables - moves to the fore.

Post 3-11 Toshiba Smart Community(https://www.linkedin.com/company/toshiba-smart-community?trk=company_logo)

The technocrats do not explicitly declare thatthey are writing nuclear out of the power-mixfor smart communities. But the patent,post-3-11 (and post-Sandy) need for distributedpower and resilient communities seems to leadaway from nuclear. This logic appears to havepermeated the Japanese smart-communityconcept without anyone publicly stating it. Yetit makes complete sense: Unless one isprepared to offer the world smart communitieswith a small-modular nuclear reactor (SMR)underneath, low-carbon (or even no-carbon)smart communities mean maximizingrenewable energy and efficiency. This appearsto be what works best economically andenvironmentally. Indeed, Japan’s blue-chippower-unit makers Toshiba and Hitachi’scorporate PR videos and other media forpromoting their smart communities emphasizethat the projects are 100% renewable energy.35

Neither are they alone in this: the US Navy’sOffice of Naval Research – hardly averse tonuclear, whether power or weapons – is takinga central role (via a DC smart grid and othergear) in such projects as 100% renewableChiang Mai World Green City (ASEAN’s first),with explicit aims to broaden that renewablecollaboration elsewhere in Thailand as well asVietnam, and explicitly as a little noticed partof the pivot to the Asia-Pacific.36

Smart Communities for Decarbonizationand Democratization

Japan’s new paradigm of smart communities

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thus emerges from its most authoritativecircles, emphasizes equitable structural reform,and focuses on energy. This is very important.What has hitherto been absent from Japan’s –not to mention the global – debate on smartcommunities is an explicit statement that theircore is energy. What has also been missing is apowerful engine for their diffusion anddemocratization. We are now getting both fromthe Japanese, and at a time when these areundeniably urgent matters for all countries.

S o n g d o s m a r t c i t y d e s i g n(http://www.theurbandeveloper.com/songdo-paves-the-way-for-the-smart-cities-of-the-future/)

Consider the confused international debateover smart cities. LSE Senior Urban FellowAdam Greenfield, in his “Against the SmartCity,” lambasted such corporate-led, resource-intensive smart cities as Songdo (South Korea)and Masdar (Abu Dhabi).37 Greenfield’s worklacks, however, engagement with theimperative of building resilient decarbonizingsmart communities in the face of extremeweather, unsustainable energy, and thenumbing prospect of large infusions ofgreenhouse gases associated with India’s andChina’s mega-urbanization. China, in thecourse of accelerated urbanization, hasconsumed more cement in three years(2011-2013) than the US did in the entire

century and played a large part in driving upthe price of oil to levels where USD 70 nowseems impossibly cheap.38 China’s resource-intensive urbanization involving hundreds ofmillions of migrants in a matter of decades iscontinuing apace. It cannot be repeatedwithout blowing past even more planetaryresource and environmental boundaries. IfIndian PM Narendra Modi’s proposed smartcities are to evolve as radically resource-liteand decarbonizing communities, as they simplymust, Japan’s emerging paradigm of smartcommunities will be one reason.

L e t ’ s n o t t r y t h i s i n I n d i a(http://www.gatesnotes.com/Books/Making-the-Modern-World)

Japan’s paradigm, as it is taking shape, standsout against most competing visions in beingprimarily about energy, the crucial andgeopolit ical ly fraught material f low.Kashiwagi’s vision is focused on sustainablegeneration, smart and small-scale transmission,and maximizing efficiency on the consumptionside. Moreover, that centrality of smart energyonly makes sense in an archipelago withminimal conventional resources, one that is stillreeling from a massive shock to a deeplyentrenched power monopoly.

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The Japanese model of the stadtwerke istechnocratic, to be sure. But at the same time,it appears to be a realistic mechanism forachieving a rapid rollout of smart communities.Public corporations have access to finance, cancollaborate on overturning regulatory obstacles(such as those impeding the fast diffusion ofonshore wind) and otherwise have means ofacting to further community interests. Thisstadtwerk mechanism also has the virtue ofalready existing in the local public corporationsthat the MIC is building on. This makes itpossible to avoid having to replicate fromscratch the German experience of building apolitical movement for renewables, somethingthat took several decades.

