kaizen fmea (uncompressed)
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KBS1 Lowest Value Chain Cost with High Reliability
KBS 2 Rapid Growth of Added Value Independent Business
KBS 3 European Operations Optimisation
Support Strategies HR, IT & Technology
1. Think Safety; Act Safely
2. Embrace 5S
3. Foster Employee Development
4. Be Environmentally Responsible
5. Model Corporate Social Responsibility
6. Deliver Quality
7. Breathe Fact-Based Decision-Making
8. Show Visual Management
9. Deploy Standardisation
10. Live KAIZEN
11. Pursue Super Low Cost
12. Implement Synchronisation
S
E
Q
C
D
Title: FMEA to Meet RPL’s Robust Manufacturing ConstitutionStart Date: 2009Project Sponsor: Tim JamesManagement Support: Colin Weaver, Darren Nutting
Project Lead Name: Robert FarrJob Title: Product Recycling EngineerDepartment: Recycling EngineeringLog Number: K000433
Project Team Members (Optional): Robert Farr, David Newbrook, Rhona Davies, Tom Foster, Deborah Figueiredo-Daniels
Step 1 Introduction of Problem
Problem Statement: Inconsistent Approach to FMEA and Product Quality Defect Analysis / Countermeasure Techniques
Goal Statement:To develop the FMEA Template & Methodology to meet RPL’s Robust Manufacturing Constitution
Brief History
< 2010
• Supplies Recycling has Inconsistent Finished Goods Quality• No FMEA Conducted at New Model Introduction• Quality Controlled by Reactive Defect Management
2010
• Decision for New Model Introductions to incorporate FMEA (No Template)• Supplies Recycling Engineering develop basic 10 Scale FMEA
2011 > 2013
• SR Continue Evaluation of 10 Scale FMEA Definitions/Scaling Features • December 2012: IMS Procedure updated to use 5 Scale RPL FMEA Template
QA Approve SR Engineering to Continue Trials of 10 Scale Method
PERSEUS
MIDAS
RINMEI
SINCERECASSIS /
ADAM
SCHMIDT
PANACHE
JUPITER
Step 2 Investigation of Facts
PROBLEM 1 - No FMEA Situation (Before 2010)Through the years Supplies Recycling Right-First-Time (RFT) and IQ Sampling Quality has been inconsistent…This is particularly noticeable at New Model Introduction (NMI) phase, where quality can be poor whilst production is stabilising.Defects found at Final QC or QA Sampling were countermeasured reactively by Engineering/Manufacturing in Defect Meetings.
PERSEUSNMI
SINCERENMI
CASSIS /
ADAM
SCHMIDT
PANACHENMI
JUPITER PCUNMI
Current Product
JUPITER FUSINGNMI RFT Results take a long time to
stabilise after NMI, and are generally inconsistent throughout Product-Life-Cycle
RFT
% D
efec
ts a
t Pro
duct
ion
QC
Step 2 Investigation of Facts
Key Point: There was no Proactive Failure Mode Analysis in SR prior to 2010 for an FMEA to be incorporated in NMI.
PERSEUSNMI
SINCERENMI
CASSIS /
ADAM
SCHMIDT
PANACHENMI
JUPITER PCUNMI
Current Product
JUPITER FUSINGNMI
PROBLEM 1 - No FMEA Situation (Before 2010)
IQ Results take a long time to stabilise after NMI, and are generally inconsistent throughout Product-Life-Cycle
IQ %
Sam
plin
g R
ate
Step 2 Investigation of Facts
PROBLEM 2 - 2012 IMS Update (5 Scale FMEA Template)In December 2012 the QA Department updated the IMS Procedure to include an FMEA Procedure & Template.A template was based on a 5 Scale System.When reviewing this template in SR Engineering, there were issues found with 5 Scale FMEA as detailed below:
Rank Effect rate Criteria
No effect No effect.
P/O Not to standard but does not affect overall appearance or function
Slight ef fect Fit & f inish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect likely to be noticed by customers.
C Functions but not to standard i.e. Scratch, misset or damaged parts
Moderate Item operable, but Comfort/ Convience item(s) inoperable. Customer experiences discomfort.
