philosophy e166: ethical theory week fourteen: kant’s categorical imperative

Philosophy E166: Ethical Theory

Week Fourteen:

Kant’s Categorical Imperative

Some Themes in Ordinary Moral

Reasoning Kant Tries to Capture • 1) Moral reasons are the most important

reasons for acting and override other kinds of reasons for acting.

• 2) The motive behind an action is the factor determining its moral worth.

• 3) Each person deserves to be treated with dignity and respect.

• 4) It’s morally wrong to take advantage of others or make an exception of oneself: “What if everyone were to do that?”

The Function of Reason: Paragraphs 4-7

• In ¶ 5, Kant puts forward a curious argument about the nature and purpose of reason

• He contends that everything in nature has its place, and it has its place for a particular purpose

• This is a thoroughgoing teleological conception of nature

• Nature is organized in such a way that everything in it has its own special place and purpose

Paragraph 5

“In the natural constitution of an organic being—that is, of one contrived for the purpose of life—let us take it as a principle that in it no organ is to be found for any end unless it is also the most appropriate to that end and the best fitted for it. Suppose that for a being possessed of reason and a will the real purpose of nature were his preservation, his welfare, or in a word his happiness. In that case nature would have hit on a very bad arrangement by choosing reason in the creature to carry out this purpose.[…] If reason should have been imparted to this favored creature as well, it would have had to serve him only for contemplating the happy disposition of his nature, for admiring it, for enjoying it, and for being grateful to its beneficent Cause—not for subjecting his power of appetition to such feeble and defective guidance or for meddling incompetently with the purposes of nature.”‖

Kant’s Point

• Kant contends that the purpose of reason cannot be to attain happiness.

• Since instinct would be much better than reason at achieving happiness, it can’t be happiness that reason is directed at.

• So then what is the purpose of reason? • Kant concludes that it must be to produce a

good will. • But note that it’s not really clear how this

conclusion is supposed to follow.

Assumptions

• Notice the background assumptions, as Rawls points out, roughly

– (i) that nature is purposive, and

– (ii) that there is an author of nature, or, here it is called the “beneficent Cause,” whose purposes are the purposes we observe in nature

A Darwinian Response

• If we are Darwinians, we might grant something like (i), but think about the adaptationist‘s interpretation of Darwinism where the kinds of evolutionary explanations are in terms of adaptations

• You can give an account of the thumb, e.g., in terms of an adaptation in particular environmental conditions

• Adaptation does not require an author of nature

Adaptationism

• Let‘s suppose we are adaptationists• We can grant (i) in that the explanations of nature are

functional/purposive• If we have that kind of explanation, then every

biological feature can be explained either directly (by giving an account like the thumb case) or indirectly (as a byproduct—given that there are direct adaptations, the thumb arose as a byproduct)

• According to that kind of account, where does reason fit in?

• Straightforwardly, reason then doesn‘t necessarily have a direct purpose

• It might have arisen as a byproduct

Mill’s Contrary Idea

• Even if we suppose that reason has a function, there’s Mill’s idea:

• We have higher needs that are the products of reason and they separate us from animals

• These higher needs are the concern of reason and not the subject of instinct

• So it seems that what Kant is writing here is in direct conflict with Mill‘s idea

• I do not usually prefer Mill to Kant, but I do here• It seems that Kant’s conception of happiness here

is hedonistic – it seems that only hedonistic happiness could be instinctual in this way

¶7: The Distinction Between the Highest Good and the Complete Good

• The ¶7 distinction between the highest good and the complete good– “Such a will need not on this account be the sole and complete good,

but it must be the highest good and the condition of all the rest, even of all our demands for happiness.”

• He acknowledges that the good will is the highest good and the precondition of all other goods.

• But it isn’t the complete good – other goods (such as happiness) must be added to the good will to attain this kind of good.

