인도철학회(ksip) | 『인도철학』(issn: 1226-3230), kci 등재지

http://doi.org/[10.32761/kjip.2018..54.010] 인도철학 제54집(2018.12), 303～342쪽

Intellectual History: Pivoting on Historicityin Philosophy

__An Example from Buddhism__

Jo Sokhyo*1)

Introduction. Ⅰ Historicity of Maitreya(nātha) and Vasubandhu. Ⅱ Historicity: Logic of Pivoting in Intellectual History. Final Remark

요약문[주요어: 지성사, 역사적 실재성, 철학의 역사성, 유식 철학자들,논리적 순환]

* 조석효. Research Institute of Korean Studies, Korea University. [email protected]

근대의 역사 의식은 이전 시대에 연구되기 어려웠던, 지식 그 자체에 대한 탐구인 지성사 연구로 구체화되었다. 지성사의 학문 분과적 성격을 이해하기 위해서는 여타 연관 학문들을 검토할 필요가 있다.

먼저, 지성사는 역사성/ 역사적 실재성 (historicity)을 주요한 연구 분야의 하나로 간주하는 고전학·문헌학의 성과에 대한 비판적 검토에 기초하여, 비정합적·비본질적·모순적인 해석적 요소들을 시간성의 틀 내에서 일관된 논리로 구성해 내는 작업이다. 따라서 지성사에서, 역사적 실재성은 사실의 층이라기보다는 연구자에 의한 해석적 층이라 할 수 있다.

다음으로, 지성사는 개념과 사상가들의 역사를 다루는 분야인만큼 철학·철학사와도 밀접한 연관을 가진다. 따라서 지성사에서는 텍스트 간의 통시적인 사상의 영향 관계와 변화라는 측면이 강조되며, 철학의 역사성과 역사의존성이라는 기본 전제에서 철학 텍스트가 이해되어져야 함이 강조된다. 그러다 보니, 지성사 연구는 철학적·해석적 전통이 전통 내적으로나 현대적 해석에서도 그 시간성을 망각하여, 비역사적 내지 탈역사적으로 이해되는 것을 경계한다.

종합해보면, 지성사는 고전학·문헌학에 기초하면서도, 탈역사적으로 이해되기 쉬운 철학과도 위태로운 빠드두(pas de deux)를 추고 있다고 할 수 있다.

서구 근대 학문 체계가 가지는 문제 의식 내에서 성장해 온 지성사 연구의 이러한 일반적인 측면들은 그 토양에서 성장해 온 불교학 내지 불교지

304 ∙ 印度哲學 제54집

Introduction

Historical research in the modern period features increased accessibility to various language sources and an ensuing knowledge expansion into a global context with understanding through the examination of synchronic and diachronic histor-ies, etc.. Thereby, knowledge and belief that have long been fixed have begun to be questioned by modern critical thinking, and scholarly works have appeared in line with the develop-ment of intellectual history.

Modern Buddhist studies also witnessed remarkable develop-ment in historical research on the basis of the intellectual his-torian mindset. First, by textual study, historians have inspired criticism on the unquestioned acceptance and convictions that had long constituted the received wisdom. For example, John Brough(1917-1984), who posited the influence of the

성사 연구에도 내재해 있다. 가령, 20세기 이후 불교학에서 논쟁적 문제로 자리잡은 마이트레야(-나타)의 역사적 실재성 문제와 바수반두의 저작으로 알려져 있는 논서들에서 보이는 사상의 전환 문제는 근대 역사 의식에 의해 구체화된 지성사 연구의 문제의식과 방법론이 불교철학사 연구에도 적용되고 있음을 보여주는 예들이다. 또한, 그 문제들과 관련하여, 서구 불교학계가 제한된 텍스트 내외적 증거들을 정합적으로 구성해 내려 노력해 온 과정에서 출현한 의견의 분기와 불일치는 본질적으로 지성사 연구라는 분야가 다양한 해석 가능성들의 전제들과 논리적 구조 역시 내함하는 이론적 과정임을 의미한다.

Intellectual History: Pivoting on Historicity in Philosophy∙ 305

Dharmaguptaka sect in Gāndhāran Buddhism through the de-coding of the Gāndhārī Dharmapada, has facilitated the theory that some of the early Chinese Buddhist texts were translated from Gāndhārī texts, contrary to the uncritical belief that they had been translated from Sanskrit texts.1)

Next, the perception that texts are media containing in-formation on specific temporal and historical circumstances relates to broader theoretical debates and concerns regarding historical evidence. For example, Gregory Schopen, who made provocative assertions that Mahāyāna Buddhism originated from the cult of the book, rebutting the widely believed pre-sumption that it originated from the stūpa cult, threw fresh light on the development of Buddhism in India.2) Being equip-ped with a modern mindset, he, by relating textual study based on epigraphical study to historical theory, showed the sig-nificance of historicity in elucidating Buddhist intellectual history.

Next, it is assumed that philosophical texts can be under-stood as existing within a temporal frame of historicity, and philosophical interpretations are inseparable from the histor-ical layers of the intellectual historian’s research. For example, the historicity of Yogācāra Buddhist philosophers, which is my topic in this essay, typically shows history’s own role in trig-gering a variety of philosophical discourses. The historicity of Maitreya, who is deemed the source of religious authority as

1) See Brough (1962).2) See Schopen (1975) pp. 147-81. Note that Schopen (2004: 497-8) withheld

his opinion.


the author of the Five Treatises of Maitreya (Tib. Byams chos sde lnga) in the Tibetan tradition,3) has been challenged. Also, that of Vasubandhu, who was another source of religious au-thority and showed various layers of thought, has been con-fronted by criticism in terms of the consistency and coherence of thoughts, bringing up the issue of whether there is one Vasubandhu or more than one.

In the following essay, my aims are two-fold: I first summa-rize the historical and philosophical rationale that scholars present in order to clarify the historicity of the early Yogācāra masters. Without adding new discoveries to the historicity of Maitreya(-nātha) and Vasubandhu, I rather show logical as-sumptions of the previous scholarly achievements. Secondly, I ultimately aim at bridging the approach to intellectual history as seen in the issues in this essay, to intellectual history in general.