B Functions but not to RGS i.e. Not enough toner, print defects
Major ef fect Item inoperable, w ith loss of primary function.
A Does not function i.e. Machine does not pow er up
Extreme effect
Very high severity ranking w hen a potential failure mode affects personal safety, safe item operation and/or involves non-compliance w ith government regulation
AA Cause major ill effects, serious malfunction, damage to company image or lack of compliance to legislation
SEVERITY
5
4
1
2
3
Severity Rating
Severity Rank & Criteria Definitions are compressed into the RPL QA Defect Ranking.
(x1 Severity Rank for x1 RPL QA Rank)
This means the degree of severity of the Defect cannot always be accurately registered…
Example: The severity degree of Rank B Defects can vary…
RPL QA Ranking dictates a Copy Defect outside of specification is a Rank B Defect and therefore registers as 3 on the FMEA Rating.
However, some Rank B Copy Defects, although out of standard, are more obviously sever to the customer than others, meaning the customer complaint severity will also vary.
Varying Rank B Defects:
x11 0.5mm Black Spots on a White Chart
Large Black Mark on a White Chart
Step 2 Investigation of Facts
Rank CPK Failure Rate Criteria
> 1.17> 1.33
1 in 20001 in 15 000 Low
OCCURENCE
Failure is unlikely1 in 150 000< 1 in 1 500 000
> 1.50> 1.67
4
5< 0.33> 0.33 Very high
< 1 in 31 in 3
> 0.51> 0.67
1
2
3> 0.83> 1.00
Regular1 in 801 in 400
1 in 81 in 20 High
Occurrence Rating
Defect Quantity or CPK Values are have large ranges for each rank.
This means it is difficult for the occurrence to be accurately registered due to large quantity differences between each FMEA Rank Scale.
Also there is no probability rating which is helpful for New Model Introductions where the final production capacity is only an estimate.
Example: “Probability on most units” - “…on a daily basis” - “…every week”
Rank Detection rate CriteriaDesign Controls w ill almost certainly detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
100% w ill be detected
High chance the Design Control w ill detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
Likely to be detected during normal process
Moderate chance the Design Control w ill detect a potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
Unlikely to be detected during normal process
Very Low chance the Design Control w ill detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode.
Ghost part present or failure mode not visible
Design Control w ill not and/or cannot detect a potential cause/ mechanism and subsequent failure mode; or there is no Design Control.
Not likely to be detected
4
5
DETECTION
1
2
3
Almost certain
High
Moderate
Absolute uncertainty
Very low
Detection Rating
Criteria Definition has no clear distinction between 2 fundamental detection factors:1. Error Proofed Detection (e.g. Automation)2. Subjective Detection (e.g. Manual Inspection)
Criteria Definitions are also very vague in description.
Example:
“Likely” / “Unlikely” to be detected during normal process… What is likely? Is likely automated inspection or manual inspection method? How can we define the effectiveness of a manual inspection?
PROBLEM 2 - 2012 IMS Update (5 Scale FMEA Template)
Step 2 Investigation of Facts
Similarities with the Likert Scale:
The Likert Scale is a 5 Scale Method normally adopted for questionnaire studies. The RPL developed 5 Scale FMEA has clear similarities with this scaling.This does cause a problematic issue with predictive Severity, Occurrence, Detection ratings
Key Point: Avoidance of extreme ratings for categories that are hard to predict… “Central Tendency Bias”
RPL FMEA Scaling Different to the “General Industry Standard”:
PROBLEM 2 - 2012 IMS Update (5 Scale FMEA Template)
COMPANIES using 1-10
Scale Methodology
EDUCATION PROVIDERS using 1-10
Scale Methodology
Benchmarking the Industry Standard.In general, both Education Providers and Manufacturing Companies use a 1-10 Scale FMEA Methodology
Step 2 Investigation of Facts
RPL FMEA Procedure Different to the “General Industry Standard”:
RPL FMEA IMS Procedure does not include the requirement for the FMEA to be conducted as a team.It only requires the assignment of responsibility to an appropriate Engineer:
Key Point: The “Industry Standard” of conducting FMEA, is to incorporate a FMEA Team with select disciplines and product/production knowledge. This is to maximise product quality defect predictions.
