religious tensions in malaysia

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Patterns of Religious Tension in MalaysiaAuthor(s): Raymond L. M. LeeSource: Asian Survey, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Apr., 1988), pp. 400-418Published by: University of California PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644735

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PATTERNS OF RELIGIOUSTENSIONIN MALAYSIARaymond L. M. LeeThree decades after independence and nineteen yearsafter the May 13th (1969) riots, Malaysia is experiencing another tenseperiod characterizedby increasing religious ferment.1 The emergence of

Islamic revivalist movements (popularly known as dakwah) in the 1970s,spawned by global Islamic resurgence and internal fissures in the MalayMuslim community, captured headlines and influencedpolitical events foralmost ten years. The ramifications of Islamic revivalism continue to befelt in present-day Malaysia, one of which is the nascent mobilization ofnon-Muslims in the face of perceived threats of Islamic dominance andexpansionism. Non-Muslims make up about 43% of the populationon thepeninsula, and they constitute a potentially formidable body of resistanceto the Islamic challenge.2 However, non-Muslim diversity in beliefs, prac-tices, and organization poses a problem of consensus and coordination inconfronting the growing Islamic movement. The task of this article is tosketch recent developments in Malaysian Islam, their impact on non-Mus-lim religious groups, and the relationship between national politics andreligious tension.

Recent Developments in IslamThere has been an intensification of Islamic activities since the 1970s,partly because of rising Islamic consciousness around the world and partlybecause of political conflicts within the Malay community that are oftenarticulated as religious issues. The latter reason can be considered the

Raymond L. M. Lee is Associate Professor in the Department ofAnthropology and Sociology, University of Malaya.( 1988 by The Regents of the University of California

1. Malaysia in this context refers to Peninsular Malaysia.2. The breakdown is 2% Christian, 8% Hindu, 32% Buddhist-Confucianist (Taoist), and1% followers of tribal religions. 1980 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, vol. 1, p.152. Non-Muslims are mainly Chinese, Indians, Eurasians, and members of aboriginalgroups.400


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RAYMOND L. M. LEE 401more important, since rivalrybetween the United Malay National Organi-zation (UMNO), the dominant Malay party, and Parti Islam Se-Malaysia(PAS), the Islamic party, has perpetuallyrevolved around the issue of theestablishment of an Islamic state in Malaysia. Although couched in thelanguage of religious issues, this rivalry has been analyzed as a sublimatedform of class conflict in Malay society, between UMNO representingtheMalay bourgeois elite and PAS as the voice of the Malay proletariat.3 Af-ter its formation in 1946, UMNO was continuously engaged in struggleswith severalradical Islamic groups, notably Hizbul Muslimin, the forerun-ner of PAS. UMNO's experiencesin these protracted conflicts resulted ina strategyof generatingits own Islamic programsto meet the challenges ofthe Malay religious opposition. This strategy has survived into the 1970sand 1980s as evidenced by the government'srelatively successful manage-ment of the dakwah movement.4The dakwah movement surfaced in the mid-1970s, not long after thegovernmentcrackdown on student dissidents in 1974 and the amendmentsin 1975 to the draconian Universities and University Colleges Act.5 Themovement was largely an urban phenomenon, attracting many alienatedMalay youths and dissatisfiedMalay professionals. Its visibility was estab-lished not only by a voluminous output of literature and speeches, but alsoby the introduction of a new dress code for the faithful. The code decreedveiled clothing for females, robes and turbansfor males. This fashion hasnow become a common sight on university campuses, in schools, and invarious government institutions where Malays predominate. Dakwah inMalaysia does not comprise a unified movement; rather the term has beenused loosely to describe a conglomeration of disparate Islamic organiza-tions, communes, and cults, many of which are not sponsored by the gov-ernment and are occasionally at odds with each other over issues ofreligious doctrines and practices. The most publicized dakwah organiza-

3. For purposes of making a general statement, I have oversimplified here the problem ofclass in Malay society.4. There is an extensive literature on dakwah: M. L. Lyon, The Dakwah Movement inMalaysia, Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, 13:2 (1979), pp. 34-45; MohammadAbu Bakar, Islamic Revivalism and the Political Process in Malaysia, Asian Survey, 21:10(October 1981), pp. 1040-1059; JudithA. Nagata, TheRefloweringof MalaysianIslam: Reli-gious Radicals and Their Roots (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1984);Chandra Muzaffar,Islamic Resurgencein Malaysia (Petaling Jaya: Fajar Bakti, 1987).5. Amendments to this act were made in 1975 to control political activities on universitycampuses. This form of legal intimidation has resulted in a subdued student population thathas led one writer to suggest that dakwah activities have become a substitute for the radicalstudent politics of the early 1970s. See Mohammad Abu Bakar, Kebangkitan Islam danProses Politik di Malaysia, paper presentedat the International Conferenceon Malay Studies,Kuala Lumpur, 8-10 September 1979.


