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MOSZT Könyvek 3.

„Utak és alternatívák”

Előadások és tanulmányok az 1917-es orosz for-radalom 90 éves évfordulója alkalmából

Pécs, 2009

PTE-BTK Történettudományi Intézet – Modernkori Oroszország és Szovjetunió Történeti Kutatócsoport

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MOSZT

Történészcéh Egyesület

Szerkesztette: Lengyel Gábor Társszerkesztő: Kolontári Attila

Felelős szerkesztő: Bebesi György

© - MOSZT © - TCE

© - Bebesi György, Kolontári Attila, Lengyel Gábor © - Szerzők

Borítóterv: Polgár Tamás

ISSN: 1788-4810

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Nyomdai előkészítés és kivitelezés: Bookmaster Kft., Pécs. Felelős vezető: Bernáth Miklós

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MOSZT-TCE, Pécs, 2009.

Boris Trechniewski: Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism…

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Boris Trechniewski: Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism and projects of union in

Central Europe

Nowadays, a huge question animes the European Union’s debates, con-cerning its future and its enlargement toward Russia’s periphery. The main question is about the rule and the place of Russia in Europe: part-nership or integration? This is more crucial since the integration of Cen-tral Europe into the EU, which were under Sovietic obedience during the second half of the 20th century. In this region of Europe, Russia and „russianism” have a special signification, that we can explain through the History. One of its manifestation could be focused on the Pan-Slavism and the Pan-Russianism, whose theories will be soon defined in the lines below. But we cannot mention Pan-Slavism without dealing with its counterpart in Central Europe, that is Pan-Germanism.

In fact, we will focus this study on the links existing between these two ideas and the projects of union in Europe, more specially in Central Europe and during the interwar period. It seems to be interesting to show how Pan-Slavism and Pan-Russianism could influence the birth of some European idea, either to apply, or to counter it.

We will concentrate this study on the interwar period, because it ap-pears that during the decades 1920-1930, the European ideas were dis-cussed or elaborated with full passion and interest by men, who wanted to preserve Europe from another tragedy like the World War. The Peace treaties were signed in 1919-1920 and deeply modified the European map. The fall of the Habsburg empire and the birth, or rebirth, of new states completly changed the face of Europe.

At first, we will try to define more exactly these both conceptions and present their short history. As well, we will attempt to show how these ideas were perceipted is Central Europe, especially in Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

In a second time, we would like to introduce some projects of union at the Central European scale. Some of them obviously turn on the ques-tions of Pan-Slavism or Pan-Germanism, either they try to materialize it, or on the contrary, to prevent from it.

1 – Definition of the Pan-Slavism

Pan-Slavism can be defined as following: political system, which aims to unify all the Slavic people under Russian authority. This word was used the first time in 1826, by the Slovak Ján Herkeľ, who litteraly


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thought about unity between all the Slaves1. This idea was born with the hope of people under Austrian, Hungarian or Turkish domination after the victories of the tsarist army on the Napoleonic Great Army. The feel-ing highly increased after the crushing of the Hungarian revolution in 1849.

The concept really take body during the congresses of Moscow and Prag, at he half of the 19th century. These both congresses are important, because we can distinguish two pathes in the Pan-Slavism after it:

-The „Pan-Russianism”, following the idea of Vladimir Ivanovitch Lamansky. He claimed, that the Pan-Slavism should be inspired by the Polish and Ukrainian experiences: a territory ruled by Russia, where the orthodox religion could be dominant, even if the „inferior” Slavic people could be allowed to keep their traditions. In his mind, Pan-Slavism should mean russification of the Austrian and Balkanic Slaves2.