Quoted from Quality Associates International Inc: FMEAs are conducted by a core team of three or four people with supporting Subject Matter Experts (SME). This group creates the Cross Functional Team (CFT). Ideally, the CFT should be selected from disciplines that have a slightly different view of the product or process under investigation. The synergy created by the CFT is what makes FMEA so powerful.
A single person will not be able to develop a comprehensive FMEA without input from the CFT. It is easy to tell when a FMEA is created by one individual rather than the team. Such FMEAs are typically generated to satisfy customer requirements but have very little value to the program or organization. FMEAs are a means to achieve better quality products and processes. Many Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) require the proper use of FMEA. Industry standards in diverse industries, such as automotive, medical device manufacturing, aerospace, chemical processing and more, have been developed to utilize the power of FMEA.
PROBLEM 2 - 2012 IMS Update (5 Scale FMEA Procedure)
Both RPL 5 & Industry Standard 10 Scale FMEA incorporate the requirement to reduce residual risk as much as possible.
Residual Risk is the remaining RPN Risk to a Process after all available actions from the FMEA Group has been implemented
Observed RPL & Industry Standard Problem:The tendency for the majority of FMEA approvers within RPL (particularly in NMI Gate Meetings), that high / medium residual risks are deemed to “have to be low”, that it is not satisfactory to have remaining RPN Risks above Low Ratings.
This is an extremely difficult mandate to achieve for all design or production processes, especially those developed around the following criteria limitations:
1. Small Investment for Design / Product / New Model Introduction 2. Product has a Low Volume of Production – Return On Investment (ROI) is High3. Product has Low Gross Margin – Return On Investment (ROI) is High4. Technology is not advanced enough to develop an Error Proofing Method (Automation or Mistake Proofing Gauge)
Examples of Residual Risk in Supplies Recycling:Since the first use of 10 Scale FMEA within Supplies Recycling, NO Process FMEAs have ran live within production without there being high or medium residual risks. See examples below:
Step 2 Investigation of Facts
PROBLEM 3 - FMEA Residual Risk Management (Monitoring)
MIDAS RINMEI
Note: Midas has a higher Production Volume, higher Gross Margin and larger NMI Investment than Rinmei, therefore
Midas had more investment for Residual Risk Reduction Practices, due to its ROI
Quality Residual Risk countermeasure is too High Cost for Product Investment
Key Point: Due to the nature of investment into products & ROI (the 4 limitations above), management of high residual risks are a problem
Step 3 Root Cause Analysis
Inconsistent Approach to FMEA
and Product Quality Defect
Analysis / Countermeasure
Techniques
No FMEA Conducted
5 Scale System – RPL FMEA Procedure
Industry Standard 10 Scale System –
No Residual Risk MonitoringNG RFT % Level
NG IQ % Level
No Proactive Defect Management
High Customer Complaint Probability
Poor Operator Awareness of High Risk Processes
NG NMI Vertical Launch
Inconsistent Failure Detection Ratings
Failure Severity Rating Not Always Precise
Vague Understanding of Detection Method Effectiveness (“How Subjective”)
No Requirement for an FMEA Team
Emphasis is placed on Residual Risk Reduction not Monitoring
No / Limited High / Medium Residual Risk Monitoring
Low Investment / ROI have limited Residual Risk Reduction Capability
4M Controls not always based on FMEAPatrol Inspections not always based on FMEA
Hard to Predict Failures Suffer “Central Tendency Bias”
Different to the General Industry Standard (Difficult to Benchmark)
Technology Limitations can limit Residual Risk Reduction Capability
No Standard for Residual Risk Monitoring
ImprovementArea
Quality:Right-First-Time Rate Increase
Quality:IQ Sampling % Increase
Quality:Reduce Customer Complaints
Quality:Residual Risk Understanding & Monitoring
No FMEA
Use RPL 5 Scale FMEA
Develop RPL “Industry Standard” 10 Scale FMEA
10 Scale FMEA with Residual Risk Monitoring Development
Step 4 Proposed Improvements
Measurable Items
Step 5 Implementation of Improvement
