COMPILATION OF NATURAL LAW REPORTS

PEOPLE v. GENOSA

FACTS: On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the re­examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re­opening of the case a quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists.

The Supreme Court partly granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as constituting self defense.

2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling:

1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted with the “battered woman syndrome”.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.

Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so­called “cycle of violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension­building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self­defense arising from the battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life.

Third, at the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable – not necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of self­defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the context of self­defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to self­defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.

Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the following requisites of self­defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self­defense. It presupposes actual, sudden and unexpected attack – or an imminent danger thereof – on the life or safety of a person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their children’s bedroom.

During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however, taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances – psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation – did not arise from the same set of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted by the batterer­spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason.

2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant.

Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer­spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance, the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14 years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

PRECEPTS OF NATURAL LAW:

Justice and Equality.

USES OF NATURAL LAW:

Justificatory Use ­ To warrant some legal innovation, as this is the first case in the Philippines where BWS was taken into consideration as a justifying circumstance (considered only as a mitigating circumstance in this case).

Interpretative Use ­ To broaden the meaning of self­defense and not construe it strictly according to the words defining it, but to the spirit and intent of the law.

ALEJANDRO ESTRADA vs. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR

FACTS:

Soledad Escritor is a court interpreter since 1999 in the RTC of Las Pinas City.

Alejandro Estrada, the complainant, wrote to Judge Jose F. Caoibes, presiding judge of Branch 253, RTC of Las Pinas City, requesting for an investigation of rumors that Escritor has been living with Luciano Quilapio Jr., a man not her husband, and had eventually begotten a son. Escritor’s husband, who had lived with another woman, died a year before she entered into the judiciary.

On the other hand, Quilapio is still legally married to another woman. Estrada is not related to either Escritor or Quilapio and is not a resident of Las Pinas but of Bacoor, Cavite.

Consequently, respondent was charged with committing "disgraceful and immoral conduct" under Book V, Title I, Chapter VI, Sec. 46(b)(5) of the Revised Administrative Code.

Escritor is a member of the religious sect known as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society where her conjugal arrangement with Quilapio is in conformity with their religious beliefs.

Estrada believes that Escritor is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.

After ten years of living together, she executed on July 28, 1991 a “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” which was approved by the congregation.

Such declaration is effective when legal impediments render it impossible for a couple to legalize their union. For Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Declaration allows members of the congregation who have been abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations.

Gregorio, Salazar, a presiding minister since 1985 and has been a member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses 1919, testified and explained the import of and procedures for executing the declaration which was completely executed by Escritor and Quilapio’s in Atimonan, Quezon and was signed by three witnesses and recorded in Watch Tower Central Office.

In sum, therefore, insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in the congregation.

By invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her congregation, in asserting that her conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be held administratively liable, the Court had to determine the contours of religious freedom under Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution, which provides, viz:

Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and immoral conduct”.

HELD:

REVIEW OF THE OLD WORLD ANTECEDENTS OF RELIGION

It ascertained two salient features in the review of religious history:

1. With minor exceptions, the history of church­state relationships was characterized by persecution, oppression, hatred, bloodshed, and war, all in the name of the God of Love and of the Prince of Peace.

2. Likewise with minor exceptions, this history witnessed the unscrupulous use of religion by secular powers to promote secular purposes and policies, and the willing acceptance of that role by the vanguards of religion in exchange for the favors and mundane benefits conferred by ambitious princes and emperors in exchange for religion’s invaluable service

This was the context in which the unique experiment of the principle of religious freedom and separation of church and state saw its birth in American constitutional democracy and in human history.

Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice While the Establishment Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. It shows the movement of establishment of religion as an engine to promote state interests, to the principle of non­establishment to allow the free exercise of religion. This was the context in which the unique experiment of the principle of religious freedom and separation of church and state saw its birth in American constitutional

democracy and in human history.

The Court then turned to the religion clauses’ interpretation and construction in the United States because the U.S. religion clauses are the precursors to the Philippine religion clauses.

A. STRICT SEPARATION AND STRICT NEUTRALITY/SEPARATION

Only the complete separation of religion from politics would eliminate the formal influence of religious institutions and provide for a free choice among political views, thus a strict "wall of separation" is necessary.

The strict neutrality or separationist view, is strict in holding that religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of governmental action, whether the action confers rights or privileges or imposes duties or obligations.

B. BENEVOLENT NEUTRALITY/ACCOMMODATION

the wall is meant to protect the church from the state. It recognizes that religion plays an important role in the public life. Religious freedom is seen as a substantive right and not merely a privilege against discriminatory

legislation.

The Court states that our Constitution adheres the benevolent neutrality approach that gives room for accommodation of religious exercises as required by the Free Exercise Clause.

This benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. The state’s interest is the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high standard of morality and decency. “There is nothing in the OCA’s (Office of the Court Administrator) memorandum to the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override

respondent’s plea of religious freedom. Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General”.

The solicitor general’s office represents the Government in cases before the Supreme Court and supervises the handling of litigation on behalf of the government in all appellate courts.

In order to properly settle the case at bar, it is essential that the government be given an opportunity to demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s position that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it is within the scope of free exercise protection.

The Court could not prohibit and punish her conduct where the Free Exercise Clause protects it, since this would be an unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom. Furthermore, the court cannot simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious freedom but must also apply the “COMPELLING STATE INTEREST” TEST.

The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity

(a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent's claimed religious belief and practice;

(b) to present evidence on the state's "compelling interest" to override respondent's religious belief and practice; and

(c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent's religious freedom.

Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent ESCRITOR’S CONJUGAL ARRANGEMENT CANNOT BE PENALIZED as she has made out a case for exemption from the law based on her FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF RELIGION.

The Court recognizes that state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms ­ including religious freedom ­ may be enjoyed.

In the absence of a showing that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.

THE PETITION WAS DISMISSED.

USE OF NATURAL LAW:

The interpretative use of natural law is being used in the case of Estrada vs Escritor. The interpretative use of natural law is explained that it involves its utilization as an interpretative alembic or devise to express or put into effect the legislative intention.

In this case, Freedom of Religion or the Free Exercise Cause is being used as a defense against the allegation that the cohabitation of Escritor to Quilapo, although morally wrong, is being accepted to their religion which is the Jehovah’s Witness. The cohabitation of the defendant with Quilapo is not considered as a violation in the Seperation of the Church and the State doctrine, due to the fact that there was no usurpation on the function of the government.

PRECEPT OF NATURAL LAW.

Fairness is the precept of natural law embodied in this case since the petition was dismiss due to the reason that the complainant, Estrada, is not the proper person that should file the complaint since Estrada is not being injured in the act of the defendant and her partner. And there is fairness because, even though the act of Escritor and her partner is not morally accepted, the ruling was favored to them because of the Free Exercise Clause and Freedom of Religion. And it was not actually considered as a bigamy because the defendant and Quilapo is not married but just cohabiting according to the laws accepted in their religion.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LAURENCIO LASPARDAS

FACTS

a review en consulta of the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Lanao del Sur.

convicting Laurencio Laspardas of rape with homicide, sentencing him to death and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victims, the sisters Elizabeth Arriesgado and Josephine Arriesgado the sum of P24, 000 as indemnity.

PETITIONER

Constabulary sergeant filed on December 17, 1976 against Laurencio Laspardas in the municipal court of Wao, Lanao del Sur a complaint for double murder

It was alleged therein that on December 1, 1976 in Sitio San Roque, Barrio Pagalongan, Wao, Laspardas, with treachery and premeditation, inflicted twelve wounds upon Elizabeth Arriesgado and Josephine Arriesgado thereby causing their death

– Listed as witnesses in the complaint were Bibiana Arriesgado, Vicente Magdaloyo, Armando Ortanillas, and Solomon Manzano.

– Attached to the record are the following:

(1) photographs of the bodies of the victims;

(2) sketch of the place where their bodies were found; and

(3) two death certificates. The certificates of death show that the two victims were twelve and eight years old.

Benjamin Catalan, the barrio captain

– Laspardas, alias Laurel, was the last person who saw the two victims, that the crimes were committed in the evening of December 1, that one of the victims was raped, that the skirt of Elizabeth was raised above her waist, the zipper of her short pants was open and torn and her legs were spread apart, that there was blood on her genitals, and that Laspardas fled from the barrio.

Bibiana Tarroza Arriesgado

– declared that Laspardas was a guest at her house and that on the day of the killing and rape she entrusted to him her children when she left her house.

Vicente Magdaloy, a twenty­six year old farmer

– resides at Sitio San Roque

– Declared that the killing and rape were perpetrated in the victims' house and that at two o'clock in the morning of December 2, 1976 (or less than twenty­four hours after the unusual incident)

– Laspardas appeared in his house and asked for payment of the amount which Magdaloyo owed him.

Armando Ortanillas a twenty­two year old farmer and a neighbor of the victims

– declared that Laspardas killed the Arriesgado sisters.

– He saw Laspardas with the victims in the afternoon of December 1, 1976.

– The municipal court issued a warrant for the arrest of Laspardas. He was arrested at Cabadbaran, Agusan on December 10, 1976.

– A Constabulary sergeant took the extrajudicial confession of Laspardas which was sworn to before the municipal judge of Wao, Laspardas was interrogated in the Cebuano dialect

– Upon arraignment in the Court of First Instance, Laspardas, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, again pleaded guilty after the information was translated to him in the Cebuano dialect which he speaks.

– He answered in the affirmative when the trial judge asked him if he understood the charge.

– The accused admitted to his counsel that he had executed an extrajudicial confession.

– In view of Laspardas admission in his confession that he raped Elizabeth, the complaint was amended so as to add rape to the charge of double murder.

– Upon arraignment in the municipal court, Laspardas pleaded guilty.

– The case was elevated to the Court of First Instance where a fiscal filed an information for those offenses aggravated by treachery, evident premeditation, and dwelling.

– After the arraignment, Laspardas was placed on the witness stand.

– He testified that the contents of his confession were explained to him in the Cebuano dialect;

– He affixed his thumbmark thereto and that it was true, as stated in his confession, that he killed the two girls because he was mad at their parents;

– that his organ touched the lips (labia) of the vagina of Elizabeth Arriesgado who was still alive, when he tried to have sexual intercourse with her; and

– that he used his bolo in wounding the two victims.

– The thirty­ eight­year­old accused declared that he worked for two years as a farmhand of the Arriesgado spouses, plowing their farm and harvesting their corn. Because he had not been paid his accumulated wages amounting to more than four hundred sixty pesos, he was very angry with the said spouses.

– When on December 1, 1976 the said spouses left the house and he found himself alone with their two daughters, he conceived the Idea of killing them. He perpetrated the killing in the evening of that day. He could not state the exact time because he had no watch.

– As the elder daughter, Elizabeth, was dying, he was sexually aroused and he had carnal intercourse with her. About half an inch of his penis penetrated her vagina.

