race prejudice and racism: a distinction

Research notes/Notes de recherche

RACE PREJUDICE AND RACISM: A DISTINCTION

JAMES WHITE I University of Calgary J.S . FRIDERES I University of Calgary

Jusqu’a tout recemment, les auteurs n’essayaient pas de clarifier la difference entre les notions de racisme et de prejudice racial. Les deux expressions sont souvent interchangees. Comme I’ont indique certains critiques, les idees de racisme et de prejudice racial ne sont pas les mimes. Afin de distinguer entre ces deux topiques, I’hypothese qu’il n’existe pas de relation entre les mesures empiriques des deux idees a ete mise a I’epreuve. On s’est servi de mesures autonomes pour definir enfin la dimension affective concernant I’attitude du prejudice racial. Les conclusions suggerent que les deux idees ne sont pas etroitement reliees quand elles sont mesurees par des questions-type Likert. Toutefois, ces mimes idees sont etroitement reliees quand elles sont mesurees par des indicateurs autonomes d’eveillement affectif.

Until recently authors have made little attempt at clarifying the differences between the concepts of racism and race prejudice. The two terms have often been used interchangeably. As a few contem- porary critics have pointed out, the concepts of racism and race prejudice may not be the same. In order to distinguish between racism and race prejudice, the hypothesis that there is no relationship between empirical measures of the two concepts was tested. Autonomic measures were used to operationally define the affective dimension of the attitude: race prejudice. Findings suggest that the two concepts are not closely associated when measured by Likert-type questions, but closely associated when measured by autonomic indicators of affective arousal.

Much of the literature in the sociology and social psychology of race relations deals with the problem of race prejudice and racism. Research in this area tends to vary from experimental designs focusing on the attitude of race prejudice to the more macro institutional structures of racism. This field offers us an excellent example of the theoretical bifurcation in sociology between what we label the macro and micro approaches. We feel that this bifurcation arises in the area of race relations when one examines the current use of the terms race prejudice and racism. In the majority of social-psychological research the term race prejudice is encountered frequently where the concept racism is much less frequent. The macro-type approaches the terms racism and race prejudice often as synonyms. The manner in which these terms are employed suggests that they represent an area in sociology that is in need of conceptual clarification.

Conceptual clarification of the terms race prejudice and racism might yield the result that these terms are actually incompatible in some respects. For instance, race prejudice may very well be a fruitful concept at the social- psychological level but may be relatively use- less at the macro-level of institutional analysis. The alternative result which might be forthcom- ing from conceptual clarification is that the two terms are in fact synonyms and, hence, inter- changeable at any level of analysis. Such a finding would imply that since race prejudice could be used as a macro-level concept, much of the inquiry concerning institutional race relations could be tied to the research in attitude theory.

Much of the social psychological research on race prejudice has been closely aligned with attitude theory and, therefore, this body of knowledge could become useful to the sociologist studying race relations if, in fact, the

R e v . canad. SOC. &Anth./Canad. R e v . SOC. &Anth. 14(1)1977

82 / James White and J.S. Frideres

two terms are synonyms. The implications for conceptual clarification of the two terms, racism and race prejudice, are that if the two terms are distinct then this may well imply the term’s limitation to one level of analysis, whereas if they are synonyms this would imply the fruitfulness of attitude theory for the macro-level analyst.

Theoretically, one evaluates concepts to be incorporated into theory on the basis of clarity, scope, and systematic import. The present paper specifically addresses the issue of clarity and indirectly sets the scope conditions. We have also attempted to determine the systematic import of the concepts although only future research can accurately assess this dimension.

The confusion between the concepts of racism and race-prejudice is exemplified by Kinloch:

‘Racism’ may be viewed as uncritical acceptance (through socialization) of a negative social dejinition of a group identijied as a race on perceivedphysical grounds along with the legitimacy of the discriminatory treatment ac- companying that definition. Secondly, ‘prejudice is similar acceptance ofnegative social dejinitions without consideration of their validity in reference to ethnic as well as race groups ( 1974: 59).