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402 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVIII, NO. 4, APRIL 1988tion duringthe late 1970s was ABIM (the MalaysianIslamic Youth Move-ment), whose leader was Anwar Ibrahim, a former student leader andpolitical detainee.6 ABIM was a legally recognized organization that en-joyed a large following throughout Malaysia. Unlike the smaller dakwahgroups susceptible to government persecution, ABIM's connections withinternational Islamic bodies and the maintenance of a clean image pro-tected it from accusations of heresy.The growth of ABIM and similar organizations posed a grave threat tothe government's political position. Fearing left-wing infiltration intothese organizations and their potential for alliance with PAS, the govern-ment adopted several measures to neutralize the dakwah movement, in-cluding symbolic concessions, cooptation, centralization, and coercion.7Symbolic concessions to the promotion of Islamic sentiments have becomeso much a part of government rhetoric that it is difficult to differentiatebetween their use as a strategy of dakwah control and as routine policy.Similarly,centralizationof Islamic activitieshas always been an importantaspect of governmentpolicy, and it is superfluousto think of it as a specificform of dakwah management. The strategies of cooptation and coercionare therefore the most clearly defined aspects of the government's ap-proach to the dakwah movement. The crossover of Anwar Ibrahim fromABIM into the government in 1982 marked the climactic success of thecooptation method; thereafter its use seems to have declined considerably.Perhaps this can be attributed to governmentsmugness in winning over toits ranks a major leader of the dakwah movement. Coercion continues tobe used as an instrument of control against Muslim dissidents-e.g., thePenal and Criminal Codes were amended in December 1982 empoweringthe government to fine or imprison individuals charged with instigatingreligious disturbances. Coercion also includes the use of paramilitaryforceto check the spreadof Islamic dissent, as in the Memali incident in 1985 inwhich the attempted arrest of a recalcitrant Muslim leader by the PoliceField Force resulted in a shootout that left 18 people dead.The increasedreligious competition for political ends has created an am-bience of heightened Muslim sensitivity and a drive toward the expansionof Islamic institutions. At the cultural level, Muslim sensitivities have im-pinged upon Malay customs that were once taken for granted. For exam-ple, the Malay wedding ceremony (bersanding)has been rejectedby manyMalays as un-Islamic because of its Hindu accretions. Many Malay

6. Anwar Ibrahim joined the Barisan Nasional government in 1982, rising from a deputyminister in the Prime Minister's Department to minister of education in 1986.7. Simon Barraclough, Managing the Challenges of Islamic Revival in Malaysia, AsianSurvey, 23:8 (August 1983), pp. 958-75.


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RAYMOND L. M. LEE 403couples preferto performthe less ceremonious akad nikah (marriage con-tract) in the presence of a Muslim official (kadi) and attend a quiet familydinner, bypassing the more conspicuous bersanding ceremony. Anotherexample concerns fasting during the month of Ramadan, which has beenso rigorously enforced and observed that many Malay restaurant ownershave felt pressured to close during this period rather than cater to theirnon-Muslim customers.At the social level, these sensitivities have been transformed into a gen-eral paranoia, suspicious of almost anything that is not Muslim. The hos-tility directed against non-Muslims tends to betray a sense of insecuritythat surroundsthe incipient notion of a new Islamic identity. The Nesdalecase in mid-1986 clearly illustrated that the renewal of Islamic exclusive-ness is fraught with a simmering bellicosity toward the outside world.8Terrence Nesdale and his companion, Mary Miessen, two Christian mis-sionaries from New Zealand, were charged in a magistrate's court withinsulting Islam. The plaintiff was a 35-year old Malay cosmetics dealerwho claimed that Nesdale had hurt his religious feelings by uttering, Is-lam is not original, Prophet Mohammad and the Quran are not true. Inthe trial that followed, the defense produced evidence that not only sug-gested misinterpretationsby the plaintiff of his conversationwith Nesdale,but also political motives underlying the case. Apparentlythe plaintiffhadlodged a police report five days after the incident, but not before his com-plaint had been discussed by a mosque committee, a local welfare commit-tee, and a kadi. Furthermore,the police officers who interviewed Nesdalewere allegedly less interestedin his conversation with the Malay business-man than in his religious activities in Malaysia. Despite the defense's pleaof cultural misunderstanding,Nesdale was fined M$1000 and jailed for aday (Miessen was acquitted), lending credence to the observation that reli-gious naivete does not pay.Two more cases emerged in mid-1987 that also reflect the role of reli-gious trivialities in demarcating the new boundaries of Islam. The firstconcerned a controversialposter given free of charge with the purchaseofa new Malay pop album recordedby a popularlocal Eurasiansinger.9 Onthe poster the singer was pictured wearing a gold cross around her neck.At least three Malay language newspaperscomplained bitterly that it wasinappropriate for the singer, who is not Muslim, to wear a cross sincemany of her fans are Muslims. The case was not taken to court but thealbum distributorsapologized to the Muslim public. In the second case,the arrival of a merchant vessel, the Doulos (a Christian-sponsored ship

