konkurentnost privrede i kriza evropske monetarne unije

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KONKURENTNOST PRIVREDE I

KRIZA EVROPSKE MONETARNE UNIJE

Rezime

Kriza u Evropskoj Monetarnoj uniju (EMU) otkrila je unutrašnje slabosti njenog funkcionisanja. Evolucija EMU nije bila praćena odgovarajućim strukturnim transformacijama. Pretpostavke optimalnog valutnog područja o njegovom endogenom karakteru nisu se u dovoljnoj meri potvrdile. Utvrđeno je da se konkurentnost privreda evrozone pogoršala u odnosu na relevantne konkurente u svetu. Uniformno delovanje jedinstvene valute doprinelo je i produbljivanju razlika u konkurentnosti članica. Na duži rok, postojeća recesija usporava razvoj EMU i otvara pitanje njenog opstanka. Pred članicama EMU je dug put strukturnih transformacija. Radi adekvatnijeg prilagođavanja krizi, visoko zavisne od evra srpske finansije moraju da izaberu odgovarajući režim deviznog kursa.

Ključne reči: konkurentnost, kriza, Evropska monetarna unija, optimalno valutno područje, strukturno prilagođavanje

JEL: E61, E63, F15, F42

UDK 338.124.2:339.738(4) ; 339.137.2originalni naučni

rad

Rad primljen: 23.12.2013.

Odobren za štampu: 04.03.2014.

Prof. dr Vladimir GrbićFakultet za međunarodnu

ekonomiju, Univerzitet Megatrend, Beograd

[email protected]

Rad je realizovan u okviru naučnih projekata: “Unapređenje javnih politika u Srbiji u funkciji poboljšanja socijalne sigurnosti građana i održivog privrednog rasta“ (47004) i „Srbija u savremenim međunarodnim odnosima: strateški pravci razvoja i učvršćivanja položaja Srbije u međunarodnim integrativnim procesima - spoljnopolitički, međunarodni, ekonomski i bezbednosni aspekti“ (179029), Ministarstva prosvete, nauke i tehnološkog razvoja Republike Srbije, za period 2011-2014. godine

Prof. dr Dragoljub TodićInstitut za međunarodnu

politiku i privredu, [email protected]

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COMPETITIVENESS OF THE ECONOMY

AND THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN MONETARY UNION

Summary

The crisis in the European Monetary Union revealed the internal weaknesses of its functioning. The evolution of the EMU was not accompanied by appropriate structural transformations. The prerequisite for optimal currency area on its endogenous character is not sufficiently confirmed. It was found that the competitiveness of the euro area economy worsened compared to the relevant competitors in the world. A uniform operation of the single currency has contributed to the deepening of the differences in competitiveness among members. In the longer term, the current recession has slowed the development of the EMU and raises the question of its survival. In front of the EMU’s members is a long road of the structural adjustments. In order to adapt to the European crisis adequately, Serbian finance highly dependent on euro must choose an appropriate exchange rate regime.

Key words: competitiveness, crisis, European Monetary Union, optimum currency area, structural adjustments.

JEL: E61, E63, F15, F42

UDC 338.124.2:339.738(4) ; 339.137.2 original scientific paper

Paper received: 23.12.2013

Approved for publishing: 04.03.2014

Prof Vladimir Grbić, PhDGraduate School of International Economics, Megatrend University, [email protected]

This work is made within the framework of the scientific projects: “Promotion of public policies in Serbia in the function of enhancement of social security of citizens and sustainable economic growth” (ev. No. 47004), and “Serbia in contemporary international relations: strategic development objectives and reinforcement of the position of Serbia in the international integration processes - foreign-political, international, economic, and security aspects” (ev. No. 179029), Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia, for the period 2011-2014.

Prof Dragoljub Todić, PhDInstitute for International Politics and Economics, [email protected]


Uvod

Osnovno pitanje na koje želimo u ovom radu da odgovorimo je da li je funkcionisanje Evropske monetarne unije (EMU) dovelo do uspešnijeg razvoja realnog sektora i povećanja konkurentnosti ili nije. U odgovoru na ovo pitanje, ciljeve i sam rad smo struktuirali na sledeći način, Prvo, da utvrdimo koje su pretpostavke pre svega ekonomske, pa onda i monetarne integracije, oličene u teoriji optimalnog valutnog područja, kao i kontraverze vezane za uvođenje evra, sa kojim se ova kriza u osnovi identifikuje. Drugo, da analiziramo tendencije u razvoju konkurentnosti privreda evrozone, kako u odnosu prema odgovarajućim konkurentima u svetu (SAD, Japan) , tako, još i više, imeđu članica same integracije. Treće, da analiziramo moguća rešenja i rasplet krize, kao i njene implikacije na Srbiju.

Integracija i Evropska monetarna unija

Integracija, kao fenomen, u privrednom, pa može se reći i u socijalnom životu ima svoje pretpostavke. Kada se integrišu dva preduzeća na jednom privrednom prostoru i formiraju jednu upravljačku strukturu, kao pretpostavka, odnosno preduslov javlja se sličan nivo njihove razvijenosti. Ako to nije slučaj, ako su preduzeća odnosno firme na različitim ekonomskim nivoima, onda se može raditi o akviziciji jednog od strane drugog, a ne o zajedničkom poslovnom poduhvatu.

Ista pretpostavka u osnovi važi za integraciju među državama. U međunarodnoj integracionoj praksi mogu se identifikovati i razdvojiti tri integraciona obrazca prema kriterijumima razvojnog nivoa zemalja članica integracije: sever-sever, sever-jug i jug-jug. Pokazalo se u dosadašnjoj praksi da stepen korisnosti i uspešnosti opada od prvog ka poslednjem, ali isto tako da i svaki od njih može pozitivno uticati na razvoj zemlja članica, zavisno od konkretnih okolnosti (Grbić, Antevski, Todić, 2013) U današnjoj Evropskoj uniji mogu se prepoznati praktično sva tri obrazca. Članice osnivači EU, kao i zemlje EFTE imaju karakter obrazca sever-sever, nove članice primljene u tzv. velikom proširenju 2004. godine i posle, kao

i neke zemlje juga kontinenta daju Uniji karakter integracije sever-jug, dok zemlje članice CEFTE predstavljaju primer obrazca jug-jug.

Ovo što je rečeno može se interpretirati i na sledeći način. Prvo utemeljenje EU, odnosno realizovanje sever-sever obrazca integracija, bilo je zasnovano na realnijim ekonomskim kriterijumima, a pre svega, na sličnom nivou privredne razvijenosti i sličnostima privredne strukture koja omogućava razvoj konkurencije, dok su kasnija proširenja bila više inspirisana političkim razlozima i vezana su za obrazac sever-jug. Konkurentska osnova nije predstavljala impuls već eventulno ekonomiju obima i mogućnost lakšeg prikupljanja kapitala, dok su privredne stukture bile različite, ostavljajući manje prostora za razvoj konkurencije na zajedničkom tržištu. Što se tiče poslednjeg integracionog obrazca jug-jug, oličenog danas u zemljama Zapadnog Balkana, on je i zamišljen kao privremeni, a tako je i funkcionisao u prethodnim slučajevima.

Procesi proširenja EU su se odvijali u ambijentu uspešnog razvoja svetske privrede. Period od sredine osamdesetih godina prošlog veka do izbijanja krize 2008. godine karakteriše makroekonomska ravnoteža i stabilne stope rasta bruto domaćeg proizvodu u EU. Realizovana proširenja nisu izazivala posebne probleme, osim prvog, nemačkog ujedinjenja. Adaptiranje novih članica u ovom ambijentu je bilo olakšano. Prve analize nisu ukazivale da je ojačao južni pol zemalja sa nižim učešćem industrije u BDP i da se na taj način debalansirao obrazac sever-jug evropskih integracija. U tom makroekonomskom stabilnom miljeu ojačala je i ideja o formiranju nove novčane jedinice, evra, iako su dva prethodna pokušaja fiksiranja kursa, u liku vezivanja valuta za dolar, tzv. monetarna zmija (1972-1977) u prvom, i funkcionisanja ekija (1979-1993) u drugom pokušaju bila neuspešna (Lučić, 2011).

Teorijsku osnovu formiranja evra i etabliranja Evropske monetarne integracije (EMU) takođe nalazimo u bližoj prošlosti; vezuje se za rad Mundell-a (1961) koji je u raspravi, za i protiv fleksibilnog deviznog kursa (Friedman, 1953; Meade, 1957) upotrebio sintagmu: optimalno valutno područje (OVP). To je, dakle, područje koje ne koincidira sa državnim granicama i koje, ako postoji visoka mobilnost radne

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Introduction

The basic question that we wish to answer in this work is whether the functioning of the European Monetary Union (EMU) has led to a more successful development of the real sector and to an enhanced competitiveness or not. In the answer to this question we have structured the objectives and the paper itself in the following manner. Firstly, to determine what are the prerequisites, primarily economic ones, to be followed by monetary integrations that are embodied in the theory of the optimum currency area, but also controversies related to the introduction of euro, with which this crisis is basically identified. Secondly, to analyze tendencies in the development of competitiveness of the euro-zone economies, both with respect to the adequate competitors in the world (USA, Japan), but even more so amongst the member-countries of the integration itself. Thirdly, to analyze possible solutions and resolution of crisis, and its implications with respect to Serbia.

Integration and the European Monetary Union

Integration, as a phenomenon, in the economic and it may be said also in the social life is having its prerequisites. In case two companies are merging in a single economic area and are forming a single managerial structure what appears as a prerequisite is to have a comparable level of their development. If this is not the case, and the companies, i.e. firms are on different economic levels then it may rather be a case of acquisition of one company in respect of the other, and not of a joint business venture.

The same prerequisite basically applies for integration between states. In the integration practice what can be identified and distinguished are the three integration formats according to the criteria of the development level of the integration member country: North - North, North - South, and South - South. The past practice has shown that the level of benefit and success declines from the first to the last format, but also that every one of them can have a positive influence on the development of the member countries, depending on concrete circumstances (Grbic, Antevski, Todic, 2013, 49).

In the present-day European Union, it is possible to identify practically all of the three formats. The EU founding member countries, but also EFTA countries, are having the character of the North - North format, the newly admitted member countries in the so-called broad expansion of the year 2004 and thereafter, and some of the countries in the southern part of the continent are giving the Union the character of the North - South integration, while the CEFTA countries are an example of the South - South format.

The above said may be interpreted also in the following way. Firstly, founding of the EU, i.e. creation of the North - North integration format was based on more realistic economic criteria, primarily on a comparable level of economic development and similarities in the economic structure which allows for the development of competitiveness, while the later day expansions were rather inspired by political reasons and connected with the North - South format. The competitive basis did not appear to give an impetus, but rather the economy of scale and the option of easier access to capital, while economic structures remained different leaving little space for development of competition on a common market. Regarding the last integration format South - South, embodied today in the countries of the Western Balkans, it was envisaged as a temporary one and it did act in such a fashion in the previous cases.

