solit 1/2 air naval postgraduate unclas7sified … · department of national security affairs and...
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OD-RI75 342 THE ICRUS ILLUSION: TECHNOLOGY DOCTRINE AD, THE SOlIT 1/2AIR FORCE(U) NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA
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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOLIn Monterey, California
DTIC ELECTE
THESISTHE ICARUS ILLUSION:
TECHNOLOGY, DOCTRINE AND THE SOVIET AIR 4
W FORCE
'V by
Steven K. Black
September 1986
Thesis Advisor Jan A. Dellenbrant
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THE ICARUS ILLUSION: TECHNOLOGY, DOCTRINE AND THE SOVIET AIR FORCE
12 PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
Black, Steven K.13a TYPE OF REPORT 13b TIME COVERED 14 DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 15 PAGE COUNT
Master's Thesis FROM TO September 1986 13216 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION
17 COSATI CODES 18 SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD GROUP SUB-GROUP Technology, Doctrine, Soviet Air Force, Air
Employment DQctrine, MIG, SUKHOJ, Acquisition,Aircraft Design, Strateay, Tactics.
9 ABSTRACT (Continue on revere if necessary and identify by block number)
This thesis describes and analyzes the relationship betweenpost-World War II Soviet fighter aircraft design and Soviet air employmentdoctrine. It tests the proposition that Soviet fighter aircraft aredeveloped in response to design criteria established solely on the basisof military requirements. The results show that Soviet fighter designhas not only progressed largely independently of prevailing doctrinalrequirements, but appears to have driven the development of tactical airemployment doctrine over the past forty years.
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Jan A. Dellenbrant (408) 646-2228 Dt
DO FORM 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PACEAll other editions are obsolete UN CLASS I FTI E D
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Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
The Icarus Illusion:Technology, Doctrine and the Soviet Air Force
by
Steven K. BlackCaptain, United States Air Force
A.B., University of Michigan, 1980
Submitted in partial fulfillment of therequirements for the degree of
MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS
from the
NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOLSeptember 1986
Author: L.__/_ _ -- ..__..../ / Steven K. Black
Approved by: I/JayllA. De-llenbr¥t, Tesis Advisor
\K ,ry W. KaitcltAfi~f,-Second Reader
-'Sherma-n W.Bandin, Chairman,Department of National Security Affairs and Intelligence
K n ea le 'r . M a s h -1 - -: -,Dean of Information and Policy-grAces
2
The Icarus Illusion:Technology, Doctrine and the Soviet Air Force
Steven K. BlackCaptain, United States Air Force
A.B., University of Michigan, 1980
This thesis describes and analyzes the relationship between post-World War II
Soviet fighter aircraft design and Soviet air employment doctrine. It tests the
proposition that Soviet fighter aircraft are developed in response to design criteria
established solely on the basis of military requirements. The results show that Sovietfighter design has not only progressed largely independently of prevailing doctrinal
requirements, but appears to have driven the development of tactical air employment
doctrine over the past forty years.Accession For
NTIS GRA&I
DTIC TABUnannounced 0
Justificat ion
ByDistributtion/
Availabilityoe
A. C'r Avail and/orDist Special
Master of Arts in National Security Advisor: Jan A. DellenbrantAf tairs Department of National SecuritySeptember 1986 Affairs and Intelligence
Classification of thesis: Unclassified
!y
ABSTRACT
\ his thesis describes and analyzes the relationship between post-World War I ISoviet fighter aircraft design and Soviet air employment doctrine. It tests the
proposition that Soviet fighter aircraft are developed in response to design criteria
established solely on the basis of military requirements. The results show that* Soviet
fighter design has not only progressed largely independently of prevailing doctrinal
requirements, but appears to have driven the development of tactical air employment
doctrine over the past forty yas
*1~ Yars 3
THESIS DISCLAIMER
The views and judgments presented in this thesis are those solely of the author.They do not necessarily reflect official positions held by the Naval PostgraduateSchool, the Department of the Navy, the Air Force Institute of Technology, theDepartment of the Air Force, the Department of Defense, or any other US government
agency or organization. No citation of this work may include references or attributionsto any official US government source.