3) The Five Treatises of Maitreya (Byams chos sde lnga) include Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (Mdo sde'i rgyan), Abhisamayālaṃkāra (Mngon rtogs rgyan), Madhyāntavibhāga (Dbus mtha' rnam 'byed), Dharmadharmatāvibhāga (Chos dang chos nyid rnam 'byed), and Ratnagotravibhāga (Rgyud bla ma). Davidson (1985: 37-9) holds that the Byams chos sde lnga had not been mentioned by Tibetan doxographers until the twelfth century and suggests that the Tibetan numbering could have originated from Dunhuang. However, Turenne (2015) suggests on the basis of the previous philological achievements that “a notion that the Five Treatises had been composed by Maitreya” existed in eleventh cen-tury India and Tibet, and that especially in Tibet, the earliest “notion” of the Byams chos sde lnga is seen in Rngog Blo ldan Shes rab’s (1059-1109) Theg pa chen po rgyud bla ma'i don bsdus pa, as proposed by Kanō Kazuo’s dissertation submitted to Universität Hamburg in 2006. In addi-tion, this Tibetan “notion” was influenced by Indian, rather than Chinese, texts, traditions or scholars.


I. Historicity of Maitreya(nātha) and Vasubandhu

1. Historicity of Maitreya(nātha)

Tibetan tradition holds that Asaṅga received the teachings of the Byams chos sde lnga texts in a direct encounter with Maitreya (Ajitanātha) in the Tuṣita Heaven. These kinds of statements are often found in the Byams chos sde lnga texts and their commentaries. For example, as is found in Haribhadra’s (T. Seng ge bzang po, 8th c.) Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā, one of the influential commentaries on Abhisamayālaṃkāra.4) They may be a way of obtaining ra-tionality that Tibetan religious texts aim at. So, pointing out a lack in historical consciousness in them may be a mere mod-ern opinion,5) but it is also true that they presuppose the his-toricity that cannot be verified. Western opinions are largely divided into two groups: either there was a historical human teacher of Asaṅga who wrote the Byams chos sde lnga texts and whose name is Maitreya(nātha), or Asaṅga wrote them himself and pseudoepigraphically attributed them to the bodhi-sattva Maitreya for spiritual authority.6) In the following, I will

4) See Amano ed. (2000) p. 3. The Ālokā, another of Haribhadra’s commen-taries on the Abhisamayālaṃkāra, also specifies that Maitreya is the au-thor of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra. See Sparham tr. (2006) p. 165.

5) For this context, see Cabezón (1992).6) Ui, Tucci (1930) and Frauwaller (1956) belong to the former; Obermiller


briefly sketch both opinions chronologically.Ui Hakujū (1882-1963), who initiated the debate of the his-

toricity of Maitreya(nātha), maintained throughout his life that there existed a historical Maitreya(nātha). His articles pre-sented in 1928 and 1929 argue that the terminus ad quem of Maitreya(nātha) was C.E. 350.7) However, even if he tried to support his argument by bits of information gained from liter-ary sources, it is essentially a circular reasoning: his argu-ment was not that which verifies that Maitreya(nātha) lived a life in the fourth century. Rather, he presented the possible date of Maitreya(nātha) if he had existed in this world. Maitreya(nātha) as a historical person is presupposed in his argument.

In 1930, Giuseppe Tucci (1894-1984), one of the chief propo-

(1932), Demiéville (1954), Tucci (1956), and Mukai (1976) belong to the latter. Either is aloof of logical conclusion. Logical pitfalls in each are as follows: in the former, the fact that the so-called Maitreya(nātha) was not the only teacher of Asaṅga needs to be considered. Maitreya’s authority as the author of the Byams chos sde lnga texts may be closely tied to the historicity and thoughts of the other masters. In the latter, it is not nec-essary for Maitreya to exist only as future Buddha. Chances are that Maitreya(nātha) might have existed even if Asaṅga wrote the texts attrib-uted to Maitreya.

7) As far as I know, his first argument appears in 1924: “… as for the date of the three, it turns out that Maitreya is around from 270 to 350, Asaṅga is around from 310 to 390, and Vasubandhu is around from 320 to 400. Therefore, the Yogācāra school is considered to be one that prospered from around the same time as the rise of the Gupta Empire, i.e. the year of 320.” In 1928, he reiterated his argument in a more concrete way. Page 223: “… Maitreya once stayed in Ayodhyā where he composed some of his works and instructed Asaṅga who came from Gandhāra … . … the termi-nus ad quem of Maitreya cannot be later than 350, but may not be much earlier than that.” See Ui (1929) p. 101.


nents of the historical Maitreya(nātha), accepted Ui’s argument uncritically.8) He asserted that he found more evidence to cor-roborate Ui’s contention: “… the Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā and the commentary by Sthiramati upon the ṭikā of Vasubandhu on the Madhyāntavibhaṅga of Maitreya.”9) Moreover, he tried to prove consistency among the Byams chos sde lnga texts which he believed is a sine qua non to decide the date of the so-called historical Maitreyanātha.10) However, it was not workable. Although Eugéne Obermiller (1901-1935) found com-mon features among Maitreya’s works, he presented a differ-ent opinion from that of Tucci in which the works were ac-tually written by Asaṅga.

… the Uttaratantra and the Abhisamayālaṃkāra … We have little reason to doubt of their having been composed by one author … The difference in the points of view which we have noted, can be explained as being either due to an evolution in the conceptions of Asaṅga, whom we consider to be the actual author of the works, or to the habit of writing different treatises from different points of view which was familiar to so many teachers of India.11)

The contrast in opinions between Tucci and Obermiller, who tackled the same texts, might prove that the coherence of the texts is one thing, the interpretation of the historicity of the author is another.

8) Note that he changed his opinion in 1956, endorsing Demiéville (1954). See Tucci (1956) p. 14. n. 1.

9) Tucci (1930) p. 7.10) Tucci (1930) p. 18.11) Obermiller (1932) pp. 90-1.


Paul Demiéville (1894-1979), in 1954, denied the historicity of Maitreya(nātha). Analyzing religious narrative in the Datang xiyuji, he asserted,

Il s'agit d'une révélation reçue en extase, comme en admettent toutes les religions, toutes les litteratures.12)

He hypothesized that Asaṅga’s encounter with Maitreya is a kind of religious experience.13)

Around the same time as Demiéville, Erich Frauwallner (1898-1974) (1956) joined the debate, distinguishing Maitreya(nātha) from Asaṅga both of whom he assumed were historical.14)

Since Demiéville and Frauwallner presented their opinions in the 1950s, no further progress was made until Alex Wayman joined the debate in 1969, arguing that extant literature would not make it possible to ascertain whether Maitreya(nātha) lived

12) Demiéville (1954) p. 381.13) Mukai (1976), who gives prominence to the transmission and develop-

ment of the Maitreya cult in India, made a similar claim to Demiéville. On page 28, where he relates Asaṅga’s explication of the śūnyatā to Maitreya, he criticizes Ui: “Dr. Ui Hakujū, who consistently maintained Maitreya as a historical person, placed Maitreya as Asaṅga’s teacher, or the real master who is to become the founder of the Yogācāra school, in the history of Indian Buddhism, … the characteristic of the bodhisattva as the future Buddha in the heaven being ruled out as that which was fabricated mythologically.”. Also, on page 32, he adds his religious inter-pretation toward Asaṅga’s encounter with Maitreya in the Tuṣita Heaven: “ … [it] means a specific mystic experience that Asaṅga, as a Yogācārin, had when he reached the extreme stage of the vipaśyanā-carita and dhyāna.”

