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irst Person Perspective 

I've already blogged about ThomasMetzinger a couple of times. In this post I want to write about another of his ideas. His book The Ego Tunnel: The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self  opens with the words "Inthis book, I will try to convince you that there is no such thing as a self" and as Buddhists wemay immediately feel that this is familiar ground. However Metzinger is not a Buddhist, andsums up the Buddha as a pessimist who posited, "essentially, that life is not worth living".(Ego Tunnel, p.199) Of course I disagree with this summation - the Buddha wasn't a

 pessimist, and did not say this, although he did place limits on what kind of life is worthliving.

In this post I want to look not at Metzinger's book, but at a talk he gave in 2005 as part of the Foerster Lectures on the Immortality of the Soul , (available on YouTube) entitled "Being NoOne" (also the title of a book ) which explores the idea of a first person perspective.

Metzinger says that for there to be a first person perspective we need three 'target properties'

1. mineness - a sense of ownership, particularly over the body.2.  selfhood - the sense that "I am someone", and continuity through time.3. centredness - the sense that "I am the centre of my own subjective self".

I'm not sure where he got these criteria, but after working on the Alagaddūpama Sutta

recently I am struck by a parallel. Selfhood in the Pāli texts is often summarised in the phrase:etaṃ mama, eso'haṃasmi, eso me attā.this is mine, I am this, this is my self.

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I suggest that:etaṃ mama = this is mine = mineness.eso'hamasmi = I am this = centredness.eso me attā = this is my self = selfhood.The order is different but the criteria are almost identical. I've recently argued that these are

general observations, and not specifically connected with Brahmanical ideas about ātmanwhich which the only minimally overlap.[1] Buddhists will hopefully be familiar with thetraditional analytical approach to deconstructing these statements, so I can focus onMetzinger's approach.

Drawing on work by Antonio Damasio and Ronald Melzack, Metzinger proposes we replacethe notion of a 'self' with a theoretical entity which he calls a Phenomenal Self Model . This isa representational system, created in the brain, the content of which is us, ourselves. "We" arein fact a simulation. We simulate and emulate ourselves for ourselves, and thereby createwhat we call consciousness. This model is rooted in our proprioceptive sense (the informationderived from muscle tension, inner-ear and other bodily sensations) according to Melzack;

and in our bodily systems (especially endocrine, blood and viscera) and emotions according toDamasio. These (probably both) generate a constant input which is modelled in the brain for the purposes of regulation and optimisation. This model is sub-personal, it is not a 'person' inour heads directing our actions (there is no homunculus as it used to be called). What we callour 'self' is in fact simply a representation of our bodily, and mental states, combined with arepresentation of representing (reflexive awareness).

However this model is transparent to us - we do not understand ourselves to be relating to amodel of reality, we understand ourselves to be relating to reality. This is because the

 processes which generate the model are not available to introspection - they happen too fast,and too seamlessly for us to see them. There was a clear evolutionary advantage to having thisability to model reality and use that model to guide our actions; but there is no advantage inknowing that we are doing this - we see a danger and react, but to complicate things by seeingthe picture of a danger in our head as a picture would only slow our reactions down, and wewould not survive. For Metzinger the transparency of the Phenomenal Self Model is a stronglimit that we cannot break through. It only becomes obvious through detailed analysis of whatgoes wrong with consciousness in specific brain injuries. We are all naive realists accordingto Metzinger, i.e we think we interact directly with reality, because that is how it feels. It is

 probably this naive realism that makes us resistant to reductive explanations of consciousness- whether Buddhist or scientific. The mechanisms of consciousness are not available tointrospection, but we feel (want, assume) it to be something more than simple biological

 processes, and we are baffled by complexity generally so we think of consciousness assomething rather magical. We may be wrong.

Metzinger's critique of the idea of a first-person perspective centres on the way that thePhenomenal Self Model can go wrong. In the case of "mineness" for example, we get caseswhere our thoughts do not seem to under our control, as in schizophrenia. In unilateral hemi-

neglect a person may not recognise their limbs as their own. In alien hand syndrome one of the hands appears to act independently of our conscious will. Likewise some delusional

 people experience everything that happens as caused by their intention - Metzinger relatesmeeting a person who stood all day looking out the window making the sun move. In therubber-hand experiment we find that an artificial hand can become included in our body

image by confusing the physical and visual senses. Finally he cites the case of a woman bornwith no arms or legs who never-the-less has phantom limb sensations. Having never hadlimbs where could such phantoms come from if not the brain itself? The sense of mineness is

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actually prone to error in many ways which would not be possible if it actually reflected our  bodies. The sense of ownership is generated within the Phenomenal Self Model, within the brain.

Similarly the sense of  selfhood is prone to malfunction. Various disorders of the dissociative

type show that what R. D. Laing called 'ontological security' is by no means assured, andsome people experience a complete breakdown of their sense of being a self, while remainingconscious. Or we may, through delusion, wrongly identify ourselves as some other person.

The first person perspective also capable of being disrupted: in out of body experiences for instance (which Metzinger has vivid experience of); and in mystical experiences of onenesswith the universe. Compare Jill Bolte Taylor's description of her stroke in which the left-hemisphere of her brain shut down. (TED) Taylor's description of the breakdown of the first

 person perspective is similar to the mystical experience sometimes called oceanic boundary

loss that is described by mystics of many traditions. Note that Taylor lost all language, theability to speak, memory of who she was, and the ability to walk, but she did not lose

consciousness nor the ability to make intentions or memories. However Taylor associates "Iam" with the left hemisphere of the brain which "shut down" during here stroke - sheremained conscious and aware, but with no sense of "I am".