– Counsel de oficio, assigned to defend the accused in this Court, contends that the accused made an improvident plea of guilty.

– He invokes the ruling that in a capital offense, specially where the accused has little or no education, the proper and prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as is available and necessary in support of the material allegations of the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only for the satisfaction of the trial judge himself but also to aid this Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood the consequences of his plea

– Counsel de oficio adverts to the trial court's failure to require the prosecution to present evidence.

– The record itself shows why the trial court did not do so, It discloses that there is not a scintilla of doubt as to the guilt of the accused.

– In such a situation. the trial court does not abuse its discretion in not requiring the prosecution to present its evidence

– Another contention of counsel de oficio is that the trial court erred in convicting the accused of rape with homicide although in the information three distinct offenses, namely, rape and two murders, were charged.

– The fiscal characterized them as "double murder with rape." He alleged in the indictment that the rape was committed on the occasion of the murders.

– Rape with homicide was committed where:

(1) the rapist, who was suffering from gonorrhea infected the victim and, as a result of the infection, she died of peritonitis (People vs. Acosta)

(2) the accused dragged a woman to a canefield, struck her, rendered her unconscious, had sexual intercourse with her and then killed her thereafter (People vs. Lopez)

(3) the accused had sexual intercourse with a girl below twelve years of age and then strangled her (People vs. Yu)

Whether or not Laurencio Laspardas should be convicted of rape with homicide, sentencing him to death and ordering him to pay the heirs of the victims.

– The corpus delicti, or the fact of the commission of the two murders, is indubitably shown in the record. By his plea of guilty, he himself supplied the necessary proof as to his culpability

– WHEREFORE the trial court's judgment is affirmed with the modification that the accused is found guilty of two separate murders and is sentenced to two death penalties. Costs de oficio.

– Those decided cases are different from the instant case.

– Since the victim herein was already at the threshold of death when she was ravished, that bestiality may be regarded either as a form of ignominy causing disgrace or as a form of cruelty which aggravated the murder because it was unnecessary to the commission thereof and was a manifest outrage on the victim's person

– where the rape was treated as an aggravating circumstance in robbery with homicide.

– Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, imposes the death penalty "when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed."

– The instant case presents a novel, reverse situation (analogous to rape accompanying a robbery) where the rape was committed on the occasion of the murder, that is to say, when the female victim of a murderous assault was at death's door, she was raped.

– Agreed with counsel de oficio that the special complex crime of rape with homicide was not committed in this case and that two separate murders were perpetrated.

– The murders were qualified by treachery and aggravated by evident premeditation and abuse of confidence, two circumstances which are deducible from the testimony of the accused.

– Premeditation was evident because there was a sufficient interval of time between the planning of the murders and the execution thereof to allow the conscience of the accused to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warnings.

– There was abuse of confidence because, according to the accused, he had stayed for two years with the family of his two young and trusting victims who in their immaturity and innocence never had an inkling that he had homicidal intentions towards them

– Presumably, they looked upon him as their protector and guardian in their parents' absence and not as their aggressor and assassin.

– Dwelling is not aggravating because the house of the victims was also the residence of the accused .

– Passion and Obfuscation and lack of instruction should be taken into account cannot be sustained because the accused acted in a spirit of lawlessness.

– Lack of instruction is not mitigating because the illiterate accused, as a Christian, cannot possibly be ignorant of the fifth commandment (you shall not kill) or that it is contrary to natural law to commit murder

– Plea of Guilty, the only mitigating or extenuating circumstance that can be appreciated in his favor, can offset only one of the two aggravating circumstances.

– Ignominy or Cruelty, the additional aggravating circumstance as to the killing of Elizabeth

– Two death penalties should be imposed on the accused

– Two murders were specifically alleged in the information. The accused cannot complain that he was not duly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

– Although his extrajudicial confession was used as a basis by the trial court in interrogating him, it was not formally presented in evidence.

– Even without his extrajudicial confession, his plea of guilty and testimony establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt

RIGHTEOUSNESS

First precept of Natural law

• That good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.

• This is in accordance with the virtue of doing what is right.

• The lack of instruction is not mitigating because the illiterate accused, as a Christian, cannot possibly be ignorant of the fifth commandment (you shall not kill) .

• The act of committing murder is evil by nature. It is not a good act which is in accord with the nature of man.

PRESERVE LIFE AND WARD OFF ITS OBSTACLES

Second Precept of Natural Law

• It means natural inclination which man shares with all substances.

• It is the preservation of its own being according to its nature. Meaning, from the natural inclinations that we and all other animals have to preserve our own existence, we can infer that life is good, that we have an obligation to promote our own health, and that we have the right of self­ defense.

• Negatively, this inclination implies that murder and suicide are wrong. Where life is valued, murder is taboo.

JUSTICE

Third Precept of Natural Law

• Justice is giving to someone what is due to him.

• The law punishing murder is based on the moral ideas that innocent blood should not be shed, that private individuals should not take the law into their own hands, and that individuals should be held responsible for their deeds.

• The trespassers of natural law should be given punishment which is due to them.

• The innocent Elizabeth and her sister must be given justice and make Laspardas responsible for the murder and rape.

• The judgment sentencing two death penalties constitute the punishment for the death of the two sisters.

JUSTIFICATORY USE

– Natural law was used by John Locke as basis of doctrine of natural rights which according to him are inherent and inalienable such as the right to life and human dignity.