-The „Austro-Slavism”, suggested by Karel Havliček Borovský and František Palacký, during the Congress of Prag, in June 1848. This path is defended by the Czech liberals, which proposed a federation of eight national regions, each with a local government. Besides, they imagined that the Slavic nationalities, inside the Austrian empire could coexistate with each other. Furthermore, a such cooperation could resist efficiently against the Germanic domination. We can quote that Masaryk was a par-tisan of this movement, until he began to think about creating a Czecho-slowak State. The Austro-Slavic trend lost its influence after the Austro-Hungarian compromise, in 1867, when it appeared, that the Germanic – and Hungarian – element of the empire remained dominant and did not accept the Slavic one could reach to a complete egality.

If the Czechs favourably received these theories, they saw in them a

way to liberate from the Austrian domination. Russia was compared to a power able to lead them to the freedom. The Russian intervention against the Hungarian revolution, in 1849, could be counsidered like a help from the „big brother”, saving the little disarmed Slavic nations, especially the Slovaks. Even if this intervention was rather motivated by others reasons, like the necessity to fight against any attempt, which could turn upside down the Central European configuration born at the issue of the Congress of Wien in 1815.

1 Cf. Marie Élizabeth DUCREUX, Histoire de l’Europe du centre-est, Paris, PUF, Coll. Nouvelle Clio, 2004, p. 452. 2 Cf. Sándor KOSTYA, Panslavism, Danubian Press, 1981, p. 6. Cf. also Géza GECSE, Bi-zánctól Bizáncig, Az orosz birodalmi gondolat, Budapest, Nemzeti Tankönyvkiadó, 2007.


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In Poland, the Pan-Slavic theories were differently received. Any perspective to reach project lead by Russia was seen as an attempt to harm the Polish interests and its existence. We must remember that Po-land was divided into three parts since 1795, between Russia, Prussia and the Austrian Empire. In the Kingdom of Poland, Russia was above all synonymous with oppressive yoke. But it did not mean that Poland was deaf to any Pan-Slavic plan. A confederation of Slavic nations was counsidered as a future possibility, providing that Russia stand outside from this construction.

On her side, Hungary always saw Pan-Slavic theories like a threat on its existence. The inability to manage the national claims of the Slovaks, who watched in the direction of Russia to find some support, had created a great gulf between the both nations. Hungary adopted a tough politic of „magyarization” in order to saping the Slovak national feelings. The hardest time was during the revolution in 1848, when Hungarian sys-tematically rejected concession to an egality between them. The repres-sion was such as Slovaks gave the gallows the name of „freedom’s trees of Kossuth”3. Following this repression, the idea born in Slovakia to eventually create a common state with the Czechs. Besides, Hungary prefered to put her hopes close to Germany and the Pan-German con-cepts, which attitude increased the misunderstanding between Hungarian and Slavic nations.

2 – Definition of the Pan-Germansim

Like the Pan-Slavism, the Pan-Germanism is a political theorie, whose aim reaches to unify in a common state all the people of German origin. More than the Pan-Slavism, Pan-Germanism is an expression of the awakening of the nationalities and their affirmation, following the prin-ciple of Éric Hobsbawm, according whom Nation = State = People4. Pan-Germanism really born during the Napoleonic wars, after the col-lapse of the Saint Roman-Germanic Empire in 1806. German thinkers began to think about the idea to unify all the people, who have in com-mon the German ethnic group and the language, the Volksdeutschen. That theory should not be compared with a kind of German nationalism, following the concept of Gilbert Delannoi, according whom nations

3 Cf. Encyclopædia Universalis, vol. XIV, édition de 1973, p. 1087 : article sur la Slovaquie 4 Cf. Eric HOBSBAWM, Nations et nationalisme depuis 1780, Paris, Gallimard, 1992, p. 31.


