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8/3/2019 Legtech Cases

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FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 192217, March 02 : 2011]

DANILO L. PAREL, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF SIMEON PRUDENCIO, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO JR.,J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 assails the February 4, 2010 Decision[1] and April 22,2010 Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 105709, which affirmed the Ordersdated February 15, 2008 and July 31, 2008, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 60 inBaguio City, in Civil Case No. 2493-R for recovery of possession and damages.

The Facts

A complaint for recovery of possession and damages was filed by Simeon Prudencio (Simeon) againstDanilo Parel (Danilo) with the RTC in Baguio City.

Simeon alleged that he was the owner of a two-story house at No. 61 Forbes Park National Reservationin Baguio City. Simeon allowed Danilo and his parents to live on the ground floor of the house since hiswife was the elder sister of Danilo's father, Florentino.[3]

In November 1985, Simeon needed the whole house back and thus informed Danilo and his parents thatthey had to vacate the place. Danilo's parents acceded to Simeon's demand. Danilo, however, remainedin the house with his family despite repeated demands on him to surrender the premises. Thisdevelopment drove Simeon to institute an action for recovery of possession and damages.[4]

Danilo offered a different version of events. He maintained that the land on which Simeon's house wasconstructed was in his father Florentino's name. He explained that his father Florentino, who had bythen passed away, did not have enough funds to build a house and thus made a deal with Simeon forthem to just contribute money for the construction of a house on Florentino's land. Florentino andSimeon were, thus, co-owners of the house of which Simeon claims sole ownership.[5]

The Ruling of the Trial Court

On December 15, 1993, the RTC ruled in favor of Danilo. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decisionreads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby declares that the house erected at [No.] 61 DPSCompound, Baguio City is owned in common by the late Florentino Parel and herein plaintiff SimeonPrudencio and as such the plaintiff cannot evict the defendant as heirs of the deceased Florentino Parelfrom said property, nor to recover said premises from herein defendant.

Likewise, the plaintiff is ordered to:

(a) pay the defendant in the total sum of P20,000.00 for moral and actual damages;(b) pay the defendant P20,000.00 in Attorney's fees and P3,300 in appearance fees;

(c) pay the costs of this suit.

SO ORDERED.[6]

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

On March 31, 2000, the CA, on Simeon's appeal, rendered a Decision[7] reversing the RTC Decision asfollows:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SET ASIDE and a new one is entered declaringplaintiff-appellant as the new owner of the residential building at 61 Forbes Park National Reservation,near DPD Compound, Baguio City; appellee is ordered to surrender possession of the ground floorthereof to appellant immediately.

Further, appellee is hereby ordered to pay appellant P2,0000/month [sic] for use or occupancy thereoffrom April 1988 until the former actually vacates the same, and the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney'sfees. And costs of suit.


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SO ORDERED.

Danilo challenged the CA Decision before this Court via an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of theRules of Court.

On April 19, 2006, this Court issued its Decision[8] in G.R. No. 146556, affirming the CA Decision.

On May 9, 2007, Simeon sought to enforce this Court's April 19, 2006 Decision and thus filed a Motionfor Issuance of Writ of Execution.[9]

On June 19, 2007, Danilo filed his Comment[10] on Simeon's Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution.Heprayed that the PhP 2,000 monthly rental he was ordered to pay be computed from April 1988 to March1994 only since he had vacated the premises by April 1994.

On February 15, 2008, the RTC ruled as quoted below:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a Writ of Execution be issued to enforce the decision of the Courtin the above-entitled case.[11]

A Motion for Reconsideration of the February 15, 2008 RTC Order was filed by Danilo.

On July 31, 2008, the RTC issued another Order[12] denying the motion. The dispositive portion of theOrder is quoted below:

WHEREFORE, premises duly considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied for lack ofmerit. Let a Writ of Execution be issued to enforce the decision of the Court in the above-entitled case.

SO ORDERED.

On February 5, 2009, the RTC ordered the following:

Furthermore, the decision in the above-entitled case has already become final and executory. Toreiterate, this Court, much less the defendant, cannot modify the decision of the higher courts which hasnow become final and executory. The defendant is bound by the said decision and he cannot alter the

same nor substitute his own interpretation thereof.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Motion filed by the defendant is DENIED. The Courtreiterates its order dated July 31, 2008 for the issuance of a Writ of Execution to enforce the decision ofthe Court in the instant case.

SO ORDERED.[13]

On February 23, 2009, Danilo filed a Supplemental Petition with Urgent Motion for Issuance ofTemporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the RTC from enforcing the

judgment against Danilo for him to pay PhP 2,000 in monthly rentals from April 1994 onwards.

On August 23, 2010, this Court issued a Resolution requiring Simeon to file his Comment on Danilo'sPetition for Review on Certiorari.

On October 28, 2010, Simeon filed his Comment before Us. He argued that the RTC and CA correctlyruled that the prayer for a reduction of back rentals should be denied, since Danilo never turned overpossession of the subject premises to him.

The Issues

I

Whether the CA committed an error of law in upholding the RTC Order dated February 15, 2008.

II

Whether the Court of Appeals committed an error of law in upholding the RTC Order dated July 31, 2008

The Ruling of This Court


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Danilo questions the following order of the CA:

Further, appellee is hereby ordered to pay appellant P2,0000/month [sic] for use or occupancy thereoffrom April 1988 until the former actually vacates the same, and the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney'sfees. And costs of suit.[14]

We resolve to grant the petition.

Danilo argues that he vacated the subject premises in April 1994 and claims that he stated this fact inhis Comment on Simeon'sMotionfor Issuance of Writ of Execution dated May 9, 2007 and in his Motionfor Reconsideration before this Court on June 12, 2006. He, thus, argues that the monthly rentals heshould pay should only be from April 1988 to March 1994. He alleges that the CA committed an error inlaw in upholding the RTC Orders dated February 15, 2008 and July 31, 2008.

The questioned February 15, 2008 RTC Order stated:

x x x The defendant should have filed his comment on any appropriate pleading before the Court or inthe Supreme Court at the time when he actually vacated the premises, but he did not. Perhaps, stillhoping that the decision of the higher courts would be in his favor. All told, the defendant neverintended to surrender the premises to the plaintiff even after he vacated it in April 1994. For this reason,

he should now suffer the consequences.

It must be reiterated that this Court cannot now modify the decision of the higher courts which has nowbecome final and executory.[15]

On July 31, 2008, the RTC ruled:

While the alleged supervening facts and circumstances which changed the situation of the parties in theinstant case occurred before finality of the judgment, as in Morta vs. Bagagnan, the factual backdrop inthe aforecited jurisprudence does not call for its application in the present case. In the cited case, thecomplainants have been ousted from the subject premises pursuant to the decision of the DARAB in twocases involving the same parcel of lot before the decision of the Supreme Court attained finality. In thecase at bar, defendant claims to have vacated the subject premises as early as April 1994. Thisallegation however was belied by the fact that he did not turn[over] the premises to the plaintiff, a fact

which has been stipulated by the parties. Defendant did not effectively and completely relinquishpossession of the subject premises to the plaintiff thereby depriving the latter of effective possessionand beneficial use thereof. To reiterate, defendant never intended to surrender the premises to theplaintiff even after he vacated it in 1994. Defendant's failure to seasonably bring to the attention ofeither the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court of the supposed change in the circumstances of theparties cannot be excused. Had the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court been seasonably informed ofsuch fact, the appellate Courts would have considered the same in their respective decisions. It must benoted that defendant had more than enough time from April 1994 to June 2006, a total of 12 years,within which he could have informed the two appellate Courts of the supposed change in thecircumstances of the parties, but he did not. He only belatedly informed the Supreme Court in its motionfor reconsideration after the latter Court issued it decision, in the hope of reducing the full payment ofback rentals.[16]

It is true that Danilo should have brought to the Court's attention the date he actually left the subject

premises at an earlier time. The RTC is also correct in ruling that the judgment involved was alreadyfinal and executory. However, it would be inequitable to order him to pay monthly rentals "until heactually vacates" when it has not been determined when he actually vacated the ground floor ofSimeon's house. He would be paying monthly rentals indefinitely.