– Supports the concept of crimes against humanity and the Universal Decalration of Human Rights of the United Nations

– Laspardas’ act of vengeance on the parents’ nonpayment of his salary cannot be equated over the victims’ deaths. This does not give him the right to resolve such matter on his own by taking the life of the innocent children. More over, Laspardas should be accounted for his malicious act of degrading Elizabeth while she was being taken advantaged of at the verge of death.

GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT

Right to Privacy

­ not explicitly stated in the US Bill of Rights but found in the “penumbras” of other constitutional protections

­ In this case the Right to Privacy of Husband and Wife

FACTS:

Appellants, the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut (Estelle Griswold), and its medical director (C.Lee Buxton), a licensed physician, were convicted as accessories for giving married persons information and medical advice on how to prevent conception and, following examination, prescribing a contraceptive device or material for the wife's use. A Connecticut statute makes it a crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent conception. Appellants claimed that the accessory statute as applied violated the Fourteenth Amendment. An intermediate appellate court and the State's highest court affirmed the judgment. Held:

1. Appellants have standing to assert the constitutional rights of the married people. The appellants have standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married people with whom they had a professional relationship. The accessory should have standing to assert that the offense which he is charged with assisting is not, or cannot constitutionally be, a crime. The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who have this kind of

confidential relation to them

2. The Connecticut statute forbidding use of contraceptives violates the right of marital privacy which is within the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights. Pp. 481­486.

a. The present case concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees.

b. It concerns a law which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship.

c. We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights – older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred.

PRECEPTS OF NATURAL LAW JUSTICE

­ giving to someone what is due to them. They recognize the right of husband and wife for their right to privacy EQUALITY

­Impartial in their decision, that everyone is equal in the eyes of the law and equal protection of rights. USE OF NATURAL LAW INTERPRETATIVE USE

­The recognition of the existence of the “penumbra” of the US Constitution, specifically in the Bill of Rights ­ Expand the meaning of each statute to cover the “right to privacy” and to reflect the true intentions of the framers of the US Constitution

OPPOSITIVE USE

­ Refusing to obey the strict adoption of Comstock Law in the State of Connecticut for completely forbidding the use of contraceptives. In this case to protect the privacy of husband and wife in the comfort of their homes and in their family planning.

JUSTIFICATORY USE

­ Use to warrant some legal innovation. In this case the cognizance of the “penumbra” of specific guarantee of the Bill of Rights and the implied existence of the “right of privacy” between husband and wife.

Brief Fact Summary. A Connecticut provision outlawing the counseling of others to use contraception, as well as the use of contraception, was found unconstitutional under strict scrutiny because it violated the Due Process Clause. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right of marital privacy lies within the penumbra of the Bill of Rights. Therefore, it is a fundamental right and strict scrutiny is the standard of judicial review. Facts. Appellant, Ms. Griswold, was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut (“League”). Appellant and the Medical Director for the League gave information and instruction and medical advice to married couples about birth control. Appellant and her colleague were convicted under a Connecticut law which criminalized counseling, and other medical treatment to married persons for purposes of preventing conception. Appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. The state appellate courts affirmed. Issue. Whether the Constitution protects the right of marital privacy against state restrictions on a couple’s ability to be counseled in the use of contraceptives? Held. Yes. Judgment of the state appellate court affirmed. The Bill of Rights has a penumbra expanding the right of privacy. The present case concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. It also concerns a law that, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive impact upon that relationship. Such a law cannot stand in light of the familiar principle that a “governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.” Thus, the Connecticut statute conflicts with the exercise of this right and is therefore null and void.

OPOSA V. FACTORAN

FACTS

• This petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology with the twin concepts of "inter­generational responsibility" and "inter­generational justice. • They represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. • The continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance which resulted in environmental tragedies • Petitioner alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country’s tropical forest. • Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae. • Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. • Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs. • The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that

is desertified, bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been abundantly blessed with. • Defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind — the natural law — and violative of plaintiffs' right to self­preservation and perpetuation.

• Prayed for cancellation of all existing Timber License Agreement and cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new agreements. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss viz;

• Complaint had no cause of action against the defendent • Raises political question. • Lower court dismissed the case, if granting the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of contract which is prohibited by the Constitution. • Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and ask the Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely

abused his discretion in dismissing the action ISSUES

• (1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action. • (2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue. • (3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.

RULING

• On the Cause of Action The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right ­­ the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same gives rise to a cause of action.

• On Political Issue Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court.

• On violation of non­impairment clause • Not a contract • Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. • the constitutional guarantee of non­impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the exercise by the police power of the State

• DISPOSITIVE RESOLUTION • WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case

No. 90­777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.

USE OF NATURAL LAW

• “right to self­preservation and perpetuation” • Justificatory Use of Natural Law

– Inter­generational Responsibility and Justice • Regulatory Use of Natural Law

– ‘Self­executing’

ROYAL L. RUTTER vs. PLACIDO J. ESTEBAN

This is an appeal filed by Royal L. Rutter of the ruling of the Court of First Instance on his action for recovery of the balance due, against Placido J. Esteban for the remaining payment for the sale of two parcels of land sold by Rutter to the latter.

