Orde  Wingate,  Unconventional  Warrior:  From  the  1920s  to  the  Twenty-­‐First  Century,  Simon  Anglim,  Pen  &  Sword  Military,  2014  (252  pages).  

Major  General  Orde  Wingate  (1903-­‐1944)  the  creator  of  the  famous  ‘Chindit’  units  which  served  in  Burma  during  the  Second  World  War,  but  whose  military  career  was  more  extensive  than  the  general  public,  or  even  some  historians  or  military  analysts  may  be  aware,  was  an  excellent  choice  for  investigation  by  author  Simon  Anglim.  Fittingly,  Anglim’s  excellent  choice  of  subject  is  covered  by  a  genuinely  excellent,  complex,  analytical,  but  nonetheless  thoroughly  readable  and  well-­‐structured  book,  which  works  as  a  biography,  as  a  history,  as  historiography,  and  also  an  indication  of  how  Wingate’s  military  experience  is  still  relevant.  

The  complexity  and  thoroughness  of  this  book,  together  with  its  analytical  and  provocative  approach,  is  apparent  to  the  reader  from  its  introduction.  Anglim  opens  by  painting  a  good  in-­‐depth  portrait  of  Wingate,  which  clearly  indicates  that  he  was  and  still  is  seen  as  a  controversial  figure.  The  introductory  section  also  assists  the  reader  by  outlining  the  general  structure  that  the  book  follows  by  outlining  the  three  main  operations  involving  Wingate  that  it  covers.  These  were  his  involvement  in  counter-­‐insurgency  in  Palestine  between  1937  and  1939,  his  work  to  stimulate  guerrilla  resistance  to  Italian  rule  in  Ethiopia  during  1940-­‐1941,  and,  most  famously,  Wingate’s  role  in  overseeing  Chindit  operations  in  Burma  between  1942  and  1944.  

From  the  perspective  of  a  modern  reader,  perhaps  the  most  vital  question  that  Anglim  asks  during  the  book’s  introduction,  is  why  anybody  should  still  be  interested  in  Orde  Wingate  in  the  current  21st  Century  context.  From  the  outset,  Anglim  clearly  indicates  that,  in  his  view,  Wingate  is  still  worth  considering  because  some  of  the  methods  that  he  pioneered  have  been  utilised  in  much  more  recent  operations.  Anglim  cites  the  Special  Night  Squads  (SNS)  used  in  a  counter-­‐insurgency  role  in  Palestine  during  the  1930s,  and  compares  their  modus  operandi  and  ethos  with  that  of  Allied  Tier  One  Special  Forces  in  Iraq  between  2007  and  2010,  and  in  Afghanistan  during  the  2011-­‐2013  period.  Anglim  also  highlights  the  fact  that,  as  long  ago  as  1942,  Wingate  argued  that  paramilitary  operations  were  “the  wave  of  the  future”,  and  in  doing  this  advocated  what  modern  military  personnel  refer  to  ‘manoeuvre  warfare’,  which  is  executed  by  a  combination  of  specialist  regular  troops,  local  irregulars,  and  air  support.  Such  operations  have  taken  place  in  the  21st  Century.  The  example  cited  by  Anglim  in  this  introductory  section  is  that  of  how,  in  2001,  a  combination  of  US  Special  Forces,  Northern  Alliance  fighters  and  US  airpower,  defeated  the  Afghan  Taliban  regime  in  a  matter  of  weeks.  Therefore,  the  book  clearly  sticks  to  its  remit  to  examine  Wingate’s  ideas  in  a  modern  context  from  the  very  start.  