So Metzinger argues that all of this plasticity and bugginess [my choice of terms] in the threequalities tells us that they do not exist as such, but are elements of a simulation.Consciousness, self-consciousness is a virtual reality. He sums up the idea with an annotatedstatement about the process of cognition.

 I myself [the content of the currently active transparent self model] am seeing this object [thecontent of the transparent object-representation] and I am seeing it right now [as an elementwithin a virtual window of presence (i.e. working memory)] with my own eyes [the simplestory about "direct" sensory perception, which suffices for the evolutionary purposes of the

 brain].He says "of course you don't see with your eyes!" We see with our visual perception systems.But we cannot experience these systems working, we just experience seeing . In the final partof the lecture two questions emerge from the the title of the lecture series which concerns thequestion of "the immortality of the soul". The first is: is the self an illusion? "For the self to bean illusion," says Metzinger, "there would have to be someone whose illusion it was, andthere is no one," thus: "if it is an illusion, it is no one's illusion". The second question relatesto immortality, and to this idea he says: "strictly speaking nobody is ever born, and nobodyever dies". His phrasing perhaps suggests a Vedanta outlook (we know he meditates but not in

what tradition).

Having begun with the familiar and traversed some unfamiliar territory, we find ourselves back on familiar ground with these last statements. It sounds a lot like Buddhism - from anon-Buddhist scientific philosopher. But note that Metzinger is saying that the process istransparent, that it is not available to introspection - he does not seem to allow for a radicalchange in consciousness like bodhi. In traditional Buddhist terms there is no possibility of direct contact with reality - this becomes a contradiction in terms because consciousness isonly a simulation. In my own terms, which derive mainly from the writing of Sue Hamilton,he does not allow for access to the khandhas, the apparatus of experience: he allows for noinsight into the creation of a first person perspective which might allow for liberation from it

in a positive sense. I believe, to some extent I know, that in meditation the Self Model becomes opaque and available to introspection.

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In The Ego Tunnel Metzinger explores some of the ethical and even spiritual implications of his theory, and here he says some very interesting and attractive things which I will try towrite about at some point. For more on Metzinger's theory see the self-model page onScholarpedia.

Notes

1. In making this claim I am consciously and explicitly contradicting both K. R. Norman and RichardGombrich who see this particular phrase as a specific echo of the early Upaniṣads - Chāndogya in thecase of Norman, and B ṛ hadāranyaka for Gombrich. Part of my rebuttal is précised in the post EarlyBuddhists-and ātman/brahman - while the whole argument is set out in a longer but not quite finishedessay. Suffice it to say, I do see a connection of a sort, but nothing to indicate that the Buddha had anydirect contact with Upaniṣadic sages or was directly dealing with issues central to their texts. The papers I am thinking of are:

o Gombrich, Richard. (1990) 'Recovering the Buddha’s Message.' The Buddhist Forum:

Seminar Papers 1987-88. Ed. T. Skorupski, London, SOAS.

o  Norman, K. R. (1981) 'A note on attā in the Alagaddūpama-sutta.' Studies in Indian Philosophy (Memorial volume for Pandit Sukhlaji Sanghvi), Ahmedabad, pp. [Reprinted inCollected Papers, Oxford: Pali Text Society, 1991; vol. ii, p.200-209.]

A Theory of Language Evolution (with a footnote about mantra) 

I HAVE BEEN READING The Ego Tunnel:The Science of the Mind and the Myth of the Self by Thomas Metzinger. It is a book with

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some flaws, which I'm not going to dwell on, but on the whole Metzinger presents afascinating theory of consciousness, selfhood, and self-consciousness. Metzinger is a

 philosopher, so is concerned to give an overview and to create a coherent narrative of consciousness, but his source materials are the findings of neuroscience, along with his ownout-of-body experiences and lucid dreams. The combination is intriguing because though he

fits in with a scientific, even materialistic, world-view, he seeks a theory of consciousnesswhich takes his unusual experiences seriously and explains them. This may make him uniquein the field.

His opening sentence declares that he is setting out to convince us that there is no such thingas a self. In this he follows in the footsteps of Antonio Damasio whose book The Feeling Of 

What Happens I highly recommend. I want to come back to Metzinger's theory of consciousness in subsequent blog posts, but here to talk about a point he makes in passing inhis chapter the 'Empathetic Ego'.

Recently neuroscientists discovered two related facts about the link between behaviour and

the brain. When we see an object, groups of neurons associated with motor activity are active.These are called canonical neurons. When we perceive objects part of us is relating to them

 by imagining potential physical interactions, by how we might manipulate them. I'm remindedhere of George Lakoff & Mark Johnson's theory of metaphor . They say that the metaphorswhich underlie our abstract language and thought are related to our physical interactions withthe world. Hence we can say that we grasp an idea meaning that we understand the concept.(See Metaphors We Live By ).

On the other hand we know that some neurons associated with motor activity -- called mirror neurons -- light up whether we are doing the action ourselves, or whether we are observingsomeone else doing it. In particular these mirror neurons seem to be active when we witnessemotional states in other people and feel empathy with them. It seems that mirror neurons areinvolved in modelling the posture, gesture and facial expression we see in others, in order tounderstand the kinds of feelings we associate with that physical arrangement. This ability tosense emotions in others is quite accurate, and important for us social primates.

