An Efficient An Efficient Dynamic Router Dynamic Router

Approach to Approach to Defeat Defeat

“DDOS Attack“DDOS Attack””Presentation byPresentation byB. Rajeswara Reddy,B. Rajeswara Reddy,

N.V.S.L. Swarupa.N.V.S.L. Swarupa.

ContentsContentsDenial-of-Service attacksDenial-of-Service attacksNecessity for solutionNecessity for solutionCooperative Technological Cooperative Technological SolutionsSolutionsExisting SolutionExisting SolutionProposed SolutionProposed SolutionConclusionConclusion

Denial-of-ServiceDenial-of-Service Attempt to make Attempt to make

resources unusable resources unusable to intended usersto intended users

Largest threat Largest threat faced by present faced by present day internetday internet

More among Social More among Social Networking SitesNetworking Sites

If more attackers it If more attackers it becomes DDoSbecomes DDoS

Necessity For Necessity For SolutionSolution

Media: 2.8% lossMedia: 2.8% lossTwo StagesTwo Stages

Recruiting Recruiting ZombiesZombiesFlooding VictimFlooding Victim

DrawbackDrawbackService DelaysService Delays

Dynamic Router Dynamic Router Approach.Approach. Mechanism of DDoS attacks.

COOPERATIVE COOPERATIVE TECHNOLOGICAL TECHNOLOGICAL

SOLUTIONSSOLUTIONS TO “DDOS TO “DDOS ATTACKS”ATTACKS”

ComponentsComponents1.1. Internet CoreInternet Core2.2. Internet CloudInternet Cloud3.3. Edge of InternetEdge of Internet4.4. Servers and ClientsServers and Clients

Service By D.S.C.Service By D.S.C.1.1. Direct Direct

CommunicationCommunication2.2. Cache Cache

CommunicationCommunication

1.Digital Supply Chain

The digital supply chain.

Steps in Steps in Cooperative Cooperative Filtering:Filtering:

1.1. AlarmingAlarming2.2. TracingTracing3.3. FilteringFiltering

Simple ApproachSimple Approach Delete Same IP Delete Same IP

PacketsPacketsBan IP spoofingBan IP spoofing The process of cooperative filtering.

a. Cooperative Filtering

b. Cooperative Cachingb. Cooperative Caching Draw Backs of FilteringDraw Backs of Filtering

ExpensiveExpensive Legal Packets LostLegal Packets Lost

Traffic Shared By Traffic Shared By RoutersRouters

Routing Tables NeededRouting Tables Needed Bandwidth efficiently Bandwidth efficiently

Utilized.Utilized. Combining both results Combining both results

in Effective in Effective PerformancePerformance

Fig Cooperative Caching

Incentive ChainIncentive Chain Major Sources For Major Sources For

Digital Content Digital Content flowflow End Users DemandEnd Users Demand ICP’s DemandICP’s Demand

Chain links all Chain links all parties for end to parties for end to end transmissionend transmission

Broken Incentive ChainBroken Incentive Chain Lack of Incremental Lack of Incremental

Payment Structure Payment Structure and Failure of and Failure of Cooperative FilteringCooperative Filtering Have unused residue Have unused residue

bandwidthbandwidth Cost and Benefits for Cost and Benefits for

ISP in Cooperative ISP in Cooperative FilteringFiltering

Payment to ISP’sPayment to ISP’s With Congestion no With Congestion no

profit to ISP’sprofit to ISP’sFig 3: Incentive Chain

Broken Incentive ChainBroken Incentive Chain Caches on the Edge of the Internet: Caches on the Edge of the Internet:

Inaccessible TreasuresInaccessible Treasures Missisippi rule For Cooperative CachingMissisippi rule For Cooperative Caching Cost efficient than FilteringCost efficient than Filtering Reasons for breaking incentive chainReasons for breaking incentive chain

ICP’s does not provide money for cachingICP’s does not provide money for caching Resource becomes inactiveResource becomes inactive

ICP’s not sure about DDoS: No ICP’s not sure about DDoS: No PaymentPayment

Existing Soln: Capacity Existing Soln: Capacity Provision NetworkProvision Network

Network of Cache Network of Cache ServersServers

Demand side Demand side Cache tradingCache trading

Owner of ISP Owner of ISP plays main role in plays main role in it.it.

Dilution of traffic Dilution of traffic by the best Cacheby the best Cache

Proposed SolutionProposed Solution

Difficult to locate Difficult to locate origin of attackorigin of attackRequest Request ConstraintsConstraints

Size: 2GBSize: 2GBFields: 100Fields: 100

Check header Check header info, at first routerinfo, at first routerRouter DatabaseRouter Database

Restricting Fake Packet

Sample Data And Sample Data And ResultsResults

Nodes in the Nodes in the time takentime taken network network 100 100 0.0781250.078125 200200 0. 1093750. 109375 300300 0.1093750.109375 400400 0.156250.15625 500500 0.156250.15625 600600 0.156250.15625 700700 0.1718750.171875 800800 0.2343750.234375 900900 0.2343750.234375 10001000 0.2656250.265625

Series 1

-200 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400

0.1

0.2

0.3

x

y

Nodes in the Network

Time Taken

CPN method

Identifying the AttackIdentifying the Attack

Nodes in the Nodes in the Time Time takentaken

network network 100 100

0.0781250.078125 200200 0.0781250.078125 300300 0.50.5 400400 0.0781250.078125 500500 0.0781250.078125 600600 0.0781250.078125 700700 0.0781250.078125 800800 00781250078125 900900 0.0781250.078125 10001000 0.0781250.078125

Results in Dynamic Results in Dynamic Router MethodRouter Method

No..of packets Transfer rates (No’s) (Mbps) 100 100 200 96 300 84 400 77 500 55 200 90 210 96 220 94 215 98

ConclusionConclusion Previously proposed methods Previously proposed methods

concentrated mostly on determining the concentrated mostly on determining the attack path only.attack path only.

In Our proposed solution we can easily In Our proposed solution we can easily safe guard any network from attack.safe guard any network from attack.

Here for LAN congestion problem add Here for LAN congestion problem add the implementation of multiple cache the implementation of multiple cache servers on network by complex congestion servers on network by complex congestion control algorithm.control algorithm.

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