FACTS

On August 20, 1941, Royal L. Rutter sold to Placido J. Esteban two parcels of land for the sum of P9,600. Of the P9,600, P4,800 was paid outright, and the balance of P4,800 was made payable in two installments of P2,400 on August 1942 and another P2,400 on August 1943, with interest at the rate of 7 percent per annum. To secure the payment of said balance of P4,800, a first mortgage over the same parcels of land has been constituted in favor of the plaintiff. The deed of sale having been registered, a new title was issued in favor of Esteban with a mortgage duly annotated on the back thereof. Then, the Japanese came and invaded the Philippines on December 8, 1941. After the war, Rutter filed an action to claim to recover the balance due to him against Esteban. On August 2, 1949, Rutter filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila an action for recovery of the balance due, the interest due thereon, and the attorney's fees stipulated in the contract. Esteban admitted the allegations of the complaint. However, he set up the defense of moratorium clause embodied in Republic Act No. 342, otherwise known as the Debt Moratorium Law, specifically Section 2 thereof, which reads in part: “Section 2. All debts and other monetary obligations payable by private parties within the Philippines originally incurred or contracted before December 8, 1941, and still remaining unpaid, x x x shall not be due and demandable for a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the war damage claim of the debtor by the United States Philippine War Damage Commission, x x x.” The CFI dismissed the case upholding the moratorium of 8 years had not yet lapsed. In Rutter’s motion, he raised the constitutionality issue for the first time, but said motion was denied. Hence, Rutter’s appeal with the Supreme Court.

ISSUE

Whether or not Republic Act No. 342 is unconstitutional being violative of the constitutional provision forbidding the impairment of the obligation of contracts (Article III, Section 1, Constitution of the Philippines).

RULING

“Wherefore, the decision appealed from will be reversed, without pronouncement as to costs. Judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P4,800 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per cent annum from August 27, 1942, until its full payment, plus 12 per cent as attorney's fees. Failure to pay this judgment as stated, the properties mortgaged will be sold at public auction and the proceeds applied to its payment in accordance with law. So ordered.”

USE OF NATURAL LAW

Regulatory

In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only course dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under the present circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No. 342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect. In deposing of the issue of whether a retroactive statute may be held void even if there are no constitutional prohibition against such kind of statute, CJ Homer said: “I would consider it a violation of the social compact and within the control of the judiciary”

NL devotees sustain their arguments that Courts can hold statutes null and void even when they are not contrary to the Constitution when the people themselves may have expressed their preference for the precepts of natural law in their constitution.

CHUA­QUA V. CLAVE

FACTS:

EVELYN CHUA ­ 30 years of age, had been employed in TAY TUNG HIGH SCHOOL, INC. (Bacolod City) as a teacher since 1963 and, in 1976 and class adviser in the sixth grade.

Bobby Qua ­ 16 years old, student whom EVELYN CHUA fell in love with

December 24, 1975 ­ petitioner and Bobby Qua got married in a civil ceremony solemnized in Iloilo City by Hon. Cornelio G. Lazaro, City Judge of Iloilo

January 10, 1976 – marriage was ratified in accordance with the rites of their religion in a church wedding solemnized by Fr. Nick Melicor at Bacolod City

On February 4, 1976, private respondent filed with the sub­regional office of the Department of Labor at Bacolod City an application for clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner on the following ground:

“For abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher and that her continued employment is inimical to the best interest, and would downgrade the high moral values, of the school.”

Petitioner was placed under suspension without pay on March 12, 1976.

Affidavits were submitted by private respondent to bolster its contention that petitioner, “defying all standards of decency, recklessly took advantage of her position as school teacher, lured a Grade VI boy under her advisory section and 15 years her junior into an amorous relation.”

More specifically, private respondent raised issues on the fact that petitioner stayed alone with Bobby Qua in the classroom after school hours when everybody had gone home, with one door allegedly locked and the other slightly open.

On September 17, 1976, Executive Labor Arbiter Jose Y. Aguirre, Jr., without conducting any formal hearing, rendered an “Award” in NLRC Case No. 956 in favor of private respondent granting the clearance to terminate the employment of petitioner.

On October 7, 1976, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. contended that there was nothing immoral, nor was it abusive and unethical conduct unbecoming of a dignified school teacher, for a teacher to enter into lawful wedlock with her student.

On December 27, 1976, the National Labor Relations Commission unanimously reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision and ordered petitioner’s reinstatement with backwages, with the following specific findings:

Affiant Maselliones deposed and said that he saw appellant and Qua sitting on the student desk inside a classroom after classes. The depositions of affiants Despi and Chiu are of the same tenor. No statements whatever were sworn by them that they were eyewitnesses to immoral or scandalous acts.

March 30, 1977, The case was elevated by private respondent to the Minister of Labor who reversed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission. The petitioner was, however, awarded six (6) months salary as financial assistance.

On May 20, 1977, petitioner appealed the said decision to the Office of the President of the Philippines.

After the corresponding exchanges, on September 1, 1978 said office, through Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave, rendered its decision reversing the appealed decision. Private respondent was ordered to reinstate petitioner to her former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and with full back wages from the time she was not allowed to work until the date of her actual reinstatement.

However, in a resolution dated December 6, 1978, public respondent, acting on a motion for reconsideration of herein private respondent and despite opposition thereto, reconsidered and modified the aforesaid decision, this time giving due course to the application of Tay Tung High School, Inc. to terminate the services of petitioner as classroom teacher but giving her separation pay equivalent to her six (6) months salary.

ISSUES:

Is dismissal or termination of petitioner’s employment illegal?

Are there sufficient proofs to show that petitioner committed serious misconduct or breached the trust reposed on her by her employer or committed any of the other grounds enumerated in Article 283 (Now Article 282) of the Labor Code which will justify the termination of her employment?

RULING:

We rule that public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion.