Another  perennially  relevant  issue  highlighted  during  the  introduction,  and  revisited  later  in  the  book,  is  that  of  alleged  excessive  brutality  during  counter-­‐insurgency  operations,  and  the  treatment  of  detainees.  Allegations  made  by,  among  others,  the  Israeli  journalist  Tom  Segev,  hold  that  Wingate  and  others  acting  under  his  authority  mistreated  captured  or  suspected  insurgents.  By  citing  these  allegations,  both  here  and  later  in  the  book,  and  drawing  parallels  between  these  and  more  recent  allegations,  such  as  those  against  US  and  Allied  forces  in  Iraq  following  the  2003  invasion,  and  also  against  Israeli  forces,  the  author  successfully  follows  the  book’s  objective  of  examining  why  Wingate’s  military  career  is  still  relevant.  

Following  the  introduction,  the  author  examines  why  Wingate  is  a  controversial  figure,  and  how  this  controversy  arose.  It  is  this  second  section  of  the  book’s  opening,  titled  Genius  or  Madman,  which  most  clearly  demonstrates  that  Anglim  is  not  simply  setting  out  to  write  a  history  of  Orde  Wingate’s  military  career,  but  is  also  aiming  to  examine  the  historiography  surrounding  it,  which  he  does  in  a  straightforward,  concise  and  structured  manner.  Anglim  notes  that  senior  Allied  officers  who  served  in  Burma  during  the  Second  World  War  held  differing  opinions  of  Wingate  whilst  the  conflict  was  still  ongoing.  In  seeking  to  locate  the  root  of  post-­‐war  criticism  of  Wingate,  Anglim  argues  that  two  books,  Volume  III  of  the  British  Government’s  Official  History  of  the  War  against  Japan,  largely  written  by  Major  General  S.  Woodburn  Kilby,  and  Defeat  into  Victory,  the  personal  memoir  of  Field  Marshal  Lord  Slim.  Anglim  argues  that  Slim  is  the  only  senior  British  commander  of  the  Second  World  War  who  has  not  been  subject  to  a  critical  reappraisal,  meaning  that  his  criticisms  of  Wingate  have  become  historical  orthodoxy.  

 

 

In  the  first  sub-­‐section  of  this  chapter,  Prosecution-­‐Wingate  the  Charlatan,  Anglim  argues  that  assessments  of  Wingate  can  be  divided  into  pre  and  post-­‐Kirby  work.  Therefore,  Anglim  strives  to  provide  a  framework  regarding  the  historiography  surrounding  Wingate,  and  uses  this  as  a  starting  point  to  explore  the  work  of  other  historians’  views  of  Wingate,  and  why  these  emerged.  For  example,  Anglim  notes  that  Wilfred  Burchett,  the  writer  of  Wingate’s  Phantom  Army¸  was  influenced  by  his  own  radical  left-­‐wing  politics  which  led  to  him  portraying  Wingate  as  an  anti-­‐imperialist  and  quasi-­‐revolutionary.  In  the  second  sub-­‐section  of  this  chapter,  Wingate  the  Genius,  Anglim  takes  great  pains  to  outline  how  pro-­‐Wingate  historians  and  writers  have  come  to  influence  the  historical  dialogue  concerning  Wingate,  thereby  further  fuelling  the  controversy  surrounding  him.    

Looming  large  in  this  section  is  the  figure  of  Mike  Calvert,  who  served  directly  under  Wingate  in  Burma  as  his  subordinate  commander,  as  well  as  being  a  close  friend.  Continuing  with  his  comprehensive  examination  of  the  historiography  concerning  Wingate,  Anglim  cites  the  work  of  the  David  Rooney,  Calvert’s  biographer,  who  has  written  that  in  1947,  during  a  staff  posting,  Calvert  saw  a  British  Army  memo  slating  Wingate  as  a  “divisive  influence”.  From  this  starting  point,  Calvert  developed  a  belief  that  an  anti-­‐Wingate  conspiracy  had  existed  within  the  British  Army.  This,  combined  with  the  fact  that,  as  Anglim  indicates,  most  post-­‐1945  writers  on  Wingate  consulted  Calvert,  has  only  added  to  the  controversy  surrounding  this  unconventional  figure.  In  short,  the  book’s  examination  of  the  how  Wingate  has  been  viewed  by  historians  and  writers  is  concise  but  very  thorough.  