Japanese civil society certainly has potentialforce, but lacks a narrative for constructive andconsistent action on smart communities. In thewake of 3-11 Japanese people-powermovements and public opinion played avaluable role in blocking a return to nuclear“business as usual.” Despite Prime MinisterAbe Shinzo’s pressures, none of Japan’s 48nuclear power reactors has restarted. Butpopular movements have not been verysuccessful in leading an energy shift orarticulating a vision of resilient, decarbonizingand democratic smart communities. Yet as thestadtwerk-centred smart communities unfold,civil society may be empowered to act moredecisively. That is, popular movements, localbusiness, and other elements of civil societywill create roles for themselves in the emerginginstitutional context and economic opportunity.Local politics in Japan, as elsewhere, is mucheasier for citizens to influence than its national-level counterpart because the incentives arestronger and transaction costs lower. And theemergent paradigm of smart communitiesseems likely to amplify these incentives.

So in the face of considerable inertia and ashortage of time to act on climate change andresilience, there is radical potential inKashiwagi's vision and in what the MIC and

other central agencies and many localgovernments are doing. Cities stand to beempowered to ensure that the community'sinterests are served by the interests runningtheir core lifeline infrastructures. Kashiwagialso stresses that deregulated power and theFIT are essential to the Japanese-stylestadtwerke, whose aim is to strengthen inter-regional equity as well as sustainable growth.He also wants to build on this, very fast, andmake it regional, encompassing East Asia andbeyond. It is difficult to overstate theimportance of this vision for the geopoliticallyunstable Asia-Pacific region where much thathappens on critical issues of urbanization,energy and CO2 emissions will be decided.

Japanese-Style Stadtwerk’s Implications

The intellectual leadership as well asinstitutionalization of stadtwerk-centred smartcommunities open the way to a profound shiftin R&D investment priorities within Japan’s big-three conglomerate (Hitachi, Toshiba andMitsubishi) power-unit operations and beyond.The makers are clearly aware of the businessopportunity. Toshiba, for example, detailed itssmart community growth strategy on December16, 2011, declaring that the smart communitymarket was to expand to YEN 163 trillion by2015 and that they were aiming at Yen 8trillion, or 5% of this total.39 The big three’soperations are at present clearly divided amongthose who want to stick with nuclear (as well asinvest in next-generation technologieschampioned by Tanaka Nobuo and others),those who want to emphasize Carbon Captureand Storage (CCS)-equipped and other fossilfuel power units, and those who want to stressall of the technology involved in the smartcommunity to promote renewables.

The latter technologies are core to the new E.O N c o m p a n y , w h o s e D e c e m b e r 1announcement – described in the introductionto this article – surely did not go unnoticed byJapan’s big three conglomerates. Moreover, the

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sustainable power systems include not justsolar and wind, but also waste-heat recovery insewerage as well as other advanced gear that isbeing deployed within Japan and in a host ofother countries, including Denmark, Canada,and other smart city leaders.40 The scale ofsmart-community infrastructure has expandedfar beyond what Toshiba assessed it at just 4years ago.

On the energy front, the smart communitydebate is thus rapidly evolving a model thatelaborates beyond simply smart grids, energymanagement and some solar and wind. It iscoming to include a myriad of advanced energyharvesting systems in development anddeployment, engineered wood that is beingused in building high-rises,41 and otheremergent decarbonization technologies. Themore this model evolves and diffuses, thegreater the pressure within Hitachi, Toshibaand Mitsubishi to focus their R&D resources onthat green paradigm in order to avoidgalapagos effects.

Like what you see? Panasonic-led FujisawaS u s t a i n a b l e S m a r t T o w n(http://www.dw.de/energy-hungry-japan-puts-smart-towns-to-the-test/a-17790945)

The number of smart-community participants isincreasing as well, opening up yet more roomfor local leadership, innovation, andengagement of universities as well as NGOs

and other citizen groups. For example, theTokyo Metropolitan Government and its 62area local governments (wards, cities, andtowns) are organized as EcoNet Tokyo 62. TheEcoNet Tokyo 62 “Commission on RenewableEnergy and Smart Communities” has been atwork since 2012, developing a “smartcommunity handbook” of best practices forlocal communities that have yet to initiateprojects.42 This commission is not a passivevehicle for distributing corporate PR. One ofthe three key members of the committee,Morotomi Tooru, Professor of Economics atKyoto University, is a specialist on Germany.He is also head of the “Ider Project” at KyotoUniversity, which has been undertakingextensive research on the German model as ameans of diffusing renewables, not just by theFIT but a lso by the stadtwerke as aninstitution.43 Added to this leadership, theKanto and other regional divisions of METI arealso working on organizing area localgovernments, so as to accelerate the diffusionof smart communities centred on energy.44