The EU expansion processes were taking place in an environment of successful development of the world market. Period from the mid-1980s and up to the outbreak of the crisis in 2008 is characteristics for macro-economic balance and stable GDP growth rates in the EU. The expansions made did not cause any special problems, except for the first one, German unification. Adaptation of the new member countries in such a climate was facilitated. The initial analyses did not indicate that the southern pole of countries with the lower share of industry in the GDP was strengthening, and that it had in this way disturbed the balance of the North - South European integrations format. In such a stable macro-economic milieu what was strengthened was the idea of formation of a new monetary unit - euro, although the previous two attempts at fixing exchange rate in the form of pegging


snage, može fiksirati devizni kurs unutar njegovih granica, dok bi izvan granica, dakle prema spoljnjem svetu, trebalo da ostane fleksibilan. Ako bi se desili spoljnji izazovi, tzv. asimetrični šokovi tražnje, kao zamena za devalvaciju valute predviđa se i fleksibilnost cena i nadnica. Kasnije je teorija proširena na više polja. Najreprezentativnija od svih novih teorija OVP je ona o endogenom karakteru zone. Tako Frankel i Rose (1997) naglašavaju da zona ima potencijal da samostalno kreira svoj razvoj u sferi ekonomije, a neki autori, na primer Issing (2001) proširuju endogenost i na političke integracije.

Veliki broj ekonomista je bio skeptičan prema evru. Upozorenja, pre njegovog uvođenja, ili čak u doba njegovog uspešnog funkcionisanja koncentrisana su na činjenicu da evrozona nema karakteristike optimalnog valutnog područja. Krize mogu pogoditi jednu zemlju, a pogodovati drugoj, dakle asimetrične su. Fiskalna politika je u nadležnosti članica i nema političke volje da se integriše. Na primer, jedna od studija, koja u istraživanju OVP prezentuje klasičan doprinos analizi konkurentnosti članica (Eichgreen, Bayoumi, 1996) i čiji su rezultati kasnije u osnovi potvrđeni (Joao, Rui, 2011) istražujući sledeće kriterije konvergentnosti: uticaj asimetričnih šokova na proizvod, radnu mobilnost i transakcionu vrednost jedinstvene valute, dolazi veoma precizno, po zemljama, do identifikacije onoga što se kasnije i dogodilo, ukazujući na:• Prvo, OVP ne predstavlja optimalno valutno

područje; • Drugo, prema stupnju konvergiranja prema

OVP mogu se izdvojiti tri grupe zemalja: prva, u koju spadaju Nemačka, Austrija i zemlje Beneluksa spremne za članstvo u EMU; druga, u koje spadaju Velika Britanija, Danska, Finska, Norveška i Francuska, koje pokazuju mali stepen konvergencije i treće, u koje spadaju Italija, Grčka, Portugalija i Španija koje postepeno konvergiraju prema članstvu u EMU;

• Treće, između OVP kriterija i kriterija za ekonomsku integraciju postoji simbioza, odnosno potvrđuje se teza da je integracija uspešna u zemljama koje imaju uporediv nivo ekonomske razvijenosti i potencijala za konkurentsku utakmicu.

Već ovaj kratak pregled pogleda na mogućnosti funkcionisanja OVP ukazuje na složenost i neizvesnost poduhvata uvođenja evra. U njega se ipak ušlo, iako institucionalna struktura evra nije bila formirana. Mastrihtskim ugovorom utvrđeni su kriteriji za članstvo u EMU, tzv. kriteriji konvergencije, kao uslovi postavljeni za pristup njenom članstvu. To su: konvergencija stope inflacije i kamatnih stopa, budžetska ograničenja i stabilnost deviznih kurseva. Formirana je Evropska centralna banka i formulisana njena politika. Za ispunjenje kriterija stabilnosti javnih finansija formiran je Pakt za stabilnost i rast 1997. koji je usvojio fiskalna pravila i sankcije za države koje ih ne poštuju (Grbić, 2005). Nameće se pitanje kako je evropska privreda funkcionisala u tom okruženju, odnosno u uslovima formiranja monetarne integracije koje je počelo 1999 godine.

Konkurentnost privrede EU

Za istraživanje konkurentne pozicije u EMU i EU relevantne su razlike u jediničnim troškovima rada i razlike u stopama inflacije. Ove razlike se mere implicitnim realnim deviznim kursevima, odnosno paritetom cena. Za to se koriste realni efektivni devizni kursevi (REER) Evropske centralne banke (ECB) dobijeni od nominalnih realnih kurseva putem tzv. Deflatora. Oni obuhvataju 36 zemalja. Pored 27 članica EU, tu su još i Norveška, Australija, Kanada, Japan, SAD, Meksiko, Novi Zeland, Turska i Švajcarska (European Commission, 2011). Na ovaj način se omogućava analiziranje konkurentih pozicija, kako EU i EMU u odnosu na važnije trgovinske partnere, tako i među zemljama članicama. Pri tome, rast indeksa znači gubitak konkurentnosti.

Troškovi radaSmanjenje jediničnih troškova rada (JTR)

predstavlja danas osnovno oružje praktično svih zemalja u svetu u poboljšanju konkurentske pozicije njihovih privreda. Uspešno reduciranje troškova radne snage povećava prohodnost robe i usluga na svetskom tržištu na jednoj strani, a na drugoj, čini zemlju atraktivnijom destinacijom za strane direktne investicije. Stoga ovo postaje, ne samo politika preduzeća, nego i državna politika, u globalizacijskom procesu. U

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currencies to the dollar, the so-called monetary snake (1972-1977) in the first, and functioning of the equi (1979-1993) in the second attempt, have proved to be unsuccessful (Lucic, 2011, 56).

Theoretical basis for the formation of euro and establishment of the European Monetary Union (EMU) is also to be found in our near past: in the work of Mundell (1961) who has, in a discussion on the pros and cons of the flexible exchange rate (Friedman, 1953, Meade, 1957) used the syntagm: optimal currency area (OCA). Hence it is an area which does not coincide with the state borders, and which, if there is high work force mobility, can fix the exchange rate within its borders, while beyond borders, therefore towards the outside world, would let the exchange rate remain flexible. If some exterior challenges are to appear, the so-called asymmetric demand shocks, as a substitute for currency devaluation what is foreseen is the prices and wages flexibility. Later on this theory was expanded to cover several fields. The most representative of all the new theories on the OCA is to be found in the endogenous character of the zone. Thus Frankel, Rose (1997) underline that the zone has the potential for creating independently its own development in the sphere of economy, while some of the authors, Issing (2001), are expanding endogenous on to the political integrations as well.

A large number of economists were sceptical towards euro. The warnings, before its introduction, or even at the time of its successful functioning, are focused on the fact that euro-zone does not have the character of an optimum currency area. Crises may impact one country, yet benefit another one, therefore they are asymmetric. Fiscal policy is within the competences of the member countries and there is no political will for it to integrate. For example, one study which is presenting, in the research of the OCA, a classic contribution to the analysis of competitiveness of the member countries (Eichgreen, Bayoumi, 1996, p. 6, 7) and whose results have later on been basically confirmed (Joao, Rui, 2011), while researching the following convergence criteria: impact of asymmetric shocks on product, work mobility and transaction value of the single currency, comes very precisely, per countries, to the identification of what was later on actually to

happen, pointing out at the following:• Firstly, OCA does not represent an optimum

currency area.• Secondly, according to the degree of

convergence towards OCA there are three groups of countries to be distinguished: the first one, with Germany, Austria and the Benelux countries, is the group ready for the membership in the EMU; the second group, covering United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Norway and France, is the group showing a small degree of convergence, and the third group with Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain is the group of countries gradually converging towards the membership in the EMU.

• Thirdly, between the OCA criteria and criteria for economic integration there is a symbiosis, i.e. the thesis is confirmed that integration is successful in those countries that have a comparable level of economic development and potential for competitive game.Already this brief survey of the views

on the possibility of functioning of the OCA shows complexity and uncertainty of the euro introduction venture. The venture was conducted nevertheless, although the institutional euro structure had not as yet been formed. Under the Maastricht Agreement, criteria were prescribed for the membership in the EMU, the so-called convergence criteria, as a requirement for the access to its membership. They are: inflation rate and interest rates convergence, budgetary limitations, and exchange rates stability. European Central Bank was established and its policy formulated. For purpose of fulfilling criteria of public finance stability, the Stability and Growth Pact 1997 was formed, which adopted fiscal rules and sanctions for those states who would fail to comply (Grbic, 2005). The question is raised here how European economy functioned in such an environment, i.e. in the conditions of formation of the monetary integration which started in the year 1999.

Competitiveness of the EU economy

For the research into competitive position in the EMU and the EU what is relevant are the differences in the labour unit cost and the differences in the inflation rates. These differences are measured with the implicit real


EMU, ova politika ima posebnu težinu jer oblik „interne devalvacije“ omogućava da članice samostalno prilagode svoje cene okolnostima tržišta u uslovima datog, fiksnog kursa.

O konkurentnoj poziciji EMU i tendencijama među članicama odgovarajuću informativnu poruku daju sledeći podaci o realnom efektivnom deviznom kursu (REER) zasnovani na JTR za ekonomiju kao celinu (Tabela 1. i Tabela 2)

Iz prezentovanih podataka mogu se uočiti sledeće tendencije.

Prvo, EMU i EU u celini su pogoršali svoju konkurentnu poziciju u odnosu na osnovne konkurente SAD i Japan.

Drugo, u EMU su jedino Nemačka i Austrija smanjila JTR, a u EU samo Velika Britanija, dok su u Švedskoj, JTR u posmatranom periodu pretežno ostali na istom nivou.

Treće, JTR u članicama EU pridruženim

Tabela 1. Realni efektivni devizni kurs zasnovan na JTR za ukupnu ekonomiju, indeks (1999=100)

MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK US JP EA17 EU271999 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,02000 97,3 98,2 95,5 106,0 99,6 129,3 97,4 109,3 94,0 102,9 103,2 106,0 105,4 89,7 89,52001 104,8 101,6 94,4 121,2 101,4 142,3 98,5 107,1 96,3 96,9 102,0 110,9 92,1 90,6 91,42002 105,1 105,7 93,7 111,1 103,5 116,5 99,4 110,6 97,1 97,9 102,4 108,4 83,2 94,4 96,92003 113,0 110,8 96,3 94,5 109,0 118,1 101,0 119,7 101,2 102,5 98,4 98,9 78,6 105,2 108,72004 116,7 111,2 95,8 89,8 109,8 112,3 102,5 128,3 102,1 102,8 104,1 93,1 75,9 108,1 115,02005 113,9 109,1 95,0 99,6 111,6 149,9 101,5 135,8 102,6 99,0 103,6 91,9 71,5 105,8 113,32006 117,1 109,0 95,5 101,0 110,9 160,5 101,8 141,8 102,0 97,5 106,3 92,3 65,0 105,2 114,42007 119,7 110,3 95,5 105,1 111,0 192,1 103,0 154,0 101,7 100,8 108,5 88,7 57,8 106,8 120,62008 121,8 111,6 96,0 118,4 112,3 207,3 105,4 166,5 105,5 97,8 94,3 84,4 62,7 11,2 122,32009 122,4 114,6 97,9 95,7 113,0 171,8 112,2 183,5 111,2 90,1 86,7 86,7 72,1 114,5 117,62010 117,4 111,3 95,7 104,5 110,3 172,0 110,9 177,8 105,9 95,5 83,6 83,5 74,5 105,9 108,02011 110,0 110,9 95,9 103,0 110,8 178,7 110,9 177,7 106,1 101,3 79,2 79,2 79,0 107,3 112,8