Throughout  the  remainder  of  the  book,  although  there  are  arguably  minor  instances  that  contradict  this  notion,  Anglim  does  a  very  good  job  in  demonstrating  that,  far  from  being  a  ‘maverick’,  the  tactics  and  doctrines  developed  by  Wingate  more  often  than  not  placed  him  firmly  within  British  military  orthodoxy.  This  first  becomes  apparent  in  the  second  main  chapter  of  the  book,  Winning  Small  Wars-­‐Wingate’s  Army.  This  chapter  opens  with  an  overview  of  how,  at  the  time  that  Wingate  was  commissioned  into  the  British  Army  in  1922,  the  Army  was  revering  to  its  pre-­‐1914  role  as  a  colonial  police  force.    

Crucial  in  setting  the  scene  for  the  later  examination  of  Wingate’s  counter-­‐insurgency  work  in  Palestine  is  the  author’s  explanation  of  the  Cardwell  System  of  military  unit  rotation  within  the  British  Empire,  which  meant  that  individual  army  battalions  would  almost  certainly  be  posted  to  areas  which  experienced  what  would  now  be  termed  ‘insurgency’.  Therefore,  counter-­‐insurgency  was  already  an  established  part  of  British  Army  operations  long  before  Wingate’s  arrival  in  Palestine.  In  keeping  with  Anglim’s  emphasis  on  how  Wingate’s  military  experience  is  still  relevant  to  current  operations,  the  opening  of  this  chapter  makes  a  key  point  which  should  be  borne  in  mind  by  those  seeking  to  ‘learn  from  the  past’.  Wingate  and  his  colleagues  operated  prior  to  the  1950s,  since  when  analysts  and  other  figures  have  come  to  view  counter-­‐insurgency  as  more  complex  than  ‘war’,  meaning  that  insurgency  requires  a  more  ‘sophisticated’  solution  than  simply  defeating  the  enemy.  Whereas  British  colonial  authorities  might  have  been  willing  to  try  and  address  legitimate  grievances,  they  had  no  qualms  regarding  the  meeting  of  armed  revolt  or  civil  disorder  with  force.  Anglim  makes  the  key  point  that,  even  after  the  1919  Amritsar  Massacre,  Wingate  and  many  others  within  the  British  Army  took  this  view.  Wingate’s  aggressive  deployment  of  SNS  units  in  Palestine  was  therefore  most  likely,  in  part  at  least,  driven  by  prevailing  British  Army  orthodoxy,  rather  than  any  significantly  unconventional  views  of  his  own.  

This  second  chapter  of  the  book  also  provides  a  good,  brief  overview  of  how  British  Army  counter-­‐insurgency  tactics  evolved  during  the  first  half  of  the  20th  Century,  and  how  they  reinforce  the  notion  that  Wingate  was  militarily  orthodox,  rather  than  being  a  military  maverick.  For  example,  the  author  notes  that  in  1931,  over  a  decade  before  Wingate  proposed  a  similar  concept,  Major  L.V.S.  Blacker  argued  that  army  columns  operating  on  the  Northwest  Frontier  of  India  could  be  supplied  by  either  airdrops  or  air  landings.  Similarly,  with  regard  to  counter-­‐insurgency  as  opposed  to  long-­‐range  penetration  (LRP)  operations,  the  Corps  of  Gurkha  Scouts,  formed  in  1919  and  designed  to  carry  out  nocturnal  ambushes  in  the  same  area,  may  be  seen  as  the  forerunners  of  the  SNS  in  Palestine.  These  and  other  examples  that  Anglim  utilises  only  help  to  support  the  proposal  that  Wingate,  far  from  being  a  maverick,  fitted  in  well  with  wider  British  military  thinking.  