Nippon Steel and Sumitomo Metal Group’sK i t a k y u s h u S m a r t C o m m u n i t y(http://www.nssmc.com/en/product/use/resource/smart/)

Japan has at least 100 smart city (aka “smartcommunity,” “smart town,”) projects underway.At the end of the current fiscal year (March 31,2014), the flagship projects in Kitakyushu,

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Yokohama, Keihanna (Kyoto) and Toyotagraduate from their 4-year subsidy support, toemerge as full-fledged self-sustaining projects.These appear to be too strongly led by largecorporate concerns, as the EU-Japan Centre forIndustrial Cooperation’s Clarisse Phamhighlights in her detailed October 2014analysis “Smart Cities in Japan.”45 SurelyKashiwagi and his cohort are well aware ofthose facts, and what they imply for theviability of Japan’s smart communities in theglobal marketplace. But in the wake ofKitakyushu and other projects, there aredozens of other projects building on theflagship model but distinct from it. The newerprojects are deepening their deployment ofinnovations in renewable energy (includingrenewable heat), ICT-enabled efficiency (inlighting, heating and cooling, etc.), mobility,health-care services and other core urbanfunctions.

There appears to be plenty of scope for growth.The most recent survey of Japan’s smartcommunities was undertaken by EcoNet Tokyo62, and between June 19 and July 4th of thisyear.46 The survey sampled all 62 of the EcoNetTokyo 62 governments, with all of themcomplying. The survey results show a dramaticincrease in awareness of smart communities.Moreover, whereas only 2 of the areagovernments were in the midst of deploying asmart community in 2012, the figure had risento 10 by 2014. All told, this year 22 of the 62member governments were either initiatingprojects or preparing to, versus a total of 14 in2012.

The results also showed a consistent focus onenergy throughout, even among governmentsthat were initially simply thinking about smartcommunities. In 2012, there were 156 replies(with multiple choices allowed) on the desiredgoals of the smart community. Of these, 40sought increased residential energy efficiency,31 increased office-building energy efficiency,17 community economic stimulation, 8

enhanced tourism, 11 increased industrialdevelopment, 8 area energy independence, and36 opted for greater resilience of schools,hospital and other facilities. That means 79 of156 replies focused on energy, either throughefficiency or generation.

In 2014, the total number of replies had risento 176. Of these, 38 sought increasedresidential energy efficiency, 29 increasedoffice-building energy efficiency, 15 communityeconomic stimulation, 11 enhanced tourism, 11increased industrial development, 29 areaenergy independence, and 36 opted for greaterresilience of schools, hospital and otherfacilities. In short, 86 of 176 replies focused onenergy, either through efficiency or generation.Moreover, the desire for area energyindependence leapt from 8 in 2012 to 29 in2014, showing by far the greatest increaseamong all categories.

And as we have also seen earlier, the newprojects are being given a vehicle – via thestadtwerke – to ramp up local governments’incentives and ability to lead the projects.

Why is this Unfolding in Japan?

Japan confronts the stark challenge ofachieving resilient, decarbonizing, resource-litegrowth in the world’s most rapidly ageingsociety. The country faces among the direstthreat-levels from climate change, thedeveloped economies’ most gargantuan publicdebt, extreme dependence on increasinglyprecarious fossil fuels, an unprecedentedeconomic experiment (Abenomics) now clearlyin deep trouble, dangerously poisoned relationswith unstable neighbours, and a multiplicity ofother crises that collectively have noprecedent. All developed and developingcountries face dense clusters of “wickedproblems,” particularly via the water-energy-food nexus in the midst of accelerating climatechange. But Japan’s crises appear to be amongthe most daunting.

