lynch three questions for truth pluralism

ThreeQuestionsforTruthPluralismMICHAELP.LYNCH1. Threequestions

Truthpluralism,asIunderstandit,isametaphysicaltheoryaboutthenatureoftruth.Itisthereforeconcernedwiththatinvirtueofwhichpropositionsaretrue,whentheyareluckyenoughtobetrue.Incontrasttomonists,whoholdthatthereisonlyonepropertyofpropositionsinvirtueofwhichtheyaretrue,anddeflationists,whocanbeunderstood,crudely,todenythatthereisanysuchproperty(oranyinterestingproperty),thepluralistseekstowidentheplayingfield.1Sheendorses

PLURALISM:thereismorethanonepropertyofpropositionsinvirtueofwhichpropositionsaretrue.

Whilethereare,aswe’llsee,arangeofpluralist

positionsontruth,thebasicideabehindmostversionsisthatwhilesomepropositionsaretrueinvirtueofsay,correspondingtoreality,othersmaybetruebyvirtueofpossessingsomeepistemicproperty,suchas:

SUPERWARRANT:PissuperwarrantedjustwhenbelievingPiswarrantedatsomestageofinquiryandwouldremainwarrantedwithoutdefeatateverysuccessivestageofinquiry.2

Onebasicmotivationforpluralism—nottheonly

motivation,butanimportantone–isthatithascertaintheoreticalbenefitsthatitsrivalslack.Monisttheorieshave

1CrispinWrightisthemostimportantadvocateofpluralism;hisoriginalstatementisWright,1992;someimportantrevisionstohisviewweremadeinhis2001:there,ashere,thepositionispresentedintermsofproperties.2ThisnotionisobviouslyderivativeofCrispinWright’snotionofsuperassertbility.Forarelatedepistemicnotionoftruth,seePutnam,1982.

Lynch:ThreeQuestionsforTruthPluralism

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alwaysseentruthasanexplanatorilyrichnotion:understandingthenatureoftruthhelpsusunderstandthenatureknowledge,contentandthenormsofthought.Buttraditionaltheoriesfacecounterexamples,andcounterexamplesofaparticularform.Suchtheoriesworkwell‐enoughasaccountsofhowsomepropositionsaretrue,butfailwhenwithregardtoothers.Themostplausiblecorrespondencetheories,forexample,areplausiblewhenappliedtopropositionsaboutthecolorofsnow,butgenerateproblemswhenappliedtonormativeandmathematicalpropositions.3Epistemictheories–whethertheyareunpackedintermsofsuperwarrantorcoherence—seemonfirmergroundwhenappliedtonormativepropositions,butlessplausiblewhenappliedtopropositionsaboutmiddle‐sizeddrygoods.

Thesepatternsoffailurehavemotivatedmanyphilosopherswhothinkabouttruthforalivingtopursuedeflationism.Thebasicdeflationaryinsightisthatwecanknowallweneedtoknowabouttruthbylookingatitsfunction.Andthatfunction,saysthedeflationist,isreallyverysimple:ourconceptoftruthdoesn’tworktopickoutaninterestingpropertyofpropositions,itsimplyservesasanexpressivedevice:itallowsustoovercomeourbiologicallimitationsandgeneralizeoverinfinitestringsofpropositions.Butasmostdeflationistswillacknowledge,theypayapriceforthissimpleaccountoftruth:theyremovetruthfromourexplanatoryresources.Wecannolongeruseittohelpexplaincontent,ormeaning,orthenormsofthought.4

Primafacie,thepluralistseemspoisedtotakeadvantageoftheotherapproaches’shortcomings.Sheclaimsthatdifferentpropositionscanbetruebyvirtueofdistinctproperties.So,likethetraditionalist,thepluralistcanseeminglyallow,ifshewishes,thattruthcanhaveexplanatoryvalue.Wemightevenbeabletoappealtothedifferentkindsoftruthtoexplainthedifferentkindsofcontentourpropositionalattitudesenjoy.5AndasI’llarguebelow,pluralism–seeninits

3ByaplausiblecorrespondencetheoryoftruththatgoesbeyondsimplyaffirmingthecorrespondenceorObjectivityplatitudeabouttruth,butexplainssuchplatitudesbyappealtoatheoryofcorrespondence,orwhatincontemporarytermsiscalledrepresentation.SeeWittgenstein(1922);RussellseeLynch2009.4Forexplicitacknowledgementsofthissort,seeforexample,Horwich,1998andMichaelWilliams,2001.5SeeLynch2009forjustsuchanattempt.


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bestlight—alsosharesakeycommitmentwithdeflationism:theideathatthekeytotruth’snatureisthroughitsfunction.

Naturally,pluralism’stheoreticaladvantages(anditscosts)arebestappreciatedafterwegetaclearsenseoftheviewitself.Indeed,aswithanynewview,makingsenseofitishalfthebattle.Sointhisessay,Iaimtoclarifypluralismbyconcentratingonthreequestionsanypluralisttheoryoftruthmustanswer:

• Howdoweidentifythepropertiesinvirtueofwhichpropositionsaretrue?

• Howarethosepropertiesrelatedtotruth?• Whatdetermineswhetheragivenpropositionhasone

ofthosepropertiesratherthananother?Clearly,thesearen’tjustquestionsforpluralists.Anysubstantiveviewoftruthmustfacethem.Noraretheytheonlyquestionsfacingpluralists.Yettheyarecertainlyamongthemostbasic.Consequently,itpaysforanyonesympathetictotheviewtogivethesequestionsseriousattention.Butmyaimwillnotbesolelyclarificatory.Iwillmakeacaseforaspecificanswertoeach,buildingonsomeoftheviewsIdefendedinTruthasOneandMany(hereafterTOM).2. Whatmakesatheoryatheoryoftruth?

Alethicpluralismisametaphysicalviewoftruth.Likeanyothermetaphysicsoftruth,itisdistinctfromviewsabouttheconceptoftruth,orthemeaningofthetruthpredicate,andagainfromanaccountofhowwefixthatpredicate’sreference.Nonetheless,itisclearthatsomethingneedstobesaidaboutanissuethat,attheveryleast,isintheneighborhoodoftheseotherquestions.Anynon‐deflationaryviewoftruthtakesitthatthereissomepropertyFoftruepropositionsinvirtueofwhichtheyaretrue.SomeofthoseviewswilltakeitthatFistruth.OthersmayholdthattruthsupervenesonF.Butwhicheverwayoneendsupgoingonthatquestion,wewillneedtobegivensomereasonforthinkingthatFhas–toputitbluntly—anythingtodowithtruth.AndthatmeansweneedsomewayofnarrowingdownthecandidatesforF–onethatrulesoutobviousnon‐starters.