• The highest good is the good will while the complete good is the good will plus the happiness appropriate to that good will

¶ ¶8-9: The Concept of Duty

• The rest of Chapter One is taken up with our conception of duty and its link to GW

• Kant later refers to a “second proposition” (on p. 67) and a “third proposition”

• The first proposition, according to Paton and Rawls, maps out a connection between good will and the motive of duty, but there is no passage in which Kant sets out a first proposition and there is nothing highlighted, italicized, etc., as if it’s one

The First Proposition

• This is what Paton says (on p. 18 and 19 in his analysis): • “A human action is morally good, not because it

is done from immediate inclination—still less because it is done from self-interest—but because it is done for the sake of duty.”

• Paton takes that to be the first proposition. • What Rawls takes to be the first proposition:

• “A good will is a will the actions of which accord with duty, not from inclination, but from duty (out of duty).” (LHMP, p. 152)

What Rawls Takes to Be the First Proposition

• When Rawls gives that reading, he cites this passage in Kant (at the end of ¶11 in Groundwork): – “It is precisely in this [that a man who was

cold and indifferent might still find in himself a motive for helping others] that the worth of character begins to show—a moral worth and beyond all comparison the highest—namely, that he does good, not from inclination but from duty”

Four of Five Types of Actions

• 1. Actions contrary to duty • 2. Actions for the sake of duty • 3. Actions

– (a) which are in accord with duty but – (b) for which men have no immediate inclination and– (c) perform them [only] because they’re impelled to do

so by some other inclination (i.e., self-interest)

• 4. Actions • (a) which are in accord with duty but • (b) the subject has in addition an immediate

inclination to the action

A Fifth

• A fifth type, for completeness:– 5. Actions neither in accord with duty nor

contrary to duty

• Kant doesn‘t include, but if we must if we want a complete list

• It is a type of action that is neutral with respect to duty (e.g., brushing your teeth)

Kant’s Goal; Actions of Type (1)

• Kant’s goal here is to elucidate the concept of duty

• Since the good will involves duty, getting clear about duty will also shed light on the concept of the good will

• In regard to (1), Kant says (in the ninth paragraph) that he won’t discuss actions contrary to duty. He says these won’t tell us anything about acting for the sake of duty

Type (2) & the Shopkeeper Example

• In regard to actions of type (2), Kant provides his shopkeeper example.

• Consider a shopkeeper who gives a fair price to a child but does it because of self-interest rather than duty or immediate inclination.

• The concern is his reputation not his duty• Nevertheless he acts in conformity with duty• The thought is that his action doesn’t express

a good will, since it’s out of self-interest. • See the last sentence in ¶9.

Does Kant Go Too Far?

• Kant seems to overstate his point here. • He appears to suggest that if one acts out of self-

interest, then it can’t be out of duty as well. • But that just seems wrong. • Why not think that multiple motives could be

involved in one’s action—duty as well as self-interest?

• Perhaps the thought is that if self-interest is sufficient to explain the motivation for the action, then there’s no need to think that any other motive was present.

Recognition

• But Kant makes the point as a point about recognition– “[I]t is easy to decide whether the action which accords with duty has

been done from duty or from some purpose of self-interest. This distinction is far more difficult to perceive when the action accords with duty and the subject has in addition an immediate inclination to the action.”

• Thus this is not a conceptual issue. We can make the distinctions conceptually; instead, it is recognizing the cases in everyday dealings that is the problem for Kant (and moreover agents recognizing cases in themselves)

• A reoccurring discussion in Kant is the granting of our ability to understand and recognize distinctions a priori on the basis of reason alone, but nevertheless having difficulty applying the distinctions “empirically”

Temptation

• Notice that the one time when duty really does seem to be present as a motive for one’s action is when there’s some temptation to act against duty

• But on the other hand, Kant seems to be correct that if one’s action is in accordance with duty and if one also feels some inclination or has some self-interest, then we have a hard time determining whether duty is also active in producing the action

¶¶10-11: The Motive of Duty

• In paragraphs 10 and 11, Kant considers actions of type (3)—those done in conformity with duty, and where there is immediate inclination