4,4
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ....................... 10
A. PURPOSE ........................................... 10B. METHODOLOGY..................................... 10C. ORGANIZATION..................................... 11
II. THE SOVIET WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROCESS .............. 13A. THE PARTICIPANTS ................................. 13
1. The Politburo....................................... 132. The Secretariat...................................... 143. The Defense Council ................................. 14
4. The Ministry of Defense .............................. 15
5. The Defense Industry................................. 16
6. The Ministry of Aviation Ministry (MAP) .................. 177. The Military- Industrial Comm-ission (VPK) ................. 21
B. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES....................... 21
ill. THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET FIGHTER DESIGN .............. 25A. 1945-1953, THE GERMAN LEGACY...................... 25B. 1954-1964, A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS ..................... 34
C. 1964-1973, THE RISE OF GROUND ATTACK...............44D. 1973-1985, THE RISE OF AIR COMBAT ................... 51
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF Alit EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE .......... 61A. 1945-1953. THE STAGNATION OF MILITARY
DOCTRINE ......................................... 61B. 1954-1964, A PERIOD OF TRANSITION ................... 65C. 1964-1973, THE NUCLEAR PERIOD...................... 74
D. 1973-1985, THE CONVENTIONAL PERIOD ................ 771. Introduction........................................ 772. The Theater Strategic Conventional Operation .............. 78
5
3. The Operational Maneuver Group ......................... 81
4. The Soviet Air Forces Reorganization ...................... 84
5. The Air Operation ...................................... 89
V. QUANTIFYING THE PROBLEM ............................... 91
A. THE COMPONENTS OF FIGHTER CAPABILITY ............ 91
B. SCORING SOVIET FIGHTER TECHNOLOGY ANDD O CTR IN E ............................................. 96
VI. TECHNOLOGY AND DOCTRINE IN PERSPECTIVE ............ 109A. GROUND ATTACK ..................................... 110
B. AIR COM BAT .......................................... 114
C. TOWARD THE YEAR 2000 ............................... 116
APPENDIX A: THE DATA BASE ..................................... 119
APPENDIX B: SAMPLE METHODOLOGY ............................ 124
BIBLIOG RA PHY ..................................................... 126
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ........................................ 130
6
LIST OF TABLES
I. LIST OF VARIABLES USED IN FACTOR ANALYSIS ............ 92
II. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR FIGHTER MATRIX(FTR M A T) .................................................. 93
Ill. ESTIMATES OF COMMUNALITY ............................. 94
IV. FACTOR DELINEATION ..................................... 94
V. UNROTATED FACTOR MATRIX .............................. 95
VI. FINAL VARIMAX-ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX ............... 95
VII. TINDEXA VALUES FOR AIR DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS ........ 97
VIII. TINDEXA VALUES FOR AIR SUPERIORITY FIGHTERS ........ 98
IX. AVERAGE TINDEXA VALUES ................................ 99
X. TINDEXG VALUES FOR GROUND ATTACK FIGHTERS ....... 101
XI. DISAGGREGATED TINDEX VALUES ........................ 102
XII. DEPTHRATIO-M ISSION RELATIONSHIPS .................... 103
XIII. DISAGREGGATED AVERAGE DEPTHRATIO VALUES BYPER IO D ................................................... 104
XIV. EVOLUTION OF SOVIET FIGHTER DESIGN AND AIREMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE .................................. 109
I7
ZI +~l-
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Location of Soviet Aircraft and Aircraft Engine Plants ................. 192. Location of German Aircraft Engine Plants, 1945 ..................... 263. Dispositon of Main German Aircraft Engine Plants .................... 264. Evolution of ThicknessChord Ratio (1945-1953) ...................... 30
5. Evolution of Combat Radius (nm) (1945-1953) ....................... 316. Evolution of Maximum Thrust (lbs) (1945-1953) ...................... 31
7. Evolution of Ground Run (ft) (1945-1953) ........................... 328. Evolution of Wingsweep (degrees) (1945-1953) ........................ 329. Evolution of Aspect Ratio (1945-1953) .............................. 33
10. The Trend Toward Supersonic Flight ............................... 3411. Evolution of Thickness,,Chord Ratio (1945-1965) ...................... 3612. Evolution of Aspect Ratio (1945-1965) ............................... 3613. M IG -21 FISH BED .............................................. 3714. Evolution of Maximum Mach at Altitude ............................ 3715. Evolution of W ingloading (1945-1965) .............................. 3816. M IG-23 FLOGGER ............................................. 3917. SU -7 FITTER .................................................. 4018. Evolution of Maximum Thrust (lbs) (1945-1965) ...................... 4019. Evolution of Ordnance-Carrying Capability (lbs) (1945-1965) ............ 4120. Evolution of Ground Run (ft) (1945-1965) ........................... 42
21. SU-11 FISH PO T ................................................ 4322. Evolution of Combat Radius (nm) (1945-1965) ....................... 4323. SU-15 FLAGON E/F ............................................ 4624. Comparison of MIG-23 (top) and MIG-27 (bottom) ................. 4725. Comparison of Panavia TORNADO and SU-24 FENCER .............. 4926. Soviet Interest in Western Propulsion Systems ........................ 5227. Evolution of Al Radar Search Range ............................... 5628. Evolution of Al Radar Track Range ...................... .......... 56
8
29. Evolution of AAM Range ........................................ 57
30. Evolution of Thrust-to-Weight Ratio (ibs) (1945-1980) ................. 57
31. Evolution of W ingloading (1945-1980) .............................. 58
32. Evolution of Long-Range Kill Capability ............................ 59
33. Evolution of M aneuverability ...................................... 60
34. Evolution of Maximum Maneuverability and Maximum Kill-Range ...... 60
35. Request Sequence to Fire Nuclear Artillery .......................... 83
36. Evolution of TINDEXA .......................................... 99
37. Evolution of TINDEXG ......................................... 102
38. Technology-Doctrine Convergence ................................. 106
39. Components of a Modem Ground Attack Mission ................... 111
.1
,.