8. See The Star, July 10-August 1, 1986.9. The Star, June 12, 1987.


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404 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVIII, NO. 4, APRIL 1988with a book exhibition), at the ports of Penang and Klang was heraldedbya controversy involving the distribution of Christian literature to Mus-lims.10 The allegation that some crew members had given copies of theBible and pamphlets on Christianityto Muslim visitors resulted in a direc-tive from the Ministry of Home Affairs barring Muslims from boardingthe ship. However, the government realized that the directive contra-dicted the rights of individual Muslims and eventually lifted the ban tosave itself from further embarrassment.11Obviously, much of this hostility is directed at Christian groups andsymbols because of a generalized fear that Christians, especially Indone-sian immigrants,are making concerted efforts to convert Muslims. Accu-sations have been made that Christians are offering jobs and women toMuslim youths in order to convert them.12 The veracity of such reportshas yet to be determined,but they have contributedto a growing suspicionof Christian activities and intentions.These reactions are paralleled by an inward-looking process that empha-sizes the tightening of shari'ah laws. Shari'ah forms a part of the Malay-sian legal system, applying only to Muslims, while civil laws continue toplay a more prominent role in public life. However, advocates of shari'ahhave been agitatingfor Islamic laws to be uniformly implemented through-out the country;13actually, some efforts were made between 1950 and1965 by state governments in revisingtheir Islamic laws to emphasize uni-formity and stringency in religious administration. In December 1985 anew bill was introduced in the state legislative assembly in Terengganu totighten Muslim laws relating to marriage, divorce, family support, andcustody of children. The rationale of the bill, according to the state reli-gious commissioner, was to ensure the safety and harmony of the Muslimcommunity and to cut down the rampant divorce cases in the state. 14Basically, passage of the bill increased the powers of the shari'ah courts,introduced harsher penalties in the punishment of Muslim offenders,andprovided a legislative model for other states to emulate. As individual

10. The Star, June 10-18, 1987.11. The well-publicized visit to the Doulos by a retired politician, Tan Sri Khir Johari,may have speeded the government's decision to retract its directive.12. The Star, October 9, December 22, 1986.13. Shari'ah as currently practicedin Malaysia comes under the jurisdiction of individualstate governments ratherthan the federal authorities. The development of shari'ah-minded-ness among the Malays is not a recent phenomenon but dates back to the early nineteenthcentury;see A.C. Milner, Rethinking Islamic Fundamentalism in Malaysia, Review of In-donesian and Malaysian Affairs, 20:2 (1986), pp. 48-75.14. Noraizan Abdul Rahman, Terengganu tightens syariah laws, The Sunday Star, De-cember 15, 1985, p. 6.


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RAYMOND L. M. LEE 405states become more zealous in the administration of shari'ah laws, Muslimintellectuals are increasingly emboldened to challenge the dominance ofcivil laws and to demand a nationwide application of shari'ah to Muslimsand non-Muslims.15 These moves to raise the status of shari'ah are furtherreinforced by a recent proposal by the state religious council of Kedah toprosecute Muslims who commit apostasy. Muslim officials from otherstates have expressedsupport for this proposal and are using it as a modelfor increasing religious control in their own states.These varying levels of religious sensitivity have developed against abackground of expanding Islamic institutions. Not only does this expan-sion imply increasedpersonneland powers for religious control, but it alsoaccentuatesthe government'srole as the chief architect of Islamic develop-ment. The establishment of an Islamic bank, an internationalIslamic uni-versity, an Islamic research center, and various Islamic administrativeorganizations is testimony to the government's commitment to solidify theIslamic character of Malaysian public life. The expected growth of theIslamic bureaucracy is complemented by increasing enrollments in Islamicstudies on university campuses, suggesting that future recruitment into thegovernmentservice may gradually shift from a saturatedcivil sector to thereligious domain. If such a trend occurs, the vested interests of the Islamicbureaucratswill increase proportionately, and the pressure to institutional-ize shari'ah at all levels of Malaysian social life is likely to be perceived bythese bureaucrats as necessary to their advancement. In other words, thegovernment'sIslamization policy seems to be generatinga momentum be-yond its original intentions. Through this policy the governmentis able toprotect its image as the defender of Malay Muslim interests and controlthe religious opposition. At the same time, the policy is inadvertentlycre-ating new levels of religious organization that in the long run may threatenthe secular basis of the government.

Revivalism in Non-Muslim ReligionsThe scope of religious fervor in Malaysia has been widening over the yearsto include revivalism in Christianity, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Sikhism.It is simplistic to assert that the emergence of non-Muslim revivalismis adirect reaction to Islamic dakwah, although it can be argued that Islamicresurgence has generated much fear among non-Muslims, many of whomwere already participating in a variety of revivalistic activities. Like15. This constituted a major theme of a recent Islamic seminar, TowardMaking IslamicLaw a Reality in Malaysia, at University of Malaya, June 16, 1987 (The Star, June 17,1987).


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406 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVIII, NO. 4, APRIL 1988dakwah in Islam, many new movements in the non-Muslim religions wereformed as a direct result of worldwide religious developments. Thegrowth of the non-Muslim movements, however, has been accelerated bythe threats posed by the push for Islamic hegemony.Christians. Among Christians, the Charismatic Renewal has been instru-mental in infusing innovative religious sentiments throughout all denomi-nations. The emergenceof this movement in the mid-i1970swas influencedchiefly by Catholic and Protestant revivalisms in the United States, and ina way it has provided an informalnetwork of ties among Malaysian Chris-tians that has surpassed the faltering efforts at promoting ecumenism atthe national level. Malaysian Christianity can be arbitrarilydivided intothree spheresof organizationalinfluence-Catholic, liberalProtestant,andEvangelical. Despite efforts at ecumenism, these three divisions of Chris-tian organization have remained mutually exclusive because of sharp dif-ferences in doctrines and practices. In February 1985 the ChristianFederation of Malaysia (CFM) was formed, an alliance of the Catholicchurch, the Council of Churches of Malaysia (CCM), and the NationalEvangelical Fellowship (NEF).16 The CFM does not actually represent anachievementin Malaysianecumenism; ratherit is an agreementon organi-zational Christiancooperationin the face of increasingIslamization. Doc-trinal differences and divergences in religious practices among thesechurches remain unchanged.A homogenization of beliefs and practices is more apparent in the Char-ismatic Renewal, which draws members from all denominations into ec-static worship and fervent strivingfor spiritual powers. There is no centralorganization that regulates charismatic teachings and practices. Eachcharismaticgroup is independentlycontrolledby the laity, which conductsits activities in private homes and rented premises. Some groups haveclose ties to churches, particularly the Catholic charismatic groups thatare generally condoned by the church. Nevertheless, they are differentinorganization from established charismatic churches such as the Pentecos-tal Church of Malaysia.17The basic characteristic of the charismatic movement is emphasis onintense emotional experiences stemming from individual contact with the