Metzinger speculates that these two types of neurons might have been associated with thedevelopment of communication and I want to run with this idea, and sketch out an idea abouthow language might have evolved.

Once we move beyond the very simple forms of animal life - the single celled organisms - and

look at the way animals communicate there are clearly hierarchies. We all release chemicalmessengers, e.g. hormones, and these are sensed with the mouth and nose, or have a physicaleffect on us. The other form of communication shared by all animals is posture - and postureis one of the basic activators for the canonical and mirror neurons. Posture can communicateattitude - aggression, receptivity (for mating), submission or dominance. But not much

 beyond this. Think of reptiles.

Subtlety begins to emerge when we employ three other forms of communication. Over  posture we note that reptiles will sometimes reinforce posture with sound , although reptiliansounds don't add much to the message. Birds developed elaborate postural displays, andadded more complex sounds to the mix. These sounds mainly seem to transmit the the

message conveyed by posture -- e.g. territorial displays, or receptivity to mating -- but over a broader area. In other words, birds can broadcast their posture. Mammals, however, arecapable of producing more sophisticated sounds, though these are still related to fairly basic

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'emotions' like fear, contentment, receptivity, and aggression.

Some mammals added gesture, a more subtle form of posture, to the mix. Gesture allows for more nuanced communication. Then primates in particular added facial expression to thismix. With these one can communicate a wider range of emotions. Scholars have come up with

many lists of  basic emotions which overlap but do not converge. However, any list wouldcontain some common items, for instance: anger, joy, sadness, fear, disgust, surprise, desire.All of these, and many variations can be accurately communicated without any words through

 posture, gesture, tone of voice, and facial expression.

With posture, non-language verbal sounds, gesture, and facial expression we cancommunicate the full range of human emotions. However there is not much scope for abstraction, no possibility of communicating outside the immediate present. And in fact weshare this level of communication with other primates. We do know that chimps are capable

 passing on knowledge of tool use, of planning, and getting others to cooperate in groupactions that require forward thinking - war and hunting. So this level of communication is

quite sophisticated, but language is orders of magnitude more sophisticated again.

Language sits on top of all of this. You would be forgiven for thinking that language existedapart from all of this because linguists seldom make reference to non-linguisticcommunication, and are often focussed on just the words involved in language, or even justwritten language. As I mentioned, Lakoff & Johnson have argued that the metaphors whichunderlie the our abstract though are based in our physical interactions with the world. Sonative English speakers know the metaphor that up is good (on the whole) and down is bad :e.g. a good mood is up; optimists feel things are looking up etc. (Similar metaphors are foundin Sanskrit btw.). Similarly, in discussions we employ the argument is war metaphor: we take

 sides and defend positions against opponents; a vigorous exchange involves cut and thrust ;we line points up and shoot them down; and we win if our points are on target or we exploit a

weakness, or lose when our argument is undermined or demolished ; we love to drop

bombshells, and overturn paradigms, but hate to capitulate and back down. This suggests thatlanguage doesn't jut sit on top of the under-layers of physical, emotional communication, butis deeply rooted in them, and perhaps emerges out of them. We can't really consider languageseparately from gesture for instance, or from posture, or tone of voice.

Further support for this idea comes from research on the Brocas area of the brain. This regionis intimately connected with language, but is also part of the system that controls motor function in the mouth and hands. V. S. Ramacandran (in his 2003 Reith Lectures) speculated

that cross-activation in this area is responsible for the tongue poking out during intenseconcentration on manual tasks for instance, and that this is related to the evolution of language. Gestures, mouth movements and language are obviously connected. People cancommunicate complex abstract language with only their hands.

Vocal sounds are, at least some of the time, used symbolically and the study of this phenomenon is called Sound Symbolism or Phonosemantics. The roots of sound symbolismmay be in pre-language sounds which communicate emotions, and in mouth movementswhich either directly interact with an object, or imitate an interaction. In which case we wouldexpect that both canonical and mirror neurons would be involved in the language as well - I'mnot sure if anyone has looked at this.

One of the central dictates of modern linguistics is that "the sign is arbitrary". This is usuallyqualified by saying that it is arbitrary but not random, since clearly conventions of sounds are

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seen. Sound symbolism takes this further by saying that the conventions are so pervasive andthey represent such a high a level of organisation that they cannot be arbitrary. Indeed itwould be surprising if verbal sounds were arbitrary in relation to the concept being conveyed

 because they would exist outside the structure of language itself. Lakoff & Johnson say thatabstractions are not arbitrary, but rooted in how we physically interact with the world. Sound

symbolism tells us that there is a relationship between a word and it's meaning which is notarbitrary, but related to how verbal sounds function as symbols.

So Metzinger's theory is interesting because we can construct a plausible narrative about theevolution of communication around it, and it links up with other interesting ideas about the

 brain, the mind, and the evolution of language. It can incorporate many different observations,and it dovetails with other theories of embodied awareness and communication. It certainlyseems to tie together many of my own interests. Though I note that one reviewer of The Ego

Tunnel complained that "Grandiose philosophy is so 19th-century". [1] So perhaps Metzinger and I, with our interest in such "grandiose philosophy", are out of step with contemporary

 philosophy - but there have been few ages when being out of step with contemporary

 philosophers has been a bad thing. Personally I think Metzinger is ahead of his time.