Although  short,  the  next  chapter,  Before  Palestine,  1923-­‐36  is  vital  in  helping  to  understand  how  Wingate  developed  his  tactical  ideas  before  his  posting  to  Palestine,  and  in  demonstrating  tactical  continuity.  It  highlights  how,  during  his  deployment  to  the  Sudan  and  service  with  the  Sudan  Defence  Force,  Wingate  regarded  the  Ethiopian  frontier  as  a  proving  ground  for  his  development  of  guerrilla  tactics,  which  he  was  already  working  out  at  a  theoretical  level.  One  piece  of  evidence  that  Anglim  uses  to  help  confirm  this  is  the  testimony  of  Moshe  Dayan,  a  protégé  of  Wingate’s  in  Palestine.  Dayan  argued  that  Wingate  employed  lessons  learned  during  his  service  in  the  Sudan  during  his  later  Palestinian  operations.  During  its  focus  on  Wingate’s  role  in  the  Sudan,  the  book  demonstrates  the  tactical  continuity  apparent  throughout  his  career  by  stressing  that  the  main  security  threat  that  Wingate  faced,  whilst  primarily  criminal  rather  than  insurgent  in  nature,  possessed  a  similar  modus  operandi.  In  order  to  deal  with  this  problem  of  cross-­‐border  criminality,  Wingate  developed  counter-­‐insurgency  methods  that  he  would  later  utilise  in  Palestine,  including  concentrating  forces  on  insurgent  entry  points  and  deception  in  order  to  achieve  surprise.    This  focus  on  tactical  continuity  demonstrates  that  Anglim  follows  a  coherent  narrative  path  throughout  the  book.  One  fascinating  historical  aside  that  can  be  found  in  this  chapter  is  a  comparison  of  Wingate’s  methods  and  tactical  views,  and  those  of  his  distant,  and  most  likely  more  famous,  relative,  T.E.  Lawrence  (of  Arabia).  Whilst  Anglim  stresses  that  the  two  individuals  held  different  views  regarding  irregular  warfare,  the  possibility  that  Lawrence’s  views  influenced  Wingate  is  also  mooted,  reinforcing  the  notion  that  rather  than  being  a  maverick,  Wingate  used  the  ideas  of  others  in  developing  his  own  tactical  outlook.  

Following  its  examination  of  Wingate’s  operations  in  the  Sudan,  the  book  moves  on  to  look  at  his  counter-­‐insurgency  work  in  Palestine  between  1937  and  1939.  Writing  as  he  has  a  book  that  seeks  to  challenge  orthodox  views  of  Wingate,  Anglim  opens  the  chapter  with  a  brief  but  telling  overview  of  the  popular  image  of  Wingate  in  Palestine.  The  author  states  that  virtually  every  previous  account  regarding  Wingate  in  Palestine  makes  two  main  claims.  These  are  that  his  actions  stemmed  from  his  “fanatical”  Zionism,  and  that  these  led  to  him  becoming  a  “pariah”  within  the  British  Army.  Continuing  with  his  examination  of  the  historiography  concerning  Wingate,  Anglim  also  quotes  from  a  history  of  Special  Forces,  written  in  2006,  which  repeats  these  ideas.  Aside  from  its  content,  this  chapter  is  very-­‐user  friendly  for  the  reader,  as  it  is  divided  into  three  main  sections  covering  that  Arab  Revolt  of  1936-­‐1939,  each  one  examining  a  distinct  phase.  This  allows  the  reader  to  better  understand  how  the  Revolt  broke  out  and  evolved  over  time.  

