Comparative Cases from Europe and Asia-Pacific

Policy Dialogue and Governance of Migration:

Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University (Phase 2)龍谷大学アフラシア多文化社会研究センター

研究シリーズ 1

Research Series Studies on Multicultural Societies No.1

Edited by:

Pauline Kent, Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos,Aysun Uyar, Shincha Park

with Bogaziçi University

Ryukoku University Afrasian Research Centre First International Workshop

Cover designed by Daisuke Yamanaka Haruko Uchida

The logo mark of Afrasian Centre is adopted from an Adinkra symbol of “Siamese crocodiles” in the

ancient kingdom of Asante that existed in what is now the Republic of Ghana, West Africa. It is a

popular symbol of peace and unity, as Siamese crocodiles share a stomach, or the same ultimate goal,

even if they tend to fight with each other.

March 2-3, 2012

Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University (Phase 2)龍谷大学アフラシア多文化社会研究センター

研究シリーズ 1

Research Series Studies on Multicultural Societies No.1

Edited by:

Pauline Kent, Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos,Aysun Uyar, Shincha Park

Bogaziçi University Rector’s Conference HallIstanbul, Turkey

Comparative Cases from Europe and Asia-Pacific

Policy Dialogue and Governance of Migration:

with Bogaziçi University

Ryukoku University Afrasian Research Centre First International Workshop

©2012 Afrasian Research Centre Ryukoku University 1-5 Yokotani, Seta Oe-cho, Otsu, Shiga, JAPAN All rights reserved. ISBN 978-4-904945-25-4

The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the author/s and do not necessarily reflect the view of the Afrasian Research Centre. No part of this publication shall be reproduced in any form without the permission of the author/s and Afrasian Research Centre. This publication has been supported by the Project for Strategic Research Base Formation Support at Private Universities at Ryukoku University “Research into the Possibilities of Establishing Multicultural Societies in the Asia-Pacific Region: Conflict, Negotiation and Migration” initiated and funded by the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (2011-2013).

PHOTOS

Kemal Ki ri ci Selçuk Esenbel

Pauline Kent

Soo im Lee Zeynep Kadi rbeyo lu (left)

Yasukatsu Matsushima

Eriko Aoki

Aysun Uyar

Dilek Çinar

Habibul H. Khondker

Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos

Chizuko Sato (left) and Shincha Park

Nermin Abadan-Unat (right) Akihiro Asakawa

Ahmet çduygu (centre)

Mine Eder

PREFACE “As the world continues on the path of globalization, modern Asia and Africa are on the brink of two very different fates. On the one hand, there are regions experiencing ongoing economic development while, on the other, some areas have missed the development train and are suffering from poverty and armed conflict” (Afrasian pamphlet 2011). Given such diverse directions, achieving coexistence among and within different societies has become a great challenge that can be met by looking more closely at multiculturality and its roles in peace and development.

The Afrasian Research Centre at Ryukoku University incorporates immigration, international relations and communication theory into its efforts to build a new foundation for interdisciplinary research into multicultural society (Project title: Research into the Possibilities of Establishing Multicultural Societies in the Asia Pacific Region: Conflict, Negotiation, and Migration). “It aims to do this through research—both theoretical and practical—necessary to enable us to identify issues that need to be overcome in order to make policy suggestions” (Afrasian pamphlet 2011).

Focusing on the importance of dialogue and social, cultural, environmental, economic and structural aspects of conflict, the Afrasian Research Centre will conduct interdisciplinary research from FY2011 through FY2013 by dividing its research questions into three main groups: immigration, international relations and communication. Group I, which organised this workshop, focuses on the empirical study of migration in the Asia-Pacific region by comparing different theoretical and practical experiences of migration in sending and receiving countries. Objectives of the Workshop Japan is now at the crossroads of its migration experience, with its restrictive migration policy being challenged by the greater demand for international competitiveness in spite of its aging population. Although Japan has experience as a receiving country, it is also crucial to examine experiences of other nearby countries as well as countries like Turkey, which has both sending and receiving country experiences.

Keeping in mind the rich and resourceful capacity of migration research and practices by researchers in both Turkey and Japan, this joint workshop was planned and organized with the collaboration of scholars from Bo aziçi University and other research institutes in Turkey as well as researchers from Ryukoku University’s Afrasian Research Centre. Our targeted objectives were as follows:

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- Discussing and sharing our theoretical as well as empirical understanding of migration,

policy dialogue and governance of migration by focusing on issues of international migration in selected countries (Japan, Turkey, Germany, Australia, UAE, Philippines, etc.) based on the participants’ past research experiences.

- Exploring possible research collaboration in the near future (e.g. like data sharing, joint follow-up workshop in Japan and/or joint publications).

- Establishing and sharing our network on migration and multicultural societies with our neighbouring countries in the Asia-Pacific and Europe.

Pauline Kent

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE OPENING REMARKS ·············································································· 3

Kemal Kiri ci, Bo aziçi University Pauline Kent, Ryukoku University

OPENING SESSION “Japan’s and Turkey’s Experiences with Immigration and Current Research Agendas”

Abstracts of Presentations ··········································································· 9

Zainichi Koreans and their Transnational Ties with Japan and Korea ····················· 13 Soo im Lee, Ryukoku University

Lost in Transition: Current Issues in Japan’s Labor Migration ····························· 21 Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos, Ryukoku University

Comments and Questions ········································································ 33 SESSION I “Governance of Migration in Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region I”

Abstracts of Presentations ······································································· 37

The Naturalization System in Modern Japan ·················································· 39 Akihiro Asakawa, Nagoya University

Who Benefits from Dual Nationality? Cases from South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan ········································· 43 Shincha Park, Binghamton University

Discussion and Responses from the Presenters ··············································· 51

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SESSION II “Governance of Migration in Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region II”

Abstracts of Presentations ······································································· 61

Understanding Diversity and Solidarity among Bangladeshi Workers in the United Arab Emirates: Implications for Migration Governance ····················· 63 Habibul H. Khondker, Zayed University

The Implications of the Transfer of US Bases from Okinawa on the Economy and International Migration in Guam ······································ 69 Yasukatsu Matsushima, Ryukoku University

Discussion and Responses from the Presenters ··············································· 79

ROUNDTABLE-GENERAL DISCUSSION “Migration Policy Dialogue in Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region” ·················· 89 Nermin Abadan-Unat, Bo aziçi University Ahmet çduygu, Koç University Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos, Ryukoku University

WORKSHOP PROGRAM ····································································· 101 LIST OF PARTICIPANTS ····································································· 103

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OPENING REMARKS

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Kemal Kiri ci Bo aziçi University

In 1971, Robert College was turned over to the Turkish government and it became a Turkish State University called Bo aziçi University, with education continuing to be provided in English. Furthermore, we have tried our best to protect the liberal values that have come to be associated with the college itself. Today, each year around 1.5-1.7 million graduating high school students take up a very difficult, gruelling centralized entrance exam for universities and Bo aziçi receives its students from the top 2,500 students. We are therefore lucky to be very privileged and we have a lot of academics that keeps the academic level and dynamism of Bo aziçi University going.

I would like to once more welcome you. The topic is of great interest to Turkey. You will see momentarily in my presentation why this is the case, and I am expecting this workshop to be a lively one.

Pauline Kent Ryukoku University

We are all very delighted to be here in what is really a very magical city. I am hoping the magical powers of the setting will also create some interactive and stimulating discussion today.

I would first like to give a little bit of background to our project “Research into the Possibilities of Establishing Multicultural Societies in the Asia Pacific Region: Conflict, Negotiation, and Migration.” The initial Afrasia project began in 2005 as a five-year project focusing on conflict and conflict resolution, and examined the content and mechanisms of conflict. We realized that conflict can range from very violent warfare all the way through to imperceptible levels of conflict that can affect us in everyday life.

Of these different types of conflict that we were able to identify, we found that different cultural backgrounds can clash to create a number of types of conflicts that we often find difficult to articulate and therefore may not receive attention due to its seemingly invisibility. Thus, being able to identify a conflict becomes an important part of the process of conflict prevention and resolution. Going on to resolve something is another issue altogether, but at least by identifying some of these conflicts we are able to try and prevent or minimize the

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things that occur not just on a violent scale, but also within our everyday lives. Over the course of the five-year project, this was perhaps one of the most interesting

aspects of our research. As an example, we found that increasing local participation in food production, rather than thrusting so-called advanced technology upon people, produced much better results for the residents of the local area. They were able to incorporate tried and true traditions along with the new technology to create a sustainable environment. Increased active participation has been proven to be one good way of avoiding unnecessary conflict.

In the same sense, especially as seen in Professor Carlos’ research, with the coming in of Filipino and Indonesian care workers into Japan recently, we found that unseen cultural conflict did much to stop the programs operating productively. Thus addressing cultural aspects along with practical needs becomes imperative (certainly not superfluous) in order to achieve more immediate goals.

Now we have begun a three-year project and are at the end of the first year. The movement of people has increased rapidly and with it a ‘clash of cultures’ is inevitable. In the past we have talked about people migrating and creating new lives for themselves, but we are at the point, now, where we need to redefine “migration” as it encompasses a new range of movement and subsequently a new range of issues. In this new project we are putting our focus more on migration, or the movement of people.

With this radical increase in the movement of people we have divided our present project into three different research groups. Our group covers migration in the Asia-Pacific area thus Professor Matsushima’s talk today about migration from Micronesian islands to Guam. Naturally we also have a focus on Japan as part of Asia. The second group focuses on communication and language acquisition and is headed by Professor Lee who is also presenting today. The third group covers overarching issues from the perspective of international relations.

With more and more people moving, being able to communicate, or have access to a system that enables one to acquire a language, can play a very important part in how newcomers integrate or participate to their host society. Alternatively, language policies also tend to shape how people think about newcomers and how they interact with them. This is another unseen type of influence that we have decided to focus on during this project.

In our workshop, today the focus is on migration issues. We are now a world that has a population of over seven billion people, one billion of whom are concentrated in what we call the “advanced societies.” What then happens to the other six billion people? Our resources are becoming more and more scarce and this is of course one of the reasons for erupting conflict. As a result, we are seeing a redistribution of the population through migration. How we redistribute that population through migration differs from country to country, hence the workshop today. We would like to explore new ideas when it comes to migration, a phenomenon which has changed dramatically in just the past few years. In Japan, as I said, immigration is something that is now a real issue but one for which both the government and society are ill-prepared. It will therefore be very interesting for us to hear what our Turkish

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colleagues have to say because Turkey has a very vibrant immigration policy in terms of a sending country. I heard yesterday that perhaps there are a few interesting common aspects with the Japanese side when it comes to how they receive people.

I think we have a lot that we can discuss on a common basis, and I am very much looking forward to some interesting discussions. We are here today to promote discussions that may help us to prevent some conflict by sharing our academic resources and I hope we can profit from these discussions not only today but also in the future.

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OPENING SESSION

OPENING SESSION“Japan’s and Turkey’s Experiences with Immigration and Current Research Agendas”

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Abstracts of Presentations Turkey: A Country of Transition from Emigration to Immigration Kemal K R C , Bo aziçi University Traditionally, Turkey has been known as a country of emigration. Starting from the early 1960s and well into the 1970s, large numbers of Turkish nationals migrated to western European countries, particularly West Germany. This emigration continued until recent times through family reunification schemes and the asylum track. However, more recently, Turkey has also become a country of transit to the European Union for irregular migrants from Asian countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan as well as African countries. Turkey is also becoming a destination for EU professionals and retirees, second and third generation Turkish migrants from European countries especially Germany as well as regular and irregular migrants from former Soviet Bloc countries and the Middle East. Furthermore, growing numbers of transit migrants are stranded in Turkey. Finally, Turkey is a country of refuge for asylum seekers coming from neighbouring Middle East countries and beyond. This paper will discuss the evolution and nature of these three types of migrations and reflect on the various administrative, foreign policy and political challenges they raise for Turkey. Issues in Japan’s Transition from Migrant-Sending to Migrant-Receiving Country Soo im LEE & Maria Reinaruth D. CARLOS, Ryukoku University The presentations by Lee and Carlos will give a general overview of the problems and issues faced by migrants in the light of Japan’s transition from a mainly migrant-sending to a mainly migrant-receiving country. Lee will describe the case of the Koreans whose first generation migrants came to Japan before World War II, while Carlos will discuss the implications of this country’s ambiguous and passive labor migration policy on foreign workers’ employment and welfare. Zainichi Koreans and their Transnational Ties with Japan and Korea (LEE) Numbering a little fewer than 600,000 in total, multiple generations of Koreans with diverse legal and residential categories live in Japan today. The majority of these resident Koreans, commonly termed the zainichi Koreans, are the descendants of colonial-era migrants who migrated from the southern regions of the Korean peninsula to Japan during the first half of

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the twentieth century. Over 80% of zainichi (Resident) Koreans in Japan today are second- or third-generation Koreans. The identity of these younger generation Koreans varies depending on nationality, political orientation, family background and their educational experiences. Those who belong to the zainichi category, however, are in fact not always obvious. Their indistinguishable appearances from the Japanese, their cultural literacy, use of Japanese names, and their fluency in the Japanese language (most cannot speak Korean fluently) allow “passing” as a way of life, making them an invisible postcolonial community.

Despite the community’s high degree of social and cultural assimilation in Japanese society, they are legally marginalized as foreign residents. In this respect, Japan is currently the only advanced nation with a fourth-generation immigrant problem. It is important to note, however, that Koreans were Japanese nationals under the colonial rule and it was in 1952 that their Japanese citizenship was taken away without choice. This legal exclusion of former colonial subjects may not have been a concern for Korean migrants who repatriated back to the Korean Peninsula after World War II, but it had a significant impact on the lives of those who remained in Japan. By focusing on the identity and citizenship in relation to transnational ties to their homelands, South Korea and North Korea, as well as the host nation, Japan, this study argues that the cultural discourse of “homeland” and “host” among ethnic Koreans in Japan is shaped by changing circumstances and shifting identities across multiple generations. Lost in Transition: Current Issues in Japan’s Labor Migration (CARLOS) In the first 30 years after WWII, populous Japan embarked on a massive economic reconstruction without the help of foreign workers. Instead, it mobilized and prioritized (over foreign workers) the locals, especially those from the countryside and those who returned from former overseas colonies. Such restrictive and passive policy towards accepting foreign workers, particularly the less-skilled, has continued to be implemented even as the country experienced serious labor shortage in the economic booms in the 1970s to 2000s and amidst pressures from the business sector and sending countries to open its labor market to foreigners. While the Japanese government heavily guards its “front doors” to prevent the entrance of foreigners as “laborers” (with working visa), it has allowed many of them through the “side doors” (such as the Japanese descendants Nikkeijin, the technical intern trainees Jisshusei and candidate-nurses and candidate-careworkers under the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), and at one time, through the “back door” (the undocumented foreign workers). In this presentation, I will focus on the “sidedoor” entrants and argue that because of the long standing policy of the government to restrict entrance of foreign workers, their employment and welfare have been heavily compromised and their existence as workers ambivalent. In the face of the rapid ageing of its society and heightening international competitiveness, decisions on whether and how it will allow entrance of foreign workers from the front doors become more relevant and crucial.

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Historical Perspective: the Case of Tartar Immigrants in Japan Selçuk ESENBEL, Bo aziçi University [No Abstract]

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Zainichi Koreans and their Transnational Ties with Japan and Korea1

Soo im Lee Professor, Faculty of Business Administration

Ryukoku University

INTRODUCTION Numbering a little fewer than 600,000 in total, multiple generations of Koreans live in Japan today under diverse legal and residential categories. The majority of these residents, commonly termed zainichi (meaning “living in Japan”) Koreans, are the descendants of colonial-era migrants from the southern regions of the Korean peninsula who came to Japan during the first half of the twentieth century.

Despite the community’s high degree of social and cultural assimilation into Japanese society, they are legally marginalized as foreign residents. In this respect, Japan is currently considered to be the only advanced nation with a fourth-generation immigrant problem. It is important to note, however, that Koreans were once Japanese nationals under colonial rule, and it was in 1952 that they were deprived of their Japanese citizenship without choice (Tanaka 1995). This legal exclusion of former colonial subjects may not have been a concern for Korean migrants who repatriated back to the Korean peninsula after World War II, but it had a significant impact on the lives of the Koreans who remained in Japan. In addition, this legal exclusion has subsequently affected the lives of new foreigners in Japan, beginning after the 1980s.

It is not always obvious who is a zainichi Korean. They are indistinguishable from the Japanese in terms of appearance, cultural literacy, use of Japanese names, and fluency in the Japanese language. (Indeed, most cannot speak Korean fluently.) This allows “passing” as a way of life, making the zainichi Koreans members of an invisible postcolonial community.

This paper primarily focuses on zainichi Koreans’ identity, ethnicity, and citizenship in relation to transnational ties to their homelands (North and South Korea) and ties to Japan as a host nation. More specifically, this study aims to illuminate the cultural discourse of “homeland” and “host” among ethnic Koreans in Japan, as well as their changing

1 This paper was an early version of a manuscript, “Diversity of Zainichi Koreans and Their Ties to Japan and Korea.” Working Paper Series: Studies on Multicultural Societies No.8, 1-17. Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University.

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circumstances and shifting identities across generations. MIGRANT WORKERS, FORCED LABOURERS, AND FOREIGN RESIDENTS’ STATUS In this section, the legal status of Koreans living in Japan from 1910 to the present day is explained from a chronological perspective. During the 1910s, land and rice confiscation from Korean farmers under Japanese colonial rule led to a rural exodus of Korean farmers to seek work overseas (S 1987). Increasing numbers of displaced farmers in the southern regions who had lost ownership of their land immigrated to Japan. By 1920, approximately 30,000 Koreans had migrated to Japan (Kawa 1997, 22).

After the rice riots of 1918 in Japan, the Japanese government reorganized the farm villages of the colonies in order to stabilize the rice supply. This led to a continued increase in the migration of Korean farmers to Japan, with numbers climbing from 300,000 to 400,000 by the year 1930 (Kawa 1997, 22). Since the legal status of Koreans was “Japanese” under the colonial nationality clause, migration from the periphery of the Japanese empire to the imperial metropolis was considered to be domestic migration, even though it was necessary to apply for a permit to move to Japan (Kawa 1997, 24). Since Korea had become a logistical base for Japan’s invasion of mainland China, the destruction of farm villages proceeded and farmers suffered in succession from starvation. Koreans were displaced in the Japanese industrial market as low-paid unskilled labourers (S 1987; Lee 2005).

Since many Japanese were conscripted after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the war industry faced a labour shortage. Under the “civilian deployment plan/Korean conscription order,” Koreans were forcibly recruited as low-paid workers under the most severe working conditions, mainly in construction, coal mining, and metal manufacturing (Lee 2009).

Under the occupation of the Allied Forces (primarily the United States), Koreans were placed in an obscure position. General Douglas Macarthur received instructions from the U.S. government to designate Koreans as “liberated nationals” or “enemy nationals.” The Alien Registration Law (promulgated on May 2nd, 1947; Edict No. 207) was issued, and Clause 11 ruled that “Koreans designated by the Ministry of Justice, as well as Taiwanese, are to be considered foreigners for the time being” (Tanaka 1995). As a result, former colonized subjects with limited Japanese citizenship were registered as foreigners and were obliged to carry an alien registration document at all times, on which it was recorded that their nationality was “Korean.” However, this did not signify their official nationality, due to the precarious situation of their homeland. STRUGGLE BETWEEN THE TWO KOREAS When separate governments were established in the northern and southern regions of Korea, some Koreans began to change the country name in their registered documents from “Korea”

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to “South Korea” (Minami Ch sen or Nansen). Just before the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty came into effect and Japan recovered its autonomy, Koreans living in Japan were deprived of their Japanese citizenship without any sort of notice.

After Japan-South Korea political relations were reconciled in 1965, Koreans were given the legal right to live in Japan as permanent residents. However, since the reconciliation was conducted with only one of the Koreas, those who chose South Korea became South Korean nationals, while those who supported the North did not obtain the right to permanent residency and became stateless. In 1959, a major repatriation project was started when Kim Il Sung promised “a dream life after their return to the homeland” to celebrate the tenth anniversary of North Korea’s founding. A repatriation campaign by the Chongryuon or Chosen S ren succeeded in repatriating 89,011 Koreans by 1967, with 95.3 % of the repatriates returning to North Korea during this time (Kim 2004).

According to the Japan-South Korea Foreign Exchange Memorandum of 1991, the right to permanent residency was recognized for descendants of all former colonial subjects living in Japan (Tanaka 1995). The right to permanent residency for both groups, those of South Korean nationality and pro-North Koreans, was assured as special permanent residents. STRUGGLE BETWEEN ASSIMILATION AND SEPARATION After Japan’s defeat in World War II, about 2.4 million Koreans were given the choice of returning to Korea or remaining in Japan. Out of this 2.4 million, approximately 650,000 remained in Japan. There are no exact records of demographic differences between those who left and those who stayed, but it is safe to assume that majority of those who remained were living in Japan for many years, had basically settled within society (with Japanese-born, Japanese-speaking children), and enjoyed a relatively privileged status compared to the newer immigrants, especially those who came under forced migration after 1940 (Lee and Tanaka 2007). Nevertheless, their hope of eventual return was further shattered as their homeland was partitioned between the Soviet-occupied north and the U.S.-occupied south, and as the subsequent Korean War (1950-3) consolidated the division.