WHAT• Development of an RPL Version 10 Scale FMEA Template & Definitions• Development of a Residual Risk Management (Monitoring) Methodology
WHEN• From 2010 - FMEA Requirement at NMI
WHY1. Improve Production RFT & IQ Rates, particularly after NMI stage – “Achieve Vertical Launch”2. Improve the current RPL 5 Scale Template which has weaknesses:
Severity Rating: Difficult to measure the “Degree of Severity” of a Defect
Occurrence Rating: Large Ranges (“Gaps”) between RanksNo Probability Statements
Detection Rating: Definitions are VagueNo Distinction between Subjective & Error Proofing Methods
No Requirement for FMEA to be conducted in Groups
3. Improve Method & Control of Residual Risks which are still High / Medium• Little Emphasis on Monitoring High/Medium Residual Risks that cannot be Reduced Further• High / Medium Residual Risks are difficult to reduce with Low Investment or Low Production
Volume / Gross Margin Products• Technology Limitation can mean some Residual Risk cannot be reduced from High/Medium
WHO• Robert Farr, David Newbrook, Rhona Davies, Tom Foster, Deborah Figueiredo-Daniels
WHERE• RPL Supplies Recycling Engineering & Production, with support from QA Department
HOW – 10 Scale ResearchThe general industry standard shows that there is a basic 5 Criteria Division, but of a 10 Scale Rating System:
1 – Remote Rating Measurement2 ~ 5 – Low Rating Measurement4 ~ 8 – Moderate Rating Measurement7 ~ 9 – High Rating Measurement9 ~ 10 – Very High Rating Measurement
Examples of this can be seen below…
Step 5 Implementation of Improvement
This information is available at Quality Associates International Inc.
Step 5 Implementation of Improvement
HOW – FMEA Scale Definitions ResearchSeverity:
This information is available at Quality Associates International Inc.
The Severity Measurement is a rating for when a Potential Failure Mode results in a Customer or Final QC Manufacturing Defect.
The severity definition shown is a general industry standard for the training of the FMEA Tool.
Improvement Area: Severity Definition Scaling still compares well to the RPL QA
Defect Ranking Policy.
However, it also expands on this by having a severity degree.
Example: Degree of Rank B Defects:High = Customer Very DissatisfiedModerate = Customer DissatisfiedLow = Customer Somewhat Dissatisfied
QA RANK AA
QA RANK A
QA RANK B
QA RANK C
QA RANK PO
Occurence:The Occurrence Measurement is a rating given for the amount of times the Potential Failure Mode Defect happens within Production.
The occurrence definition shown is an example used in industry.
Improvement Area:The Failure Rate Criteria can be
adjusted to match any Production Quantities per Period (day, month, year etc), or can be
measured by Process CPK Values if known.
The ranges between quantity values are smaller meaning
scoring can be more accurate.
Also most industry models show a probability estimate
description.
Step 5 Implementation of Improvement
HOW – FMEA Scale Definitions Research
This information is available at Quality Associates International Inc.
Detection:The Detection Measurement is a rating given for the ability the production process has to detect a Potential Failure Mode Defect.
An example of a general industry standard definition is shown.
Inspection Types: A = Error ProofedB = Gauging or Mistake Proofing (Poka Yoke)C = Manual Inspection
Improvement Area:The Detection Rating is based
on how Subjective the Detection Method is.
Example:There is a clear distinction that Manual / Visual Inspections score worse than Mistake Proofing or Automation Inspections which are more Error Proofed.
The Criteria Definition is also very precise in description.
Step 5 Implementation of Improvement
HOW – FMEA Scale Definitions Research
This information is available at Quality Associates International Inc.
HOW – Testing SR Developed 10 Scale vs RPL 5 Scale
Step 5 Implementation of Improvement
Using the Research Findings SR Engineering created an RPL 10 Scale Template & Definitions Scaling.This was then tested in some production process scenarios to compare risk results and precision of the risk rating:
Copy Check Inspection:Potential Failure Mode Effects of Failure S Class Causes of Failure O Current Prevention Current Detection D RPN Recommended Action S O D RPN
A defective print image is missed by the inspection
operator
Defective print image: any print defect. 7 B Operator Inspection Error. 8 Keypoints in WSPB.