Asitturnsout,thisisnotaquestionthatonlythepluralistmustanswer.Anyviewoftruthmustsaysomethingaboutwhatwouldqualifyasapropertyinvirtueofwhichpropositionsaretrue.Thisisbecauseourfirstquestionis


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reallyjustaninstanceofamoregeneralissue.Whatmakesagivenmetaphysicaltheoryoftruthatheoryoftruth,ratherthanatheoryofsomeotherthing? Indoingmetaphysics,wearelookforrealessences—weseektounderstandthenatureofcausation,identity,mind.Yetinordertosearchforsomething,youmustalreadyknowsomethingaboutit,otherwiseyouwon’tknowifyouhavefoundit.Soinsearchingfortherealessenceofsomething,wemustalreadyhavesomebeliefsaboutit.Callthesebeliefsitsnominalessence.Thenominalessenceofsomething,inthesenseIintendhere,isthesetoflargelytacitbeliefswefolkhaveaboutit.Byappealingtothosefolkbeliefs,ortruisms,wewon’tlearneverythingabouttheobjectorpropertyweareinterestedin.Andourlaterdiscoveriesmayforceustoreviseourpreconceptionsofit.Buthoweverthesequestionsplayout,keepingoneeyeonourfolkbeliefsaboutthethingaboutwhichwearecuriouswillhopefullytelluswhetheroursubsequenttheoriesofitsnatureaddressthetopicwewereconcernedwithwhenourtheorizingbegan.6

Whatappliesinmetaphysicsgenerallyappliestothemetaphysicsoftruth.Thissuggestsasimpleanswertoourquestion.AtheoryisabouttruthasopposedtosomethingelseifitincorporatesmostofwhatI’llcallthecoretruismsabouttruth–thenominalessenceoftruth.Sowhatarethese?Welloneobviouscontenderisthetruismcelebratedbycorrespondencetheoriesoftruth:theideathattruthisobjective.Tospeaktrulyisto“sayofwhatis,thatitis”,asAristotlesaid.7Andsincewhatwesay,atleastwhenwearesincere,isanexpressionofwhatwebelieveorjudge,aparalleltruismholdsabouttruepropositionswebelieve.Thatis,

Objectivity: True propositions are those that whenwebelievethem,thingsareaswebelievethemtobe8.

6Thestrategyisofcoursefamiliar.SeeJackson(1998)andCrispinWright(1992).7MetaphysicsΓ.7.27,(1993).8Togetherwithsomefurtherandreasonablyobviousassumptions,Objectivityunderwritesfurtherderivativeprincipleswhicharetypicallyhighlightedbyphilosophers.Onerelatedprincipleisthatwhen,forexample,Ibelievethatrosesarered,thingsareasIbelievethemtobejustwhenrosesarered.Thatis,

WithrespecttothebeliefP,thingsareastheyarebelievedtobeif,andonlyif,P.


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Twomoreobviouscontendersareplatitudescelebratedbyepistemictheoriesoftruthsuchasclassicalpragmatisttheories:

EndofInquiry:Truepropositionsarethoseweshouldaimtobelievewhenengagingininquiry.

NormofBelief:Truepropositionsarethosethatarecorrecttobelieve.

Therearedoubtlessmanyotherobviousandfundamentalplatitudesabouttruth,butthehistoricalimportanceofthesethreesuggesttheyareamongthemostcentral.Theyconnecttruthtoinquiry,belief,andobjectivebeing—howthingsare.Itisdifficulttodenythattruthhastheserelationsintheplatitudinoussenseidentifiedbythetruisms.Wewouldfinditpuzzling,tosaytheleast,ifsomeoneclaimedtobelievetrulythatrosesareredbutdeniedthatthisishowthingsare.Wewouldaskforanexplanation,andifnonewasforthcoming,we’dsuspectthatthattheymeansomethingdifferentby“believingtruly”thanwhatwemean.Likewise,withEndofInquiry:ifyoudon’tthinkthattruthis,otherthingsbeingequal,whatwearetryingtogetatwhenaskingquestions,thenyouareprobablyusing‘‘truth’’totalkaboutsomethingotherthanwhattherestofususethosewordstotalkabout.

Callsuchtruismscoretruisms.Coretruismsabouttruthcannotbedeniedwithoutsignificanttheoreticalconsequenceandlossofplausibility.Ifyoudodenyanyoneofthem,youmustbepreparedtoexplainhowthiscanbesointhefaceofintuitiveopposition.Anddenyingmanyorallwouldmeanthat,attheveryleast,otherusersoftheconceptwouldbejustifiedastakingyoutobechangingthesubject.9 Twopointstoallaymisunderstanding.First,insayingthattheseprinciplesaretruisms,Idon’tmeanthattheyareconsciouslyendorsedbyallthefolk.Theyarethesortsofprincipleswebelievetacitly.AndwhatsomeonetacitlyWiththispointinhand,wecanderive,togetherwiththeideathatitisthepropositionwhichisbelievedthatisprimarilytrueorfalse,instancesoftheequivalenceschema

TS:ThepropositionPistrueifandonlyifP.

9Foranearlier,andsomewhatdifferentdiscussionoftruisms,seetheexchangebetweenmyselfandCoryWright(Lynch,2005,C.D.Wright,2005).


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believesismoreoftenrevealedinactionthaninverbalreports.Sothefactthat,e.g.manycollegefreshmanwouldappeartodenyObjectivitybysayingthat“whatistrueformemightnotbetrueforyou”doesn’tmeanthattheythinkthatbelievingmakesitso.Mostfreshmen,Ithink,aren’tgoingtoactconsistentlywiththeideathatbeliefissufficientfortruth.Second,thefactthatthereisdisagreementamongstexpertsaboutwhicharethecoretruismsdoesn’timplythattherearenosuchtruisms,orthatwedon’ttacitlybelievesomeratherthanothers.Nobodyeversaiditwouldbeeasytospecifythecontentofourtacitbeliefsaboutmattersascomplicatedastruth.