Korean youths usually become conscious of their ethnic roots in a fully assimilated environment during the first phase of their identity formation. The experience of being discriminated against in their childhood awakens them and forces them to face the reality associated with being different from others. In contrast with first-generation Koreans, who have stronger ties to the homeland, most second-generation Koreans are born and raised in Japan, educated in Japanese schools, and unfamiliar with Korea or Korean culture. However, most experience direct or indirect discrimination and prejudice at some point in their lives.

Chung (2007, 128) explains that zainichi identities are affected by six factors, following Suh’s interpretation (Suh 1997, 23). These six attributes are: 1) division of the Korean peninsula; 2) separation of Koreans in Japan from the homeland; 3) forced assimilation and exclusion by Japanese society; 4) economic situations in the homeland and

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Japan; 5) the state of democratization in the homeland; and 6) individual social-psychological factors. It is not appropriate to generalize about collective zainichi identity, because differences exist among zainichi depending on how individuals interact with Japanese society. CONCLUSION Although duties to pay taxes are imposed on zainichi Koreans, they are not granted the right to participate in civil society or to vote in the most important elections. Even though 25% of the residents of Ikuno Ward in Osaka are of Korean origin, they have no political voice. Affected by the EU as a supranational idea, the argument in Japanese society that foreigners should be granted local suffrage has only recently begun. There are gradual efforts seen in local governments to recognizing residential voting rights for those holding foreign nationality.

In contrast to Japan, the Roh Moo-Hyun administration passed the Bill for Local Suffrage of Foreign Permanent Residents in 2005. Even while Japanese politicians were giving an indifferent glare to Korea’s sudden change in treatment of foreign residents, the argument remained that instead of giving local suffrage to foreigners, naturalization standards should be relaxed and zainichi Koreans should be encouraged to become naturalized. In January 2008, a project team related to the LDP Committee on the Issue of Nationality Law projects (chairman: Kawano Taro) held a 24-day meeting with the agenda of submitting special legislation on a policy for easing the procedures of naturalization for Koreans holding special permanent residency. However, even today Japan fails to show a clear direction in immigration policy, and worse, it is expected that the long-lasting stagnant economy and the aftermath of the 2011 earthquake will cause deterioration of the status of foreign residents.

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Sasaki, T. 2003. Nihonjin ni narukoto: nihon kokusekisha no shiten kara [Becoming Japanese: From the views of the newly naturalized citizens]. Unpublished PhD thesis. Tsukuba University.

S , Y. 1987. Kankoku ch senjin no genjy to sh rai [The present and future of Koreans and ch senjin]. Tokyo: Shakai Hyoronsha.

Suh, K. S. 1997. ‘Esunikku mainoriti’ ka ‘neishon’ ka: Zainichi Ch senjin no susumu michi [‘Ethnic minority’ or ‘nation’? The path of Korean residents in Japan]. Rekishigaku kenkyû [Journal of Historical Studies]. 703: 20-30.

Tanaka, H. 1995. Zainichi gaikokujin. Shinpan: H no kabe kokoro no kabe [Foreign residents in Japan: racism penetrating into legislation, the first edition]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

Tanaka, H. 2006. Emerging Political and Legal Challenges of Ethnic Schools in Japan. In Japan’s Diversity Dilemmas: Ethnicity, Citizenship, and Education, eds. S. Lee, S. Murphy-Shigematsu and H. Befu, 150-167. New York: iUniverse.

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Ryang, S. 1997. North Koreans in Japan: Language, ideology, and identity. Boulder: Westview.

Willis, D. B. and S. Lee. 2007. Korean Minority Entrepreneurs in Japan. In Handbook of Research on Ethnic Minority Entrepreneurs: A Co-evolutionary View on Resource Management, ed. Léo-Paul Dana, 653-668. London: Edward Elgar.

Yan, S. 2001. Chi to Hone, 1 and 2 [Blood and Bones, Part 1 and 2]. Tokyo: Gentosha. Yun, K. 1992. Zainichi wo ikiru towa [Living as a Korean in Japan]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

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Lost in Transition:

Current Issues in Japan’s Labor Migration

Ma. Reinaruth D. Carlos Associate Professor, Faculty of Intercultural Communication

Ryukoku University 1. Introduction Prime Minister Noda in his speech during the APEC Summit in November, 2011 said that Japan is a kadai senshinkoku (a frontrunner in terms of issues confronting developed countries), with reference, for example, to the recent nuclear meltdown incident and labor productivity and social welfare issues due to the ageing of its population.1 This is also true in the case of labor migration in which coping with the increasing international movement of workers as well as looking at it as a viable option to its domestic labor problems, are also critical issues that Japan has to deal with today.

This presentation attempts to give a general picture of Japan’s migration experience, particularly its transition from being a sending to a receiving country, and then together with Lee’s presentation, will cite specific migration issues that Japan is facing today in the process of transition from sending to receiving country. In Japan’s Immigration Bureau’s 4th Immigration Control Plan2 issued in 2010, Japan has finally openly expressed that “even with these (domestic) measures (to deal with the problems of ageing population), if difficulties or insufficiencies remain, while paying due consideration to the national consensus on issues relating to the daily lives of the people such as the impact on our industries, public safety and the labor market, there is a need to have wide-ranging debate on the future ideal image of Japan” (Ministry of Justice 2010, 28). This hints at the government’s active participation in discussions on whether and how to accept foreign workers to be “advantageous to the society and the economy.” Japan has begun to introduce programs aimed at correcting problems regarding foreign workers but still, so much needs to be done. Through this presentation, we hope to share Japan’s migration experiences and learn 1 Okinawa Times Internet Edition (November 14, 2011) (in Japanese) http://www.okinawatimes.co.jp/article/2011-11-14_26022/, last accessed February 20, 2012. 2 Japan Ministry of Justice (March 2010) “Basic Plan for Immigration Control 4th edition March 2010 <provisional translation>” http://www.immi-moj.go.jp/seisaku/keikaku_101006_english.pdf, last accessed March 20, 2012.

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from Turkey’s migration experiences and from there identify common issues and possible areas for research collaboration.

This presentation focuses on the issues concerning three kinds of “newcomer” labor migrants in Japan today: a. descendants of Japanese overseas (Nikkeijin), b. Technical Trainees (Jisshusei) and c. candidate nurses and careworkers under economic partnership agreements (EPAs). I argue that while Japan continues to deny entry to foreign workers through the front door, it welcomes their passage from the side and back doors. Although these paths could be a convenient way to alleviate labor shortage today, the foreign workers’ status has become ambivalent, thus their welfare is compromised in many cases.

2. Migration in Japan (1900 - present) The country’s modern migration history began when it reopened its doors to the world during the Meiji Restoration period in 1868. Foreigners came to Japan as traders and technical experts (oyatoi gaikokujin). In the same period, the government considered sending its people overseas not only to study and learn from foreign cultures, but also as a way to alleviate poverty in the country. The first batch of such a group of Japanese emigrant workers went to Hawaii in 1868. While at first, the deployment of these workers was carried out based on agreements between Japan and the receiving countries, the private sector had begun to play a more vital role in recruitment and replacement from 1884. Many of those deployed as temporary workers (dekasegi) chose to settle in North and South American countries, and a few in the Philippines.

Also, at the beginning of the 20th century, Japan sent its people to its former colonies (Korean Peninsula and Taiwan) and to Southeast Asian countries (Philippines and Malay Peninsula). As a result, there was a considerable departure of Japanese nationals before the break-out of WWII (see Table 1). On the other hand, the number of foreign settlers (excluding those who came from the colonies, then considered internal migrants- refer to Lee’s presentation in this volume) remained at a very low level (see Figure 1).

Table 1. Number of Emigrants from Japan (flow data) (1899-1941)

1899-1911 203,742

1912-1925 217,643

1926-1941 234,546

1952-1993 73,035

Source: Compiled from Japan International Cooperation Agency (1994) Kaigai Ijuu Toukei 1952-1993 ( 1994 27 - 5 )

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Figure 1. Number of Foreign Immigrants in Japan (stock data, 1880-1938)

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications Statistics Bureau eds. (1985) Kokuzei

chousa shutaisei Jinkou Toukei Souran

(in Japanese 1985 ) p.51.

After Japan lost in WWII, it embarked on a massive national reconstruction program under the guidance of the US General Headquarters (GHQ). The country adopted the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act in 1951 and the Alien Registration Act (1952) that stipulated conditions for the acceptance and stay of foreigners in the country and the most prominent provision was that which stripped off Japanese nationality from Korean settlers. For this reason, the number of foreigners in 1947 jumped to more than 600,000 with 95% of them comprised by Koreans, popularly called the “oldcomers.” In later years, foreigners from other countries, particularly as dependents of Japanese nationals (international marriage), students, trainees, entertainers and skilled workers came from many Asian countries, making up the so-called “newcomers” group. There are also the undocumented foreigners whose number dramatically dropped to a few thousand in recent years as a result of this country’s massive campaign for their deportation in the past ten years. The number of registered aliens reached more than two million in 2010 (roughly about 1.8% of the total population) from almost all parts of the world. In terms of countries of origin, China overtook Korea as the leading country of origin in 2008, while the 3rd and 4th placers are currently Brazil and the Philippines (see Figure 2).

One significant feature of Japan’s rapid economic growth from the 1950s to 1960s was that it was achieved with very minimal contribution from foreign workers. The government mobilized young (high school) and seasonal workers from the countryside, as well as war returnees to provide the much-needed workforce. Even when labor shortage begun to be felt and insinuations by the business sector to employ foreign workers emerged in the late 1960s, the government refused to implement any foreign workers’ program and instead declared in its First Basic Employment Plan in 1967 that “Japan will not accept foreign workers for the

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time being, and prioritize the employment of local people.” This basic stand, especially towards unskilled foreign workers, continues to the present despite several instances of labor shortage (i.e. during the two Oil Shocks in the 1970s and the Bubble period in the 1980s) and impending demand brought about by the ageing of its population. As a result, the number of foreigners entering and staying in the country with the status of “residence for the purpose of work” (Engineer, Specialist in Humanities/ International Services, Intra-company Transferees, Instructors, Skilled Laborers, and Entertainers) has been constantly kept at relatively low levels, their number even fewer than those with status as “college students.” We can also see from Figure 3, which shows the stock of registered foreign nationals in Japan in 2006-2010 based on their status of residence, that 64.4% of the total foreign nationals hold the status of “residence without any restrictions in activities,” such as the permanent and special permanent residents, the dependents of Japanese nationals and permanent residents and the long-term residents.

The same story emerges when we look at the number of foreign workers in Japan based on notification from employers in Figure 4. Of the total number of foreign workers reported by their employers as of October, 2011, only 17.6% have the status of “residence for the purpose of work,” while those with no restrictions on activities comprise almost half, and about 35% are students and technical interns combined.

Figure 2. Number of Registered Foreigners in Japan per Country of Origin (1947-2010)

Source: Compiled from Japan Ministry of Justice “Statistical Data on Registered Foreigners” 2006-2010.

(In Japanese: 2006 -2010 )

http://www.moj.go.jp/housei/toukei/toukei_ichiran_touroku.html (last accessed Feb. 2, 2012).

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Figure 3. Number of Registered Foreigners in Japan per Status of Residence (2006-2010)

Source: Ibid.

Figure 4. Number of Foreign Workers (as of October, 2011, based on employers’ report)

Source: Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (Jan. 27, 2012) Report on the Situation of Foreigners’ Employment Notification (in Japanese: 2012 27 23

10 http://www.mhlw.go.jp/stf/houdou/2r98520000020ns6.html (last accessed: January 30, 2012).

Despite the government’s position of not accepting foreigners as “workers” for a long

time, it cannot be denied that foreigners, particularly those whose status of residence is NOT for the purpose of work, make up a stable pool of workers in the country, and play an important role in terms of alleviating labor shortage and providing cheap labor for many industries in the country. Indeed, Japan up to now has somehow managed to employ foreigners without resorting to opening its “front doors” to foreign labor, and without actively

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implementing foreign workers’ programs like the gastarbeiter system in Germany or the “Live-In Caregiver Program” in Canada. Under Japanese current immigration laws, while having provisions for the granting of working visas to highly-skilled workers and professionals, the qualifications (for example, obtaining a Japanese license) are so rigid and the criteria are ambiguous and outdated so that even foreign students graduating from Japanese universities find it difficult to convert their status from student to workers.

Instead, Japan has resorted to allowing foreign workers through the “side doors” (and for a time in the 1970s-80s, through the backdoors as illegal workers) as trainees, descendants, “candidate” professionals and students. While such strategy worked quite well in alleviating labor shortage in the country, it resulted in the ambivalent status (as workers but not “workers”). In the rest of this paper, I would like to introduce the issues regarding three kinds of ambivalent workers, the foreign nationals of Japanese descent (Nikkeijin), the technical interns (Jisshusei) and the candidate-nurses and candidate careworkers under EPA and how their welfare has been compromised and affected by the country’s lack of clear-cut foreign labor migration policies.

3. Ambivalent Foreign Workers 3.a. Japanese descendants (Nikkeijin) Although many Japanese who left Japan as “dekasegi” planned to come back after some years when they had “saved enough,” a large number settled in their host countries and established families there, the most prominent of which are those who went to Brazil and the United States. There were also Japanese nationals who were repatriated back to Japan at the end of World War II, leaving their families in the host countries like the Philippines. According to the Association of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad, the total number (including first to fourth generations) is estimated at over 2.6 million in 2010, with 1.6 million in Brazil and one million in the US.3

When Japan faced a serious labor shortage during the bubble economy from the late 1980s, it refused to open its front doors to foreign workers. Expressing concerns regarding the hiring of illegal workers, which at that time became quite common especially among small and medium scale companies, and demands from the business sector to allow more foreign workers to come in, the government revised its Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act4 in 1990. Under this Act, the Nikkeijin, especially those living in Latin American countries and the Philippines to come to Japan initially as “long-term residents.”

3 The Association of Nikkei and Japanese Abroad website http://www.jadesas.or.jp/aboutnikkei/index.html, last accessed February 1, 2012. 4

http://www.moj.go.jp/nyuukokukanri/kouhou/nyukan_hourei_ h07-01-01.html, last accessed February 10, 2012. For the latest version of the Law’s English translation, refer to http://www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/law/detail/?id=1934&vm=04&re=01

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After a few years, many of them are able to apply for permanent residency and even Japanese nationality, giving them the opportunity to settle in the country with their families. From a mere 6,872 settlers from Brazil in 1988, it rose to 72,495 in 1990, and at its peak, the number reached 393,842. Since the Japanese law does not allow foreigners to take up unskilled jobs in principle, these Nikkeijin, whose activities in the country are not restricted, conveniently became a stable source of labor in the manufacturing sector because their status of residence did not prohibit them from doing any activities in the country.

The recruitment and employment of Nikkeijin have developed into an organized comprehensive system controlled by the temporary employment agency (hakengaisha) which takes care of all the needs of the Brazilian workers, from pre-migration screening to travel arrangements, from deployment to housing, healthcare, children’s education, language interpretation and renewal of visa and passport. Since all their needs in Japan are met by dealing only with the agency, the Nikkeijin groups in Japan have transformed into an “invisible” community 5 with very limited interaction with the locals. The Japanese government implemented few programs for their economic and social integration and left almost everything under the care of the agencies.

However, at the outbreak of the global economic crisis (popularly called the Lehman Shock in Japan) in late 2008, many of the factories where they worked as contractual workers had to cut down production, and temporary employment agencies had to close down. For the Nikkeijin who were the first in line to be laid-off, losing their job meant “total destruction” as their economic and social base in Japan collapsed.6 They were forced to evacuate apartments provided by the agency and children had to stop schooling. This unfortunate incident, however, was an opportunity to question Japan’s policy (or lack of it) towards the Nikkeijin who suddenly became visible in Japanese society. Japanese local governments began to establish programs that would assist these Nikkeijin, who in principle cannot be forced to leave Japan by virtue of their status of residence. Those with permanent residency could even enjoy benefits given to Japanese nationals – such as unemployment insurance, public assistance and free schooling – adding pressures to the welfare budget of the government.

One program worth mentioning is the “return subsidy” scheme in which Nikkeijin residents only from South America who wanted to return to their home country during the economic crisis were given 300,000 yen for every householder and 200,000 yen for each member of the household as an incentive to return to their home country – provided that they

5 Kajita T., K. Tanno and N. Higuchi. (2005) “Kao no mienai Teijuka – Nikkei Burajirujin to Kokka, Shijo, Imin Nettowaaku” (in Japanese Nagoya University Press: Nagoya. 6 Ishii, A. (2011) Speech delivered at the “A Roadmap to Formulate a Rights-based Comprehensive Immigration Policy ~ In Response to the UN Special Rapporteur’s Recommendations to the Japanese Government” Commemorative Symposium for International Migrants Day, December 17, 2011, Meiji Gakuin University Shirogane Campus, Tokyo. (In Japanese

2012 12 17).

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do not return to Japan under the same status of residence for three years. Concerned about the time they need to spend in the home country before being able to come back to Japan, as well as the economic situation in their home countries, only 21,675 South American Nikkeijin, less than 10% of the total, availed of this program which ended in March, 2011.7

As of September, 2011, there were 215, 135 Brazilian nationals in the country, only about 70% of its number at its peak in 2007 and given that many of them are here to stay, their social and economic integration (especially in terms of children’s education, training for employment, health and language) will remain a big challenge for the Japanese government in many years to come. 3.b. Technical Internship (Jisshusei) Program Accepting foreigners under the “Industrial Training Program” (now called Technical Internship Program following amendments in 2011) from 1992 was another option that Japan adopted to pacify demands from the agricultural and manufacturing sectors to alleviate labor shortage. This program is managed by the Japan International Training Cooperation Organization (JITCO). Under this program, whose purpose is “to transfer skills to technical intern trainees who will form a basis of economic development in their respective countries and play an important role in Japan's international cooperation and contribution,” the foreigner is given the status of “trainee” with both education and work components.8 From 1992 to 2009, a total of 674,289 foreigners were deployed to Japan under this program, of which 70% of them came from China and about 5% each from Indonesia, Vietnam, Thailand and the Philippines.9 Also, 90% were deployed in small to medium scale enterprises in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Until the program was amended in 2011, their stay was limited to three years – one year as “kenshusei” (apprentice) and the last two years as “ginoujisshusei” (interns).

This program has been highly criticized as a way to exploit foreign workers. While the government emphasizes that the purpose of their stay in Japan was that stated above, in reality, they were treated as a much needed unskilled, cheap and stable pool of workers for small- and medium-scale enterprises in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. Many of their tasks are manual “mass-production” type of work that provided minimal transfer of technology. Stories about abuses, such as very low wage only a third of the minimum wage, long overtime and overwork, “timed” toilet breaks, hefty penalties for petty violations in the workplace, unsanitary and overcrowded dormitories, confiscation of passports and money,

7 Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare (2010) “The Result of a Support Program to those unemployed of Japanese descent wishing to return to home country” (In Japanese )http://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/koyou/gaikokujin15/kikoku_shien.html, last accessed Feb. 1, 2012). 8 JITCO Japan International Training Cooperation Organization website http://www.jitco.or.jp/english/overview/itp/index.html, last accessed February 1, 2012. 9 JITCO Japan International Training Cooperation Organization website http://www.jitco.or.jp/english/overview/staticstics1.html, last accessed February 1, 2012.

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excessive amount of recruitment fees to unauthorized local brokers and the guarantor system, abound, prompting the Japanese government to implement reforms in 2011. Many of these problems/issues regarding the trainees/interns originate from the fact that as trainees, especially in their first year, they are not “workers” and thus are not covered by labor laws. While control over them as foreigners is strict, regulations regarding them as “workers” (especially in their first year) were almost absent.

Strong demands from NGOs and associations, notably the Bar Association of Japan and its members, paved the way for the reexamination of the system and in 2011, amendments were introduced, such as re-categorizing their status of residence and applying the provisions of the Japanese labor law even in their first year. To what extent the new system will correct the problems remains to be seen in the next few years. 3.c. Candidate nurses and careworkers under Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) The issue of who will take care of the elderly in the light of the rapid aging of Japanese society has been widely debated in the past ten years, and as in other countries, Japan has been looking at the possibility of employing foreign nurses and careworkers. However, while it is evident that there are current and future shortages of healthcare workers, the government refuses to accept foreigners as health care workers to fill the gaps. Instead it resorted to allowing their entry as candidates within the framework of EPAs with the Philippines and Indonesia, and soon, with Vietnam and other Asian countries. As part of these EPAs, under what conditions/requirements and how many foreign nurses and careworkers would be accepted as candidates were negotiated vis-à-vis how much tariff would be imposed on traded goods and what kinds of special treatment foreign investments would be served in the partner countries.

The current scheme (with Indonesia and the Philippines) allows a limited number of such nurses and careworkers (initial quota is 400 for nurses and 600 for careworkers from each country for the first two years) on a specified visa under which they are allowed to get training and work only in the receiving institution. The candidates should pass the Licensure examination within 3-4 years from arrival to entitle them to continue working in Japan. Failure to pass the licensure exam within this designated period will require them to go back to the home country.