This is not idle speculation on my part, nor only a side line. This idea has been bubbling awayin my Buddhist brain because I am fascinated by Buddhist mantra. Mantras are said to besound symbols, and I'm interested in how verbal sounds function as symbols. I believe thatthis sketch of a theory, or something very like it, might begin to explain the effectiveness of Buddhist mantras both as a collective, devotional practice, and in individual meditative

 practice -- without resort to the supernatural.

~~oOo~~

Note

1. Flanagan, O. (2009). Review: The Ego Tunnel by Thomas Metzinger. New Scientist ,201(2700), 44.

Explanation vs Interpretation 

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I N THE INTRODUCTION to their book  Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture, the authors Thomas Lawson andRobert McCauley admit they intend to cause trouble. The audience for the book is probablyinvolved on one side or the other of the sometimes bitter scholarly conflict they are writingabout. The combination of jargon and assumed common political and intellectual backgroundmake it a bit daunting for the general reader. However in Chapter One Lawson and McCauleymake some interesting observations about the social sciences generally and the study of religion in particular that I want to pick up on.

They note a dichotomy between those who seek knowledge through explanation and thosewho seek it through interpretation, but make the point that the dichotomy is in many ways afalse one.

In its extreme form the explanation camp says that all interpretation is irrelevant. Thestereotype here is the materialist scientist, the logical empiricist who is only concerned withthe observation of facts. Knowledge is the discovery of causal laws, and interpretive effortssimply get in the way. The approach to knowledge puts strict limits on acceptable subjectmatters and methods. The important thing about science - which distinguishes it fromcommon sense - is that scientific explanations form general systems of abstract principles.These principles can be applied beyond the domain in which they were discovered. It is theinter-connectedness of scientific theories, the way they work together to support each other,that contributes to their success. Common sense knowledge, by contrast, is typically restrictedto a particular domain, and it isn't related strongly to other knowledge. Explanations lead toconsensus, but only on the subset of all possible knowledge amenable to empiricalobservations.

We can safely let Richard Dawkins stand as a good example of the scientist explanationistcamp. He is known for his impatience with superstition and ignorance of facts, and for his

 public attacks on religious beliefs. Interestingly Richard Dawkins evinces surprise that peopleshould see him as 'cold' and 'nihilistic' on reading The Selfish Gene, and attempts to alter that

impression with his next book, Unweaving the Rainbow. But for all that he shows that he isfamiliar with poetry and deft at manipulating metaphors in his factual explanations, he alsoseems to misunderstand something fundamental about human cognition and decision making -

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the role of emotion in our lives. Dawkins appears to explain his failure to communicatehimself as laziness or stupidity on the part of his audience. He is openly contemptuous of 

 people who are not persuaded by his explanations, but makes no attempt to connect with thevalues of the audience, which means that he presumes that everyone prioritises cold hard factsas he does. Note that his sub-title for Unweaving the Rainbow contrasts science with delusion

as though these are the only two possible positions. His contumely is reminiscent of legacyattitudes of the British upper-classes to the common people. Similarly Stephen Hawking in hisrecent book The Grand Design declares "philosophy is dead", and that scientific determinism

is simply how things are - he goes as far as denying the possibility of free will, but allows thatdespite the lack of true agency that behaviour is so complex that it remains unpredictable. TheGrand Design trumpets itself as offering "new answers to life's ultimate questions" - and theselection of the questions is telling. First and foremost Hawking seeks to answer: 'why is there

 something rather than nothing?'. Socrates question 'how should we live?' is not only notaddressed, is it not even asked! Scientific determinism creates a sterile vacuum by placingmany aspects of human life - especially all the creative and imaginative arts, and the humanemotions and values - outside the sphere of knowledge seeking and making.

On the other hand is the interpretationist who says that all inquiry about human life andthought occurs in irreducible frameworks of values and subjectivity. Human beings aresubjects not objects. The search for knowledge about human beings - and therefore aboutreligion - is the search for reasons (hermeneutics) and meaning (semiotics). Explanation is notonly unnecessary it is at best undesirable, and at worst not possible. Since interpretationallows no common (objective) standard and there is much less interactivity amongstknowledge found in this way, there is a tendency to splinter into factions e.g. Freudian,Foucauldian, Feminist, Marxist, Christian, Buddhist, etc. Each group comes up with a

 plausible story about what things mean, and criticises the other groups with no possibility of consensus. The interpretationist account of humanity is overly fecund, and reaches anapotheosis in the Post-Modernists who reject all explanation and all objectivity, and disclaimall possibility of wider consensus since there is only personal interpretation. However interpretation allows us to structure and understand those areas of life which science cannottouch - particularly human experience. Although laws may not be possible, there are certainly

 patterns. Identifying and discussing problems such as universal human rights rely oninterpretation rather than explanation.

I'm not familiar with any of the examples of interpretationist type given in the book, but itstrikes me that Joseph Campbell fits the profile. He interprets myths and legends, seekingreasons for human behaviour and sources of meaning relating to it. He is not concerned with

what causes us to behave, in the way that a scientist is, only in what it means that we do behave the way we do. Campbell on the other hand accepts everything as part of life's richtapestry without judgement. So when discussing the theme of rebirth (in his interviews withBill Moyers published as The Power of Myth) he sees the images of the Buddha peacefullymeditating beneath the bodhi tree, and Jesus brutally nailed to a cross as being the same storywithout any qualification (I disagree). Equally he discusses ritual murder in the same contextwithout any sense of moral judgement - every expression of human behaviour is valid to him

 because it is simply an expression of the myth. The term for this kind of view is monist -expressed sometimes as "all is one". There is no way to prove what Campbell says - it issimply one interpretation of a range of observations. Campbell's position is not easilyreducible, but he is broadly speaking a Jungian, I think. If he were a Marxist his reading of the

myths would no doubt be different. However Campbell creates extremely plausible narrativesin many cases and he seems to shed light on the content and importantly the function of myths. Since the Enlightenment myth has become a byword for something which is not true.