Izvor: European Commission, 2011, str. 84

Tabela 2 Realni efektivni devizni kurs zasnovan na JTR za ukupnu ekonomiju, indeks (1999 =100)

BL BG CZ DK DE EE GR ES FR IE IT CY LV LT HU1999 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,02000 95,2 97,1 102,1 94,1 93,6 97,2 93,3 97,4 95,1 95,5 94,6 97,2 103,5 101,3 103,72001 97,6 105.4 109,6 97,3 91,8 98,5 90,6 98,8 95,6 99,6 95,7 97,8 100,0 98,9 114,42002 99.1 105,8 127,9 100,4 92,1 98,9 99,6 100,8 98,3 100,8 99,1 101,7 94,1 104,0 130,52003 102,5 108,3 129,1 105,7 96,3 105.4 102,8 105,8 103,3 109,9 107,2 113,8 91,5 107,7 133,72004 102,1 109,9 132,9 106,9 96,5 111,5 105,2 108,6 104,9 116,0 110,3 114,9 93,6 111,5 140,92005 102,0 112,2 138,6 107,5 93,3 113,3 106,0 110,1 104,9 120,7 110,3 115,2 101,0 115,1 143,72006 103,0 115,0 145,6 108,8 90,1 121,5 102,6 112,6 105,9 124,3 111,6 115,1 115,4 124,1 136,72007 104,7 122,8 150,6 113,2 88,9 139,2 104,4 116,6 107,4 130,5 112,8 113,5 143,0 128,1 150,42008 107,5 133,4 168,0 118,8 88,7 152,4 108,7 120,2 108,9 141,0 115,6 112,4 165.3 134,8 151,42009 108,5 147,5 158,8 122,3 91,7 152,7 113,8 118,6 109,1 133,9 117,3 114,4 150,3 132,5 137,12010 106,2 144,5 162,4 116,8 87,7 142,0 109,4 112,9 107,3 120,6 113,7 113,7 132,6 121,2 132,62011 107,7 154,4 167,4 115,2 88,9 142,9 106,6 111,4 108,1 116,0 115,2 115,2 134,4 121.0 133,8

Izvor: European Commission, 2011, str. 83

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exchange rates, i.e. with the price parity. For this purpose real effective exchange rates (REER) are used, those of the European Central Bank (ECB) obtained from the nominal real exchange rates by means of the so-called deflator. They cover 36 countries. In addition to the 27 EU member countries, included are Norway, Australia, Canada, Japan, USA, Mexico, New Zealand, Turkey and Switzerland (European Commission, 2011). In this way an analysis is enabled of the competitive positions, both those of EU and EMU in respect to the important trading partners, and internally, amongst the member countries themselves. However, this implies that the growth of index designates loss of competitiveness.

Labour costsLowering of the labour unit costs (LUC)

represents today the basic weapon of practically all the countries in the world in

the fight to improve competitive position of their economies. Successful reduction of the labour force costs is enhancing free flow of goods and services on the world market on the one hand, and on the other hand is making the given country a more attractive destination for the foreign direct investments. Therefore this is becoming not only the policy of companies, but also the state policy in the process of globalisation. In the EMU, this policy has a special weight as the form of “internal devaluation” is allowing member countries to independently adjust their prices to the market conditions under the circumstances of the given fixed exchange rate.

The competitive position of the EMU and the tendencies within the member countries is best illustrated by the informative message contained in the following data: REER based on the labour unit cost (LUC) for the economy as a whole (Table 1 and Table 2).

Table 1 - Real effective exchange rate based on the LUC for the total economy, index (1999.=100)

MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK US JP EA17 EU271999 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.02000 97.3 98.2 95.5 106.0 99.6 129.3 97.4 109.3 94.0 102.9 103.2 106.0 105.4 89.7 89.52001 104.8 101.6 94.4 121.2 101.4 142.3 98.5 107.1 96.3 96.9 102.0 110.9 92.1 90.6 91.42002 105.1 105.7 93.7 111.1 103.5 116.5 99.4 110.6 97.1 97.9 102.4 108.4 83.2 94.4 96.92003 113.0 110.8 96.3 94.5 109.0 118.1 101.0 119.7 101.2 102.5 98.4 98.9 78.6 105.2 108.72004 116.7 111.2 95.8 89.8 109.8 112.3 102.5 128.3 102.1 102.8 104.1 93.1 75.9 108.1 115.02005 113.9 109.1 95.0 99.6 111.6 149.9 101.5 135.8 102.6 99.0 103.6 91.9 71.5 105.8 113.32006 117.1 109.0 95.5 101.0 110.9 160.5 101.8 141.8 102.0 97.5 106.3 92.3 65.0 105.2 114.42007 119.7 110.3 95.5 105.1 111.0 192.1 103.0 154.0 101.7 100.8 108.5 88.7 57.8 106.8 120.62008 121.8 111.6 96.0 118.4 112.3 207.3 105.4 166.5 105.5 97.8 94.3 84.4 62.7 11.2 122.32009 122.4 114.6 97.9 95.7 113.0 171.8 112.2 183.5 111.2 90.1 86.7 86.7 72.1 114.5 117.62010 117.4 111.3 95.7 104.5 110.3 172.0 110.9 177.8 105.9 95.5 83.6 83.5 74.5 105.9 108.02011 110.0 110.9 95.9 103.0 110.8 178.7 110.9 177.7 106.1 101.3 79.2 79.2 79.0 107.3 112.8

Source: European Commission, 2011, p. 84

Table 2 - Real effective exchange rate based on the LUC for the total economy, index (1999.=100)

BL BG CZ DK DE EE GR ES FR IE IT CY LV LT HU1999 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.02000 95.2 97.1 102.1 94.1 93.6 97.2 93.3 97.4 95.1 95.5 94.6 97.2 103.5 101.3 103.72001 97.6 105.4 109.6 97.3 91.8 98.5 90.6 98.8 95.6 99.6 95.7 97.8 100.0 98.9 114.42002 99.1 105.8 127.9 100.4 92.1 98.9 99.6 100.8 98.3 100.8 99.1 101.7 94.1 104.0 130.52003 102.5 108.3 129.1 105.7 96.3 105.4 102.8 105.8 103.3 109.9 107.2 113.8 91.5 107.7 133.72004 102.1 109.9 132.9 106.9 96.5 111.5 105.2 108.6 104.9 116.0 110.3 114.9 93.6 111.5 140.92005 102.0 112.2 138.6 107.5 93.3 113.3 106.0 110.1 104.9 120.7 110.3 115.2 101.0 115.1 143.72006 103.0 115.0 145.6 108.8 90.1 121.5 102.6 112.6 105.9 124.3 111.6 115.1 115.4 124.1 136.72007 104.7 122.8 150.6 113.2 88.9 139.2 104.4 116.6 107.4 130.5 112.8 113.5 143.0 128.1 150.42008 107.5 133.4 168.0 118.8 88.7 152.4 108.7 120.2 108.9 141.0 115.6 112.4 165.3 134.8 151.42009 108.5 147.5 158.8 122.3 91.7 152.7 113.8 118.6 109.1 133.9 117.3 114.4 150.3 132.5 137.12010 106.2 144.5 162.4 116.8 87.7 142.0 109.4 112.9 107.3 120.6 113.7 113.7 132.6 121.2 132.62011 107.7 154.4 167.4 115.2 88.9 142.9 106.6 111.4 108.1 116.0 115.2 115.2 134.4 121.0 133.8

Source: European Commission, 2011, p. 83


posle 2004. godine su eskalirali, što može biti povezano i sa Balaša-Samjuelsonovim efektom (Balassa-Samuleson Effect).

Četvrto, u članicama koje su zahvaćene dužničkom krizom, pre svega, u Grčkoj i Španiji, pa i u Italiji, Portugaliji i Irskoj, JTR su rasli po stopoma sličnim kao i u starim članicama, Holandiji i Danskoj, a u celini posmatrano, konkurentska pozicija im se pogoršala.

Detaljnija analiza iznetih podataka moguća je putem uvida u kumulativan rast nominalnih nadnica, produktivnosti i JTR (Tabela 3).

Podaci ukazuju, pre svega, na značajno povećanje nadnica u Grčkoj, Španiji i Portugaliji,

zemljama koje su pristupile Uniji osamdesetih. Ovaj proces se mogao očekivati pošto integracija podrazumeva fenomen konvergencije cena. Međutim, rast nominalnih nadnica treba da prati produktivnost rada, što se ovde nije desilo. U ovim zemljama postoji značajan raskorak između ostvarene produktivnosti, koja je po pravilu manja, od rasta nominalnih nadnica.

Na ovom mestu treba međutim ukazati i na sledeće elemente relevantne za ocenu iznetih podataka. U EU postoje značajna izdavanja iz budžeta u pojedinim sektorima. Veoma evidentno su to sredstva izdvojena za ekološke svrhe i poljoprivredu (Todić, 2010). Ona se velikim delom plasiraju preko subvencija farmerima. Pošto su oni samozaposleni, subvencije se iskazuju kroz povećanje nadnica. One, međutim, predstavljaju rezultat povećanje transfera iz EU fondova, a ne povećanja troškova farmera (Malliaropulos, 2010). Ovo se više odnosi na zemlje juga Evropske unije, pošto one predstavljaju neto budžetske korisnike ekoloških i poljoprivrednih subvencija.

InflacijaDrugi relevantni element istraživanja

konkurentnosti je visina inflacije. Podaci u tabelama 4. i 5. Odnose se na REER zasnovan na CPI (indeks potrošačkih cena)

Tabela 3. Nadnica, produktivnosti i JTR u EMU (1999=100)

Nominalne zarade

Produktivnost JTR

Nemačka 111,37 112,89 105,99Holandija 137,64 112,66 127,28Finska 139,06 110,91 125,19Belgija 130,60 105,58 123,70Austrija 124,43 115,05 111,44Francuska 128,96 113,19 118,46Portugalija 142,29 109,98 129,39Grčka 173,93 129,43 137,88Španija 141,96 110,05 134,58Irska 164,63 132,57 132,77Italija 126,59 100,68 131,44

Izvor: OECD, 2010.