• First case: there is a duty to preserve one’s life, but there’s also an immediate inclination to preserve it as well

• Ergo, there’s no moral worth to actions that aim to preserve one’s life just on the basis of this sort of inclination

• Is it there is no acting from duty at all, or that we could not recognize acting from duty? The first

Avoiding Suicide

• He then varies the example • Assume we have a person who has lost all will to live • He’s miserable but decides to preserve his life anyway • In this case, Kant says that such an action would have moral

worth, because it would be done not out of inclination but duty

• But what would this sort of duty look like? That’s not so easy to figure out, as least not for me

• I don’t know what it means for somebody to preserve his or her life only for the sake of duty

• That kind of case, while easy perhaps to understand conceptually, doesn‘t seem to exist in reality

Benevolence, or a Helping Character

• In ¶11, he considers another example: someone who helps another who is in need, but he does it not because of self-interest or a feeling of duty, but just because he likes doing this sort of thing

• Kant thinks that even if this is a good thing, it has no genuine moral worth

• A Humean, of course, would object to this view• The Humean would say that this is precisely the

sort of action that has moral value – that it shows that one has a good character

The Example Revised

• Kant goes on to revise the example: now imagine that this beneficent man has fallen on hard times and no longer has any desire to help others, because he’s so absorbed with his own troubles.

• But now suppose that despite his lack of inclination to be helpful, he helps someone out of a sense of duty anyway.

• Then, Kant thinks, his action would have moral worth.

Kant’s Passage

• “Suppose then that the mind of this friend of man were overclouded by sorrows of his own which extinguished all sympathy with the fate of others, but that he still had power to help those in distress, though no longer stirred by the need of others because sufficiently occupied with his own; and suppose that, when no longer moved by inclination, he tears himself out of this deadly insensibility and does the action without any inclination for the sake of duty alone; then for the first time his action has its genuine moral worth.” (I:¶11)

Why Think He’s Acting From Duty?

• Why might Kant think that such a man is now acting out of duty?

• Presumably the idea is that if you’re completely robbed of all inclination to do φ, then it’s only duty that can step in to motivate you to do φ

• What else could possibly motivate you to act in accordance with duty if not duty itself?

Nice People

• This passage seems pretty strange (off the mark) to a lot of people.

• It would seem to many that nice people are people of moral worth, and one who has lost his niceness but only does an action out of duty has no moral worth in his action

• Kant’s view is the reverse • Niceness doesn’t offer anything more (or,

strictly speaking, anything at all) to moral worth, according to Kant

Consider a Possible Counterexample to Kant

• Consider a case in which a child is in grave danger of dying and his father decides to undergo an operation that will help save his son but also lead to his own death

• It seems tempting to say that if he did it merely on the basis of duty – and not out of some spontaneous paternal love – then his action would be lacking in moral worth in some way

The Second Proposition

• At the bottom of Paton, p. 67 – ¶14: • [1] “An action done from duty has its moral

worth, not in the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon;

• [2] it depends therefore, not on the realization of the object of the action, but solely on the principle of volition in accordance with which, irrespective of all objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been performed.”

The Idea

• The idea seems to be that an action cannot get its moral worth from – (i) its purpose, – (ii) its end or motive, or – (iii) its effect

• (i) – (iii) give no unconditioned moral worth• What does that leave? • Only the principle of the will as the source of moral

worth• Once that move is made, then it‘s a pretty quick

step to the categorical imperative

The Third Proposition

• The so-called “third proposition” is in the middle of p. 68 of Paton (¶15): – “Duty is the necessary to act out of the reverence for the law.”

• How does the third proposition follow from the first and second? It is unclear

• What is important here is the important role that reverence plays – Respect here is for the respect for duty (for the moral law). – Duties are all-important– In the order of the things which are supposed to move us, duty is

always at the top

• It is by seeing this order and duty on the top that we have an attitude of reverence

¶16: The Derivation of the Categorical Imperative

• What relation to duty is morally worthy? Is it fear, or is it reverence? Kant believes that it is reverence, but it is hard to grasp precisely what Kant means by this.