“Indeed, the records relied upon by the Acting Secretary of Labor in arriving at his decision are unbelievable and unworthy of credit,

For one thing, the affidavits refer to certain times of the day during off­school hours when appellant and her student were found together in one of the classrooms of the school. But the records of the case present a ready answer: appellant was giving remedial instruction to her student and the school was the most convenient place to serve the purpose. What is glaring in the affidavits is the complete absence of specific immoral acts allegedly committed by appellant and her student.

For another, the alleged acts complained of invariably happened from September to December, 1975, but the disciplinary action imposed by appellee was sought only in February, 1976, and what is more, the affidavits were executed, 1only in August976 and from all indications, were prepared by appellee or its counsel. The affidavits heavily relied upon by appellee are clearly the product of after­thought

While admittedly, no one directly saw Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua doing immoral acts inside the classroom, it seems obvious and this Office is convinced that such a happening indeed transpired within the solitude of the classroom after regular class hours. The marriage between Evelyn Chua and Bobby Qua is the best proof which confirms the suspicion that the two indulged in amorous relations in that place during those times of the day.

Private respondent utterly failed to show that petitioner took advantage of her position to court her student. If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know. But, definitely, yielding to this gentle and universal emotion is not to be so casually equated with immorality. The deviation of the circumstances of their marriage from the usual societal pattern cannot be considered as a defiance of contemporary social mores.

The charge against petitioner not having been substantiated, we declare her dismissal as unwarranted and illegal. It being apparent, however, that the relationship between petitioner and private respondent has been inevitably and severely strained, we believe that it would neither be to the interest of the parties nor would any prudent purpose be served by ordering her reinstatement.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the resolution of public respondent, dated December 6, 1978 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private respondent Tay Tung High School, Inc. is hereby ORDERED to pay petitioner backwages equivalent to three (3) years, without any deduction or qualification, and separation pay in the amount of one (1) month for every year of service.

Used Precepts of natural law

Natural Law is a rule of reason. Instilled by God in man’s nature, whereby man can discern how he should act.

­that LOVE is one of the teachings of God and already part of the nature of man , that loving someone whom you have feelings for is not against with anyone else.

For St. Paul, conscience must not be guided by customs and traditions but by love and reason.

­that we should not be subjective in giving our judgment to other people. That we must learn to understand what they are fighting for and not be so rude because what is good to you may not be that good to others. Therefore, we must understand it with full charity and by fair judgment of reason.

The self evident precept of natural law­ RIGHTEOUSNESS, the virtue of doing what is right.

­ That the spouses are just human and as a natural being they are also dwelling on the purposes of this world, and one of these is to experience and to feel love and be loved.

The basic inclinations of man includes:

­to preserve himself in existence, to preserve the species, to live in community with other men and to use his intellect and will, that is to know the truth and make his/her decisions.

Fairness and Equality­ that we are created equal in the eyes of God, as long as we are not hurting each other, no one is to suffer and there is peace. There can be no problem.

The interpretative use of natural law

The spirit of the law is the most important part of it. Without knowing its intent and purpose, the law will cease to exist. In the case, the Supreme Court it self, does not literally used other decided cases in order to rule but rather interpreted it with what is really the good thing to be done. There is no any provisions of the law that hinders lovers not to love because of age disparity neither law that prohibits relationship among teacher and students. The reason is very clear and strong. Even the reasons of love has its own interpretation that only an understanding heart and judgment could only understand.

The JUSTIFICATORY USE of natural law

If the two eventually fell in love, despite the disparity in their ages and academic levels, this only lends substance to the truism that the heart has reasons of its own which reason does not know.

MEANING THAT LOVE and the REASON OF LOVE was used as JUSTIFICATION to the ruling of the Supreme Court.

The oppositive use of natural law

“is however enough for a sane and credible mind to imagine and conclude what transpired and took place during these times”

­it is very absurd to rule that because you are in proper state of your mind you can now assure and assert that something happens without proper evidences to prove of certain immoralities. Natural law opposes instant and undue judgment and believes that everyone must be given due process.

the regulatory use of natural law

Based on the case and the rulings of the Supreme Court, LOVE regulates the understanding and the intention of the decision and since, Love is the greatest gift from God, it is also instilled in the nature of man that LOVE conquers all for good.

FLORESCA V. PHILEX MINING CORPORATION

FACTS

Perfecto Floresca et al are the heirs of the deceased employees of Philex Mining Corporation who, while working at its copper mines underground operations in Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as a result of the cave­in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine. Their complaint alleges that Philex, in violation of government rules and regulations, negligently and deliberately failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the lives of its men working underground. Floresca et al moved to claim their benefits pursuant to the Workmen’s Compensation Act before the Workmen’s Compensation Commission. They also filed a separate civil case against Philex for damages.

Philex sought the dismissal of the civil case as it insisted that Floresca et al have already claimed benefits under the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

ISSUE

Whether or not Philex is correct.

RULING

Yes. Under the law, Floresca et al could only do either one. If they filed for benefits under the WCA then they will be estopped from proceeding with a civil case before the regular courts. Conversely, if they sued before the civil courts then they would also be estopped from claiming benefits under the WCA.

HOWEVER, the Supreme Court ruled that Floresca et al are excused from this deficiency due to ignorance of the fact. Had they been aware of such then they may have not availed of such a remedy. But, if in case they’ll win in the lower court whatever award may be granted, the amount given to them under the WCA should be deducted. The SC emphasized that if they would go strictly by the book in this case then the purpose of the law may be defeated. Idolatrous reverence for the letter of the law sacrifices the human being. The spirit of the law insures man’s survival and ennobles him. As Shakespeare said, the letter of the law killeth but its spirit giveth life.