OntheviewI’msuggesting,then,whatmakesatheoryabouttruthratherthansomethingelseisthatitincorporatesthecoretruisms,inthesenseofeitherincludingthemamongtheprinciplesofthetheoryorincludingprinciplesthatdirectlyentailthem.Andwe’llcountitasaTHEORYoftruth(asopposedtojustachataboutitsay)justwhenitexplainsthosetruisms.Andanobviouswaytodothatistoshowwhytheyaretruebypointingtosomepropertyorpropertiesthatalltruepropositionshavethatresultsinthosepropositionssatisfyingthetruisms.Suchapropertywillhavethefeaturesdescribedbythecoretruisms.Featuresofthissortcouldobviouslybecalledcorefeatures.Butinthepresentcasewhatwemightaswellcallthemthetruishfeatures.3. Afunctionalanalysis

Ourfirstquestionforapluralisttheoryoftruthwas:howdoweidentifythepropertiesinvirtueofwhichpropositionsaretrue?Wenowhaveananswer.Apropertydeterminesthatapropositionistruewhenithasthetruishfeatures.Thatis:

TRUISH:Apropertydeterminesthatpropositionsaretruejustwhenitissuchthatpropositionswhichhaveitareobjective,correcttobelieve,andthoseweshouldaimtobelieveininquiry.

Thetruishfeaturesarerelational;theyspecifythattruthhasaroleinastructureofinterrelatedproperties,revealedbythefolktruisms–whatwecalleditsnominalessence.Theremaybeotherfeaturesthatarepartoftruth’snominalessenceofcourse,featuresthat—whilepossiblygoingbeyondthecore—alsohelptodemarcatetruthinastructureofrelations.Theseincluderelationstoassertion,negation,andlogical


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consequence.Butatitsheart,thatstructureconnectstruthwithbelief,inquiryandobjectivebeing.

This,ineffect,isthebasicinsightandstartingpointofwhatI’veelsewherecalledthefunctionalisttheoryoftruth.Theguidingideaofthatviewisthatwethinkofthecoretruismsasrevealingwhattruthdoes–itsfunctionalrole.Thatis,

(F)(∀x)xistrueif,andonlyif,xhasapropertythatplaysthetruth‐role.

Ineffect,ourdiscussionabovetellsuswhatconstitutesplayingthetruth‐role.Apropertyplaysthetruthrolewhenithasthetruishfeatures.Moreover,thisidea—theideathattruepropositionshaveapropertythathasthetruishfeatures(orwecannowsay:“playsthetruth‐role”)—isaconsequenceofwhatittakesforatheorytoevencountasatheoryoftruth.Thesefeaturestelluswhatapropertymustbeliketoplaythetruth‐role.10Thuswhileweinitiallyappealedtothetruishfeaturesonlytohelpidentifythatpropertyorpropertiesthatplaysthetruth‐role,itseemswarrantedtogofurtherandtakethosetruishfeaturesasdefiningthatrole.Thismeanstreatingthetruishfeaturesasfeaturesoftruth’snominalessencethatareconceptuallyessential—essentialbywayoftheveryconceptoftruth.11

Understoodinthisway,ourfunctionalunderstandingoftruthispresupposedinourgraspoftheconcept.12Not10Asjustnoted,therewillbeotherfeatures,andpossiblyothercorefeatures,thatwillhelpusdemarcatethetruth‐role.Specifyingtheextentandlimitsofthesefeaturesoftruth,anddeterminingwhicharemorecentrallyweightedthanothers,isanimportantfurtherprojectforthealethicfunctionalist,justasitisforfunctionalistsinthephilosophyofmind.Buthoweverthosequestionsaredecided,thebasicfunctionalistideatruth’sconceptuallyessentialfeaturesjointlydefinethetruth‐role.SeeLynch,2009,chapter1formorediscussion.11Obviously,noteveryessentialfeatureofapropertyisconceptuallyessential.Beingidenticaltoitselforbeingdistinctfromthenumber1arebothfeaturesoftruth,forexample.Butneitherservestoidentifytruth(theydon’tdistinguishtruthfromotherproperties)andcertainlyneitherisaconceptualtruthabouttruth.CompareDavid’sremarks,thisvolume.12Inarecentarticle,CoryWrightarguesthatfunctionalistviewsfaceaproblemofepistemiccircularity.Wrighthasinmindversionsoftheviewthatexplicitlyemployramsificationtechniquesformakinganimplicitdefinitionoftruth(seeLynch2001,2004).Suchtechniquesareuseful,butasourdiscussionillustrates,theyarenotnecessarytomakethefunctionalist’sbasicpoint.Nonetheless,Wrightmaysuspecthisworryis


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surprisingly,then,themajormetaphysicaltheoriesoftruth’snatureareperfectlyconsistentwithit.Takeastandardmonisttheorysuchasthecorrespondencetheoryoftruth.Understoodfromafunctionalperspective,thisistheviewthatthereisonlyonepropertythathasthetruishfeatures,andwhichthereforeplaysthetruth‐role:thecorrespondenceproperty.Evendeflationisttheoriescanbeunderstoodinthisway.Indeed,deflationistsareobviouslyfunctionalists:theytellusthattruth’snatureisexhaustedbyitsfunction,whichbytheiraccountisquitethin:truthfunctionsasanexpressivedevice,andthatisall.Consequently,ontheirview,truthdoeshaveafunctionalrole,andthatrole,insofarasitisplayedbyanypropertyatall,isplayedbythepropertyofbeinganexpressivedevice.

Sothefunctionalisttheoryitselfisnotametaphysicaltheoryofthenatureoftruth.Itdoesn’ttelluswhattruthis.Butitdoesgiveusawayofansweringaquestionthatanymetaphysicoftruthmustanswer,andaquestionthatisparticularlyimportantforpluralism.Ittellsushowtoidentifythepropertiesthatmakejudgmentstrue.Theyarethepropertiestheplaythetruth‐roleorhavethetruishfeatures.

Indeed,itisdifficulttoseewhatothersortofanswerapluralistcangivetoourquestion.Pluralismistheviewthatthereismorethanoneproperty,F1…Fninvirtueofwhichpropositionsaretrue.EitherF1….Fnpossesthetruishfeaturesortheydonot.Iftheydo,thentheyallhavesomethingincommon:theyallsatisfythetruisms–whichistosaythattheyallfallunderthesame(functional)description.Iftheydonot,then,thenforreasonsadducedabove,weshouldnotregardthepositionasatheoryoftruthatall.Itistheview,instead,thattheword“true”picksoutvariousproperties,noneofwhichhaveanythingtruishincommon.Thiswould,ineffect,beaformofeliminativismabouttruth,notpluralism.

Asimilardilemmaconfrontsanyonewhotakes“true”tobestraightforwardlyambiguousliketheword“bank”–thatis,asawordwithmorethanonemeaningandreferent.Eitherthepropertiesreferredtobythepredicatebearthenominal

moregeneral;hesays:“Butanyimplicitdefinitionproceedsonthebasisofexplicitdecisionsthattheprinciplesconstitutiveof[therelevantramseysentence]arethemselvestrue.Hencethecircularity.Inturn,makinganyexplicitdecisionsthattheyaretruerequiresalreadyknowinginadvancewhattruthis.Hencetheepistemiccircularity.”(Wright,2010).Thisisageneralproblem–butitis,Iwouldsuggest,toogeneraltobejustaproblemforthepluralist.Anyattempttodefine–orevenfixthereferenceof–“true”–byappealtowhatI’vecalledtruismswillfacesuchaproblem.Butthentheproblemisoneforanyview.