This  chapter  provides  a  good  narrative  historical  overview  of  the  Arab  Revolt,  which  outlines  the  context  within  which  Wingate’s  actions  can  be  understood.  Although  this  historical  overview  of  the  Revolt  is  narrative,  it  is  also  nuanced,  detailed,  and  explains  the  complexities  of  situation.  For  example,  Anglim,  when  examining  phase  one  of  the  Revolt  notes  that  the  guerrilla  groups  that  took  part  in  it  fell  into  two  broad  categories,  the  Mujahedeen,  which  carried  out  guerrilla  strikes  against  Jewish  settlements  and  road  links,  and  Fedayeen,  who  were  more  covert  in  nature,  often  resorting  to  sabotage.  Also,  rather  than  being  a  widespread  popular  uprising  as  its  title  suggests,  elements  of  the  Revolt  depended  upon  external  volunteers.  During  the  early  phases  of  the  revolt,  the  Mujahedeen  relied  upon  Syrian  and  Iraqi  volunteers.  Also,  apart  from  a  brief  period  in  late  1938,  the  local  Arab  population  appear,  according  to  contemporary  British  reports  cited  by  Anglim,  to  have  been  largely  law-­‐abiding.  Indeed,  Anglim  also  notes  that  many  actively  worked  with  the  British  authorities,  and  even  violently  confronted  the  guerrillas  during  the  Revolt’s  later  stages.  

As  before,  Anglim  follows  a  coherent  narrative  regarding  continuity  in  British  counter-­‐insurgency  tactics.  He  refers  to  the  fact  that  during  the  initial  British  military  response  to  the  Revolt,  RAF  aircraft  carried  out  reconnaissance  missions  to  ‘pin’  insurgents  in  villages  whilst  army  columns  closed  in,  and  also  provided  close  air  support  when  need  in  response  to  radio  messages  from  ground  forces.  That  these  tactics  had  already  been  refined  by  British  forces  during  other  counter-­‐insurgency  efforts  demonstrates  tactical  continuity.  Anglim  elaborates  on  this  during  his  overview  of  phase  two  of  the  Arab  Revolt  by  citing  the  creation,  in  1921,  of  the  Palestine  Gendarmerie,  which  included  large  numbers  of  former  ‘Black  and  Tans’  personnel  who  had  served  in  Ireland.    

Although  this  chapter  is  of  course  largely  historical  in  scope,  Anglim  never  forgets  his  aim  of  demonstrating  not  only  tactical  continuity,  but  also  how  similar  situations  can  arise  in  counter-­‐insurgency  operations  that  take  place  decades  apart.  During  the  later  stages  of  the  Arab  Revolt,  factions  headed  by  two  rival  Palestinian  

chieftains,  Abdul  Rahim  al  Haj  Muhammad  and  Arif  Abduk  Razzik  came  close  to  fighting  each  other,  apparently  over  controlling  illegal  activity  such  as  hashish  and  weapons  smuggling  that  was  part-­‐funding  the  Revolt.  A  further  factional  leader,  Kamal  Hussein,  also,  at  times,  smuggled  weapons,  drugs  or  Jewish  illegal  immigrants.  This  situation  meant  that  the  British  forces  in  Palestine  were  faced  with  an  insurgent  movement  which  lacked  centres  of  gravity  against  which  they  could  concentrate  their  efforts.  A  similar  scenario  was  encountered  by  British  troops  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  during  the  2000s.  Another  example  of  recurring  difficulties  faced  by  British  forces  in  different  counter-­‐insurgency  scenarios  is  that  the  Palestine  Police  was  largely  ineffective  due  to  bribery,  corruption  and  intimidation,  a  situation  similar  to  that  which  occurred  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq  during  recent  years.  This  example  especially  would  seem  to  suggest  that  the  British  Army  has,  to  an  extent,  failed  to  learn  from  the  mistakes  of  previous  counter-­‐insurgency  efforts.  