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make nationalism5, because German nation did not still exist until 1871. Pan-Germanism, in its modern meaning, was defined by the policy of Bismark, the first chancellor of the Second Reich. He initialized a policy aiming to guarantee Germany a real independance and a status of great self-sufficient power, through a system of alliances in which, „all the States, except France, will be dependent on Germany and, because of these links, which unify themselves, would not be able to create an alli-ance against Germany”6. The successors of Bismark followed this path, but gave it an economical tint. The emblematic project of railway be-tween Berlin and Bagdad, the so-called Bagdadbahn, was the perfect illustration of the new orientation. By this way, Germany wanted to ex-tend its influence in Central Europe, in an economical sense. These eco-nomical motivations were more important than the political ones, only defended by a minority like the Pan-German League (Alldeutscher Ver-band) of Heinrich Class, founded in 18917. But with the approaching war, Pan-Germanism was more offensive, in willing offset the increase of the Pan-Slavic ideas in Central Europe, especially by the Czechs and a part of the Poles.

During the First World War, Pan-German ideas were developped more precisely with the essay of Friedrich Neumann, Mitteleuropa, pub-lished in 19158. He proposed a real project of European economical un-ion, including Central Europe and the Ottoman Empire. In the same time, Neumann thought about the main European problem of his time, concerning minorities in the Empires. Conscious to Poland represented one of the most difficult problem, he tried to solve it in suggesting that Poland could have the same status inside the Habsburg empire as Hun-gary. This solution was rejected by the German staff headquarter, put-ting forward the loss of guarantee on the Eastern border, against Russia. The only point which would survive on this project was the idea of a custom union between Germany and Austria, but all the attempts to real-ize it failed, face to the opposition of Hindenburg and Ludendorff9, who

5 He set this theory opposite the Ernest Gellner’s one, according whom nationalism make nations. Cf. François BÉDARIDA, «Phénomène national et État-nation, d’hier à aujourd’hui», Vingtième Siècle, vol. 50, n° 50, 1996, pp. 6-7. 6 Cf. Klaus-Jürgen MÜLLER, «Les deux tentations de la politique extérieure allemande, de Bismarck à nos jours», Vingtième Siècle, vol. 27, n° 27, 1990, p. 19. 7 Cf. Encyclopædia Universalis, vol. I, édition de 1973, p. 729 : article sur l’histoire de l’Allemagne moderne et contemporaine. 8 Cf. Károly IRINYI, A Naumann-féle «Mitteleuropa» - tervezet és a magyar politikai köz-vélemény, Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1963, pp. 20 et suivantes. 9 Cf. Mária ORMOS, Közép-Európa, Volt? Van? Lesz?, Budapest, Napvilág Kiadó, 2007, p. 53.


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refused the union of Poland and Austrian Empire, precondition of this custom union.

Among the Czechs and the Poles, these projects were very circum-spectly counsidered. In the part of Poland occupied by Germany, the re-action is quite similar to this one in the Kingdom of Poland face to Pan-Russian theories.

From the Czech point of view, the fear of Pan-Germanism could be explained by the fact that there was an important German minority who observed these ideas with great interest. Furthermore, this minority con-stitued the elite of the region, managing the essentials of the economical life of the country. These both things kept alive the Czech resentment against the German minority. This frustration showed itself against Hungarian, accused to favour the Pan-German theories in Central Europe10.

Indeed, Hungary did not counsider Pan-Germanism as a threat. On the contrary, Hungary enjoyed a privileged place in the Pan-German plans, the German liberals already suggesting in 1848 to create a Central European union with the Hungarian collaboration to face the Slaves and the Latins. Hungary lended a willing ear to this project, fearing of the Pan-Slavic threats in the region. In the same time, Hungary expected to use the Pan-Germanism to keep pressure on the Austrian empire and ob-tain some advantages from Wien. This attitude induced the others na-tionalities to mistrust Hungary, this suspicion bringing by the Entente the feeling that she was hugely responsible for the war and then, seri-ously condemned during the Peace Treaties.