14) Frauwallner (1956) p. 296.


or not:

One need only compare statements in this Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra with Asaṅga’s developed position of the Yogācārabhūmi to see numerous disagreements. This bhāṣya by Asaṅga could be his early survey work which established him as a master of the Mahāyāna. The verses were probably written by his teacher, whether or not that teacher is to be called Maitreyanātha.15)

He asserted that it is impossible to prove that Maitreya(nātha) was a historical personage. Thus, he presented the hypothesis that given the disagreements seen in the writ-ings ascribed to Asaṅga, Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra must have been written by his unidentified teacher.

In Japan, Suguro Shinjō, based upon the introductory verse of Parahitabhadra’s (9th c.) Sūtrālaṃkārādiślo-kadvayavyākhyāna which clearly states that Maitreya “taught” the treatise16), unlike previous commentaries on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra, carefully shows that:

Because Parahitabhadra looks to have lived around the 9th cen-tury … there is a possibility that the content of the legend of Maitreya-Asaṅga changed [later] … it appears as if the content of the legend understood by Dr. [Ui] is the thing of the developed stage.17)

15) Wayman (1969) pp. 190-1. 16) For the verses, see Suguro (1989) p. 68; Kim (2004) p. 241.17) Suguro (1989) p. 72; see also Kim (2004) p. 241.


As for the historicity of Maitreya(nātha), Suguro tentatively says:18)

It turns out that Maitreya, being considered as the representa-tive of high bodhisattva-s without being a historical person, … the treatises were composed by means of being attributed to his (= Maitreya’s) teachings.19)

His argument is plausible because the Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā, which could have been later attrib-uted to the lineage of Maitreya-Asaṅga for legitimacy, was not mentioned by Xuanzang (602-664) who is a savant in the Maitreya-Asaṅga tradition.

All in all, some earlier modern scholars with different textual evidence presented the following trifurcated opinions: 1) there was one historical Maitreya(nātha). 2) one historical teacher existed, whose name may be / may not be Maitreya(nātha). 3) no historical Maitreya(nātha) existed and all of the texts were authored by Asaṅga. These opinions derive from modern his-torical consciousness leading to the verification of historicity, but also are inevitably based on subjective reading of philo-sophical thoughts, ideas, styles, etc. of the Byams chos sde lnga corpus. Consequently, whichever stance among the three

18) For the same argument made by him, see also Suguro (1985) pp. 337-8: “However, as for the content of the legend of Maitreya-Asaṅga that Dr. [Ui] took as a basis of his argument, it appears as if it is that of the rel-atively developed and organized stage … As for the Tibetan transmission, it is considered that it indicates the most developed stage of the legend of Maitreya-Asaṅga … .”

19) Suguro (1989) p. 241.


is taken, each cannot refute its counterparts. Further, as will be mentioned below in the case of Vasubandhu, the circular logic between the explanation of philosophical ideas and their attendant issue, i.e. the determination of their authorship, is inevitable.

2. Historicity in the Case of Vasubandhu.20)

In 1904, Takakusu Junjiro (1866-1945), based upon the Biography of Vasubandhu by Paramārtha (499-569),21) pre-sented an article which posits Vasubandhu’s date as 420-500. In 1911, Noël Péri (1865-1922), based upon Chinese sources, repudiated it, presenting an article which places the death of Vasubandhu at 350.22) The so-called theory of two

20) In this section, I firstly briefly present major scholarly suggestions. I fo-cus on the logical circulation between historicity and philosophical de-scriptions and ultimately aim at making a transition to the part II which tackles the nature of intellectual history in general. Gold (2015: 6-21) is a nice summary of the previous research into the historicity of Vasubandhu /Vasubandhu-s. However, in it, as in previous scholarship before him, Gold’s upholding of one Vasubandhu theory is tautological to his upholding of the continuity of Vasubandhu’s Yogācāra philosophy.

21) T. 2049: Posoubandoufashizhuan 22) See Péri (1911) pp. 279-390. One of key factors enabling Péri to decide

Vasubandhu’s dates is Kumārajīva’s (383-412 in China) dates of the translations of Vasubandhu’s texts (works attributed to Vasubandhu in Chinese tradition). Péri (1911) p. 372: “…il me semble sûrement établi que le Çata-çāstra (Bailun) et Bodhicittopādana-çāstra (Faputixinlun) traduits en 404 et 405 par Kumārajīva sont bien des œuvres de Vasubandhu, et que par conséquent celui-ci, qui a dù être antérieur à


Vasubandhu-s had not been presented until the time the two scholars disputed each other.23) And then, some scholars real-ized that many descriptions in the works ascribed to

son traducteur, a vécu au IVe siècle.” Péri (1911) p. 375: “Le Çata-çāstra ne peut donc être qu'une œuvre relativement tardive, de la vieillesse de Vasubandhu et Kumārajīva l'a connu sûrement assez longtemps avant 380; c'est qu'il circulait et était parvenu jusqu'à Koutcha bien avant cette date.”

23) As for the issue of the Tibetans’ dealing with historicity as well as their history of textual criticism, it is certain that they had a sense of histor-icity comparable to that triggered by modern historical consciousness. For example, 'Gos Lo tsā ba Gzhon nu dpal’s (1392-1481) Deb ther sngon po exhibits a two person theory for Vimalamitra (Dri med bshes gnyen). This position was evaluated and rejected by Faber (1989). However, in general, Tibetans attach weight to religious reality as differentiated from modern historical reality, namely historicity. It may be claimed from a modern perspective that the Tibetans’ sense of historical reality was overshadowed by religious authority. Also, it may be safely assumed that the Tibetans’ defense of religious authority, being connected to the issue of religious reality, is in a different dimension from that of the modern historians maintaining that faulty ideas and thoughts have been uncriti-cally accepted in the Tibetan tradition because of religious and sectarian authority. For a defense of Tibetan voice, see Cabezón (1992). It is not difficult to list examples. To give a few examples, the two G.yu thog Yon tan mgon po-s, Elder and Younger, were presented to establish the reli-gious authority of Tibetan medicine rather than the clarification of historicity. For more information, see Martin (2016). Another example is the life story of Nya dbon pa Kun dga' dpal who is described to have outlived G.yag phrug Sangs rgyas dpal (1348-1414) and Red mda' ba Gzhon nu blo gros (1349-1412). See Rgyal ba Jo bzang dpal bzang po ([n.d.]: 22a). It is an example used to show that the justification of sec-tarian and doctrinal superiority was dominant, and thereby caused mod-ern scholars to be confused when dating him. For more information, see Huang (2014) and van der Kuijp (2016). Lastly, it should be noted that while modern historians are well aware of the way Tibetan historians dealt with historical strata, they still focus on revealing faulty factual strata by questioning the veracity of records.