_P
I. INTRODUCTION
After Daedalus had crafted the wings upon which he and his son would escape tosafety, he gave very specific instfuctions to Icarus on how to use them tomaximum e'ehct. Daedalus warned Icarus not to fly too low. lest the wingsbecome damaged by the salt water spray; nor should he fly too high, lest the sunmelt the wax that held the structures tokether .... Growing over-confident in hisnew-found ability, the young boy forg~t his father's warnings and. oblivious tothe danger, climbed high into the sun, where his wings disintegrated, and Icarusperishedin the sea beldw.
A. PURPOSEThis thesis describes and analyzes the relationship between post-World War II
Soviet fighter aircraft design and Soviet tactical air employment doctrine (thatunderlying body of principles that govern the operational use of tactical air assets). It
is widely held that weapons procurement derives rationally from pre-existing doctrinal
and operational requirements. Thus, the evolution of weapons design should "track
with" the evolution of this tactical air employment doctrine. Further, not only shouldthis doctrine not demand more of the available systmes than they can deliver, it should
not fail to fully exploit available capability. This research effort tests the proposition
that Soviet fighter aircraft are developed in response to design criteria established solely
on the basis of military requirements, as we understand them from available Soviet
writings. The results show that Soviet fighter design has progressed largelyindependently of existing doctrinal requirements, and in fact, appears to have driventhe development of tactical air employment doctrine over the past forty years.
B. METHODOLOGYThe basic "method" of this research is to compare the most easily-observed
characteristics and performance figures for most Soviet fighter aircraft with theemployment concept prevalent at the time of each fighter's design. The data base fromwhich the information on Soviet fighter aircraft (hereafter referred to simply as
"fighters") is derived is one created by the author in late 1985 and early 1986. Itincludes only aircraft designed at the MIG (the acron ym for Mikoyan-Gurevich, thenames of the two designers who founded the design bureau) and SUKHOI (the
10
abbreviation for which is "SU") design bureaus since 1945.1 Only those aircraft put into
serial production are included in the data base. ThL. does, however, include some
aircraft produced in very small numbers, such as the MIG-23 FLOGGER A.
The data were all derived from unclassified sources. Where the necessary data
were not available, the author derived them, either through simple "number-crunching"
(as was the case, for example, in determining thrust-to-weight ratios or wingloading
values) or through the use of simple linear regression (as in the case, for example, of
determining non-afterbuming maximum thrust based on a regression of maximum
afterburning thrust, where the correlation coefficient was close to unity. 2
C. ORGANIZATION
Although the thesis discusses the evolution of fighter design and the evolution of
air employment doctrine in the Soviet Union since the Second World War, Section II
provides necessary background information on the Soviet weapons procurement
process in general. It also offers some propositions about its systemic impact on
fighter design and doctrinal devlepment.
The chronological analysis of Soviet fighter development in Section III is
formatted the same way as the chronological analysis of doctrinal development
presented in Section IV. In each, the postwar period is divided into four parts: The
Stalinist Period (1945-1953); the Khrushchev Period (1954-1964); a "nuclear" period
(1964-1973), and; a "conventional" period (1973-1985). Taken together, these two
sections argue that the evolution of Soviet fighter technology has largely driven Soviet
air employment doctrine over the past forty years.