To conclude this short presentation of these both concepts, it seems to be interesting to quote an article of Romain Rolland, he published in 1915, in Annales des Nationalités: „Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism? Of two evils, the lesser”. In his article, he answered to some German intel-lectuals who supported the German imperialism and wrote a binding, „ for the benefit of the civilized nations”, denying the German responsa-bility in the war opening: „…The Russian domination had often been ferociously hardly felt by the little nationalities under her rule. But how does it matter, Germans, that the Poles still prefere it than yours? Do you think, that Europe ignore the monstrous way with which you annihi-late the Polish nation? […] My friends of Germany, either you are strangly ignorant of the mind of the people who surround you, or you think we are naive and badly informed. Your imperialism, under civi-lized exterior, does not seem to me less savage than the tsarism, in all

10 Cf. Marie Élizabeth DUCREUX, Histoire de l’Europe du centre-est, op. cit., pp. 445-450.


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which face his greedy dream of global domination”11. In reading this quote, we must however keep in our mind, that the writer was French and, above all, treated Russia as an ally. Criticizing Russian policy re-mained forbidden during the war until 1917.

3 – Which union for Central Europe ?

This presentation of the both concepts of Pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism was necessary to better understand how the projects of un-ion in Europe could structure themselve around it. In this way, we should shortly mention some projects of union at the European scale, or at least, at the Central European scale. Two of them particulary holded my attention, namely the Polish plans and the Little Entente between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Romania. There are both interesting if we observe them from this point of view, and not only as we usually do, that is as political and military alliance. If the first one did not reach his aim, we could wonder if the second one did it also.

A – Polish conceptions: „inkorporacja„or „ federacja”?

This question represents the two alternatives of the Polish foreign policy at the time of its rebirth. The first one was defended by Roman Dmowski, who commended a Poland inside her historical borders. He was above frightend by the German threat and the Pan-German theo-ries12. On the contrary, the second one, advocated by Piłsudki, coun-sidered the Pan-Russianism as the most dangerous threat for Poland. He imagined a Poland surrounded by a string of little states allied with her, against Russia. To reach this objective, Piłsudski strongly supported the independance of Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus in order to contitute a real barrier from the Baltic to the Black Seas13. This second project pre-

11 Cf. Sophie CŒURÉ, «Romain Rolland, "Pangermanisme, panslavisme ? De deux maux, le moindre" (1915)», Matériaux pour l’histoire de notre temps, n° 41/42, janvier-juin 1996, pp. 56-57. „…La domination russe s’est faite cruellement lourde souvent pour les petites nationalités qu’elle a englouties. Mais comment se fait-il, Allemands, que les Polonais la préfèrent encore à la vôtre ? Croyez-vous que l’Europe ignore la façon monstrueuse dont vous anéantissez la race polonaise ? […] Mes amis d’Allemagne, ou vous êtes étrangement ignorants de l’état d’esprit des peuples qui vous entourent, ou vous nous croyez bien naïfs et bien mal informés. Votre impérialisme, sous des dehors civilisés, ne me paraît pas moins féroce que le tsarisme, pour tout ce qui veut l’opposer à son rêve cupide de domination universelle… 12 Cf. Jan Waskan, «Geopolityka i idea państwa narodowego. Granice Polski w koncepcjach obozu narodowego przed traktatem wersalskim», Polska i Polacy w kręgu zagadnień europejskich, Bydgoszcz, 1999, pp. 13-28. 13 Cf. Piotr Okulewicz, Koncepcja „międzymorza” w myśli i praktyce politycznej obozu Józefa Piłsudskiego w latach 1918-1926, Poznań, Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 2001, p. 39.


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sents more interest because it putted real base for a regional cooperation between states against a common menace, even if it was essentially con-ceived in military terms.