16. The CCM is a liberal Protestant body dominated by the Methodists and the NEF is anorganization of fundamentalist churches. There are several independent churches which donot belong to the CFM.17. A detailed description of these organizational relationships and a comparison of theCharismatic Renewal with other new religious movements in Malaysia are given in Susan E.Ackerman and Raymond L. M. Lee, Heaven in Transition: Non-Muslim Religious Innovationand Ethnic Identity in Malaysia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987).


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RAYMOND L. M. LEE 407Holy Spirit, the third aspect of the Trinity. Because of its focus on ecstaticexperiences, the charismatic movement promotes a type of religious indi-vidualism that is potentially a threat to organizational stability. Individualseekers are not necessarily committed to a specific charismatic group butmay range over many groups in search of spiritual experiences. Ironically,it is in these wanderings that many Christians have rediscovered their reli-gious identity, even to the extent of interfering with their professional lives.This rejuvenatedidentity is not necessarily nurtured by commitment to acharismaticgroup or to a particular church, but by a decentralized dissem-ination of charismatic teachings and practices across the boundaries of allChristian denominations. In other words, there is an amorphous qualityin the spread of a new Christian identity in Malaysia that allows a certainresilience against the institutional controls of the churches. On the otherhand, some churches have endeavored to strengthen Christian identity byestablishing lay-centered cell groups modeled after the charismatic move-ment. In particular, the Catholic church has sponsored the activities ofsuch groups, known as Basic Christian Communities, to reinforcea specifi-cally Catholic identity. Overall, it can be said that Christian revivalisminMalaysia has occurred on two levels: at the individual level, the charis-matic movement has been most significant in transforming personal identi-ties; and at the church level, clerics have initiated efforts atinterdenominational cooperation and encouraged lay participationthrough new organizational structures.Hindus. The complexities of Hindu organizations in Malaysia haveshaped Hindu revivalism in less than a straightforward way. If this revi-valism is construed as a renewed pursuit of higher Hindu ideals, then thepresent movement in Malaysia is split along two lines, one emphasizingtheadoption of a Sanskriticparadigmand the other focusing on the religiousvirtues of the Tamil Saivite tradition. The former is based largely on Ve-danta philosophy that stresses monism and finds expression in scripturessuch as the Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita. Tamil piety, on the otherhand, focuses on a dualistic philosophy promoted by Saiva Siddhanta, asouthern school of Hinduism inspired by the works of the Tamil Saivitesaints. Both approaches, however, are strongly identifiedwith the bhaktimovement that idealizes as its tenet the unquestioning devotion to a cho-sen deity (istadevata)or preceptor (guru).18

18. These Hindu modes are further discussed in Raymond L.M. Lee and R. Rajoo, San-skritization and Indian Ethnicity in Malaysia, Modern Asian Studies, 21:2 (April 1987), pp.389-415.


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408 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVIII, NO. 4, APRIL 1988In Malaysia, these two modes of Hinduism are sustained by continuouslinks with the Indian subcontinent, even dating to the days before indepen-dence. In recent years these links have become stronger as more Malay-

sian Indians sought to rediscover the religious roots of their identity.There is a general concern among older Indians that the younger genera-tion, unschooled in Hindu teachings, will lose touch with its cultural heri-tage, and many classes on Hinduism have been organized to improve thereligious knowledge of Indian youths. The dissemination of this knowl-edge is augmented by the services of itinerant ascetics from India and thewide availabilityof tapes, films, and literatureon Hinduism. These effortsto upgradeHinduism can be attributedto the work of several Hindu orga-nizations in promoting religious literacy among urban and rural Indians.Because Hinduism in Malaysia is not a centrally controlled religion, theseorganizations operate independently of each other, often resulting in ad-verse competition for adherents and influence. The Vedanta-basedorgani-zations originally attracted many English-educated, middle-class Indians,but have now attempted to extend their reach into the lives of lower-classand vernacular-educated Indians, particularly in the rural estates. TheSaivite groups that were popular among Tamil-educated individuals havenow attracted the attention of English-educatedIndians. Although differ-ent in philosophy, both approaches to Hinduism offer various religiousideas that are easily assimilated without intensive study. The practice ofgroup chanting and singing in the Vedanta and Saivite organizations, com-monly known as bhajan, provides another source of spiritual fervor inHindu revivalism.Like the Christian Charismatic Renewal, the Hindu organizations arecontrolled largely by the laity whose role in Hindu revivalismsuggests thatreligious orthodoxy is circumscribed by varied interpretations. Hindupriests generally perform their duties in temples and have no influenceover the affairsof these organizations. Competition among the organiza-tions promotes diverse definitions of Hinduism, thus fractionatingthe fieldinto self-contained units that seem to generate a disparate vitality forHindu revivalism as a whole. In addition, many of these organizationsreceive patronage from politicians in the Malaysian Indian Congress(MIC), although they do not profess political aims. Unlike the charis-matic movement, which lacks political ties, the Hindu organizations arepotential vehicles of political mobilization should the MIC leadershipchoose to utilize their resources in a social crisis.Buddhists. Buddhist revivalism in Malaysia appearsto be spearheaded byvarious Theravada organizations with missionary goals such as the Bud-dhist Missionary Society (BMS), a lay organization involved in active