Crucially,  this  chapter  highlights  the  fact  that  far  from  being  a  lone  pro-­‐Zionist  voice  within  the  British  authorities  in  Palestine,  Wingate  was  one  of  a  number  of  senior  figures  who  understood  the  potential  of  the  Jewish  Hagannah  as  a  counter-­‐insurgency  force,  thus  refuting  the  claims  of  a  number  of  subsequent  historians.  For  example,  Anglim  cites  Lieutenant  Anthony  Simonds,  a  critic  of  anti-­‐Semitism  in  within  the  Palestine  Police,  who  stated  in  1934  that  “My  personal  sympathies  were  with  the  Jews”.  Additionally,  in  another  prescient  piece  of  analysis  regarding  the  Arab  Revolt,  Anglim  notes  that  concerns  existed  regarding  the  aggressive  tactics  employed  by  SNS  units  under  Wingate’s  direction,  both  within  the  British  authorities,  and  also  Jewish  communities  in  Palestine.  The  latter,  including  officers  of  the  Hagannah,  feared  that  the  methods  employed  by  the  SNS  might  damage  relations  with  neighbouring  Arab  villages.  This  is  relevant  as  concerns  regarding  the  potential  alienation  of  local  populations  during  counter-­‐insurgency  efforts  persists,  and  may  be  felt  even  more  acutely  in  the  early  21st  Century.  

When  examining  the  Arab  Revolt  and  Wingate’s  role  in  countering  it,  Anglim  successfully  examines  the  work  of  previous  historians  of  these  matters,  and  manages  to  paint  a  much  more  nuanced  picture  than  that  which  has  previously  been  available.  Anglim  also  highlights  genuine  tactical  continuity  and  the  need  for  militaries  to  learn  from  previous  campaigns.  

Moving  onto  the  next  chapter,  Wingate  in  Ethiopia  1940-­‐41,  Anglim  again  clearly  indicates  his  intention  to  investigate  the  historiography  surrounding  Wingate,  and  the  conclusions  of  previous  historians.  Anglim  takes  care  to  debunk  ‘myths’  that  have  spread  about  Wingate,  and  which  subsequently  became  the  orthodox  view  of  him.  One  such  idea  is  Luigi  Rosetto’s  belief  that  Wingate’s  tactical  ideas  were  completely  original.    

This  idea  is  quickly  refuted  at  length  by  Anglim,  who  provides  a  highly  detailed  overview  of  British  covert  warfare  planning  following  the  Allied  withdrawal  from  Dunkirk  in  1940,  and  by  citing  the  existence  of  the  (MI(R))  branch  of  the  British  War  Office,  whose  role  was  to  raise  units  to  operate  in  enemy  territory  in  conjunction  with  local  partisan  forces.  Also,  British  forces  had  contacts  with  insurgent  elements  within  Ethiopia  as  early  as  October  1939.  These  two  pieces  of  evidence,  along  with  several  others  cited  in  the  book,  indicate  that  the  idea  of  behind  the  lines  operations  alongside  local  irregular  forces,  both  generally  and  in  Ethiopia  specifically,  preceded  Wingate’s  arrival  in  East  Africa,  thus  helping  to  place  him  within  the  wider  context  of  such  British  operations.  

An  element  of  this  chapter  that  should  be  required  reading  for  military  and  intelligence  personnel  involved  in  stimulating  guerrilla  operations  can  be  found  on  page  135,  which  states  that  Wingate  understood  the  necessity  for  a  “controlling  element”  to  prevent  “unintended  consequences”  following  the  stimulation  of  resistance  movements.  Anglim  elaborates  on  this  by  citing  the  example  of  external  support  for  the  Afghan  resistance  following  the  1979  Soviet  Invasion,  arguing  that  by  helping  to  stimulate  Sunni  Muslim  unity  in  the  shape  of  an  armed  resistance  against  “Godless  outsiders”  without  considering  the  longer-­‐term  consequences,  the  US  helped  to  create  modern  Islamist  extremism.  Also,  Anglim  highlights  that  Wingate  concluded,  as  a  result  of  his  operations  in  Ethiopia,  that  there  is  “no  such  thing  as  a  regular  patriot”,  and  that  local  groups  should  be  assessed  as  to  their  combat  ability,  potential  commitment,  and  whether  they  may  have  any  ulterior  motives  for  cooperating  in  operations,  before  they  are  engaged  as  operational  partners.  Anglim  argues  that  Wingate  would  probably  have  opposed  the  “buying”  of  the  Northern  Alliance’s  support  in  Afghanistan  in  2001,  and  

been  vindicated  due  to  their  apparent  lack  of  aggression,  which  was  only  rectified  by  the  payment  of  increasingly  large  bribes,  and  the  deployment  of  US  Special  Forces  in  a  supporting  role.  