• We do know that it is a “respect for the law.” But what sort of law? • This law is the categorical imperative: “But what kind of law can this

be the thought of which, even without regard to the results expected from it, has to determine the will if this is to be called good absolutely and without qualification? Since I have robbed the will of every inducement that might arise for it as a consequence of obeying any particular law, nothing is left but the conformity of actions to universal law as such, and this alone must serve the will as its principle. That is to say, I ought never to act except in such a way that I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law.”

Imperatives

• There are two kinds of imperatives: hypothetical and categorical.

• Think of imperatives as commands expressing reasons for action. The imperative is not itself a reason for action but rather an expression of a reason for action.

• Example: “If you want to stay dry, bring an umbrella” is not a statement, but a command. However, it expresses much the same idea as “You ought to bring an umbrella if you want to stay dry,” which states a reason for action.

Hypothetical Imperatives

• These are conditional imperatives, sentences of the form: “If such-and-such, then do so-and-so.” – e.g., “If you want a good reputation, don’t cheat people.”

• If the condition is not one that everyone wants, it is problematic. For example, “If you want to stay dry, take an umbrella.”

• If this condition is one that everyone wants, it is assertoric. For example, “If you want to stay healthy, eat well.”

• When the condition is one that everyone wants – i.e., when the hypothetical imperative is assertoric – we often don’t mention the condition explicitly. Then the imperative appears to be unconditional.

Two Sorts of Hypothetical Imperatives

• Hypothetical imperatives link means with ends.– “If you want to stay dry, bring an umbrella” expresses as a reason

for action the carrying out of a means (bringing an umbrella) in order to effect an end (staying dry).

• There are two sorts of hypothetical imperatives: – 1) Rules of skill (with a variety of possible ends)

• “If you want to cure this man, use this prescription.”

– 2) Counsels of prudence (with, according to Kant, only one end: happiness)

• “If you want to be happy, then exercise.”

Categorical Imperatives vs. Hypothetical Imperatives

• Categorical imperatives, unlike hypothetical imperatives, do not have “if”-clauses.– For example: “Don’t lie.” There is no “if” about it.

– A categorical imperative should not be confused with counsels of prudence expressed without “if”-clauses (because the end is understood).

• Thus, these are truly unconditional imperatives.• The order always bestows a reason for action.

– For example, the command “Don’t lie” expresses a straightforward reason for acting: You oughtn’t lie.

• Such an imperative would govern all rational beings at all times and all similar circumstances.

Are there any categorical imperatives?

• However, the question is: Are there any categorical imperatives?

• Kant’s answer is: Yes, because rationality tells us to act according to the form of a categorical imperative:

• “[I]f I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For since besides the law this imperative contains only the necessity that our maxim should conform to this law, while the law [because unconditional] … contains no condition to limit it, there remains nothing over to which the maxim has to conform except the universality of a law as such; and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly asserts to be necessary.” (Paton, p. 88; Ak 421)

“A Single Categorical Imperative”

• Thus, he says, there is “only a single categorical imperative”

• It is this: “Act only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”

• This formula captures at least two of the elements of reasoning I set out:– The motive determining actions’ moral worth – The wrong of making an exception of oneself

The “Single Imperative” Thesis

• There are thus various morally justified commands of morality – for example, “Don’t lie!” “Don’t break promises!” “Don’t make lying promises!” – that Kant calls “imperatives of duty.”

• But Kant seems to hold that “at bottom” there is only one categorical imperative -- the Categorical Imperative.– If that’s right, it’s not clear what “at bottom” means.– Idea seems to be that “all imperatives of duty [might] be

derived from this one imperative as their principle.”– Perhaps it is like saying that for utilitarians there is “at

bottom” only one principle – the Principle of Utility – and that any other moral principle (or rule) is a special case of the Principle of Utility and justified by it.