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Campbell shows how myths have value because they symbolically communicate meaningsand purposes, and has to some extent rehabilitated the word myth.

Lawson and McCauley outline some intermediate positions, but these require some familiaritywith the literature and are therefore harder to explain. Overall when there are concessions

made by 'social scientists', the authors say, they inevitably privilege interpretation andsubordinate explanation. Some see the methods of social science as yet inadequate to the task of an empirical approach, leaving interpretation as the only way forward. A second groupacknowledge that explanation has a role, but see human actions as guided by reasons and not

 by causes, so it seems natural to focus on interpretation while not actually discountingexplanation (I think the problem here is free will). A third intermediate position sees allknowledge seeking - including the natural sciences - as fundamentally interpretive, and in

 particular argue for the importance of subjectivity in the construction of scientific knowledgesystems. For this last group interpretation sets the agenda for explanation. In studying humansthey prioritise the concrete contents of human experience over the abstract theories aboutthem.

In my experience most religious people are interpretationists of either the extreme kind whodeny any possible explanation for human, especially religious, experience; or they tolerate alevel of explanation but place certain types of experience forever beyond the reach of empiricism and factual knowledge (my Buddhist teacher Sangharakshita is overtly in thiscamp I would say). Religious people are wary of explanation which they see as 'cold', and as'killing the magic'. They speak of scientists 'explaining away' their beliefs. The danger religious people see is that science, in explaining human religious behaviour, will destroy thethings they value about their religious practices and communities. And on past evidence this isnot an unreasonable fear as explanationists are often insensitive to values.

It's clear that the extreme approaches are not always helpful. Although both have had their successes, they have tended to polarise the discussion about religion and stymiecommunication and understanding. The point that Lawson and McCauley wish to make is thatthere is a way to combine both interpretation and explanation without privileging or banishingone or the other, and that in effect we all do it anyway. They point out that in fact explanationand interpretation are different cognitive tasks.

"When people seek better interpretations they attempt to employ the categories they have in better ways. By contrast, when people seek better explanations they go beyond therearrangement of categories; the generate new theories which will, if successful, replace or 

even eliminate the conceptual scheme with which they presently operate." (p.29)Interpretation presupposes a body of explanation (of facts and laws), and seeks to (re)organiseempirical knowledge. Explanation always contains an element of interpretation, butsuccessful explanations winnow and increase knowledge. The two processes are not mutuallyexclusive, but interrelated, and both are necessary.

In the process of attempting to integrate Buddhism and Western Culture (which includesscience and technology as well as distinctive myths and ideas about what gives life meaning)we cannot afford to take an exclusively explanatory or interpretive approach. We are forced,

 by intellectual honesty, to accept the strong conclusions of science: the classical laws of  physics and chemistry for instance are not really in doubt despite being dependent on a frame

of reference - we do in fact live in that frame of reference. Some of the critique of each campis useful - explanation helps to put useful limits on interpretation; while we are reminded thatfacts are not always hard (think of statistics and how vital they are in biology or quantum

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mechanics) and laws governing imagination and emotion are vague, though not withoutimportance.

One of the big issues of religion in the modern world is the status of the supernatural. On thetrivial level we have ghosts and 'energies' of various kinds, and on a more serious level we

have a transcendental Buddha beyond any predication or description, let alone explanation. Nirvāṇa is taboo, and remains not just inaccessible but forbidden to scientists. Though one of the most interesting areas of neuroscience is the effects of meditation on the brain.

To even consider trying to explain the Buddha is seen as a kind of heresy. We Buddhists domaintain conceptions equivalent to both heresy and blasphemy - despite all protestations tothe contrary - that emerge when we transgress. It can be heresy to deny some doctrines. Tosome denying rebirth is a heresy. More or less any doctrinal innovation in Buddhism leavesone open to the charge of heresy. If we go further and declare our belief that consciousness isentirely based in the brain (which I more or less accept) or that the Buddha was just a human

 being who was kind and not troubled by psychological suffering then we will find the charge

of blasphemy being laid surreptitiously at our doorstep. We may find that someone will saythat we are not in fact Buddhists if we don't accept a transcendental version of Buddhism; or we may be called a materialist . The label materialist has a powerfully pejorative sense in thiscontext; and often comes with an offhand, sometimes contemptuous, dismissal of the so-called materialist's opinions. The form of the arguments is identical, I would say, to those wesee in theistic milieus.

Buddhists like to emphasise true, original (in the temporal sense) and authentic teachings; genuine masters, living Buddhas; unbroken lineages; and fully ordained individuals. We are a bit obsessed with appealing to external authorities to bolster our internal authority. Why do Iconstantly refer to the Pāli Canon for instance when I have my personal experience? Could it

 be from lack of experience?