The RTC should have determined via hearing if Danilo's allegation were true and accordingly modifiedthe period Danilo is to be held accountable for monthly rentals.

Unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught the role of courts in disposingjusticiable controversies with finality. [17] Once a judgment becomes final and executory, all the issuesbetween the parties are deemed resolved and laid to rest. All that remains is the execution of thedecision which is a matter of right.[18]

Banaga v. Majaducon,[19] however, enumerates the instances where a writ of execution may beappealed:


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1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;

2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;

3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;

4) it appears that the controversy has never been subject to the judgment of the court;

5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or

6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective insubstance, or is issued against the wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwisesatisfied, or the writ was issued without authority;

In these exceptional circumstances, considerations of justice and equity dictate that there be somemode available to the party aggrieved of elevating the question to a higher court. That mode ofelevation may be either by appeal (writ of error or certiorari), or by a special civil action of certiorari,prohibition, or mandamus.

The instant case falls under one of the exceptions cited above. The fact that Danilo has left the propertyunder dispute is a change in the situation of the parties that would make execution inequitable or

unjust.

Moreover, there are exceptions that have been previously considered by the Court as meriting arelaxation of the rules in order to serve substantial justice. These are: (1) matters of life, liberty, honoror property; (2) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (3) the merits of the case; (4) acause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of therules; (5) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (6) theother party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. [20] We find that Danilo's situation merits a relaxationof the rules since special circumstances are involved; to determine if his allegation were true would allowa final resolution of the case.

Applicable, too, is what Sec. 5, Rule 135 of the Rules of Courtstates as one of the powers of a court:

Section 5. Inherent powers of the courts.Every court shall have power:

x x x x

(g) To amend and control its process and orders so as to make them conformable to law and justice.

Thus, the Court ruled in Mejia v. Gabayan:[21]

x x x The inherent power of the court carries with it the right to determine every question offact and law which may be involved in the execution. The court may stay or suspend the executionof its judgment if warranted by the higher interest of justice. It has the authority to cause a modificationof the decision when it becomes imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening eventswarrant it.The court is also vested with inherent power to stay the enforcement of its decision based onantecedent facts which show fraud in its rendition or want of jurisdiction of the trial court apparent onthe record. (Emphasis supplied.)

The writ of execution sought to be implemented does not take into consideration the circumstances thatmerit a modification of judgment. Given that there is a pending issue regarding the execution of

judgment, the RTC should have afforded the parties the opportunity to adduce evidence to determinethe period within which Danilo should pay monthly rentals before issuing the writ of execution in theinstant case. Should Danilo be unable to substantiate his claim that he vacated the premises in April1994, the period to pay monthly rentals should be until June 19, 2007, the date he informed the CA thathe had already left the premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 105709 is hereby SETASIDE. The RTC, Branch 60 in Baguio City is ORDERED to determine the actual date petitioner left thesubject premises before issuing the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 2493-R that will be based on theresolution of said issue.

SO ORDERED.

Corona, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur.


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Endnotes:

[1]Rollo, pp. 20-27. Penned by Associate Justice Jane Aurora C. Lantion and concurred in by AssociateJustices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe.

[2] Id. at 33.

[3] CA rollo, p. 21.

[4] Id.

[5] Id.

[6]Rollo, p. 22. Penned by Judge Pastor V. de Guzman.

[7] Id. at 103-112. Penned by Associate Justice Corona Ibay-Somera and concurred in by AssociateJustices Portia Alio Hormachuelos and Elvi John Asuncion.

[8] Id. at 129; 487 SCRA 405. Penned by then Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez andconcurred in by then Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban and then Associate Justices Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, Romeo S. Callejo, Sr. and Minita V. Chico-Nazario.

[9] Id. at 48-50.

[10] Id. at 51-54.

[11] Id. at 63.

[12] Id. at 69-70. Penned by Judge Edilberto T. Claravall.

[13] Id. at 92.

[14] Supra note 7.

[15]Rollo, p. 63.

[16] Id. at 69.

[17]Aguilar v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 157911, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 354, 382.

[18] National Power Corporation v. Laohoo, G.R. No. 151973, July 23, 2009, 593 SCRA 564, 580.

[19] G.R. No. 149051, June 30, 2006, 494 SCRA 153, 162-163.

[20] PCI Leasingand Finance v. Milan, G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010, 617 SCRA 258, 279.

[21] G.R. No. 149765, April 12, 2005, 455 SCRA 499, 512.


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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 184980, March 30 : 2011]

DANILO MORO, PETITIONER, VS. GENEROSO REYES DEL CASTILLO, JR., RESPONDENT.

D E C I S I O N

ABAD,J.:

This case is about the right of the petitioner to be reinstated through an action for quo warranto againstthe present holder meantime that petitioner has appealed from the Ombudsman's decision dismissinghim from the service for, among other grounds, misconduct in office.

The Facts and the Case

On December 7, 2005 the Ombudsman charged respondent Generoso Reyes Del Castillo, Jr. (DelCastillo), then Chief Accountant of the General Headquarters (GHQ) Accounting Center of the ArmedForces of the Philippines (AFP), with dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best

interest of the service in OMB-P-A-06-0031-A. The Ombudsman alleged that Del Castillo made falsestatements in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities from 1996 to 2004 and that he acquired propertiesmanifestly out of proportion to his reported salary.

On April 1, 2006 the GHQ reassigned Del Castillo to the Philippine Air Force (PAF) Accounting Center byvirtue of GHQ AFP Special Order 91 (SO 91).[1] Through the same order, petitioner Danilo Moro (Moro),then Chief Accountant of the Philippine Navy, took over the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQAccounting Center.

Meantime, on August 30, 2006 the Ombudsman placed Del Castillo under preventive suspension for sixmonths and eventually ordered his dismissal from the service on February 5, 2007.[2] The penaltyimposed on him included cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement benefits, and perpetualdisqualification from reemployment in the government. Del Castillo filed a motion for reconsideration,which is pending to this date.

Following the lapse of his six-month suspension or on March 12, 2007 Del Castillo attempted toreassume his former post of GHQ Chief Accountant. But, he was unable to do so since Moro declined toyield the position. Consequently, on April 4, 2007 Del Castillo filed a petition for quo warranto[3]againstMoro with the Regional Trial Court[4](RTC) of Paraaque City in Civil Case 07-0111.

Del Castillo claimed that Moro was merely detailed as GHQ Chief Accountant when the Ombudsmanplaced Del Castillo under preventive suspension. Since the latter's period of suspension already lapsed,he was entitled to resume his former post and Moro was but a usurper. [5]

For his part, Moro pointed out in his Answer [6] that his appointment under SO 91 as GHQ ChiefAccountant was a permanent appointment. Indeed, the GHQ had already reassigned Del Castillo to thePAF Accounting Center even before the Ombudsman placed him under preventive suspension. DelCastillo was, therefore, not automatically entitled to return to his former GHQ post despite the lapse ofhis suspension.

During the pendency of the quo warranto case before the RTC, Del Castillo refused to report at the PAFAccounting Center despite a memorandum from the AFP Acting Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel thatcarried the note and approval of the AFP Chief of Staff.[7] Del Castillo insisted that he could not beplaced under the PAF since he was the GHQ Chief Accountant.[8]

On October 10, 2007 the RTC dismissed Del Castillo's petition,[9] holding that Moro held the position ofGHQ Chief Accountant pursuant to orders of the AFP Chief of Staff. Moreover, the RTC found DelCastillo's reassignment to the PAF Accounting Center valid. Under the Civil Service Commission (CSC)Rules, a reassignment may be made for a maximum of one year. Since Del Castillo's preventivesuspension kept him away for only six months, he had to return to the PAF to complete his maximumdetail at that posting. Besides, said the trial court, the Ombudsman's February 5, 2007 Order, whichdirected Del Castillo's dismissal from the service for grave misconduct, among others, rendered thepetition moot and academic. The RTC denied Del Castillo's motion for reconsideration.