The realisation of the Piłsudski’s conception did not unfortunaly happend like he planned, because of strong divergences between Poland and her neighbours about territorial quarrels. Furthermore, Lithuania and Ukraine did perceive these plans like an expression of the Polish imperi-alism, and not like a construction able to resist against the expansion of Russia. Here the problem lies in the fact that this project was not moti-vated by a will to build a real federation, but to contain the Russian threat. The failure of the Polish project could be also explained by the impossibility for Piłsudski to put into pratice his policy, because of the difficulties with his opponents leaded by Dmowski. During the Lithunian crisis about Vilnius in April 1919, for example, the Polish chief of state was pressured by the extremists to adopt a stronger politic toward the reoccupation of the Lithuanian town. In the Ukrainian affair, the pressures were much stronger in reason of the war between the two countries. Polish clumsinesses and the hard-line policy of Dmowski con-tributed to the misunderstanding between Poles and their neighborhood.

The unability to manage the Soviet threat on the borders desserved the Polish interests, and Poland was menaced with the Red Army’s inva-sion. Even the victory on the Vistula, in August 1920, did not permit Piłsudski to continue his policy. Indeed, the march of the Bolchevic troops up to Warsaw showed the limits of the Polish projects and prooved its incapacity to play an efficient rule of barrier in Eastern Europe.

However, these failures cannot be just putted down to Poland. The attitude of the Western Allies, especially France and Great-Britain, is highly ambiguous, when they did not support the Polish war effort against Bolcheviks, arguing that Poland had to take on the responsability for this war. From the British point of view, Poland was only motivated by a desire of conquest, as said Lloyd George, the 21th of May 1919, during a session of the Council of Four: „All we tell about the fight against bolchevism is just a pretext: Poland does not fight against bol-chevism in Galicia, but for the conquest of the oil wells. We can really fight Bolchevism just with Russian troops” 14. This assertion, even if wrong, because it betrayed the British economical conceptions in her Eastern European policy, further showed, how the Allies counsidered the Russian problems. France, on her side, tried to support Poland as

14 Cf. Paul MANTOUX, Les délibérations du Conseil des Quatre, Paris, CNRS, 1955; minutes of the session of the 21th of May 1919.


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much as she could, in sending war material to the Polsih army. This atti-tude can be explained by the reason, that Poland was an essential piece in the French security system in Eastern Europe, in order to replace Rus-sia, victim of civil war and with an unsettled future15. French and British policy did not take into account the Polish feelings toward Pan-Russian threats, because it did not arrange them to see Poland taking care more about Russia and not enough about Germany. They gave a real support when the Red Army was on the Warsaw’s gates16.

B – The Little Entente

The case of the Little Entente is quite different, in the meaning of this alliance aimed to tie Hungary. Nevertheless, this military system found its roots in the conception of Masaryk, he exposed in his book, la Nou-velle Europe17. The father of the Czechoslovakian State argued the ne-cessity to build in Central Europe a block of Slave nations, between Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia, able to mainly face the Pan-German and, secondary, the Hungarian pretentions. In his mind, the Hungarian aggressivity in Central Europe was kept by the German parti-sans, that’s why it was primordial to shut down the German activism. The collaboration with Yugoslavia seemed to be the most easy to start, but suffered from a huge problem. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia did not have any common frontiers. Masaryk proposed also to make a corri-dor between the two countries, through Austria and Hungary, but this project was quickly rejected by the Allies, who counsidered that it was too artificial18. Toward Poland, the relations were much more turbulent for two reasons. In one hand, Poles and Czechs experienced vis-à-vis each other very ambiguous feelings, like Masaryk had resumed after a meeting with Dmowski in Paris, in December 1918: „Too much cultural differences distinguish the aristocrat, catholic and culturally less ad-vanced Polish people with the democrat, religiously indifferent and massively literacy Czech people” 19. Besides, Poles and Czechs were op-posed about a territorialy question in Teschen, Silesia. This dispute took

15 Cf. Kalervo Hovi, „Cordon sanitaire” or „Barrière de l’Est” ? The emergence of the new French Eastern European alliance policy, Turku, Turun Yliopisto, 1975. 16 Cf. Alexandra VIATTEAU , «La guerre polono-bolchévique, la bataille de la Vistule (1920), et l’"insurrection" de Varsovie (1944): deux batailles de Varsovie aux conséquences capitales pour l’Europe», extracts of a conference added the 29th of Novem-ber 2005, at the Polish History and Literature Society of Paris. 17 Cf. Tomáš MASARYK, La Nouvelle Europe, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2002. (publishing annoted by Alain SOUBIGOU) 18 Cf. Margaret MACMILLAN , Peacemakers, London, John Murray, 2001, p. 246. 19 Note du 12 décembre 1918, AMAEF, Europe 1918-40, Roumanie, vol. 32, p. 27.