We refer to Table 2 in order to evaluate the performance of this scheme in the first three years. Of the total quota of 2,000, only 1,016 (about 55%) were filled, not because there were few takers, but mainly because of the small number of health and elderly care institutions in Japan willing to take them in.

The failure of the scheme can be attributed to the differences in the views of the different stakeholders that led to the ambivalent and ambiguous position of the candidates. The Japanese government, through the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, issued a

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Circular (Notification No. 509, series of 2008)10 emphasizing that the acceptance is an exceptional measure through formal channels under an EPA. As such, the candidates would be given a working contract, must engage in training to pass the exam while working at the accepting facilities and receive remuneration equivalent or higher than that of Japanese workers. The accepting institutions have a certain responsibility to implement appropriate training aimed at acquiring national licenses. The acceptance of these foreign workers was not intended to alleviate labor shortage in the nursing and care sector.

When the receiving institutions were asked about the purpose of accepting candidates in a survey,11 the top two choices were “to contribute to Japan’s international status” and “to provide stimulus to the Japanese counterpart,” and “to alleviate labor shortage” only ranked third. However, in interviews with the Japanese coworkers, they expected that candidates would (and should) be treated like them in terms of workload and hours of work, since “they receive the same and sometimes even higher salary than us.” Interviews with some administrators of the receiving institutions expressed concern that “the burden (in terms of expenditures and human resources for the education and training of the candidate) borne by the employers is too high compared to their expected returns.”12

The candidates, who expected full support in terms of formal language and skills training would be given to them in order to pass the licensure examination, were disappointed when they were asked to work eight hours, and do self-study for the examination. The treatment towards candidates varied among the receiving institutions. Some employers allotted part of the eight-hour work time to study and even provided a language tutor, while most employers thought that study should be done after work. These instances of ambiguities and ambivalence in the treatment of the candidates became burdensome not only to the institution but also to the candidates themselves. As a result, some have already returned to their home country without completing the initial 3-4 years stipulated in the EPA (see Table 2).

We have seen from above that these three programs are in accordance with the basic policy of not accepting foreign workers through the front doors. These foreign workers were accepted as blood relatives, or trainees. In reality, however, they were treated as “guestworkers,” with the Japanese hoping that they will return to their homeland when the contracts expire or when they lose their jobs in this country.

10For details, refer to Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare website (in Japanese)

(Acceptance of Nurse and Careworkers under Economic Partnership Agreement) http://www.mhlw.go.jp/bunya/koyou/other22/index.html, last accessed February 5, 2012. 11 Goto, Y., H. Nakai and M.R.D. Carlos (2011) (in Japanese) EPA

(Report on the Survey Regarding the Acceptance of Nurses and Careworkers (First Batch) under EPA). Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) Research Grant C No. 21500722. 12 Interview with Ms. Yukako Ueno, Elderly Care Institution Administrator, Maizuru City, Kyoto, November 26, 2011.

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In the light of these observations on the issues concerning the ambivalence of the three categories of foreign workers in Japan, I would like to particularly raise the issue of the retention of foreign workers, for in my opinion, unless Japan recognizes its need to accept foreign workers in the light of this country’s ageing population and international competitiveness, and includes this in its general immigration policy, this country may not be able to keep the foreigners who are “advantageous to the society and the economy” – the foreigners that it badly needs especially in critical areas such as the elderly care, nursing and IT sectors. To initiate such moves, there are two areas that it needs to look into: (1) to make a thorough examination of the current system with references to the experiences of other countries in transition from sending to receiving (like Turkey), and (2) to create a national consensus and political will which are indispensable in making the necessary reforms in the current Japanese policy on international migration.

Table 2. Foreign Candidate Nurses and Candidate Careworkers under EPA with the Philippines and Indonesia (2008-2010)

Sources: Compiled from data from Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare and Ministry of Foreign Affairs

websites (last accessed February 15, 2012).

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Opening Session Comments and Questions

Aysun UYAR: I would like to underline some keywords just mentioned during the presentations. Some of these keywords are “religion,” “ethnicity,” “imperialism,” “being targeted – the reasons for national strategies and policies,” and “trade,” which Professor Carlos was focusing on. These all lead to the issue of “governance of migration” and this shall be our main topic for the first and second sessions.

This brings the introductory session to an end. We have a busy agenda for the day so if you have a burning question we can spend a little time on it. If not, I would like to proceed to session one.

Habibul H. KHONDKER: I have one important question that I wanted to comment on: an issue that exists in common and which I believe we need to discuss. My comment is regarding Professor Kiri ci’s presentation. I found what the professor said about the Budapest Process to be really interesting. At the moment we have many different procedures and individual global systems that operate very much like golf tournaments. One golf tournament happens in Abu Dhabi, one in California, another in North Carolina, and none of them are coordinated. The direction which should be taken is to follow the FIFA model for soccer around the world. As the professor was talking about the Budapest Process, I was thinking about the Abu Dhabi Process, the Colombo Process, and the Commonwealth Process. Each country is locked into this migration network of a limited number of countries and these groupings are not talking to each other. We should therefore switch from the golf model and adopt the soccer model, which will allow better coordination and interconnection. Thank you very much for your absolutely interesting talk.

Aysun UYAR: Thank you very much for your comment, Professor Khondker. Unfortunately we do not have the time to open up to the floor for further discussion, so if there are any more questions, perhaps we can address them in the next session’s question and answer time. Let us now move on to session one. I would like to welcome our chair, Professor Esenbel.

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SSE

SS

ION

Ⅰ

SESSION ISESSION I

“Governance of Migration in Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region I”

Abstracts of Presentations

Trends and Issues in the Governance of “Citizenship” in Turkey Zeynep KAD RBEYO LU, Bo aziçi University International migration and globalization are factors which affect citizenship practices throughout the world. Increasing tolerance of multiple citizenship is, amongst other things, one of the results of these trends. My presentation analyzes the Citizenship Law in Turkey and argues that the most important changes in the law were made to accommodate the needs and wishes of the emigrants who – even up to the third generation – maintain vibrant ties with their home countries. The presentation will provide a historical overview of citizenship laws in Turkey and outline the amendments to the previous law (Law No. 403 1964) that regulated the acquisition and loss of citizenship. Finally I will discuss the changes that were brought about by the new citizenship law (Law No. 5901 2009). The Naturalization System in Modern Japan Akihiro ASAKAWA, Nagoya University This presentation will give an overview of the history of naturalization and citizenship from post-Edo period to the present. The fall of the Edo (Tokugawa) Shogunate in 1868 marked the end of its “closed country” policy that strictly prohibited the permanent residence of foreigners. Under the new Meiji government, policies regarding migration and citizenship were gradually introduced. In 1899, the Japanese parliament passed its first “Nationality Law” and the policy on the naturalization of foreigners was formally established. Since then, naturalization has been one of the most important policies on migration in Japan. This presentation argues that even though law and regulation on naturalization has been almost the same over the past one hundred years, its actual practice and implementation have changed in the context of international migration in modern and contemporary Japan. Who Benefits from Dual Nationality?: Cases from South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan Shincha PARK, Binghamton University While increasing transnational activities of people enabled imagining citizenship beyond territorial borders in recent years, “citizenship” still serves as an important instrument of

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social control with which nation-states justify classification, differentiation, and discrimination of population within and sometime beyond their territories. Yet there are various practices of citizenship and nationality policies among countries, presenting both commonalities and differences. This presentation aims to evaluate citizenship and nationality policies of Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, with focus on accessibility and conditions of nationality (re)acquisition and the attitude towards dual nationality. As these three countries have close relationships through migration, comparative study of these countries will contribute to correctly address the question of migrants disadvantaged in the interstice of citizenship laws in these countries. European Practices of Citizenship and Changing Trends Dilek ÇINAR, Bo aziçi University Long-term immigrants in several member states of the European Union may enjoy to a great extent civil, economic and social rights due to permanent settlement. However, full security of residence, the right to re-admission to territory as well as political participation rights still remain “privileges’’ of national citizenship. Moreover, access to Union citizenship for third country nationals presupposes the acquisition of the nationality of a member state. Thus, acquisition of nationality matters significantly for the legal incorporation of immigrants in the EU. This presentation will discuss the findings of two major research projects (NATAC and EUCITAC) carried out over the last years with the aim of comparing and identifying trends in national citizenship policies of selected EU member states. The results clearly show that over the last decades EU citizens living in another member state have clearly lost interest in ‘changing flags,’ while immigrants from outside the EU have developed a strong interest in becoming citizens of their ‘host countries.’

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The Naturalization System in Modern Japan

Akihiro Asakawa Assistant Professor, Graduate School of International Development

Nagoya University 1. INTRODUCTION As Japan is said to be one of the few countries in the developed world with a non-immigration policy, it is worthwhile to examine the actual history of Japanese migration policies. In this sense, a closer look at the evolution and development of the naturalization policy is important. Naturalization is one of the most significant inclusive measures for migrants because it imparts the same legal status as that held by nationals. This paper briefly explains the evolution of Japan’s naturalization policy and its actual practice in modern Japan in order to elucidate one aspect of the history of Japan’s policy toward migrants.

Most importantly, the first Japanese Nationality Law was established in 1899, when unequal treaties with Western countries were normalized and the geographically unlimited residence of foreigners was permitted. Under this law, the naturalization system was first legislated, giving the Minister for Home Affairs the right to grant naturalization to foreigners. Until the end of World War II, around 300 foreigners were naturalized in Japan. In addition, some foreigners were naturalized through special consideration even before the establishment of the Nationality Law and the naturalization system. This paper explains developments in Japanese naturalization policy both before and after the enactment of the Nationality Law. 2. NATURALIZATION BY SPECIAL CONSIDERATION The Meiji Japanese government allowed some foreigners to be naturalized to Japan even before the official start of the naturalization system in 1899. These cases were very closely related to the government’s major national policies concerning the modernization of the country.

One case of naturalization involved foreigners who lived on the Ogasawara Islands. The Japanese government had occupied the Ogasawara Islands, located about 1000 kilometers from Tokyo. These islands are located in a major whale hunting area and there were no other major countries that occupied them in any real sense. Therefore, it was very important for the Japanese government to have an actual presence on these islands in order to

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legitimize their occupation. One way to achieve this was to populate the islands. An 1877 census of the population of the Ogasawara Islands found 71 residents, all foreigners except for two Japanese citizens. The fact that the majority of residents were foreigners did not provide a convincing basis for Japanese occupation. Therefore, the government decided to naturalize all foreigners and convert them into Japanese nationals. Following this, the government granted them money and agricultural equipment to help achieve more beneficial conditions for settlement. However, they were prohibited from traveling to mainland Japan until 1897. This measure clearly shows the intention of the government, which was to naturalize them and populate the islands with Japanese.

The second case is naturalization concerned Chinese famers in Hokkaido, the northern island of Japan. The development of under-populated Hokkaido was an important government priority, because the increase of agricultural products from turning vast tracts of native land into farms would contribute to an increase in the Japanese population. For this purpose, numerous Westerners with significant skills were employed by the government at high salaries. At the same time, the government initiated a trial scheme to import ten young Chinese men for farming, in order to encourage Japanese people to migrate to Hokkaido. Probably, they wished to show the Japanese people that even Chinese foreign migrants would be able to succeed in Hokkaido.

However, mainly because of a lack of agricultural skills, this scheme was unsuccessful. Only five out of ten people remained until the end of the contract. Two of these five wished to permanently settle in Hokkaido, and the government permitted them to be naturalized and to live there. These two were given initial grants to establish businesses. At least one of the two, Kyo-Shitai ( ), had become successful in farming and employed numerous workers. In addition, he invited students from China’s Santou Province to receive agricultural training.

The third case involves the naturalization of Chinese people who cooperated with the Japanese army in the First Sino-Japanese War. After the end of the war, the Chinese collaborators were living in fear of persecution by the Chinese authorities. The Japanese government decided to naturalize them and permit them to migrate to mainland Japan and live there permanently. As the war had been the first war conducted by the modern Japanese government, it was logical for the government to save those who had contributed to the victory. Some of them were given grants to settle in Japan.

One of those who migrated to Japan was Ryu-Uden ( ), who came from a rich family in China and cooperated in the war. After he arrived in Japan, he learned the Japanese language. Then he was appointed to serve as a professor at the Army Academy in order to teach the Chinese language. When the Russo-Japanese war started, he joined the war effort as an interpreter, and after the end of the War, he returned to his home village. Because of his contributions, the Japanese government gave him the Medal of Honor in 1915.

In these cases, naturalization was permitted because it was somehow related with major government policies, even when no law naturalization existed. At the same time, several

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Westerners who stayed in Japan applied for naturalization to the government, but these applications were denied due to a lack of a law on naturalization. Because naturalization was not legislated in this period, only cases that had very strong relationships with national policies were permitted. In this sense, Japanese citizenship was defined as a very modern concept in relation with the then-modern Meiji government. 3. NATURALIZATION CASES AFTER 1899 As mentioned above, the Nationality Law, which includes a section on naturalization, was established in 1899. The first case of naturalization based on the Law came in 1900. Until the end of World War II, there were 309 cases of naturalization. The original nationality of those who naturalized during this period was as follows: China (168), Britain (41), stateless (27), Germany (19), and United States (18), among others. It is important to note that about half of those who were naturalized were Chinese. In this early period of the twentieth century, major migrant-accepting countries such as the United States and Australia prohibited the immigration of colored races. As part of such measures, in the United States, colored races were defined as “Aliens Ineligible to Citizenship” and categorically excluded from naturalization. Australia’s “White Australia Policy” is very famous, and colored races were also prohibited from being naturalized there as well. Therefore, it should be stressed that in comparison with the Western nations, Japan did not adopt a policy based on race.

Chinese naturalization is mainly concentrated in the early twentieth century. Of 168 cases, 75 cases occurred from 1900 to 1909. Most of the cases during this period involved the naturalization persons staying in Kobe and Yokohama. Both cities have major ports and played important functions in international trade and the movement of people. Chinese in these cities were engaged in trade-related business, and some of them succeeded in amassing substantial fortunes. Many of the naturalized were also community leaders in both cities and contributed large sums of money to the Japanese government for the Russo-Japanese War. The war continued from 1904 to 1905, coinciding with growing Chinese naturalization. It is possible that these Chinese decided to become naturalized to Japan because of its victory in the Russo-Japanese War, which showed the power of Japan to the whole world.

Many Westerners who naturalized had migrated to Japan as missionaries. These people had been ordered to come to Japan to spread Christianity and had the intention of living in Japan permanently from the beginning. Therefore, naturalization was their natural course of action. Many of them were involved in social enterprises such as kindergartens, orphanages, or medical services for the poor. At the start of World War II, Americans and British people were forced to choose to leave Japan or to be naturalized, as they had become nationals of hostile country. Some missionaries decided to stay in Japan through naturalization. For example, Margaret Armstrong, who came to Japan from Canada in 1903, moved to Toyama and established a kindergarten there in 1911. Named the Armstrong Aoba Kindergarten, it still exists. Armstrong naturalized in 1941 and died in 1960.

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Other cases concern various forms of migration from overseas. Some had married Japanese spouses and decided to live in Japan permanently and become naturalized. There were 27 stateless people naturalized, and some of them are thought to have been Russians. There was a sharp increase of Russians staying in Japan after the Russian Revolution, and it is believed that a certain number of these were people who had escaped from the Russian Revolution. One example was a 61 year-old Russian man who married a Japanese woman and was naturalized in Hakodate. It is confirmed that he migrated from Russia after the revolution, as he had been a member of a noble family in the former regime.

Those cases show that naturalization is very much related to international relations between Japan and other countries. For example, the victory of Russo-Japanese War encouraged prominent business people in Japan to be naturalized. The war between Japan and Western countries also directly affected foreigners who stayed in Japan, and some of them chose to be naturalized. The Russian Revolution also has an impact on foreigners in Japan and naturalization. In addition, as mentioned above, Japanese nationality law did not categorically prohibit naturalization based on race or nationality. In this sense, pre-World-War II Japanese citizenship and naturalization is a quite modern concept strongly tied to the Japanese state and its relationship other countries. 4. CONCLUSION It is said that Japan has very exclusive migration policies. However, a closer look at Japanese pre-World-War-II naturalization policy and practice shows that this is not exactly the case. Even though small in number, migrants from various backgrounds were permitted to naturalize based on their contribution to the Japanese nation-state. The fact that some cases of naturalization existed even before the establishment of the Nationality Law based on a strong connection with Japanese government policy also shows the nature of Japanese citizenship at this time. The inclusion of those who did not have a Japanese ethnic background as the members of Japanese nation-state represented a very modern concept. Before the establishment of Meiji government, Japan had a “closed country policy” that severely prohibited foreigners from staying in Japan and Japanese people from going overseas. After the collapse of this policy, the naturalization of foreigners began, and this process was very modern in nature and related to the development of the Japanese nation-state. This fact requires us to take a much closer look at and consider the nature of the supposed “exclusiveness” of Japan.

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Who Benefits from Dual Nationality?:

Cases from South Korea, the Philippines, and Japan

Shincha Park Ph.D Student, Department of Sociology

Binghamton University

While increasing transnational activities of people enabled imagining citizenship beyond territorial borders in recent years, “citizenship” still undeniably serves as an instrument of social control with which nation-states justify classification, differentiation, and discrimination of population within their territories. Citizenship has been a crucial institution for the modern nation-state since its germinal stage such as in the post-revolution French Republic. Yet practices of citizenship and nationality policies vary widely among countries, presenting both commonalities and differences. While there are many questions surrounding citizenship and nationality, the question of dual nationality seems to be increasingly important around the world. This paper thus aims to compare and evaluate citizenship and nationality policies of three Asian countries – Japan, South Korea and the Philippines – with specific a focus on dual nationality policy. As these three countries have had close relationships through trans-border migration, comparative study of these countries can contribute to correctly understand the meaning and consequences of dual nationality policy as well as to see whether it will bring about a further opportunity for trans-border migrants or if it will rather limit agency of migrants by securing the position of states as the sole and legitimate bodies to grant rights and protection.1 Costs and Benefits of Dual Nationality International legal norms have long acknowledged singular allegiance between individual and a polity as the principle of modern nation-state allowing each individual to have only one ‘nationality’ (1930 Hague Convention on Nationality). Already in the nineteenth century, for

1 Bloemraad noted; “Dual citizenship inhabits a curious place. On the one hand, it undermines traditional citizenship by allowing, and even promoting, mutual belonging, claims-making, rights and responsibilities. … On the other hand, dual nationality reinforces the centrality of nation-states because they continue to be the bodies that grant citizenship.” Irene Bloemraad. 2004. “Who Claims Dual Citizenship? The Limits of Postnationalism, the Possibilities of Transnationalism, and the Persistence of Traditional Citizenship,” International Migration Review, Vol.38 No.2 (Summer 2004), p.393.

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instance, acquisition of nationality was a matter of interstate cooperation for the United States and European countries to resolve the question of competing military conscription claims.2 A state authority under such a principle reserved political, economic, social and civil rights for its citizens, and only those who have these rights are treated as moral equals and enjoy full securement of their interests and identities. Although many of these rights have also been granted to resident foreigners recently, there still is a clear boundary between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of core political rights such as voting rights and civil servant positions. However, policy makers today see dual nationality as a possibility to solve many social problems and to promote economic development rather than as a problem for sovereignty and social integration. As a consequence, the number of states admitting dual nationality is increasing these days and more and more individuals hold two or more nationalities, which is posing a question to the traditional norm of singular allegiance. This shift may be a result of several changes in the international social environment such as the end of the Cold War that made claims of military conscription less urgent for states, the development of gender equality under citizenship laws, and advancement of human rights norms. The benefits of dual nationality for states in general are an increase in naturalization rates, advancement of transnational participation, and enhancement of self-esteem and self-respect of immigrants. Its advantages for individuals include employment opportunities, passport and travel convenience, entitlement to social programs, such as education, health care, and pensions, and property ownership and unrestricted residency. Recognition of dual nationality may also help immigrants be recognized as equal members of society and protect them from discrimination because, even though there may be many other instances of discrimination, the existence of the boundary between citizens and outsiders may become a source of disrespect and discrimination. On the other hand, problems of dual nationality for states may be the possibility of dual voting, low level of integration and lack of loyalty among foreign residents, and confusion regarding protection responsibility abroad. For individuals, problems may include extra taxation, military obligation, and possibility of limited assistance abroad due to multiple affiliations. As such, not only the legal structure of the host society but also that of the sending country affects the practice of dual nationality. Devaluation of national citizenship is also an important issue for the state authority. If core political rights are granted only to citizens, acceptance of dual nationality seems to the eyes of native citizens with one nationality to be a betrayal by the state because dual nationals are not only granted the same rights as native citizens but they in actuality enjoy more advantages by belonging to multiple polities. Citizens, therefore, may become cautious of their privileged position over non-citizens that might be reversed by turning non-citizens to dual nationals.