We have some way to go as most of these issues are not even conscious. As someone with ascience education and a leaning towards explanation, I regularly find myself in conflict withthose who embrace interpretation - often having to point out that my disinclination tosupernatural interpretations of experience does not amount to materialism (see Am I aMaterialist?). The important thing about Lawson and McCauley's analysis is that it clarifieswhat issues and values are at stake so that we can bring them to awareness, and have thediscussion in the open. Facts are important, and we should not be denying facts in promotingBuddhism. One fact is that human values are not easily objectified, and another is that

experience doesn't necessarily conform to mathematical laws.Lawson, E. T. and McCauley, R. N. (1990). Rethinking Religion: Connecting Cognition and Culture.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapter One Reprinted as Lawson, E. T. and McCauley, R. N. (2006). "Interpretation and Explanation: Problemsand Promise in the Study of Religion." J. Slone (ed.). Religion and Cognition: A Reader , London: Equinox.

See also:Oliver Sacks on Why the brain creates myths on bigthink.com: "Jerome Bruner, a great

 psychologist, has spoken of two modes of thinking. One is to create narratives, one is to create

 paradigms or explanations or models."You might also like:

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11 February 2011

Happiness and Unhappiness 

Timbaruka Sutta

S 12.18, PTS ii.22 [1]

STAYING AT SĀVATTHĪ. Then the wanderer 

Timbaruka approached the Bhagavan, and having exchanged pleasantries, he sat to one sideand asked a question.

Are happiness and unhappiness ( sukhadukkha) made by one's-self ( sayaṃ-kata)?

 No, Timbaruko, that's not it, replied the Bhagavan.

Are happiness and unhappiness made by another ( paraṃ-kata)?

 No, that's not it.

Are happiness and unhappiness made by one's-self and others?

 No, that's not it.

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Do happiness and unhappiness appear without any reason?

 No, that's not it.

Is there no such thing as happiness and unhappiness?

It's not that there is no happiness and unhappiness. Clearly there is happiness andunhappiness.

Is it that you don't know or see happiness and unhappiness?

It's not that I don't know or see happiness and unhappiness. I do know them, and see them.

Gotama, you've answered 'no' to all my questions. Please explain to me what you mean.Explain happiness and unhappiness to me.

Well Timbaruka, I do not say "happiness and unhappiness are caused by one's-self" becauseunderlying that statement is the eternalist view that the experience (vedanā) and the oneexperiencing ( so vedayati) are the same.

I do not say "happiness and unhappiness are caused by another" because underlying that is theview of one overcome by sensations, [i.e.] that the experience and the one experiencing aredifferent.

Avoiding both of these positions I point to a foundation (dhamma) in the middle. Withignorance (avijjā) as condition there are volitions ( saṅkhārā), and with volitions as conditionthere is consciousness etc... [i.e the nidāna chain] and thus the whole mass of disappointmentcomes about. With the complete cessation ignorance, volitions cease, with the cessation of volitions, ignorance ceases, etc... thus the whole mass of disappointment ceases.

When this was said the wanderer Timbaruka said Gotama I go for refuge to the BhagavanGotama, to the Dhamma and the community of Bhikkhus. Please remember me as a non-monastic disciple from this day forward.

~:o:~

Comments

I've translated sukha and dukkha as happiness and unhappiness here which is fairlyconventional. On this level they represent the positive and negative aspects of experience, thethings we find pleasing and displeasing, the aspects of experience on which we base our notions of happiness and unhappiness. However the words are used in a variety of ways, andthere may be other interpretations. I've noted in my comments on Dhammapada v.1-2 that

 sukha/dukkha can represent nibbāna and saṃ sāra for instance.

Timbaruka seeks to understand the problem of suffering in terms of  self and/or other . TheBuddha lets Timbaruka exhaust all the possible options within that paradigm without

committing himself. It seems that some of the wanderers were a bit like the sophists in ancientAthens and some people these days, who go around just arguing with everything. One gets thesense that Timbaruka was ready to argue whatever the Buddha might agree with or disagree

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with. The fact that the Buddha does not take a stand on any of the views presented is astrategy Timbaruka has apparently not anticipated. The Buddha uses this strategy fairly often.The approach the Buddha takes is distinctly different to this one which proposes a dichotomyand then finds fault with all possible alternatives.

Having rejected the Timbaruka's terms the Buddha gives an explanation of why he is notinterested in that particular argument, and then gives his alternative way of looking at things.There are two basic positions: the experience is either the same as the experiencer, or different. From the fact that the Buddha doesn't bother to answer the other variations proposed

 by Timbaruka, we might conclude that he does not take them seriously. His answer though partial from Timbaruka's point of view, covers the only sensible points.

We see that the rejection is in terms of Buddhist technical terminology, which reminds us thatthe story is told specifically for a Buddhist audience. Eternalism and nihilism as critical termsare distinctively Buddhist.

The first view - that suffering is caused by self - is that of the eternalist. The problem here isthat we identify ourselves with experience, and see our self as continuous and lasting. This isalmost the default setting for humanity: in effect we are our thoughts and emotions. By this Imean we don't consciously make this decision, it's just how things seem to us. As ThomasMetzinger says we are all 'naive realists'. However this leaves us with no real choice in howwe respond to situations and causes us problems. [2] Elsewhere the Buddha uses the metaphor of intoxication ( pamāda) to describe this condition.

The second view - that suffering is caused by other - is the view, not of the nihilist, but of someone overwhelmed by sensations [vedanābhitunna]. In this we aren't identified with thesensations, but feel compelled by them as when we are "overcome with grief", or we "seered". Again we often imagine that we have no choice about responding to powerful desiresand aversions. Falling in love is such a powerful sensation, and chaos if not mayhem oftenensues. The nihilist would presumably argue that ultimately there is no suffering (somethingI've heard Buddhists argue, to my consternation!)