Tabela 4. Realni efektivni devizni kurs zasnovan na CPI (1999 =100)

MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK US JP EA17 EU271999 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,02000 99,1 96,9 96,5 110,6 97,6 112,4 97,8 110,7 95,7 98,2 100,9 105,2 107,9 90,1 88,62001 100,3 100,4 96,6 124,8 100,0 114,4 98,3 112,9 97,3 90,3 98,1 111,2 94,5 91,6 89,92002 101,8 103,2 96,8 119,0 102,3 114,6 100,1 115,8 98,6 92,3 98,0 109,5 87,0 94,4 93,82003 104,7 107,4 99,8 105,6 107,0 110,6 102,9 130,4 103,1 98,5 93,2 99,7 84,6 104,7 104,12004 107,4 107,6 100,3 104,6 108,2 112,8 102,8 143,2 102,8 99,6 96,6 93,9 84,0 107,7 109,82005 107,3 106,6 99,4 117,2 107,7 133,3 101,8 147,4 101,0 96,0 95,1 93,3 79,6 106,1 108,22006 108,8 106,2 99,2 120,0 108,6 143,1 102,2 155,8 100,5 96,0 96,1 93,6 73,2 106,8 110,42007 110,7 106,6 99,9 124,2 109,9 155,1 103,8 171,0 101,3 97,1 98.0 89,6 67,2 109,9 117,22008 114,7 107,3 100,4 136,1 110,6 147,4 106,1 185,8 103,6 95,2 85,5 86,4 73,1 113,4 118,12009 114,9 109,2 101,3 115,5 109,8 136,3 108,1 198,0 105,9 88,0 77,1 90,6 83,1 115,3 111,92010 110,9 105,6 98,6 123,7 107,2 139,3 106,2 191,4 101,6 94,8 78,7 87,6 86,2 106,6 103,42011 111,0 105,5 99,4 121,3 108,3 143,7 105,7 194,0 102,2 99,1 79,6 83,6 88,7 107,0 105,2

Izvor: European Commission, 2011.

21Bankarstvo 2 2014

From the data presented above it is possible to note the following tendencies:

Firstly, EMU and the EU in general have deteriorated their competitive position in respect to their basic competitors the U.S.A. and Japan.

Secondly, in the EMU, only Germany and Austria have reduced their LUC, and in the EU only the United Kingdom, while in Sweden the LUC in the observed period mostly remained on the same level.

Thirdly, LUC in the EU countries that have joined after 2004 have escalated, which may be linked with the Balasha-Samuelson effect.

Fourthly, in the member countries that have been impacted by the debt crisis, primarily in Greece and Spain, and even in Italy, Portugal and Ireland, LUCs have growth at the rates similar to those in the old member countries, Netherlands and Denmark, and globally observed, their competitive position has deteriorated.

A more detailed analysis of the above stated data is possible through an insight into the cumulative growth of the nominal wages, productivity and the LUC (Table 3).

Data indicates, most of all, that there is a significant increase of wages in Greece, Spain and Portugal, countries that have joined the Union in the 1980s. This process was to be expected as the integration assumes the phenomenon of price convergence. However, the growth of nominal wages should be followed by work productivity which had failed to happen in this case. In these countries there is a significant mismatch between the productivity achieved which is as a rule lower than the growth of nominal wages.

It is necessary to point out here also at the following elements which are relevant for the evaluation of the above data. In the EU, there is significant budgetary spending in certain sectors. Highly evident are the funds allocated for environment protection and for agriculture (Todic, 2010, 129). They are in great part placed through the farmers’ subsidies. As the farmers are self-employed, subsidies are expressed through increase of wages. However, they represent the result of an increase of transfers from the EU funds, and not the increase of the farmers’ costs (Mallaropulos, 2010, 11). This rather applies to the countries of the southern part of the European Union as they represent net budgetary beneficiaries of environmental and farming subsidies.

InflationThe second relevant element in the research

into competitiveness is the level of inflation. Data given in Tables 4 and 5 offer the following indications: REER based on CPI (consumer price index).

Table 3 - Wages, productivity and the LUC in the EMU (1999=100)

Nominal earnings

Productivity LUC

Germany 111.37 112.89 105.99Netherlands 137.64 112.66 127.28Finland 139.06 110.91 125.19Belgium 130.60 105.58 123.70Austria 124.43 115.05 111.44France 128.96 113.19 118.46Portugal 142.29 109.98 129.39Greece 173.93 129.43 137.88Spain 141.96 110.05 134.58Ireland 164.63 132.57 132.77Italy 126.59 100.68 131.44

Source: OECD, 2010.


Iako se najveći doprinos rada ECB smatra držanje inflacije pod kontrolom u evrozoni, njen ukupni rezultat, odnosno činjenica da je u pojedinim članicama inflacija imala sopstvene putanje, dovelo je do pogoršanje konkurentne pozicije EMU i EU u odnosu na SAD i Japan. U EMU, jedino su Nemačka i Austrija imale uspeha u kontroli inflacije u odnosu na početak stvaranja evrozone, a u EU još Švedska i Velika Britanija.

Ove podatke testirajmo još jedanput, sada kroz kumulativno kretanja JTR i inflacije u nominalnim vrednostima (Tabela 6).

Raspoloživi podaci ukazuju na to da su identifikovane neravnoteže u računu tekućih plaćanja između severnih i južnih članica EMU zemalja, a pre svega između Grčke, Španije, Italije i Irske, determinisane razlikama nastalim iz razlika između nivoa JTR i inflacije. Ove razlike nisu mogle da budu kompenzovane prilagođavanjem realnog deviznog kursa. Međutim, ova analiza koja pokriva ekonomske izraze unutrašnjih neravnoteža indicira i na potrebu istraživanja kretanja unutar privreda ovih članica, odnosno zaostajanja u promenama u strukturama njihovih privreda, tj. nedostatka

razmenljivih dobara u južnim zemljama Evrope.

Bruto domaći proizvodAnalizirajmo sada sumarno stanje

konkurentnosti koristeći BDP.

Tabela 5. Realni efektivni devizni kurs zasnovan na CPI, indeks (1999 =100)

BL BG CZ DK DE EE GR ES FR IE IT CY LV LT HU1999 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,02000 96,8 103,8 102,3 95,8 93,8 97,6 93,2 97,6 94,8 97,2 95,5 98,5 107,5 109,5 101,62001 97,6 111,5 109,0 97,2 93,7 101,9 94,2 98,6 94,9 99,7 96,1 99,1 108,4 112,2 109,92002 98,1 115,4 120,6 98,9 94,2 103,9 96,4 101,0 96,1 104,5 98,0 100,8 105,0 115,2 120,52003 101,8 118,6 117,6 103,6 98,5 106,7 101,5 106,2 101,1 114,2 104,0 106,7 99,9 116,8 122,12004 102,7 123,6 118,4 103,8 99,7 109,0 103,1 108,2 102,7 117,2 105,6 107,3 100,9 116,9 129,42005 102,8 125,8 124,9 103,0 98,7 111,1 103,0 109,0 101,9 117,0 104,8 107,8 100,4 116,4 131,72006 103,3 132,2 131,2 103,0 98,7 113,6 104,1 110,7 101,9 118,1 105,2 108,2 104,7 117,9 125,82007 104,1 138,8 135,0 104,0 100,4 119,4 105,1 112,8 102,8 122,0 106,5 107,6 112,1 122,1 139,72008 107,2 151,4 155,4 106,3 101,2 127,9 107,2 115,7 104,6 126,5 108,3 110,5 124,6 130,7 143,92009 107,5 156,9 149,2 108,9 101,9 129,1 109,4 116,0 104,8 124,5 109,4 111,6 129,9 138,1 135,92010 105,4 153,2 152,0 105,5 97,6 126,5 109,5 113,3 101,5 116,0 105,6 108,9 122,0 133,9 139,32011 106,5 156,1 155,5 104,7 97,5 129,0 110,3 114,8 101.3 114,8 106,1 109,7 123,7 135,7 139,2


Tabela 6. Inflacija, jedinični troškovi rada i tekuća plaćanja kao % BDP

CPI inflacija JTR% promena CA/BDP*100

1999-2012 1999-2010 1999-2012Nemačka 21,8 1,4 52Holandija 30,3 4,2 79,6Finska 26,4 -19,9 66Belgija 29,9 8 32,5Austrija 26,4 -1,5 28,1Francuska 24,5 2,4 -3,4Portugalija 35,1 11,1 -132,2Grčka 43,1 54,9 -123,2Španija 38,4 24,8 -75,5Irska 32,1 -22,5 -19,1Italija 30,9 28,5 -24,4

CPI= index potrošačkih cena, JTR= jedinični troškovi rada, CA= Bilans tekućih računaIzvor: za CPI inflaciju CA i BDP (International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database 2012), za UCL (OECD, Main economics indicator, 2012), za 2012. godinu procena iz istih izvora

23Bankarstvo 2 2014

Table 4 - Real effective exchange rate based on the Although the greatest contribution of the ECB work is attributed to its holding of inflation under control in the euro-zone, its overall result, i.e. the fact that certain member countries had taken their own individual routes did bring about the deterioration in the competitive position of the EMU and the EU in respect to the USA and Japan. In the EMU, only Germany and Austria had success in controlling inflation at the beginning of creation of the euro-zone, and in the EU it was also Sweden and United Kingdom that were successful.

Let us test these data once again, this time through the cumulative movement of the LUC and inflation in the nominal values (Table 6).

Table 5 - Real effective exchange rate based on CPI, index (1999.=100)BL BG CZ DK DE EE GR ES FR IE IT CY LV LT HU

1999 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.02000 96.8 103.8 102.3 95.8 93.8 97.6 93.2 97.6 94.8 97.2 95.5 98.5 107.5 109.5 101.62001 97.6 111.5 109.0 97.2 93.7 101.9 94.2 98.6 94.9 99.7 96.1 99.1 108.4 112.2 109.92002 98.1 115.4 120.6 98.9 94.2 103.9 96.4 101.0 96.1 104.5 98.0 100.8 105.0 115.2 120.52003 101.8 118.6 117.6 103.6 98.5 106.7 101.5 106.2 101.1 114.2 104.0 106.7 99.9 116.8 122.12004 102.7 123.6 118.4 103.8 99.7 109.0 103.1 108.2 102.7 117.2 105.6 107.3 100.9 116.9 129.42005 102.8 125.8 124.9 103.0 98.7 111.1 103.0 109.0 101.9 117.0 104.8 107.8 100.4 116.4 131.72006 103.3 132.2 131.2 103.0 98.7 113.6 104.1 110.7 101.9 118.1 105.2 108.2 104.7 117.9 125.82007 104.1 138.8 135.0 104.0 100.4 119.4 105.1 112.8 102.8 122.0 106.5 107.6 112.1 122.1 139.72008 107.2 151.4 155.4 106.3 101.2 127.9 107.2 115.7 104.6 126.5 108.3 110.5 124.6 130.7 143.92009 107.5 156.9 149.2 108.9 101.9 129.1 109.4 116.0 104.8 124.5 109.4 111.6 129.9 138.1 135.92010 105.4 153.2 152.0 105.5 97.6 126.5 109.5 113.3 101.5 116.0 105.6 108.9 122.0 133.9 139.32011 106.5 156.1 155.5 104.7 97.5 129.0 110.3 114.8 101.3 114.8 106.1 109.7 123.7 135.7 139.2

Source: European Commission, 2011.

Table 6 - Inflation, labour unit costs and current payments as the % of the GDP

CPI inflation LUC% change CA/GDP*100

1999-2012 1999-2010 1999-2012Germany 21.8 1.4 52Netherlands 30.3 4.2 79.6Finland 26.4 -19.9 66Belgium 29.9 8 32.5Austria 26.4 -1.5 28.1France 24.5 2.4 -3.4Portugal 35.1 11.1 -132.2Greece 43.1 54.9 -123.2Spain 38.4 24.8 -75.5Ireland 32,1 -22,5 -19,1Italy 30.9 28.5 -24.4

CPI = consumer price index, LUC = labour unit cost, CA = current account balanceSource: for CPI inflation CA and GDP, (International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database 2012), for UCL (OECD, Main economics indicator, 2012), the 2012 estimate from the same sources.