USE of Natural Law:

­ Interpretative Use of Natural Law

­ Involves its utilization as an interpretive alembic or devise to express or put into effect the legislative intention

LUNA V. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

FACTS

Private respondent Maria Lourdes Santos is an illegitimate child of the petitioner Horacio Luna who is married to his co­petitioner Liberty Hizon­Luna. Maria Lourdes Santos is married to her correspondent Sixto Salumbides, and are the parents of Shirley Santos Salumbides, also known as Shirley Luna Salumbides, who is the subject of this child custody case.

It appears that two or four months after the birth of the said Shirley Salumbides on April 7, 1975, her parents gave her to the petitioners, a childless couple with considerable means, who thereafter showered her with love and affection and brought her up as their very own. The couple doted upon Shirley who called them "Mama" and "Papa". She calls her natural parents "Mommy" and "Daddy." When Shirley reached the age of four (4) years in 1979, she was enrolled at the Maryknoll College in Quezon City, where she is now in Grade I I I.

A few months before September, 1980, her "Mama" and "Papa" decided to take Shirley abroad and show her Disneyland and other places of interest in America. Shirley looked forward to this trip and was excited about it. However, when the petitioners asked for the respondents' written consent to the child's application for a U.S. visa, the respondents refused to give it, to the petitioners' surprise and chagrin Shirley was utterly disappointed. As a result, the petitioners had to leave without Shirley whom they left with the private respondents, upon the latter's request. The petitioners, however, left instructions with their chauffeur to take and fetch Shirley from Maryknoll College every school day.

When the petitioners returned on October 29, 1980, they learned that the respondents had transferred Shirley to the St. Scholastica College. The private respondents also refused to return Shirley to them.

ISSUE

Whether or not procedural rules more particularly the duty of lower courts to enforce a final decision of appellate courts in child custody cases, should prevail over and above the desire and preference of the child

RULING

Besides, in her letters to the members of the Court, Shirley depicted her biological parents as selfish and cruel and who beat her often; and that they do not love her. And, as pointed out by the child psychologist, Shirley has grown more embitered cautious and dismissing of her biological parents. To return her to the custody of the private respondents to face the same emotional environment which she is now complaining of would be indeed traumatic and cause irreparable damage to the child. As requested by her, let us not destroy her future. Petition granted.

USE OF NATURAL LAW

REGULATORY

The right of the parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or by the decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of parental relationship. Since the rights of parents to the custody of their minor children is both a natural and a legal right, the law should not disturb the parent­child relationship except for the strongest reasons, and only upon a clear showing of a parent’s gross misconduct or unfitness, or of other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the child.

The majority decision runs counter to the parental­preference rule.­

—Evidently, the present petition for custody of petitioners runs counter to the parental preference rule. Under the so­called parental preference rule, a natural parent, father or mother, as the case may be, who is of good character and a proper person to have the custody of the child and is reasonably able to provide for such child, ordinarily is entitled to the custody as against all persons. Accordingly, such parents are entitled to the custody of their children as against foster or prospective adoptive parents.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SANDIGANBAYAN, MAJOR GENERAL RAMAS, ELIZABETH DIMAANO

FACTS: After a raid executed by the Philippine Constabulary under the command of the PCGG, properties and unexplained wealth are found owned by MGen Ramas and his Mistress Dimaano.

The PCGG directed their investigation to MGen Ramas with the assumption that he is a subordinate of Pres Marcos due to the latter’s high position in the AFP. However, in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan and Republic v. Migrino, there must be a clear relation between Pres. Marcos and the person investigated before the PCGG can have jurisdiction on the matter, unless the President instructs the PCGG to investigate that specific person.

The seizure done by the Philippine Constabulary was conducted five (5) days after the EDSA revolution.

The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March 1986.

ISSUE: Whether or not PCGG have jurisdiction to investigate.

HELD:

Though it is evident that the properties in question are unproportional to the salaries of the respondent, there is no prima facie relationship between the properties and the corruption done by the Marcos regime. The Ombudsman could have conducted a preliminary investigation but not the PCGG.

ISSUE: Whether or not the bill of rights of the 1973 constitution still operative

HELD:

A revolutionary government is not bound by its prevailing constitution, however, it is still bound by customary international law. As the de jure government (1986), the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law (can be the connection to Natural Law).

Under this international laws are the Covenant and the Declaration which is similar to the 1973 bill of rights. (Declaration Article 17(2)). As a de jure government and as human beings, the Philippines cannot denounce its obligations to the Declaration and the Covenant.

• Application of Natural Law

In the natural law point of view, revolution is an inherent right of the people to cast out their rulers, change their policy, or reform their government. This is one issue of common good versus general welfare; what is inherently beneficial for humanity versus what is favourable to the many.

Moreover, in the Philippines, revolution is not illegal. It is a proper exercise of sovereignty. The power is originally and legally lodged in the people and the government are their representatives. If the people, the sovereign, chooses to change the whole mechanism of the state, they are legally and constitutionally entitled to do so by law and by nature.

• Use of Natural Law

Justificatory use – Where the Supreme Court ruled that the items seized by the PC should be returned to Dimaano for such seizure is illegal and violates the rights of Dimaano, even thought the 1973 Constitution was not operative under the de jure government in 1986, and is recognize under the Declaration and the Covenant.

OBERGEFFELL ET AL. V. HODGES

14TH AMENDMENT DEFINITION

The Fourteenth Amendment (Amendment XIV) to the United States Constitution was adopted on July 9, 1868, as one of the Reconstruction Amendments. The amendment addresses citizenship rights and equal protection of the laws, and was proposed in response to issues related to former slaves following the American Civil War.