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on considerable proportions, enough for harming on a long-term basis the Polish-Czech relations during all the interwar20.

The Peace negociations and Treaties showed also how dangerous could be the Hungarian irredentism for the Czech security, further when Hungary tried to collaborate with another power. During the 133 days of Béla Kun, in the spring 1919, this danger concretly arised, when the Hungarian Red Army attacked Czechoslovakia in order to establish a jonction with the Red Army through Ruthenia. While this attack, a Bol-chevist government had been shortly settled in Slovakia and Hungarian troops arrived at the gates of Bratislava21. Only a masssive armed inter-vention of Romania, finally backing to by the Allies22, saved Czechoslo-vakia from a defeat. This Bolchevist adventure showed to the Czechs the necessity to prevent from any Hungary’s attempts to retrieve her lost ter-ritory. Alone, Czechoslovakia was not able to resist against this agres-sion. Furthermore, an alliance berween Hungary and Poland frightened the Czech leaders most. It could happend during the summer 1920, when Hungary proposed to Warsaw, with her military help against Bolche-vism, a plan to reconquer Slovakia23. Another fact let Czechoslovakia be afraid of a possible French – Hungarian agreement. Indeed, negociations were conducted in order to build a Danubian Confederation. In exchange of economical concessions, France could be ready to make peace condi-tions more flexible, promising some minor frontier revisions, in Bur-genland and Ruthenia24. If the reality of these negociations is recog-nized, notably through French archives25, it exists no document prooving that an agreement was really signed. France was not able, alone, to change all the terms of the peace treaty. If some French leaders were about to accept it, British and Italian diplomacy blocked any attempt, fearing to let the French obtain a dominant position in the Danubian re-gion.

In face of these threats, the Czech diplomacy, leaded by Beneš, vig-orously acted to find an agreement with Yugoslavia and Romania, in or-

20 Cf. Marek Kazimierz KAMIŃSKI, Konflikt polsko-czeski, 1918-1921, Warszawa, Wydawnictwo NERITON, 2001. 21 Compte-rendu n° 1870 (confidentiel) du 2e Bureau de l’État-Major de l’Armée du 17 juin 1919; SHAT 6N247. 22 Cf. Traian SANDU, Le système de sécurité français en Europe centre-orientale, l’exemple roumain (1919-1933), Paris, L’Harmattan, 1999, pp. 71 et suivantes 23 Cf. Boris TRECHNIEWSKI, Le facteur tchèque dans les relations polono-hongroises, 1918-1939, non-published PhD work, defended in Paris III in Februar 2007, pp. 250-293. 24 Cf. Jacques BARIÉTY, «L’"accord révisionniste" franco-hongrois de 1920. Histoire d’un mythe», Les conséquences des traités de paix de 1919-1920 en Europe centrale et sud-orientale, Strasbourg, 1987, pp. 75-84. 25 See also, among others, AMAEF, Série Europe 1918-40, Hongrie, vol. 58-61.