Instead of appealing from the order of dismissal of his action, Del Castillo filed a petitionfor certiorariwith the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 103470. On October 13, 2008 the CA


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reversed the RTC Decision.[10] Notwithstanding the procedural error, the CA gave due course to thepetition on grounds of substantial justice and fair play. It held that Del Castillo's reassignment exceededthe maximum of one year allowed by law and that SO 91 was void since it did not indicate a definiteduration for such reassignment. Further, the CA held as non-executory the Ombudsman's dismissal ofDel Castillo in view of his appeal from that dismissal. With the denial of his motion for reconsideration,Moro filed this petition via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The Issue Presented

The key issue in this case is whether or not respondent Del Castillo is entitled to be restored to theposition of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center that he once held.

The Court's Ruling

An action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Rules of Court may be filed against one who usurps,intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office.[11] It may be brought by the Republic ofthe Philippines or by the person claiming to be entitled to such office.[12] In this case, it was Del Castillowho filed the action, claiming that he was entitled as a matter of right to reassume the position of GHQChief Accountant after his preventive suspension ended on March 11, 2007. He argues that, assuminghis reassignment to the PAF Accounting Center was valid, the same could not exceed one year. Since

his detail at the PAF took effect under SO 91 on April 1, 2006, it could last not later than March 31,2007. By then, Moro should have allowed him to return to his previous posting as GHQ ChiefAccountant.

But, as Moro points out, he had been authorized under SO 91 to serve as GHQ Chief Accountant. DelCastillo, on the other hand, had been ordered dismissed from the service by the Ombudsman in OMB-P-A-06-0031-A. Consequently, he cannot reassume the contested position.

Del Castillo of course insists, citing Lapid v. Court of Appeals,[13] that only decisions of the Ombudsmanthat impose the penalties of public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not more than a month or afine of one month salary are final, executory, and unappealable. Consequently, when the penalty isdismissal as in his case, he can avail himself of the remedy of appeal and the execution of the decisionagainst him would, in the meantime, be held in abeyance.

But, the Lapidcase has already been superseded by In the Matter to Declare in Contempt of Court Hon.Simeon A. Datumanong, Secretary of DPWH.[14] The Court held in Datumanong that Section 7, Rule IIIof Administrative Order 7, as amended by Administrative Order 17,[15] clearly provides that an appealshall not stop a decision of the Ombudsman from being executory. The Court later reiterated this rulingin Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals.[16]

In quo warranto, the petitioner who files the action in his name must prove that he is entitled to thesubject public office. Otherwise, the person who holds the same has a right to undisturbed possessionand the action for quo warranto may be dismissed.[17]

Here, Del Castillo brought the action for quo warranto in his name on April 4, 2007, months after theOmbudsman ordered his dismissal from service on February 5, 2007. As explained above, that dismissalorder was immediately executory even pending appeal. Consequently, he has no right to pursue theaction for quo warranto or reassume the position of Chief Accountant of the GHQ Accounting Center.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision datedOctober 13, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 103470, andREINSTATES the October 10,2007 decision of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case 07-0111, which dismissed the complaint for quowarranto.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Nachura, Peralta, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

[1] Records, p. 113.

[2]

Rollo,pp. 88-115.[3] Records, pp. 41-54.


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[4] Branch 274.

[5] Records, pp.47-48.

[6] Id. at 99-111.

[7] Id. at 121-122.

[8] Id. at 123.

[9] Rollo, pp. 48-54. Penned by Presiding Judge Fortunito L. Madrona.

[10] Id. at 58-87. Penned by Associate Justice Pampio A. Abarintos and concurred in by AssociateJustices Amelita G. Tolentino and Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok.

[11] Rule 66, Section 1.Action by Government against individuals.

An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verifiedpetition brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position orfranchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which, by the provision of law, constitutes a ground forthe forfeiture of his office; or

(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legally incorporated orwithout lawful authority so to act.

[12] Rule 66, Section 5. When an individual may commence such an action.

A person claiming to be entitled to a public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised byanother may bring an action therefor in his own name.

[13] G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 738.

[14] G.R. No. 150274, August 4, 2006, 497 SCRA 626.

[15] Section 7. Finality and execution of decision. - Where the respondent is absolved of the charge, andin case of conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not morethan one month, or a fine equivalent to one month salary, the decision shall be final, executory andunappealable. In all other cases, the decision may be appealed to the Court of Appeals on a verifiedpetition for review under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43 of the Rules of Court,within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the written Notice of the Decision or Order denying theMotion for Reconsideration.

An appeal shall not stop the decision from being executory. In case the penalty is suspension

or removal and the respondent wins such appeal, he shall be considered as having beenunder preventive suspension and shall be paid the salary and such other emoluments that he

did not receive by reason of the suspension or removal.

A decision of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases shall be executed as amatter of course. The Office of the Ombudsman shall ensure that the decision shall be strictly enforcedand properly implemented. The refusal or failure by any officer without just cause to comply with anorder of the Office of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend, demote, fine, or censure shall be ground fordisciplinary action against said officer. (Emphasis supplied)

[16] G.R. No. 159395, May 7, 2008, 554 SCRA 75, 93-94.

[17] Feliciano v. Villasin, G.R. No. 174929, June 27, 2008, 556 SCRA 348, 366.


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SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 191389, March 07 : 2011]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. LUISITO LALICAN Y ARCE, APPELLANT.

D E C I S I O N

ABAD,J.:

The public prosecutor charged the accused Luisito Lalican yArce with rape before the Regional TrialCourt (RTC) of Manila[1] in Criminal Case 05-238386. The prosecution presented the testimonies ofSHINE,[2] the private complainant; SPO2 Manuel Castro III, the arresting officer; and Dr. Anabelle L.Soliman, the medico-legal officer.

SHINE worked as guest relations officer in a club in Tondo, Manila. She had been renting a room inaccused Lalican's two-storey house in Tayuman for the past seven months. SHINE stayed at the groundfloor while Lalican and his family occupied the second floor.

SHINE testified that at around 9:00 to 10:00 a.m. on July 10, 2005 she heard Lalican knock on her door.Hesitant at first, she eventually opened the door to find Lalican imploring her help because he and hiswife supposedly had gotten into a fight. SHINE declined to intervene, however, afraid of the wife's ire.She started to close the door on him but Lalican resisted and forced it open. He closed the door andpulled a knife, pointing it at SHINE's neck. Shocked, she was unable to scream for help. Lalicangrabbed and undressed her, using his right hand. He then put down the knife and removed his clothes.He pushed SHINE down on the floor and successfully had his way with her, keeping his hand on theknife that lay on the floor.

After ravishing SHINE, Lalican stood up but remained in the room. Although Lalican would not let her goto the bathroom at first, he eventually let her. She hid there and later left the house for a nearby storeand bought prepaid credits for her mobile phone so she could call her brother-in-law, a policeman, forhelp. When she could not contact him, she went to the police station to report the matter. Somepolicemen went with her to Lalican's house but SHINE declined to enter it. After arresting Lalican, theyall went back to the police station.

SPO2 Castro testified that at around 10:00 a.m. on July 10, 2005, SHINE arrived at the Police Station 7in Tayuman and complained that Lalican had raped her. SPO2 Castro and three other officers went withSHINE to Lalican's house. Upon entering it, SHINE pointed to Lalican as the man who raped her. Theofficers then invited Lalican to come to the police station for investigation.

Dr. Soliman testified having examined SHINE. She noted (1) no extragenital physical injuries on herbody; (2) that the hymen was reduced to carunculae myrtiformis; and (3) that succeeding sexualintercourse may not produce any new hymenal injury.

Lalican denied raping SHINE. He recounted that on the previous day, July 9, 2005, he attended thewake of a friend's mother. He returned to his house at around 6:00 a.m. on the following day. Aftercooking food, he went to the bathroom. Before he could fully shut the door close, the door of SHINE'sroom opened. Her boyfriend, Francis, walked out and left the house. After taking a bath, Lalican wentupstairs to sleep but because it was humid hot, he went down and slept on a make-shift bed near the

door of SHINE's room. At around 10:00 a.m., some policemen woke him up and invited him to go to thepolice station.

