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SogangLaw Review2014 9 7

Koreas Outside Director System for Financial Institutions Yeon-Ju Kim 3 19 45 63 87 (Multilateral) 111 SPS , 137 Interpreting Financial Investment Services and Capital Market Act:

Definition of Terms and Allocating Burden of Proof Jeehoon Lee 163 2011398 183

Sogang Law Review Vol.7, September 2014. Sogang Law School

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Sogang Law Review

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2014 9 7 3-18

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Koreas Outside Director System for Financial Institutions

Yeon-Ju Kim1)

. Introduction. The Role of the Outside Director System. Features of Financial Institutions. Problems of the Present System 1. Influence of CEOs and Controlling Shareholders in Appointing

Outside Directors.

2. Lack of Expertise

. How to Improve the Current System 1. Require Independence

1) Mandate Concentrated Voting

2) Adopt the Total Tenure Ceiling System

3) Lengthen the Cooling-Off Period

2. Standards of Professionalism

1) Legislation of Positive Eligibility

2) Continuing Education

. Conclusion

. Introduction

Koreas Outside Director System ("ODS") was primarily designed to increase

1) 5

4

7

transparency and assure legitimacy in corporate management, by : reforming

corporate boards of directors (BOD); ensuring democratization of organizational

management; and improving corporate fundamentals thereby strengthening

competitiveness. The term Outside director has been understood to mean a

'part-time director' who is not an executive or employee and who; participates

only in board decisions. Although the ODS was introduced in Korea immediately

following the financial crisis of 1997 and financial institutions began using outside

directors since then, it was not until January 2009 when the concept of 'outside

directors' actually appeared in Korean Commercial Law. Outside director is

defined as 'director that is not engaged in ordinary courses of business in the

company.2)

Although a significant amount of time has passed since the law was

implemented, there remains controversy over the effectiveness and function of the

outside director. Particularly within financial institutions, the ODS is more heavily

regulated due to the unique risks presented by such institutions.3)

This paper is divided in six parts including introduction and conclusion. Part II

will explain common roles for outside directors. Part III will analyze unique

characteristics of financial institutions regarding the necessity of oversight. Part IV

introduces problems inside Koreas ODS in financial institutions. Part V offers

methods to improve the functioning of the ODS.

. The Role of the Outside Director System

Article 382, Section 3 of Commercial Law provides the definition and grounds

2) Korean Commercial Law, Art. 382, Sec. 3.

3) Jae-Kyu Jeong, Outside Director System of Financial Institutions, Korean J. Comm. L. vol. 29,

2011, pp.9-44.

5


disqualifying outside directors, yet it does not define their specific role. Instead, in

2010, the Association of Banks() published the Best Practice Guidelines

for Outside Directors of Banking Institutions (, Best

Practice) and provides detailed criterion, as follows:

Article 13 (Role of Outside Director): An Outside director, as a member of the

board of directors, is bound to establish business goals and oversee the

management of the business executives, to ensure sound management

strategies for the long-term interests of the bank and the shareholders.

Article 14 (Authorities of Outside Director): Outside Director, as a member of

the board of directors, shall require reporting about the situation of

execution of operation and the submission of relevant data.

Article 15 (Responsibilities of Outside Director):

1. Outside directors shall actively participate in the board so that it can

enhance the long-term interests of the Bank and the shareholders, and

shall faithfully preview agendas of the board.

2. Outside directors shall spend over a certain period of time in

participating in activities of the board as required by it, in order to

fulfill the responsibilities of section 1.

3. Outside Directors shall not reveal or use to acquire benefits the bank's

(including its affiliates) confidential business information.

4. Outside directors assume civil and criminal responsibilities in case of

giving damage to the bank or a third party by violating laws or deed

of association, or neglecting the duty.

The roles of outside directors are essentially similar to that of the internal

directors who are usually executives. The main purpose of the ODS is to secure

6

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transparency of corporate management through the independence and expertise

of outside directors.

. Features of Financial Institutions

Banks more so than financial institutions emphasize the significance of

corporate management because it affects property value evaluation and cost of

capital and stock prices ; however, more importantly, corporate management

performs an essential role allocating resources to the whole economy and

monitoring corporations.4)

The risks related to the bank management are relatively high due to various

interested parties such as account holders, and a possible moral hazard which

arises from the existence of public safety net(e.g., deposit insurance). The

establishment of the system in banks and financial companies has a significant

meaning from this point of view, considering that the ODS aims to effectively

regulate bank management of executives.5) This becomes more evident when

pointing out that the current ratio of outside directors in BOD among Korean

banks and financial institutions is 70.4%, which is much higher than what is

required by law.6) As the table below shows, outside directors make up a large

portion of the main committees inside Banks and financial institutions,

respectively.7)

4) Si-Yeon Lee, "Financial Focus: Implications for operating outside directors system of banks and

financial holding companies", 18/15 Weekly Fin. Brief, 2009, pp. 12-13.

5) For details, see the Supreme Court case 20099086, Feb. 15, 2002.

6) Bank Law art.22; Financial Holding Company Law art. 40.

7) Lee, supra note 2.

7


Financial Holding

CompaniesBanks Ratio

averageOSD KB

Total OSD 9 12 9 7 4 7 4 8 8 8 5 5 4 4 5 4 70.4

BOD

Committees12 15 15 8 7 9 8 11 10 11 7 7 6 6 7 6

Steering

Committees

5

(6)

4

(5)

4

(7)

4

(5)

3

(4)

8

(8)

3

(4)

3

(4)

3

(4)77.8

Compensation

Committees

4

(4)

5

(6)

3

(5)

3

(3)

3

(5)

5

(5)

5

(5)

4

(4)87.9

Audit

Committees

5

(5)

4

(4)

3

(4)

4

(4)

2

(3)

2

(3)

3

(4)

3

(4)

5

(5)

4

(4)

2

(3)

2

(3)

4

(5)

2

(3)

2

(3)

4

(5)80.3

Nomination

Committees

4

(4)

4

(5)

4

(6)

4

(5)

3

(4)

4

(4)

4

(5)

8

(8)

3

(3)

4

(5)

2

(3)

3

(3)

2

(3)

4

(5)

3

(4)

4

(6)82.3

Source : each annual report (the end of March 2009)

BOD of Banks and Financial Holding Companies

(Unit : person, %)

. Problems of the Present System

Although the BOD has been the central governance mechanism of Korean

banks, it has often been criticized due to its ineffectiveness at monitoring

management and enhancing shareholder value. Furthermore, outside directors'

shortage of both independence and expertise are contributing to the

ineffectiveness of their monitoring role.