2 Thomas Faist and Jürgen Gerdes. 2008. “Dual Nationality in an Age of Mobility,” Migration Policy Institute.

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South Korea: The New Nationality Law and Acceptance of Dual Nationality The revision of the Nationality Law of South Korea in May 2010 (effective since 1 January 2011) opened up a way to dual nationality. Although the issue of dual nationality had been discussed several times in the past, it was seen negatively as becoming a privilege for the upper-class and foreign-born citizens to avoid military service and there was even an amendment to prohibit those who hold two nationalities as a result of ‘overseas birth’ to give up Korean nationality without completing military service. However, the rapid increase of non-professional migrant workers and international marriages as well as aging population and declining birth rate made the issue the priority agenda. The question of dual nationality in this context came up again for discussion. The new nationality law is characterized with: 1) the relaxation of requirements for naturalization of competent foreigners, 2) relaxation of obligation to give up foreign nationality upon naturalization (limited acceptance of dual nationality), 3) acceptance of dual nationality by acclaiming not to exercise his/her foreign nationality inside the country, and 4) the prohibition of expatriation without completing military service. The new nationality law allows dual nationality upon naturalization to foreigners who performed meritorious deeds for Korea, those who had dual nationality at birth and did not choose nationality by age of 22, those who chose foreign nationality over Korean nationality before the enactment of this law, those who lost Korean nationality but want to recover it (e.g. adopted children, married with foreigners), overseas Koreans who are over 65 years of age and planning to live permanently in the Republic of Korea. But it excludes those who hold two nationalities as a result of ‘overseas birth,’3 foreign spouses of Korean nationals who could not keep the marriage

3 ‘Overseas birth’ means that parents intentionally go to another country such as the U.S. with the purpose of giving birth to make their child a dual national.

Table 1. Trend in Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship in Korea from 2007 to 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Total 34,839 36,098 49,820 42,036 44,089

Naturalization 8,536 11,518 25,044 16,312 16,090

Recovery of nationality

1,783 3,740 1,712 1,011 2,265

Loss of nationality

22,802 20,163 21,136 22,131 21,473

Renunciation 726 276 886 734 1,324

Other 992 401 1,042 1,848 2,937 Source: Korean Ministry of Justice (2011), Yearbook of Statistics on Immigration and Foreign Population

Policies.

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going through unforeseeable reasons (such as death or disappearance of the Korean spouse), Chinese minorities, overseas Koreans under 65 years old, and low-skilled foreign workers.4 The most powerful force behind this policy change is no doubt economic benefits. By allowing dual nationality, the government may expect to attract more talented foreigners to stay in the country, to keep ties with such talented immigrants as well as Koreans moving abroad for career and education in order to contribute to development of the economy, and to bring in to the country assets and pensions of overseas Koreans in their old age. However, at the same time, it attempts to continue marginalization of low-skilled and low-educated foreign labor in society, to maintain national security system, and to prevent Korean citizens in other developed countries like the U.S. and Japan to enjoy (economic) privileges of dual citizenship over native citizens by setting detailed legal limitations on the acquisition of dual citizenship. As such, the dual nationality policy should be understood as a part of South Korea’s global strategy for economic development that also includes a set of policies for overseas Koreans to grant them partial citizenship.5 As this policy of dual citizenship is still new, we may need more time to see its effect on South Korean society and its contributions to the policy goal of strengthening international competitiveness. However, considering the fact that South Korea started its economic development and became a country of immigration later than Japan and many other so-called developed countries, its introduction of dual citizenship policy ahead of many other Asian countries may serve as a useful reference for other Asian countries.

The Philippines: Protection of Migrants and Shift to Dual Nationality Naturalization in the Philippines is relatively open to foreigners as long as they have certain qualifications, and the Philippines also accept dual nationality. Succeeding the Commonwealth Act No.473 of 1939, the Republic Act No.9139 of 2001 provided that persons with specific qualifications may become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization.6 In the Philippines, like in South Korea and Japan, when either father or 4 Hi Korea: e-government for foreigners (http://www.hikorea.go.kr/pt/main_kr.pt), last accessed on 21/02/2012. See also Natsuo Fujiwara. 2010. “Kankoku no kokusekihou kaisei – genteiteki na juukokuseki no younin” [The revision of nationality law in South Korea: limited acceptance of dual nationality], Gaikoku no Rippou, 245 (Sep. 2010). pp. 113-140. 5 This global dispersion of Koreans is often illustrated as “Korean Diaspora,” and overseas Koreans tend to find this expression favourable to represent their historical trajectories and sufferings in new societies. Adopting a discourse of “Korean Diaspora,” the South Korean government has introduced a set of policies since the late 1990s to grant partial citizenship to overseas Korean including legal residency, possession of land, and freedom to work in the country. Such policies aim to build a network of Koreans to pull in labor from China and Russia as well as investment from the U.S. and Japan. The discourse of “Diaspora” here is mobilized politically to disguise the intra-ethnic stratification and to institutionalize discrimination among overseas Koreans to build an economic network for the interest of “homeland.” 6 These qualifications are 1) Age (over 21 years of age), 2) Residence (10 or more years of residence), 3) Good Conduct (good moral character), 4) Financial Stability (real estate worth more than 5000 pesos, or lucrative trade or profession), 5) Language (English, Spanish or any one of the principal language), and 6) Education

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mother of a child is a national of the Philippines, the child is able to acquire a Filipino nationality. However, unlike the other two countries, the recovery of nationality has been easy in the Philippines since there have been many Filipino women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who have lost their Philippine citizenship.7

In 2003, the government enacted the Republic Act No. 9225 which allowed all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country to keep their Philippine citizenship, and natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship, by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, are also able to re-acquire Philippine citizenship upon taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic. It also recognised their children below 18 years of age to be citizens of the Philippines regardless of them being legitimate, illegitimate or adopted.8 There have been a lot of requests since then from naturalized Filipinos overseas to recover their Philippine citizenship.

Such transition of the nationality law in the Philippines may primarily be due to the country’s increasing export of migrants during the last few decades. While the remittance from overseas Filipino workers is one of the largest sources of revenue for the country, it is still dependent on the status of global economy. In such a context, acceptance of dual nationality may have the potential to strengthen the network of Filipinos under the flag of the Philippines through which various flows occur. Japan: Closed Immigration Policy and Non-acceptance of Dual Nationality Low fertility rates and aging population have been important questions for many years in Japan. While it is expected that productive-age population will decrease by 14 million by 2030,9 the Japanese government has been reluctant to take in low-skilled foreign workers.10 Nevertheless, the number of foreign workers in reality is on the increase. Although Japan’s Immigration and Refugee Control Law ostensibly deny reception of low- or unskilled foreign workers, it in fact leaves a way to bring in foreign workers without infringing on the scope of

(minor children of school age in the public or private schools). 7 Presidential Decree No. 725(1975) and Republic Act No. 9225(1995), provided a mechanism to allow Filipino women who married with foreigners and their children to recover their nationality of the Philippines. 8 Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under Republic Act (RA 9225) and Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004. 9 National Institution of Population and Social Security Research, Population Estimates of Japan 2011-2060, http://www.ipss.go.jp/syoushika/tohkei/newest04/gh2401.pdf., last accessed on 2 July 2012. 10 As an example of acceptance of skilled workers, Japan now accepts Indonesian and Filipino nurses and careworkers, based on the Economic Partnership Agreement, who hold a nursing license in their home country to work in Japanese hospitals. However, they are required to pass the national exam to have nursing or careworker licenses in Japan within a certain period of time (three years for nurses, four years for careworkers), or they will lose the work permit. The number of those who passed the exam is low due to the language barrier: Among 108 nurses from Indonesia who arrived as the first group in 2008, only 24 passed the exam at the end of their third year.

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the Law, such as granting “Long-term Resident” status to descendants of Japanese emigrants in Latin America and China.11 Japan’s policies on immigration and citizenship are not as complicated and strict as South Korea, but are restrictive and closed. While the issue of accepting more immigrants has been discussed at length to counter aging population and lowering fertility, the government has been reluctant to opening its ‘front door’ widely and has not made any significant policy changes in relation to this matter.

The Immigration and Refugee Control Law of Japan has been amended several times in the past. One major change was made in 1990 when the government opened a door to descendants of Japanese emigrants allowing them to stay and work in Japan with Long-term Resident status. The amendment of 2009 also made it possible for a child with a Japanese father and a foreign mother to apply for Japanese nationality regardless of the marital status of his/her parents.12 Nevertheless with these policy changes, the Japanese government has been reluctant to accept dual nationality. Japan’s rationale behind this policy is to avoid 1) international frictions as a result of conflicting right of diplomatic protection of individual country, and 2) confusion of identity as a result of registration as different individual in different countries which, for example, results in marriage to different persons in other countries (Ministry of Justice). Therefore, persons who have multiple nationalities by birth need to choose nationality of Japan or that of the other country within a certain time limit (by 22 years of age, or within two years if over 22). However, the Japanese government will automatically recognize that a person with dual nationality has opted for Japanese nationality

11 There is also the Industrial Training and Technical Internship Program System since 1993 which has been quite often criticized for being “slavery” system. See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Jorge Bustamante - Addendum 3 - Mission to Japan (UN A/HRC/17/33/Add.3, 21 March 2011). 12 Before the amendment, acquisition of nationality by a person who was recognised by his/her Japanese father after birth was possible only when his/her Japanese father was married to his/her foreign mother. But the new legislation removed the requirement of marital status.

Table 2. Trends in Acquisition and Loss of Citizenship in Japan from 2007 to 2011 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Naturalization 14,680 13,218 14,784 13,072 10,359 - Korean 8,546 7,412 7,637 6,668 5,656 - Chinese 4,740 4,322 5,391 4,816 3,259 - Others 1,394 1,484 1,756 1,588 1,444

Recovery of Nationality

1,428 1,386 1,572 1,396 1,207

Loss of Nationality

608 619 628 583 712

Renunciation 159 179 209 180 168 Source: Japan Ministry of Justice.

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if the person does not choose one nationality by 22. It is therefore expected that there are certain numbers of dual nationals who hold a Japanese passport without renouncing their other nationality and there is no real legal sanction for such duality.

Such an attitude of Japan may be because Japan has not had enough experience in facing the question of dual nationality until recently. While this issue became prominent from the 1990s especially after starting to grant Long-term Resident status to Japanese emigrants and their descendants from Latin America, it attracts almost no attention from policy makers or media even today. However, as Japan accepts more and more immigrants in the future, the question of dual nationality will be an unavoidable agenda. Conclusion The issue of military service cannot be ignored when discussing dual citizenship policy. The dual nationality practice in South Korea is still in a process of establishment and questions of its conflict with state sovereignty/security and national identity require further discussion. In case of the Philippines, while the government is concerned more on emigration of Filipino workers than immigration of foreign workers, it also plays an important role in the region to protect migrant workers through international instruments. The policy of dual nationality was introduced in order to provide support and protection to overseas Filipinos as well as to mobilize their network as a resource for the state. The policy of dual nationality serves in both countries to build a resourceful network but the reasons behind seems different: In Korea to cope with aging society and to bring in investment, and in the Philippines to secure the remittances and to keep overseas Filipinos under the flag of the state. Interestingly, however, the rate of naturalization in Japan shows no significant difference compared to South Korea regardless of the fact that Japan has no mandatory military service for male citizens. While the barriers to become permanent residents and to naturalize are relatively low if once entered, many immigrants – Chinese and Brazilians especially – are not likely to develop a sense of belonging to Japanese society so much as to choose naturalization. One reason may be because there is still a strong sense of discrimination in society against non-Japanese as pointed out in the UN reports for instance.13 As a means of selection of population and social control, the institute of citizenship is expected to bring in immigrant labor in an orderly manner depending on needs of the host society’s economy. It aims to control the entry of low-skilled labor migrants and to regulate their living sphere by limiting the field they can enter in the market while encouraging high-skilled and educated ‘talents’ to be PRs or to naturalize by providing privileges.14 13 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Doudou Diène, MISSION TO JAPAN (E/CN.4/2006/16/Add.2, 24 January 2006), and Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Jorge Bustamante, Mission to Japan (A/HRC/17/33/Add.3). 14 Guild noted; “Without a clear category of ‘citizen’, ‘migration’ can only describe the wandering of people,

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However, in reality, such a function of citizenship is not fulfilled as expected in the face of the changing domestic and international environment: including social pressure of aging society and low fertility rate, increasing mobility of people as a result of technological advancement, globally expanding human rights norms and practices, conflict between the national security issue and growing demand for dual nationality from overseas citizens, and development of NGO activities and media. Therefore, the question of dual nationality is a battle field of conflicting forces: a force trying to protect privileges of citizens, a force to attract more economic benefits from foreign labor by making them permanent residents or dual citizens; finding a solution to social problems such as aging population and lowering fertility; a force of immigrants who are trying to naturalize or settle down but do not satisfy criteria; and a force of immigrants exercising their agencies by choosing not to naturalize to the host country but to stay as permanent or long-term residents to keep their sphere of living as wide as possible.

not the relationship of movement across international borders and the acquisition of rights. Without the category of ‘citizen’, the justifications which states put forward for treating some individuals more favourably, and others less so, tend to sound suspect to modern ears.” Elspeth Guild, 2009. Security and Migration in the 21st Century, Polity Press: Cambridge, p.29.

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Session 1 Discussion and Responses from the Presenters

Selçuk ESENBEL: If there are any questions or comments remaining from the introductory session, which border on the second session, then please, the floor is open for you. Chizuko SATO: I have two questions. The first question is about an issue that Professor Kiri ci touched upon, regarding highly skilled workers as an important topic when discussing global migration. Since the period of 2007-2008, a number of countries including the UK have introduced point-based systems for selecting migrant workers, and Japan is also considering introducing such a point-based system. So my first question is whether giving work permits to people with a certain type of education or for certain type of jobs also syncs into this question of citizenship. Dr. Ç nar gave her presentation about citizenship issues and stated that in 2010 countries decided that integration comes before naturalization and a number of countries have started to introduce language proficiency and citizenship tests. Are skill-based qualifications also counted in the decision on whether to grant citizenship or not? My second question is about Turkey starting to receive more immigrants and becoming a country with an increased number of immigrants. I think this implies that Turkey’s economy has been developing in the past five or ten years, and that is the reason why more and more people are coming to seek work in Turkey. I would like to ask whether the Turkish diaspora outside the country has made a significant contribution to recent economic development in Turkey or not? Could this have implications to the case of the Philippines? The Philippines has been lagging behind in terms of development compared with other self-sustaining countries within Asia such as Vietnam. Remittances are important in the Philippines but they have not contributed significantly to national economic development. I am wondering, in the case of Turkey, to what extent the Turkish diaspora has contributed to its economic development. ESENBEL: Thank you very much. Kemal K R C : I will answer the first question about highly skilled immigrants and countries of citizenship very quickly. The European side of it, I will leave to Dr. Çinar to address. On the Turkish side, I am not an expert on this topic, but from what I gather, there is no particular legislation in this area to encourage highly skilled migrants to obtain Turkish citizenship other than the citizenship law that Dr. Kadirbeyo lu elaborated in her presentation.

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She might be able to reflect more on the details of it but over the course of the last two years, the current government has tried to introduce special legislation to make possible the employment of foreign workers. This, however, met with massive resistance from the Turkish medical industry and associations. I will say a few extra words in regard to your second question with the caveat that I am not an expert in this area, either. If one of my colleagues joins us later in the day she might be able to reflect on it. When the first labor migration from Turkey occurred, there was the expectation that these migrants would be able to contribute to the development of Turkey, especially the industrial development of Turkey. There is a massive amount of literature on this, but in a nutshell, this expectation did not materialize in any visibly conspicuous manner. If anything, the literature that I have read has said that there was a lot of waste, especially in terms of remittances that came to Turkey that were invested in guest worker schemes. However, when we look to this period, what we do see is more and more educated, relatively high-skilled second- and third-generation Turkish migrants coming and picking up important jobs in tourism, for example. They are picking up important positions in German-Turkish or French-Turkish companies in Turkey and creating a particular niche for themselves. There is also literature that looks at the “Anatolian Tigers.” From the early 1980s, these cities in Anatolia developed into export-oriented production centers and a number of the Turkish companies and companies set up by Turkish immigrants in places like Germany, especially in food industry, played a role in transferring capital as well as industrial experience into these cities, helping the development of these cities. Today, these cities–the Anatolian Tigers–have played a very important role not only in the economic growth of Turkey, but also the integration of the Turkish economy with its neighborhood. Dilek ÇINAR: I’m not sure whether I will be able to answer your question in a satisfying way, simply because in all of these projects that I have been talking about, highly skilled migrants are not a central category of research. The situation in Europe is stimulating difficulties in attracting highly-skilled immigrants. As I mentioned, in the case of Germany, which is the country in need of the largest number of highly skilled immigrants in Europe, the German authorities had been considering the introduction of a special status for highly skilled immigrants, a “German Green Card.” However, due to the German Green Card being constructed in such a restrictive way, the result was that although Germany wanted to attract about 50,000 highly skilled immigrants, these immigrants were not allowed to bring their family members, they were not exempt from citizenship tests, etc., and Germany succeeded in attracting only about 5,000 people. This is because most of the highly skilled immigrants still prefer Australia, Canada, and the United States. The other issue that you find in citizenship laws in almost every country, is that there are very

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general, vague clauses that state that if an applicant for naturalization has the potential to contribute by special achievements to the benefit of the country, then this whole condition may be waived in order to easily grant citizenship. However, in any law you will not find a legal paragraph saying, “These are the conditions for highly skilled immigrants,” because this could easily be brought before a court. K R C : To add an example, if you are a really good football player of Brazilian or other nationality, through that provision in the Turkish citizenship law, you can become a Turkish citizen. Zeynep KAD RBEYO LU: Just to conclude, not just specifically for the reasons that Dr. Ç nar mentioned, there is the likelihood that with a point system, because you also have to qualify what you mean by skills, this will provide the grounds for migrants asking for citizenship or permanent residence permits, which I imagine the country may not want to grant. There therefore is not such a plan yet. ESENBEL: Thank you very much. Are there any other questions or comments? Habibul H. KHONDKER: I just wanted to comment on something that I found very useful. I want to identify certain concepts that we can weave our papers around that go beyond the level of simple description and generate synthesis. Recently, I saw Benedict Anderson at a conference. In answer to your question, Anderson, as a veteran who has been thinking about these issues for a long time, provided a brilliant observation: “There are two concepts; ‘ethnicity’ and ‘nationalism.’ Ethnicity is about the past. Nationalism is about the future.” Now looking at Dr. Esenbel’s paper, looking at the strategic use of ethnicity, for example by the Japanese government, is brilliant to me. If it is useful for us to present the Turkish as Muslims, let us present them as Muslims. If it is beneficial to present them at a social level on par with America’s, present them that way. In this way, ethnicity becomes a value, not a concept, and at a certain level we are talking about culture as a tool here. So then the ethnicity becomes a tool. This is very interesting and useful to continue the debate. You see China is opening its door for anyone who is Chinese. In contrast, India was really resistant to Indians who left India. They were completely forgotten and forbidden from coming back. Suddenly they realized when the tech economy was taking off from the 1990s onward, that they could be considered a resource. Certainly now they have so many categories. Everyone is talking about non-resident Indians. When Indian children are asked, “What do you want to grow up to be?” they say, “I want to grow up to be a non-resident Indian.” There is also a category called person of Indian Origin. So they are trying to attract people who have left India three generations ago, bringing them in to address the IT skills

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needed and so on. Smaller countries, such as Singapore, are less interested in democracy, human rights, and conforming to European standards. Singapore says, “If you have a PhD in computer science, come in. If you do not, you can stay here for 50 years and still cannot be a citizen.” No one can contest this, this is their sovereignty, their policy, and they want to get the maximum out of migrants. There is the famous line, “It is not what we see, you have to go behind the scenes and explain what you see there.” So we see all the changes in Europe, all the policies, all the organizations. My point is that we really need to step back and say, “Why now?” “Why are we changing this policy?” “Why do are we making strategic use of ethnicity or strategic use of nationalism?” and other questions. I think that this represents a much more fruitful path in terms of research and scientific contribution. ESENBEL: Thank you very much for your comment. If I may add to that, my intellectual interests in this enigmatic relationship between pre-war Japanese and Muslims is because the Japanese pioneered this very modern 20th century world power strategy of using ethnicity as a global strategy, starting with Muslims in particular. So although there were only 1,000 Tatars, that fact is immaterial. This propaganda image used these 1,000 Tatars and made them out to be as if they were millions, projecting the image of Japan as the friend of 300 million Muslims around the world. Of course, the sad part is that this mobility of ethnicity and national identity hit a wall. In the post-war period some of these Tatars were arrested by the Soviets because they were pro-Japanese and were forced to live in the gulags of Siberia. On the other hand, when the Japanese prisoners of war were repatriated at the end of the 1950s, the Japanese government refused to repatriate the Tatars and only the ethnic Japanese were repatriated. The Tatars were left stuck in the middle between nowhere and the gulag because their ethnicity was now no longer of use back in Japan, in fact it would probably be a liability. That is a possible underside of where this strategy has gone. Let us move on. Your question, please. Soo im LEE: So as you said, definitions of nationality and citizenship are quite different depending on the country. In Japan’s case, there is only nationality; we have no concept of citizenship. In the US, nationality is broader; not all nationals are US citizens. In Turkey, what kind of definition do you have of nationality and citizenship? K R C : This is quite a difficult question to answer. Dr. Kadirbeyo lu in her presentation showed how in 1944 the constitution defined anyone within the territory of the Turkish Republic as a Turkish citizen. However, when looking at the debates in parliament that took place at the time, there is a clear sense that their definition of a “Turkish citizen” was really someone who spoke Turkish and was of Sunni Hanafi origin, so not even including Shia or