If one were to allow Kinloch’s distinctions we would find that racism and race prejudice are indistinguishable attitudes. Other authors, such as van den Berghe (1967: 18), view racism as a set of beliefs, reducible to a set of attitudes.

As a result of our review of the literature with regard to the concepts, we find that the concepts of racism and race prejudice are confused in several ways. First of all, there is a lack of conceptual clarity in terms of the broader theoretical constructs of attitudes and beliefs. In other words, when defining racism and race prejudice we are linking these concepts with the more general concepts of attitudes and beliefs. We must, therefore, know precisely whether race prejudice is an attitude, and is consistent with that body of theory or some other theoretical construct. And, likewise, we must distinguish whether racism is a belief or an attitude.

We agree with the theoretical perspective that conceptual clarity refers to the concept’s potential for moving down the ladder of abstrac- tions to an objective determination or mea- wrement. To facilitate their use in developing

theories, we must have concepts that are clear and precise in definition. Thus, our first step in conceptual clarity is ascertaining the analytic definitions of race prejudice and racism. In con- junction with this endeavour we must clarify the concepts of attitude and belief.

The second step in assessing aconcept’s clarity is to examine whether or not it is useful empirically. This not only means that the concept is measureable but that its measurement is independent from other concepts. If two concepts have the same referents or measurements we may seriously doubt the usefulness of main- taining them as separate conceptual entities even on a purely analytic level. Applying the above discussion to the concepts in question we find that our task is to define racism and race prejudice and, then, to assess its empirical usefulness.

In order to facilitate a more precise statement of the problem we must turn to a discussion of the theoretical and conceptual frameworks which are at variance. We, therefore, focus our examination first, on the varying concepts of attitude and belief and, secondly, on the concepts of race prejudice and racism.

A T T I T U D E A N D B E L I E F

Presently, social psychology appears to be bifurcated into two views of the concepts attitude and belief. The dominant view is represented by Fishbein (1967), Fishbein and Raven (1967), Osgood et al. (1957); and the minority view is defended by Rokeach (1969). Fishbein (1967) takes the stance that attitudes are distinct from beliefs conceptually and empirically.

Fishbein and Raven (1967: 183), following Osgood, Tannenbaum, and Succi (1957), define attitude as an evaluation of an object, situation, etc., and define belief as the ‘probability dimension of a concept’ towards the object, situation, etc. This is to assert that an attitude is the evaluative and affective dimension, and that belief is the existential dimension. For instance, one may evaluate the worth and affect of an object regardless of its probable existence and one may think an object non-existent even though it has an affective component.

When defined as the probability dimension, a belief can change independently of an attitude. Further, two individuals may differ in belief but have similar attitudes, or vice versa. In addi-

Race prejudice and racism / 83

tion, with respect to any object of belief, it is possible to obtain a measure of the evaluative dimension or attitude toward that object . .. (Fishbein and Raven, 1967: 187).

This dominant viewpoint, then, views attitudes and beliefs as being separable and independent dimensions of cognitions about an object or situation.

The opposing view, represented by Rokeach (1969:406), is that ‘... an attitude is defined simply as an organization of interrelated beliefs around a common object.’ An attitude may be both affective and evaluative in the same or opposite directions. One may think the poetry of Ezra Pound to be good but at the same time not like it. Rokeach, further, separates beliefs into cognitive, affective, and behavioural components. The cognitive is the evaluative and existential component similar to what Fishbein has called ‘belief.’ The affective component refers to the arousal of positive or negative feel- ings with respect to the object of belief. The behavioural component is the predisposition to act when the appropriate threshold has been reached. Rokeach views attitudes as composed of beliefs with each belief having three components that may be independent of one another.

Rokeach (1969:405) acknowledges that his type of ‘... definition departs from one widely held distinction between belief and attitude, namely that beliefs have only a cognitive component while attitudes have both cognitive and affective components.’ The real differences, then, between these two conceptual frameworks is that with the Fishbein et al. approach we have two independent concepts, as opposed to the Rokeach view that attitudes are composed of beliefs.