1. Influence of CEOs and Controlling Shareholders in Appointing Outside

Directors

The purpose of the ODS is to prevent arbitrary decisions by CEOs and

controlling shareholders to ensure transparency in management of companies.

Nevertheless, the independence of outside directors is not secured under the

8

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current system. Since there is no regulation prohibiting controlling shareholders

and executives from participating in the Nomination Committee, their

recommendation on the appointment has a large influence, even though more

than a half of the committee consists of outside directors.8)

According to a survey performed by the Association of Korean Listed

Companies in May 2010, employees responded that up to 48.1% of the whole

outside directors are recommended by controlling shareholders and related parties

and 29.1% by other executives. Outside directors answered that 50% by

controlling shareholders and related parties, and 23.1% by the nomination

committees.9) The Dong-A Ilbo newspaper reported that 30 companies among top

50 domestic sales companies processed 729 agenda in 250 directors' meeting held

during period of from January to September 2009, and dissenting votes were only

two.10) Lately, it was also reported that outside directors in Koreas top 10

companies voted 99.7% in favor of the agenda submitted in recent 5 years.11)

Similar trends can be found in financial institutions as well.

In a survey in which questions were asked to 36 people who have served as

outside directors in banks, 36.1% responded that they were recommended to their

positions by executives, and 19.4%, 16.7% each responded that they were

recommended by government officials financial personnel and major shareholders. It means that they are not free from the influence of management team and

stakeholders as much.12)

8) Byeong-Yoon Lee & Si-Yeon Lee, "Ways of Improving the Outside Director System in Banks", 6

Korean Pol. R. 13, 2009.

9) Kwae-Yeoung Jeong, "Ways of Improving the Outside Director System", 25 Korean J. Cor. L.122,

2011.

10) Jin-Young Hwang &Sang-Woon Kim, "Only Two Oppose Votes in 729 Agendas: 'Rubber Stamp'"

Outside directors Turns Reality, Feb. 4, 2010, Dong-A Ilbo, available at http://news.donga.com/

3/all/20100204/25929045/1 (last visited on June 25, 2014).

11) Ho-joon Lee, "99.7% Consent Rate: Outside directors of Top 10 Companies Become 'Yes Men'",

Apr.23, 2014, KyunghyangShinmun, available at http://bizn.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html?

artid=201404232123525&code=920509&med=khan (last visited on June 25, 2014).

9


2. Lack of Expertise

The reason why outside directors do not properly check the management of

executives is not only because of the links between the management team and

outside directors, but also partly due to their lack of expertise. Directors who do

not have sufficient understanding about corporate management cannot produce

independent and careful judgment, and just directly follow the intention of the

management team. Moreover, the current law does not provide grounds for

qualifications of experts (only grounds for disqualifications are mentioned) and

management information of the company is not timely forwarded to outside

directors.

In order for outside directors to properly perform their role of providing

oversight, it is necessary to have a proper institutional environment. Part V

proposes methods of improving the roles of the current ODS, focusing on two

central elements: independence and professionalism.

. How to Improve the Current System

1. Require Independence

1) Mandate Concentrated Voting

Directors shall be elected at the general shareholders' meeting (Article

12) Seung-Jae Seong, "Outside directors are Useless: Independency is Urgent Necessary", Nov.03,

2011, Etoday, available at http://www.etoday.co.kr/news/section/newsview.php?TM=news&SM=

0201&idxno=265843 (last visited on June 25, 2014).

10

7

382,Section 1 of Commercial Law). This is by ordinary resolution, which requires a

majority of voting rights of the present shareholders and more than 25 percent out

of total outstanding shares(Article 368, paragraph 1). The Concentrated Voting

System (CVS)allows directors supported by minority shareholders to get

appointed, preventing adhesion between outside directors and major shareholders,

ensuring independence of outside directors. Under the CVS, general shareholders

meetings may take place to appoint more than one director. Each shareholder

retains the same number of voting rights, as the number of directors appointed

(voting rights is equal to the number of shares multiplied by the number of

directors being appointed). Shareholder may use rights intensively for certain

candidates.

However, the CVS is not effective in current legal system, because Article

382(2)(1) leaves the system to a companys option. As a matter of fact, 92 percent

of publicly traded companies have not adopted the CVS; only four companies

among the top 100 enterprises in the current capital markets are known to have

adopted the system. It is necessary to make the CVS mandatory to ensure its

effectiveness. Particularly regarding outside directors in financial institutions,

expanding the portion of outside directors appointed by the CVS should be

required considering the presence of interested bank depositors, government and

regulatory authorities.

2) Adopt the Total Tenure Ceiling System

Outside directors must retain experience and knowledge about the company.

Short tenures restrict their familiarity with the organization, thereby limiting their

knowledge and effectiveness. However, excessively long tenures may weaken

independence between outside directors and executives. In Korea, most banks

except KB Group (three years) and Foreign Bank() (two years) fix

11


1-year-tenure. Such short periods have a tendency to turn outside directors into a

rubber stamps allowing controlling shareholders or management to get

reappointed again.13) The first term should be two to three years, and Korea

should adopt 'the Total Tenure Ceiling System,' so that the total tenure should not

exceed six years. Considering the below survey,14) which shows the difficulty in

making decisions during years three through five, such measure may be an

effective solution.