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Alawite Muslims. This discussion is occurring today too, in a relatively more liberal climate, with the contestation being between the notion of a Turk with their nationality and citizenship—the two get confused; or Türkiyeli, someone who comes from Turkey as a country or state. The head of the Greek Orthodox Church, addressed the Turkish parliament for the first time in the history of the institution, and he defined himself as a Turk, to the enchantment of the rightwing nationalist MPs. The next day, a long-standing professor of these issues asked him how he would feel if in Greece, Turks were also defined as Greeks, ignoring their Muslim identity. This was very intriguing; meanwhile the head of the Syrian church said, “I would really prefer the term Türkiyeli (meaning ‘from Turkey’).” LEE: I see. In Japan, we do not have the concept of citizenship, so we use “resident” instead of “citizen.” The ideas of “Japanese nationals” and “foreign residents” are based on this concept of citizenship. In all, I think you are more advanced than Japan in terms of this conceptualization. KAD RBEYO LU: I have a question to Professor Asakawa and Mr. Park. This is specifically on the question of dual nationality. I know that the Japanese government does not recognize dual nationality, but I am asking you for your personal opinion. The newspapers published that one of the most famous American scholars of Japanese literature, Donald Keene, after the Fukushima disaster, made a grand gesture and said: “Now, I’m going to settle in Japan. I’m going to show my solidarity with the suffering Japanese people and this is going to be my home.” All his life he regularly visited Japan but now, in his late 80s, he has formally applied for Japanese citizenship. Do you think he will be asked to give up his American citizenship? Akihiro ASAKAWA: The short answer is “Yes.” Of course, according to Japanese law, the exact wording is that the Minister of Justice can naturalize those persons who satisfy five certain criteria. One criteria is that he or she must be either stateless, or intend to renounce their prior nationality after naturalization, which means the Minister of Justice cannot naturalize those persons who will continue to have other nationalities after Japanese naturalization. This means that at the time of application, the applicant has to declare that he or she will renounce their original nationality. One other case, South Korea’s nationality law says that if a person acquires another country’s nationality, then he or she will automatically lose South Korean nationality. That condition is the same also in Japanese and Chinese laws. KAD RBEYO LU: Are the Japanese more strict about this process? ASAKAWA: In short, Japan does not allow dual nationality. Maria Reinaruth D. CARLOS: I just got my Japanese nationality last October. When I

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went to the Ministry of Justice to apply, the first thing I was shown was a video on how to give up my Filipino nationality if I was granted Japanese nationality. However, when I actually got my nationality I was not told anything. I therefore have two nationalities at the moment, but I still have to give up my Filipino nationality within two years. They are not strict about checking whether people still have dual nationality or not. LEE: Following on what Professor Asakawa said, this is often just a formality among westerners, and in American cases, they simply keep it. They can declare, “Yes, I will relinquish my US citizenship,” but actually many applicants do not, and the Japanese government knows that these Americans and Europeans have dual citizenship. However, in Korea’s case, our two countries connect very closely, and the same is true for Japan and China. So after naturalization, the documents are automatically sent to the Korean government and the family registry, etc. will be erased within 90 days. Is that right Professor Asakawa? ASAKAWA: I do not think the Japanese government notifies the South Korean government. LEE: Well that is what I was told; in my case it was 90 days. They exchange the data. They do this with Thailand, too. ASAKAWA: I think that may be the case, but South Korea’s nationality law states that those who receive another nationality will lose their citizenship. This practice is therefore consistent with South Korea nationality law and there may be that kind of arrangement in place. In addition to this government level debate, in the case of those Japanese who go overseas and acquire nationality there, for example in Australia, Australian citizenship does not require that applicants renounce their original citizenship. There is no problem therefore in qualifying for Australian citizenship. At the same time, Japanese nationality law states that when a citizen receives another country’s nationality they automatically lose their Japanese citizenship. However, if the Japanese government is not informed, then it can still be kept. So even if on the surface it is not possible, in practice there is dual nationality in Japan. ESENBEL: That used to be the case in the United States, actually. United States law does not automatically allow dual citizenship, but they have what they call “friendly countries.” Italy would be possible, but Bulgaria, for example, maybe not. Are there any other questions or comments? LEE: Regarding the difference between nationality and citizenship, could you explain what is the situation with usage of these words. Do nationality and citizenship mean the same thing?

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KAD RBEYO LU: That is a difficult question to answer because it depends on the language being looked at. For example, there is not necessarily a translation of “citizenship” directly into the German language. What we tried to do during the first phase of this project between 2004 and 2006 was to use the notion of nationality as a legal concept exclusively, not in terms of ethnicity. We also asked all the experts across 15 countries involved in this project to keep to this notion of nationality; not to use nationality and citizenship interchangeably, because citizenship can also be defined as a broader category, namely as a bundle of rights that may be granted to people who do not necessarily have the same legal nationality. As an example, in an increasing number of European Union member states, foreign nationals have been granted direct political participation at local and regional levels, and that is typically a traditional citizenship right. It is not a nationality right in terms of ethnicity. So this is why we decided to keep a strict limit on the notion of nationality as a legal category during the first phase of the project. However, over time, it turned out that this was actually difficult to impose such a strict discipline on terminology, so we then changed to citizenship. But to come back to my first point, it is not possible to give you a clear-cut answer because it partly depends on the respective languages. ESENBEL: On the website I mentioned previously, there is a section on “Citizenship or Nationality?” Everyone who participated in this project was asked to write a paragraph on this distinction; whether it exists or what it means. There are entries for all the countries that Dr. Kadirbeyo lu mentioned, with a paragraph or two explaining the distinction between the two on the website under “Terminology.” KHONDKER: May I ask what you wrote? ESENBEL: I wrote that sometimes we can use them interchangeably, but the law itself refers to citizenship rather than nationality. ASAKAWA: What is “nationality” in Turkish? ESENBEL: Tâbiyet. ASAKAWA: Soyda ? KAD RBEYO LU: Soyda is not nationality, really. It is co-ethnic origin. ASAKAWA: The genealogy of ethnicity. KAD RBEYO LU: Legal categories for the same nation of national origins.

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K R C : In the last two or three years, Turkey has opened up a new administrative unit associated with the Prime Minister’s office for overseas Turks and relatives, Akraba. This is an office to promote and develop the interests of the diaspora. However, it is still not clear whether that office will, for example, take an interest in the Turkish-Jewish community in Tel Aviv, or whether they would take an interest in the Assyrians living in Stockholm. Only time will tell. It will also be curious to see if the Kurds of northern Iraq will be defined as relatives. During the 1991 mass influx of refugees from northern Iraq, a former president of Turkey did in fact make such a reference, saying “They are relatives of our citizens.” The situation itself with the Kurds was complicated. It is a very interesting situation that we have in Turkey, and it relates to the point that was made earlier on by Benedict Anderson. KAD RBEYO LU: To return to the example of the German language. In German, you have two corresponding terms: Nationality vs. Citizenship. Nationality in German is “Staatsangehörigkeit.” When you define nationality, the meaning stems from the link between an individual and the state. Nationality is the legal link and it is about which state one belongs to, because “angehörigkeit” means “belonging.” Whereas citizenship put into the German language is “Staatsbürgerschaft” and its meaning is much more about the rights that are attached to your legal status as a national. Being a national is more a legal, formal status, whereas being a citizen is something that also comes equipped with citizenship rights. So this from my viewpoint is the most important distinction. ESENBEL: The first one implies something more specifically territory-oriented like a nation and the second one sounds more universal. So citizenship rights could be more universal. It does not necessarily have to be on a national basis. Nationality has to be nation-based in some manner. Are there any other comments or questions? LEE: I have a very short comment. In 1981, your nationality law was amended to admit women as equal. In Japan, it happened in 1985. So behind the scenes, was there any gender equality international law at work? I was having a discussion yesterday about whether international laws were more powerful than domestic laws. So I think that many things are happening.

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SESSION IISESSION II

“Governance of Migration in Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region II”

Abstracts of Presentations Understanding Diversity and Solidarity among Bangladeshi Workers in the United Arab Emirates: Implications for Migration Governance Habibul H. KHONDKER, Zayed University Migration governance is often seen from the macro-perspectives by analyzing official policies and memoranda. By using diversity and solidarity as two key sociological concepts, this paper explores the social life of migrant workers from Bangladesh in Abu Dhabi which has implication for migration governance. The paper argues that many important aspects of labor migration process from South Asia to the UAE can be gleaned from examining the micro-processes of everyday lives of migrant workers from Bangladesh in Abu Dhabi. This paper takes a micro-sociological approach to understand the diversity of the workers, their resourcefulness, their ability to make the best use of their social network to advance their own interest, and when possible to further the interest of their family members, especially their siblings by helping them to secure jobs in the UAE. In other words, aspects of migration governance are viewed from the lenses of the everyday life of the migrant workers. The paper presents the Bangladeshi workers as a differentiated group and warns against stereotyping them as cleaners or engaged in “unskilled” work. Bangladeshi workers are engaged in a diverse range of activities. Their diversity is also a result of their points of origin (so-called “home districts”). The issue of diversity is important because, in the everyday discourse on labor migration, migrants and the work they do are often stereotyped. The paper seeks to illuminate the daily lives of the workers and through a discursive process it wants to dwell on the subjects of social mobility, social obligation, cooperation and competition among the workers. The social life of the migrant workers is multifaceted and layered. The paper investigates the relationship between migrant experience and changes in the behavior of migrant workers, their sense of community and solidarity, career aspiration, and a concern for future when they return to their native land. The Implications of the Transfer of US Bases from Okinawa on the Economy and International Migration in Guam Yasukatsu MATSUSHIMA, Ryukoku University The object of this presentation is to identify/clarify the conflicts and social and cultural problems, their reasons and their possible solutions, regarding the immigration of workers and military persons to Guam where new bases and infrastructure have been built because of

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the transfer of the US Marines’ Bases from Okinawa. First, I will discuss the “Compact Impact,” which details the problems of immigrants from Micronesian countries (Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands) to Guam. Then, I will explain about the relationship among the social, economic, cultural, environmental problems posed by the expansion of the military bases and the movement of workers and military persons to Guam. Finally, I will make clear the resistance by Chamorros and Okinawans against the ‘Build Up’ in Guam and suggest some solutions to these problems and conflicts by the way of the “Peoples’ Civic Relations.” Exploring Layers of “Othering”: Globalization and Female Migrant Workers in Turkey Mine EDER, Bo aziçi University Based on a series of interviews with “undocumented” female migrant workers at different sites in Istanbul (deportation centers, shops, churches and private houses) this paper aims at mapping out the layers of vulnerabilities female migrant workers face in Turkey. In line with feminization of global migratory flows, Turkey has started receiving an increasing number of irregular female migrants in the 1990s, mostly from the post-Soviet world. These women have found jobs in precarious informal labour markets as domestic caregivers, cleaners, shop clerks as well as sex workers. Apart from the well-known vulnerabilities embedded in being a migrant, I argue that these women’s face three additional challenges that compound their difficulties. One is that Turkey, emulating Europe’s Schengen system, has started securitizing its borders making it harder for these women to move back and forth which lead to increasing criminalization of their status. Second, there is increasingly visible differential treatment and reception of these migrants according to their religion and country of origin. While a Muslim woman from Turkmenistan is more likely to receive a preferential treatment from law enforcers, for instance, a non-Muslim Ukrainian is more likely to be labeled as a “Natasha,” which became a pejorative term used for post-Soviet women working as sex workers. Third, and perhaps most difficult to tackle, these women have found themselves in a society with rising conservatism and Islamization of gender norms. The reinforcement of traditional gender roles by the governing party (AKP), the persistent decline in (Turkish) female labour participation in the country have further complicated this picture adding new layers of “othering” for the new migrants.

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Understanding Diversity and Solidarity among Bangladeshi Workers in the United Arab Emirates: Implications for Migration Governance

Habibul H. Khondker

Professor, Department of Humanities and Social Sciences Zayed University

If the migrant population world-wide formed a state of their own, with more than 215 million people, or 3% of the world population, it would be the fifth largest country of the world. This hypothetical country would be placed between fourth most populous country, Indonesia (235 million) and fifth largest country, Brazil (193 million). Given the present trends and the demographic imbalances in the world, it is very likely that the trends in migration will continue. Labor migration – especially, temporary contractual migration to the labor-deficit countries has grown to phenomenal proportion given rise to the discourse of migration governance.

Although there has been a significant growth in the number of migrant population in recent decades, earlier centuries saw more mobility of people in terms of percentage of total population. The last decade of the twentieth century as well as the present decade has been described as the “age of globalization,” yet the nineteenth century allowed easier migration flows. Contrary to the perception, or imagination of a “borderless world,” in the twentieth century the world has become more bordered than at any other time in the past. We live in a state-centered and bordered world. The contradiction of globalization is best revealed in the free-flow of capital and restricted movement of labor. It is in this context, migration governance has gained a new significance. Unlike in the past centuries, migration in the recent decades has come under the fold of the state institutions. In the governance of migration of contract laborers, there are several stake-holders: the migration sending state, the migration receiving state, the private sector involved in recruitment and placement, non-governmental organizations involved in the issues of labor rights, and the contract workers themselves.

In the 1970s and 80s there was a great deal of concern with what was called, “brain-drain.” With the increasing understanding and appreciation of the processes of globalization, the trans-border movement of the people is being looked at new light. Rather than looking at migration in terms of “brain drain,” the new concept that best describes the process is “brain in circulation.” One commentator remarked somewhat cynically, “brain drain is better than brain in the drain.” In many developing countries professionals do not

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always get the support or opportunities they deserve for their further development and choose to migrate to greener pastures. Unlike in the past, migrants have become more flexible or foot-loose. In the old paradigm, migrants left their homeland to settle down in a new home country. In the twenty-first century, migrant professionals have become the new nomads. Aihwa Ong, a Berkeley anthropologist, has coined the term, “flexible citizenship” to capture this new reality. A distinction has emerged between juridical citizenship and cultural citizenship. Individuals, like companies, are becoming multinational or bi-national and bi-cultural. A new-cosmopolitanism is becoming the new trend in a globalized world. The new-nomads are at home everywhere, as much as they are homeless everywhere. The meaning of home has lost its salience. A simple question like, “where are you from?” is now not-so simple to answer.

Many of the above characterization may be more appropriate to the migratory movements of the middle class, professionals. However, when it comes to the condition of the labor migration where the actors are working class migrants, the situation is quite different. As the number of migrants is rising in aggregate terms, it is of crucial importance to examine the diversity of the migrants in terms of their class, gender, and ethnic backgrounds.

Economic forces continue to dominate international migration. Both the working classes as well as the professionals are driven by the same economic motive. While for the professional class there are more choices, the working class is constrained by a raft of factors. Sometimes, the line that separates migrants from refuges or asylum seekers becomes blurred, especially when it comes to working class migrants. According to a recent report, refugees and asylum seekers made up 16.3 million, or 8%, of international migrants in 2010.

Migrants have become a valuable source of cash-flows. Worldwide remittance flows are estimated to have passed $440 billion in 2010, of which developing countries received $325 billion. Even the global financial crisis of last two years did not dent it that much. Bangladesh has seen steady growth in remittance reaching US$11 billion in 2010 which is expected to rise in 2011. This is no mean amount. It is 13% of Bangladesh’s GDP. The remittance earning is six times the foreign aid Bangladesh receives and 12 times of foreign direct investment (FDI). Such glowing figures are both encouraging as well as worrying.

Some of the top labor receiving countries for Bangladeshi labor such as, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, along with Kuwait and Qatar are now seriously discussing reducing dependence on foreign labor. In some countries such as the United Arab Emirates foreigners constitute nearly 80% of the labor force. For Kuwait this figure is nearly 70% and for Qatar it is 86.5% respectively. This demographic imbalance is increasingly dominating public discourses in the Arabian Gulf countries. Programs such as Saudization, Qatarization or Emiratization are in place. Yet, the need for skilled workforce globally is likely to last.

In this climate, it is important for the labor-sending countries to devote more attention and resources to labor migration. In order to improve migration governance, Nasra Shah, an expert at Kuwait University, has suggested regulation, facilitation and protection as three key variables. To this list, I would add utilization. The migrant workers, especially those who are

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returning or will return in the future must be looked after. Many of the migrants are conduits of ideas and skills. They often assist in knowledge

and technology transfer. An unskilled worker at the time of departure, returns home as a skilled construction-worker or user of heavy construction equipments. Appropriate measures must be taken to utilize their skills by helping them find appropriate work where they can use their skills. Here the government and the private sector must work hand in hand. The recent achievements must be sustained and more resources should be deployed at skill-developments and skill-utilization of the labor force.

Two of the recent processes deserve special attention. One is the growing South – South migration. There has been a marked shift from South – North to South – South migration. Countries which are considered as labor sending countries have also become labor receiving countries. India, Pakistan, South Africa, to name a few cases. Many of the Bangladeshi migrants cross into Indian borders illegally and end up in the Indian metropolises. Many Bangladeshis go through the landmass of India to enter Pakistan illegally finding employment in the informal, mainly domestic sectors of Pakistani metropolises such as Karachi. The other is the relocation of returnee migrants. Migration governance needs to capture both these areas.

Migration governance is often seen from the macro-perspectives by analyzing official policies and memoranda. While it is important to examine the policies, especially the best practices with regard to migration governance, it may be useful to explore the micro-level processes in the migrant communities to assess the impact of the official policies and proms on the migrants.

By using diversity and solidarity as two key sociological concepts, this paper argues that the everyday social life of migrant workers from Bangladesh in Abu Dhabi which has implication for migration governance. The paper argues that many important aspects of labor migration process from South Asia to the UAE can be gleaned from examining the micro-processes of everyday lives of migrant workers from Bangladesh in Abu Dhabi. This paper takes a micro-sociological approach to understand the diversity of the workers, their resourcefulness, their ability to make the best use of their social network to advance their own interest, and when possible to further the interest of their family members, especially their siblings by helping them to secure jobs in the UAE.

In other words, aspects of migration governance are viewed from the lenses of the everyday life of the migrant workers. The paper presents the Bangladeshi workers as a differentiated group and warns against stereotyping them as cleaners or engaged in “unskilled” work. Bangladeshi workers are engaged in a diverse range of activities. Their diversity is also a result of their points of origin (so-called “home districts”). The issue of diversity is important because, in the everyday discourse on labor migration, migrants and the work they do is often stereotyped. The paper seeks to illuminate the daily lives of the workers and through a discursive process it wants to dwell on the subjects of social mobility, social obligation, cooperation and competition among the workers. The social life of the migrant

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workers is multifaceted and layered. The paper investigates the relationship between migrant experience and changes in the behavior of migrant workers, their sense of community and solidarity, career aspiration, and a concern for future when they return to their native land.

The rapid economic development in the United Arab Emirates has attracted an estimated two million overseas contract workers. The consequences of the temporary labor migration have been identified as an important national issue. In recent years the Government of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has been facing mounting challenges in managing the expansion and complexity of labor migration. At the same time in response to the international plea for the improvement in protecting the fundamental rights of expatriate workers the government of the UAE has shown its commitment to the protection of the rights of the overseas contract workers. The migrant workers comprise both skilled workers, low-skilled workers in various sectors of the economy and workers in the construction sector as well as large number of women working as domestic helpers.

The UAE government hosted an international conference of labor sending and labor receiving countries with representatives of international organizations such as International Labor Organization (ILO), International Organization for Migration (IOM), and Human Rights Watch (HRW) in attendance. The Abu Dhabi Declaration of 2008, which followed the conference, has outlined an initiative to improve collaboration between labor sending and labor receiving countries involving concerned parties. It is in this context of initiatives taken both by the government of the labor receiving countries and the support of the international organizations, the study aims at a deeper understanding of the issues of governance of labor migration.

The impact of Global economic crisis on both labor-receiving and labor-sending countries provides the immediate context for this study. The economic downturn is likely to worsen the situation of temporary migrant workers, especially those who are undocumented. The government of the UAE has taken many important steps towards protecting the rights of the overseas contract workers ranging from monitoring the payment of wages, health and occupation safety. In an important way, despite the good intentions of the UAE government the problem at hand is complex and challenging.

Abu Dhabi Declaration opens up the possibility of closer cooperation between labor sending and labor receiving countries in protecting the rights and welfare of the overseas contract workers.

The key issues of migration governance with regard to the temporary migrant workers in the Gulf region are concerned include:

1. Protection and welfare of the rights of the workers by the government of the host countries so that the contract workers are not deprived of their entitlements such income, housing and health-care;

2. Ensuring their social and cultural adjustments to the host countries;

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3. Ensuring the political, economic and social interests of the host countries; 4. Maximum utilization of talents and skills in matching the workers with appropriate

sectors of work; 5. Ensuring that migration is a positive experience in skill and professional development

for the migrant workers; 6. Ensuring that the migrant workers contribute to the development of their home

countries through remittance of income, technology and ideas; and 7. Enabling the returnee migrant workers to integrate in society with work that meets

their interest and where they can best utilize their new skill, experience and knowledge.