Genie Suarez corroborated Lalican's testimony. Suarez said that he was with the accused at a wake onthe previous day. Suarez accompanied Lalican home and left him to sleep on a make-shift bed on theground floor of the house. Suarez then went to a nearby store. At 7:00 a.m. he saw Francis go out ofthe house and around 10:00 a.m. he saw SHINE leave the house and later return in the company ofpolicemen.

The RTC found Lalican guilty of raping SHINE and sentenced him to suffer the penalty ofreclusionperpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law.[3] The RTC ordered him to pay P50,000.00 asindemnity to SHINE without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the cost.

On October 28, 2009 the Court of Appeals (CA) rendered judgment in the case,[4] affirming the decisionof the RTC with modifications. The CA affirmed the finding of guilt of the RTC but included the paymentof an additional P50,000.00 as moral damages. Lalican appealed to this Court.


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The Issue Presented

The sole issue in this case is whether or not the CA erred in finding accused Lalican guilty beyondreasonable doubt of raping SHINE.

The Court's Ruling

Courts have to be cautious in assessing the evidence of rape. By the nature of rape, it is hardlycommitted before the eyes of witnesses. In true cases of rape, witnesses are shut out either becausethe offender has put enough terror and fear of death in his victim such that, psychologically, she has lostthe will to resist or, the place of commission being far remote from people who can hear and rescue hisvictim, the offender uses brute force to overcome her resistance. In false cases of rape, prompted bysome ill motive, the supposed victim claims rape when it did not happen or when she cooperated withthe offender in the supposed rape. Whether it is true rape or false rape, the victim usually testifiesalone. Consequently, care is taken in examining what she says.[5]

Here, SHINE testified on direct that when Lalican forced her door open and entered, he poked a knife onher neck, grabbed her, undressed her, took his own clothes off, pushed her down the floor, and violatedher.[6] Lalican points out that SHINE cannot be believed since this version is inconsistent with hertestimony on cross that he made her lie down first before he undressed her.[7] Lalican also assailed theinconsistencies in her statements concerning where he placed the knife that he threatened her with

during the time he was abusing her.

But must the victim's testimony dovetail in every respect regarding the precise movement of theoffender from beginning to end such as which foot he used in stepping into the victim's room or whathand he used for undressing her and himself? Violent crimes usually fill their victims with dread andterrible fear for their lives. Rarely would they mentally record details of the startling events as theyhappen with the expectation that they would get some subpoena in some future time to testify in somefuture court. Reality is not like that.

What is important is that the core of SHINE's testimony that Lalican, her lessor, barged into her room,threatened to butcher her with a knife if she resisted, and forced himself into her, had remainedunchanged. Perfect testimonies, repeated with precision in the same language, in the course of cross-examination usually indicate coaching and rehearsals. It is here that the trial judge's face-to-faceappreciation of the complainant's testimony makes a lot of difference. He can see the movement of the

eyes, the tremor of the lips, or the turn of the head that only the sum total of human experiencebrought to bear can interpret. The Court is robbed of that opportunity. Consequently, except where thetrial judge's error is so obvious, the Court will, as in this case, defer to his appreciation of the credibilityof the witness.

It does not help the case of Lalican that he has not shown proof that SHINE was prompted by somesinister motive in accusing him of rape. She had been his tenant the last seven months. Admittedly, hehad been observing her since he even spoke of seeing SHINE's boyfriend come out of her rented roomthat morning. And Lalican admittedly chose to sleep on a make-shift bed near her door. An opportunityfor lechery clearly presented itself.

What is more, it was quite unlikely that SHINE would spontaneously walk to the police station shortlyafter to voice her outrage and convince the policemen to come with her to investigate the matter if shehad no genuine cause to gripe about.

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS in its entirety the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC03382 dated October 28, 2009 which affirmed with modification the trial court's conviction of theaccused Luisito Lalican yArce of the crime of rape.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Peralta, Perez,* and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

* Designated as additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per SpecialOrder 967 dated February 28, 2011.

[1] Branch 21.

[2] Pursuant to Republic Act 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their


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Children Act of 2004" and its implementing rules, the real name of the victim, together with the realnames of her immediate family members, is withheld and fictitious initials instead are used to representher, both to protect her privacy (People v. Cabalquinto, G.R. No. 167693, 502 SCRA 419, 421-426 [2006]).

[3] Decision dated March 10, 2008, records, pp. 256-261.

[4] Docketed as CA-G.R. CR-HC 03382.

[5] People v. Bidoc, G.R. No. 169430, October 31, 2006, 506 SCRA 481, 495.

[6] TSN, September 14, 2005, pp. 6-7.

[7] TSN, September 28, 2005, p. 9.


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Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176389 January 18, 2011

ANTONIO LEJANO, Petitioner,vs.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

G.R. No. 176864

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.HUBERT JEFFREY P. WEBB, ANTONIO LEJANO, MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, HOSPICIOFERNANDEZ, MIGUEL RODRIGUEZ, PETER ESTRADA and GERARDO BIONG, Appellants.

R E S O L U T I O N

ABAD, J.:

On December 14, 2010 the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals (CA) andacquitted the accused in this case, Hubert Jeffrey P. Webb, Antonio Lejano, Michael A.Gatchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong of thecharges against them on the ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On December 28, 2010 complainant Lauro G. Vizconde, an immediate relative of the victims,asked the Court to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the prosecution due process oflaw; seriously misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro as lacking credibility;issued a tainted and erroneous decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in themiscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in its treatment of the evidence and prosecutionwitnesses."1

But, as a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered because it places the accusedunder double jeopardy. The Constitution provides in Section 21, Article III, that:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. x x x

To reconsider a judgment of acquittal places the accused twice in jeopardy of being punished forthe crime of which he has already been absolved. There is reason for this provision of theConstitution. In criminal cases, the full power of the State is ranged against the accused. If thereis no limit to attempts to prosecute the accused for the same offense after he has been acquitted,the infinite power and capacity of the State for a sustained and repeated litigation wouldeventually overwhelm the accused in terms of resources, stamina, and the will to fight.

As the Court said in People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan:2

[A]t the heart of this policy is the concern that permitting the sovereign freely to subject the citizento a second judgment for the same offense would arm the government with a potent instrumentof oppression. The provision therefore guarantees that the State shall not be permitted to makerepeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to
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embarrassment, expense, and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxietyand insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent he may be foundguilty. Societys awareness of the heavy personal strain which a criminal trial represents for theindividual defendant is manifested in the willingness to limit the government to a single criminalproceeding to vindicate its very vital interest in the enforcement of criminal laws.3

Of course, on occasions, a motion for reconsideration after an acquittal is possible. But thegrounds are exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved the accused gravelyabused its discretion, resulting in loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In any ofsuch cases, the State may assail the decision by special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.4

Here, although complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he has been unable to bring hispleas for reconsideration under such exceptions. For instance, he avers that the Court "mustensure that due process is afforded to all parties and there is no grave abuse of discretion in thetreatment of witnesses and the evidence."5But he has not specified the violations of due processor acts constituting grave abuse of discretion that the Court supposedly committed. His claim that"the highly questionable and suspicious evidence for the defense taints with serious doubts thevalidity of the decision"6is, without more, a mere conclusion drawn from personal perception.

Complainant Vizconde cites the decision in Galman v. Sandiganbayan7as authority that theCourt can set aside the acquittal of the accused in the present case. But the government provedin Galman that the prosecution was deprived of due process since the judgment of acquittal inthat case was "dictated, coerced and scripted."8 It was a sham trial. Here, however, Vizcondedoes not allege that the Court held a sham review of the decision of the CA. He has made out nocase that the Court held a phony deliberation in this case such that the seven Justices who votedto acquit the accused, the four who dissented, and the four who inhibited themselves did notreally go through the process.

Ultimately, what the complainant actually questions is the Courts appreciation of the evidenceand assessment of the prosecution witnesses credibility. He ascribes grave error on the Courts

finding that Alfaro was not a credible witness and assails the value assigned by the Court to theevidence of the defense. In other words, private complainant wants the Court to review theevidence anew and render another judgment based on such a re-evaluation. This is notconstitutionally allowed as it is merely a repeated attempt to secure Webb, et als conviction. Thejudgment acquitting Webb, et al is final and can no longer be disturbed.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES for lack of merit complainant Lauro G. Vizcondes motion forreconsideration dated December 28, 2010.