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RAYMOND L. M. LEE 409proselytizing among English-speaking non-Malays. The BMS has closelinks with the Young Buddhist Association of Malaysia (YBAM), a na-tional-level organization with more than a hundred branches throughoutthe country. The YBAM concentrates its efforts on recruiting Chineseyouths, especially on university campuses, through spiritual programsaimed at increasing knowledge of Buddhism. These efforts at spreadingBuddhist scriptures and liturgies have been complemented by the growthof independent Buddhist temples with thaumaturgical reputations linkedto the charismatic and healing powers of individual monks. Buddhist tem-ples of the Tibetan and southern Thai varieties have attracted many wor-shippers on the basis of such reputations. Unlike the Theravadaorganizations, many Mahayana groups are not explicitly engaged in mis-sionary work, although this does not necessarily imply that they are quies-cent. On the contrary, many Mahayana temples together with theirTheravada counterparts have been celebrating Wesak (the birthday ofSakyamuni Buddha) on a grand scale in recent years. The overcrowdedtemples and the grandiosity of processions at Wesak attest to the recentresurgence of Buddhist consciousness in Malaysia, a development thatmerits further investigation.Sikhs. Another religion that is experiencing a nearly unnoticed revivalis Sikhism whose adherents total less than 1% of the population. Sikhismin Malaysia is not a centrally administered religion but is fictionalizedalong regional lines. Many Sikh temples (gurudwara)and associations areorganized in accordance with networks based on ties to origins in theMalwa, Mahja, and Doaba regions of the Punjab. Despite regional an-tagonisms, many gurudwara have in recent years become centers of spiri-tual gatherings (satsang) organized by Sikh youths. Although thisrevivalist movement is amorphousin structure,its origins can be traced tothe activities of the Sikh Naujawan, an association establishedin the early1960s to promote the ideal of pan-Sikhism. Its founder was a highlyrespected holy man, Sant Sohan Singh Ji, whose religious mantle was as-sumed by Giani Mohinder Singh after the former's death in the mid-1970s.Giani Mohinder Singh is now an independent ascetic who commands alarge following of Sikh youths attracted by his reputed charisma.19 Theeagerness of many Sikh youths to rediscover their cultural identity mustalso be understood in terms of the recent political events in the Punjab.

19. Giani Mohinder Singh has claimed that he once studied under the martyred Sikhleader, Jernail Singh Bhindrawale, in Amritsar (personal communication with SarandevSingh, September 1987).


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410 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVIII, NO. 4, APRIL 1988The Sikh separatistmovement in India has contributed to a rising religiousconsciousness among many Sikh youths in Malaysia today.None of the non-Muslim revivalist movements described above is explic-itly motivated by political interests. All of them are concerned mainlywith increasing awareness of their individual religious identities throughecstatic worship and scripturalstudy. Unlike the Islamic revivalistorgani-zations, these non-Muslim movements pose no immediate threat to thegovernment and thus their need for political protection has yet to arise.However, the formulation of certain government policies directly affectingnon-Muslims has increased their sense of vulnerability to external pres-sure. This has brought about some interreligious cooperation among non-Muslims, but it has not yet created the kind of extreme frustration thatmay predispose these movements to political action. On the other hand,this pressurehas given members of the movements more reasonfor contin-uing their revivalistic activities.

Public Policies and Non-MuslimReactionsWithin the context of non-Muslim revivalism, two issues have emergedconcerning land and language that exacerbate non-Muslim fears of Islamicdomination. Many non-Muslims perceive them as instruments of govern-ment policy to limit their resourcesand block their growth. Symbolically,the exercise of these policies serves to emphasize non-Muslim powerless-ness.The issue of land allocation for religious buildings is central to this sym-bolic statement. Before independence, many non-Muslim organizationswere able to build churches and temples on prime lands received from thecolonial government. In urban areas, many of these religious buildingswere located on strategicallyattractive hillsides and along main thorough-fares. Moreover, churches and temples were built in ethnically segregatedneighborhoodswhere the Chinese and Indians were in the majority. Evenin the 1950s and 1960s, with rapid urbanization and desegregationof eth-nic neighborhoods, there were relatively few obstacles to the constructionof non-Muslim religious buildings. From the 1970s onward, however,when pressures for Islamization became stronger, non-Muslims exper-ienced greater difficultyin acquiring land for religiouspurposes, and in thenewer suburbs of Malaysian cities they resort to congregating and wor-shipping in store-front facilities and rented houses. Expansion of non-Muslim religious buildings is now largely confined to those within thegroundsof establishedchurches and temples. Some Christian leaders haveexplained these restrictionsas a reversalof the privileges they had enjoyed