The conceptual argument concerning the two views of attitude and belief bear directly on our conceptualization of race prejudice and racism. Kinloch (1974:54) states that ‘... racism and prejudice are attitudes.’ On the other hand, van den Berghe (1967: 11) views racism as a set of beliefs. Ehrlich (19734). following Rokeach, discusses only prejudice since ‘an attitude is an individual’s theory of an object.’ The above authors illustrate the lack of consensus in the discipline to date. We are impeded by the con- jecture that perhaps racism and race prejudice

are the same concepts. In order to clarify the problem we turn to an examination of the concepts racism and race prejudice. .

R A C E P R E J U D I C E VS. R A C I S M

Race prejudice has consistently been treated as an attitude, (Ehrlich, 1973; Westie and De- Fleur, 1970). Westie and DeHeur (1970) use the terms race attitude and race prejudice interchangeably. As previously discussed, the definitions of race prejudice are often not in agreement (Harding et al., 1969).’

It is this apparent isomorphism between measures even when concepts differ widely that leads us to accept the broadest of definitions. By doing so, we also reduce our chances of distinguishing between racism and race prejudice, thus, making the hypothesis that they are truly different concepts more difficult to sustain. We, therefore, accept for our purposes the definition offered by Ehrlich (1973) that prejudice is an attitude towards any group of people.

Having delineated broadly what we mean by prejudice we now turn to an examination of the term racism. While many authors do not define racism, a few have made aneffort to distinguish between race prejudice and racism. We adopt for the present research, van den Berghe’s definition of racism:

Racism is any set of beliefs that organic, geneti- cally transmitted differences (whether real or imagined) between human groups are intrinsi- cally associated with the presence or the ab- sence of certain socially relevant abilities or characteristics, hence that such differences are a legitimate basis of invidious distinctions between groups socially defined as races (1967: I I) .

The acceptance of this definition is based upon its conceptual clarity and general acceptance by those authors using the concept as well as be- cause its concept specification is more general than others utilizing the concept.

It should be clear that a person may hold a racist set of beliefs, that is, a set of beliefs on which invidious social distinctions can be made, without being prejudiced. This is to say

I The correlations between attitude scales designed explicitly as measures of prejudice according to some conceptual definition and other attitude scales thrown together intuitively are sufficiently high that either type of scale can be treated for most practical purposes as a measure of prejudice.

84 I James White and J.S. Frideres

that racism, as a set of beliefs, can be independent of race prejudice as an attitude. However, as we have previously pointed out, a minority of social psychologists and sociologists have viewed such a distinction as meaningful in dis- cussing race relations. We are, therefore, faced with the task of showing the empirical relationship between these two concepts. In other words, we may make an analytic distinction between racism and race prejudice but not necessarily have a real distinction. Do we, in fact, find that persons that hold a racist set of beliefs are not necessarily prejudiced? Or, on the contrary, do the two always go hand in hand?

We are now in a position to state our substantive hypothesis. We assume that there is no relationship between racism and race prejudice. We view these concepts as independent and distinct from one another. Further, we feel that the definitions of attitude and belief stated by Fishbein (1967) have buttressed our contention that these two concepts are not necessarily related.

M E T H O D S

I n our attempt to test the hypothesis, two general techniques will be employed. The first is based on a traditional questionnaire approach. The second is based on an independent measure - autonomic measures.

In order to fully understand the significance of the autonomic measures we must return to our theoretical argument. We have defined race prejudice as an ‘attitude towards any group’ and, thus, have tied our discussion of race prejudice to attitude theory. Since attitudes, like race prejudice, have affective, cognitive, and behavioural components we may measure any of these. We have proceeded to operationalize race prejudice and all three of its attitudinal components, affective, cognitive, and behavioural, by the means of a set of questions about attitudes towards groups in Canadian society.