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der to completely surround Hungary. First contacts existed between Yugoslaves and Czechs since the end of 1919, but did not reach because the Romanian – Yugoslavian opposition about Banat. But the rise of the Hungarian irredentism, further after the signature of Trianon, get hurry the negociations between Prague and Belgrad and ended up at the signa-ture of a military convention, the 14th of August 1920, in which the both countries agreed on the priority to give to the Hungarian threat and promised to help each other if Hungary would attack one of the contract-ing part. The first reactions toward this signature were revealed very negative, especially in France. The diplomatic genius alone of Beneš could allow to present this alliance as a tool against a German threat in Central Europe and a way to attend to the upholding of the Peace Trea-ties, two arguments which finally convinced the French diplomacy. This change in the French attitude can be also explained by internal factors, Berthelot replacing Paléolgue as General Secretary of the Quai d’orsay. While Paléologue strived for building a Danubian Confederation with Hungary, Berthelot was a partisan of the hard line and deeply hostile to Hungary.

The following step was to let Romania join the alliance in order to completly surround Hungary. The Romanian signature was given the 23rd of April 1921, one month after the first attempt of Charles IV to re-trieve the Hungarian thrown. The Little Entente was really completed the 7th June 1921, while Romania and Yugoslavia signed their agree-ment. This alliance should be larger, Poland being about to join, as such as Greece. Unfortunately, Polish-Czech relations never performed to be cordial, despite an improvement at the end of 1921 – signature of the pact Beneš-Skirmunt, the 6th November 192126 – until the summer of 1922. The misunderstanding between Prague and Warsaw resurfaced around the quarrel of Jaworzyna, on the Polish-Slovak border27. Con-cerning Greece, the relations between Athens and Belgrad were too deli-cate, about the Macedonian frontier, to envisage a real collaboration, even if the Greek integration into the Little Entente could serve the French interests, military speaking28.

26 Cf. Piotr WANDYCZ, France and her Eastern allies, 1919-1925. French-Czechoslovak-Polish relations from the Paris Peace Conference to Locarno, Minneapolis, 1962, pp. 395-397. 27 Cf. Alain SOUBIGOU, «Plus grave que Teschen? Javořina, 1922», L’amitié franco-tchécoslovaque nº 1, Paris, février 1998. 28 Cf. François GRUMEL-JACQUIGNON, «Un exemple d’illusion stratégique : la route de Salonique (1920-1933)», Relations Internationales nº 109, Paris, Printemps 2002, pp. 49-68.


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To conclude this part, we could say, that what could be an instrument to face the Pan-German threat in Central Europe finally appeared like a tool of the Czech foreign policy in order to establish its domination on the region and control as the Polish pretentions, such as the Hungarian irredentism.

In conclusion, we can say, that Central Europe consitute the main playground for the Pan-Slavism and the Pan-Germanism, two concep-tions which oppose themselves, as well as they complete themselves. Between them, the countries of Central Europe tries to find their own fate, in supporting one or the other, according to their interests. After the First World War and the Peace Treaties, the Central European map was deeply modified, with the birth – or rebirth – of new states, each of one willing to find its place on this new scene. Either they defended the new peace order, or they preached for its revision, but in all the cases, they manoeuvred between the both concepts in order to emphasize their views.

At the same time, the tragedy of the war motivated some people to imagine new solutions in order to avoid another war, which already seemed close, because of the peace imperfections. The ideas of union or federation blossomed in the mind of those people, either at the European scale, or at a more regional scale, such as the Central European one.

We saw two examples of projects, which are, in the same time, two counter-examples. We have chosen them, because they show how could be instrumentalized the Pan-German and Pan-Slavist concepts in order to serve personnal projects of „federation”. Either Piłsudski or Masaryk – later Beneš – followed their own path, in order to guarantee for their country a dominant position on the Central European scene. We could say that their project failed because of a vision too restrictive. But be-sides, it existed a lot of other projects, some of them could require more attention, in reason of their visionnary aspects, if we see the most suc-cessfully and most known among them, like the Pan-Europe of Couden-hove-Kallergi. The European Union, in which we are living, inherited a lot of those projects of the interwar. As well, the actual main debates around the future of the EU were already in discussion at this period. We should better know it in order to better understand the opportunities of the EU toward Eastern Europe and Russia’s periphery.

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