For essentially the same reason, the Court DENIES the motions for leave to intervene of Fr.Robert P. Reyes, Sister Mary John R. Mananzan, Bishop Evangelio L. Mercado, and Dante L.A.Jimenez, representing the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption and of former Vice

President Teofisto Guingona, Jr.

No further pleadings shall be entertained in this case.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABADAssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:
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I vote to grant the M.R.RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

No part, prior inhibition

ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALESAssociate Justice

No part due to relastionship to a partyPRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

No part; filed pleading as Sol GenANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

I vote to grant the motion forreconsideration

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTROAssociate Justice

Same vote as J. VillaramaARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTAAssociate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMINAssociate Justice

No partMARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

I vote to grant the motion forreconsideration

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZAssociate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZAAssociate Justice

See concurring OpinionMARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions inthe above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to thewriter of the opinion of the Court.

RENATO C. CORONA

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Private Complainants Motion for Reconsideration, p. 8.

2 G.R. Nos. 168188-89, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 185.

3 Id. at 207.

4 Castro v. People, G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008, 559 SCRA 676, 683-684.
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5 Supra note 1, at 7.

6 Id. at 12.

7 228 Phil. 42 (1986).

8 Id. at 89.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

CONCURRING OPINION

SERENO, J.:

The Motion for Reconsideration assails the majority for failing to uphold the trial courts

conclusions. The simple fact is that the evidence tends to demonstrate that Hubert Webb isinnocent. The simple fact also is that the evidence demonstrates that not only had Jessica Alfarofailed to substantiate her testimony, she had contradicted herself and had been contradicted byother more believable evidence. The other main prosecution witnesses fare no better. This is thegist of the Decision sought to be reconsidered. While this Court does not make a dispositiveruling other than a pronouncement of "guilt" or "non-guilt" on the part of the accused, the legalpresumption of innocence must be applied in operative fact. It is unfortunate that statementswere made that sought to dilute the legal import of the majority Decision. A pronouncement ofthis Court that the accused has not been proven to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt cannot betwisted to mean that this Court does not believe in the innocence of the accused when thereasoning of the Court demonstrates such belief. A careful reading of the majority Decision, aswell as the concurring opinions, is required to determine whether the accused were

acquitted solely becausethere was lingering doubt as to their guilt of the crime charged orwhether the accused were acquitted not only because of doubt as to their guilt but also becausethe evidence tends to establish their innocence. In the case of Hubert Webb, the evidence tendsto establish his innocence. On the other hand, the testimony of Jessica Alfaro was whollyrejected by the majority as not believable.

In his Motion for Reconsideration, private complainant asserts that this Court should haverespected the trial courts resolve to give full credence to the testimony of Jessica Alfaro. Whileas a general rule, a trial judges findings as to the credibility of a witness are entitled to utmostrespect as he has had the opportunity to observe their demeanor on the witness stand, this holdstrue only in the absence of bias, partiality, and grave abuse of discretion on the part of thejudge.1 The succeeding discussion demonstrates why this Court has no choice but to reject the

trial courts findings.

The mistaken impression that Alfaro was a credible witness was, in significant measure,perpetrated by the trial courts inappropriate and mismatched attribution of rights to and duties ofthe accused vis-a-vis the principal witness in a criminal proceeding. As discussed in thepromulgated Decision of the Court in this case, the trial court failed to recognize the accusedsright to be presumed innocent. Instead, the trial courts Decision indicated a preconceived beliefin the accuseds guilt, and as a corollary, that witness Alfaro was telling the truth when shetestified to the accuseds guilt. In excessively protecting Alfaro, the trial court improperly ascribedto her the right reserved for an accused. It also unreasonably imposed severe limitations on theextent of the right of the defense to cross-examine her.

During Alfaros cross examination, the defense counsel tried to impeach her credibility by askingher about her 28 April 1995 Affidavit, which markedly differs from her 22 May 1995 Affidavit. Theprosecution objected and moved that the questions be expunged from the records on the basis
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of the inadmissibility of the evidence obtained allegedly without the assistance of counsel,pursuant to Article III Section 12(1) and (3) of the 1987 Constitution.2This constitutional right,however, is a right reserved solely for the accused or a "person under investigation for thecommission of an offense." The prosecutions objection had no legal basis because Alfaro wasclearly not the accused in the case. Alfaro was a witness who had a legal duty to "answerquestions, although his (her) answer may tend to establish a claim against him

(her)."3 Notwithstanding this, the lower court sustained the prosecutions objection.

The law does not confer any favorable presumption on behalf of a witness. It is precisely due tothe absence of any legal presumption that the witness is telling the truth that he/she is subjectedto cross-examination to "test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, orthe reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue."4 The Rules provide that "thewitness may be cross-examined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the directexamination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom."5] A witness may beimpeached "by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty,or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent withhis present testimony."6

The right to cross-examine a witness is a matter of procedural due process such that thetestimony or deposition of a witness given in a former case "involving the same parties andsubject matter, may be given in evidence against the adverse party" provided the adverse party"had the opportunity to cross-examine him."7

Notwithstanding the right of the accused to fully and freely conduct a thorough crossexamination, the trial court set undue restrictions on the defense counsels cross examination ofAlfaro, effectively denying the accused such right. The length of the cross-examination is not asmaterial in the determination of the credibility of the witness as much as whether such witnesswas fully tested by the defense when demanded to be tested on cross-examination for honestyby contradictory evidence of a reputation for dishonesty, for inconsistency, or for possible bias orimproper motive.

To establish Alfaros bias and motive for testifying in the case, the defense counsel sought to askAlfaro about her brother, Patrick. Alfaro admitted that Patrick was a drug addict and had beenarrested once by the NBI for illegal possession of drugs, but that he was presently in the UnitedStates. The theory of the defense was that Patricks liberty was part of a deal that Alfaro hadstruck with the NBI in exchange for her services. When defense counsel inquired about thecircumstances of Patricks departure for the United States, the prosecution objected to thequestions on the ground of irrelevance. Respondent judge sustained the objection, thusforeclosing a significant avenue for testing Alfaros "freedom from interest or bias."

The defense counsel tried to cross-examine Alfaro regarding her educational attainment asstated in her sworn statements. The defense presented her college transcript of records to prove

that she only enrolled for a year and earned nine (9) academic units, contrary to her claim thatshe finished second year college. Notably, Alfaro misrepresented her educational attainment inboth of her affidavits her 28 April 1995 Affidavit which she claimed was executed withoutassistance of counsel, and her subsequent 22 May 1995 Affidavit which was admittedly executedwith the assistance of counsel. Apparently, Alfaros lie under oath about her educationalattainment persisted even after being given counsels assistance in the execution of the secondaffidavit, as well as more time to contemplate the matter. Unfortunately, the lower court sustainedthe prosecutions objection to the question on the ground of irrelevance when the line of testingcould have tested Alfaro's penchant for "accuracy and truthfulness."

Ironically, notwithstanding the trial courts disallowance of the defenses attempts to impeachAlfaro's character, and the rule that "(e)vidence of the good character of a witness is not

admissible until such character has been impeached,"8 the trial court allowed the prosecution topresent Atty. Pedro Rivera9 to testify positively on Alfaros character. Worse yet, the trial court
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disallowed the defense from presenting Atty. Riveras earlier statement to impeach the latterscredibility; again, this was disallowed on the ground of immateriality. When a proffer ofevidence10 was made by the defense following such disallowance, the trial court struck the profferfrom the record on the ground that it was allegedly improper on cross-examination.

The notion that witness Alfaro was able to withstand her cross examination appears sustainablein large part because her cross examination was so emasculated by the trial courts inordinateprotection of her, which went so far as to improperly accord her the right reserved for anaccused. Taken together with repeated instances of unwarranted exertion of effort to wipe therecord clean of some entries that cast doubt on Alfaros credibility, the trial courts actions showthat it had a bias towards upholding the truthfulness of Alfaros testimony.