We have also operationalized racism by the means of a set of questions derived from the conceptual definition offered by van den Berghe (1967). That is, that these questions ask about

beliefs rooted in genetic-type suppositions; for example: ‘races differ in their capacities to understand and manipulate the complexities of some societies’; and, again, ‘one can judge the relative innate capabilities of different races by looking at their cultural achievements.’ Fur- thermore, we noted that in the definition of racism it was defined as a belief. According to Fish- bein (1967) and others, a belief is non-affective. Thus, the import of the autonomic measures is that it allows us a means by which to measure the degree of affective arousal in each question for racism and race prejudice. It is expected, given our theoretical discussion, that there should be a much higher degree of affective arousal for the race prejudice attitude questions then for the racism belief questions. In our questionnaire approach, race prej-

udice is operationally defined as a subject’s response to 35 Likert-type questions. Twelve of these 35 questions are about the subject’s attitude towards Indians, nine about attitudes towards French, and 14 about attitudes towards Asians.2 An initial identification of several dimensions of the particular attitudinal object (in this case specific ethnic groups) was under- taken. Items were then constructed to tap each of these dimensions. A pretest of the questionnaire was then made. The Asian scale and In- dian scale initially had 60 and 65 items respectively. After the pretest, the items were subjected to a t-test item analysis in order to select those items which best distinguished the low scoring group from the high scoring group. Only those which attained a significance level of .OI were retained. A factor analysis was later used to aid in selecting the items for the final questionnaire. If two items had attained a significant score, but were ‘reversals’ of each other, one was removed before subjecting it to the factor analysis. Only those items which attained a factor loading of .50 or greater were used in the final questionnaire.

Racism is operationally defined as subject responses to seven Likert-type questions. The content of these questions was based upon a meaning analysis of racism. These questions are not race specific and are aimed at general beliefs about race and cultural achievement, natural law, superiority, and other similar dis-

z The questions measuring attitudes towards specific groups were adapted and preliminarly validated by previous research, eg., Dutta, Norman, and Kanungo (I&). Examples of the questions used are: I have no objection to Indians provided they stay on their reservations; The French Canadians are perfectly justified in demanding special status and privileges in this country; I would not mind if Asians moved into my neighbour- hood.


tinctions. Each of these seven questions is viewed as indicating a different dimension of racism and, so, a composite racism score is constructed from the seven Likert-type questions.

In our discussion of racism and race prejudice we relied heavily upon the distinction between attitudes and beliefs. That is, we have defined racism as a set of beliefs and race prejudice as an attitude. As Fishbein (1967) and Fishbein and Raven (1967) have pointed out, attitudes can be independent from beliefs. It seems possible, then, that we may strengthen our case if we can derive some additional measure for beliefs and attitudes, using racism and race prejudice, and test the hypothesis that there is no relationship. In other words, we might be able to deduce from the concepts of attitude and belief certain characteristics associated with one but not the other. We would then expect to find these characteristics present in one of our substantive concepts - race prejudice or racism -but absent in the other.

The characteristic that most authors attribute to attitude but not to belief is that of affective arousal. Fishbein and Raven (1967:183) state that ‘Generally, cognitive aspects have been attributed to “beliefs” and affective or motiva- tional aspects have been attributed to “attitudes.” ’ A number of researchers in this area are in substantial agreement with this position. More precisely, Cooper and Pollock (1967: 182) conclude that their findings lend ‘ . . . additional support to the contention that prejudicial attitudes are affectively supported.’ Beliefs, on the other hand, are not considered by most authors to be affectively supported. We, therefore, would expect to find that race prejudice is correlated with states of affective arousal, whereas racism -as a set of beliefs - is not.

The solution of affective arousal from other aspects of attitude measurement is difficult. Self-reports of affective arousal depend upon the subject’s awareness of that state and the willingness of the subject to communicate these states to the experimenter. Obviously these assumptions are most difficult to meet and test. Inference of affective arousal drawn from ob- servations of overt behaviour are, perhaps, more reliable but at the same time are much more difficult to obtain. This is especially true when dealing with various ‘race’ groups as we

are. There is, however, a type of attitude measurement that would allow isolation of affective arousal. This is the use of autonomic measures to reflect affective arousal. Summers is optimis- tic concerning the use of autonomic measures. He states that,

There are two primary reasons for optimism. First, the respondent is unable to inhibit or alter the response voluntarily. Second, there pre- sumably is a close relationship between such psychological responses and the emotional (or affective) states of the respondent (1970:481).