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RAYMOND L. M. LEE 411during the colonial period, with the Muslims now having the upper handin acquiring choice land for erecting mosques. Because of diminishing op-portunities to buy land, these leaders have been forced to make joint bidswith members of other Christian denominations on scarce land the govern-ment occasionally grants for non-Muslim religious purposes. This form ofcooperation is seen as necessary to control land prices, which may increasewith independentbids.These land problems have been increased by recent government actionagainst various Chinese and Indian shrines and store-front churches inKlang and Petaling Jaya, two major urban centers with large non-Muslimpopulations. The issue of shrine control originally surfaced in 1983 at aconferenceof chief ministers in Johor Baru.20 Two reasons were given forcurbingthe indiscriminate erection of wayside shrines. First, shrines wereseen as hindrances to urban renewal projects. In fact, many worshippersare preparedto relocate their shrines if the proper rituals for moving areperformed and the necessary funds provided. Some engineering and hous-ing contractors who fear the wrath of the deities even offer to rebuild theshrines elsewhere. Second, government authorities were concerned that,once established, the shrines could develop into temples and the worship-pers could make de facto claims on the land. This reason appears to bemore important than the first, since land claims are more difficult to re-solve than the relocation of shrines.Furthermore, the opinion that shrines are obstacles to urban develop-ment has been used as a discreet means to threaten non-Muslim devoteeswho worship at Sino-Malayshrines. These shrines,known as tokongkera-mat or tokong datuk, are usually dedicated to Malay territorialspirits ordeified Malay individuals. Occasionally, the Malay deities may be wor-shipped alongside Chinese deities such as Dabogong (great uncle spirit)and Tudigong (the earth spirit). The campaign against these shrines hasbeen confined mainly to Klang, the royal town of Selangor. Acting oncomplaints by the Sultan of Selangor that illegal temples were retardingurbandevelopment in Klang, the Klang District Chinese Temples Associ-ation conducted a census of existing Chinese temples and shrines in theroyal town. Officially, the census was meant to identify illegal temples andshrines,but according to an official of the SelangorNon-Islamic ReligiousAffairsCommittee, the real concern of the state governmentwas the use of

20. The Sunday Star, January 16, 1983. Many shrines dedicated to Hindu and Chinesedeities are found under large trees, on large rocks, in new housing sites, on street corners, andassorted locations throughout Malaysia. These shrines are usually built without the approvalof local authorities, many of whom turn a blind eye to theirexistence (some of them may evenworship at them).


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412 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVIII, NO. 4, APRIL 1988Quranic verses at some of these shrines.21 The state government also al-leged that the shrines resembled mosques because they had domes built inthe Moorish style. Many shrines were demolished as a result of this cam-paign, the origins of which, ironically, can be traced to a statement by aChinese deputy minister that many Chinese shrines bear Islamic namesand influences. His concern that these shrines could be exploited by reli-gious extremists suggests a strategy to preemptpossible actions by Islamicfundamentalists.The campaign against shrines in Klang has spread to nearby PetalingJaya, the satellite town of Kuala Lumpur. However, the campaign herehas not focused on shrines but on churches and temples located in rentedhouses and shopping complexes. Citing a clause from the Street, Buildingand Drainage Act of 1974 pertainingto the improperuse of buildings, thePetaling Jaya Municipal Council (MPPJ) served eviction orders on 46non-Muslim religious groups operating in houses and shops. They weregiven fourteen days to vacate their premises, but a temporary reprievewasachieved upon intervention of the Selangor branch of the Malaysian Chi-nese Association (MCA). Some Christians affected by this order claimedthat they had worshipped in store-front churches for more than thirtyyears without any problems. They perceived eviction without an alterna-tive site for worship as the height of government injustice, citing the con-travention of Article 11 of the constitution guaranteeing freedom ofreligious practices. In the negotiations that followed between MPPJ andthe affected groups, two recommendations were made: (1) to legalize thestore-front churches and temples by convertingthe status of their premisesfrom residential and commercial to institutional ; and (2) to pro-vide more land for church and temple construction. The first recommen-dation involves more red tape because it requiresthe approvalof the LandOffice and the state government, while the second strikes a raw nerve inthe Malay assertion of Islamic dominance. Like the shrine issue in Klang,this eviction problem will not be easily resolved, thus further frustratingnon-Muslim religious expression.The language issue concerns the use of the Bible and related terminolo-gies in Malay (BahasaMalaysia). Since the mid-1970s increasing numbersof Christians have been using the Alkitab and the PerjanjianBaru (Bibleand New Testament, respectively) imported from Indonesia. This trend inthe popularity of the two versions can be attributedto the present genera-tion of Malaysian Christians who have been educated largely in BahasaMalaysia. Their use of the Indonesian versions of the scripturesdoes not