Vasubandhu and Paramārtha’s Biography of Vasubandhu, re-sist fitting together in the formation of one Vasubandhu. Kimura Taiken (1881-1930), who, as far as I know, first brought up the possible conflation of two or more distinct Vasubandhu-s, presented the famous phrase of Yaśomitra (T. Rgyal po'i sras grags pa'i bshes gnyen, 8th c.), “sthaviro vasu-bandhur ācārya manorathopādhyāya evam āha.” (“Sthavira Vasubandhu, who is the teacher of ācārya Manoratha, says so”)24), to substantiate his argument.

In the Abhidharmakośa … . The words “another commentator” here are rightly explained by Pukuang [Puguang], a pupil of Hiuentsang [Xuanzang], as the older Vasubandhu. Further, Yaśomitra too, in his Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, explains it in the following words: “sthaviro vasubandhur ācārya manor-athopādhyāya evam āha.”25)

No further rejoinders concerning the theory seem to have been made since then. Eventually, Frauwallner (1951) drew out the matter from oblivion.26) He was a strong proponent of the theory of two Vasubandhu-s. Since he raised the issue, schol-ars have been fractured into two camps in opinions: either there existed more than two Vasubandhu-s because one Vasubandhu is not enough for the dates or to find coherence in thoughts, or there existed only one Vasubandhu because one Vasubandhu is enough to expound his thoughts or to

24) See Wogihara ed. (1934) p. 289.25) Kimura (1929) p. 91.26) For a summary of the article, see Jaini (1958) pp. 48-9.


identify his date.27)

Frauwallner, who is a staunch exponent of the first group, first located the three dates of Vasubandhu: 900 years after the Nirvāṇa (a.N.), 1100 a.N. given by Paramārtha, 1000 a.N. given by Xuanzang.28) And then he, through the analysis of Paramārtha’s Biography, Vasubandhu’s commentary on the Madhyāntavibhāga, and Péri’s and Takakusu’s arguments, pointed out that the first date is one thing, and the last two dates can be grouped as another.29) In other words, he hy-pothesized the theory of two Vasubandhu-s: one is Vasubandhu the elder (“Vasubandhu der Ältere 320-380”) who is a brother of Asaṅga and wrote the commentary to the Śataśāstra, the Bodhicittotpādanaśāstra,30) Daśabhūmi-kabhāsya, Vajracchedikāprajñāpāramitāśāstra, etc.; the other is Vasubandhu the younger (“Vasubandhu der Jüngere 400-480”) who is the author of the Abhidharmakośa.31) To

27) Some scholars have found convincing or unconvincing evidence to re-fute Frauwallner. However, they, basically, could not simply dismiss Frauwallner’s evidence, and showed discrepancy in terms of interpretive assumptions and attitude: some were very cautious. For example, Schmithausen is a moderate thinker who thinks highly of ideas that can be philologically accepted given the development philosophical ideas. Others were more aggresive. I assume that presumption of the con-tinuity of Yogācāra philosophy in Vasubandhu decided their stance.

28) Frauwallner (1951) pp. 3-4.29) See also Jaini (1958) pp. 48-9. Frauwallner (1951: 32) approved Péri (1911)

and disapproved Takakusu (1904).30) For Péri’s dating of the two śāstra-s, see note 22.31) Especially see Frauwallner (1951: 46-57). As for the Vimśatikā and the

Triṃśikā, he conjectured that they are the woks of Vasubandhu the younger, and Schmithausen also concurred with it. See Frauwallner (1956 edition) p. 351: “…eines in zwanzig Versen (Vimśatikā), das andere


substantiate his theory, he presented such expressions seen in Yaśomitra’s Sphuṭārthā as “vṛddhācārya-vasubandhu” (“old master Vasubandhu”), and “pūrvācāryā yogācāra āryāsaṅga prabhṛtayaḥ” (“old Yogācāra masters beginning with Asaṅga, etc.”).32) He regarded these expressions as evidence that Vasubandhu the younger considered Asaṅga as one of the older masters.33)

Next, providing a new bit of information about the so-called Vasubandhu the younger, Jaini put forth a slightly different opinion from Frauwallner.

The Vṛddhācārya Vasubandhu certainly existed, as is clear from the statements of Yaśomitra … But we certainly are not justified, in the light of the evidence of the Abhidharmadīpa, in limiting the activities of the younger Vasubandhu to Hīnayāna alone, in credit-ing him only with the authorship of the Kośa and thus relating the last part of Paramārtha’s Biography to the life of Vasubandhu the elder.34)

in dreiβig (Triṃśikā). Die äuβere Überlieferung lässt keine Entscheidung zu, ob diese beiden Werke von Vasubandhu, dem Bruder Asaṅgas sta-men, oder von Vasubandhu dem Jüngeren, dem Verfasser des Abhidharma-kośaḥ. Meiner Ansicht nach ist Vasubandhu der Jüngere ihr Verfasser.”

32) For the former, see Wogihara ed. (1932) p. 35; for the latter, see Wogihara ed. (1934) p. 281.

33) See Frauwallner (1951) pp. 21-3. As for “sthaviro vasubandhur ācārya manorathopādhyāya evam āha”, Frauwallner (1951: 45-6) presented a slightly different interpretation from Kimura: “… But Manoratha was hardly the teacher of the younger Vasubandhu … the teacher of the younger Vasubandhu was Buddhamitra … But in no case can we place him at a much earlier date; otherwise it would be difficult to understand how he could later take the place of Buddhamitra. Besides, the date of 1000 a.N. in Hsüan-tsang was attributed to him too.”