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essenceoftruthincommon,ortheydon’t.Iftheydo,thenwhynottakethatsharednominalessenceasthecommonmeaningof“true”?Iftheydon’t,thenitismisleadingtosaythat,“thereismorethanonewaytobetrue”.Thereisnotmorethanonewaytobeabank.RiverbanksandtheBankofAmericaarenottwowaystobethesamething.Therearesimplydifferentmeaningstotheword.Analogouslywithanambiguityviewabout“true”.Whatwebelievedwasincommonbetweenthedifferentuses,has,onthisview,beeneliminated.13

Sowenowhaveawayforthepluralisttoidentifythosepropertiesinvirtueofwhichpropositionsaretrue.Butwestillneedaddressoursecondquestion:tosaywhattruthis–andhowitisrelatedtothosepropertiesthatdetermineit.Herethefunctionalistfacessomeoptions.4. TheNatureofTruth:Fourinitialoptions

Iftheaboveremarksareright,pluralistsmustbefunctionalistsabouttheconceptoftruth,oratleastabouthowweidentifythereferent(s)ofthatconcept.Butthatstillleavesopenoursecondquestion,whichishowtorelatethevariouspropertiespluralistsarepluralistsabouttothepropertyoftruthitself.Herearefouroptionsforthepluralistcumfunctionalist:Truthistherealizerproperty.Onthisview,thereisasinglefunctionalconceptoftruth,butitpicksoutdifferentpropertieswhenascribedtodifferentkindsofpropositions.14ThisistheversionofpluralismdefendedbyCrispinWright(2001).Theconceptactsasanon‐rigiddefinitedescription.Inthisway,“true”islike“thecoloroftheskyatnoon”.Thelatterphraseexpressesasingleuniformconcept,butitdenotesdifferentpropertiesindifferentenvironmentalcontexts.Analogously,“true”expressesasingledescription(asgivenbyTruishabove)butthatdescriptionapplies(orcanapply)todistinctproperties.Henceonthisview,wemightsaythattruthjustiswhateverpropertyplaysthetruth‐roleforagivenkindofproposition.

Realizerfunctionalismisreductiveinnature,andthusakintootherreductivefunctionalisms,suchasthose13Forfurtherproblemswithsuchaview,seeLynch,2009,Pedersen2006,Tappolet1997.14AlengthierdiscussionofCrispinWright’spositioncanbefoundinLynch2006.


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championedbyLewis(1980)andKim(1998)withregardtopsychologicalproperties.Onthissortofview,thereisnofactaboutwhether,e.g.,xisinpainoverandabovewhetherxhassomephysicalpropertyP,andso“thereisnoneedtothinkof[pain]itselfasapropertyinitsownright”(Kim1998,104).Realizerpluralismisparallel:thereisnofactofthematterwhetherapropositionistrueoverandabovewhetherithassomelower‐levelpropertylikesuperwarrantorcorrespondence.Consequently,“truth”doesnotnameapropertysharedbyalltruths.

Realizerfunctionalismhasitsattractions,butitfacessomeby‐nowfamiliarproblems.Oneofthemostdiscussedconcernsthetruthof“mixed”compoundpropositions.15Considertheproposition

(W)Waterboardingispainfulandwaterboardingiswrong.

Intuitively,theconjunctsofthispropositionareofdistinctkinds.Oneisnormative,theothernot.Soaccordingtorealizerpluralism,thetruthconceptexpressesdistinctpropertieswhenascribedtooneconjunct(somecorrespondencepropertysay)andanotherproperty(superwarrantsay)whenascribedtotheother.Butifso,whatpropertydoesitpickoutwhenascribedto(W)asawhole? Thisisasignificantproblem,andnotjustforrealizerfunctionalism,aswe’llseebelow.Butitisparticularlydamningforanyview,likerealizerfunctionalism,whichdeniesthatthereisa“global”truthproperty–apropertyexpressedbythetruthconceptthatappliesacrosstheboardtopropositionsofeverytype.Indeed,asanumberofauthorshaveargued,tseemsthatanysatisfactoryresolutionoftheproblemwillrequirejustsuchaproperty(Tappolet,1997,Lynch,2006,Pedersen2010,Cotnoir2009). Asecondproblemforrealizerfunctionalismisthatunderminesoneofthemotivationsforadoptingpluralisminthefirstplace.Aswejustnoted,theanalogouspositioninthephilosophyofmindimpliesthatpainisnotarealpsychologicalkind.Thereisnothingincommon,inotherwords,betweenthestateswedescribeaspain‐statesindogsandthestateswedescribeaspain‐statesinhumans.Consequentlytheviewgivesuptheabilitytoappealtopainassuchingeneralpsychological

15AsamplingoftheliteraturehereincludesWilliamson,1994;Tappolet2000;N.Pedersen2006,Edwards2008,2009,Cotnoir2009.


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explanation.Andthisisaloss.Forwedofinditusefulandinformativetotalkaboutpainassuchinordertoexplainotherthingsofpsychologicalinterest,suchasfear,oranger.Asimilarlossoccurswithrealizerfunctionalismabouttruth.Itimpliesthattruepropositionsdonotformarealkind.Theonlypropertysharedbyallandonlytruepropositionsisonethatisnot,bythelightsofthetheoryitself,ascribedbyouruseof‘‘true’’ordenotedby‘‘truth’’.Consequently,thereisnopropertyweascribeby‘‘true’’thatcanbeappealedtoinordertoexplaincertaingeneralfacts.Onesuchgeneralfact,forexample,wemightwishtoexplainis

Unity:beliefswithradicallydistinctkindsofcontentareequallyaptforonekindofnormativeassessment.