21. The Star, December 4-5, 1986, January 23-24, 1987.


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RAYMOND L. M. LEE 413constitute a problem of transliteration since Indonesian and Malay areclosely related languages, but legal problems surfaced in December 1981when the government banned the sale and distribution of the Alkitab andthe PerjanjianBaru under a gazette notification order. The governmentwas obviously concerned that the wide circulation of the Alkitab mightinadvertently influence the Muslim population. Christian leaders madeconcerted efforts to convince the Minister of Home Affairs to lift the ban.Negotiations resulted in an amended order: the Alkitab and PerjanjianBaru would be permitted only within church grounds. Dissatisfied withthis limited condition, the leaders continued to press the government for amore liberal decision, and in March 1984 an agreement was reached toestablish ten authorized outlets to import and distribute the Alkitab andPerjanjianBaru. Nevertheless, Christian leaders still feel outraged at theimpositions placed on them in a matter concerning the future of Christian-ity in Malaysia.Christians continued to face other restrictions related to the use ofArabic words in non-Muslim worship. In February 1986 the Catholicchurch of Sabah received instructions from the government forbidding itand other Christians to use sixteen Arabic words in their publications.22A list of alternative terminologies in Bahasa Malaysia was provided. Aprecedent had already been set in Terengganu and Kelantan when thestate governments passed laws in 1980 and 1981 prohibitingnon-Muslimsfrom using 21 words and 10 expressions in Arabic. The Sabah crisisbrought together Catholic and Protestant leaders on the peninsula whojointly refused to accede tV the government's order;eventual negotiationsresultedin the reduction of the list to four forbidden words: Allah, Baitul-lah, Kaabah, and Solat.These conflicts over land and language have intensified non-Muslims'sense of religious persecution and increased their awareness that theyshould stand together to protect their rights. An interreligiousorganiza-tion, known officiallyas the Malaysian Consultative Council of Buddhism,Christianity, Hinduism and Sikhism (MCCBCHS), was formally estab-lished in August 1983 by dissatisfied non-Muslim representativeson thegovernment-sponsoredNational Unity Board. Feeling that their presenceon the board was merely cosmetic, they decided to work as an independentgroup for a more effective defense of non-Muslim rights. Since its forma-tion, the MCCBCHS has made several public statements concerning thethreat of Islamization to non-Muslims, but its role seems to be limited to

22. It may be speculatedthat the Catholic church of Sabahbecame a targetbecause of thelarge number of Christians in Sabah and the recent political victory of the Kadazan party,Parti Bersatu Sabah, led by Joseph Pairin Kitingan who is a Catholic.


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414 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVIII, NO. 4, APRIL 1988that of organizingseminarsand releasing press statements. The more diffi-cult task of negotiating with governmentauthoritiesover the land and lan-guage issues continues to fall on the shoulders of non-Malay politiciansand organizations representingspecific religions. Moreover, relations be-tween component groups in the MCCBCHS have not been fully stabilizedfor consensual functioning; for example, tension between Christians andHindus has arisen over the issue of mass conversion of Hindus to Christi-anity, particularlyamong Indians in rural plantations. Despite this prob-lem, the MCCBCHS is the only interreligious body of non-Muslims inMalaysia that projects an image of a united non-Muslim front against Is-lamic domination. As a symbol of resistance, it will continue to functionas a meeting point for non-Muslims to air their grievances.

National Politics and Religious TensionsThe growing tension between Muslims and non-Muslims in Malaysia isnot an isolated religious factor, but is linked to the broader problemof racerelations at the national level. Since independence, problems of race andethnicity have almost always been resolved at the cabinet level, so much sothat racial compromiseseems to be the preserveof the political elites. Theentire structure of the Malaysian political system hinges on the delicatebalance among the various ethnic component parties of the Barisan Na-sional government. Differences among these parties at the federal leveltend to have serious consequences on race relations at the local level.However, the decade since 1977 has been marked by intense factionalstruggles within each of the three major component parties-the UMNO,MCA, and MIC. The impact of intraethnic conflict in the three parties onrace relations has been asymmetrical. In the late 1970s, the conflict be-tween Samy Vellu and S. Subramaniamin the MIC had an insignificanteffect on race relations, and in the MCA, the Lee San Choon-MichaelChen tussle of the late 1970s and the contest between Tan Koon Swan andNeo Yee Pan in the mid-1980s did not spread beyond the boundaries ofthe Chinese community. However, the split of UMNO in the mid-1980sinto two opposing camps, Dr. Mahathir Mohamad vs. Tengku Razaleigh/Musa Hitam, seems to have generated an indirect fallout on Malay-non-Malay relations.

Three reasons can be offeredto explain the effect of Malay political fac-tionalism on race relations. First, UMNO as the dominant party occupiesa commanding position in the Barisan Nasional government. Wheneverinternal differencesarise in UMNO, the central decision-makingprocess inthe government may be affected so as to cause shifts in relationships withother Barisan Nasional partners. Acrimonious feelings may develop be-