Section V atempts to quantify the problem, presenting the results of both factor
and multiple-attribute utility analyses. The factor analysis follows from the assumption
that the technological level of fighter capability can be viewed as a "combination of its
IThe chief designer of the MIG design bureau .(OKB) is currently R. A.Belyakov. Although it had been customary to honor a designer s successfullv-producedproduct with the irst two or three letters of the designer s name (e.g.,MI -15 for. Mikovan and Gurevich, SU-7 for Sukhoi, TU-16 for tupolev) the prctice followed inthis thesis, as it appears to be in the Soviet Union, is to credit the 0KB itself, ratherthan the particular designer. Thus, an aircraft recently designed by Belyakov will berefkrred to as a " theG: productand bears the "ntGl designatlon pro-ilac for theSukhnot OKB, where, the chief designer is currently E:. A . Ivanov;, products of theSukhoi 0KB bear the designation 'SU," even where they may have been designedunder Ivanov's tenure.
2The sources for the data base were Modern Air Combat (1983) Aircraft of theSoviet Union (1983h and An Illustrated Guide to Future Fig hters and tombat Aircraft(1984) [all by Bill Gunstoni, as well as Janes All the vorra's Aircraft, Aviation veekand Space Technology, and interavia.
11
" " '/ ) . e ' e N " -'. . " - , - -. ", ' '-.. _ ' ,_ .,. e , "', . , . . .' .' , :. " .. ' , _e., " -. , , , , e . e , ' _ ,. .. 3 "-"-.0" "_ - -'' "e e "F€ £ " '" " ""%" " -" ""%- %€ ," '
component capabilities, each of which can be measured at an interval level. "3 The
model derived from the multiple-attribute utility analysis is specifically designed toemphasize the growth in particular capabilities of different aircraft over a long period
of time, as well as to permit a quasi-mathematical calculation of the relationship
between doctrine and technology in the postwar period.The final portion of the thesis (Section VI) considers a variety of factors external
to the intrinsic characteristics of the aircraft itself--pilot skill, initiative, and tactics--in
an effort to ground the quantitative portion of this research in a larger context.
3Allan Wesley LeGrow, Measuring Aircraft Capabilitv for Military and PoliticalAnalsis (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Mlonterey, California, June1976), p.31
12
"C
I_ W I, . 0111..1F IL JU T - X M W. -L- n ..
II. THE SOVIET WEAPONS ACQUISITION PROCESS
It is practically a cliche to identify the Soviet Union as a superpower primarily, if
not solely, because of its military prowess. Numerous scholars have commented on the
"backwardness" that characterizes the overall Soviet economy. At the same time,
however, the Soviet Union clearly has a capacity to produce weapons of a sufficiently
capable quality and in vast enough numbers to -qualify" as one of the world's two
superpowers. The discrepancy between the civilian and military sectors of the Soviet
economy appear to be so great that one is tempted to conjure up an image of two
distinct economies; one that produces sophisticated military hardware roughly
comparable to Western equipment, and another one that produces consumer goods
only erratically and at all times of a significantly inferior quality, compared both to
their Western counterparts and to the higher-quality workmanship found in and
priority attached to items produced in the military sector.
This section of the thesis describes, in general terms, how the Soviet political and
military leadership acquires weapon systems. It will be shown, in particular, that the
Soviets are able to acquire weapons of high quality and in enormous number in the
midst of an economy riddled with waste, inefficiency, and built-in impediments to
innovation, at the same time as the process imposes certain costs on the design system.
A. THE PARTICIPANTS
1. The Politburo
Military policy in general, and weapons acquisition in particular, take place
within a dual government-Party structure. For the most part, the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union (CPSU), specifically the Politburo and the Secretariat, formulate
policy, while the governmental apparatus ratifies and implements those decisions.
Within the CPSU, the Politburo is the most important organization involved in the
Soviet weapons acquisition process. The Politburo both regularly participates in
defense-oriented decisionmaking and retains the power to initiate, cancel or modify
programs that capture its interest. 4
4The Politburo considers all "large, non-recurring expenditures," budgets,numbers of weapons, and programs with cost-overruns. Arthur Alexan~der,Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurement (London: Adlard and Son Ltd.,1978), p. 9.