Wemightputthisbysayingthattheyareopentobeingassessedascorrectinthesamesortofway.Whatexplainsthis?Thesimpleexplanationisthatbeliefsarecorrectwhentheyhavethepropertytruth.Ofcourse,tothosewhoalreadybelievethattruthassuchhasnogeneralexplanatoryroletoplay—whobelievethatitdoesnotfigureinexplaininganythingelseofinterestsuchasbelief,orcontentormeaning—thiswillnotbetroubling.Butthentheywillnothaveneededrealizerfunctionalismtoreachthatconclusion.Buttothosewhoseetruthasatleastapotentiallyvaluableexplanatoryresource,realizerpluralismremainsdissatisfying.Truthistheroleproperty.Thisview(Lynch,2001,2004,2006)attemptstoavoidtheaboveproblemsbyidentifyingtruthwithwhatissometimescalledthe“role”property:orthepropertyofhavingapropertythatplaysthetruth‐role.Thisallowsonetosaythatthereisasinglepropertyoftruth.HencethereisnobarriertoUnity:anypropositioniscorrectjustwhentrue–thatis,justwhenithasthepropertyofhavingapropertythatplaysthetruth‐role. Butthispositionisultimatelyunsatisfying.First,likeitscousin‘realizertruthfunctionalism’itsaysnothingaboutmixedconjunctionsotherthantheyaretruewhentheyhavethepropertyofhavingapropertythatplaysthetruth‐role.Butitdoesn’ttelluswhatpropertyamixedconjunctionhasthatplaysthetruth‐role. Second,thepropertyofhavingapropertythatplaysthetruth‐roledoesn’tobviouslyhavethetruishfeaturesthatdefinetruth’sfunctionalrole.Isthepropertyofhavingapropertythatplaythetruth‐rolethepropertythatweaimourbeliefstohaveininquiry?Itdoesn’tlooklikeit.


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Truthisadisjunctiveproperty.Athirdoptionistotakethefunctionalconceptoftruthtodenoteasingledisjunctiveproperty.16Suppose,forsimplicity’ssake,thatsomepropositionsaretruewhensuperwarrantedandallotherpropositionsaretruewhentheyrepresentthingsastheyare.Ifso,thenwemightsaythatourfunctionaldescriptionoftruthjustpicksoutapropertydefinedlikethis:

ApropositionistrueDjustwhenitiseithersuperwarrantedorrepresentsthingsaretheyare.

IfwecanacceptthatapropositioniscorrectjustwhenitistrueD,‐‐‐whenitiseithersuperwarrantedorrepresenting,thisviewallowsustograntthesimpleexplanationofUnity.Butittooseemstofounderonmixedconjunctionslike(W)above.Foragainthequestioniswhatmakestheconjunctionitselftrue.Andtheconjunctionitselfissurelynottruebecauseithasthepropertyof,say,beingeithersuperwarrantedorrepresentingthefacts.Forthattobethecase(W)musthaveoneofthe“disjunctproperties”;butitisnotclearwhatpropertythatwouldbe.Thepropositionthatwaterboardingispainfulmightrepresentsomefact(orobject/propertypair).Itisfarfromclearthatthepropositionthatwaterboardingispainfulandwaterboardingiswrongitselfrepresentsanyfact.Truthisadisquotationalproperty.Afinalpossibilityisthattruthitselfisamerelydisquotationalproperty:thatis,thepropertyofbeinganexpressivedevice.17Thiswouldtheresultifwetookitthatthefunctionoftruthwasasthinasthedeflationiststypicallytakeittobe.Onthisview,theconceptoftruthwouldbetheconceptofthepropertywhoseonlyfeatureisthatitisadeviceforgeneralizationviadisquotation.Thereisnothingelsetosayabouttruthitselfotherthanthat. Theproblemwiththisviewbecomesapparentoncewerememberitistobecombinedwiththemetaphysicsofpluralism.Thecombinedviewisoddtosaytheleast:truthitselfisadisquotationalproperty.IfapropositionPhasthatproperty,youcaninferP,andifP,youcaninferithasthat

16SeePedersen2010fordiscussionofversionsofthisalternative.Inaforthcomingpaper,hesuggeststhattherearepropertiesspecifictothevariouscompoundsinvirtueofwhichtheycanpossessthedisjunctiveproperty.Thisleads,asheacknowledges,toamultiplicationoftruthdeterminingproperties.17AvariantistentativelysuggestedbyCotnoir(2009).


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property.Butwhetherapropositionhasthatpropertyisdeterminedbywhetherithassomemoresubstantiveproperty,likecorrespondence.Butwhywouldaproposition’shavingthedisquotationalpropertydependonitshavingsomeother,presumablynon‐disquotationalproperty?Moreover,theviewwouldruleoutappealingtotruthitselftoexplainphenomenalikeUnityabove.Soliketherealizerview,itisnotclearthatitwouldhavevirtuesabovethoseofdeflationismsimpliciter. 5. TruthasImmanent

Recallwhereweare:I’vesaidthatpluralistsshouldbe—indeed,havetobe—functionalists.Thepropertiesinvirtueofwhichpropositionsaretruearethosethatplaythetruth‐role.Whatconstitutesapropertyplayingthatroleisit’shavingthetruishfeatures.Butoursecondquestionisstilloutstanding:whatdothesepropertieshavetodowithtruth?

Inordertoanswerthisquestion,thepluralistcumfunctionalistneedstwothings.Sheneedsanaccountofwhatfunctionalistssometimescall“realization”andsheneedsanaccountofthepropertytruthitself.

Ithinkwecanmeetbothdemandsatonce.Startwiththethoughtthatpropertiescanhavetheirfeaturesessentiallyoraccidentally.Afunctionalpropertyisdefinedbyitsfunctionalrole,which,I’vesuggested,isbestseenasthesumofthoserelationalfeaturesimplicitinthenominalessenceoftheproperty.Thosefeaturescanthereforebethoughttobeessentialtoit.Thus,forthefunctionalist,thenaturalsuggestionistoequatethepropertyoftruthwiththepropertythathasthetruishfeaturesessentiallyorwhichplaysthetruth‐roleassuch.Itisthepropertythatis,necessarily,hadbybelievedcontentsjustwhenthingsareastheyarebelievedtobe;hadbypropositionsbelievedattheendofinquiryandwhichmakespropositionscorrecttobelieve.

Thisgivesusastraightforwardaccountofwhattruthis.Yetonceweunderstandtruththisway,wecangoontosaythatthepropertycanbeimmanentinotherproperties.18Animmanentpropertyisapropertythatcanbemanifestedbyotherproperties.MmanifestsanimmanentpropertyFjustwhenitisapriorithatF’sconceptuallyessentialfeaturesareasubsetofM’sfeatures.Again,aconceptuallyessentialfeature

18Whytalkofmanifestationandimmanenceratherthanrealization?Toavoidconfusion;“realization”isgenerallyunderstoodbyphilosophersofmindtobeanaposteriori,non‐rationalrelationship.