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Tokyo-Yokohama unmatched on risk index(http://www.intechopen.com/books/the-econ o m i c - g e o g r a p h y - o f -g loba l i za t ion /enhancement -o f - the -r e s i l i e n c e - o f - b u i l d i n g - c o n t i n u i t y -development-of-independently-secured-and-highly)

In short, Japan has perhaps unparalleledincentives as well as technological foundationson which to build resilient, smart communities.Among incentives to secure a resilient future isthe fact that Japan’s Tokyo-Yokohama region’snatural-disaster threat is rated by Munich Re at710, compared to 167 for San Francisco, 42 forNew York, and 15 for both Seoul and Beijing,as reported in the MEXT 2012 White Paper.47

The US National Bureau of Economic Research(NBER) also assesses Japan’s risk from typhoondamage, through 2090, as being a staggeringUSD 4.4 trillion of the global total of USD 9.7trillion, with perhaps diminishing capacity torecover from repeated disasters.48

The top 10 countries suffering economiclosses from increased storm strength by2 0 9 0(http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/10/12/3579143/vongfong-japan-storm-losses/)

The Japanese have powerful incentives to actand are well-endowed institutionally andtechnologically to do so. Given a conventional-resource-poor archipelago, one st i l lreverberating from the shock of 3-11, Japan’stechnocrats are now working with localgovernments and their intermediaries, todiffuse smart grids, energy-managementsystems and renewable power (among otheradvanced technologies) in the context of smartcommunities. They are doing this, it wouldseem, in part because many wanted to allalong, which is implicit in a commitment todistributed generation. And now they have todo i t , both because of the dangerousdependence on fossil fuels - a reality that nocredible scenario of nuclear restarts will fix -and because they need to put a productivefocus on all that Abenomics money that thus farhas failed to jump start the economy.

Moreover, in contrast to the German smart-cityenthusiasts, forced to work in a federal systemdominated by what Wolfgang Streeck rightlyderides as intellectually bankrupt managers ofthe “consolidation state,”49 the Japanese workwithin a unitary state in which 2/3 of publicspending is done locally. The central agencies,i n c l u d i n g M E T I ( e c o n o m y ) , M L I T

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(infrastructure), MEXT (education), MAFF(primary industries), and MHLW (health andwelfare), all have their respective reasons forfavoring smart communities. These interestshave in part been coordinated by the MIC thatoversees local governments’ fiscal health and iseager to put the stadtwerke model at the coreof the smart community.

To be sure, the Japanese initiative is neitherparty-led nor people-led. This democraticdeficit will disturb and dismay many observerswho would prefer bottom-up initiatives to arisespontaneously. But that risks taking time wesimply do not have. The UNEP, the IPCC, theIEA, the US military, Michael Mann and arapidly lengthening list of agencies and expertswarn that we must act now on climate changeand energy.50 Japan’s technocratic initiative iscentred on local governments, and is investingthem with the incentives and means to act. Inaddition, local governments are the mostdemocratically responsive and climate-sensitiveagent in our era of dangerously dysfunctionalnational and international governance. Local-government-led smart communities, in thisevolving paradigm using the FIT, distributedenergy, and stadtwerke, have the potential topull in yet more citizens, local businesses,universities and other elements of Japanesecivil society. That is a very different dynamicfrom corporate-led smart communities.

Japan is in desperate need of sustainablegrowth as well as a credible, progressive visionfor its citizens. The fact that the country isembarrassingly sidelined as a player in the COP21 climate talks in Paris next year makes thisall the more urgent. Japan is a story ofdysfunction at the national level. And yet,looking beyond national politics, Japan hassomething very important to offer. As we haveseen, the Japanese smart community project isdeliberately aimed at building new industries,enhancing interregional equity as well asaffording a means of mitigating and adapting tothe profound climate and energy challenges of

the Asian region.

But there is room for deeper externalengagement through many international city-centred initiatives involving institutions takingaction on climate change and urban resilience.These agencies include the C40,51 ICLEI (LocalGovernments for Sustainability),52 Metropolis,53

Rockefeller Resilient Cities,54 the PaulsonInstitute55 and others.The Japanese have agreat deal to teach the world on buildingresilient smart communities centred on energyand with a productive role for the public sector.The Japanese also have much to learn aboutavoiding galapagos and involving civil societyin smart communities. What the Japaneseenergy technocrats have done with theirlearning from Germany and in their ownevolving projects, suggests there are myriadother synergies to be gained through a broaderexchange. The potent ia l benef i ts o finstitutionalizing much more internationalexchange include opening new avenues forSME-level disruptive technology, businessmodels and other innovations to flow past thegatekeepers and into this emergent paradigm.The more fluid and diverse these exchangesbecome, the more resilient, decarbonized anddemocratic the emerging smart communityparadigm is likely to be. As we have seen, thepotential scale of these projects is such thataccelerating them, while maximizing theirdiversity and innovativeness, could assure aJapanese leading role toward sustainable andequitable growth.