Operator Training.
Visual Check of Unit Prints. Sampled QA
Inspection.5 28
0
1) Production Monitor Copy Defect Mis-Judgements.2) 4M QA Check of Operator checking Copy Samples.3) Process Confirmation in Training Document.
7 7 5 245
Defective Print Image missed by inspection
operatorDefective Print Image 3 Operator Inspection Error.
Poor assembly of product. 3 Visual Check.QA Sampled Check. 2 18
1) Production Monitor Copy Defect Mis-Judgements.2) 4M QA Check of Operator checking Copy Samples.3) Process Confirmation in Training Document.
3 2 2 12
Copy Check Inspection for a Recycling Process is one of the most important Quality Check Processes. It is extremely subjective in that it is totally reliant on manual inspection, and because of this operators used to conduct Copy Inspection are highly trained and highly critical with their judgements based on strict Ricoh Japan Copy Standards. Automation of this process is extremely difficult with high cost implications which most (if not all) recycling products cannot invest against.Result: • 5 Scale shows a Medium Risk rating before / after countermeasures. Final residual risk is the lowest medium rating.• 10 Scale shows a High Risk rating before / after countermeasures. Final residual risk is a mid-level high rating.
10 Scale:
5 Scale:
Development unit over/under filled with toner.
Defective print yield: The unit does not complete its designed print yield.
5 B
The Toner Filling Jig might fail due to any number of
running conditions moving out of specification.
5Every unit is 100%
checked by an integral load cell on the filling jig.
Units are weighed. 4 100 5 5 4 100
Under Weight Development Unit
Defective Print Yield as rans out of Toner 3 Filling Jig running out of
specifications 2 Weight Check. 1 6 3 2 1 6
Damage to OPC during the fitting of the LEFT/RIGHT
CUSHIONCopy quality problems. 7 B
Poor holding and assembly process or process
adherence.6 Keypoints in WSPB.
Operator Training. Sampled QA Inspection. 9 378
1) 4M QA Check of Operator correctly holding PCU whilst inserting into Packaging Cushions/2) Process Confirmation in Training Document.
7 5 9 315
Damage to OPC during fitting of the Left/Right
CushionCopy quality problems 3 Poor handling and assembly
of product into packaging 2 QA Sampled Inspection 4 241) 4M QA Check of Operator correctly holding PCU whilst inserting into Packaging Cushions/2) Process Confirmation in Training Document.
3 1 4 12
Step 5 Implementation of Improvement
Manual Packing of Exposed / Sensitive OPC Unit:Potential Failure Mode Effects of Failure S Class Causes of Failure O Current Prevention Current Detection D RPN Recommended Action S O D RPN
Packing of exposed or sensitive products (like OPC Units) are inherently risky processes. This is because there is no way to Quality Check that the unit has not been damaged in some way after the packing process. Automation of this process is extremely difficult with high cost implications which most (if not all) recycling products cannot invest against.Result: • 5 Scale shows a Medium Risk rating before / after countermeasures. Final residual risk is the lowest medium rating.• 10 Scale shows a High Risk rating before / after countermeasures. Final residual risk is a mid-level high rating.
10 Scale:
5 Scale:
Toner Filling a Unit:Potential Failure Mode Effects of Failure S Class Causes of Failure O Current Prevention Current Detection D RPN Recommended Action S O D RPN
Automation process with automatic weight check. Process still has a subjective possibility if operator ignores fill-weight result.Result: • 5 Scale shows a Low Risk rating before / after countermeasures. Final residual risk is a very low, low rating.• 10 Scale shows a Medium Risk rating before / after countermeasures. Final residual risk is a low-level medium rating.