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ofFisanessentialfeatureofFthat(a)ispartofthenominalessenceofF;(b)holdsasamatterofconceptualnecessity;andso,(c)helpstodistinguishFfromotherproperties.Sinceeveryproperty’sconceptuallyessentialfeaturesareasubsetofitsownfeatures,everypropertymanifestsitself.Soimmanence,likeidentity,isreflexive.Butunlikeidentity,itisnon‐symmetric.WhereMandFaredistinct—individuatedbynon‐identicalsetsofconceptuallyessentialfeaturesandrelations—andFisimmanentinM,Misnotimmanentintruth.Intuitivelyput,whereFisimmanentinM,itwillbethecasethatpartofbeingMisbeingF.

Appliedtotruth,theinitialthoughtisthis:forsomepropositions,truthismanifestedby,orimmanentintheircorrespondencetovariousbitsofreality.Partofwhatisforthosepropositionstocorrespondisforthemtobetrue.Justasthepsychologicalfunctionalistwillclaimthatwhichphysicalpropertyrealizespaininagivenorganismisdeterminedbyfactsabouttheorganism,thealethicfunctionalistwillclaimthatwhichpropertymanifeststruthforaparticularpropositionwilldependonfactsaboutthatproposition.Twokindsoffactareclearlyrelevant.Thefirstiswhatthepropositionisabout.Thesecondistheproposition’slogicalstructure.

Thissecondpointisnotsurprising.Thataproposition’slogicalstructureshouldhelptodeterminehowitistrueisfamiliarfromtraditionalcorrespondenceviews,accordingtowhichtheonlysortofpropositionsthatcorrespondtofactsareatomic.Similarly,whichpropertymanifeststruthforapropositiondependsonwhetheritisatomicornot.Howweunderstandthis,however,dependsonhowweunderstandthefirstsortoffact.

InTOM,IsuggestedthatpluralistsholdthattruthforatomicsisalwaysmanifestedrelativetowhatIcalledadomainofinquiry.AsIdefinedit,apropositionaldomainisasubject‐matter:mathematicsandethicsaretwoexamples.Howdoweknowwhetherapropositionisaboutonesubjectratherthananother?Howelse?Bylookingattheobjectsandpropertiestheconceptswhichcomposethatpropositionareabout.

Istilltakethistobefairlystraightforward.Almostanyphilosopherwillthinkthattherearedifferentkindsofcontent,andwilltakeitforgrantedthatwebelieveallsortsofdifferentkindsofpropositions:propositionsaboutethics,mathematics,aboutthesundriesofeverydaylife.Noone,presumably,willdenythatthesepropositionsconcernnotjustdifferentsubjects,butfundamentallydifferentsubjects.Andanyphilosopherwhowishestoclaimthatweshouldtreat


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propositionsaboutthesesubjectmattersdifferently—forexample,bysayingthattheyaren’trepresentational,orareallfalse—musthaveawayofdistinguishingpropositionsofdifferentkindsfromoneanother.Nothingaboutpluralismdistinguishesitinthisregard.

Nonetheless,talkof“domains”,doessuggest,ifitdoesnotimply,thatsubjectmatterscomeinnaturalkinds,andthatasaresult,wecansortthemintothesekindswithlittledifficulty.Thatisimplausible.Wecanadmit,asisobvious,thatbeliefshavedifferentkindsofcontent,butweneedn’tsaythatthepropositionsthatarethosecontentsdivideintonaturalorrigidkinds.

Sowhytheuseoftheterm“domain”?Onereasonwasthis.Therearedoubtlesspropositionsthatcorrespondbutarenotsuperwarranted.Forexample,consider

(Star)Atthisverymoment,thenumberofstarsintheuniverseisodd.

Presumablyeitherthispropositionoritsnegationistrue.Butneitherissuperwarranted.Nomatterhowmanystagesofinquirywegothrough,wearenevergoingtopossesswarrantfororagainst(Star).Yetpresumablythereeitherareorarenotanoddnumberofstarsintheuniverseatthismoment.

Ifbothcorrespondenceandsuperwarrantmanifesttruth–playthetruth‐role–for(Star)thenwehaveaproblem.Assumethatfalsityistruthofnegation.Assumethat(Star)isnotsuperwarranted,butthatitdoescorrespondwithreality.Conclusion:itisbothtrueandfalse.InTOM,Isolvedthisbydrawingapagefromthephilosophyofmind.Justasagivenneuralpropertyonlyrealizespainrelativeforagivenorganism,soagivensemanticpropertylikecorrespondenceonlyrealizestruthforadomain.ButthiswasmoretheorythanIneeded.AllIreallyneededtosaywasthis:propertieslikecorrespondencemanifesttruthforsomepropositionsandnotothers,andonlyonepropertyofapropositionmanifeststruthforthatproposition.19

Let’sunpackthis.WecansaythatwhereMisapropertydistinctfromtruth,

IfPisanatomicproposition,then:PistrueifandonlyifithasthepropertyMthatmanifeststruthforP.

19Anumberofcommentatorshavesuggestedthispointtome,including,mostrecently,MarianDavidinhiscontributiontothisvolume.


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And

IfPisatomicandPisM,then:MmanifeststruthforP,ifandonlyifitisapriorithatthetruishfeaturesareapropersubsetofM’sfeatures.

SoanatomicpropositionistruewhenithasthedistinctfurtherpropertythatmanifeststruthforM.20Notbeingtrueconsistsinlackingthatproperty,eitherbecausethereisnopropertythatmanifeststruth,inwhichcasethecontentinquestionisneithertruenorfalse,orbecausethereissuchaproperty,butthepropositioninquestionfailstohaveit,inwhichcaseitisfalse.

Butifitisnotthefactsaboutthedomaintowhichapropositionbelongswhichdeterminewhichpropertymanifeststruthforaproposition,whatdoes?Theverysamefactsasbefore.Thinkaboutitthisway.Nomatterwhatyourtheoryoftruthmightbe,thequestionofwhatmakesaparticularpropositiontrue(oreventruth‐apt)willdependonthefactsaboutthatproposition.Whatisitabout?Whatconceptsdoesitemployandsoon?Thesearethequestionswewillaskwhenconfrontingthisissue.Itwouldbecuriousifouranswersdidn’tsortthemselvesintogroups,since,asI’vealreadynoted,itisobviousthatpropositionsdocomeinatleastroughkinds–kindsthatareindividuatedbydifferencesinthesortsofpropertiesandobjectsthatthevarioussortsofpropositionsareabout.