Andrew DeWit is Professor in RikkyoUniversity’s School of Policy Studies and acoordinator of The Asia-Pacific Journal. Hisrecent publications include “Climate Changeand the Military Role in HumanitarianAssistance and Disaster Response,” in PaulBacon and Christopher Hobson (eds) HumanSecurity and Japan’s Triple Disaster(http://www.amazon.com/dp/1138013137?tag=theasipacjo0b-20) (Routledge, 2014), "Japan’srenewable power prospects," in Jeff Kingston

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(ed) Critical Issues in Contemporary Japan(http://www.amazon.com/dp/0415857457/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20) (Routledge 2013), and (withKaneko Masaru and Iida Tetsunari) “Fukushimaand the Political Economy of Power Policy inJapan” in Jeff Kingston (ed) Natural Disasterand Nuclear Crisis in Japan: Response andR e c o v e r y a f t e r J a p a n ' s 3 / 1 1(http://www.amazon.com/dp/0415698561/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20) (Routledge, 2012). He is leadresearcher for a five-year (2010-2015)Japanese-Government funded project on thepolitical economy of the Feed-in Tariff.

Recommended Citation: Andrew DeWit,"Japan’s Resilient, Decarbonizing andDemocratic Smart Communities", The Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 50, No. 3,December 15, 2014.

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• John Mathews and Hao Tan, China’srenewable energy revolution: what is driving it?(https://apjjf.org/-Hao-Tan/4209)

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Notes

1 This article complements and expands onAndrew DeWit, “Japan’s Radical EnergyTechnocrats: Structural Reform Through SmartCommunities, the Feed-in Tariff and Japanese-S t y l e “ S t a d t w e r k e , ”(https://apjjf.org/-Andrew-DeWit/4229) TheAsia-Pacific Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 47, No. 2,December 1, 2014.

2 Paul Hockenos, "German Fossil Fuel GiantJumps on Renewables Bandwagon,”(http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2014/12/german-fossil-fuel-giant-jumps-on-renewables-bandwagon) RenewableEnergy World, December 3, 2014.

3 See E. ON’s December 1 overview of itsrevolutionary organizational changes andd i s t r i b u t i o n o f a s s e t s h e r e(https://www.eon.com/content/dam/eon-com/Investoren/141201_Strategy_IR-Charts_EN-final.pdf).

4 Paul Hockenos, "German Fossil Fuel GiantJumps on Renewables Bandwagon,”(http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2014/12/german-fossil-fuel-giant-jumps-on-renewables-bandwagon) RenewableEnergy World, December 3, 2014.

5 See Kash iwag i Takao ( ed ) , Smar tCommunities: A Smart Network Design forL o c a l G o v e r n m e n t I n f r a s t r u c t u r e(http://www.jihyo.co.jp/smart_community4.html) (Tokyo: Jihyosha).

6 On this, see Kenji Kaneko, “Japan AnnouncesRoadmap for Hydrogen Introduction,”

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(http://techon.nikkeibp.co.jp/english/NEWS_EN/20140703/362860/?ST=msbe) Nikkei BPCleanTech Institute, July 3, 2014.

7 Kashiwagi’s leadership message is availableo n - l i n e i n E n g l i s h(http://aes.ssr.titech.ac.jp/english/en-greeting).

8 On this, see p. 5 Caroline Julian, “CreatingLocal Energy Economies: Lessons fromG e r m a n y , ”(http://www.respublica.org.uk/Images/Creating%20Local%20Energy%20Economies%20-%20Lessons%20from%20Germany .pdf )ResPublica, July 2014.

9 See Paul Hockenos, “Local, Decentralized,Innovative: Why Germany’s Municipal Utilitiesa r e R i g h t f o r t h e E n e r g i e w e n d e , ”(http://energytransition.de/2013/09/local-decentralized-innovative-why-germanys-municipal-utilities-are-right-for-the-energiewende/)Energy Transition, September 28, 2013.