To reiterate an important point: these 'views' are not conscious ideologies, not philosophiesthat we take on willingly. They are the default settings for human beings, a mixture of evolution and early conditioning; nature and nuture. Buddhists, like other religieux, tend toexpress a tinge of blame when describing the human condition. Although we reject theexplicit notion of original sin, we smuggle through an implicit one. We often describe people

as basically greedy and hateful for instance. I find this both philosophically problematic, andunhelpful. The Buddha here is arguing for a much less personal view of the problem of suffering. Suffering is not caused by oneself ! At least in this text.

The kind of dichotomy that Timbaruka proposes doesn't apply in the Buddha's frame of reference. And note that what is being rejected is not the self/other dichotomy per se, but theidea that suffering comes from either. This is not advaita (non-dualist) philosophy, it is

 pragmatism aimed at relieving suffering. The kind of view which is engendered by mysticalexperiences such as oceanic-boundary-loss - i.e. all is one - is being criticised here, andthroughout the Pāli canon.

In his explanation the Buddha focusses on how dukkha arises and ceases as an impersonal process. Understanding that experience is impermanent we see that there is nothing to identifywith. Identity is just another experience - impermanent, disappointing, and impersonal.

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Experiences constantly arise and cease, meaning that there is nothing to hang on to, nothing tolet go of even. Seeing experience as an impersonal process, in which the first-person

 perspective is a just another conditioned experience, means we don't blame anyone. If there isa painful state we see it has arisen dependently, and often we do have some influence on theconditions that contribute to suffering. Dependency does not do away with agency, at least not

completely.

The more subtle point is that our own relationship to experience is the primary condition tothink about. By dis-identifying with experience we make it less likely that we are either caught up in, or overwhelmed by experience, and we have a choice about being happy or unhappy that is not related to (not conditioned by) the particular experience we are havingnow. I have a growing suspicion that this is what asaṅkhata [unconditioned] means.

In a sense Timbaruka is right. Any view about happiness or unhappiness based on self and/or other leads to contradictions and argumentation. Human intercourse in any age has shown thisto be true, and such tensions and disagreements continue to play out in human civilisations,

even nominally Buddhist ones (2500 years, and we still can't agree on some things!). The problem is not this or that strategy for achieving happiness, but a fundamental mistake aboutthe nature of happiness. What we naively pursue is not happiness, but following our evolutionary heritage and conditioning we pursue pleasant sensations. So we are not happy,and our conditioning says that someone must be to blame - if not me, then you, or him, or 

 perhaps God or the Universe! In order to change this we need to step outside that frame of reference and see our experience in a completely new light - as impermanent and impersonal.Then a kind of happiness not conditioned by pleasant or unpleasant experiences can and doesarise.

~~oOo~~

Notes

1. main points identical to S 12.17. My translation.

2. There is a distant echo here of the Brahmanical view that one achieves liberation through acomprehensive identification with the world, probably associated with the mystical experiencesometimes described as oceanic boundary loss. The feeling of breaking down the subject/objectdistinction and identification with everything. Jill Bolte Taylor's description of this experience during amajor stroke is instructive because she articulates the relevant aspects of it, even if a stroke is not

attractive as a way to have that experience [See her TED presentation; and my response An Experienceof Awakening?]. I say the echo is distant  because I don't think that Brahmins are the target here. Thetarget is everyday naive realism, the identification with experience as real.

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Jayarava

My name is Jayarava which means: "Song, cry or shout of victory". I am a member of the Triratna Buddhist Order - a Triratna-dharmacārin. If you want to contact me about this blog, please use thecomments link at the end of each essay, or email 'myname'@yahoo.com.

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The idea that the universe is non-random,above all that the universe follows rules analogous to human social rules that we canunderstand and follow in order to get along, is one of the most pervasive human myths and an

important idea in most religions. Indeed we could define myth in this sense as a story or narrative which conveys the sense of an ordered universe, and in what way the universe isordered (i.e. myth is descriptive); and religion as attempts to ensure we follow the lawsimplied by an ordered universe (i.e. religion is prescriptive). In ancient India this order wascalled first  ṛ ta and then dharma.. In some tellings of Greek myth first there was khaos - anunordered, unstructured void - and then the ordered universe, the kosmos, was brought into

 being.

Since the European Enlightenment it has been discovered that mathematical models candescribe aspects of the world very accurately. Simple equations such as F=ma or E=mc2 tellus a great deal about how matter behaves, and what to expect from it in the future - matter appears to 'obey' these 'Laws'. In the course of my education I studied these physical laws ingreat detail, and personally demonstrated many of them. But along the way I began to see thatmy education in science consisted in being presented with a series of increasinglysophisticated models, none of which was true in any absolute sense, and none of which didmuch for my angst . The Laws of physics are useful and accurate descriptions of matter under most circumstances, but they do not meet every need.

Just because we perceive order, does not mean that there is order. Hopefully readers willrecall the movie A Beautiful Mind . It no doubt romanticised the experience of madness, andyet it highlighted something about the human mind. Our mind sees patterns - we are pattern

recognition sensors of the highest sensitivity. In fact we tend to see order where there is none.Give a human being a random array of points of light (like, say, the stars) and we fill it with a bestiary and a pantheon that reflects everything that we care about. Given random events wewill see connections. In the movie John Nash becomes obsesses with and delusional about

 patterns, but this was a natural faculty gone haywire, not simply a product of madness.