Number of Response Composition

3 years 5 27.8

5 years 11 61.1

7 years 1 5.6

9years or more 0 0.0

etc 1 5.6

18 100.0

Source : Lee & Lee, supra note 6, at 32.

[Poll Results] Tenure during which independent decisions become difficult

3) Lengthen the Cooling-Off period

The 'Cooling-off Period' is a period of time during which one who was in a

close relationship with a certain company is prohibited from becoming an outside

director. According Koreas Commercial and Financial Holding Company Law, an

individual who was a director, auditor, executive or employee in a publicly traded

company or its subsidiaries within the two most recent years are prohibited from

becoming an outside director. (the Commercial Law Article 382, 542/2 Section

2(7), its implementing ordinance Article 13 section 5(1)) However, the current

13) Lee & Lee, supra note 6, at 29.

14) Ibid. at 32.

12

7

cooling-off period will be expanded to three years, if considering that CEO's term

of office is three years; most of the developed countries define it three to five years;

Best Practices for Corporate Governance() and Guidelines for Voting() made by Korea Corporate Governance Service() establish a cooling-off period of five years, in order to secure the

possibility of independent decision-making of outside directors.15)

2. Standards of Professionalism

1) Legislation of Positive Eligibility

As before mentioned, current Commercial Law only prescribes negative

disqualifications and does not establish prerequisites. Under such legislation,

anyone who is not in a personal relationship with shareholders or CEOs of a

corporation is permitted to become an outside director; thereby function as a

rubber stamp for the executives; consequently makes the system nominal by

leading to a lack of independence.

It is intensifying that professors from universities or those from authorities such

as the Ministry of Strategy and Finance Director, the Financial Supervisory Service

and etc engross outside directors of financial institutions. What is more

problematic is that directors are unable to serve as an effective check on

executives because they lack sufficient professional knowledge or experience in

the area of management,16) as evidenced by the following table:17)

15) Taeg-Sik Ahn, "Independence of Outside Director", 23 Korean J. Busin. L. () 86 ,2013.16) Yu-Yeon Park &Shin-Young Lee, "Outside Directors of Financial Companies Seized by Professors

and Officials", Chosun Biz, Apr. 4, 2014, available at biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/

04/03/2014040304791.html (last visited on June 25, 2014).


13


Number of OSD Composition

major shareholder related

person12 11.3

current and former officials 10 9.4

finance professinals 7 6.6

academics 35 33.0

business men 26 24.5

lawyer 12 11.3

Journalist 2 1.9

CPA 1 0.9

Etc 1 0.9

TOTAL 106 100.0

Source : Korea Listed Companies Association, quarterly reports of each bank holding

company (2009)

Occupational Distribution of OSD in Banks and Bank Holding Companies

(Unit : person, %)

Recent revisions of the Best Practices clarify the qualifications although not

mandatory. Moreover, there are several other defects with the Best Practices, e.g.,

not providing clear guidelines on how so-called 'professional managers' can be

considered understanding financial company's operating principles; keeping

silence about the meaning of experience in supervision which may cause

conflicts of interests, detailing process is necessary. The criterion could be

leveraged for the future legislation after the process, in order to increase the

expertise of outside directors.

2) Continuing Education

Considering the attributes of corporate finance which require advanced

knowledge, consistent prior education and up-to-date information should be

provided to increase their level of professionalism, even for those who are familiar

14

7

to such. The table below shows the results of a recent survey:18)

Number of Response Composition

Yes 30 83.3

No 6 16.7

36 100.0

Source : Lee & Lee, supra note 6, at 68.

[Poll Results] Whether post-education for expertise is needed when OSD are

newly appointed

(Unit : person, %)

. Conclusion

The Outside Director System was first introduced in Korea 14 years ago. It is

meaningful to review the system, especially at this time when the Ministry of

Justice is now under processing to reform corporate law in Korea. Financial

institutions, although private in nature, also perform public functions by protecting

deposits, extending credit, and maintaining the efficiency of capital markets,

thereby keeping economy stable and prosperous. Therefore, outside directors in

financial institutions shall have higher duties and responsibilities than other

general companies.

This paper has focused on methods of improving the role of the outside director

systemwith emphasis on independence and professionalism. Independence may

be accomplished by mandatory and extended CVS, adopting the Total Tenure

Ceiling System, and increasing the cooling-off period. Professionalism can be

fulfilled through legislation of positive eligibility and extension of post educatio

n.19)


15


References

[Journals]

Byeong-Yoon Lee & Si-Yeon Lee, "Ways of Improving the Outside Director

System in Banks", 6 Korean Pol. R. 13, 2009.

Jae-Kyu Jeong, Outside Director System of Financial Institutions, Korean J.

Comm. L. vol. 29, 2011.

Kwae-Yeoung Jeong, "Ways of Improving the Outside Director System", 25

Korean J. Cor. L.122, 2011.

Si-Yeon Lee, "Financial Focus: Implications for operating outside directors

system of banks and financial holding companies", 18/15 Weekly Fin.

Brief, 2009.

Taeg-Sik Ahn, "Independence of Outside Director", 23 Korean J. Busin. L.

() 86 ,2013.

[Websites]

Ho-joon Lee, "99.7% Consent Rate: Outside directors of Top 10 Companies

Become 'Yes Men'", Apr.23, 2014, KyunghyangShinmun, available at

http://bizn.khan.co.kr/khan_art_view.html? artid=201404232123525&code=

920509&med=khan (last visited on June 25, 2014).

Jin-Young Hwang &Sang-Woon Kim, "Only Two Oppose Votes in 729

Agendas: 'Rubber Stamp'" Outside directors Turns Reality, Feb. 4, 2010,

Dong-A Ilbo, available at http://news.donga.com/3/all/20100204/25929045/1

Seung-Jae Seong, "Outside directors are Useless: Independency is Urgent

19) This report followed the general assorting method analyzing the two factors in parallel.