10 Jutta Schwengsbier, "The energy avant-garde: when coal mining goes green,”(http://www.dw.de/the-energy-avant-garde-when-coal-mining-goes-green/a-18105345) DW,December 4, 2014.

11 See Charleen Fei and Ian Rinehart, “The Re-Municipalization of the Hamburg Grid,”(http://energytransition.de/2014/06/remunicipalization-of-hamburg-grid/) Energy Transition,June 27, 2014.

12 On this ambitious goal, see Claire Provostand Matt Kennard, “MSP Co-Directorinterviewed on remunicipalisation trend,”(http://www.municipalservicesproject.org/event/ m s p - c o - d i r e c t o r - i n t e r v i e w e d -remunicipalisation-trend) Municipal ServicesProject, November 12, 2014.

13 See p 32 European Parliament DirectorateGeneral for Internal Policies, “Mapping SmartC i t i e s i n t h e E U , ”(http://energytransition.de/2014/06/remunicipal

ization-of-hamburg-grid/) January 2014.

14 See p. 38 Richard Samuels, The Politics ofRegional Pol icy in Japan: Local i t iesIncorporated? Princeton: Princeton UniversityPress, 1983

15 See p. 139 Masaru Sakamoto, “PublicCorporations in Japan, with Special Emphasison Personnel Management,” in All Farazmand(ed) Publ ic Enterprise Management:International Case Studies. Greenwood Press,1996.

16 See (in Japanese) “The Particulars of Meijiand Showa-era Amalgamations and Changes inthe Number of Local Governments ,”(http://www.soumu.go.jp/gapei/gapei2.html)M i n i s t r y o f I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s a n dCommunications, (nd).

1 7 The detai ls on Japan’s local publicc o r p o r a t i o n s a r e a v a i l a b l e(http://www.soumu.go.jp/iken/zaisei/24data/2012data/24020802.html) (in Japanese) at theM i n i s t r y o f I n t e r n a l A f f a i r s a n dCommunications White Paper on Local Finance,2014.

18 For a good recent paper on Japan’s financialreforms as a work in progress, which may moveto Anglo-Saxon liberalism or revert back moretowards traditional models, see Kenji E.Kushida and Kay Shimizu, “Syncretism: thepolitics of Japan’s financial reforms,”(http://fiid.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/Kushida-Shimizu-2013-Syncretism-financial-reforms.pdf) Socio-Economic Review (2013) 11.

19 On the institutional details, not the politics,see Peter Weigand and Sumitaka Matsumoto, “J a p a n ’ s N e w E l e c t r i c i t y M a r k e t , ”(http://www.elp.com/articles/powergrid_international/print/volume-19/issue-7/features/japan-s-new-electricity-market.html) Electric Light andPower, July 16, 2014.

20 On this, see “Small-town Japan's big hopes

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f o r e n e r g y s e l f - s u f f i c i e n c y , ”(http://asia.nikkei.com/Politics-Economy/Policy-Politics/Small-town-Japan-s-big-hopes-for-energy-self-sufficiency) Nikkei Asian Review,October 28, 2014.

21 See (in Japanese) “Opening of a Commissionfor Deploying a Local-Government-LedC o m m u n i t y E n e r g y S y s t e m , ”(http://www.soumu.go.jp/menu_news/s-news/01gyosei05_02000053.html) Japanese Ministry ofInternal Affairs and Communications (MIC),November 4, 2014.

22 For a summary of the politics of “localAbenomics,” see Linda Sieg and TetsushiKajimoto, “Japan's 'Abenomics' feared int r o u b l e a s c h a l l e n g e s b u i l d , ”(http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/02/us-ja p a n - e c o n o m y - a b e n o m i c s -idUSKBN0GX0VY20140902) Reuters,September 2, 2014.

23 On this very important question of whetherthe public sector will lead, see Alex Marshall,“ B i g D a t a , B i g Q u e s t i o n s , ”(http://www.metropolismag.com/February-2014/Big-Data-Big-Questions/) Metropolis, February2014.