Two of the most frequently used autonomic measures are Galvanic Skin Response ( G S R ) ~ and heart rate. As Mueller (1970:536) points out ‘Without a doubt, the most widely used index of activation level in psychological research is the electrical conductance of the skin.’ Further- more, he continues by asserting that: ‘GSR is probably the best single measure (if testing conditions are highly controlled and extraneous in- terference is kept at a minimum). GSR can be used to measure the strength of emotions and of strong attitudes’ (1970:547).

Both GSR and heart rate have been used ex- tensively in social psychological measurements of autonomic arousal associated with race prej- dice.^ The research in this area has reported successful use of the GSR as a measure of attitude with the exception of Porier and Lott (1970). And, this exception was attributed by the researchers as being due to the experimental procedure. Mueller (1970:539) suggests ‘that for strong attitudes, the CSR may be able to supply better interval level data than attitude scales (where an interval level of measurement is attained only through a process of arbitrary weightings).’ Such findings support our use of these measures of autonomic arousal as indicating race prejudice as a state of affective arousal.

A second autonomic measure used, heart rate, does not present such problems of measurement. It is simply the number of heart beats per minute as measured by a finger-attached photoelectric transducer.

We expect that - since racism is a set of beliefs and race prejudice is an attitude with an affective component - we would find no relationship between our GSR measures of racism and race prejudice.

3 Also called Electro-Derman Response (EDR) and Psychogalvanic Response (PGR). 4 For example, see Porier and Lott (1970); Vidulich and Krevanick (1970).


P R O C E D U R E

Forty-two students from a class in social psychology from a Western Canadian university volunteered to take part in this r e s e a r ~ h . ~ They were equally divided by sex, and were asked to take a paper and pencil questionnaire composed of 50 questions. The questionnaire was administered in a small-groups laboratory to one subject at a time.6 The subject was told when to start the questionnaire but had as much time to complete it as he needed. Each of the questions was on a separate page. The subject could only answer one at a time, and would have to turn to the next page to work on the next question. The questions were ordered so that the first six were about age, sex, and other such variables. This allowed us to establish a baseline for each subject. The next series were racism questions, followed by race prejudice questions about Indians, French Canadians, and Asians respectively.

Before starting the questionnaire the subject was ‘hooked-up’ to a Grass Model 7 Poly- graph with capacity to produce both GSR and heart rate readings. A short ‘settling-in’ time was allowed before initial readings were taken. The small-groups laboratory reduced external stimuli to a minimum. The subject was ob- served through a two-way mirror by the ex- perimenters in an adjacent room which also housed the polygraph. The two-way mirror allowed the investigators to mark the time taken to answer each question as well as the GSR and heart-rate readings for each question. This ob- servation was facilitated by having each question on a separate page so that when the subject

turned a page he also moved to the next question.

GSR scores represent the log change in conductance for each individual on each question. This procedure is recommended by Lacey and Siege1 (1949).’ All GSR readings were stan- dardized as to sensitivity. The conductance for each question was based on the level at which the person started the question subtracted from the highest level of conductance for that question. The conductance for each question was then converted into common logs.

Regression analysis is used to ascertain the strength of the overall relationship between the two variables. The more commonly reported correlation coefficient would seem less reveal- ing of the overall magnitude of the association between racism and race prejudice.

The Likert-type questions were, following Labovitz (1972), subjected to the same type of analysis ( R z ) as our interval data obtained from our polygraph readings. The rationale for this is that no significant distortion to the nature of the relationship, in this case, has occurred. We further checked this assumption by the use of Spearman’s correlation coefficient and found almost non-existent differences between that measure of association and the product-mo- ment correlations.