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RAYMOND L. M. LEE 415tween Malays and non-Malays because of particular tactics used by theUMNO combatants, or assorted alliances may result from the complexnetworks between UMNO factions and the non-Malay parties. Whateverthe outcome of the internal conflict, race relations as a whole will be af-fected by virtue of UMNO's central position in the government.Second, Islam constitutes a powerful weapon in the struggle for politicalsupremacy. In the protracted conflict between UMNO and PAS, bothsides have used Islam as their main instrument of attack and defense. Andin the current disputes within UMNO, Islam is used by the Mahathir fac-tion as a continuing source of political legitimacy and as a shield againstexternal interference in Malay politics. Because of its narrow victory inthe UMNO triennial elections in April 1987,23 the Mahathir faction maysee a greaterneed to accelerateIslamization to reinforceits embattled posi-tion. For ambitious individuals in this faction who lack grass-roots sup-port, Islamization provides opportunities for building power bases in thereligious arena. By increasing religious zeal through Islamization, the im-age of Malay Muslim unity is promoted, thereby diverting attention fromthe ongoing internecine struggles in UMNO. Insofar as race relations areconcerned, Islamization is likely to create greater divisivenessbetween theMalays and non-Malays.Third, issues relating to the New Economic Policy (NEP) have beenraised in connection with the UMNO conflict. Because the NEP has adirect bearing on race relations, its use as political fodder in the UMNOdispute has encouragednon-Malay politicians and interest groups to voicecriticism of the wanton exercise of special privileges for Malays. Imple-mented in the early 1970s, the NEP was officiallydefinedas the principalmeans for eradicating poverty and restructuringMalaysian society, but inactuality it became the major vehicle for Malay social mobility. Aftermore than 15 years of political and economic decisions based on the NEP,several observers have concluded that these decisions have benefitedmainly Malays in the upper classes, although some well-placed non-Malays also have been beneficiaries of the policy. However, this trend to-ward wealth concentrationhas been retarded by the economic recession ofthe early 1980s. The limitation of resources has generatedlevels of desper-ation not felt before by the upper and ruling classes, and it is in this con-text of economic gloom that disagreements have arisen within UMNOover various aspects of the NEP. One of the reportedreasons for the splitbetween Dr. Mahathir and Musa Hitam, resulting in the latter's resigna-

23. Dr. Mahathir managed to retain his presidency against the challenge of TengkuRazaleigh by 43 votes, and GhafarBaba defeated Musa Hitam for the deputy presidencyby aslim margin of 40 votes.


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416 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVIII, NO. 4, APRIL 1988tion as deputy prime minister in February 1986, was Musa Hitam's oppo-sition to various NEP-related projects such as the national car and thePenang bridge. In his letter of resignation he complained bitterly aboutthe prevalence of money politics in UMNO, a direct reference to theindirect effects of the NEP on Malay politics.These top level criticisms have in a way provided a license for non-Ma-lay questioning of the Malay sacred cow. In July 1987 the predomi-nantly non-Malay opposition party, the Democratic Action Party (DAP),threatened to sue the governmentover its award of a M$3.4 billion tenderto United Engineers Malaysia (UEM) for construction of the north-southhighway. The DAP alleged that Hatibudi, an UMNO holding company,has a 50% stake in UEM, and the contract therefore contradicts the objec-tive of privatizing the highway project as claimed by the government.Although the Penang high court ruled against the DAP's suit, its appealtothe supremecourt was upheld, thus bringingthe UEM contract to a stand-still. The implication of this suit is that non-Malay politicians in the futuremay turn more to the courts to challenge the government'seconomic poli-cies. Aliran, a public interest group, organized a seminar in August 1987on the Malaysian constitution. Its president sent a memorandum to theprime ministerrequestinghim to reviewthe constitution in order to reducediscriminationand promote equal opportunities for members of all ethnicgroups.24 These two examples suggest that UMNO infighting has indi-rectly instilled a growing boldness among non-Malays in questioning theapparent sanctity of Malay privileges.The level of racial tension in 1987 was further increased by severalevents not directly related to the UMNO conflict. Between June and Au-gust, a language issue emerged at the University of Malaya that spreadbeyond the campus into the political arena. It related to a ruling by UMauthorities that students not majoringin English, Chinese, or Tamil can-not enroll in vernacular courses as electives. The English, Chinese, andIndian Studies departmentsat UM objected strongly to the ruling, claim-ing that its implementation would effectively lower their enrollments. De-spite their protests, the ruling was endorsed by the UM senate. Thedecision was perceivedby non-Malays as an erosion of their ethnic rights,and it elicited a storm of protest from several non-Malay political parties,including the MCA, MIC, and Gerakan. The DAP organized a demon-stration on the UM campus. The university authorities refused to revokethe ruling, the education minister refrained from intervening, and non-

24. See The Star, August 17, 1987.


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418 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XXVIII, NO. 4, APRIL 1988ConclusionThe religious dimension of racial conflict in Malaysia has become moreprominent in recent yearsbecause of the increasingencroachment of Islamon the lives of non-Muslims. Islam is an important symbol for the expres-sion of Malay identity, but it is also a political weapon in the hands ofMalay power aspirants. Given the close links between the ethnic andpolitical function of Malaysian Islam, it is not surprisingthat its height-ened expression is related to political tensions within the Malay commu-nity. These tensions are complex, reflecting various levels of personalfeuds, class conflicts, and regional differences. But the singular conditionthat presently reflects these tensions is the conflict within UMNO. The

persistence of these tensions will continue to fuel the drive toward Is-lamization, maintaining the impression of Malay-Muslim unity at the ex-pense of deterioratingrelationsbetween the Malays and non-Malays. Theprospects for attenuation of this tense situation depend greatly on the out-come of the UMNO conflict and the religious policies pursuedby the gov-ernment. If Islamization is accelerated as a manifestation of theturbulencein Malay politics, the organized responseof the non-Muslims tothis threat will become more apparent. Because non-Muslim religiousgroups lack political clout, they will necessarilyseek assistance from estab-lished non-Malay political parties. If this situation develops, non-Muslimreligions will become politicized and the boundaries between religious andpolitical conflicts in Malaysia will become more blurred.

religious tensions in malaysia

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