10 Scale:
5 Scale:
HOW – Testing SR Developed 10 Scale vs RPL 5 Scale
HOW – FMEA Methodology Research - “Industry Standard”From various FMEA Education outlets (Websites, Textbooks, University) an FMEA Study is generally conducted as follows:
Establish FMEA Group
• Engineering Control of FMEA
• Group consists of Product Designer, Production Design Engineer, Production Staff (including Key Operators), Offline Support Staff (Warehouse), Process Book Author
Conduct FMEA
• Estimate Potential Failures
• Investigate Potential Failure Effect
• Detail Root Cause of Failure
• Score the Severity of the Failure to the Customer
Identify Current Controls
• Identify any Current Prevention Methods to stop the failure from happening
• Identify any Current Detection Methods to detect the failure has happened within the process.
Score FMEA
• Score Occurrence Rate Potential of the Failure Happening based on current Prevention Methods
• Score Detection Rate for finding the failure in the process based on current Detection Methods
Identify Corrective
Actions• Identify
Recommended / Corrective Actions to further reduce Risk Rating Score (RPN)
Implement Corrective
Actions• Assign Responsibility• Assign Completion
Date• Change Process
Approve Residual Risks
• Score Implemented Corrective Actions to provide Residual Risk (RPN)
• Create Priority List of Residual Risks for future RPN risk reduction exercises
Note: Risk Rating (RPN) is produced by the multiplying of Severity / Occurrence / Detection Rating Scores (S x O x D)
Step 5 Implementation of Improvement
HOW – FMEA Methodology Improvement
Establish FMEA Group Conduct FMEA Identify Current
Controls Score FMEA
Identify Corrective
Actions
Implement Corrective
Actions
Prioritise Residual Risks
• Score Implemented Corrective Actions to provide Residual Risk (RPN)
• Create Priority List of Residual Risks for future RPN risk reduction exercises
• Identify any Process Monitoring Techniques for High / Moderate Residual Risks that cannot be immediately reduced or reduced cost effectively
Implement Residual Risk
Actions• Action RPN Risk
Reduction Exercise• Create High /
Moderate Residual Risk Monitoring Documentation (i.e. Process Confirmation, 4M, Patrol Inspections)
Improvement Area: This feature is being conducted in Supplies Recycling FMEA but is missing from RPL IMS 2012 ENG
027 Procedure
Step 5 Implementation of Improvement
SR Engineering reviewed the FMEA methodology, but expanded the Residual Risk Management at the end of the process flow. This enabled an understanding of how high / medium residual risks that can no longer be reduced in a cost effective way can be monitored and managed. This alternative flow is as follows:
Improvement Area
Step 6 Confirmation of Effect
RFT Results since 10 Scale FMEA Implementation
MIDASNMI
RINMEINMI
APOLLONATHENANMI
RINMEILBGNMI
TAURUS TCRUNMI
RFT Results are within Good Ratings 1~2 Months after NMI
Note: Residual Risk Monitoring Methodology was completely incorporated into Apollon/Athena NMI and onwards.Results further improved from this point…
RFT
% D
efec
ts a
t Pro
duct
ion
QC
Step 6 Confirmation of Effect
IQ Results since 10 Scale FMEA Implementation
MIDASNMI
RINMEINMI
APOLLONATHENANMI
RINMEILBGNMI
TAURUS TCRUNMI
IQ Results are within Good Ratings 0~1 Month after NMI
IQ %
Sam
plin
g R
ate
Step 7 System Improvement
SR FMEA Final 10 Scale Definition DocumentationAfter 10 Scale FMEA Trials on Midas, Rinmei, Apollon/Athena and Taurus NMI, Supplies Recycling have compiled a complete FMEA Template Spreadsheet including Definition Rating Scale Template.
(See Kaizen Presentation Attachment – SR FMEA Template v2.0)
SR FMEA Residual Risk Management Supporting Documentation High / Medium Residual Risk Items found on the FMEA RPN after all countermeasures are implemented are recorded as requiring Residual Risk Monitoring techniques within the “Recommended Action” column.
Potential Failure Mode
Charge Frame is C1, C2 or C3 type.