The trial courts treatment of documentary evidence also suffered from mismatched ascription discarding legal presumptions without evidence to the contrary while giving evidentiary weight tounsubstantiated speculation. For instance, in rejecting Webbs alibidefense, the trial court usedmere speculation that the accuseds family influenced the production of false entries in officialdocuments to defeat the legal presumption of said documents accuracy and regularity ofissuance. Notably, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (US INS)

Certification, which confirmed that Webb was in the United States from March 1991 until October1992, was authenticated by no less than the Office of the U.S. Attorney General and the U.S.State Department. Furthermore, this official certification of a sovereign state. having passedthrough formal diplomatic channels, was authenticated by the Department of Foreign Affairs. Asdiscussed in the main decision, such official documents as the authenticated U.S. INSCertification enjoy the presumption of accuracy of the entries therein.11 Official documents are notinfallible, but the presumption that they are accurate can only be overcome with evidence.Unfortunately, in the mind of the trial court, pure conjecture and not hard evidence was allowedto defeat a legal presumption.

Clearly, the trial courts decision in this case was, in significant measure, the product of switchedattributions as to who should enjoy certain rights and what should be presumed under the law.

This behavior on the part of the trial court and the effect it had on the factual conclusions on thecredibility of Jessica Alfaro and on the presence of Hubert Webb in the Philippines at the time ofthe commission of the crime cannot be upheld.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOAssociate Justice

Footnotes

1

People v. Dizon, G.R. Nos. 126044-45, 2 July 1999, 309 SCRA 669.

2 "SEC. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shallhave the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent andindependent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford theservices of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived exceptin writing and in the presence of counsel.

x x x x x x x x x

"(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the precedingsection shall be inadmissible in evidence against him."

3 Rules of Court, Rule 132. Section 3.
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4 Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 6.





9 Notably, in the Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention filed by the Volunteers AgainstCrime and Corruption (VACC), Fr. Roberto Reyes, Sister Mary John Mananzan andBishop Evangelio Mercado, they attach a copy of Atty. Pedro Rivera's Affidavit to onceagain resuscitate Alfaro's credibility.

10 Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 40 provides that "(i)f documents or things offered inevidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same attached to or made

part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record thesame and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of theproposed testimony."

11 Citing Antillon v. Barcelona, 37 Phil. 148 (1917).

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 192649, March 09 : 2011]
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HOME GUARANTY CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. R-II BUILDERS INC., AND NATIONAL

HOUSING AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS.

D E C I S I O N

PEREZ,J.:

Primarily assailed in this petition for review filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of CivilProcedure, is the Decision dated 21 January 2010 rendered by the Former Fifteenth Division of the Courtof Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 111153,[1] the dispositive portion of which states as follows:

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby DENIED.

The assailed Orders, dated March 3, 2009 and September 29, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court ofManila, Branch 22 are hereby AFFIRMED.

Consequently, the injunction earlier issued on December 4, 2009, restraining the proceedings in CivilCase No. 05-113407, is hereby DISSOLVED.[2]

The Facts

On 19 March 1993, aJoint Venture Agreement(JVA) was entered into between respondents NationalHousing Authority (NHA) and R-II Builders, Inc. (R-II Builders) for the implementation of the SmokeyMountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP). Amended and restated on 21 February1994[3] and 11 August 1994,[4] the JVA was aimed at implementing a two-phase conversion of theSmokey Mountain Dumpsite "into a habitable housing project inclusive of the reclamation of the areaacross Radial Road 10 (R-10)".[5] By the terms of the JVA, R-II Builders, as developer, was entitled toown 79 hectares of reclaimed land and the 2.3 hectare commercial area at the Smokey Mountain.Aslandowner/implementing agency, NHA, on the other hand, was entitled to own the 2,992 temporaryhousing units agreed to be built in the premises, the cleared and fenced incinerator site consisting of 5hectares, 3,520 units of permanent housing to be awarded to qualified on site residents, the industrialarea consisting of 3.2 hectares and the open spaces, roads and facilities within the Smokey MountainArea.[6]

On 26 September 1994, NHA and R-II Builders, alongside petitioner Housing Guaranty Corporation(HGC) as guarantorand the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as trustee, entered into anAsset PoolFormation Trust Agreementwhich provided the mechanics for the implementation of the project. [7] Toback the project, anAsset Poolwas created composed of the following assets: (a) the 21.2 hectareSmokey Mountain Site in Tondo, Manila; (b) the 79-hectare Manila Bay foreshore property in the nameof the NHA; (c) the Smokey Mountain Project Participation Certificates (SMPPCs) to be issued, or theirmoney proceeds; (d) disposable assets due to R-II Builders and/or its proceeds as defined in the JVA;(e) the resulting values inputted by R-II Builders for pre-implementation activities and some start-upworks amounting to P300,000,000.00; (f) the 2,992 temporary housing facilities/units to be constructedby R-II Builders; and, (g) all pertinent documents and records of the project.[8]

On the same date, the parties likewise executed a Contract of Guarantywhereby HGC, upon the callmade by PNB and conditions therein specified, undertook to redeem the regular SMPPCs upon maturityand to pay the simple interest thereon to the extent of 8.5% per annum.[9] The foregoing agreements

led to the securitization of the project through the issuance of 5,216 SMPPCs upon theAsset Pool, with apar value of 1 Million each, classified and to be redeemed by the trustee or, in case of call on itsguaranty, by HGC, in the following order of priority:

a) Regular SMPPCs worth P2.519 Billion, issued for value to the general public at specified interests andmaturity dates. These were to be redeemed by the PNB which was obliged to exhaust all liquid assets ofthe Asset Pool before calling on the HGC guarantee;

b) Special SMPPCs worth P1.403 Billion, issued exclusively to the NHA for conveyance of the SmokeyMountain Site and Manila Bay foreshore property to the Asset Pool, redeemable upon turnover of thedeveloped project; and

c) Subordinated SMPPCs worth P1.294 Billion, issued exclusively to R-II Builders for its rights andinterests in the JVA, redeemable with the turnover of all residual values, assets and properties remaining

in the Asset Pool after both the Regular and Special SMPPCs are redeemed and all the obligations of theAsset Pool are settled.[10]


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Subsequent to R-II Builders' infusion of P300 Million into the project, the issuance of the SMPPCs andthe termination of PNB's services on 29 January 2001, NHA, R-II Builders and HGC agreed on theinstitution of Planters Development Bank (PDB) as trustee on 29 January 2001.[11] By 24 October 2002,however, all the Regular SMPPCs issued had reached maturity and, unredeemed, already amounted toan aggregate face value of P2.513 Billion. The lack of liquid assets with which to effect redemption of theregular SMPPCs prompted PDB to make a call on HGC's guaranty and to execute in the latter's favor

a Deed of Assignment and Conveyance (DAC) of the entireAsset Pool, consisting of: (a) 105 parcels ofland comprising the Smokey Mountain Site and the Reclamation Area, with a total area of 539,471.47square meters, and all the buildings and improvements thereon; (b) shares of stock of Harbour CentrePort Terminal, Inc. (HCPTI); and, (c) other documents.[12]

On 1 September 2005, R-II Builders filed the complaint against HGC and NHA which was docketed asCivil Case No. 05-113407 before Branch 24 of the Manila Regional Trial Court, a Special CommercialCourt (SCC). Contending that HGC's failure to redeem the outstanding regular SMPPCs despite obtainingpossession of theAsset Poolballooned the stipulated interests and materially prejudiced its stake on theresidual values of theAsset Pool, R-II Builders alleged, among other matters, that the DAC should berescinded since PDB exceeded its authority in executing the same prior to HGC's redemption andpayment of the guaranteed SMPPCs; that while the estimated value ofAsset Poolamounted toP5,919,716,618.62 as of 30 June 2005, its total liabilities was estimated at P2,796,019,890.41; and,that with the cessation of PDB's functions as a trustee and HGC's intention to use theAsset Poolto settle

its obligations to the Social Security System (SSS), it was best qualified to be appointed asnew trustee in the event of the resolution of the DAC. Assessed docket fees corresponding to an actionincapable of pecuniary estimation, the complaint sought the grant of the following reliefs: (a) atemporary restraining order/preliminary and permanent injunction, enjoining disposition/s of theproperties in theAsset Pool; (b) the resolution or, in the alternative, the nullification of the DAC; (c) R-IIBuilders' appointment as trustee pursuant to Rule 98 of the Rules of Court; (d) HGC's rendition of anaccounting of the assets and the conveyance thereof in favor of R-II Builders; and, (e) P500,000.00 inattorney's fees.[13]