Considering that it is necessary for outside directors to have expertise in order to properly check

the management team, however, the professionalism factor could be covered under the issue of

independence.

16

7

Necessary", Nov.03,2011,Etoday, available at http://www.etoday.co.kr/news/

section/ newsview.php?TM=news&SM=0201&idxno=265843

Yu-Yeon Park &Shin-Young Lee, "Outside Directors of Financial Companies

Seized by Professors and Officials", Chosun Biz, Apr. 4, 2014, available

at biz.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2014/04/03/2014040304791.html (last

visited on June 25, 2014).

[Cases]

Supreme Court case 20099086, Feb. 15, 2002.

17


ABSTRACT

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:

Keywords : Outside Director, Financial Institution

Sogang Law Review


Sogang Law School

2014 9 7 19-44

19

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.(35 2 a, c)

, 2 a

(Ordinary Use) .

.

.36) , (Resale)

.

.

3)

,

.

,

. ,

. 1995 37)

34) , , , , 2009, 14.

35) , , , 7, , 1998, 216-217.

36) , , 17.

37) Germany; 08/03/1995; unilex VIII ZR 159/94.

35

.

,

.

(Particular purpose) ,

(Ordinary Use)

,

.

,

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CISG 35 2

. ,

CISG 35 2 b ,

,

.39)

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CISG

35 ,

38)

.

39) Germany; 08/03/1995; unilex VIII ZR 159/94

. http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cisg/text/e-text-35.html, : 2014.4.13.

36

7

,

.

,

.

.

3.

1) (Free Trade Agreement)

(Regional Trade

Agreement) . , ,

, .

(Substantial)

.

GATT/WTO

. GATT/WTO

WTO

. FTA , EU

FTA , .

WTO FTA

.

. , FTA

.

37

2) FTA

2008 6 26

( FTA) . FTA

,

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, 30

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2008 4 18

40) ,

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, 6 5 9 6072 ,

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12.

38

7

. 5 ,

(BSE, Bovine Spongiform Encephalophy)

. ()

(OIE) ()

.43) .

(OIE)

,

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WTO SPS 5 7

, OIE

.

.

4)

,

WTO

.

.

43) 5 .

In the event (an) additional case(s) of BSE occur(s) in the United States, the U.S. government

shall immediately conduct a thorough epidemiological investigation and inform the Korean

government of the results of the investigation. the U.S. government will consult with the Korean

government about the findings of the investigation. The Korean government will suspend the

importation of beef and beef products if the additional case(s) results in the OIE recognizing an

adverse change in the classification of the U.S. BSE status.

39

FTA

,

.

IV.

,

.

. 8

.

.

SPS 5 7

,

,

TBT 2

.

.

(CISG) 35

,

40

7

.

,

, 35

,

.

.

.

.

.

1,000

,

.

.

.

41

[ ]

, , , 7, , 1998.

, - II WTO, , 10 2, , 2012.

, , , 15 2, 2008.

, , , , 2009.

, , SPS

, , 29 3, 2007., ,

, 82, 2008.

[]

Schlechtriem, P., The Sellers Obligations under the United Nations Convention

on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, : Galston/Smit(ed.),

International Sales, New York: Matthew Bender, 1984.

[]

Appellate Body Report, Japn-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples,

WT/DS245/AB/R., Nov.26.2003.

Appellate Body Report, United States-Measures Concerning the Importation,

Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Product, WT/DS381/AB/R.,

42

7

Sep.15.2014.

Germany; 08/03/1995; unilex VIII ZR 159/94.

[]

, ", WTO ",

http://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?year=2013&no=851268, : 2014.04.10.

, WTO SPS, ,

http://news.naver.com/main/read.nhn?mode=LSD&mid=sec&sid1=104&oid=

001&aid=000654080, : 2014.04.10.

TV, , ,

http://news.tvchosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2013/09/02/2013090290350.html,

: 2014.04.10.

[]

, ( 1) , e-,

http://www.index.go.kr/potal/main/EachDtlPageDetail.do?idx_cd=1317

: 2014.04.10

,

, , 2006.

, http://www.wto.org, : 2014.04.10.

, http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu, : 2014.04.10.

43

ABSTRACT

Analysis on Radioactive Contamination on Japanese

Marine Product Problem

- Focusing on an Analysis of Current Regulatory Actions of Korean

Governments and Counterplan for Expected Disputes -

Kim, Yong Sung

In 2013 August, Japanese government officially conceded that 300 tons of

cooling water for the nuclear reactor has been discharged into the sea

everyday. Japan added theres no way to stop the spill at all. Thus, it is not

difficult to foresee secondary damages which are fatal; radioactive

contamination on marine products could be one of them. Still, the access to

related informations is highly restricted by Japanese government.

After the radiation leak has been reported, neighboring countries put an

governmental actions to guarantee food safety. Korean government, for

example, forbids the importation of all marine products from Hukushima

and 7 neighboring provinces, regulates other provinces by asking

certificates when imported products exceed standards. Those governmental

actions are based on SPS (Sanitary and Phytosanitory Measures Agreement)

agreement Article 5.7.

This study puts an analysis on those actions. They could violate various

regulatory agreements under the present WTO system. Suspension of

importation can not be continued when Japan provides proper informations

for risk assessment. Asking certificates to japanese marine products only

44

7

could be interpreted as a Technical Barrier which needs to be rid of.

In later part, this study searches what are the options for us when current

regulatory actions are no longer valid. Counteractions can be done in two

levels; one for private contract applying Article 35 of CISG and the other for

Governmental agreement as a part of FTA which is an exception to WTO rules.

Considering precedent cases, claim for damages may rarely be admitted.

So, it is important for each party to put an compensation article before

signing the contract in personnel level. Therefore, government level

agreement would be more effective solution.