The policy measures of the respective governments are often inadequate in view of the

gravity and magnitude of the problem. Sometimes there is absence of good will and when there is, the will is not translated into policies and effective measures due to inadequacy of the administration. The workers often fall prey to unscrupulous agents or labor contractors who promise them one type of work and redirect them to other less favorite and more strenuous works. There are also errant employers who fail to pay the wages earned by the workers regularly. In this complex situation, despite the best intention on the part of the government of the receiving country, some problems remain unaddressed or inadequately dealt with. Hence, a critical assessment of the situation of the migrant workers under the changed global circumstances assume key importance. Both macro-data and micro studies must be drawn upon to formulate appropriate policies, and monitoring the application of the policies in order to secure the interests of all the parties involved in the process: the interests of the respective governments but most importantly, the interests of the workers who are the engine of global development.

At one level, there has to be growing coordination of the three levels of migration governance: the international organizations (such as ILO, IOM, etc.), the national governments and the local communities of the migrant workers. This is where the challenges lie for the researchers of migration governance.

At the micro-level, it is important to examine to solidarity and divisions within the migrant communities. More research is needed to explore how temporary, contractual laborers cope with their host environment, especially among their own community. What kind of social and economic relationships they forge with their fellow members because that’s where their relationships are often confined. In the context of the United Arab Emirates, a growing number of migrant workers work under the supervision of a fellow migrant supervisor or manager either from their own country or a neighboring country. How does this micro-relationship work? In other words, there are newer fields of research that need attention.

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Concepts such as “social capital” and “moral economy” are useful in examining the everyday life of the Bangladeshi working class communities in Abu Dhabi. I studied the networks of obligations and duties among Bangladesh small-business owners and their employees in Mussafah, the industrial suburb near Abu Dhabi, over a period of time. The relationship is closer to patron-client relations between the landlord and the peasants of the earlier times in Bangladesh than relations between factory owners and employees. The informality of the relationships feature both the work place and outside of work-place. In some cases, spatially, there is no difference because the workers are given accommodation at the work-place itself, despite official prohibition.

Every year, in late January or early February to commemorate the birth of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), a ceremonial feast is organized by the employers association in Mussafah which is open to tens of thousands of Bangladeshi and other South Asian workers. Seemingly, the only restriction is inadvertently imposed by the dietary restrictions. Most of the Indian workers gave the feast a miss because the menu was rice and beef-curry, hallmark of one of the districts of Bangladesh, Chittagong. The feast was organized by the garage and work-shop owners who mostly hail from the district of Chittagong. It was an instance of noblesse oblige.

Such relationships and social interactions are guided by loyalty and obligations. The dense relations that bind the employers and the employees can be a cultural resource as well as an impediment for the enforcement of regulatory policies. Yet, the host government can neither overrule nor overlook these relationships. In order to ensure the rights and entitlements of the migrant workers, the local authorities must work with and through these social networks. A more sociological understanding of these processes is of utmost importance. Note: This paper draws from the ongoing research on migration governance by the author funded by the National Research Fund, UAE.

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The Implications of the Transfer of U.S. Bases from Okinawa on Society and International Migration in Guam

Yasukatsu Matsushima

Professor, Faculty of Economics Ryukoku University

1. COMPACT IMPACT1 IN GUAM Guam is a possession of the United States of America (U.S.) listed as a non-self-governing territory (or colony) by the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization. Guam has a population of 175,877 (2008: Chamorros 37%; Filipinos 26%; other Pacific Islanders 16%; Caucasians 10%; other Asians 6%).

The Compacts of Free Association (FAS) are joint congressional-executive agreements between the U.S. and the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM, 1986), the Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI, 1986), and the Republic of Palau (1994).These agreements establish that citizens of these three Micronesian countries can enter the U.S. to engage in work and establish residence. Also, the FAS affords FAS citizens the right to attend school in the U.S. without special permits. FAS citizens do not need visas to work in the U.S. and they are eligible to receive job assistance and job training. The numbers of FAS citizens in Guam were as follows in 2011: 24,737 from FSM; 730 from RMI; and 4,147 from Palau.2

In 2011, there were 6,559 FAS citizens enrolled as students, representing 21.1% of the total enrolment in Guam.3 Looking at the prison population, 26% are FAS citizens, although these citizens account for 11% of Guam’s total population.4

The government of Guam must pay for education, public safety, health, welfare, housing, and employment services for FAS citizens. FAS citizens are eligible for food stamps and affordable public housing. There are many cases in which the government of Guam has paid for FAS citizens unable to afford treatment in hospitals or fines for crimes.

The government of the U.S. has required the government of Guam to pay the burdens

1 Compact Impact in Guam indicates the adverse impact to Guam’s economy of providing health care, education, job training and public assistance to the citizens of the Freely Associated States (Palau, Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall Islands) living in Guam. 2 Government of Guam (2012) p.34. 3 Ibid., p.3. 4 Pacific Daily News, 2.2.2012.

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of government of the U.S. to support FAS countries’ economic condition on FAS. Guam Governor Eddy Calvo criticized the government of the U.S. for providing inadequate funding to offset the impact. FAS citizens represent 10% of Guam’s private workforce, and they make up 38% of workers in landscaping services, 22% of people in heavy construction and 26% of people in building maintenance.5 In March 2011, the unemployment rate of Guam was 13.3% – well above the U.S. average of 8.8%. Many Chamorros have moved to mainland U.S. and Hawai’i to get jobs. The economic, social, and cultural conflicts between the FAS citizens and other citizens of Guam remain unresolved. 2. MILITARY BUILDUP IN GUAM 2.1 What is the military buildup plan in Guam? In 2006, the U.S.-Japan Roadmap for Realignment Implementation (hereinafter, “the Roadmap”) initiatives required the relocation of 8,552 III Marine Expeditionary Force personnel and 9,000 of their dependents from Okinawa to Guam and the creation of a new military base in Henoko, Nago City, Okinawa by 2014. However, Okinawans have protested the construction of this new military base. In 2012, the government of the U.S. established a new military plan whereby 4,700 U.S. Marines would move to Guam from Okinawa before the new base would be built in Henoko. The government of the U.S. considers that moving U.S. Marines to Guam would maximize their freedom of action while minimizing any increase in response time. Under the Alliance Transformation and Realignment Agreement (ATARA) and the Roadmap, the government of Japan has agreed to a cost-sharing arrangement and will provide up to $6.09 billion in funding for facilities and construction costs for the relocation of the U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam.6

The government of Guam is responsible for obtaining the funds for necessary off-base

5 Ibid. 6 United States Government Accountability Office (2011) p.12.

Table 1. Compact Impact Cost and Compact Impact Assistance Grant from Government of U.S. to Government of Guam (M$)

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total Compact ImpactCost

31.46 28.68 42.63 47.87 53.87 64.91 71.37 96.88 440.67

Compact ImpactAssistance Grant

14.24 14.24 14.24 14.24 14.24 14.53 16.83 16.83 119.39

Source: Government of Guam, Office of the Governor (2012)

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infrastructure projects, such as off-base roads and utilities, and the cost is estimated at approximately $3.2 billion. The Department of Defense (DoD) of the U.S. government, the government of Japan, and the government of Guam will pay almost $23.9 billion for total costs for the military buildup in Guam.7 The buildup in Guam is planned as follows. Marine Corps:

(1) Facilities and infrastructure to support the Marine Corps and their dependents moving from Okinawa to Guam.

(2) Facilities and infrastructure to support training and operations on Guam and Tinian (one of the Northern Mariana Islands) for the relocated Marine Corps.

Navy: New deep-draft wharf with shoreside infrastructure improvements in Apra Harbor, Guam to support a transient nuclear powered aircraft carrier.

Army: Facilities and infrastructure to support the relocation of approximately 600 Army personnel and their 900 dependents in order to establish and operate the Army Air and Missile Defense Task Force (AMDTF) and protect against the threat of ballistic missile attacks from other countries.

Air Force: (1) A global hub known as “Guam Strike” for intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance,

strikes, and aerial refueling capabilities at Andersen Air Force Base. (2) Relocation of the Pacific Air Force’s expeditionary training center from the Korean

peninsula to Guam.

The highest priority is to reconstruct Guam as a strategic forward base. Guam will become the largest U.S. military base west of Pearl Harbour, Hawai’i.

7 Ibid., p.3.

Table 2. Military Population Changes in Guam

Permanent

Military Personnel

Dependents Transient Military

Personnel

DoD Civilian Workforce

Total

Marine 8,552 (4,700)

9,000 (4,500)

2,000 1,710 21,262 (12,900)

Navy 0 0 7,222 0 7,222 Army 630 950 0 126 1,706

Source: Joint Guam Program Office Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Pacific (2010).

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2.2 Problems and concerns related to the military buildup Housing costs in Guam are already on the rise for locals due to the generous military allowance for off-base housing. The projected water demand for Guam’s civilian population, the associated workforce, and the induced population will exceed the current capacity of the Guam Water Authority’s water system. The proposed buildup will result in more wastewater than is currently permitted with the increased load due to the workforce for the buildup.8

The buildup will damage the coral reefs in Apura Harbor and other sites, as well as locations of historic and cultural interest. The buildup will increase the possibility of Guam becoming a missile target or battle zone. Also, there will be problems such as the significant income gap among the people of Guam, the identity crisis of the Chamorro people, who face the disappearance of their culture and natural environment, and the cultural and social conflict between the people of Guam and immigrants.

The implementation of the military buildup will result in the following phenomena:

Temporary increase in population associated with the construction workforce Permanent increase in number of military and civilian personnel and dependents Increase in transient presence on Guam and Tinian Increase in number and type of major equipment assets used to support military

personnel and operations (e.g. aircraft, ships, and amphibious watercraft) Increase in number and type of training activities Construction of new facilities Improvements to existing facilities Improvements to infrastructure (including roads and utilities) Establishment of new special-use airspace supporting training activities and the

AMDTF Acquisition of additional land.9

The following shows the concerns of the people of Guam about the military buildup,

based on an interview research conducted by the University of Guam with 403 participants (Chamorros: 58%; Filipinos: 28%; other Pacific Islanders: 6%; other Asians: 4%; Caucasians: 4%).

Q: What is the biggest problem associated with the buildup? A: Strained infrastructure (35%), real estate cost (29%), jobs lost by locals (14%), land taken that is needed for business (8%)

Q: Is the buildup good for Guam’s culture? A: yes (21%), no (74%)

8 Joint Guam Program Office (2010) p.51. 9 Ibid., p.6.

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Q: What is the greatest cultural problem associated with the buildup? A: Increased crime by Marines (41%), Marines will “disrespect” women (28%), family land taken for the buildup (22%), crime by military camp followers (10%)

Q: Do you have any close family members in the military? A: yes (78%), no (21%) Q: What are the biggest concerns regarding immigration? A: Costs going up (41%), infrastructure strained (22%), jobs taken by immigrants (15%), higher real estate prices (9%)

Q: What are the biggest cultural concerns regarding immigration? A: Differences in culture (38%), increased crime (32%), destruction of local culture (20%)10

The middle-age group was most positive, while the youngest and oldest groups are the

least positive regarding the buildup. The younger generation is concerned about the loss of jobs, land, culture, and identity.

It is assumed that 75% of the civilian workforce involved in the buildup will come from off island and 25% workforce will be current Guam residents. In 2012 (the peak year for population increase in Guam), the total increase in Guam residents from off island is estimated at 79,178 people.11 The government of Guam will be burdened by several economic and social costs presented by the buildup, and Compact Impact.

Immigrant workers are necessary to build up the military infrastructure and civilian entities in Guam. Many companies from the U.S. and other countries have made investments, and many immigrant workers have come to Guam. Guam will be controlled economically by off-island companies, the Chamorro people will become a minority on their own island, and they will be unable to achieve new political status on the basis of the right of self-determination. Next, we will turn to issues related to U.S. military bases in Okinawa in order to consider the results of the buildup in Guam. Currently, 74% of U.S. military bases in Japan are concentrated in Okinawa, which covers only 0.6% of total Japanese territory. Many military bases are located on the small and highly populated island, and this accounts for the large numbers of accidents and crimes committed by U.S. military personnel. From 1972 to 2010, there were 5,705 military-related criminal cases and 1,545 military-related accidents, while from 1981 to 2010, 2,588 military-related traffic accidents occurred. There has been serious damage, such as killing and raping by U.S. military personnel, live field fires and bomb accidents caused by live ammunition practice, plane and helicopter crashes, loud roars from air traffic, traffic accidents, the destruction of environmental and historical sites, loss of indigenous cultural heritage, and disturbance of the daily life of 10 Owen (2010) pp.311-313. 11 Joint Guam Program Office (2010) p.7.

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Okinawans. Two of the most shocking cases are the rape case, involving three U.S. soldiers against a 12-year-old schoolgirl in 1995, and the U.S. Marines helicopter crash in 2004 at Okinawa International University, which is situated near the Futenma U.S. military airbase in Ginowan City. A very large number of Okinawans reject the plan of construction of the new military base on a Henoko coral reef. Okinawa Prefectural Governor Hirokazu Nakaima and Nago City Mayor Susumu Inafuku also refuse to accept a new base anywhere in Okinawa.

The people of Guam will face more accidents and crimes associated with the military presence and their activities, as Okinawa has. The relocation of U.S. Marines to Guam will deepen its colonial situation.

3. ACHIEVING COEXISTENCE OF THE PEOPLE OF GUAM AND IMMIGRANTS 3.1 Modernization of the political status of Guam Guam has been on the United Nation’s list of non-self-governing territories (or colonies) since 1946. In 1950, people living in Guam were given U.S. citizenship by the government of the U.S. through the Organic Act. Until this year, the people of Guam had not had citizenship since 1898, the year in which the government of the U.S. took Guam from Spain after the U.S.-Spanish War.

However, the people of Guam do not have the right to vote for the U.S. president, and Guam’s representative in the U.S. Congress does not have the right to vote there. The government of the U.S. can determine any Guam-related policies even if the governor, senators, and people of Guam are against such policies (including immigration policies).The government of the U.S. can use Guam for military bases and can freely influence the destiny of FAS immigrants, because Guam is a U.S. possession and the government of the U.S. can determine any policies relating to Guam.

To date, the government of Guam has promoted the decolonization process by its own organization, the Committee of Decolonization, based on popular referendums for new political status, which involves the three options of independence, free association, and U.S. state. The government considers that at first Chamorros12 will have a referendum on the future political status, and then all peoples living in Guam will make a constitution for Guam. The government of Guam thinks that after Guam achieves a new political status, immigrants will be able to stay there of their own volition.

In its Plan of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution to prevent immigration to colonial territories lest it frustrate the colonized

12 Chamorros are persons who became U.S. citizens by virtue of the Organic Act of Guam (approved August 1,

1950), and the descendants of such persons.

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population’s eventual exercise of self-determination.13 Based on this UN resolution, the U.S. should not apply the immigration policies to a colonial territory like Guam. We can say that the Government of the U.S. is against the international law.

After Guam achieves new political status in the UN process of decolonization and international law, the government of Guam can make and manage its own immigration policy, and the people of Guam will be able to move forward for coexistence with immigrants. 3.2 Demilitarization of Guam Already, one third of the total area of Guam is occupied by U.S. military bases. After the buildup plan, almost half of Guam’s land will be occupied by military bases. On a small island such as Guam, the impact of the buildup will deepen cultural, social, environmental, economic, and political problems.

The government of the U.S. has shown its plan to make the area of Pagat a firearms training site for the Marine Corps. However, this is the site of an ancient village of the Chamorros, and there are many historical, cultural, sacred sites of Chamorros in the area. Thus, many people of Guam have been against this plan, the U.S. to change the location of firearms training from Pagat to inside the Navy base on Guam.

Chamorros have used international networks for demilitarization via groups such as Organization of People for Indigenous Rights (OPI-R), Guahan Coalition for Peace and Justice, We Are Guahan, and Chamorro Nation. Also in Okinawa, there are many NGOs focusing on demilitarization. Okinawan women’s groups have visited Guam several times and held meetings about military crimes and incidents in Okinawa to allow the Chamorros to become more aware of problems associated with military bases on small islands.

Okinawans have worked with UN organizations to resolve colonization problems. In 1996, I made a presentation about the many colonial problems of Okinawans as indigenous peoples in Japan to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Peoples in Geneva. Almost every year since, Okinawans have sent a delegation to the UN. In 2011, I participated in the UN Special Committee on Decolonization as a member of the government of Guam and made a presentation about the necessity of the demilitarization of Guam and Okinawa in New York.

In 2006, Dr. Doudou Diène, United Nations Special Rapporteur on Contemporary Forms of Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance, came to survey military bases on Okinawa. He reported that Okinawan situation was abnormal and that the Government of Japan discriminated against Okinawans. In 2010, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination declared that U.S. military base problems on Okinawa constituted racial discrimination against Okinawans by the government of Japan.

In Okinawa, there are several NGOs, such as the Association of Indigenous Peoples in the Ryukyus and We Are Loochoo (Okinawan), which have taken part in UN organizations in order to resolve Okinawan human rights problems using international law and international 13 Aguon (2011) p.3.

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networks. We Are Loochoo has invited Chamorros to Okinawa for forums and meetings on the decolonization and demilitarization of Okinawa and Guam through ethnic peoples’ power. When a “human chain” was made around Futenma base in Okinawa, Chamorros were among the participants.

Many Okinawans are against the transfer of U.S. Marines to Guam and the construction of new bases there because the buildup would create a deeper colonial situation for Guam, while the militarization on Guam foes against the UN-mandated process of decolonization.

The governments of the U.S. and Japan have considered that Guam and Okinawa are vital militarily, and these islands are linked strategically. These islands are treated like colonies. The decolonization and demilitarization by Guam and Okinawa will only be possible with the cooperation of the Chamorros and Okinawans.

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REFERENCES Aguon, Julian. 2011. An Appraisal of Self-determination under International Law, Marianas

Variety, July 27-29.

Corbin, Carlyle. 2011. The Decolonization of Guam – The International Dimension, Presentation Paper at Forum on Guam’s Quest for Decolonization on Thirty-first Guam Legislature, in Guam.

First Hawaiian Bank. 2011. Economic Forecast, 2011-12 Guam-CNMI Edition

Government of Guam, 2011. Office of the Governor, Impact of the Compacts of Free Association on Guam FY2004 through FY2010.

Government of Guam, 2012. Office of the Governor, Impact of the Compacts of Free Association on Guam FY2004 through FY2011.

Guam State Data Center Bureau of Statistics and Plans, Government of Guam. 2009. 2008 Survey of Compact of Free Association (COFA) Migrants, Basic Tables: Guam.

Joint Guam Program Office. 2010. Final Environmental Impact Statement Guam and CNMI Military Relocation, Visiting Aircraft Carrier Berthing, and Army Air and Missile Defense Task Force, Executive Summary.

Matsushima, Yasukatsu. 2007. Mikuroneshia - chiisana shimajima no jiritsu heno chousen [Micronesia-Challenges in little Islands for Self-governance]. Waseda University Press.

Matsushima, Yasukatsu. 2011. Towards the Demilitarization of Guam and Okinawa, Position Paper before the United Nations Special Committee of 24 on Decolonization 66th Session in New York.

Matsushima, Yasukatsu. 2012. Ryukyu dokuritsu heno michi: shokuminchishugi ni aragau ryukyu nashonarizumu [Towards the Independence of Ryukyu]. Horitsu-Bunkasha.

Owen, Amy. 2010. Guam Culture, Immigration and the U.S. Military Build-up, Asia Pacific Viewpoint, Vol.51, No.3.

United States Department of the Interior Assistant Secretary for Insular Areas, Office of Insular Affairs. 2011. Report to the Congress on Compact Impact Analysis.

United States Government Accountability Office. 2011. Military Buildup on Guam: Costs and Challenges in Meeting Construction Timelines.