Section 1.

All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

FACTS

• The Petitioners, 14 same­sex couples and two men whose same­sex partners are deceased, filed suits in Federal District Courts in their home States, claiming that respondents state officials violate the Fourteenth Amendment by denying them the right to marry or to have marriages lawfully performed in another State given fully recognition. Each District Court ruled in petitioners’ favor, but the Sixth Circuit (The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (in case citations, 6th Cir.) is a federal court with appellate jurisdiction over the district courts in the following districts: Eastern District of Kentucky, Western District of Kentucky, Eastern District of Michigan,Western District of Michigan, Northern District of Ohio, Southern District of Ohio, Eastern District of Tennessee, Middle District of Tennessee, Western District of Tennessee) consolidated the cases and reversed.

RESPONDENTS

• > Richard Hodges, Ohio Dept. of Health, et al.

• > Bill Haslam, Governor of Tenessee

• > Rick, Governor of Michigan

• > Steve Beshair, Governor of Kentucky

A. James Obergefell – PLAINTIFF from OHIO Case

• James and John Arthur ­ Met two decades ago, fell in love and started a life together, establishing a lasting, committed relation.

• In 2011, Arthur was diagnosed with Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis, or ALS, a debilitating diseases with progressive nature and no known cure so far.

• Two years ago, James and Arthur decided to marry each other.

• They travelled from Ohio to Maryland, where same­sex marriage is recognized and legal

• Since it was difficult for Arthur to move, they were wed inside a medical transport plane as it remained in the tarmac of Baltimore. Three months later, Arnold died.

• Ohio law does not permit Obergefell to be listed as the surviving spouse on Arthur’s death certificate.

B. April DeBoer and Jayne Rowse – CO­PLAINTIFFS from Michigan

• They celebrated a commitment ceremony to honor their permanent relation in 2007

• Both are nurses, DeBoer in neonatal unit and Rowse in an emergency unit.

• In 2009, DeBoer and Rowse fostered and eventually adopted a baby boy.

• Later that same year, they welcomed another son in their family. The new baby was born prematurely and requires round­the­clock care.

• In 2010, they adopted a baby girl with special needs.

• Michigan, however, permits only opposite­sex marriage or single individuals to adopt, so each child can only have one woman as his or her legal parent.

• If an emergency were to arise, schools and hospitals may treat the three children as if they only had one parent.

• If tragedy befall either DeBoer or Rowse, the other will have no legal rights over the children she had not been permitted to adopt.

C. Army Reserved Sgt. First Class Ijpe DeKoe and Thomas Kostura – CO­PLAINTIFFS from Tennessee

• In 2011, DeKoe received orders of his deployment to Afghanistan.

• Before leaving, he and Kostura got married in New York.

• A week after their marriage, DeKoe began his deployment which lasted for one year.

• When DeKoe returned, they settled in Tennessee where he works full­time for the Army Reserve

• Their lawful marriage is stripped from them whenever they reside in Tennessee, returning and disappearing whenever they travel state lines

ISSUE

a. The first issue, presented by the cases from Michigan and Kentucky, is whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to license a marriage between two people of the same sex.

b. The second issue, presented by the cases from Ohio, Tennessee, and Kentucky, is whether or not the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State to recognize a same­sex marriage licensed and performed in a State which does grant that right.

RULING

1. The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices defining personal identity and beliefs

Courts must exercise reasoned judgement in identifying interests of the person so fundamental that the State must accord them its respect

History and tradition guide and discipline the inquiry but do not set its outer boundaries

When new insight reveals discord between the Constitutions central protections and a received legal structure, a claim to liberty must be addressed.

2. Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same­sex couples.

(a) The first premise of this Court’s relevant precedents is that the right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.

(b) A second principle in this Court’s jurisprudence is that the right to marry is fundamental because it supports a two­person union unlike any other in its importance to the committed individuals. The intimate association protected by this right was central to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the right of married couples to use contraception.

(c) A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and education.

(d) Finally, this Court’s cases and the Nation’s traditions make clear that marriage is a keystone of the Nation’s social order. States have contributed to the fundamental character of marriage by placing it at the center of many facets of the legal and social order. There is no difference between same­ and opposite­sex couples with respect to this principle, yet same­sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the States have linked to marriage and are consigned to an instability many opposite­sex couples would find intolerable. It is demeaning to lock same­sex couples out of a central institution of the Nation’s society, for they too may aspire to the transcendent purposes of marriage.

The limitation of marriage to opposite­sex couples may long have seemed natural and just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is now manifest.

3. The right of same­sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always coextensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.

4. The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment couples of the same­sex may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same­sex couples may exercise the fundamental right to marry.

5. While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting a fundamental right.

The Fourteenth Amendment requires States to recognize same­sex marriages validly performed out of State. Since same­sex couples may now exercise the fundamental right to marry in all States, there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same­sex marriage performed in another State on the ground of its same­sex character.

USE OF NATURAL LAW

Justificatory use of Natural Law

• > The US Supreme Court used the Fourteenth Amendment to justify and vindicate same­sex marriage.

• > “The Constitution promises liberty to all within its reach, a liberty that includes certain specific rights that allow persons, within a lawful realm, to define and express their identity.

Interpretative use of Natural Law

The US Supreme Court interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to the extent of making same­sex marriage constitutional.

The particular situation – same­sex marriage – is not apparently within the words of the statute, but is nonetheless within the essence and purpose