Anglim  also  uses  an  overview  the  doctrine  employed  in  Ethiopia  by  the  British  Army  and  its  insurgent  partners  during  the  Second  World  War  to  demonstrate  the  continual  effectiveness  of  such  an  approach  when  it  is  utilised  by  terrorist  and  insurgent  groups.  Wingate’s  belief  in  the  usefulness  of  a  committed  core  of  insurgents,  rather  than  an  uncoordinated  mass  uprising  has  been  confirmed  by  more  recent  examples,  some  of  which  are  cited  by  Anglim.  For  instance,  the  strength  of  the  Provisional  IRA  in  Northern  Ireland  may,  at  one  point,  have  been  only  1,200  active  members,  and  possibly  as  low  as  fifty,  within  a  Northern  Irish  Catholic  population  of  600-­‐750,000.  The  efficiency  of  such  an  approach,  the  utilisation  of  a  committed  corps  of  individuals,  rather  than  a  mass  uprising,  was  demonstrated,  according  to  Anglim,  by  an  ambush  against  a  US  Special  Forces  team  in  Afghanistan  in  2006.  During  this  incident,  Taliban  insurgents  carefully  prepared  their  positions  and  targeted  the  US  team  with  a  coordinated  assortment  of  machine-­‐guns,  mortars  and  snipers.  Anglim  argues  that  this  assault  gives  the  impression  of  a  well-­‐trained,  well-­‐disciplined  and  professional  insurgent  force,  of  the  type  advocated  by  Wingate.  Therefore,  Anglim  may  be  using  these  examples  to  reinforce  the  entirely  accurate  notion  that  counter-­‐insurgency  efforts  must  actively  seek  and  target  specific  threats  within  a  population,  rather  than  relying  on  more  general  security  practices.    

Wingate’s  most  famous  military  activities,  namely  his  development  and  oversight  of  long-­‐range  penetration  operations  in  Burma  between  1942  and  1944,  take  up  the  majority  of  the  second  half  of  the  book.  Although  this  is  too  extensive  to  discuss  in  detail  here,  there  are  numerous  elements  that  merit  a  mention  as  they  highlight  the  continued  excellence  of  the  book.  However,  it  must  be  noted  that  the  chapters  which  focus  on  Wingate’s  operations  in  Burma  provide  a  very  thorough  narrative  overview  regarding  the  Second  World  War  in  Southeast  Asia,  which  allows  the  reader  to  better  appreciate  the  wider  military  context  within  which  Wingate  operated.  Firstly,  Anglim  notes  that  Wingate  tailored  his  operational  proposals  in  Burma,  as  he  had  done  in  Palestine  and  Ethiopia,  in  order  to  take  account  of  the  perceived  strengths,  weaknesses,  culture  and  ‘national  characteristics’  of  the  enemy,  in  this  case  the  Japanese  Army.  Not  only  does  this  indicate  continuity  regarding  Wingate’s  own  modus  operandi,  but  also  a  longer  continuity  within  British  military  thought.  According  to  the  book’s  second  chapter,  Winning  Small  Wars-­‐Wingate’s  Army,  this  continuity  can  be  traced  back  to  at  least  approximately  1896-­‐1906,  during  which  period  three  editions  of  Major  General  Charles  Callwell’s  Small  Wars:  Their  Principles  and  Practice  were  published.    