Today, Food safety is one of key factors to measure how the government

carries out his duty well. Korean government needs to deal with this matter

in sub-agreement of on going Korea-Japan FTA discussion. Korea-US FTA

experience relating to American Beef Product can be a good reference.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Keywords : Radioactive Contamination on Japanese Marine Products,

Suspension on importation, SPS Agreement, TBT Agreement,

CISG, FTA, WTO

: , , , SPS(

), TBT (

), (CISG),

(FTA), (WTO)

Sogang Law Review


Sogang Law School

2014 9 7 45-61

45

- 2010. 11. 25. 20099543 1) -

2)

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51

- 2010. 11. 25. 20099543 -

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55

- 2010. 11. 25. 20099543 -

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- 2010. 11. 25. 20099543 -

24) ,

. ,

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59

- 2010. 11. 25. 20099543 -

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60

7

ABSTRACT

Research on Illegality Standard of Minimum Resale

Price Maintenance; November 25, 2010 (2009du9543)

Kim, Chongwon

Under the Korea Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act(hereinafter

MRA) article 29 (1), no enterpriser shall engage in a resale price

maintenance(RPM), but this shall not apply where there exist justifiable

reasons in terms of the maximum price maintenance preventing the

transactions of commodities or services in excess of specified prices.

However, according to 2009du9543 and subsequent precedents, the Korea

Supreme Court held that minimum RPM also could be allowed if its own

pro-competitive effect is larger than its anti-competitive effect.

It seems that the Korea Supreme Court is influenced by the Leegin

decision rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in 2007. In

Leegin decision, the U.S. Supreme Court abrogated the principle of per se

illegality and applied the rule of reason in the field of minimum RPM which

means negative effects of RPM are not sufficient reason to treat RPM

agreements as automatically illegal.

However, it raises the interpretative problem of MRA whether exceptions

can also be allowed to the minimum RPM, because exception clause of the

article 29 (1) only allows maximum RPM to be legal if there exist justifiable

reasons. Since the Korea Supreme Court have accepted the rule of reason, it

is required to seek a standard of judgment for substantive management.

61

- 2010. 11. 25. 20099543 -

Moreover, legislative amendments of RPM clause or legislation reflecting the

rule of reason in minimum RPM case also need to be considered.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Keywords : 2009du9543, resale price maintenance, minimum resale price

maintenance, Leegin decision, rule of reason

: 20099543 , , ,

Leegin ,

Sogang Law Review


Sogang Law School

2014 9 7 63-85

63

1)

I.

II.

1.

1) 2)

2.

1)

2)

3) ( 2011. 12. 29. 20071001 )

4) :

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79

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(cyworld)

.

.

,

.

3)

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,

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83

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1990. 4. 2. 89113 .

84

7

ABSTRACT

Public official election of Korea and freedom of

expression in cyber space

Kim, Jong Hwa

Historically, the definition of "the freedom of expression" that the First

Amendment deals with has been constantly broadened in its meaning.

American law currently covers a wide range of the freedom of expression

compared to the times when it was first established, and now U.S. courts

provide a comprehensive measure, "the rule of clear and present danger." It

can be said that same legal trend appears in Korean judiciary system,

considering that the existing legal system receives more challenges as social

awareness towards the freedom of expression gets momentum. Such

conflict consequently raises a critical question: Is it appropriate to limit the

election campaign regulated by the current Public Official Election Act?

In 2012, the court found real-name policy on the internet unconstitutional.

This decision is a milestone in debating the freedom of expression on the

internet. In principle, the freedom of expression shall be protected and in

particular the right to promote the election campaign on cyberspace should

be guaranteed, in that cyberspace is the place where notion of democracy

and equality could be most effectively realized. It is true that there shall be

a limitation: intentional spreading of false information or personal attack

should be restricted. Yet there is no doubt that this kind of regulation is but

an exception to the principle. The election system compatible with highly

85

sophisticated web environment is urgently requested, considering that the

process of election must guarantee the freedom of expression and allow

citizens crucial role in the center of the politics.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Key words : The First Amendment, the rule of clear and present danger,

freedom of expression, electioneering, the internet real-name

policy

: 1, , ,

,

Sogang Law Review


Sogang Law School

2014 9 7 87-110

87

1)

. .

1.

2.

3.

4.

. 1. -

2.

. 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

.

I.

,

1) 6

88

7

.

.

,

.

,

1,300 ,

.

. .

.

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.

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. 4

. .2)

.

1.

,

.

, (tribunus)3), (censor)4)

(quaestor)5)

. 2

.6)

2) R. Bauman, Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome, Routledge, 1996; O. Robinson, The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome, The JohnsHopkins University Press, 1995 ; J.Strachan-Davidson, Problems of the Roman Criminal Law, Oxford, 1912 ; O. Robinson, Penal Practice and Penal Policy in Ancient Rome, Routledge, 2007, A. Lintott, Violence in Republican Rome, Oxford, 1968 .

3) , 494 .

4) , , .

5) , .

6) G. MacCormack, The Liability of the Judge in the Republic and Principate, Aufstieg und Niedergang der romischen Welt Geschichte und Kultur Rons im Spiegel der neueren Forschung Vol.2,1982,pp.3-28.

90

7

2.

.

. .

.7)

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8)(praetor) (judex quastionis)

.9)

.

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(triumviri capitals, 3)

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3 ,

. 3

, 3

.12)

7) J. Strachan-Davidson, ProblemsoftheRomanCriminalLawI,Oxford,1912, p.47.8) , . 1 .

9) B. Frier, Urban praetors and rural violence, Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological Association Vol.113,1983, pp.221-241.

10) Ibid.

11) Ibid.

12) A. Lintott, Violence in Republican Rome, Oxford, 1968, p.79 ; W . Nippel, PolicingRome, The Journal of Roman Studies Vol.74, 1984, pp.20-29.

91

3.

.