RPN Recommended Action
Responsibility and Target Completion
Date
Action Taken
Seve
rity
Occ
urre
nce
Det
ectio
n
RPN
392
1) Process Book Page 25319 / 25437 - Add Visual Inspection for Charge Frame Types (James Radnor to confirm visual differences)2) Create Keypoint Memo for Frame Variations.3) Process Confirmation in Training Document.4) 4M QA Check of Charge Frames in Buffer Trolleys.
Ian Collins/ James Radnor
(15/08/14)Carlton Everett
(29/08/14)John Pountney
(29/08/14)
1) Process Book Addition2) SRO raised by James Radnor3) Added to Training Documents4) 4M Check Added
7 6 5 210
Apollon / Athena C2.5 PCU Recycling Process Confirmation - Strip 1
Operator Name:
Ref: Item Result CommentN/A Why is there a Downdraft Bench on the Station25305 Explain / Demonstrate remove charge cleaner
roller (to not damage unit lugs)25316 & 19
Explain / Demonstrate the method checking Charge Frame to appearance standards
25319 Explain / Demonstrate the method checking Charge Frame type is a C2.5 (Keypoint Memo to be created)
25128 & 25130
Explain / Demonstrate the method checking Coating Bar Spring to appearance standards
PROCESS
SR Invented Process Confirmation Documents – Operator Examination of Process Understanding of Risk Areas
4M QA Operator Patrol Inspection – Process Surveillance
Item No Photograph STN Check Contents MON TUE WED THR FRI
8 Strip Stn 1
Visually check x2 harness lugs HARNESS LUGS MUST NOT BE DAMAGED OR MISSING
FRAME STDS REF SRO 14-SR017CLEANLINESS STDS REF SRO 14-SR015
Ref Control No. 25278
9 Strip Stn 1
Visually check correct Charge Frame Type COVER STDS REF SRO 14-SR016
GENERIC CLEANLINESS COVER STDS REF SRO 14-SR015UNIT CONDITION STDS SRO 15-SR020
Ref Control No. 25319
10 Strip Stn 1
Visually check x9 harness lugs on side of frame & harness routing.
HARNESS MUST BE ROUTED CORRECTLYFRAME STDS REF SRO 14-SR017, CLEANLINESS SRO 14-SR015
Ref Control No. 25281
Production Line
4M Control Check (Apollon / ATHENA PCU - STRIP)mm/WK
Check by
4M CONTROL Patrol Inspection Check
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DIRECTLY LINKED
WITH FMEA
“CONSTANT
TRAINING
APPROACH”
Step 8 Horizontal Deployment
RPL ENGINEERING
All other Engineering Departments are currently using 5 Scale RPL Template(This potentially includes not using a Residual Risk Management / Monitoring Techniques)
• QA Department create a FMEA Focus Group for 10 Scale Development Findings
• RPL Engineering to be trained to FMEA Focus Group Conclusions
RPL POLICY
• IMS Procedure and Flow to be adjusted with FMEA Group Conclusion
RICOH MANUFACTURING GROUP
• FMEA Focus Group Findings to be shared with Ricoh Japan (RCL) – Ricoh Academy
Step 9 Summary of Improvement
QUALITYIQ Increase
IQ Stable at > 99.5% quickly after NMICOST
Product Rework
Reduction
QUALITY
Higher Operator Risk
Awareness
QUALITY
Right-First-Time Increase
COST
QC Rectification Reduction
DELIVERY
Lower Chance of Finished Goods
Shortage
ENVIRONMENT
Product Rework Part Usage Reduction
RFT Stable at > 95% quickly after NMI
QUALITY
Customer Complaint Reduction
QUALITY
IMS Procedure Improvement
DELIVERY
Lower Chance of Parts Shortage from Rework
Step 10 Remaining Issues & Future Plans
Future Plans Time FrameFMEA Focus Group (Engineering & QA Departments) June – Dec 2015
Create new FMEA Template & Definitions June – Sept 2015
Develop FMEA Course June – Sept 2015
Pilot Training for FMEA Course Oct – Dec 2015
Update IMS Procedure Eng-027 Dec 2015
Start-Up of RPL Academy Training for FMEA Course Jan – Mar 2016
All the above form part of this years SMO.