R E S U L T S A N D I N T E R P R E T A T I O N

Our null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between racism and race prejudice. In testing this hypothesis we have three sub- hypotheses based upon each of our indicators,

5 With regard to the biased nature ofour sample, it should be made clear that we are interested in ‘testing theory,’ not descriptive research. Our argument for accepting the findings in the present research stems from the argument that on the balance, biased samples are not significantly inferior to unbiased samples when we want to disprove a theoretical hypothesis. The relationship expressed in theoretical propositions are presumed to be universally present, i.e. in both unbiased and biased samples. The only qualification we must make is that we have not introduced into our data ‘selective’ sampling procedures. As Zetterberg (1965: 129) points out, ‘To disprove or demonstrate their existence (a relationship) is, hence, possible in any kind of sample -biases or unbiased. * 6 We are concerned with testing an hypothesis derived deductively from the current theoretical work in social psychology. For a disconfirmation to occur in such a case, we need only one deviation from our hypothesis as long as all other things are equal. We have used a sample in an attempt to randomize measurement error and extraneous variables. In otherwords, we have tried to approximate the conditions of’all other things being equal’ (Hempel, 1966). Furthermore, we feel that our laboratory setting has aided us in this task of control and thus allows for a small sample size. 7 Investigations performed by Lacey and Siege1 (1949) indicate: ( I ) Independence - in order that GSRS obtained from s’s differing in basal level may be validly compared, the GSR scores must be independent of basal level. (2) Normality -In order that data may be amenable to ordinary statistical treatment the GSR scores must not violate the assumption of normality in the parent population. The results obtained indicate that only change in conductance and log change in conductance are acceptable in terms of these two criteria.


TABLE I

EXPLAINED VARIANCE BETWEEN RACISM A N D RACE PREJUDICE AS MEASURED BY: (A) LIKERT-TYPE QUESTIONS (B) G.S.R. (C) HEART RATE

Race prejudice

Total Indian French Asian

(A) Likert Racism rz .0744 .oooO6 ,1463 .0565

(B) G.S.R. Racism r2 .6042 .5412 .4495 .5694

(c) Heart rate Racism r2 .9002 .9169 .I633 ,8119

i.e., Likert-type questions, GSR, and heart rate. Each of these sub-hypotheses are examined in light of our results.

The first of these sub-hypotheses was previously stated as there being no relationship between racism and race prejudice, using Likert- type measurement procedures. Further, we concluded that we would reject the null hypothesis if 50 per cent or more of the variance is explained.*

The results for the Likert-type questions re- lating racism to race-prejudice are summarized in Table I (Section A). We find that there is a small percentage of the variance explained (seven per cent) between the two variables. If we examine the relationship between racism and race prejudice Indians, Asians, or French, we find that the variance explained is still sur- prisingly small (14.63 per cent).

We may interpret these results as grounds for failing to reject our null hypothesis that there is no relationship between scores on our Likert- type questions for racism and race prejudice. However, there exists the alternative interpretation that in fact racism and race prejudice are

related but that we have not met one or more of our assumptions. Our confidence in a decision to reject or fail to reject the null hypothesis could be bolstered by agreement or disagree- ment between sub-hypotheses. Therefore, we defer a decision until we analyse the degree of consensus between the other sub-hypotheses.

The second of our sub-hypotheses is that there is no relationship between racism and race prejudice as measured by GSR. Again, we reject our null hypothesis if 50 per cent or more of the variance is e ~ p l a i n e d . ~

Our results for GSR are presented in Table I (Section B). We find that the variance explained between racism and race prejudice using this indicator is fairly substantial (60.42 per cent). Further, we find that the relationship between racism and race prejudice Indians, French, or Asians is consistent with our overall measure of race prejudice. l o

Our findings for GSR seem contradictory to our findings for the Likert-type questions. We may view this contradiction as a warning against making too hasty a decision regarding our general hypothesis. In this case, our sub-