Table 4 - Real effective exchange rate based on the CPI, (1999.=100)

MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK US JP EA17 EU271999 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.02000 99.1 96.9 96.5 110.6 97.6 112.4 97.8 110.7 95.7 98.2 100.9 105.2 107.9 90.1 88.62001 100.3 100.4 96.6 124.8 100.0 114.4 98.3 112.9 97.3 90.3 98.1 111.2 94.5 91.6 89.92002 101.8 103.2 96.8 119.0 102.3 114.6 100.1 115.8 98.6 92.3 98.0 109.5 87.0 94.4 93.82003 104.7 107.4 99.8 105.6 107.0 110.6 102.9 130.4 103.1 98.5 93.2 99.7 84.6 104.7 104.12004 107.4 107.6 100.3 104.6 108.2 112.8 102.8 143.2 102.8 99.6 96.6 93.9 84.0 107.7 109.82005 107.3 106.6 99.4 117.2 107.7 133.3 101.8 147.4 101.0 96.0 95.1 93.3 79.6 106.1 108.22006 108.8 106.2 99.2 120.0 108.6 143.1 102.2 155.8 100.5 96.0 96.1 93.6 73.2 106.8 110.42007 110.7 106.6 99.9 124.2 109.9 155.1 103.8 171.0 101.3 97.1 98.0 89.6 67.2 109.9 117.22008 114.7 107.3 100.4 136.1 110.6 147.4 106.1 185.8 103.6 95.2 85.5 86.4 73.1 113.4 118.12009 114.9 109.2 101.3 115.5 109.8 136.3 108.1 198.0 105.9 88.0 77.1 90.6 83.1 115.3 111.92010 110.9 105.6 98.6 123.7 107.2 139.3 106.2 191.4 101.6 94.8 78.7 87.6 86.2 106.6 103.42011 111.0 105.5 99.4 121.3 108.3 143.7 105.7 194.0 102.2 99.1 79.6 83.6 88.7 107.0 105.2



Podaci Tabele 7. indiciraju da je konkurentnost EU i EMU u odnosu na SAD i Japan, analizirana kroz kretanje BDP, značajno smanjena od formiranja EMU. Godina 2003. predstavlja prekretnicu (kao i u slučaju JTP i inflacije), kako u EU i EMU tako i u Japanu, a posebno u SAD. Od te godine pogoršava

se konkurentna pozicija EU i EMU, a sa druge strane raste, odnosno poboljšava se konkurentnost Japana i SAD.

Od te, 2004. godine, počinje i širenje deficita tekućih računa najvećeg broja članica (Tabela 9), a od 2007. i povećanje zaduženja u odnosu na BDP (Tabela 10).

Tabela 7. Realni efektivni devizni kurs zasnovan na BDP, indeks (1999=100)

MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK US JP EA17 EU271999 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,02000 101,3 99,3 96,5 108,6 98,5 111,4 95,3 109,2 95,7 98,1 101,2 103,7 107,4 90,0 88,42001 103,5 103,1 96,4 120,7 100,1 116,4 96,1 109,5 97,8 90,2 98,9 109,6 94,0 91,8 90,42002 105,7 105,7 96,0 115,3 102,1 116,7 97,9 112,4 98,4 92,0 100,0 108,0 86,0 94,7 95,22003 109,9 109,9 98,4 101,8 106,3 120.6 100,4 122,6 100,8 97,5 96,1 97,6 82,3 104,9 106,02004 111,0 109,3 98,9 101,4 107,3 126,8 100,0 132,8 100,7 97,5 100,7 91,4 80,7 107,0 111,22005 111,2 109,5 98,4 114,3 107,1 154,6 98,6 136,9 98,6 93,6 99,4 90,7 75,7 105,0 109,12006 113,3, 109,5 98,6 117,5 107,6 172,6 98,8 143,3 97.5 93,6 101,2 90,6 68,7 104,8 110,62007 117,9 110,0 99,0 123,0 109,4 202,5 100,6 155,8 99,4 95,4 103,0 86,3 62,3 107,5 117,42008 121,2 112,0 99,2 134,7 110,3 207,5 102,5 169,6 100,7 93,8 90,6 82,2 66,9 109,9 117,52009 121,7 112,0 100,2 113,9 110,7 188,7 106,3 176,3 103,1 87,0 81,0 87,9 76,5 112,3 111,62010 119,7 109,6 98,6 121,3 108,8 191,6 102,0 171,6 98,5 93,4 83,1 85,1 79,4 104,4 103,82011 121,0 109,5 99,0 119,6 108,7 197,9 100,5 174,3 98,9 98,5 83,6 80,2 82,4 103,6 104,0


Tabela 8. Realni efektivni devizni kurs zasnovan na BDP, indeks (1999=100)

BL BG CZ DK DE EE GR ES FR IE IT CY LV LT HU1999 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,02000 96,6 100,9 100,9 96,1 92,1 98,3 94,4 97,9 95,2 98,3 96,2 97,5 109,7 100,9 102,42001 97,0 107,6 108,1 98,0 91,4 102,4 95,1 100,5 95,6 103,5 97,5 100,0 110,3 110,7 113,42002 97,8 11,6 121,1 99,7 91,9 103,1 97,0 103,6 96,9 108,5 99,9 100,0 107,9 113,5 128,02003 102,2 113,4 119,1 103,9 96.0 108,9 102,3 109,9 101,5 117,3 106,2 106,4 103,4 115,1 131.02004 103,4 115,7 121,8 105,5 96,4 112,1 103,7 113,0 102,3 120,0 107,9 108,1 105.0 116,5 137,32005 103,6 119,6 126,5 105,8 94,1 116,5 103,0 115,1 101,4 121,0 106,8 109,7 107,3 120,3 137,82006 104,6 125,1 131,3 105,9 92,6 123,8 103,3 117,6 102,0 123,0 106,6 111,3 116,3 124,7 131,22007 105,9 133,1 135,3 107,2 93,1 134,6 104,4 119,8 103,8 124,9 108,0 112,8 135,8 131,2 141,92008 107,9 141.3 151,1 110,7 92,8 138,6 107,9 121,9 106,1 123,8 109,8 116,8 149,5 140,2 146,62009 109,1 146,8 146,6 112,8 94,3 139,2 111,3 122,2 106,3 118,6 112,1 117,4 150,3 137,5 137,42010 107,7 146,8 146,1 110,8 90,6 135,1 109,2 118,,4 103,0 110,4 107,9 115,1 140,5 135,3 139,72011 108,6 154,8 149,1 109,6 89,6 136,7 109,1 118,5 102,7 107,8 107,7 116,8 143,5 138,1 138,9

Izvor: European Commission, 2011

25Bankarstvo 2 2014

The available data indicate that imbalances identified in the current account payments that were established between northern and southern EMU members, most of all Greece, Spain, Italy and Ireland, were determined by the differentiations incurred from the mismatch between the level of the LUC and the inflation. These differences could not have been compensated for through the adjustment of the real exchange rate. However, this analysis which is covering economic expressions of the interior imbalances indicates that there is also a need for researching the interior content of economies of the member countries, i.e. lagging behind in making structural changes in the economy, and the absence of exchangeable goods in the southern countries of Europe.

Gross Domestic ProductLet us now analyze summary state of

competitiveness by using the GDP.

Data presented in Table 7 indicate that the competitiveness of the EU and EMU in respect to the USA and Japan, when analyzed through the GDP movement, was significantly lowered with the formation of the EMU. The year 2003 represents a turning point (as was also the case with the LUC and inflation), both in the EU and the EMU and also in Japan, but especially in the USA. From that year onwards, there is deterioration in the competitive position of the EU and the EMU, while on the other hand there is growth, i.e. improvement in the competitiveness of Japan and the USA.

From 2004 what begins is also expansion of the current account deficit in the major number of the member countries (Table 9), and from 2007 onwards increased borrowing started in respect to the GDP (Table 10).

Table 7 - Real effective exchange rate based on the GDP, index (1999=100)MT NL AT PL PT RO SI SK FI SE UK US JP EA17 EU27

1999 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.02000 101.3 99.3 96.5 108.6 98.5 111.4 95.3 109.2 95.7 98.1 101.2 103.7 107.4 90.0 88.42001 103.5 103.1 96.4 120.7 100.1 116.4 96.1 109.5 97.8 90.2 98.9 109.6 94.0 91.8 90.42002 105.7 105.7 96.0 115.3 102.1 116.7 97.9 112.4 98.4 92.0 100.0 108.0 86.0 94.7 95.22003 109.9 109.9 98.4 101.8 106.3 120.6 100.4 122.6 100.8 97.5 96.1 97.6 82.3 104.9 106.02004 111.0 109.3 98.9 101.4 107.3 126.8 100.0 132.8 100.7 97.5 100.7 91.4 80.7 107.0 111.22005 111.2 109.5 98.4 114.3 107.1 154.6 98.6 136.9 98.6 93.6 99.4 90.7 75.7 105.0 109.12006 113.3. 109.5 98.6 117.5 107.6 172.6 98.8 143.3 97.5 93.6 101.2 90.6 68.7 104.8 110.62007 117.9 110.0 99.0 123.0 109.4 202.5 100.6 155.8 99.4 95.4 103.0 86.3 62.3 107.5 117.42008 121.2 112.0 99.2 134.7 110.3 207.5 102.5 169.6 100.7 93.8 90.6 82.2 66.9 109.9 117.52009 121.7 112.0 100.2 113.9 110.7 188.7 106.3 176.3 103.1 87.0 81.0 87.9 76.5 112.3 111.62010 119.7 109.6 98.6 121.3 108.8 191.6 102.0 171.6 98.5 93.4 83.1 85.1 79.4 104.4 103.82011 121.0 109.5 99.0 119.6 108.7 197.9 100.5 174.3 98.9 98.5 83.6 80.2 82.4 103.6 104.0


Table 8 - Real effective exchange rate based on the GDP, index (1999=100)

BL BG CZ DK DE EE GR ES FR IE IT CY LV LT HU1999 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.02000 96.6 100.9 100.9 96.1 92.1 98.3 94.4 97.9 95.2 98.3 96.2 97.5 109.7 100.9 102.42001 97.0 107.6 108.1 98.0 91.4 102.4 95.1 100.5 95.6 103.5 97.5 100.0 110.3 110.7 113.42002 97.8 11.6 121.1 99.7 91.9 103.1 97.0 103.6 96.9 108.5 99.9 100.0 107.9 113.5 128.02003 102.2 113.4 119.1 103.9 96.0 108.9 102.3 109.9 101.5 117.3 106.2 106.4 103.4 115.1 131.02004 103.4 115.7 121.8 105.5 96.4 112.1 103.7 113.0 102.3 120.0 107.9 108.1 105.0 116.5 137.32005 103.6 119.6 126.5 105.8 94.1 116.5 103.0 115.1 101.4 121.0 106.8 109.7 107.3 120.3 137.82006 104.6 125.1 131.3 105.9 92.6 123.8 103.3 117.6 102.0 123.0 106.6 111.3 116.3 124.7 131.22007 105.9 133.1 135.3 107.2 93.1 134.6 104.4 119.8 103.8 124.9 108.0 112.8 135.8 131.2 141.92008 107.9 141.3 151.1 110.7 92.8 138.6 107.9 121.9 106.1 123.8 109.8 116.8 149.5 140.2 146.62009 109.1 146.8 146.6 112.8 94.3 139.2 111.3 122.2 106.3 118.6 112.1 117.4 150.3 137.5 137.42010 107.7 146.8 146.1 110.8 90.6 135.1 109.2 118..4 103.0 110.4 107.9 115.1 140.5 135.3 139.72011 108.6 154.8 149.1 109.6 89.6 136.7 109.1 118.5 102.7 107.8 107.7 116.8 143.5 138.1 138.9