However, basically, he contended that there were two Vasubandhu-s. He did not negate Frauwallner’s argument.35)

However, many scholars are skeptical of Frauwallner’s theory. Some think that there is no need for two persons from a doxographical viewpoint. Wayman repudiated Frauwallner’s hypothesis because he thinks that one Vasubandhu would suf-fice to give counterargument to the theory of two Vasubandhu-s. For the “pūrvācāryā” at stake, he stated:

Yaśomitra might well be mistaken in his interpretation of what Vaubandhu means by the expression, but it is certain that Yaśomitra takes Asaṅga to be a pūrvācāryā with respect to Vasubandhu … Asaṅga belongs to the immediately preceding generation. Furthermore, he “converted” Vasubandhu to the Mahāyāna … .36)

Later, he reiterated his opinion about the “pūrvācāryā,” at-tributing Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya to the Sautrāntika School in order to provide scholarly connection between Asaṅga and Vasubandhu.

It would be a reference to Asaṅga’s Abhidharmasamuccaya, a kind of Sautrāntika work … He would add a few remarks about Yogācāra theories, the reference to an “old master”, perhaps some of the references to “others” (apare).37)

34) Jaini (1958) p. 53. By ‘the last part ~ Vasubandhu the elder,’ he means Vasubandhu the elder’s conversion from Hīnayāna to Mahāyāna Buddhism. See Jaini (1958) p. 49.

35) Recently, Buescher (2013) maintained the theory of two Vasubandhu-s. See Gold (2015: 251, no. 21).

36) Wayman (1961) p. 23.


Wayman claimed that the so-called works of Vasubandhu the younger and those of Vasubandhu the elder do not show “significant contrast” in terms of thoughts, and thus can be regarded as one person’s.38) Also, he supported his ideas with historical conundrums seen in several biographies of Vasubandu, which he suggests are contrary to Frauwallner’s theory.39)

Anacker, another opponent of Frauwallner, tried out various possibilities that “vṛddhācārya” and “pūrvācārya” might have indicated so as to disarm Frauwallner’s opinions.

“Vṛddha” in “vṛddhācārya” does not necessarily mean “old”; it may simply mean “eminent” (Apte [Dictionary], p. 1491). Similarly, much has been made of the fact that Yaśomitra calls Asaṅga a pūrvācārya, “ancient master.” … But, besides, the expression may mean simply “previous master,” i.e. a master prior to Vasubandhu.40)

37) Wayman (1997) pp. 119-20. 38) Wayman (1961) pp. 19-24; Wayman (1997) pp. 116-7.39) Schmithausen (1967: 110, n. 5) shows reservations about Frauwallner’s

theory with criticism on Wayman’s counterargument to Frauwallner: “Nach Wayman’s Auffassung ist der Verfasser des Abhidharmakośaḥ mit dem Bruder Asaṅgas identisch. … scheint mir Wayman’s Argumentation gegen Frauwallner nicht ganz schlüssig zu sein. Es ist zwar merkwürdig, dass Paramārtha den Bruder Asaṅgas für identisch mit dem Verfasser des Abhidharmakośaḥ hält, sein jüngerer Zeitgenosse Yaśomitra ihn hin-gegen von diesem zu unterscheiden scheint, und es mag gleichfalls merkwürdig sein, dass offenbar beide Vasubandhus vom Hīnayāna zum Yogācāra übergetreten sind; aber unmöglich ist das doch nicht! Und es mag Verdacht erregen, dass wir jeweils nur von einem der beiden Vasubandhus Geburtsort, Abstammung usw. kennen; aber eine Verschmelzung der Biographien zweier Vasubandhus zu einer einzigen wäre doch ohne eine solche Vereinheitlichung kaum möglich gewesen!”


This kind of argument is far from compelling. He cannot confirm that the gloss should be like that in this case.

Recently, Fukuda, based upon a comprehensive research in-to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, Yaśomitra’s Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmkośavyākhyā (P. 5593: Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi 'grel bshad), Sthiramati’s (Blo gros brtan pa) Abhidharmkośabhāṣyaṭīkā Tattvārtha (P. 5875: Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa'i rgya cher 'grel pa don gyi de kho na nyid), Pūrṇavardhana’s (Gang ba spel ba, 8th c.) Abhidharmakośaṭīkālakṣanānusāriṇī (P. 5597: Chos mngon pa mdzod kyi 'grel bshad mtshan nyid rjes su 'brang ba), and Saṅghabhadra’s (Dge 'dun bzang po) Apidamo shunzhenglilun (T. 1562 < S. Nyāyānusāra), Puguang’s (7th c.) Jushelunji (T. 1821), Fabao’s and Jushelunshu (T. 1822), concludes that Frauwallner’s hypothesis is not convincing: first, there are discrepancies and difficulties in identifying Vasubandhu among different traditions, and the “sthavira” in the famous Yaśomi-tra’s phrase is not confined to addressing Vasubandhu, rather, its usage is found elsewhere.41) Also for the “Vasubandhu the elder,” (Ch. Gu Shiqin) seen in Puguang’s Jushelunji,42) two possibilities may be raised: one is that “gu” can be interpreted as “long ago”, the other is that Puguang himself heard of it from his teacher Xuanzang. However, the lingustic obscurity of Chinese language cannot legitimize any historical facts. Also,

40) Anacker (1984) p. 25. n. 13. 41) For more information, see Fukuda (2003) pp. 258-9. n. 10.42) For “Vasubandhu the elder, a dissident Sarvāstivādin,” which is indicated

by Fukuda (2003), see T41n1821_p0167c20(00)~T41n1821_p0167c22(18).


whether Xuanzang’s information is right or wrong cannot be verified even if we assume that it was conveyed to Puguang without distortion of memory.

3. Vulnerable Footing for the Sake of Historicity:

Philosophical Interpretation or Historical Facts?

The historicity of early Yogācāra masters is pivotal in the construction of early Yogācāra philosophy.43) However, limited textual records have inevitably caused philosophical inter-pretation to play a big part in deciding the historicity. For ex-ample, scholars have presented different opinions on the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra and its commentary, the Sūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya.44) However, the following hermeneutical issues may need to be considered when the historicity is sug-gested from philosophical interpretation.