Further  stressing  continuity  in  British  military  though,  as  well  as  aiming  to  demonstrate  that  Wingate  was  not  as  great  a  ‘maverick’  as  some  have  claimed,  Anglim  also  discusses  how  unconventional  warfare  in  Southeast  Asia  was  already  being  advocated  and  discussed  by  elements  within  the  British  Army  and  intelligence  community  before  Wingate’s  arrival  in  this  theatre  of  war,  and  indeed  before  the  outbreak  of  hostilities.  To  support  this,  Anglim  cites  the  example  of  Air  Chief  Marshall  Sir  Robert  Brooke-­‐Popham,  Commander-­‐in-­‐Chief  Far  East,  who  wrote  to  the  War  Office  in  April  1941  advocating  the  creation  of  a  contingency  force  of  Chinese  guerrillas,  commanded  by  Indian  Army  officers  and  supported  by  specialist  British  demolition  personnel.  Also,  following  the  outbreak  of  war  in  December  1941,  GHQ  India  proposed  the  deployment  of  “small  mobile  guerrilla  columns”  to  operate  in  Thailand  if  the  need  arose.    

Sticking  with  his  remit  to  explore  how  Wingate’s  campaign  experiences  are  still  relevant,  Anglim  notes  that  Wingate’s  view  regarding  local  guerrillas  did  not  change  during  the  early  stages  of  his  work  in  Burma.  This  view  was  that  guerrilla  forces  could  be  useful  against  occupying  armies  who  were  wary  of  losses,  restrained  in  their  use  of  force  and  constrained  by  a  moral  view  that  prevented  reprisals.  Alternately,  according  to  Wingate,  guerrillas  facing  an  army  which  had  no  compunction  in  killing  prisoners  or  carrying  out  reprisals  for  resistance  activity  could  be  prevented  from  acting  by  emotional  ties  to  the  population  in  whose  name  they  claim  to  be  acting.  Anglim  argues  that  guerrilla  warfare  may  have  been  a  workable  strategy  for  insurgents  in  Afghanistan  and  Iraq,  due  to  constraints  placed  on  modern  armies.  

One  surprising  comment  in  the  Burma  section  of  this  book  comes  from  Wingate  himself,  who  is  referenced  as  arguing  that  his  long-­‐range  penetration  groups  were  not  ‘Special  Forces’,  and  that  he  was  sceptical  of  units  which  were  designated  as  such,  believing  instead  that  existing  units  with  an  established  espirit  de  corps  and  containing  a  number  of  specialists  and  trained  personnel  could  quickly  adapt  in  order  to  carry  out  

unconventional  operations.  As  in  the  rest  of  the  book,  Anglim  examines  the  historiography  surrounding  Wingate,  and  in  this  case  examines  how  analysts  saw  Wingate  shortly  after  his  death  in  1944.  

Anglim  concludes  the  book  by  arguing  that  it  may  be  more  accurate  to  claim  that  there  are  potential  ‘messages’  rather  than  ‘lessons’  from  Wingate’s  military  career  that  modern  military  personnel  should  be  aware  of.  This  approach  is  a  good  deal  more  nuanced  than  the  common  dictum  regarding  the  ‘lessons’  of  history,  as  it  concedes  that,  despite  superficial  similarities,  no  two  situations  are  the  same.  This  means  that  codified  ‘lessons’  that  were  applicable  in  one  situation  may  not  be  in  another.  Anglim  also  recaps  on  the  issues,  strategies  and  tactics  that  have  been  discussed  in  the  book,  and  their  continued  relevance.  There  is  so  much  from  this  excellent  book  that  I  wanted  to  discuss  in  this  review,  but  was  prevented  from  doing  so  by  the  limited  space  available.  However,  I  can  confidently  say  that  this  book  is  a  must-­‐read  for  those  interested  in  warfare,  both  historic  and  modern,  counter-­‐insurgency  strategies  and  the  issues  and  controversies  that  can  accompany  them,  military  thought  processes  and,  also  the  processes  that  helped  create  the  modern  Middle  East.