One could also say that religion is simply our collective hopes and fears writ large and projected out onto the universe: our worst fear is that the universe is devoid of rules, or elseutterly determined by rules; the hope is that there are enough rules to make life predictable,not too many as to make it stultifying. We want to be free to act, to choose, to experiencenovelty; but not too much. We want to know that the sun will rise each day, that the seasons

will appear in due course, that the crops will grow and ripen; that we will have enough foodand water, that predators will not carry us or our loved ones away etc. Most of these are notvery sophisticated and reflect our evolved biological needs rather than our intellectual

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longings. Our societies overlay this with a veneer of sophistication, but our actual needshaven't changed in millennia, just the strategies for meeting those needs. As social primatesit's important for us to establish social rules and hierarchies and for everyone to keep to themin order to fulfil our social needs. Hence we see the personified forces of nature as a celestialsociety, or as in ancient China as a celestial empire. The gods of course are not observed to

obey the same social rules as humans, but never the less we discern order amongst them anddo what we can to facilitate that order through sacrifice and prayer (all gods are similar inneeding to be propitiated in order to behave - rather like over-sized toddlers). Many gods areeffectively alpha-male primates in the sky - demanding submission and the best food. It seemsirrational until you look at, say, chimp behaviour (I highly recommend reading Jane Goodall'sIn the Shadow of Man for instance). Part of the reason that apparently irrational religion is sovery popular is that it speaks directly to deep human needs.

I wonder if this mismatch between our basic biology and intellect may be behind themismatch between ordinary people and intellectuals? Recently I watched TED video of Richard Dawkins exhorting his audience to militant atheism. One of the points he makes is

that amongst members of the American Academy of Science less that 10% believe in a god.When you compare that to members of the public it's more like 75% of people believe in agod. Dawkins quotes (ex)president Bush as saying an atheist could not be a patriot. Atheismis, however, the largest category of religious belief in the USA after Christianity -outnumbering Judaism, Hinduism and all other religions put together. But atheists have no

 political voice in the USA. I thought that was a very interesting point.

Intellectuals can generally see that the idea of a creator god is not credible, and it is interestingthat Christian intellectuals back off from anthropomorphic versions of god even when theycannot give up the idea altogether. Ordinary people are harder to convince because they still

 project their hopes and fears onto the universe. And they want the universe to care. A caringuniverse is often personified as a loving mother or father (I don't recall any culture describingthe universe/nature as a favourite aunt or uncle for instance).

The universe described by scientists seems not to care about us. I had an important realisationabout this some years back when I used to surf on the rugged West Coast beaches near Auckland, New Zealand (especially Piha). These beaches are potentially dangerous and everyyear several people drown there, though with care they provide excellent surfing andswimming. The waves just roll in to their own rhythm, and they do not hesitate to drown theincautious. The sea does not glory in killing people, or regret one getting away. The sea iscompletely and utterly indifferent to us. When you float around on it for hours at a time,

several days a week for a couple of years this becomes apparent. The ocean is magnificent, beautiful, fascinating, and thrilling, but it is not alive, not sentient. The ocean does not care, because it cannot. Caring is something that humans do.

I believe the universe is like this also. The universe does not care about us. It is not an ethicaluniverse (i.e. it has no bias towards 'good') but one which is not aware at all, let alone awareof us and our needs: the universe is largely inanimate and driven by physics and chemistry.This might sound bleak or hard, scientists are often accused of being cold, but I'm notfinished. Because the wonder is that self-aware beings can and do care. Sure, other animalsexperience consciousness and emotions so some extent. I don't deny that. But humans havethis ability to rise above circumstances that no other animal possesses. We have an ability to

 be altruistic not possessed by other beings - for instance we help strangers, and can turnenemies into friends. In effect it is humans that provide the love, the caring, and the emotionalwarmth in the universe because they are products of consciousness, especially self-

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consciousness.

In response to one group of Brahmins who were concerned about the afterlife (Tevijja Sutta

DN 13), the Buddha described a series of meditations in which one radiates positive emotionsfor all beings. One first of all radiates general goodwill, friendliness, love. One makes no

distinctions between any beings, but imagines all beings everywhere being happy and well.Then we imagine that all people in need getting what they need, all the ill and unhappy beings

 becoming well and happy. Then we imagine ourselves celebrating along with everyone whohas good fortune. And finally we radiate equanimity - a pure positivity not dependent oncircumstances, but which arises out of our identification with all beings everywhere. Whatfiner use of the imagination is there? It is no coincidence that the Buddha named this group of 

 practices brahmavihāra (dwelling with god) and said of them that dwelling on the meditationswas like dwelling with, or perhaps as, Brahmā (the creator god - usually depicted with four faces looking in the cardinal directions). The name was probably aimed at Brahmanical theistswhose religious goal was brahmasahavyata 'companionship with Brahmā'. In response toconcerns about the afterlife the Buddha simply teaches us to love without bounds in the here

and now (as the Karaṇīya Mettā Sutta says).

The Buddha's point is much the same as I have been saying. The universe, god if you will, isnot the source of friendliness, love, caring, compassion. We are. Love is a human quality thatemerges from our consciousness. It is up to us to provide this quality. It's a big job, and so wemust set about it systematically, and collectively. Else we may fail, and we all know what thatfailure looks like. Fortunately we have ways of developing these qualities, and we haveexemplars to inspire us. All we need do really is allow ourselves to be inspired, and have a goat the practices.

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