Ifthisisright,thereisnoneedforthepluralisttosort(atomic)propositionsintostrictdomains.Shetakeseachpropositionasitcomes,findingthat,infact,theycomeingroups,inbunches,inmobs.21

6. Plaintruth

Asignificantbenefitofunderstandingtruthasanimmanent

20David(thisvolume)complainsthatImustrelativizeplayingthetruth‐role,notmanifestation.Butplayingthetruth‐rolemeanshavingthetruishfeatures,andpropertiesthathavethosefeaturesmanifesttruth.Itismanifestationthatisinthemetaphysicaldriver’sseat.21Sodoesmustthepluralistbelievethatwealwaysknowwhatsubjectwearetalkingabout?No.Arethereinterestingphilosophicalproblemsaboutwhenaretalkingaboutethicsandwhenthelaw,whenwearetalkingaboutmathematicsandwhenphysics?Sure.Buttheyaren’tspecialtopluralists.


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propertyisthatanaturalwayofdealingwiththeproblemofmixedcompoundsdropsoutoftheposition.Whetherornotarecursiveaccountofallcompoundpropositionscanbegiven,thereissomethingrightabouttheinsightthatguidessuchanalyses.What’srightaboutitcouldbecapturedbysayingthatalltruthisgroundedinacertainsense.Therecanbenochangeinthetruth‐valueofacompoundpropositionwithoutchangeinthetruth‐valueofsomeatomicpropositions.Thetruth‐valueofcompoundssupervenesonthetruth‐valueofatomicpropositions.Callthistheweakgroundingprinciple.Accordingtothetheorythattruthisanimmanentfunctionalproperty,apropertyMmanifeststruthjustwhenitisapriorithatthetruishfeaturesareasubsetofthefeaturesandrelationsofM.Manifestation,sodescribed,isareflexiverelation,sinceeverysetisasubsetofitself.Thusallproperties,includingtruth,self‐manifest.Whenapropositionistrueonlybyvirtueofself‐manifestingtruth,wecansaythattherelevantpropositionisplainlytrue.Whatmakesacompoundpropositionplainlytrue?Givenourweakgroundingprinciple,compoundpropositionsareplainlytrueiftheirtruth‐valueisweaklygrounded.Thatis,iftheirtruth‐valuesupervenesonthetruth‐valueofpropositionswhichareeithercompoundandgroundedoratomic(andhencewhosetruth‐valuedependsonhavingapropertyotherthantruththatmanifeststruth.)⁶Soevenifitturnsoutthatatruth‐functionalrecursiveanalysisdoesnotapplytoeverycompoundproposition(likesubjunctiveconditionals,forexample)theimmanencepluralistcanaccepttheweakgroundingprinciple.Moreover,shewillhaveindependentmotivationtodoso.Forsheisalreadycommittedto(i)thethoughtthatwhat’struedependsonwhatistrueinaparticularway;and(ii),totheideathattrueatomicpropositionshavefurtherpropertieslikesuperwarrantthatmanifesttruth.Consequently,itseemsreasonableforhertoholdthatacompoundproposition’struthisultimatelygroundedonthetruth‐valuesofatomicpropositions.Compoundpropositions,mixedornot,aretruebecausetheyareplainlytrue.

AsInotedabovethepicturehereisfamiliarfromoldercorrespondencetheoriesoftruth:thetheoryisappliedinthefirstinstancetoatomics.Butdoestheweakgroundingprincipleholdacrosstheboard?Mightnottherebesomeplaintruthsthatdon’tsuperveneoncountableunplaintruths?22

22ThisquestionwasputtomebyStewartShapiroinhiscommentsonmybookatasessionattheAPA,February2010.


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AsIseeit,pluralistswhoembraceanimmanencemetaphysicscanagreethattherearewithoutanysignificantmodificationtotheirview.Toseewhytheymightwishto,consideratruthattributionsuchas

(1) Thepropositionthatrosesareredistrue.Thisisanatomicproposition.Itascribesaproperty—truth—toanobject,aproposition.Invirtueofwhatisittrue?Therearevariousanswersavailabletothepluralist.Theymightsay,forexample,thattruthattributionsaretrueinthesamewayasthepropositiontowhichtruthisascribed.Callthistheinheritanceview.Thus(1),forexample,istruehowever

(2)Rosesarered

Istrue.Soif(2)istruebecauseitcorrespondstoreality(howeverthatiscashedout)thensois(1).Truthattributionsinheritthepropertythatmanifeststheirtruthfromthepropositiontowhichtheyattributetruth.Thus(1)willbecorrespondencetrue,andsowillanypropositionthatattributestruthtoitandsoonuptheladderofsemanticascent.

Givenapluralistmetaphysics,theinheritanceviewimpliesthattruthascriptionscanthemselvesbetrueindifferentways.Andthatmightseemtobeattensionwiththeideathatwhichpropertymanifeststruthforapropositiondependsonthesubjectmatteritisabout.Therewouldbenotensionif(1)and(2)arethesameproposition.Butitisnotclearthatpluralistsshould,orevencan,embracethisdeflationarystandpoint.Ifnot,thenonewouldneedtoexplainwhyattributionsoftrutharen’talltrueinthesameway.23

23Onecouldalsogointhecompleteotherdirectionandadoptalevelsview(seeCotnoir,thisvolume).Hereyouholdthateveryleveloftruthattributionismadeinadifferentdomain,andhencethateverytruthattributionistrueinadifferentwaythantheoneprecedingitonthesemanticladder.(Forreasonshavingtodowiththeparadoxes,youmightaddthatnodomainhastheresourcestomaketruthattributionsaboutitself.AsCotnoirnotes,asolutiontotheliaropensupthatwillbeinmanywaysparalleltoTarski’s).Herearethreeconcerns.First,whythinkthat(1)andanattributionoftruthto(1)manifesttruthdifferently?Second,giventhatwecancontinuetoattributetruthtothetruthattributionto(1)andsoon,thisseemstoimplythatanindefinitenumberofdifferentpropertiesthatmanifesttruth.Andfinally,notethatthelevelsviewimpliesthat(1)andanattributionoftruthto(1)arenotcognitivelyequivalent.Aswithaninheritanceview,thismayormaynotbeabadthing,dependingonone’sviewabouthowtoreadtheso‐called“equivalenceschema”.


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Inanyevent,theinheritanceviewisnot,Ithink,whatpluralistsshouldsayabouttruthattributions.Foritseemshopelessinthefaceofthefactthatweusetruthtogeneralizeoverpropositions,aswhenwesay:

(3)EverythingStewartsaysistrue.

Thisofcourse,isnotatomic.Itisauniversalgeneralizationoverpropositionssaid,orpotentiallysaid,byStewart,thatis:

ForeverypropositionP,ifStewartssaysPthenPistrue.