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Appendix 1. Guam – Current Forces

Source: Society of American Military Engineers, Guam Military Build-up Program, 2007 (This

map shows the places of US military bases in Guam)

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Session 2 Discussion and Responses from the Presenters

Pauline KENT: A variety of papers have been presented but the common keyword we keep hearing is “diversity.” Various migrants are facing more novel situations and it is this range of diversity that is making the problem so much more complex. This complexity is what these three papers have tried to address. We are now going to look to Doctor Sato to lead the discussion on these papers. Chizuko SATO: Thank you Professor Kent. Instead of summarizing what each paper has discussed, I just would like to touch upon three points in the form of questions in order to kick start the discussion. The first point is about the question of migration governance. In the morning session, we discussed the difference between citizenship and nationality. Likewise, I would like to touch on the question of governance: How are we going to define migration governance? Is it different from immigration control? I ask this because it seems that when discussing migration from the receiving country’s point-of-view, we have been using the term immigration control or immigration control policy. The receiving country controls immigration in a sense that it decides whom to accept or reject in entering the country, so we are obligated to accept this term. However, if we switch to using the term “migration governance,” shall we have to start thinking about something else? Who is going to govern whom? I pose this first question to all three presenters. Moving on to my second point, I was trying to find a common thread in these three papers and this morning Professor Kiri ci provided me with a big hint: all three papers were discussing south-south migration; Professor Khondker discussed about Bangladeshi workers in the UAE, Professor Matsushima’s paper dealt with migration of Micronesians to Guam, and Professor Eder talked about migration of women from central Asia to Turkey. Professor Matsushima’s presentation in particular highlighted the anxiety of the host countries in accepting migrants from Micronesian islands as well as from Okinawa, including military personnel. When we talk about this south-south migration, are we going to see the same problems which we saw in the case of north-south migration? In northern countries, migrants were subject to certain forms of discrimination and were in a state of vulnerability. In the case of south-south migration, are we going to see the same patterns or are we going to see a softer stance on migrants, or maybe even a harder stance? I, myself, am conducting research on South Africa and this country also both sends out and

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receives migrants. In 2008, there were shocking xenophobic incidents carried out against migrants. In the space of mere two months, more than 60 migrants from the rest of Africa were killed and more than 100 were injured. This was mainly a consequence of local resentment due to the perception of foreigners taking jobs from local residents. While South Africa, the most developed economy in the African continent, attracts migrants from the rest of Africa and is seen as a regional economic giant or hub, the unemployment rate in South Africa itself is also quite high at more than 20%. So, although South Africa is receiving migrants, it is still not really a developed country; it is somewhere in the middle. The countries of the “south” are increasingly differentiated. It can be said that all these countries of the “south,” including South Africa, which have started to attract or receive more people are also in the process of developing themselves. I would like to ask what the presenters think such countries stance on migrants will be and whether they are going to take the same stance as traditional receiving countries such as Europe, the United States, or Japan. My third point regards the aspect of gender. Professor Eder talked about the feminization of migration and this was interesting because feminization of migration can be partly ascribed to women in the “north” being integrated into the formal sector. They therefore need female workers to take care of the domestic, cleaning, or caring jobs. In the case of Turkey, however, you mentioned that the female labor participation is actually declining but women migrants are still coming in. It sounds paradoxical to me. Could you please elaborate a little more on why this is the situation in Turkey? Mine EDER: I will start with the last question. Actually, it is an ironic situation because it is the housewives who are the ones hiring a lot of these domestically employed women. SATO: Is this because the housewife does not want to do the housework and house chores? EDER: No, it is the availability. My argument here is that it is cheaper and that the availability of this kind of domestic labor due to migration has actually made it very attractive and affordable for even middle-class families to hire domestic help. Talking about this trend, female labor participation is a whole complicated issue, but urban, educated women do participate in the labor market. However, the overall female labor participation in the country is declining, which is a problem. I would give this as a sign of increasing conservatism in society in general. More women are working as housewives or even taking care of children and the elderly as their primary duty. Family values are overcoming the general female labor participation in that sense and this may create new sets of problems for women. It would be right to think that there is a paradox there. Usually the driving force has been urban women participating in the labor market, not having time to take care of the children, and that is why they hire help. But, in the Turkish context,

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paradoxically, it is the supply side of the story that has driven this demand. In the past, with domestic care in Turkey, this issue was solved through the grandmother taking care of the children, something which still goes on. However, now there is also internal Kurdish migration, rural-to-urban migration, people coming in and working in the informal labor markets, or members of a family network bringing girls to the city so they can have a better education. All of this is ongoing, but the sudden influx of this kind of female migrants has made it a broader phenomenon. I still have a couple of answers to your other questions, but I will stop there and give the floor to my colleagues. With regard to south-south migration, when I presented this in other countries I was asked, “Well this sounds very much like how the Germans or the Dutch treat their own migrants, except for the conservatism of the graphic, what’s new here?” Some police officers have actually told me that they are cooperating with their German and Dutch counterparts to learn about how deportations are being conducted. This is a new form of Europeanization for Europe; there is interaction on this front in moving towards more harmonization within the EU, which also comes with big pluses and minuses. I therefore do not see that much of a difference between “north-south” or “south-south” cases in that sense. I would like to add just one extra, more human episode. During one of my interviews, one of the women, who apparently came from a more middle-class family, started crying and I automatically assumed that she was crying because she was in a deportation center. She was crying not because she was getting deported but because she had been put in the same place as lower-class Turkmens. Thus we must be careful to ask what other kinds of factors might also be at work. Whether south-south, north-south, or east-west, with this particular woman, at that point in time, the thing that mattered most was that her class status was more important to her than her being Turkmen: “How could the Turkish government have failed to recognize this fact with the result that all of them were put in the same place within the deportation center?” My final response to the first question is: how do we legislate that? How you legislate and create a governance mechanism that can actually address all these dimensions is the perplexing question here. You can institute more liberal integration policies, standardization, and naturalization processes, but achieving some degree of acceptance of difference and tolerance, and tackling these kinds of racial, cultural and gender-based “others” is much more complicated as a consequence of this. SATO: Professor Khondker, could I ask your view on the question about governance? When we start using the term “migration governance,” are we going to talk about something which is different from “immigration control”? When it comes to the policy of migration, we have up to now been talking about “immigration control” by the government of the receiving

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country. Now we are bringing in “governance,” and therefore I wonder whether we are coming up with new policy measures in dealing with migration and the rights of migrants. Habibul H. KHONDKER: The keyword is “governance.” I am a strong believer that governance has to be separate and distinguished from the functions of government. First, governance is broader than government because in the process of governance, government is involved as only one of the parties, which also include NGOs, media, intellectuals, and others, each of which contributes to this process. Having clarified that, it is necessary to look at all the parties involved when talking about migration governance. Immigration control is one thing, but in many countries foreign labor is needed, for example in the Gulf, and governments want migrants to come. In the UAE, for instance, government is not in the business of facilitating the hyper-exploitation of migrant workers, because it is not in their best interests as a rich country. I do not think of the UAE as a “south” country, because, in terms of per capita income, it is in the top 20 or top 15 highest countries. Even in human development, according to the UNDP human development report it is in the top 30 or so countries worldwide, whether in literacy, healthcare, or any other indicator. So the UAE is basically a country which is rich, and in the high-income group according to World Bank classification. In contrast, South Africa is a new member of the BRICS countries and it occupies a different category. We need to be careful when categorizing countries. So, how does governance come in? When I attended the Abu Dhabi Process, which was a follow-up to the Colombo Process, at that meeting they had government representatives from sending and receiving countries. They had NGOs in attendance, because in Bangladesh, as in the Philippines, NGOs are very active. One of the most virulent critics of the UAE and other labor receiving countries is Human Rights Watch, the New York-based human rights organization. I was surprised to be able to meet and talk with the Human Rights Watch representative who had been invited. I have admiration for the UAE policy of being willing to engage in discussion when problems have been raised. I think that this attitude is much better than many other countries would venture. In one incident the Human Rights Watch committee was very critical of certain policies, yet they were still invited to present their annual report in Abu Dhabi at a press conference. In this way the UAE is not trying to hide their issues under the rug, they are saying, “Okay. These are problems. Let’s talk about them and see what can be done.” Once you involve all stakeholders and possible stakeholders in the process of conversation, that to me is governance, and it is the move towards improving the conditions of the workers that we all want. SATO: Professor Matsushima, do you have a response? Yasukatsu MATSUSHIMA: In my presentation I focused on the rapid increase of immigrants on small islands. A secondary focus was on military personnel as a kind of

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immigrant. In Guam and Okinawa, military personnel live both on and off base. They consume products and they interact and build relationships with the local people. Occasionally there is trouble in the form of criminal acts. I believe that such personnel should be recognized as another kind of immigrant. I mentioned the governance problem in my talk, referring to the fact that Guam is unable to legislate and manage immigration policy because they have been a US colony since 1898 and therefore do not have the power of governance over these matters. Furthermore, Guam must accept all immigrants from Micronesia, which is fairly accessible to Guam, because they cannot refuse any descendents of immigrants from Micronesia. Thus, as Guam cannot formulate their own immigration policy we can say that Guam lacks the power of governance. Moreover, the people and government of Guam are unable to participate in the process of creating governance; the US government alone is responsible for policy decisions. In answering the question about the south-south relationship, Micronesian citizens are able to go to Guam to study at university level or work and, in turn, the Guam government is responsible for paying the costs of their education, welfare, and other costs. So the relationship between Guam and Micronesia is not that of partners of equal status. The people of Guam must bear all the costs of such Micronesian immigrants while the Micronesians are free to enter Guam at will. In Guam, there are many cases of criminal acts carried out by Micronesians and this is a source of anger for the native Chamorro people. These are some of the more extreme problems of a south-south immigration relationship that is devoid of being able to resort to governance. KENT: Migration is very active within the Pacific area but there is probably little awareness of these issues on the European side of the world. Although these issues do not receive a great deal here on this side of the world, Professor Matsushima’s paper has presented some very interesting cases within the overall idea of what migration entails. It is also clear that even though people may have citizenship, if they are still considered second-class citizens, we also have to ask: what does citizenship then entail? From what we have heard today the concept of citizenship can tend to be very arbitrary. Eriko AOKI: This is a question for Professor Eder. Can you tell us more of the research you did in your interviewing of the women from Russia, Turkmenistan, or Uzbekistan? EDER: This began in 2006 with the suitcase takers. I started by interviewing the shopkeepers and went from there, and then started visiting households. I have interviewed about 30 or more women, since then, at houses, and then in 2007 I went to a deportation center where the third floor was reserved for women. There I interviewed roughly 30 women that were about to be deported. In the meantime, I went to labor agencies posing as an employer, and I also

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went to the police and conducted an interview with them during the summer of 2007. I intend hopefully to follow that up soon. I have been researching this for more than six or seven years, in total, now. Most of the interviews I reference go back to the deportation center; these were interviews with women who could actually talk freely about their story because, unfortunately, they had nothing to lose at that point. Of course, I asked them to narrate about their households as well as the police and other encounters they have experienced and this is where I got some of the stories about how the police ended up retrieving them. I also interviewed police and the police were actually quite open in telling their stories as well. I should also underline that they do not see these women as a threat. Even though there has been a securitization of the borders, it is transit migrants and men who are perceived more as a major threat in comparison to women. This explains why treatment of these women varies wildly across the board. For example, the police may adopt the attitude “Well they’re here for business, they’re making money, we’ll not disturb them” and they leave it at that. But, if they see them in a bar or they are suspected of prostitution and labeled disruptive, they are not going to leave them alone. Again, my point has been that there is such an incredible leverage here. Some of the new migration laws that Professor Kiri ci was referring to that are coming out of this are going to try and standardize some of the due processes, beginning with the management of these deportation centers, so that when these people are being mistreated they can at least get some legal recourse and assert their rights. That would be an improvement in terms of ameliorating conditions at these deportation centers in general. Of course, this is a huge undertaking. There are about 36 new deportation centers that have been established across Turkey, and there needs to be a lot of research on that. It is necessary to go and see what they are doing and what sort of due process is at work in those centers. Hopefully, that’s a project in the making. KENT: You mentioned 36 “deportation centers.” I think that this might fall under the category of “migration control,” rather than migration governance. Do we have any last pressing questions? Akihiro ASAKAWA: I have one technical question. You talked about deportation centers; I’m interested in the management of immigrants in Turkey, in particular the organizational arrangement of Turkey’s immigration policy. In Japan there is a separate body called the Bureau of Immigration which is subordinate to the Ministry of Justice. My understanding is that in Turkey the immigration authority is part of the police. When we talk about the governance of immigration, in Australia, for example, there is a Department of Immigration and Citizenship which administrates immigration control, deportation, citizenship and integration, English-language education, and related aspects. In contrast, in Japan or Turkey, the function of the similar departments is limited to the physical control, including

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deportation, of immigrants. Could you tell us a little bit more about the governmental organization and structure of immigration control within Turkey? EDER: That is an excellent question. There is a new law that they are trying to pass—Professor Kiri ci would probably be in a much better position to answer this because he was involved in the drafting of the law itself—but the new law is doing precisely this, trying to establish a new office of the Department of Immigration that would standardize and coordinate all of the aspects from citizenship to integration. Unfortunately, this law has not yet been passed, so for now, it is still part of the Ministry of Interior and is coordinated through the police. The new law that I am referring to will hopefully standardize the due process within these deportation centers, the management of these deportation centers, establish coordination between different agencies, standardize the paperwork on citizenship, standardize the granting of work permits, manage the control of these flows, and register these flows. I think that that is the problem that the Turkish government is facing right now. A lot of people are on the move. According to statistics, one million people enter and leave from Georgia. Professor Kiri ci has written about this huge explosion of Turkey as a hub of people moving in and out. Deportation numbers are increasing, some of this is illegal entry, visa overstays, prostitution—a lot of things are going on. Some of this is regular, direct migration and then there is also a lot of transit migration and some refugees. Professor Kiri ci gave you the whole map in the morning, but this is why I think there is growing pressure on the government to somehow come up with a department that would deal with the different aspects across the whole spectrum. But to my knowledge, they have been trying to pass this for the last two years or so. So there is doubt over whether or not anything will come of it. Professor Kiri ci was involved in the drafting so he is much more familiar with the ongoing issues. Kemal K R C : I was just one of those who observed the drafting of this law from the sidelines, but what you have described captures where the situation stands. This draft law has one part that deals solely with the setting up of a new agency. The draft law is in the cabinet and it is in the process of being moved to the parliament, but there is resistance and one source of resistance comes, not surprisingly, from the police. What Professor Eder may not have mentioned, is that not every single person that gets picked up by the police ends up in a deportation center because the police find ways of letting them go. So one could say that they regard such discretion as a “right.” I would like to go back to what Professor Khondker brought up about governance. In terms of this exercise here, that is one of the important concepts, and this draft law was precipitated

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partly by a Human Rights Watch report that stirred up a clamor in November 2008, which then precipitated a bureaucratic and political process that has resulted in this draft law. I think we need to bear that in mind. Secondly, listening to this provoking discussion, besides “What is governance?” we need to discuss “What is the south?” In categorizing the United Arab Emirates as “north,” we need to ask ourselves what is the difference? I think there is a difference that goes beyond just per capita income, and here, not meaning to take the side of governments of the north, but especially in the EU and EU member states, a key has emerged that signals significantly the difference between the north and the south: the rule of law. The north does get a lot of things wrong, but we have to at least recognize that governance there is very much driven by the rule of law, and also NGOs. UNHCR, for example, get to see every single communication in this area that the European Commission puts out. In the south, it varies from country to country. This exercise to which we were privy approaches to your definition of governance. My last quick point is, when one listens to Professor Eder talking about her area of interest and focus, a very gloomy picture emerges about this type of migration. If she would allow me to say so, Professor Eder is an employer of such a lady, and the way she employs that person does not mirror the examples in her paper. There are also many other people who are similar to Professor Eder and some go even further and assist these women with obtaining work permits and incorporating them into their social welfare networks. So I would say the picture is a bit more varied even if the portrait presented by Professor Eder’s paper is obviously part of the reality and may well be a dominant part of that reality. EDER: We should not forget that my employee is still vulnerable, though! KENT: I think we have heard some very important points from the floor today. Regarding the last point about definitions of “governance,” it will be important to redefine or clarify this concept so that we can employ it more objectively in our research. On the topic of terms such as the “south” and “north,” coming from Australia, I tend to object to this type of terminology because it does not describe the geographical or social reality in Australia’s case. So Dr. Sato’s point about governance and control extends to a number of concepts that need to be reformulated so that they more accurately reflect the changing world. Immigration has changed at an enormous pace over the past few years and this is evident from the stories of our Turkish colleagues. It is therefore necessary for us, as academics, to try and keep up by redefining how we talk about these subjects. From this last session, talking about this idea of diversity and how we handle it on different levels, it is clear that because immigration deals with people’s lives it is by its very nature extremely complex. It is important to ask how we, as academics, discuss this topic. I would like to conclude this session by once again thanking all three of our paper presenters today for their fascinating contributions.

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ROUNDTABLE-GENERAL

DISCUSSION

ROUNDTABLE-GENERAL DISCUSSION

“Migration Policy Dialogue in Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region”

Roundtable-General Discussion Kemal K R C : I would like to begin this session by introducing Prof. Nermin Abadan-Unat. She is a long-standing student of migration and a teacher for many of us, not only as academics but also as bureaucrats and diplomats. She has extensively studied migration from Turkey to Germany and has a very extensive list of publications, the most recent being Turks in Europe: From Guest Workers to Transnational Citizens, which I highly recommend. Nermin will be the second speaker, hence I'm going to push forward to Ahmet çduygu, the first speaker and a good friend of ours. In my morning remarks, I made a reference to Ahmet as the Director of the research program at Bo aziçi University. Ahmet has a long-standing interest in transient migration through Turkey, but his interests are not limited to that. He is a demographer and sociologist by training from Australia. I will turn the floor over to Ahmet for his overall remarks. Ahmet ÇDUYGU: One of the main objectives of this workshop is to explore possible sociological arrangements, to talk about the research agenda for Europe and Asia-Pacific. I would like to briefly talk about possible research agenda that we can explore. First, let’s return to the methodological and analytical issues and focus on two geographically separated international migration systems. One is in Europe and the surrounding area, and the other is in Asia-Pacific. Each of these two migration systems has its own history and specific characteristics, and each has its own current, ongoing regime. Of course, within these two migration systems, we can talk about subsystems and subregimes. Second, historically we are focusing on old and new migration flows after the Second World War. In effect we are focusing on the Cold War and Post-Colonial periods, so this historical background is also quite important to our discussion. And of course, over the last 20 years we have also been facing the globalization process, so this brings in another dimension. This division between the Cold War Period, the Post-Cold War period, and the globalization process forces us to consider both old and new migration flows. Historically speaking, to highlight some examples, the Mediterranean region is very connected to the southwest parts of Australia through migration from Greece, Italy, the former Yugoslavia, Turkey and elsewhere. As an example of how these regions are connected via the increased movement of

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domestic workers, I saw a documentary of a unique case of small migration flows from a town on the Black Sea to Japan and back. It showed how a group of people moved step-by-step to Japan and back. This was an example of irregular migration. Of course, our research should go beyond simple comparisons. For instance, today there was a discussion of whether we should we have such dichotomies as temporary migration versus permanent migration. In fact, these dichotomies can be discussed through geographies. Another dichotomy is legal versus illegal, a creation of globalization. The borders between these dichotomy structures are very blurred. I think this applies as well to voluntary versus forced migration. We can probably even discuss how internal migration and international migration are connected through the rural transformations taking place in certain parts of these regions. In the age of globalization, the borders between these two types of structures are quite blurred. So this could create another way of looking at the research agenda. Let’s move into the thematic base of this discussion. For instance, we can talk about crisis migration asylum seekers, refugees, and the irregular migrants who are fleeing. We can compare cases. There is also the role of independent female migration; historically, female migration is always on the agenda. Again, in the last 20 years, we have observed a growing diversification of independent female migration. There is also skilled and professional migration. Often the countries partaking in it prefer skilled and professional migrants, and this is often overestimated in the overall picture. Fifth is student migration, which is new. When my staff started studying migration, we did not talk about student migrants, but this is becoming an issue in the field of migration, with some countries like Australia now offering graduate students a transition period to settle in those countries after they complete their education. Many countries in the north, in fact, are working toward those types of settlement choices for migrant professionals. Sixth is tourism and migration. The movement of people for the purpose of tourism is very important. The relationship between tourism and migration is a new pattern. You all recognize shuttle or circular migration. We should try to organize research studies exploring female migration by marriage, or love migration, or sex worker migration. Another is migration due to environmental preferences. You have a lot of north European citizens coming to Mediterranean countries. Probably the same applies to the Pacific region since many Asians prefer Australia. So these are just a few topical issues. The question here is, what will be our contribution to the territorializing migration studies, particularly in terms of theories? When we look at the conventional migration picture, it’s very Euro-centric; European views are dominating the

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picture. The voices of the migration countries are less represented. I think this platform should work on how we can contribute theory based on case studies. Nermin ABADAN-UNAT: Listening to the different contributions, I think there was a great amount of time and effort spent on developing governance and citizenship and elaborating a number of legal norms. But I think these efforts are one-sided. They are certainly much more in the interests of the receiving country and not so much in the interests of the migrants themselves. For a great many people who have migrated, this acquisition of citizenship remains instrumental. In reality, identity is a separate issue. People are developing their own identities, cultural and individual identities. It’s not related directly to legal definitions. The legal definition is accepted because there is no other way to express it. In a way, it’s not very sincere, it’s a sort of artificial kind of admission. For instance, there are citizenship tests for loyalty in Europe. Even if you have to give up your former citizenship Germany is requiring it loyalty remains toward the home country even if the person involved is, legally speaking, now German. This is particularly important, because many European countries assumed that by insisting on acquisition of citizenship, they are going to secure integration at the same time. Integration has nothing to do with a legal act. In terms of what sort of climate exists in a country, in recent years a great number of Turks have been returning from Europe to Turkey. That number is around 900,000, which is not insignificant. Why does this happen? Because there is a climate of xenophobia which translates itself in different situations. For instance, one book published in Germany, which sold about three million copies in one week, created a lot of bad blood and encouraged racism and discrimination. Somebody came to visit the author, she had been living in Germany for over 20 years, acquired German citizenship, and passed all the tests, but she said, “I don’t speak in German to Germans because I don’t want to be regarded as a Turk.” The discrimination is so strong, she prefers to speak English although she has German citizenship. And this comes to one of your speakers who asked, who is benefitting? Well, the countries that have been able to develop a culture of tolerance are the ones that benefit. In this respect, it’s the United States, Canada, and Australia, countries that have been open in saying that everybody who comes is bringing something and they welcome it. In Germany, on the other hand, the German Christian Democratic Party repeated for over 20 years, “We are not a migration country. We don’t want these people to come.” Obviously this has created an underclass. Whether you are at the top or on the bottom, it doesn’t make much difference. People are looking at pronunciation, dialect, the words people use. So I think what we have to find out is, first of all, to what degree is there a transnational identity? If this