In the case of Maitreya, whether he is a historical or imagi-nary person is unknown. In the case of Vasubandhu, he is a historical person but the historicity is associated with the transition of philosophical thoughts. Roughly, two camps exist concerning the historicity of the latter: the first camp main-tains that the transition of philosophical thoughts was made in one person, which is historicity. Simultaneously, one person is

43) For the significance of this issue, see Gold (2015: 251-2, no. 24).44) A unified conclusion is not likely for now. See Hakamaya ed. (1993: 14-8)

- see also notes 46 and 47; Kim (2004) pp. 240-3.


historicity. It describes the possibility of being one person but does not prove that one and the only Vasubandhu existed. The second camp holds that the transition of thoughts is histor-icity, but the transition in one person is not historicity. It fol-lows that two or plural persons should be historicity. Then, who could be designated? How could it explain the historicity of the transition of thoughts without pinpointing the two or more persons? At any rate, either camp does not rebut the possibility raised by the other camp. Each side cannot dis-prove the other side. Commonly in both camps, the historicity of the transition of philosophical thoughts is explained, being associated with the issue of the historicity of a person (persons). Both are bound to admit a repetitive double layer of historicity because historicity of person(s) should be men-tioned to explain that of transition, and vice versa. In other words, recursive circularity is unavoidable because the histor-icity of the transition of thoughts and that of person are intertwined. From a different perspective, the claim made by the first camp is identical to traditionally accepted ideas and supposition in that it may not question the historicity. In it, there is no circulation between the historicity of an individual and that of the transition of thoughts. However, the issue of chronology of Vasubandhu and his texts remains unsolved. In the second camp, on the other hand, modern historical con-sciousness is certainly at full play. However, this causes a problematic situation when it comes to identifying the works written by plural Vasubandhu-s.

Another fundamental issue caused by philosophical reading


is that the reading of texts evades resolution. Sanskrit, Chinese, and Tibetan depictions may be different, and may thus make researchers’ opinions diverge according to the texts they rely upon. Also, issues about how readers positively in-volve in incorporating those texts into a coherent system may emerge. For example, when Seyfort Ruegg came across such discrepancies in Ratnagotravibhāga between the Chinese and Tibetan traditions, he suggested subjective and ungrounded reading in which the name Sāramati (Suoluomodi; Jianhui) in Chinese sources is an epithet for Maitreya given as the author in the Tibetan sources. However, historicity based on philo-sophical research may be a mere speculation. Further, some scholars took different stances as they found more evidence, regardless of its being contrary or cooperative to the previous stance. For example, Hakamaya (1973) inferred that the author of the Sūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya is Asaṅga because “ity ācārya asaṅga” from Vimuktisena’s (6th c.) Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti is also seen in the commentary in the second chapter of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra. However, he later withdrew his opin-ion and accepted Odani’s suggestion following Yamaguchi Susumu’s (1895-1976) opinion that the author of the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra is Asaṅga, and that of the Sūtrālaṃkārabhāṣya is Vasubandhu, which may ironically state the insolubility of the issue of historicity by philosophical speculations.

Essentially, clear-cut chronological unfolding of philosoph-ical tenets may not have taken place, unlike chronological his-torical evidence. Schmithausen once stated the difficulty of


working out canonical chronology in which philosophical in-terpretations must tally with historical facts.

… If he [Vasubandhu] is also the author of Tr [Triṃśikā], and if Tr is rightly believed to be his latest work, or at least one of the latest, the fact that Tr has been utilized already in the LAS [Laṅkāvatāra sūtra] version on which Guṇabhadra’s translation of 443 is based excludes 400-480 as Vasubandhu’s life-time. This date, however, is based upon Vasubandhu’s connection with two successive Gupta rulers called Vikṛamāditya and Bālāditya, and identified by Frauwallner with Skandagupta (ca. 455-467) and Narasiṃhagupta (ca. 467-473). One way out of these difficulties would be to doubt the sequence of the works of Vasubandhu ac-cording to which Tr is among his last works and rather consider her a quite early one.45)

According to him, the so-called Vasubandhu the younger maintained the sautrāntikan viewpoint when writing the Abhidharmakośa and then turned to the Yogācāra standpoint, thus he still had the sautrāntikan presuppositions when writing the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa, the Viṃśatikā, and the Triṃśikā.46)

45) Schmithausen (1992) p. 395. For a updated information regarding Vasubandhu’s relation to Gupta kings, see Deleanu (2006) pp. 186-94. Deleanu’s suggestion for Vasubandhu’s date is 350-430.

46) See Schmithausen (1967) pp. 109-36. Schmithausen accepted Lamotte’s view (1936: 151-263) that the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa was written on the basis of the sautrāntikan ideas. Lamotte (1936: 176) clearly states that “Le Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa est un traité du Petit Véhicule exposant le point de vue des Sautrāntika.” Note that contrary to Lamotte and Schmithausen, Tibetan tradition, especially Bu ston Rin chen grub (1290-1364), holds that the Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa belongs to the sems tsam. See Skilling (2000); Zhuang (2006). Concerning the so-called Vasubandhu’s sautrāntikan presuppositions, Kritzer (2003) and Kritzer


In other words, Schmithausen (1967) is opposed to Frauwallner’s theory that Vasubandhu, Asaṅga’s brother, is different from Vasubandhu, the author of the Abhidharmakośa.

In a similar way to Schmithausen who considers the con-sonance between philosophical analyses and historical facts, one may think that the latter contributes to solving the un-settled historicity, and the former is strengthened by them. It is imperative that the transition of philosophical ideas seen in works cannot be in conflict with historical facts. Therefore, historicity is certain to be a decisive factor to ascertain mas-ters’ teachings and the shift of their thoughts which is also a temporal sequence of events. The more factual it is, the stron-ger its admissibility of evidence is. It limits and conditions the possibility of philosophical interpretations. That is why in-tellectual historians cannot relinquish critical evaluation of historical data and searching for new data as well. However, I think historical facts merely provide a weak footing for the is-sue at stake in this essay. The hitherto revealed historical facts are neither decisive nor definite. Being merely fragmen-tal, they do not provide an integral picture of the historicity of Vasubandhu in its entirety. Rather, the historical facts are not aloof of, or separable from, the underlying philosophical pre-

(2005) made a provocative claim that Vasubandhu derives the sautrānti-kan positions seen in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya from the Yogācārabhūmi, and Park (2007) refuted them by presenting Dārṣṭāntika precedents for the Sautrāntika positions in the Abhidharmakośa. See al-so Gold (2015: 251).


sumptions, and thereby make a never-ending circulation be-tween the former and the latter. To deduce one Vasubandhu through philosophical analyses, without the support of histor-ical facts, is tautological to the constructed philosophy based on the premise that there is one Vasubandhu. Likewise, to ar-gue plural Vasubandhu-s through textual study, without being buttressed by historical strata, is effective as long as we are based on the supposition that there are plural Vasubandhu-s. We have yet to distribute Vaibhāṣika, Sautrāntika, and Yogācāra to plural Vasubandhu-s. In both cases, a conclusion imbued with historical assumptions is presumed, which wit-nesses a circular logic that presupposes what should be proved, and the descriptions of Vasubandhu’s philosophy are unfolded from it. All in all, neither philosophical inter-pretations nor historical facts, which have yet to be further accumulated and synthesized together, are not invulnerable.