Source: European Commission, 2011


Tabela 9. Bilans tekućih računa (u milijardama evra)

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011EU 27 -93,8 -16,2 -30,8 -35,7 -83.5 -139,6 -125.9 -261.5 -90.3 -82.2 -66.6EMU -27,2 46,1 20.7 60.8 10.8 -12.6 7.4 -143,5 -21,9 -6.8 -2.3Belgija 8.8 12.0 9.4 9.3 6.0 5.9 5.4 -5.7 -5,3 5.0 -3.7Bugarska -0,9 -0,4 -0,1 -1,3 -2,7 -4,6 -7,8 -8,2 -3,1 -0,4 0.4Češka -3,7 -4,4 -5,0 -4,7 -1,0 -2,4 -5,7 -3.3 -3,4 -5,9 -4,5Danska 5.6 4,6 6,5 5,9 9,0 6,5 3,1 6,8 7,3 13,0 15,5Nemacka 0,0 42,7 40,5 102,4 112,6 144,7 180,9 153,6 140,6 150,7 147,7Estonija -0,4 -0,8 -0,1 -1,1 -1,1 -2,1 -2,6 -1,6 0,5 0,5 0,5Irska -0,8 -1,3 0,0 -0,9 -5,7 -6,3 -10,1 -10,2 -4,7 0,8 1.1Grcka -10,6 -10,2 -11,3 -10,7 -14,7 -23,8 -32,6 -34,8 -25,8 -23,0 -21,1Španija -26,8 -23,8 -27,5 -44,2 -66,9 -88,3 -105,3 -104,7 -50,5 -47,4 -37,5Francuska 26.3 19.2 11.5 9.0 -8,3 -10,3 -18,9 -33,7 -25,1 -30,2 -38,9Italija 3,4 -5,6 -10,4 -4,6 -12,6 -22.3 -19,9 -45,2 -30,1 54,7 -50,3Kipar -0,4 -0,4 -0,3 -0,6 -0,8 -1,0 -1,9 -2,7 -1,8 -1,7 -1,9Latvija -0,7 -0,7 -0,8- -1,4 -1,6 -3,6 -4,7 -3,0 1,6 0,5 -0,2Litvanija -0,6 -0,8 -1,1 -1,4 -1,5 -2,6 -4,1 -4,2 1,2 O,4 -0,5Luksemburg 2,0 2,5 2,1 3,3 3,5 3,5 3,8 2,0 2,4 3,1 3,0Mađarska -3,6 -4,9 -5,9 -6,8 -6,4 -6,6 -7,2 -7,7 -0,1 1,2 1,4Malta -0,2 0,1 -0,1 -0,3 -0,4 -0,5 -0,3 -0,3 -0,5 -0,4 -0,2Holandija 11,6 12,3 26,4 37,5 38,0 50,4 38,4 25,5 23,5 41,5 52,4Austrija -1,8 5,9 3,8 5,2 5,3 7,3 9,6 13,8 7,5 8,6 5,9Poljska -6,6 -5,9 -4,9 -10,8 -5,9 -10,4 -19,3 -23,8 -12,1 -16,5 -16,0Portugalija -13,9 -11,8 -9,2 -12,4 -15,9 -17,1 -17,2 -21,7 -18,4 -17,2 -11,0Rumunija -2,5 -1,6 -3,1 -5,1 -6,9 -10,2 -16,8 -16,2 -4,9 -5,5 -6,0Slovenija 0,0 0,3 -0,2 -0,7 -0,5 -0,8 -1,6 -2,3 -0,2 -0,2 0,0Slovačka -2,0 -2,1 -1,7 -2,7 -3,3 -3,5 -2,9 -4,0 -1,6 -1,6 0,0Finska 11,6 12,1 7,0 9,4 5,3 6,9 7,7 4,9 3,1 2,6 -2,2Švedska 12,7 12,5 19,5 19,1 20,2 26,8 31,2 29,4 20,5 24,0 27,2V. Britanija -34,0 -29,2 -25,7 -37,4 -47,7 -66,8 -51,6 -25,1 -23,1 -56,7 -33,5Island -0,4 0,1 -0,5 -1,1 -2.2 -3,2 -2,3 -2,8 -1,0 -0,8 -0,7Norveška 29,2 26,0 24,5 26,5 39,7 46,2 40,1 54,5 35,8 38,7Hrvatska -0,8 -2,0 -1,8 -1,4 -1,9 -2,6 -3,1 -4,1 -2,2 -0,4 -0,4Turska 4,3 -0,7 -6,6 -11,5 -17,8 -25,6 -27,9 -28,1 -9,6 -35,1 -55,4Japan 97,8 120,0 120,3 138,5 133,3 136,5 154,9 107,0 105,0 153,7 85,6SAD -443,3 -482,4 -505,4 -505,4 -602,2 -637,1 -519,7 -460,5 -269,2 -357,0 -339,8

Izvor: Eurostat (online data codes:bdp_q_euro and bdp_q_c_), ECB

Tabela 10. Javni dug kao % BDP

1998 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012Belgija 117,1 84,2 89,6 96,2 96,8 97,0 97,5Nemačka 60,3 64,9 66,3 73,5 83,2 82,4 81,1Estonija 3,7 4,6 7,2 6,6 6,1 6,9Irska 53,6 25,0 44,4 65,6 96,2 112,0 117,9Grčka 105,8 105,4 110,7 127,1 142,8 157,7 166,1Španija 64,1 36,1 29,8 53,3 60,1 68,1 71,0Francuska 59,4 63,9 67,7 78,3 81,7 84,7 86,8Italija 114,9 103,6 106,3 115,1 119,0 120,3 119,8Luksemburg 7,1 6,7 13,6 14,6 18,4 17,2 19,0Holandija 65,7 45,3 58,2 60,8 62,7 63,9 64,0Austrija 64,8 60,7 63,8 69,6 72,3 73,8 75,4Portugalija 52,1 68,3 71,6 83,0 93,0 101,7 107,4Slovenija 23,1 21,9 35,2 38,0 42,8 46,0Finska 48,2 35,2 34,1 43,8 48,4 50,6 52,2Malta 53,4 62,0 61,5 67,6 68,0 68,0 67,9Kipar 58,6 58,3 48,3 58,0 60,8 62,3 64,3Slovačka 34,5 29,6 27,8 35,4 41,0 44,8 46,8EA-17 73,1 66,3 70,0 79,4 85,5 87,9 88,7EU -27 66,5 59,0 62,3 74,4 80,2 82,3 83,3

Izvor: European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, Public Finance, 2011, 2

27Bankarstvo 2 2014

Table 9 - Current accounts balance (in billion euros)

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011EU 27 -93.8 -16.2 -30.8 -35.7 -83.5 -139.6 -125.9 -261.5 -90.3 -82.2 -66.6EMU -27.2 46.1 20.7 60.8 10.8 -12.6 7.4 -143.5 -21.9 -6.8 -2.3Belgium 8.8 12.0 9.4 9.3 6.0 5.9 5.4 -5.7 -5.3 5.0 -3.7Bulgaria -0.9 -0.4 -0.1 -1.3 -2.7 -4.6 -7.8 -8.2 -3.1 -0.4 0.4Czech Rep. -3.7 -4.4 -5.0 -4.7 -1.0 -2.4 -5.7 -3.3 -3.4 -5.9 -4.5Denmark 5.6 4.6 6.5 5.9 9.0 6.5 3.1 6.8 7.3 13.0 15.5Geramny 0.0 42.7 40.5 102.4 112.6 144.7 180.9 153.6 140.6 150.7 147.7Estonia -0.4 -0.8 -0.1 -1.1 -1.1 -2.1 -2.6 -1.6 0.5 0.5 0.5Ireland -0.8 -1.3 0.0 -0.9 -5.7 -6.3 -10.1 -10.2 -4.7 0.8 1.1Greece -10.6 -10.2 -11.3 -10.7 -14.7 -23.8 -32.6 -34.8 -25.8 -23.0 -21.1Spain -26.8 -23.8 -27.5 -44.2 -66.9 -88.3 -105.3 -104.7 -50.5 -47.4 -37.5France 26.3 19.2 11.5 9.0 -8.3 -10.3 -18.9 -33.7 -25.1 -30.2 -38.9Italy 3.4 -5.6 -10.4 -4.6 -12.6 -22.3 -19.9 -45.2 -30.1 54.7 -50.3Cyprus -0.4 -0.4 -0.3 -0.6 -0.8 -1.0 -1.9 -2.7 -1.8 -1.7 -1.9Latvia -0.7 -0.7 -0.8- -1.4 -1.6 -3.6 -4.7 -3.0 1.6 0.5 -0.2Lithuania -0.6 -0.8 -1.1 -1.4 -1.5 -2.6 -4.1 -4.2 1.2 O.4 -0.5Luxembourg 2.0 2.5 2.1 3.3 3.5 3.5 3.8 2.0 2.4 3.1 3.0Hungary -3.6 -4.9 -5.9 -6.8 -6.4 -6.6 -7.2 -7.7 -0.1 1.2 1.4Malta -0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.3 -0.5 -0.4 -0.2Netherlands 11.6 12.3 26.4 37.5 38.0 50.4 38.4 25.5 23.5 41.5 52.4Austria -1.8 5.9 3.8 5.2 5.3 7.3 9.6 13.8 7.5 8.6 5.9Poland -6.6 -5.9 -4.9 -10.8 -5.9 -10.4 -19.3 -23.8 -12.1 -16.5 -16.0Portugal -13.9 -11.8 -9.2 -12.4 -15.9 -17.1 -17.2 -21.7 -18.4 -17.2 -11.0Romania -2.5 -1.6 -3.1 -5.1 -6.9 -10.2 -16.8 -16.2 -4.9 -5.5 -6.0Slovenia 0.0 0.3 -0.2 -0.7 -0.5 -0.8 -1.6 -2.3 -0.2 -0.2 0.0Slovakia -2.0 -2.1 -1.7 -2.7 -3.3 -3.5 -2.9 -4.0 -1.6 -1.6 0.0Finland 11.6 12.1 7.0 9.4 5.3 6.9 7.7 4.9 3.1 2.6 -2.2Sweden 12.7 12.5 19.5 19.1 20.2 26.8 31.2 29.4 20.5 24.0 27.2UK -34.0 -29.2 -25.7 -37.4 -47.7 -66.8 -51.6 -25.1 -23.1 -56.7 -33.5Island -0.4 0.1 -0.5 -1.1 -2.2 -3.2 -2.3 -2.8 -1.0 -0.8 -0.7Norway 29.2 26.0 24.5 26.5 39.7 46.2 40.1 54.5 35.8 38.7Croatia -0.8 -2.0 -1.8 -1.4 -1.9 -2.6 -3.1 -4.1 -2.2 -0.4 -0.4Turkey 4.3 -0.7 -6.6 -11.5 -17.8 -25.6 -27.9 -28.1 -9.6 -35.1 -55.4Japan 97.8 120.0 120.3 138.5 133.3 136.5 154.9 107.0 105.0 153.7 85.6USA -443.3 -482.4 -505.4 -505.4 -602.2 -637.1 -519.7 -460.5 -269.2 -357.0 -339.8