A “Single Categorical Imperative” but Multiple “Versions”

• Another wrinkle: Kant thinks that “the” Categorical Imperative can be formulated in a number of ultimately equivalent ways – what we usually call “versions” – differing, we might say, in which aspects of our moral thinking they emphasize – Paton sets out five –– The Formula of Universal Law (set out earlier)– The Formula of the Law of Nature

• “Act as if the maxim of your action were to become through your will a universal law of nature.” (Paton, p. 89; Ak. 421)

– The Formula of the End in Itself• “Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own

person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” (Paton, p. 96; Ak. 429)

– The Formula of Autonomy– The Formula of the Kingdom of Ends

Maxims

• An end is a state of affairs.• An action is a means to an end.• The agent of action a is the person who does

a.• A maxim is what Kant calls “a subjective

principle of action” – i.e., a statement of the form: “I am to do X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless Z.” (Rawls, p. 168.)

• The agent’s maxim is the maxim that the agent of action a had in mind in doing a.

The Categorical Imperative Procedure

John Rawls describes the CI-procedure with 4 steps (pp. 167ff):


John Rawls describes the CI-procedure with 4 steps:• 1) Formulate a subjective maxim in the form of a hypothetical

imperative: “I am to do X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless Z.” It's a first-person rule of skill or counsel of prudence.




• 2) Convert the maxim into a principle. Change the personal pronoun 'I' to 'Everyone': “Everyone is to do X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless Z.” The maxim is now a principle.





• 3) Convert the principle into a law of nature: “Everyone always does X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless Z.”






• 4) Contemplate a world in which (3) is true.

Step 4: The “Adjusted Social World”

• Rawls’ description of Step 4: “We are to adjoin the as-if law of nature at step (3) to the existing laws of nature (as these are understood by us) and then think through as best we can what the order of nature would be once the effects of the newly adjoined law of nature have had sufficient time to work themselves out.”

• He goes on to explain Step 4 in this way: “It is assumed that a new order of nature results from the addition of the law at step (3) to the other laws of nature, and that this new order of nature has a settled equilibrium state the relevant features of which we are able to figure out. Let us call this new order of nature an “adjusted social world.” Let’s also think of this social world as associated with the maxim at step (1), and impute to the agent a legislative intention, an intention as it were to legislate such a world….” (LHMP, Rawls, p. 169.)







We are permitted act from the maxim (as laid out in #1) only if:







We are permitted act from the maxim (as laid out in #1) only if: • a) We are able to act with consistency from #1 in #4, and


John Rawls describes the CI-procedure with 4 steps:• 1) Formulate a subjective maxim in the form of a hypothetical imperative:

“I am to do X in circumstances C in order to bring about Y unless Z.” It's a first-person rule of skill or counsel of prudence.




We are permitted act from the maxim (as laid out in #1) only if: • a) We are able to act with consistency from #1 in #4, and • b) We are able to will #4, i.e. to determine that #4 be brought into being.

The Moral Complexity Problem


• Rawls’s description of the Categorical Imperative Procedure invites a question:



• With all this complexity, how could we ever use the Categorical Imperative Procedure as the basis of a moral decision?



• With all this complexity, how could we ever use the Categorical Imperative Procedure as the basis of a moral decision?

• For Kant, an answer is complicated by the fact that he claims only to describe our moral intuitions

A Solution to the Moral Complexity Problem


• A solution comes from seeing that we can abbreviate the C.I.P. by asking,



– “What if everybody were to do that?”




• Separating Steps 1 – 4 from the two tests





• To pass the “What if …?” question is to pass the two tests





• To pass the “What if …?” question is to pass the two tests

• Comparing Mill’s solution to the counterpart problem from Bentham

Perfect and Imperfect Duties

Kant’s Illustration of Applying the First Formula to a Perfect Duty to Oneself

philosophy e166: ethical theory week fourteen: kant’s categorical imperative

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