II. Historicity: Logic of Pivoting in Intellectual History

4. Philosophy in a Pas de deux with History

Some may ask, “isn’t the issue of historicity merely an in-vention made within the frame of modern historical con-sciousness?” In the following, I briefly defend intellectual his-tory by means of raising the following questions: How is his-


toricity redefined and mapped within the frame of temporality in explaining intellectual history? Do readers’ epistemological assumptions underlie their approach to historicity? What logi-cal structure may be involved in the relationship between his-toricity and philosophical ideas? What role does historicity play in it?

Essentially, historicity is based on factual stratum, but it is more than factuality. Past events are inherently constructs. Therefore, inevitably different layers are involved in the for-mation of historicity. As the case of Vasubandhu drastically shows, a lacuna in historicity is combined with interpretive layers.

In terms of an interpretive layer, factuality goes together with temporality in the construction of historicity. Temporality is the presupposition which influences the understanding of text. Historicity at one point is contained in the temporality in the middle of the evolution of thoughts of an individual philosopher. Simultaneously, it may be influenced by the tem-poral strata accumulated in each text.

Factuality is defined with reference to temporality. Conversely speaking, it means that factuality may be confused and complex when a stratum of temporality is involved. Further, temporality involves interpretation from the point of the present. Historicity, which is in the interpretive layer, is accompanied with a temporality that is constructed, and for something to be interpreted, it must be already in the layer of temporality. In that sense, intellectual historians assume that text itself is history-laden and the philosophical system of an


individual is placed in the history of philosophy.47) If it can be safely assumed that thoughts are history-laden, the expression of “the transition of thoughts” is redundant because thoughts are already history-laden, being located in the stratum of temporality.

Another issue at stake is historicity in conjunction with in-terpretation by readers. Texts are not read without perception on historical cognition and its associated epistemological presuppositions. By ‘historical cognition,’ I mean that an ob-jective history independent of historical and philosophical minds cannot be constituted. The interpretation of the histor-icity of two Vasubandhu-s or one Vasubandhu may be related to the readers’ different epistemological foci, i.e. accepting ei-ther historicity in philosophy or an independent segmentation between philosophy and history. Simply put, it may be that emphasis on historical aspects or emphasis on philosophical theories causes the bifurcation.

47) The term “theory-laden” has been used in the history of science, which is linked to Michel Foucault’s (1926-1984) theoretical work. My use of the term “history-laden” is also Foucauldian in that it considers the possible conditions enabling human cognition to work. Foucault’s “archaeological” method of investigation explained in his The Archaeology of Knowledge (L'Archéologie du Savoir) presents the con-cept of the statement (énoncé) in order to elucidate how the discourses (discours), which are the object of archaeological investigation, are formed. The former does not independently exist because it has mean-ings only if it is related to the other statements and is placed in certain discourses in which certain rules are dominant. On the basis of these ideas, Foucault presents the concept of the historical subject, arguing that knowledge constitutes human beings as subject according to histor-ical periods. About how Foucault’s archaeological thoughts are applied to intellectual history, see my upcoming articles.


At any rate, epistemological presuppositions are already in-herent in both cases. Epistemological involvement influences the way of approaching the issue of historicity, which I assume is the way in which intellectual history works. In the case of Vasubandhu, scholars only have different emphatic readings with presuppositions in the texts which are a mixture between philosophy and history. Each stance explains each hypothesis from individual epistemological assumptions, with no ver-ification of historicity but the different descriptions given. Scholars have made plausible assumptions to make sense of their findings, but their opinions on the continuity and dis-continuity of thoughts among the texts attributed to Vasubandhu are nothing but the reiteration of each pre-as-sumption related to epistemological preconceptions without their being proved.

The scholarly explications made up to now may appear to deduce the historicity of Vasubandhu(s) from the transition of philosophical thoughts, but they are, conversely, nothing but following logical conjunctions: in the case that one person is historicity, the transition of thoughts in one person can be ex-plained as historicity. In the case that two persons are histor-icity, the transition of thoughts between two different persons can be explained as historicity. Basically, historicity is pre-supposed, being unproven. Even if conclusions on historicity drawn from philosophical analyses look plausible, how could further issues be proved under the situation that there is no verification of historicity? There only exist epistemological preconceptions.


For the explanations of the philosophical transition which is associated with the historicity, historicity should be established. When we say his/ her/ their thoughts, we already utter the historicity by the genitive cases. In other words, phil-osophical analysis on philosopher(s) cannot be made without putting the pre-assumed questions of historicity aside. The historical domain cannot be left unsettled. In other words, there is an interpretive circle recursive to the layer of un-answered historicity in the case of Vasubandhu. To explain the transition of thoughts, the historicity of person(s) should be verified. However, because the latter has not been verified, we will be continuously recurring to the former with the latter be-ing put aside. The repetitive structure, moving back and forth in the loop of circularity, is bound to be unfolded in explaining Vasubandhu(s)’ philosophy.

However, I assume that this is the point where philosophy is history-laden, showing the inherent relationship between phi-losophy and history. Philosophical interpretations may be ahistorical, historical, or trans-historical, and it may be com-monsensical that as a doctrinal and interpretive approach be-comes more dominant, history moves into oblivion and the layer of history fades. However, such an understanding may be implausible and infeasible because philosophical inter-pretations and historicity are inseparable. The historicity of a person and that of his or her thoughts are firmly interlocked. Therefore, when historical points are clarified, philosophical points are also clarified. The clarification of historical issues are no different to the understanding of temporality in philos-


ophy which is essential in intellectual history. Now, when someone asks, “to what extent do historical facts

contribute to clarifying the philosophical issues and elucidat-ing philosophical ideas and thoughts?,” we could reply, “temporality is already deeply involved in philosophy. How can philosophy be atemporal? Historicity and philosophical doc-trines cannot be separated.” Philosophy is interlocked to his-tory, and historicity is pivoting in the pas de deux.

Final Remark

Historical consciousness plays an important and significant role in modern fields of studies which feature a clear percep-tion of the historicity of persons and events.