Source: Eurostat (online data codes:bdp_q_euro and bdp_q_c_), ECB

Table 10 - Public debt in the GDP %1998 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012

Belgium 117.1 84.2 89.6 96.2 96.8 97.0 97.5Germany 60.3 64.9 66.3 73.5 83.2 82.4 81.1Estonia 3.7 4.6 7.2 6.6 6.1 6.9Ireland 53.6 25.0 44.4 65.6 96.2 112.0 117.9Greece 105.8 105.4 110.7 127.1 142.8 157.7 166.1Spain 64.1 36.1 29.8 53.3 60.1 68.1 71.0France 59.4 63.9 67.7 78.3 81.7 84.7 86.8Italy 114.9 103.6 106.3 115.1 119.0 120.3 119.8Luxembourg 7.1 6.7 13.6 14.6 18.4 17.2 19.0Netherlands 65.7 45.3 58.2 60.8 62.7 63.9 64.0Austria 64.8 60.7 63.8 69.6 72.3 73.8 75.4Portugal 52.1 68.3 71.6 83.0 93.0 101.7 107.4Slovenia 23.1 21.9 35.2 38.0 42.8 46.0Finland 48.2 35.2 34.1 43.8 48.4 50.6 52.2Malta 53.4 62.0 61.5 67.6 68.0 68.0 67.9Cyprus 58.6 58.3 48.3 58.0 60.8 62.3 64.3Slovakia 34.5 29.6 27.8 35.4 41.0 44.8 46.8EA-17 73.1 66.3 70.0 79.4 85.5 87.9 88.7EU -27 66.5 59.0 62.3 74.4 80.2 82.3 83.3

Source: European Commission, Economic and Financial Affairs, Public Finance, 2011, 2


Pored analize konkurentnosti EU i EMU u odnosu na glavne i uporedive svetske konkurente tabele 7. i 8. omogućavaju praćenje konkurentnosti unutar EU i EMU. Vidljivo je da su konkurentnu poziciju poboljšale samo Nemačka, Austrija i Finska među članicama EMU, a među drugim članicama EU samo Švedska. Na drugoj strani, među članicaama EMU, poseban gubitak konkurentnosti zabeležen je kod Španije. Dodatan problem predstavlja gubitak konkurentnosti starih industrijskih nacija: Italije, Holandije, Francuske. Jednom rečju, tendencije konkurentnosti praćene preko BDP potvrđuju prethodne nalaze utvrđene u slučajevima JTR i inflacije.

Na kraju ovog dela ukažimo i na sledeće. Kriza u zemljama EU se, pre svega, identifikuje sa velikim javnim dugom i budžetskim deficitom, tek potom se ukazuje na probleme vezane za deficite u računima tekućih plaćanja. Ovi potonji deficiti su direktniji rezultatat različitog stepena konkurentnosti privreda evrozone. Proistekli su iz različitih privrednih struktura članica, gde se industrijski produktivnija proizvodnja koncentrisala u nekoliko zemlja severa Evrope, dok su druge privredne delatnosti sa istorijski uslovljenim zaostajanjem produktivnosti situirane u južnim zemljama. Pored toga, vremenski se ranije javljaju problemi sa deficitom tekućih plaćanja (2004), od krize javnog duga (2007) i u tom smislu konincidiruju sa padom konkurentnosti evropskih privreda. Uniformna vrednost evra jasno je ocrtala ovaj strukturni debalans.

Redizajniranje EMU

Struktura EU je građena dugo i strpljivo. Osnovu pristupa njenoj izgradnji predstavljao je funkcionalni pristup. Zemlje članice su prenosile na Uniju samo mali deo svojih nadležnosti, što je obezbeđivalo čuvanje njihovog integriteta i trajnost Unije, najčešće na štetu efikasnosti delovanja. Uvođenje EMU je predstavljalo tektonsku promenu u tom procesu. Nacionalna samostalnost u vođenju monetarne politike

je prepuštena ECB. Na drugoj strani nisu uspostavljeni odgovarajući mehanizmi koordinacije sa drugim ekonomskim politikama. Rečju, nisu postojale institucije u EMU za uspešne odgovore na asimetrične šokove.

Pojava krize stavila je, pre svega EMU, na proveru. Prvi odgovor je bio na prvi pogled efikasan. Oličen je u koncentraciji kapitala i konstituisanju nove institucije: Evropskog finansijskog stabilizacionog fonda (ESFS), koja je sprovedena 2010 godine. Odlukom Evropskog saveta iz 2011. godine, kapitalna osnova Fonda iznosi 750 milijardi evra, a kreditni potencijal 500 milijardi evra. Međunarodni monetarni fond je obezbedio 250 milijardi evra. Od njega su preuzeti uslovi korišćenja sredstava. Smanjenje javnog duga se sprovodi budžetskim uštedama i to, na rashodnoj strani, smanjenjem troškova socijalnih beneficija, zdravstvene zaštite i penzija, smanjenjem zarada službenika u javnom sektoru, a na prihodnoj strani, povećanjem indirektnih poreza, a posebno poreza na dodatu vrednost. Pored ovih, predviđena su još neke institucionalne promene: supervizija (Momirović, 2012), koordinacija i monitoring (Kuenzel, 2011).

Nameće, se pitanje koji su rezultati ovih mera?

Iako je ovaj proces u toku, mogu se ipak izvesti sledeći zaključci.

Prvo, još uvek nije došlo do smanjenja javnog duga. Za 2012. godinu predviđa se njegovo dalje povećanje, mereno učešćem u BDP i to sa 82,3% u 2011. na 83,3% u 2012. godini (Public Finance, EMU, 2011).

Drugo, došlo je do smanjenja deficita tekućih računa u zemljama GIIPSa (Grčka, Italija, Irska, Portugla, Španija (Graf 1).

Izvor: IMF, 2012.

Grafikon 1. Bilans tekućih plaćanja, % BDP

29Bankarstvo 2 2014

In addition to the analysis of competitiveness of the EU and EMU in respect to the main and comparable world competitors, Tables 7 and 8 allow the competitiveness to be followed up within the EU and the EMU. It is obvious that the competitive position was improved only by Germany, Austria and Finland from amongst the EMU members, and amongst the other EU member countries only Sweden was successful. On the other hand, the EMU member country that recorded a particular loss of competitiveness was Spain. An additional problem is the loss of competitiveness of the old industrial nations: Italy, Netherlands, and France. In a word, competitiveness tendencies followed through the GDP confirm previous finds determined in the cases of the LUC and inflation.

In conclusion of this part of work, let us highlight the following. Crisis in the EU is primarily identified with the large public debt and budgetary deficit, and only thereafter the problems related to the deficit in the current account payments are pointed out. This latter deficit is a direct result of different competitive levels of the euro-zone economies. They have derived from different economic structures of the member countries, where an industrially more productive manufacture had concentrated in several countries of northern Europe, while other economic sectors with historically conditioned lagging behind of productivity are situated in the southern countries. In addition, problems with the current payment deficit appear earlier in time (2004) than the public debt crisis (2007) and in that sense coincide with the fall of competitiveness of the European economies. Uniform euro value had clearly outlined this structural imbalance.

Redesigning EMU

The EU structure was constructed over a long period of time and patiently. The basic approach to its creation was the functional approach. Member countries were transferring on to the Union only a small part of their competencies, which provided for the safeguard of their integrity and the longevity of the Union, most often at the expense of the efficient action. Introduction of the EMU represented a tectonic change in this process. National independence

in conducting monetary policy was left in the hands of the ECB. On the other hand, no other corresponding mechanisms have been set in place for coordination with other economic policies. In a word, there were no institutions in the EMU to successfully respond to the asymmetric shocks.

With the emergence of the crisis, EMU was actually the first one to be put to a test. The first response was, as it seemed, rather successful. The response was embodied in the concentration of capital and in the constitution of the new institution: the European Financial Stability Fund (ESFS), which was established in 2010. In the decision of the European Council in 2011, it was prescribed that the capital basis of the fund will amount to 750 billion euros, while the credit potential will be 500 billion euros. International Monetary Fund provided 250 billion euros. The IMF conditionalities will be applied for the use of funds . Austerity measures including lowering of the public debt were to be conducted through budgetary savings and this on the side of expenditures, cutting down costs of social benefits, health care and pensions, reducing salaries in the public sector, and on the earning side, through the increase of indirect taxation, especially the value added tax. In addition, some of the institutional changes were envisaged as well, those of supervision (Momirovic, 2012, 84), coordination, and monitoring (Kuenzel, 2011, p. 8).

The question is raised here what are the results of these measures?

Bearing in mind that this process is still ongoing, nevertheless the following may be concluded:

Firstly, public debt has not as yet been reduced. It is forecasted for 2012 that there will be its further increase measured as the share in the GDP, and this from 82.3% in 2011 to 83.3% in 2012 (Public Finance EMU, 2011, p. 26).

Secondly, there was a reduction in the current account deficit in the GIIPS countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) (Graph 1).


Ova povoljna tendencija međutim zasnovana je, pre svega, na značajnom opadanju tražnje i na toj osnovi omogućavanju većeg izvoza zemalja GIIPSa. U proseku, u periodu 2007-2011, tražnja je opala 10% (u Grčkoj 18%), dok je u Nemačkoj, na drugoj strani, domaća tražnja povećana 3,3%, što smanjuje prostor za njen izvoz (Dadush, Wyne, 2012). Kao rezultat smo dobili smanjenje gepa u tekućim računima između članica, odnosno mere EU su se pokazale efikasnim. Međutim, efikasnost na tom planu dovela je do niza negativnih posledica, odnosno nije obezbedila održivi razvoj. Kao najočitija konsekvenca je porast nezaposlenosti na preko 11 % (Graf 2 ), ali i pad BDP.

U GIIPS zemljama stope rasta nezaposlenosti se dramatično povećavaju. Tako, na primer, u Španiji od stope nezaposlenosti od 8,3% u 2007. godini, ona se povećava na 21,7% u 2011, u Grčkoj od 8,3% na 17,7%, a u Irskoj od 4,6% na 14,4%. U celini, najveću nezaposlenost u zrmljama EU imaju Španija, Italija i Grčka sa preko 25% (Dugalić, 2012). Na drugoj strani, u zemljama severnog dela evrozone: Nemačkoj, Belgiji, Holandiji, Austriji stope nezaposlenosti posmatrano u celini ostaju na predkriznom nivou. Kao rezultat, u 2012. godini bila je predviđena blaga recesija u EMU od -0,4 rasta GDP (IMF, 2013 October).