On 26 October 2005, Branch 24 of the Manila RTC issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by R-II Builders which, upon the challenge thereto interposed by HGC, was later affirmed by the CA in the 17December 2007 decision rendered in CA-G.R. SP No. 98953.[14] Having filed its answer to the complaint,in the meantime, HGC went on to move for the conduct of a preliminary hearing on its affirmativedefenses which included such grounds as lack of jurisdiction, improper venue and the then pendencybefore this Court of G.R. No. 164537, entitled Francisco Chavez vs. National Housing Authority, et al., acase which challenged, among other matters, the validity of the JVA and its subsequent amendments.[15] On 2 August 2007, R-II Builders, in turn, filed a motion to admit[16] itsAmended and SupplementalComplaintwhich deleted the prayer for resolution of the DAC initially prayed for in its originalcomplaint. In lieu thereof, said pleading introduced causes of action for conveyance of title to and/orpossession of the entireAsset Pool, for NHA to pay theAsset Poolthe sum of P1,803,729,757.88representing the cost of the changes and additional works on the project and for an increased indemnityfor attorney's fees in the sum of P2,000,000.00.[17]

Consistent with its joint order dated 2 January 2008 which held that R-II Builders' complaint was anordinary civil action and not an intra-corporate controversy,[18] Branch 24 of the Manila RTC issued aclarificatory order dated 1 February 2008 to the effect, among other matters, that it did not have theauthority to hear the case.[19] As a consequence, the case was re-raffled to respondent Branch 22 of theManila RTC (respondent RTC) which subsequently issued the 19 May 2008 order which, havingdetermined that the case is a real action, admitted the aforesaidAmended and Supplemental

Complaint, subject to R-II Builders' payment of the "correct and appropriate" docket fees. [20] On 15August 2008, however, R-II Builders filed a motion to admit it Second Amended Complaint, on theground that its previousAmended and Supplemental Complainthad not yet been admitted in view of thenon-payment of the correct docket fees therefor.[21] Said Second Amended Complaintnotablyresurrected R-II Builders' cause of action for resolution of the DAC, deleted its causes of action foraccounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of the entireAsset Pool, reduced the claim forattorney's fees to P500,000.00, sought its appointment as Receiver pursuant to Rule 59 of the Rules ofCourtand, after an inventory in said capacity, prayed for approval of the liquidation and distribution oftheAsset Poolin accordance with the parties' agreements.[22]

On 2 September 2008, HGC filed its opposition to the admission of R-II Builders' Second AmendedComplainton the ground that respondent RTC had no jurisdiction to act on the case until payment of thecorrect docket fees and that said pleading was intended for delay and introduced a new theoryinconsistent with the original complaint and theAmended and Supplemental Complaint. Claiming that

R-II Builders had defied respondent court's 19 May 2008 order by refusing to pay the correct docketfees, HGC additionally moved for the dismissal of the case pursuant to Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997Rules of Civil Procedure.[23] On 24 November 2008, R-II Builders also filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion


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for Annotation of Lis Pendens on the titles of the properties in theAsset Pool, on the ground that HGChad sold and/or was intending to dispose of portions thereof, in violation of the writ of preliminaryinjunction issued in the premises.[24] Finding that jurisdiction over the case was already acquired uponpayment of the docket fees for the original complaint and that the Second Amended Complaintwasneither intended for delay nor inconsistent with R-II Builders' previous pleadings, respondent RTC issuedits first assailed order dated 3 March 2009 which: (a) denied HGC's motion to dismiss; (b) granted R-IIBuilders' motion to admit its Second Amended Complaint; and, (c) noted R-II Builders'Urgent Ex-Parte

Motion for Annotation ofLis Pendens, to which the attention of the Manila Register of Deeds wasadditionally called.[25]

Undaunted, HGC filed its 22 March 2009 motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order, arguing that:(a) the case is real action and the docket fees paid by R-II Builders were grossly insufficient because theestimated value of properties in theAsset Poolexceeds P5,000,000,000.00; (b) a complaint cannot beamended to confer jurisdiction when the court had none; (c) the RTC should have simply deniedthe Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Annotation ofLis Pendens instead of rendering an advisory opinionthereon. In addition, HGC faulted R-II Builders with forum shopping, in view of its 10 September 2008filing of the complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 08-63416 before Branch 91 of the Quezon City RTC,involving a claim for receivables from the NHA.[26] In turn, R-II Builders opposed the foregoingmotion[27] and, on the theory that theAsset Poolwas still in danger of dissipation, filed an urgent motionto resolve its application for the appointment of a receiver and submitted its nominees for said position.[28]

On 29 September 2009, respondent RTC issued its second assailed order which (a) denied HGC's motionfor reconsideration; (b) granted R-II Builders' application for appointment of receiver and, for saidpurpose: [i] appointed Atty. Danilo Concepcion as Receiver and, [ii] directed R-II Builders to post a bondin the sum of P10,000,000.00.[29] Imputing grave abuse of discretion against the RTC for not dismissingthe case and for granting R-II Builders' application for receivership, HGC filed the Rule 65 petition forcertiorari and prohibition docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 111153 before the CA[30] which, thru its FormerSpecial Fifteenth Division, rendered the herein assailed 21 January 2010 decision,[31]upon the followingfindings and conclusions:

a) Irrespective of whether it is real or one incapable of pecuniary estimation, the action commenced byR-II Builders indubitably falls squarely within the jurisdiction of respondent RTC;

b) From the allegations of R-II Builders' original complaint and amended complaint the character of the

relief primarily sought, i.e., the declaration of nullity of the DAC, the action before respondent RTC isone where the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

c) R-II Builders need not pay any deficiency in the docket fees considering its withdrawal of itsAmendedand Supplemental Complaint;

d) A receiver may be appointed without formal hearing, particularly when it is within the interest of bothparties and does not result in the delay of any government infrastructure projects or economicdevelopment efforts;

e) Respondent RTC's act of calling the attention of the Manila Registrar of Deeds to R-II Builders' UrgentEx-Parte Motion for Annotation of Lis Pendens is well-within its residual power to act on matters beforeit; and

f) The withdrawal of R-II Builders'Amended and Supplemental Complaintdiscounted the forum

shopping imputed against it by HGC.[32]

HGC's motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision[33] was denied for lack of merit in the CA'sresolution dated 21 June 2010, hence, this petition.

The Issues

HGC urges the affirmative of the following issues in urging the grant of its petition, to wit:

"Did the Honorable Court ofAppeals Seriously Err When It

Failed to Rule That:

I. The Regional Trial Court a quo had no jurisdiction to proceed with the case considering

that:


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(1) the original court was without authority to hear the case and;

(2) despite an unequivocal order from the trial court a quo, Private Respondent (R-IIBuilders) failed and refused to pay the correct and proper docket fees, whether it be for a real

or personal action, based on the values of the properties or claims subject of the complaints.

II. Since the Honorable Court of Appeals had characterized the case as a personal action, the

action before the Regional Trial Court a quo should have been dismissed for improper venue.

III. The order appointing a receiver was made with grave abuse of discretion as amounting to

lack of jurisdiction for having been issued under the following circumstances:

(1) It was made without a hearing and without any evidence of its necessity;

(2) It was unduly harsh and totally unnecessary in view of other available remedies,especially considering that Petitioner HGC is conclusively presumed to be solvent;

(3) It effectively prevented the performance of HGC's functions in recovering upon itsguaranty exposure and was in contravention of Presidential Decree Nos. 385 and 1818,

Republic Act No. 8927 and Supreme Court Circular Nos. 2-91, 13-93, 68-94 andAdministrative Circular No. 11-00."[34]

Acting on HGC's motion for resolution of its application for a temporary restraining order and/orpreliminary injunction,[35] the Court issued the resolution dated 23 August 2010, enjoining theenforcement of respondent RTC's assailed orders.[36]

The Court's Ruling

We find the petition impressed with merit.