Itisobviouswhytheinheritanceviewwon’twork.Itsaysthatatruthattributerinheritsthewayitistruefromthetruthattributee.ButobviouslyStewartmaysayallsortsofpropositions,aboutallsortsofthings.Givenpluralism,theymighthavetheirtruthmanifestedindistinctways. Soiftheinheritanceviewwon’twork,whatwill?Anobvioussuggestionistosaythattruthattributionsareplainlytrue.Thatis,theyaren’ttrueinanyparticularway.Thisseemsparticularlysensibleinthecaseofapropositionlike(1).Foritisintuitivethat(1)istruebecause(2)istrue.While(1)and(2)arebothatomic,(1)isclearlytruebecauseof(2),and(2)’struthwillbemanifestedbycorrespondence.Theplaintruthof(1)isfoundedontheunplaintruthof(2).

Sofarsogood.Butwhatabout(3)?Itisnotatallclearthatthetruthof(3)willdependonanycountablenumberofunplaintruths.Thismaybebecauseofparadox.SupposeIassert(3).OneofthethingsStewartmightsayisthatwhatLynchsaysisfalse.Contradiction.Butevenputtingasidethealwaystroublesomeparadoxes,imaginethatIassert(3)andoneofthethingsStewartsaysisthateverythingLynchsaysistrue(amuchhappierexample).Whichtruths,exactly,willthetruthof(3)dependon?Weseemcaughtinaloop.

Asimplewayofunravelingtheseknotsisforthepluralisttograntthattheremaybepropositionsthatareplainlytruebutwhosetruthdoesnotdependonthetruth‐valueofanyunplaintruth.Indeed,thereareavarietyofreasonstoconsiderthis.Consider,forexample,thetruthsoflogic,suchas

(4)IfP,thenP.


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Thisisagainnotatomic.Butitstruth‐valuedoesn’tclearlydependonthetruth‐valueofitsatomiccomponents;Pcouldhaveanytruth‐valueand(4)wouldstillbetrue.Moreover,itseemscurioustosaythatitcorrespondstorealityeither.Whatreality,exactly?Andbeinganecessarytruth,itseemslessthanplausibletosaythatitstruthissomehowepistemicallyconstrainedandhencethatitstruthismanifestedbyitsbeingsuperwarranted.Itseemsmuchmoreplausibletosimplysaythat(4)isplainlytrue–notbecauseitstruthdependsonsomeothertruth,butbecauseitstruthissomehowbasic.Itneedsnometaphysicalexplanation. Butthenhaspluralism/functionalismsimplycollapsedintodeflationism?Ifungroundedplaintruthisgoodenoughforsomepropositions,thenwhynotall?Here’smyreply:Thepossibilityofungroundedplaintruthsdoesnotmeanthatdeflationismisonitsway.Toseethis,let’sthinkforaminuteaboutwhatdeflationisminvolves.Itishardtogeneralize,butIthinkdeflationaryviewsinvolvetwocommitments.First,theconceptoftruthisanexpressivedeviceofgeneralization.Second,whateverproperty,ifany,thatconceptdenotesisitselfmetaphysicallytransparent.Apropertyismetaphysicallytransparentjustwhenalltheessentialfactsaboutthepropertycanbyknownviagraspoftheconceptalone.

Itfollowsthatplaintruthisnotdeflationarytruth.Thepropertyofbeingtrue,Iclaim,isthepropertythathasthetruishfeaturesessentially.Thatis,thepropertyoftruthisthepropertypropositionshavewhentheyareobjective,correcttobelieveandthesortofpropositionsweaimatininquiry.Sotruthisnotjustanexpressivedeviceonmyview.IndeedI’mnotsureitisevenessentiallysuchadevice.Moreover,truthisnotmetaphysicallytransparenteither.Whileyoucanknowthetruishfeaturesoftruthjustbygraspingtheconceptoftruth,youcan’tknowalltheessentialfeaturesoftruththatway.Here’soneessentialfeatureoftruthyoucan’tknowthatway:thatitisopentomultiplemanifestation.

Butstill:whynotsaythatalltruepropositionsareplainlytrue?Whyworryaboutwhethersomepropositionsalsohavetotheirtruthmanifestedinsomeotherdistinctpropertylikecorrespondence?Well,thinkofidentity.Supposewethinkthatsomethings,likenecessarilyexistingobjects,arejustplainlyidenticalacrosstime.Theiridentityisnotmanifestedbyanyotherproperty.Thathardlymeansthatsomethingsmightnotbeidenticalinaparticularway.Personalidentityacrosstimemightwellbemanifestedbypsychologicalcontinuity.Italldepends–notonlyonwhatwethinkwemustsayinordertoaccountforpersonalidentity,but


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moreimportantly,onwhatwethinkwemustsayaboutpersonalidentityinordertoexplainotherphenomenaofinterest–suchaspersonalresponsibilityandhumanrights.Thesameholdsinthecaseoftruth.ThereasonIthinkthatthereismoretosayabouttruthinsomedomainsisthesamereasonothersubstantivetheoristsoftruththinkthis:Ithinkthatwemustsaymoreaboutcertainkindsofpropositionstoexplainotherphenomenaofinterest:suchasthedifferencesincontentbetweenmoral,mathematicalandphysicalobjectpropositions.

Insum,Idon’tthinktheproblemsraisedhereareproblemsforthepluralist.Afterall,everyonehasaproblemexplainingwhatmakesascriptionsoftruthtrue.Indeed,whatIthesereflectionstoshowisthattheformofpluralismI’vedefendedherehastheresourcestooffersomenewexplanationsforwhycertaintruthsaretrue.

7. Conclusion

Wehaveputthreequestionstothepluralist.Wenowhavethreeanswers.

• Howdoweidentifythosepropertiesbyvirtueofwhichpropositionsaretrue?Answer:byseeingwhichpropertiesplaythetruth‐role,andhencehavethetruishfeatures.

• Howarethosepropertiesrelatedtotruth?Answer:Truthassuchisthepropertythathasthetruishfeaturesessentially.Buttruthcanbeimmanentindistinctproperties,propertiesthathavethetruishfeaturesaccidentally.

• Whatdetermineswhetheragivenpropositionhasoneofthosepropertiesratherthananother?Answer:twothings.First,thelogicalstructureofthepropositionandsecond,thesubjectmatteroftheproposition.

Thesearenottheonlythreequestionsapluralistmustanswer.Nor,perhaps,arethesetheonlyanswersavailable.Butifthepluralistwishestomakesenseofherview,somesuchanswersmustbegiven.Avoidingthemisnotanoption.ReferencesAristotle.(1993).Metaphysics,trans.C.Kirwan,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.Beall,Jc,(2000).“OnMixedInferencesandPluralismabout

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lynch three questions for truth pluralism

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