Treće, nije došlo do zaokruživanja institucionalnog sistema. I dalje nedostaju važne karike za njegovo učvršćivanje. Postoje određeni predlozi kako da se to uradi. U ovim razmišljanjima u osnovi postoje dva pravca.

Prvi pravac je vezan za uvođenje evroobveznica kao sredstva zaduživanja članica EMU. Ovo rešenje pretpostavlja zajedničku odgovornost članica za obaveze pojedinih država Ovaj pravac pretpostavlja i centralizaciju fiskalne funkcije. Sa njom bi se monetarna unija kompletirala sa transfernom budžetskom funkcijom, koju imaju druge federalne države, kao na primer SAD, a aktivirali bi se i mehanizmi fiskalne kontrole, kao i automatski stabilizatori. Oba ova rešenja trasiraju put ka federalističkoj budućnosti EU, dakle političkoj uniji. U prilog ovom pravcu, zasnovanom na zajedničkoj odgovornosti u EMU, govori jačanje evra kao svetske valute i reduciranje prelivanja među

članicama, dok protivargumenti leže u činjenici da se nacionalne razlike u ekonomskoj strukturi i preferencijama mogu eksponirati samo posredno.

Drugi pravac nudi parcijalna rešenja, koja u uslovima neprihvatanja fiskalnog federalizma, političke integracije, pa i evroobveznica, pre svega, od Nemačke, predstavlja realniji pristup. U osnovi i analiza izneta u ovom radu se nalazi na tom tragu. Konvergencija zemalja EMU, merena OVP kriterijumima ili nivoom ekonomskog razvoja je moguća,

pre svega, između starih petnaest članica EU i/ili članica koje imaju suficite tekućih računa. Na taj način se osnažuje ideja Evrope klubova ili Evrope u dve ili više brzina, prezentovana još Amsterdamskim ugovorom. Na ovoj liniji se nalaze i druge ideje koje nude parcijalna rešenja: saniranje dugova prezaduženih članica, pa onda njihov izlazak iz zone; uvođenje Evropskog stabilizacionog mehanizma (ESM) 2012, Fonda sa kapitalom od 500 milijardi evra za saniranje eventualnih budućih finansijskih problema; etabliranje međuvladinog sporazuma: Ugovora o stabilizaciji, kordinaciji i upravljanju u Evropskoj i monetarnoj uniji (TSCG) iz 2012. Ovaj ugovor nije potpisan od strane Velike Britanije i Češke, i treba pre svega da ojača fiskalnu disciplinu. Međutim, ovaj pristup kao i prethodni, u osnovi se ne bavi razvojem realnog sektora ekonomije, nego kreira uslove za njegov

Izvor: Eurostat, 2012.

Grafikon.2. Stopa nezaposlenosti u Evrozoni i EU 27

31Bankarstvo 2 2014

This positive tendency however is based primarily on the significant fall in demand and on that basis is allowing for higher exports in the GIIPS countries. In the period 2007-2911, on an average, demand has fallen for 10%, and in Greece for 18%, while in Germany on the other hand, domestic demand has grown for 3.3.% which is narrowing down space for its exports (Dadush, Wyne, 2012). As a result what was obtained is the lowering of the gap in current accounts between the member countries, i.e. the EU measures have proved to have been efficient. However, the efficiency in this sense has caused a series of negative consequences, i.e. it did not provide for sustainable development. The most obvious consequence is the growth in unemployment of over 11% (Graph 2), but also the fall in the GDP.

In the GIIPS countries unemployment growth rates are dramatically on the rise. Thus for example in Spain, from the unemployment rate of 8.3% in 2007 it is now increased to 21.7% in 2011, in Greece from 8.3% to 17.7%, and in Ireland from 4.6% to 14.4%. In general, the highest unemployment in the EU countries is experienced by Spain, Italy and Greece, with over 25% (Dugalic, 2012, 8). On the other hand, in the countries of the northern part of the euro-

zone: Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Austria, the unemployment, globally speaking, has remained at the pre-crisis level. As a result, in the year 2012 a mild recession in the EMU is forecasted, of -0.4% of the GDP growth (IMF, 2013 October).

Thirdly, rounding up of the institutional system has failed to take place. Important links in the chain are still missing for its reinforcement. There are certain proposals as to how to proceed in this respect. In these deliberations there are basically two lines of thought.

The first one is connected with the introduction of euro-bonds as the means for borrowing of the EMU members. Prerequisite for this solution is the joint and common responsibility of the member countries for

the liabilities of individual countries. This line of thought also assumes centralization of the fiscal function. With the euro-bond, monetary union would be complete with the transfer budgetary function, like the ones in the hands of the other federal states, for example, the USA, and the mechanisms of its control would be activated, but also the automatic stabilizers. Both of these solutions are paving the road towards a federalist future of the EU, therefore, towards a political union. In support of this line, based on

the joint responsibility in the EMU, speaks the

Source: Eurostat, 2012

Graph 2 - Unemployment rate in the euro-zone and the

Source: IMF, 2012

Graph 1 - Current payments balance, in the GDP %


funkcionisanje. Kakve, videli smo u slučaju GIIPS zemlja. Dakle, potrebne su aktivnije razvojne mere usmerene na promenu privredne strukture u prezaduženim i deficitima tekućih računa opterećenim zemljama. Budžetski fondovi na nivou EU fokusirani na: održivi razvoj. Konkretno, za rast konkurentnosti i zaposlenosti izdvajanja iz ovih fondova su mala i iznose oko 15% budžeta EU na godišnjem nivou, a koji sam ne prelazi 1,2% BDP realizovanog u EU, dok su interna sredstva ovih članica usmerena na vraćanje dugova.

Imajući sve gore izneto u vidu, kao i sporost reformi u EU vezanu za duge procedure usaglašavanja, na srednji rok, ne mogu se očekivati neke bitnije izmene u odnosu na stanje u EMU. Ta ocena ima težinu za Srbiju. Ona proističe iz velikog stepena finansijske zavisnosti od evra. Ovo se dokumentuje sledećim činjenicama: u vlasništvu inostranih banaka je 74% bankarskog sektora Srbije, od čega 72% pripada bankama poreklom iz EMU (Narodna Banka Srbije, 2012); u ukupnim kreditima banaka krediti denominirani u evru u 2011. u privredi učestvuju sa 68,1%, a kod stanovništva sa 69,5%, dok doznake iz inostranstva, pretežno iz evrozone iznose 3,5 milijardi evra godišnje (Vasiljević, Gobeljić, 2011). Zadržavanje evrozone u istim uslovima u

narednom periodu nameće Srbiji da prilagođava kurs dinara evru i to u užem rasponu nego što predviđa EMU II, što je moguće u režimu valutnog odbora.

Zaključak

Utvrđeno je da kriteriji optimalnog valutnog područja daju analitičku osnovu za istraživanje Evropske monetarne unije. Analiza troškovne i cenovne konkurentnosti je indicirala da se konkurentnost u evrozoni pogoršala u odnosu na konkurentnost u SAD-u i Japanu. Još oštriji raskorak u konkurentnosti identifikovan je među članicama EMU. Antikrizni mehanizmi EMU, posebno Evropski fond za finansijsku stabilizaciju doprineli su smanjenju gepa u deficitima tekućih računa i jačanju finansijske odgovornosti. Međutim, implementacija ovih mehanizama doprinela je i produženju recesije, posebno povećanju nezaposlenosti. Na duži rok, primena strukturnih mera treba da obezbedi povećanje konkurentske pozicije članica. Na srednji rok, imajuću u vidu institucionalnu sporost u prilagođavanju, ne očekuju se značajnije promene u funkcionisanju EMU. Visoko zavisna od evra privreda Srbije stoga treba da novim mehanizmima obezbedi striktnije praćenje kursa evra.

33Bankarstvo 2 2014

strengthening of euro as the world currency and the reduction in the spilling over among the member countries, while the counter argument rests on the fact that the national differences in the economic structure and in preferences can be exposed only indirectly.

The second line of thought offers partial solutions which in the climate of reluctance to accept fiscal federalism, political integration, and even euro-bonds, primarily by Germany represents a more realistic approach. Basically the analysis presented in this paper is to be found along this track. Convergence of EMU countries measured by OCA criteria or the level of economic development is possible primarily between the old fifteen EU member countries and/or members having surplus on their current account. This is the way to strengthen the idea of an Europe of clubs, or Europe in two or more gears, as presented early in the Amsterdam Agreement. Along this line of thought some other ideas are also to be found that are offering partial solutions: solution of debts of the over-indebted member countries, and then their exit from the zone; introduction of the European Stabilization Mechanism (ESM 2012), a fund with the capital of 500 billion euro for the solution of eventual future financial problems; establishment of the inter-governmental agreement: Treaty on

Stabilization, Coordination and Governance (TSCG) in the European and Monetary Union, of 2012. This treaty was not signed by United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, and is primarily aimed at strengthening fiscal discipline. However, this approach just like the previous one basically does not deal with the development of the real sector of economy, but is creating conditions for its functioning. What conditions, we have best seen in the case of the GIIPS countries. Hence, more active development measures are necessary to be focused on the changes of the economic structure in the heavily indebted countries and those burdened with the current account deficit. Budgetary funds on the level of the EU that are focused on sustainable development, especially growth of competitiveness and employment, are small and amount to some 15% of the EU budget at the annual level, which itself does not exceed 1.2% of the GDP achieved in the EU, while the internal funds of these members countries are allocated for debt repayment.

In view of the above stated, but also mindful of the slow motion of reforms in the EU dependent on the long harmonization procedure, in the medium term it is hard to expect some more significant changes in respect to the situation in the EU. This is an assessment that has its implications for Serbia. It derives


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from the high degree of financial dependence on euro. This may be documented by the following facts: some 74% of the banking sector in Serbia is in the ownership of the foreign banks, from this number 72% belonging to the banks originating from the EMU (National Bank of Serbia, 2012), in the total banking loans, loans denominated in euro in 2011 have a corporate share of 68.1%, and a retail share of 69.5%, while the remittances from abroad are mostly arriving from the euro-zone and amount to 3.5 billion euro annually (Vasiljevic, Gobeljic, 2011, 172). The euro-zone remaining in the same circumstances over the forthcoming period will force Serbia to adjust its exchange rate to euro, and this within a narrower margin than foreseen by the EMU II, which is possible in the regime of the currency board.

Conclusion

It was determined that the criteria of the optimum currency area are providing analytic ground for research into the

European Monetary Union. The analysis of cost and price competitiveness indicated that the competitiveness in the euro-zone had deteriorated in respect to the competitiveness of the USA and Japan. An even sharper disparity in the competitiveness was identified among the EMU members. The EMU anti-crisis mechanisms and especially the European Financial Stabilization Fund have help to reduce the gap in the current account deficits and strengthening of financial responsibility. However, implementation of these mechanisms had also contributed to the extension of recession, especially the growth of unemployment. In a longer-term, implementation of structural measures should provide an enhancement for the competitive position of the member countries. In medium-term, bearing in mind institutional time-consuming pace of the harmonization, no significant changes are to be expected in the EMU functioning. Hence the economy of Serbia, with high Eurisation, should secure, through new mechanisms, a stricter tracking of the euro exchange rate.

konkurentnost privrede i kriza evropske monetarne unije

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