Jurisdiction is defined as the authority to hear and determine a cause or the right to act in a case.[37] Inaddition to being conferred by the Constitution and the law,[38] the rule is settled that a court's

jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the relevant allegations in the complaint,[39] the lawin effect when the action is filed,[40] and the character of the relief sought irrespective of whether theplaintiff is entitled to all or some of the claims asserted.[41] Consistent with Section 1, Rule 141 of

the Revised Rules of Courtwhich provides that the prescribed fees shall be paid in full "upon the filing ofthe pleading or other application which initiates an action or proceeding", the well-entrenched rule is tothe effect that a court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed filingand docket fees.[42]

The record shows that R-II Builders' original complaint dated 23 August 2005 was initially docketed asCivil Case No. 05-113407 before Branch 24 of the Manila, a designated Special Commercial Court.[43]With HGC's filing of a motion for a preliminary hearing on the affirmative defenses asserted in itsanswer[44] and R-II Builders' filing of itsAmended and Supplemental Complaintdated 31 July 2007,[45] said court issued an order dated 2 January 2008 ordering the re-raffle of the case upon the findingthat the same is not an intra-corporate dispute.[46] In a clarificatory order dated 1 February 2008,[47] thesame court significantly took cognizance of its lack of jurisdiction over the case in the following wise:

At the outset, it must be stated that this Court is a designated Special Commercial Court tasked to try

and hear, among others, intra-corporate controversies to the exclusion of ordinary civil cases.

When the case was initially assigned to this Court, it was classified as an intra-corporate case. However,in the ensuing proceedings relative to the affirmative defences raised by defendants, even the plaintiffconceded that the case is not an intra-corporate controversy or even if it is, this Court is withoutauthority to hear the same as the parties are all housed in Quezon City.

Thus, the more prudent course to take was for this Court to declare that it does not have the authorityto hear the complaint it being an ordinary civil action. As to whether it is personal or civil, this Courtwould rather leave the resolution of the same to Branch 22 of this Court. (Italics supplied).

We find that, having squarely raised the matter in its Rule 65 petition for certiorariand prohibitiondocketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 111153,[48] HGC correctly faults the CA for not finding that Branch 24 of theManila RTC had no authority to order the transfer of the case to respondent RTC.[49] Being outside the

jurisdiction of Special Commercial Courts, the rule is settled that cases which are civil in nature, like theone commenced by R-II Builders, should be threshed out in a regular court.[50] With its acknowledgedlack of jurisdiction over the case, Branch 24 of the Manila RTC should have ordered the dismissal of the


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complaint, since a court without subject matter jurisdiction cannot transfer the case to another court.[51]Instead, it should have simply ordered the dismissal of the complaint, considering that the affirmativedefenses for which HGC sought hearing included its lack of jurisdiction over the case.

Calleja v. Panday,[52] while on facts the other way around, i.e., a branch of the RTC exercisingjurisdiction over a subject matter within the Special Commercial Court's authority, dealt squarely withthe issue:

Whether a branch of the Regional Trial Court which has no jurisdiction to try and decide a case hasauthority to remand the same to another co-equal Court in order to cure the defects on venue and

jurisdiction.

Calleja ruled on the issue, thus:

Such being the case, RTC Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer ofthe case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on thematter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Certainly, the pronouncement of Br. 24, the Special Commercial Court, in its Joint Order of 2 January2008 that the case is not an intracorporate controversy, amplified in its Order of 1 February 2008 that it"does not have the authority to hear the complaint it being an ordinary civil action" is incompatible with

the directive for the re-raffle of the case and to "leave the resolution of the same to Branch 22 of thisCourt." Such a directive is an exercise of authority over the case, which authority it had in the samebreath declared it did not have. What compounds the jurisdictional error is the fact that at the time of itssurrender of jurisdiction, Br. 24 had already acted on the case and had in fact, on 26 October 2005,issued the writ of preliminary injunction sought by herein respondent R-II Builders. At that point, therewas absolutely no reason which could justify a re-raffle of the case considering that the order that wassupposed to have caused the re-raffle was not an inhibition of the judge but a declaration of absence of

jurisdiction. So faulty was the order of re-raffle that it left the impression that its previously issuedpreliminary injunction remained effective since the case from which it issued was not dismissed butmerely transferred to another court. A re-raffle which causes a transfer of the case involves courts withthe same subject matter jurisdiction; it cannot involve courts which have different jurisdictions exclusiveof the other. More apt in this case, a re-raffle of a case cannot cure a jurisdictional defect.

Prescinding from the foregoing considerations, and to show that the proceedings below was error upon

error, we find that the CA also gravely erred in not ruling that respondent RTC's (Branch 22, the regularcourt) jurisdiction over the case was curtailed by R-II Builders' failure to pay the correct docket fees. Inother words, the jurisdictionally flawed transfer of the case from Branch 24, the SCC to Branch 22, theregular court, is topped by another jurisdictional defect which is the non-payment of the correct docketfees. In its order dated 19 May 2008 which admitted R-II Builders'Amended and SupplementalComplaint, respondent RTC distinctly ruled that the case was a real action and ordered the re-computation and payment of the correct docket fees.[53] In patent circumvention of said order, however,R-II Builders filed its 14 August 2008 motion to admit its Second Amended Complaintwhich effectivelydeleted its causes of action for accounting and conveyance of title to and/or possession of theentireAsset Pooland, in addition to reducing the claim for attorney's fees and seeking its appointmentas a receiver, reinstated its cause of action for resolution of the DAC.[54] Acting on said motion as well asthe opposition and motion to dismiss interposed by HGC,[55] respondent RTC ruled as follows in itsassailed 3 March 2009 order,[56] to wit:

1. The docket fees of the original complaint has been paid, thus, the Court already acquired jurisdictionover the instant case. The admission of the Amended and Supplemental Complaint, is subject to thepayment of docket fees pursuant to the Order of this Court dated May 18, 2008. The non-payment ofthe docket fees stated in the Order dated May 18, 2008 will result only in the non-admission of theAmended and Supplemental Complaint, which means that the Original Complaint remains. However,since the Amended and Supplemental Complaint is being withdrawn and in lieu thereof a new AmendedComplaint is sought to be admitted, there is no more need to pay the docket fees as provided for in thesaid Order.

2. It is settled that once jurisdiction is acquired and vested in a Court, said Court maintains itsjurisdiction until judgment is had (Aruego, Jr., et al. vs. CA). Such acquired jurisdiction is not lost by theamendment of a pleading that raises additional/new cause(s) of action. The jurisdiction of a Court is noteven lost even if the additional docket fees are required by reason of the amendment.

Indeed, the Supreme Court held in PNOC vs. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 107518, October 8, 1998) that:

"Its failure to pay the docket fee corresponding to its increased claim for damages under the


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amended complaint should not be considered as having curtailed the lower court's jurisdiction. Pursuantto the ruling in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion, the unpaid docket fees should beconsidered as a lien on the judgment even though private respondent specified the amount ofP600,000.00 as its claim for damages in its amended complaint.

Thus, even on the assumption that additional docket fees are required as a consequence of anyamended complaint, its non-payment will not result in the court's loss of jurisdiction over the case.[57]

Distinctly, the principal reference remained to be the "original complaint," in which R-II Builders itselfsubmitted that the case "is a real action as it affects title and possession of real property or interesttherein." It was precisely this submission which was the basis of the conclusion of the SCC court, Br. 24that the case is not an intra-corporate controversy and therefore is outside its authority.

We see from the assailed Order that the regular court accepted the case on the reason that "the docketfees of the original complaint has been paid," so that, furthermore, the Amended and SupplementalComplaint may be admitted "subject to the payment of docket fees." When the required fees were notpaid, the court considered it as resulting in the non-admission of the Amended and SupplementalComplaint such that "the original complaint remains."

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