8 However, in order to justify the rejection or the failure to reject on the grounds offered by these questions we made the following assumptions concerning our measurements. These assuyptions are: ( I ) we assume that the subjects are aware of their attitudes and beliefs and can or are willing to communicate their position; ( 2 ) we assume with some degree of confidence that these questions have adegree of validity as indicators of racism and race prejudice; (3) we assume that treating the ordinal scale measurements as an interval scale produces significant systematic bias to our findings; and lastly (4) we assume that we are dealing with a bivariate normal distribution. 9 The assumptions we made with this type of measurement are different from those made with the Likert-type questions. Our assumptions are the following: ( I ) we assume, with some degree of confidence, that the laboratory situation controlled extraneous influences which might affect either the subjects' arousal or fluctuations in the polygraph; ( 2 ) we assume that the subjects' responses to the stimuli questions are immediate and not protracted; (3) we assume that GSR is drawn from a bivariate normal distribution. 10 The difference between race prejudice French with a racism (r2 = 4 9 5 ) and our rejection level ( . 50 ) is not judged significant.


hypothesis that there is no difference between racism GSR and race prejudice GSR would perhaps warrant rejection. Again, we are faced with the alternative interpretation that we did not meet the conditions which we assumed. In other words, we might reject our hypothesis when in fact our results indicate that our assumptions were not fulfilled.

The assumptions we made with the GSR were not as many nor as tenuous as with the Likert- type questions. We feel quite confident that the laboratory situation controlled major extraneous influences. We have indications from McCleary (1950) and our own data that responses were immediate. And we have confidence that we have met the assumption of bivariate normality.11 Thus, we feel that there is a strong argument in favour of rejecting the null hypothesis in this case since we have met the appropriate assumptions. However, let us again defer a decision on the hypothesis until all the arguments have been heard.

The third and last of our sub-hypotheses is that there is n o relationship between racism heart rate and race prejudice heart rate. Our rejection level is, again, if at least 50 per cent of the variance is explained.'*

Our results for heart rate are presented in Table I (Section c). We find that a large percentage (90.02 per cent) of the variance between racism and race prejudice is explained. We find that this relationship is consistently supported by the high relationships between racism and race prejudice Indians, French, or Asians. As with our previous indicators, we find that the 'control variables' (marital status, sex, father's occupation, age, education, ethnicity, religion) have no effect on these relationships.

These findings are consistent with the GSR findings, supporting a decision to reject the null hypothesis. Again, we may ask if such a decision is truly warranted or if we have simply failed to meet one or more of our assumptions. In this case, we have a great degree of confidence in having met the assumptions. There- fore, we feel that the overwhelming argument is in favour of rejecting the null hypothesis.

We may now examine the evidence for rejecting or failing to reject our null hypothesis. Our null hypothesis is that there is no relationship between racism and race prejudice. Two of our

three subhypotheses suggest that we should reject the null hypothesis. Therefore, we feel compelled to tentatively reject the null hypothesis.

Conceptually, our findings suggest an alternative interpretation to racism. Both measures of affective arousal indicate a reasonably strong association between racism and race prejudice. Such a finding is antithetical to our conception of racism as a set of beliefs and beliefs as non- affective. Thus, these findings suggest that either racism is not a set of beliefs or that we have mistakenly characterized beliefs as being non-affective or both. The low association between racism and race prejudice as measured by the Likert-type questions suggests that racism is different from race prejudice, If we follow this indication we would doubt that our concepts of attitude and belief are different. That is, we have the indication that the concepts of racism and race prejudice are different except that they both appear to have an affective component. This tends to cast doubt upon the Fishbein (1967) distinction between attitude and belief. That is that attitudes are affective whereas beliefs are not.

What, then, do we see as the appropriate status of the term racism? We have rejected the idea that racism and race prejudice are different concepts in terms of affective arousal. Do we, however, find that a case can be made for the theoretical use of the distinction between racism and race prejudice? As we previously noted, racism is not associated with race prejudice as measured by the Likert-type questions. Since these questions are derived from the definition we might assume that there is a valid analytic distinction which also is empirically supported. It is when we look at the affective measurements that we reject our null hypotheses. In interpreting the affective component of racism we find that a reconceptualiza- tion is warranted.