, 3 (praefectus

urbi) (praefectus vigilium)

.

, ,

.

.

,

.

1

.

.13)

.

4.

.

.

. 171

,

13) R. Bauman, Some Remarks on the Structure and the Survival of the Quaestio de Adulteriis,

Journal of the Australian Society for Classical Studies Vol.2,1968, pp.68-93.

92

7

. 149

,

.14)

,

.

,

1 . .15)

,

(quaestio perpetuae)

.16)

,

.

,

.17)

.

.

. .

14) J. Balsdon, The history of the extortion court, 123-70 B.C., Papers of the British School at Rome Vol. 14, 1938, pp.98-114.

15) J. Strachan-Davidson, Problems of the Roman Criminal Law I, Oxford, 1912, p.187.16) M. Alexander, Repetition of Prosecution and Scope of Prosecution in the Standing Criminal

Courts, Classical Antiquity Vol. 1, 1982, pp.141-166. 17) R. Bauman, The Crimen Maiestatis in the Roman Republic and Augustan Principate,

Johnnesberg, 1967, pp.55-56.

93

.

.

.

,

.

, ,

, .

.

.

.

,

, .

1. -

,

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. .

.

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94

7

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,

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2.

. ,

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.

.

.21)

18) ,

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.

19)

. .

.

/ .

20) J. Strachan-Davidson, Problems of the Roman Criminal Law 2, Oxford, 1912, pp.98, 101-102.21) ,

.

. (lex de capite

civis)

.

.

.

95

.22)

.

.

1. 23)

1)

. .

.

. .

.

2)

, , (calumnia)

(tergiversatio) (praevaricatio) .

,

.

.

.

.

22)

.

23) O. Robinson, The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome, The JohnsHopkins University Press, 1995, pp.142-161.

96

7

3)

.

,

. ,

.

.

4)

.

(postulatio),

.

, .

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97

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10 .

, .

100 .

2)

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30 60

.

24) R. Bauman, Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome, Routledge, 1996, pp.52-76.

98

7

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32, 50, 65 100 .

.

.

.

,

.

.

(consilium)

,

.

,

.

,

.

.

,

Q.

.

C.

.

50 .25)

,

.

25) H. Mattingly, The Extortion Law of the Tabula Bembina, The Journal of Roman Studies Vol. 60, 1970, pp.154-168.

99

, .

,

.

.

70 300 100

,

.26)

,

,

. 300 13

4000 .

3. 27)

1)

(1)

. ,

.

.

.

26) B. Marshall, Q. Cicerto, Hortensius and the lex Aurelia, Rheinisches Museum fur Jurisprudenz Vol.118, 1975, pp.136-152.

27) R. Bauman, Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome, Routledge, 1996, pp.77-102.

100

7

(2)

,

. .

2 1 .

,

. 8

, 13 18 .28)

.

. 12 1

, .

.

. ,

. ,

8 .

.

.

.

.

(3)

. 17

28) H. Mattingly, Jury-Panel of the lex-repetundarum, Latomus Vol.34, 1975, pp.726-728.

101

.

.

,

5

.

, .

.

. (orator)

,

, . ,

,

.

2)

.

.

.

. .

.

,

.

102

7

,

. ,

.

.

20

.

.

4. 29)

. 1 (non liquit),

(ampliatio) ,

.

.

3 .

.

, .

,

.

.

.

,

.

,

.

29) O. Robinson, Penal Practice and Penal Policy in Ancient Rome, Routledge, 2007, pp.67-122.

103

,

.

.

. .

1)

. (absolvo) A

(condemno) C .

. A .

A C .

.

.

.

,

.30)

2)

.

. ,

.

.

30) J. Cody, The Use of Libero/Damno and Absolvo/Condemno in the Judicial Proceedings of the

Late Republic, Classical Philology Vol.68, 1973, pp.205-208.

104

7

3)

.

, .

.

(fecisse videtur) (non

fecisse videtur) . (non liquit) 3 1

(ampliatio). ,

, .

3 1 ,

. ,

.

.

5.

, .

,

.31) .

31) Robinson, op.cit., pp.64-66.

105

.

,

. .

6.

.

,

,

,

.32)

.

. .

.

.

.

7.

.

.

.

32) Ibid.

106

7

. .

. .

.

,

. ,

, .

,

.

.

,

, ,

,

.

,

.

.

. ,

, ,

.

107

,

,

. ,

(Das Beste was wir von der Geschichte haben ist der Enthusiasmus

den sie erregt).

108

7

[]

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A. Riggsby, Crime and Community in Ciceronian Rome, University of Texas

Press, 1999.

J. Strachan-Davidson, Problems of the Roman Criminal Law, Oxford, 1912.

O. Robinson, Penal Practice and Penal Policy in Ancient Rome, Routledge,

2007.

O. Robinson, The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome, The Johns Hopkins

University Press, 1995.

R. Bauman, Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome, Routledge, 1996.

R. Bauman, The Crimen Maiestatis in the Roman Republic and Augustan

Principate, Johnnesberg, 1967.

[]

B. Frier, Urban praetors and rural violence, Transactions and Proceedings

of the American Philological Association Vol.113,1983.

B. Marshall, Q. Cicerto, Hortensius and the lex Aurelia, Rheinisches

MuseumfurJurisprudenzVol.118,1975.

G. MacCormack, The Liability of the Judge in the Republic and Principate,

Aufstiegund Niedergang der romischen Welt Geschichte und Kultur Rons

im Spiegel der neueren Forschung, Vol.2,1982.

H. Mattingly, Jury-Panel of the lex-repetundarum, Latomus, Vol.34, 1975.

H. Mattingly, The Extortion Law of the Tabula Bembina, The Journal of

Roman Studies, Vol.60,1970.

J. Balsdon, The history of the extortion court, 123-70 B.C., Papers of the

109

British School at Rome, Vol.14, 1938.