2 4 The role of the stadtwerke in smartcommunities is especially well depicted inMIC’s Local Revival Group’s Local PolicyDivision’s May 13, 2014 presentation (inJapanese) to the ruling LDP. See “Concerningthe Pro j ec t on D i s t r i bu ted EnergyI n f r a s t r u c t u r e ”(https://www.jimin.jp/policy/policy_topics/pdf/pdf170_4.pdf).

25 In a March 19, 2010 presentation, forexample, Kashiwagi argued that an energysystem shift was underway, towards low-carbonsources including nuclear power, “clean coal,”natural gas as well as renewables linkedtogether via ICT and smart communities. See(in Japanese) Kashiwagi Takao “The SmartCommunity Concept and Environmental

B u s i n e s s , ”(http://www.kanto.meti.go.jp/pickup/kankyoryoku/event/20100319kaisai_gaiyou.html) KantoMETI March 19, 2010.

26 Kikkawa voiced this idea during a September3, 2013 event (in Japanese) “Towards aNational-Government-Led Bolstering ofInternational Standardization Strategies as wellas a Diffusion of Japanese Smart CitiesG l o b a l l y , ”(http://special.nikkeibp.co.jp/as/201301/acej/report/05/) Nikkei BP (transcript), September 3,2013.

27 On this see (in Japanese) Kashiwagi’sdescription of the project in his article for theMinistry of Land, Infrastructure and Tourism(MLIT), “The Smart City: Achieving BothEconomic Development and EnvironmentalM e a s u r e s , ”(http://www.mlit.go.jp/kokudokeikaku/iten/service/newsletter/i_02_71_1.html) MLIT Shinjidai,Vol 71, February 2011.

28 See for example Komiyama’s presentation on“Japan as Forerunner of Emerging Issues,”(http://platinum.mri.co.jp/sites/default/files/101206_kdj.pdf) December 6, 2010.

29 The event is summarized by David Braun“Sustainable Cit ies: Chal lenges andO p p o r t u n i t i e s i n J a p a n , ”(http://energyblog.nationalgeographic.com/2014/10/21/sustainable-cities-challenges-and-opportunities-in-japan/) National Geographic,October 21, 2014.

30 They make this explicit in a Japanese-language discussion from October of last year,where they emphasize smart communities ascore to growth. See Komiyama Hiroshi andKashiwagi Takao, “The Outlook for EnergyPolicy and the Role of Heat DistributionB u s i n e s s , ”(http://www.jdhc.or.jp/wp_kanri/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/40th_taidan.pdf) Japan DistrictHeating Council, October 2013.

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3 1 T h e s e f l a g s h i p p r o j e c t s(https://www.smart-japan.org/english/) are ledby METI and grouped in the Japan SmartCommunity Alliance.

32 See pp 14-17 of the Cabinet’s growths t r a t e g y ( i n J a p a n e s e )(http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/sinseichousenryaku/sinseichou01.pdf).

33 The Japanese Ministry of Economy, Tradeand Industry has an English-language summaryo f the count ry ’ s energy p lans here(http://www.meti.go.jp/english/press/data/20100618_08.html).

3 4 S e e e . g .(http://www.jipdec.or.jp/dupc/project/cems/scpolicy_110225.pdf) pp 8-12 for their keenawareness of developments in Germany andelsewhere and pp 40-41 for their awareness ofthe risk of building a Galapagos.

35 Toshiba and Hitachi’s smart community PR isreadily available, in English and Japanese, invideos and documents. See, for example,“Smart Community Projects on “Eco-IslandM i y a k o j i m a ” o f O k i n a w a , ”(http://www.toshiba-smartcommunity.com/en/blog/bid/391733/smart-community-projects-on-eco-island-miyakojima-of-okinawa) ToshibaSmart Community Blog, July 15, 2014.

36 See Office of Naval Research, “Energy ActionMonth: ONR Expands "Green" Reach in Asia-P a c i f i c , ”(http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=84092) October 27, 2014.

37 See an overview of Greenfield’s work in“ D u m b i n g d o w n t h e s m a r t c i t y , ”(http://www.lse.ac.uk/researchAndExpertise/researchHighlights/societyMediaAndScience/SmartCities.aspx) London School of Economics andPolitical Science, May 19, 2014.