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transnational identity is developing in a more positive way, then maybe integration is going to happen. But simply imposing legal norms, such as not permitting children to speak their mother tongue in school, is not going to help much. It encourages people to cheat, to not be sincere. I think what we have to look at today is: what sort of transnational social spaces are created that are establishing links and significantly affect migrants? We know there are a great number of areas in which religious movements, economic cooperation, social networks, and gender networks are influential, and we have to discover the links between the sending country and the receiving country, because these legal norms do not sufficiently reflect reality. They are a sort of screen, to look correct, but political correctness is not a policy. I hope future research is done on the subject of what sort of hybrid personalities are emerging, because more and more migration is occurring and more and more, we are mixing. But in each society there are these subgroups that are developing and are pushed aside. There are indirect consequences of governments, and these indirect consequences are created in countries like my own. The emergence of ethnic conflicts and religious conflicts is juxtaposed with the expectations of Europe. Europe is graying, getting older, they want to have a young generation, and this young generation can only grow and retain something of its old background if there is a climate of tolerance. This is why I think cultural studies in terms of adaptation and integration of migrants is one the most relevant things I can imagine. Another important point is the inclusion of migration in the international relations sphere. Relationships between governments and states today are significantly influenced by migration policy, and we should have more studies about the electoral processes which take place in different countries and their outlook for migration. For example, if we look today in France, one of the major subjects of President Sarkozy is, how is he going to diminish the number of unwanted people? So electoral processes should also be studied, because they will allow us to predict the future. If we have to predict the future, I would suggest that the role of the diaspora in foreign affairs is something very closely related to the way migrant communities are included or excluded. Because if they are not included, they will try to use the diaspora to create new conflicts. Another aspect that needs to be studied is how migration is changing urban space and what can be done to overcome post-modern ghettos and post-modern urban concentration. The value system that is developing due to migration also has to be studied sufficiently deeply so that we can understand each other better. Maria Reinaruth D. CARLOS: I’ll just try to summarize what we discussed. I think all of these research agenda, discussions and issues raised here will take 20 or 30 years to explore,

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but at the same time, we realize that there is a wealth of topics and possible themes for our research collaboration. In this Workshop, we can identify three realities in the current world of international migration. First, that migration is a permanent reality in both host and sending countries. Specially for host countries like Japan and Turkey, we need to think not only of whether and who will be allowed entry to the country, but also of the foreign migrants’ integration in the society. One key word that emerged was “multiculturalism,” a word that is quite elusive and may assume different interpretations based on which host country we are talking about. We can think of Singaporean-style multiculturalism, Australian-style multiculturalism, and recently, even South Korean-style multiculturalism, etc. Second, we can also say that ageing society and intensifying international competitiveness are present realities in many host countries; and migration is an option to respond to these demographic and economic transformations. We can look further into their relationship with international migration by exploring the issues of accepting foreign health care workers as elderly care becomes a commodity, or of actively taking in IT professionals and other so-called highly skilled workers to boost a host country’s competitiveness. Having said that, on a bigger scale, I think a very vague but relevant question in our research agenda is indeed, “Who benefits and who loses from international migration?” Third and lastly, we should realize that the field of Migration Studies is interdisciplinary. We have political scientists, historians, sociologists, economists, political economists among us. Studying international migration from a wide variety of perspectives including History, Law, International Relations, Politics, Cultural Studies and Economics is necessary, but at the same time, it makes our research more complicated. I would also say that the interdisciplinary nature of this area is a worthwhile opportunity for us here to conduct research collaboration. We have also discussed governance of migration and dialogue especially in the afternoon session. I was wondering how we can conceptualize these terms. Maybe for a start, it is important to realize that there are many levels of dialogue with varied stakeholders participating; and they make up a web of interactions among each other. This dialogue can be intra-regional (ASEAN, Middle East, EU); inter-regional (ASEAN and EU); global-international (UN, ILO, IOM-led dialogues?); government to government (among sending countries like the Colombo Process or among host countries like Canada-US or several countries in EU); among stakeholders in one country, even dialogues at the micro-level such as between the health care service provider and the patient, the husband and the wife, the migrant worker and the local worker, the returning migrant and the migrant’s family, etc. How we govern migration through dialogue, and how to obtain a consensus through communication are important research agendas for us in Afrasia.

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It is not easy, however, to achieve a consensus at all levels of these dialogues; and as a consequence, conflicts become more visible and difficult to solve. To give you an example, let me briefly show what happened to Japan’s acceptance of foreign nurses and careworkers under the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement. Based on the number of Filipino nurses and careworkers deployed and the number of premature termination of the initial working contract for these foreigners, we can say that the scheme is performing below its expectations. The main reason for this was the Japanese government’s failure to gain consensus among the national stakeholders, such as the labor unions and professional organizations, the business groups, the local community, the hospitals and the care institution administrators; we should also not forget the stakeholders in the sending country as well as the migrants themselves. For these stakeholders, it is not only a one-on-one relationship with the state but between each other as well, so that makes this dialogue and consensus-building, and therefore governance, more complicated. We can imagine the number of national and international stakeholders when we discuss the Colombo Process or Intra-ASEAN migration governance. With these realities and with the complex nature of international migration, how do we move forward in our research agenda? We think that it will be much more productive if we share information on migration experiences and explore possible research topics together, perhaps based on two approaches. One, a comparative approach, for example, comparing Asia and Europe, or Japan and Turkey. We can identify commonalities and differences and their “whys” and “hows.” Examples of more concrete topics for comparison are the kinds, modes and processes of migration and identification of country-specific and cultural aspects to understand and practice migration governance and dialogue within and among countries. Perhaps another way of approaching this is to concentrate on the common issues based on some universal, or agreed-upon definitions and concepts related to migration, perhaps also with special citations to Turkey and Japan. This exercise can probably also help us in our attempt to build and establish theories. Some examples that fall under this group of research agendas are governance of migration; culture and how it affects the concepts (e.g. nationality and citizenship); international mechanisms of migration management, global societal and environmental change and migration; dialogues at different levels, its process and impacts; external pressures for migration reforms and governance (e.g. EU and Turkey, Asian countries and US); human rights and other human security concerns in migration; discrimination among migrants based on color, work, religion; impacts on sending country; etc. With these examples, we can already think of some concepts that really need to be clearly defined before we can actually begin looking at the common issues and solutions. And again, we need scholars from different disciplines to be able to do this. As for our expected output, perhaps we can have some joint publications or conferences

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regularly published as proceedings as an incentive for us to work on this project. In that way, and not limited to the members here, we can share our knowledge and output not only with academic people but also with governments and the migrants themselves. K R C : At the end you mentioned publications. Journals will constitute an important carrot in front of us, at least for Turkish academics, as we are under pressure to publish in journals that are cited in the social science citation index. We should maintain a conversation on this. Aysun UYAR: Professor Carlos and I wrote together the last four slides based on our discussions with Professor Khondker and Professor Kiri ci yesterday. We also discussed that this might be some kind of agenda. Here, I just would like to re-emphasize two things, two key words. One that has already been discussed is “change.” Change is very important in that we see societal change, even global societal change in our world recently. So we have to change the way we look at these issues. Another is that the global and environmental changes are very important and they affect people’s movements. That’s another aspect we can focus on. Based on these topics of change, the second important keyword I wanted to reemphasize was interdisciplinarity. Even going beyond interdisciplinarity, recently we have been talking about transdisciplinarity, which means going beyond our academic circles. Actually, everyone in this room has already been doing this in different ways. We can invite other interest groups and other stakeholders: from agencies and from governmental institutions. K R C : I will refrain from adding my perspective other than to make a confession. Soon it will be my thirtieth year in this profession, but interdisciplinarity is a term I always had difficulties dealing with. Now that I’ve seen you throw in transdisciplinarity, I may hasten the process of bowing out of the academic world. I find these concepts to be extremely challenging, and my sense is to try to maintain a research agenda that is as narrow as possible, to be able to deliver the goods to the people who provide the funds. I have a feeling that those who provide the funds will inevitably wish to see priority being given to policy-oriented, pragmatic issues. And following from that, I have a feeling that a key word ought to be, again, dialogue, and governance, but first of all dialogue. Habibul H. KHONDKER: I wrote a paper entitled “Wanted But Not Welcome,” a phrase I lifted from Aristide Zolberg. It’s important to make the distinction, where do we belong? You may live in England for years, and you still belong to India. I know this because I also study cricket and its supporters. In a cricket match, people support their “home” team, which is India. Location and belonging have been ruptured by the process of globalization. I think it’s quite interesting. But in terms of agenda-setting, I think that’s why the class issue prevailed. We use diaspora in

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a very generic sense. But when we look at the actual literature, we’re looking at a very middle-class, professional, culturally cosmopolitanized class, and they come under the definition of diaspora as opposed to working-class migration. The latter are not really into that cosmopolitanism, although we talk about “cosmopolitanism from below.” It would be helpful to talk about different classes, gender groups, ethnic minorities, and geographic issues, based on the fact that European countries, despite myriad flaws, are still run on the basis of rule of law, which is not missing in India, except what kind of rule of law? You know, chopping off somebody’s head? That is also rule of law, “our” law. So we need to go beyond the rule of law and ask what kind of law and what quality of law. Is the law sensitive to human rights and up to global standards of human dignity? I think we need to remember the differences, and here I was thinking of a famous statement by John Fairbank, the doyen of China Studies at Harvard. He once said, “Communism is good for China, capitalism is good for America.” I think that’s a wonderful statement. It’s not relativizing social systems, but you need to recognize that there are differences. A country with 80% foreigners and 20% local population cannot pursue a Canadian standard of a multicultural society where everyone should be given citizenship. And why not include Canada in the discussion you had multinational, multicultural, etc.? In a society where you have nationalities that pre-exist, like Canada: the Canadian-Indians, aboriginals, the French and the English, Anglo-Saxon and French-speaking, they’re nationalities. They’re not ethnic groups. Ethnic groups would be Bangladeshis coming to Canada. So we can make a distinction between nationalities, multinational societies, and poly-ethnic societies, which I find very useful. And we could use that framework when talking about Europe to a certain extent, because in some societies, in Spain and so on, you have multinational groups that change very suddenly, but then you have new waves of postwar migrants who are sensitive about ethnic groups. We need to remember those differences between advanced countries where there are issues of citizenship, as opposed to places which do not have it, like Singapore. Malaysia is a receiving country as well as a sending country. We can discuss how to ensure minimum safety for workers, to ensure that workers get paid on time, to ensure that female workers are not abused and exploited. So we are talking about different kinds of human rights regimes, and we cannot pretend they will all come under the same discussion. We need to be prepared for global diversity that is a reflection of global reality. We need to be sensitive to policy outcomes, that positive policy outcomes will come out of this discussion, because it’s not an esoteric subject. We are talking about human lives, about families, about women being

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cheated, exploited, and so on. We need to be sensitive to those differences and make compromises. I will end with one statement. What is the takeaway from this conference? For me, it was learning to make a distinction between non-violent and non-cruel. We can’t be non-violent. We eat meat and do all sorts of things, but we can be non-cruel. I think that lesson can be extrapolated to how we treat migrant workers. It’s a question of dignity. At least the way they are handled should be on the basis of non-cruelty. ABADAN-UNAT: I should remind you that Fairbanks got into trouble when he said that. The 1950s Anti-American Activities Committee pulled him down from Harvard and he had to prove himself as a loyal American and anti-Communist. He recanted his statement. K R C : That reminds me of what happened to an American university student in the 1960s in New York, Times Square, when police charged this group of students demonstrating, and this kid was yelling back at the police officer, saying, “I’m an anti-communist! You’re beating up the wrong person!” And the policeman said, “I don’t care what kind of communist you are!” ABADAN-UNAT: Speaking of multiculturalism, I would like to make two points. In 1975, 17 Dutch universities came together, established a special fund, and asked to do research here in Turkey. They selected a place called Bo azliyan in central Anatolia, which had sent a great number of migrants to different European countries. There is also a book in English, “Migration and Development,” summarizing the results of their research. Now, that research highlighted the fact that the financial and economic aspects of migration have been overemphasized. The cultural aspect was totally neglected in the study in Turkey. In Europe, there is one country that has established a policy of multiculturalism, and that is the Netherlands. The way the Netherlands has later interpreted this within its own borders has not been satisfactory. On the contrary, the harmony that was created among different Dutch religious denominations in the past did not occur in the present, and it resulted in isolating different national groups. Today in Europe, the most radical anti-migrant political parties are in Holland and Denmark. So I would like to suggest multiculturalism as a government policy, because the Netherlands did declare as a state policy that they would follow a multi-ethnic path. But later they completely turned the other way. Germany did not officially recognize multiculturalism as a governmental policy, but the municipalities all adopted it. They used euphemisms like “multi culti,” diminishing the seriousness of it, and ultimately the effort was reduced to the level of a food festival or a dance festival.

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So I think it’s something you really have to take sincerely and explore the possibility of developing multicultural policies. In that respect, what will be the place of religious values versus cultural values, and how does this reflect itself in educational policy? In Germany, for instance, this has been totally ignored. Turkey’s development has not been reflected in school texts. Therefore, the children of Turkish descent are always exposed to a sort of minimized national identity. These are some subjects that I think deserve very careful assessment. Is it possible to develop a governmental multicultural policy? If so, how can it be done? Of course there are examples like Canada. Is Canada extreme? Is that approach applicable elsewhere? I would like to see more effort in this area. K R C : This has been a very fruitful day with very interesting presentations and a very ambitious forward agenda. I must be honest: I am a bit concerned about this ambitious forward agenda. I hope we can remain in touch, and I know the word “reduce” is not a very uplifting word, but I hope we can collapse it into a more manageable agenda. I would like to reiterate from my point of view that a more manageable agenda would be an agenda that revolves around this issue of dialogue and governance across the experience of these countries we’ve looked at. I would also like to add to the point that Ahmet made about theoretical ethnicity, the bias that the current literature has. I have this intuitive feeling that if we were able to put together a special issue that addressed theoretical issues under an umbrella we could construct, it would receive a positive reception. And I think the fact that we are here, a Japanese and Turkish university, together with Abu-Dhabi, that is a strength, and we should focus on that. Selçuk ESENBEL: I’m the director of the Asian Studies Center, which has recently been established. We have some workshops that took place last year, and the proceedings will be published soon. Our agenda is basically to create a field of Asian Studies in Turkey. This in itself is methodologically significant, because Asian Studies originally grew out of the European imagination. It’s challenging to say I’m going to do Asian Studies, but I’m not going to do it from Europe. I’m not going to do it from the United States. I’m going to do it from a country which itself is Eurasian, which has a sort of hybridity that is already part of the object of study. Next week we’re cooperating with a UNESCO mission for philosophy and humanistic studies, and we’re having a special workshop on problems of methodology and theory in doing Asian Studies from Turkey. We hope this will be an open forum. The question will be,

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what are the issues you face? You want to get away from Euro-centricness, but at the same time you don’t want to be a third-world nationalist and say, I don’t like this, I’m just going to be a nationalist. That is not so easy, unfortunately. We’re also going to have a conference on “Japan on the Silk Road: Encounters and Perspectives in Eurasia between 1868 and 1945,” dealing with the Japanese imagination involved with the activities along the Silk Road Eurasian route. K R C : That reminds me of your FIFA remark, because as I spoke to the Foreign Ministry in preparation for this meeting, I was told that Turkey is pushing very hard to initiate what they call the Silk Route dialogue on migration issues within the Prague process. I’d like to thank our sponsors for having supported us on the map of the globe, along with my friends and colleagues and the visiting group. Thank you very much.

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WORKSHOP PROGRAM MARCH 2 (Friday) Tour of the University (Friday afternoon at Bo aziçi University South Campus) Official Reception (19:00~) MARCH 3 (Saturday) OPENING REMARKS (09:00-09:15) (Kemal Kiri ci and Pauline Kent) OPENING SESSION (09:15-10:30) Chair (Aysun Uyar) Japan’s and Turkey’s Experiences with Immigration and Current Research Agendas 1. Turkey: A Country of Transition from Emigration to Immigration (Kemal Kiri ci) 2. Issues in Japan’s Transition from Migrant-Sending to Migrant-Receiving Country

“Zainichi Koreans and their Transnational Ties with Japan and Korea” (Soo im Lee) “Lost in Transition: Current Issues in Japan’s Labor Migration” (Ma. Reinaruth D.

Carlos) 3. Historical Perspective: the Case of Tartar Immigrants in Japan (Selçuk Esenbel)

Short Break (10:30-10:40) SESSION I (10:40-12:40) Chair (Selçuk Esenbel) Governance of Migration in Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region I 1. Trends and Issues in the Governance of “Citizenship” in Turkey (Zeynep Kadirbeyo lu) 2. The Naturalization System in Modern Japan (Akihiro Asakawa) 3. Who Benefits from Dual Nationality?: Cases from South Korea, the Philippines, and

Japan (Shincha Park) 4. European Practices of Citizenship and Changing Trends (Dilek Ç nar)

Discussant (Eriko Aoki) Lunch Break (12:50-14:00)

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SESSION II (14:00-16:00) Chair (Pauline Kent) Governance of Migration in Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region II 1. Understanding Diversity and Solidarity among Bangladeshi Workers in the United Arab

Emirates: Implications for Migration Governance (Habibul H. Khondker) 2. The Implications of the Transfer of US Bases from Okinawa on the Economy and

International Migration in Guam (Yasukatsu Matsushima) 3. Exploring Layers of “Othering”: Globalization and Female Migrant Workers in Turkey

(Mine Eder) Discussant (Chizuko Sato) Coffee/Tea Break (16:00-16:20) ROUNDTABLE-GENERAL DISCUSSION (16:20-17:30) Migration Policy Dialogue in Europe and the Asia-Pacific Region Chair (Kemal Kiri ci) Commentators (Nermin Abadan-Unat, Ahmet çduygu, and Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos) CLOSING REMARKS Unofficial Dinner (18:30~)

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LIST OF PARTICIPANTS (In alphabetical order of last name) Nermin ABADAN-UNAT Professor Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Bo aziçi University Email: unatn@boun.edu.tr Eriko AOKI Professor Faculty of Sociology, Ryukoku University Email: aoki@soc.ryukoku.ac.jp Ye im ARAT Professor Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Bo aziçi University Email: araty@boun.edu.tr Akihiro ASAKAWA Assistant Professor Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University Email: asakawa@gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp Maria Reinaruth D. CARLOS Associate Professor Faculty of Intercultural Communication, Ryukoku University Email: rdcarlos@world.ryukoku.ac.jp

Dilek ÇINAR Associate Professor Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Bo aziçi University Email: dilek.cinar@boun.edu.tr Mine EDER Professor Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Bo aziçi University Email: eder@boun.edu.tr Selçuk ESENBEL Professor Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Bo aziçi University Email: esenbel@boun.edu.tr Ahmet ÇDUYGU Professor Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Koç University Email: aicduygu@ku.edu.tr Zeynep KAD RBEYO LU Assistant Professor Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Bo aziçi University Email: zeynep.kadirbeyoglu@boun.edu.tr

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Satoko KAWAMURA Post-doctoral Research Fellow Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University Email: s-kawamura@ad.ryukoku.ac.jp Pauline KENT Professor and Dean, Faculty of Intercultural Communication, Ryukoku University Email: pauline@world.ryukoku.ac.jp Habibul H. KHONDKER Professor Humanities and Social Sciences, College of Arts and Sciences, Zayed University (UAE) Email: habibul.khondker@zu.ac.ae Kemal K R C Professor Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Bo aziçi University Email: kirisci@boun.edu.tr Soo im LEE Professor Faculty of Business Administration, Ryukoku University Email: lee@biz.ryukoku.ac.jp Yasukatsu MATSUSHIMA Professor Faculty of Economics, Ryukoku University Email: matusima@econ.ryukoku.ac.jp

Takeshi MITA Lecturer Faculty of International Political Science and Economics, Nishogakusha University Email: weiminghu-2@ric.hi-ho.ne.jp Shincha PARK Research Assistant Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University Email: spark@ad.ryukoku.ac.jp Chizuko SATO Research Fellow African Studies Group, Area Studies Center, Institute of Developing Economies Email: chizuko_sato@ide.go.jp Aysun UYAR Assistant Professor Research Institute for Humanity and Nature Email: auyar@chikyu.ac.jp Gökçen YILMAZ Research Assistant Faculty of Economic and Administrative Sciences, Bo aziçi University Email: gokcen.yilmaz@boun.edu.tr

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1

Research Series, Studies on Multicultural Societies No.1

Ryukoku University Afrasian Research Centre First International Workshop

with Bo aziçi University

Policy Dialogue and Governance of Migration: Comparative Cases from Europe and Asia-Pacific

March 2-3, 2012 Bo aziçi University Rector’s Conference Hall

Istanbul, Turkey

Edited by Pauline Kent, Maria Reinaruth D. Carlos,

Aysun Uyar, Shincha Park

Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University (Phase 2)

2012 3 9

520-2194

TEL / FAX: 077-544-7173 http://afrasia.ryukoku.ac.jp/

600-8047 677-2

TEL: 075-343-0006 ISBN 978-4-904945-25-4

ISBN 978-4-904945-25-4

Afrasian Research Centre, Ryukoku University

1-5 Yokotani, Seta Oe-cho, Otsu, ShigaJapan 520-2194