Intellectual history has an unclear and expansive border. It has an inseparable relationship with philosophy, oscillating be-tween compatibility and incompatibility with the same goal of clarifying philosophical issues. Methodologically, it relies on philology. Because historicity is combined with the temporal structure of philosophical and religious issues, philology and philosophy are involved, being centered on historicity. Technically, it directs us towards textual criticism which as-sumes that faulty interpretations and transmissions are verifi-able or provable.

Someone may ask fundamental questions as to the reliability


of sources of intellectual history: What is credible historical fact? What is believable as veracity? What is written in text that conforms to historical facts? Those questions may bring about a fundamental skepticism in intellectual history. We may align with Hayden White (1928-2018) who argues that historical writing is prefiguratively written.48) Even if it is the case, I maintain that intellectual historians should prioritize inves-tigation into historicity based on the assumption of factuality. Why? All the issues such as epistemological presuppositions, circular logical structure, etc. begin from the underlying layer of historicity. The idea of historicity conforming to facts should be pursued even if not real. Thereby, intellectual his-torians would cast questions, making historicity into a stepping stone.

Another point of fundamental skepticism that can be raised in intellectual history is whether text in paper book format is sufficient as the sole source for intellectual history. Actually, intellectual historians also rely on other materials such as ep-igraphy, coins, stamps, artworks, etc.49) Of course, inevitably,

48) White inherits Giambattista Vico’s (1668-1744) ideas that tropes exist in the fundamental layer of the historical imagination. According to the former, historians have access to historical data in a prefigurative way, because linguistic structure, which constitutes the foundation of histor-ical imagination, has tropes including metaphor, metonymy, synecdoche, irony, etc. He proceeds to connect the tropes to emplotment subsumed under certain genres, argument which is historians’ worldview, and to the ideology of the age.

49) I have no space to explain this topic, but note that there are quality scholars such as D.C. Sircar (1907-1985), Richard Salomon, Gregory Schopen, Dieter Schuh, etc. who have dedicated themselves to increas-ing our knowledge on Buddhism by expanding the volume and type of


temporality and an interpretive layer of historicity are still a concern.

Intellectual historians aim at a bigger theory from limited bits of philological and philosophical proof. Therefore, they are alert to the fact that their interpretations are innately sub-ject to fallibility. It may be natural that no fixed theory may be posited although this is the way intellectual history is vindicated. As seen in the examples in the Introduction and in the case of the early Yogācāra masters, intellectual historians see issues from different perspectives with the eyes of a con-noisseur who detects the transmitted traditional views as hav-ing been wrongly and uncritically established for a long time.

Of course, their own theories may be hypothetical and interim. Even if intellectual historians appear to attempt con-sistent and coherent interpretations, when confronted with in-consistent, incoherent and contradictory elements they are not hesitant to indicate discordance. Basically, in the mixed strata of contested elements, consonant conclusions are rare. Unavoidably, they make issues more complex and even insoluble. In that sense, a possible answer as to why historicity matters in intellectual history may be the fact that it contains discordant diversities and multiple possible interpretations, thereby enabling intellectual history to stand shoulder to shoulder with other fields, especially classics and philosophy, in pursuit of achieving the wholesome integrity of an in-dividual tradition.

materials and texts available for academic research. See my upcoming articles for their research.


Lastly, I think that if intellectual history is innately related to the issues pertaining to historicity and temporality, epistemo-logical presuppositions, the history-ladenness of philosophy, and historicity in philosophy, etc, it may be safely assumed that intellectual historians acknowledge them at least to an ex-tent while grappling with historical materials, and intellectual history includes the way in which historians think and inves-tigate these issues. My point is that intellectual history is re-flective knowledge on knowledge through thought experiments, and historicity is a crucial part of it.


Abbreviations

BEFEO Bulletin de l'école française d'extrême-orientc. centuryCh. Chineseed. edited IsMEO Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo OrienteJIABS Journal of the International Association of Buddhist

Studies P. Peking edition of the Tibetan Bka' 'gyur and Bstan 'gyurS. SanskritT. Taishōzō 大正藏trans. translated

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Abstract

Intellectual History: Pivoting on Historicity in Philosophy:

An Example from Buddhism

Jo, Sokhyo(Research Institute of Korean Studies, Korea University)

Historical consciousness of the modern period, which shows a clear distinction from that of the previous periods, is well displayed in intellectual history, which is investigation into the development of ideas and transmission of knowledge. To understand the academic issues that are grappled with in intellectual history, it is necessary to un-derstand how it interacts with other relevant academic disciplines.

Firstly, it is connected to classics and philology, in which historicity is regarded as part and parcel of their research. Critical investigation into them leads intellectual historians to take the stance that perception on historicity lies not in a factual stratum but in an interpretive stratum. Further, they usually focus on coherently organizing incon-sistent, inessential, contradictory elements of interpretation within the frame of temporality on which all texts have a footing.

Next, intellectual history is closely tied to philosophy and the history of philosophy because it is a historiography of ideas and thinkers. On the basic assumption that the histor-


icity of philosophy should be involved for a proper under-standing of philosophical texts, intellectual history focuses on diachronic influences and changes of ideas which are in-tertextually detected. Clearly, intellectual historians assume that texts may be considered as ahistorical or even trans-historical when historicity was not a concern between traditions nor is it in modern interpretive traditions of philosophy.

As a result, a tension between intellectual history and philosophy is inevitable, and the former has conditioned and simultaneously fostered understanding of the latter. Taken together, it may look as if intellectual history, being based on classics and philology, attempts a risky pas de deux with philosophical traditions which may be understood as ahis-torical where their foci are given to doctrinal sides.

The hitherto mentioned issues of intellectual history raised by Western critical approaches to historicity are also inherent in Buddhist studies and Buddhist intellectual history which have developed on Western soil. For example, the his-toricity of person(s) as seen in such examples as the histor-icity of Maitreya(-nātha), and the transition of philosophical thought in the works attributed to Vasubandhu/ Vasubandhu-s—which have become controversial since the 20th century, can be understood within the bigger frame of modern historical consciousness and how its coupled in-tellectual history unfolded.

Specifically regarding these issues, efforts have been consistently made to construct a proper intellectual history in spite of limited sources of inner- and outer-textual evidence. The seemingly diversified opinions and cacophony in the development of interpretations of the issues epito-


mizes intellectual history, including the theoretical process which explores ways of thinking about various possibilities and the presuppositions of those possibilities.

Keywords: intellectual history, historicity, historicity inphilosophy, Yogācāra philosophers, logicalcircularity

투고 일자: 2018년 11월 27일심사 기간: 2018년 12월 7일~21일게재 확정일: 2018년 12월 21일

인도철학회(ksip) | 『인도철학』(issn: 1226-3230), kci 등재지

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