38 On comparative cement consumption, see BillGates (citing Vaclav Smil) “Have You Hugged a

C o n c r e t e P i l l a r T o d a y ? "(http://www.gatesnotes.com/Books/Making-the-Modern-World), June 12, 2014.

3 9 On the bas i s o f N ikke i BP ’ s 2012“Comprehensive Guide to Smart Cities,”Toshiba projected a total of 36 projects in Japanand 485 globally (including Japan’s), with 217of the global projects being centred on smartgrids and renewable energy (see in Japanese“Growth Strategy for Building SmartC o m m u n i t i e s ”(https://www.toshiba.co.jp/about/ir/jp/pr/pdf/tpr20111216.pdf)). Japan’s projects have sincethen increased to over 100, at least, and the5000-member Smart City Council’s 2014“ S m a r t C i t i e s R e a d i n e s s G u i d e ”(http://smartcitiescouncil.com/resources/smart-cities-readiness-guide) suggests there areseveral thousand projects underway globally.

40 See, for example, David Dodge and DuncanKinney, “Waste heat - How Vancouver mined itssewage to heat an entire neighbourhood,”(http://www.greenenergyfutures.ca/blog/waste-heat-how-vancouver-mined-its-sewage-heat-entire-neighbourhood) Green Energy Futures,February 4, 2013.

41 On engineered wood, see Paul Miles, “Whyarchitects are now using wood to construct bigb u i l d i n g s , ”(http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/408ef4c8-3f30-11e4-984b-00144feabdc0.html) Financial Times,September 26, 2014.

42 See the website (in Japanese) for the EcoNetTokyo 62 “Renewable Energy and SmartCommunity Research Commiss ion,”(http://all62.jp/saisei/index.html) which is toproduce the handbook.

43 The Ider Project page and its numersousresearch reports (in Japanese) is here(http://ider-project.jp).

44 See, in Japanese, the Kanto Meti’s page(http://www.kanto.meti.go.jp/seisaku/smacom/)

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on its “sumakomi” (smart community)collaboration group.

45 See in particular, her arguments on pp 41-2about the paucity of local leadership, citizenengagement and roles for universities andNGOs. Clarisse Pham, “Smart Cities in Japan,”(http://www.eu-japan.eu/sites/eu-japan.eu/files/SmartCityJapan.pdf) EU-Japan Centre forIndustrial Cooperation, October 2014.

46 The survey results (in Japanese), presented tothe Commission on October 8, 2014, area v a i l a b l e h e r e(http://all62.jp/saisei/meeting_h26/meeting_h26_03/meeting_h26_03_05.pdf).

47 See also Stephen Voss “A Risk Index forM e g a c i t i e s , ”(http://www.actuaries.jp/lib/meeting/reikai18-2-siryo.pdf) September 5, 2006, and a morec o m p r e h e n s i v e l i s t i n J a p a n e s e(http://www.munichre.co.jp/public/PDF/Topics_Risk_Index.pdf).

48 See Jeff Spross, “Why Tropical StormVongfong May Just Be The Beginning ForJ a p a n , ”(http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2014/10/12/3579143/vongfong-japan-storm-losses/) October12, 2014.

49 Streeck brilliantly and concisely explains howthe Schumpeter-Goldscheid tax state becamethe debt state and is now (especially inGermany) a consolidation state that manifests

an “uncompromising determination to place itsobligations to its creditors above all otherobligations” and a coalition of forces thatstands in the ways of spending increases andindeed emphasizes cuts on all expenditureother than debt-service payments. See his“Buying Time: the delayed crisis of democraticc a p i t a l i s m , ”(http://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=2642) talk on October 20, 2014 atthe LSE. The cited remarks are at the 35:00-minute mark.

5 0 M i c h a e l M a n n w a r n s(http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2014/11/michael-mann-interview-very-little-burnable-carbon-in-our-budget-emissions-ramp-down-must-start-now.html) that deep cuts in CO2 have to startnow, not sometime later, or humanity risksrunaway warming and unimaginable,accelerating chaos. I’d mention McKibben andothers.

51 See here. (http://www.c40.org)

5 2 S e e h e r e .(http://www.iclei.org/our-activities/our-agendas/resource-efficient-city.html)

5 3 S e e h e r e .(http://www.metropolis.org/initiatives)

54 See here. (http://www.100resilientcities.org)

55 See here. (http://www.paulsoninstitute.org)