J. Cody, The Use of Libero/Damno and Absolvo/Condemno in the Judicial

Proceedings of the Late Republic, Classical Philology Vol.68,1973.

M. Alexander, Repetition of Prosecution and Scope of Prosecution in the

Standing Criminal Courts, Classical Antiquity, Vol.1,1982.

R. Bauman, Some Remarks on the Structure and the Survival of the

Quaestio de Adulteriis, Journal of the Australian Society for Classical

Studies Vol.2,1968.

W. Nippel, Policing Rome, The Journal of Roman Studies Vol.74,1984.

110

7

ABSTRACT

Criminal Jury System in Ancient Rome Republic

Na, Gieop

It is well-known that criminal law of ancient Rome interests classical

scholars, because scholars intrigued to it perhaps in the hope of gaining

light upon Roman social habits and political institutions, shall find the task

of reconstruction a perpetual and exhilarating challenge to their learn,

judgment and acumen. On the other hand, study on Roman criminal law is

a significant task even in the field of comparative legal history or historical

science considering that it is almost impossible to track down the

developing process of criminal law in case of many other legal systems

from ancient culture. However, the studies on criminal law of ancient Rome

has not been that successful dragging critical attention from law scholars or

practitioners so far, compared to civil law system which receives keen

interests in all ages. In particular, the field of criminal procedure law still

stands unfamiliar to even those who hold concerns in criminal law of

ancient Rome. The purpose of the short article is to introduce the criminal

jury system of the ancient Roman Republic. Through this, the author tries to

extract the culture and principles inserted in the trial structure, and finally

attempt to find out legal meanings in its implication.

-----------------------------------------------------------------

Key words : Criminal procedure law of ancient Roman Republic, Criminal

jury system, Ancient Roman law, Legal history

: , , , ,

Sogang Law Review


Sogang Law School

2014 9 7 111-135

111

(Multilateral)

- -

1)

I.

II. WTO

1. WTO

2. WTO : Special and Differential Treatment

(S&D)

1)

2) S&D

III. WTO (Dispute Settlement System)

1. WTO

1)

2) (retaliation)

2.

1) 2)

3) IV. :

1. ACWL(Advisory Centre on WTO Law)

2. Public-Private Partnership

3. (Mediation)

V.

1) 5

112

7

I.

WTO WTO

(power-oriented) (rule-

oriented)

.

. WTO

, , (level playing field)

(development) .

, ,

(capacity) .2)

,

(LDCs)

.3) WTO

(S&D)

. WTO (LDCs)

,

. , WTO

ACWL(Advisory Centre on WTO Law)

.

2) Mervyn Martin, WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding and Development, Mattinus Nijhoff Publisher 2013, p.67.

3) Marc L. Burch and Eric Reinhardt, The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism and Developing

Countries, SIDA 2004, p.3.

113

(Multilateral)

- -

II. WTO

1. WTO

GATT 1947 23

11 . GATT WTO

2013 3 2 159 WTO

2/3 .4) WTO

(Least Developed Countries, LDCs) UN

WTO 33 .5)

GATT 18 ()

6) .

GATT WTO WTO

(Self-election) .

.7) GATT

.8)

4) : http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/dev1_e.htm (: 2014.06.24.)

5) WTO 11 2 (LDCs) (UN)

.

6) GATT Article XVIII:1 those contracting parties the economies ofwhich can only support low

standards of living* and are in the early stages of development.

7) Ferdinand Adadzi, World Trade Organization Dispute Settlement and Developing Countries, VDM Verlag Dr. Mller, 2011, p.8.

8) , WTO , 48 3 2003, 23-24.

114

7

2. WTO : Special and Differential Treatment (S&D)

1)

WTO (Most-Favored Nations, MFN)

GATT 1948 (ITO)

(special

treatment) . GATT 18

(Governmental Assistance to Economic Development) 18

A GATT 28 ,

.9) 18 B

(Balance of Payment, BOP)

.10) 12 BOP

.11)

(Special and Differential Treatment, S&D) WTO

.12) GATT 4 1966 , 1979

(Enabling Clause) . 1)GATT

9) GATT XVIII:7(a) If a contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article

considers it desirable, in order to promote the establishment of a particular industry* with a view

to raising the general standard of living of its people, to modify or withdraw a concession

included in the appropriate Schedule annexed to this Agreement,

10) GATT XVIII:9 In order to safeguard its external financial position and to ensure a level of

reserves adequate for the implementation of its programme of economic development, a

contracting party coming within the scope of paragraph 4 (a) of this Article may, subject to the

provisions of paragraphs 10 to 12, control the general level of its imports by restricting the

quantity or value of merchandise permitted to be imported; Provided that the import restrictions

instituted, maintained or intensified shall not exceed those necessary:

11) , , 32-33.

12) , , 5, 2007, 7.

115

(Multilateral)

- -

(GSP) 2)S&D, 3) RIAs , GSTP

(Global System of Trade Preferences) , 4)(LDCs)

.13)

2) S&D

S&D

. WTO 167

S&D , 78 S&D

.14) 89 S&D 71

. 18 S&D

WTO (LDCs)

. WTO

S&D

.15)

S&D

S&D

.16) S&D

13) , , 29-30.

14) Mervyn Martin, op. cit., p.70.

Mervyn Martin , S&D

39 S&D

. 35 S&D , 4

.

15) Ibid., pp.70-71.

116

7

S&D

S&D WTO (best endeavor) ,

S&D S&D

- S&D

.

III. WTO (Dispute Settlement System)

1. WTO

WTO 1947 GATT

1995 WTO WTO

. 1979

.

1) 17)

(1)

WTO WTO

16) Ibid., pp.34-35.

17) : http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/disp_settlement_cbt_e/c6s1p1_e.htm (

: 2014.6.25.)

117

(Multilateral)

- -

(Dispute Settlement Body, DSB)

(consultation) . 60

.

Terms of Reference .