If we reconceptualize racism we may, following Rokeach (1969), view it as a set of beliefs which have affective components. Sets of beliefs about an object or situation compose an attitude. Here we switch from the Fishbein (1967) approach to attitudes and beliefs, which views them as separable and independent, to the Rokeach (1969) view that an attitude is an

11 See previous discussion of Lacey and Siege1 (1949). chapter 1 1 1 . 12 The assumptions made using this indicator are: ( I ) we assume that the laboratory situation controlled extraneous influences; (2) we assume that the subjects' responses to the stimuli questions are immediate and not protracted; ( 3 ) we assume that the heart rates are drawn from a bivariate normal distribution.


organization of beliefs. Each belief has three components: a cognitive component, an affective Component, and a behavioural component. These three components of belief may vary independently. This approach, then, would explain the difference in association on the basis that our Likert-type questions are indicators of the cognitive and behavioural component while the autonomic indicators operationally define the affective component. Thus, conceptualiz- ing racism in this way, we can explain the affective response towards our racism questions, as well as explain the lack of association between the Likert-type measurements for racism and race prejudice.

I t is our contention, then, that racism is a useful concept when conceptualized as a set of beliefs with cognitive, affective, and behavioural components. We feel that it can be useful on an analytic and heuristic level as well as on an empirical plane if racism is viewed as a subset of the organized system of beliefs that compose the attitude race prejudice. In other words, racism is a set of beliefs interrelated with other sets of beliefs. These subsets are organized by specifiable relationships once they are defined. We have defined one of these subsets, racism, but the task remains to specify the other belief sets composing race prejudice. At- tempts at specifying these other sets of beliefs may yield economic, normative, and institutional sets of beliefs that are interrelated with racism and compose the attitude race prejudice. Further investigation may eventually lead to the specification of the relationships between these sets and, hence, to the use of race prejudice as a more adequate predictor of behaviour. We would also suggest that one set of beliefs might be different in direction from the other sets forming the attitude. This would mean that we may find combinations such as the non- prejudice-racist and the prejudiced non-racist.

The implications of our conceptualization need further explication. We are asserting that racism as one subset of race prejudice may vary in the opposite direction from other subsets of race prejudice. Or, it may be consistent in direction and, thus, add to the total degree of race prejudice. The other subsets of beliefs besides racism also have efficacy in determining the degree of race prejudice.

A further implication of our distinction between racism and race prejudice is that we may discuss the phenomenon of institutionalized racism with the aid of attitude theory. We may

break institutional racism into the cognitive, affective, and behavioural dimensions which would allow for greater clarity and specificity of analysis. We may raise the questionofwhether or not institutions partake in only the biologi- cally rooted beliefs of racism or are involved in other belief subsets of race prejudice as well. Such other subsets of race prejudice for institutions might be the economic beliefs of capitalism and religious beliefs. It is the task of macro-level sociologist to delineate the other belief subsets which compose race prejudice on an institutional level. Certainly, some of the attitude research from the social psychology of race prejudice is suggestive of fruitful directions which macro-sociologists may pursue.

It is implicit in the previous discussion that by linking the structural concept of racism with the predominately social psychological concept of race prejudice and its attendant concepts of attitude and belief we have removed some of the normal science constraints represented in terms of macro vs. micro sociology. In other words, we see these concepts as being fruitful for analysis on any sociological level.

In conclusion, we view the present research as having clarified and added to the specificity of one of the sets of beliefs composing race prejudice, racism. The task that remains is to further specify the other belief sets of race prejudice and to attempt to distinguish the relationships between these sets. When such research is completed we should have a more powerful predictive analytic tool in the concept race prejudice than has previously been the case. We view the clarification of these belief sets of race prejudice as being necessary if the concept of race prejudice is to ever attain the clarity requisite for theoretical constructs in the field of race relations.

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race prejudice and racism: a distinction

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