3

. EC-Banana (DS27)

WTO .18)

(panel report) .

20 DSB

DSB

.

, 1989.12.7.

(Appellate Body)

. 1991 DSU

WTO .

WTO

,

.

.19)

(2)

DSB DSB

18) James Smith, Inequality in International Trade? Developing Countries and Institutional Change

in WTO dispute Settlement Review of International Political Economy 11:3, August 2004,

pp.565-566.

19) ( 16) , , 2006, 78.

118

7

. 30 DSB

DSB ,

.

DSB

. DSU 21.5

,

90

.

DSU 21.5 .

, , 3

.20)

2) (retaliation)

DSB

WTO DSB (Suspension of Concession)

. WTO DSB

,

. DSU 22.1

(temporary) DSB

.21) WTO

20) ( 16), , 86.

21) DSU Article 22.1: Compensation and the suspension of concessions or other obligations are

temporary measures available in the event that the recommendations and rulings are not

implemented within a reasonable period of time. However, neither compensation nor the

suspension of concessions or other obligations is preferred to full implementation of a

119

(Multilateral)

- -

DSB

.22)

DSU 22.3

,

.

(Cross-retaliation)

DSB

.23)

2.

WTO UN

EU

( ).

recommendation to bring a measure into conformity with the covered agreements.

Compensation is voluntary and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements.

22) ( 16), , 86.

23) DSU Article 22.3: In considering what concessions or other obligations to suspend, the

complaining party shall apply the following principles and procedures:

(a) the general principle is that the complaining party should first seek to suspend concessions

or other obligations with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or Appellate

Body has found a violation or other nullification or impairment;

(b) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other

obligations with respect to the same sector(s), it may seek to suspend concessions or other

obligations in other sectors under the same agreement;

(c) if that party considers that it is not practicable or effective to suspend concessions or other

obligations with respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the circumstances

are serious enough, it may seek to suspend concessions or other obligations under another

covered agreement.

120

7

, , ,

. WTO 24)

WTO

GATT WTO

. WTO

.25)

WTO

,

. ,

WTO

WTO (remedies)

. , ,

(LDCs)

WTO

.26) WTO

.

24) WTO 33 (LDCs) WTO

WTO ,

8(, , , , , , , )

3 . 25

3 ,

. (, , , , , , ,

, , , , , , , , , , ,

, , , , , , 25)

(: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm)

25) Marc L. Burch and Eric Reinhardt, Developing Countries and GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement,

WTO Law and Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press, 2007, p.196.26) James Smith, op. cit., p.543.

121

(Multilateral)

- -

: WTO

: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop e/dispu e/dispu maps e.htm

1)

WTO WTO

(WTO Law) WTO .

WTO (development)

.

.

WTO

.

DSU ,

122

7

.27)

.28)

2)

WTO DSB

.

.

.

WTO

.29) ,

.

. WTO

.30)

WTO WTO

27) DSU Article 4.10, Article 12.11, Article 21.2, 21.7, 21.8

28) Hansel T.Pham, Developing Countries and the WTO: The Need for More Mediation in the

DSU, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Spring 2004.29) Ibid.

30) ( 16), , 91.

123

(Multilateral)

- -

.31)

WTO . ,

WTO

. ,

,

.32)

3)

,

WTO

.

WTO

.33) WTO

.

.

31) ( 16), , 92.

32) Hansel T.Pham, op. cit.

33) Niall Meager, Representing Developing Countries in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings,

WTO Law and Developing Countries, Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.271-218.

124

7

. WTO

WTO

.34) WTO

,

WTO 1

.35)

, ,

.36) , WTO DSU WTO

.37) ,

,

. , WTO

,

34) Marc L. Burch and Eric Reinhardt, op. cit., p.3.

35) Ibid., p.3.

36) Marc L. Burch and Eric Reinhardt, op. cit.

37) Ibid., p.197.

125

(Multilateral)

- -

.38)

IV. :

1. ACWL(Advisory Centre on WTO Law)

2001

ACWL(Advisory Centre on WTO Law) WTO

3

.39) ACWL

Endowment Fund ,

ACWL

ACWL .

ACWL

Roster External Legal Counsel .40) 2014 6 26

4 ACWL

, ACWL

.41)

WTO

.

38) Ibid., p.196.

39) Chad P.Bown and Bernard M.Hoekamn, WTO Dispute Settlement and the Missing Developing

Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector, Journal of International Economic Law 8(4), November 2005, pp.874-875.

40) Ibid., p.875.

41) : http://www.acwl.ch/e/disputes/ext_counsel.html (: 2014.06.26.)

126

7

WTO ACWL . ACWL

. , ACWL , , ,

ACWL , ,

.42)

2. Public-Private Partnership

ACWL WTO

.

. 2

, (,

, , NGO )

WTO

, .

2-

.

42) Chad P.Bown and Bernard M.Hoekamn, op. cit., p.875.

127

(Multilateral)

- -

WTO .

WTO

(Capacity) .

.

WTO ,

.

WTO

.43)

pro bono

.

3. (Mediation)

(Alternative Dispute Resolution, ADR) , WTO

ADR

. (Mediation)44)

.

43) Chad P.Bown and Bernard M.Hoekamn, op. cit., p.872 .

44) 3

,

(arbitration) .

128

7

WTO

(consultation) . DSU 5

.

.

WTO

. 3

.

.

WTO DSU WTO S&D

.

.

DSU S&D

.

V.

WTO

Emerging Market

45) ,

129

(Multilateral)

- -

(LDCs) .

WTO WTO

,

.

, ACWL

ACWL

,

. ACWL 1 ,

WTO

. ADR

.46)

S&D

WTO .

GATT WTO

.

23 GATT 2014 WTO 150

45) , 1990

, , , 4 BRICs

Emerging Market .

BRICS . WTO

, WTO

. WTO

.

46)

.

130

7

. WTO GATT

.

.

WTO

(level Playing Field)

.

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