13
Tne Politburo's intervention has been significant in the past; it is well-known
that Stalin was personally involved in the weapons acquisition process, particularly
involving nuclear weapons. Khrushchev, too, was intimately involved in the effort to
develop the Soviet space program and ballistic missiles. Currently, the extent of the
Politburo's involvement may range from minimal to maximal. This latter type of
activity is most likely for "new in principle" weapons, examples of which are nuclear
weapons, ballistic missiles, and directed-energy "beam" weapons.5 However, while
devolution of authority to the working level has been described as one of the major
characteristics of the Brezhnev era, 6 it remains to be seen what will be said of the
Andropov, Chemenko -and Gorbachev regimes..
2. The Secretariat
Another important CPSU organization is the Central Committee Secretariat.
In addition to its other functions, it is responsible for overseeing policy
implementation. There are approximately ten Secretaries, each with specific areas of
responsibility. One of these is probably charged with overseeing heavy industry and
defense production. This very powerful post was once held by Leonid Brezhnev, and
later by Dmitri Ustinov, who became the Minister of Defense in 1976. Subordinate to
* this Secretary is the Department of Defense Industry, which
is responsible for overseeing Party affairs in the military-production ministriesand also for the implerentation of weapons research and development (R&D)
4 -and production policies.
3. The Defense Council
Although the CPSU formulates and implements defense policy.
recommendations as to what policy should be in the first place probably come from the
Defense Council. This organization "links politicians and the military at the highest
level." 8 A great deal of secrecy surrounds the Defense Council, both with respect to its
5Alexander, Decision-Making, pp. 35-39.6Jerry Hough, "The Brezhnev Era: The Man and the System," Problems of
Communism March-April 1976.7"The Secretary for Defense Production, and ,perhaps also his subordinate
department, are said to be a link between the polifical and military leadership."Kenneth A. Mvers and Dmitri Simes. Soviet Decisionmaking, Strategic Policy, aridSALT(Washin 'ton. D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, GeorgetownUniversity, 1974), ACDA/PAB-243, p. 26.
8Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 14.
14
... or - .
/
membership and to its precise functions.9 Alexander says that the Defense Council is
primarily concerned with major weapons deyelopments and procurementprogrammes, manpower levels and budget allocations. In line with is budgetaryresponsibilities, the Defence touncil provides the guidelines at the beginning dfthe planning process and would make recommendations to the PolitburoregarAdig te fnalpians of the Minister of Defence and militazr,-productionministries .... the 1Defence Council approves weapons programmes.
He concludes that the Defense Council is probably the most important political
policy-making body for weapons procurement in the Soviet Union.
4. The Ministry of Defense
Another key participant in the acquisition process is the Ministry of Defense,
under which are included centralized ministerial organs, the General Staff, and the five
"services." The central Ministry organs provide the initial guidance and control for
weapons development and production. The separation of functions between the
Ministry "proper" and the General Staff provides a system of "checks and balances. " f
The General Staff itself also plays an important role. All requests for new systems flow
through the General Staff and it adjudicates inter-service disputes over resource
allocations. It is also possible that the General Staff or one of its directorates serves as
the operational staff of the Defense Council, advising it and making recommendations
to it. Because the General Staff is the main repository of professional military
expertise, its influence on the weapons acquisition process can be substantial. 12
9Vernon Aspaturian has suggested that there is no statutory composition on theDefense Council, 'that its membership can be expanded or contracted depending upon
4, circumstances." He further suggests that the 'Council's full members may be theGeneral Secretal', the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet the SecondSecretary, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the 'Minister of betnse, theChairman of the KGB, and the Minister of Foreign Afflairs. Advisory members includethe Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK), the Cfief of the GeneralStaff of the Armed Forces, the Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact Forces, aFirst Deputy Defense Minister without portfolio and the Director of the MainPolitical Adriiinistration (NPS lecture, 13 August 19 95).
lOAlexander, Decision- Making, p. 15.
"1This separation of functions would provide the Minister with an independentcheck on General Staff planning and activities. Alexander, Decision-, Making, p. 17.The planning cycle establishes a calendar for resource allocation, which represents arigidity in te. intra-plan period. Even with high prior.ity military production, somenewlv-determined" priorities cannot be reflected until the next Five Y'ear Plan.
Vern6n Aspaturian The Soviet Military-Industrial Complex--Does It Exist?" Journalof International Affairs vol. 26, no. 1, 1972, p. 26.
12The Staffs control of military information permits it to exert significantinfluence on national nilitary policy by presenting issues and options to majordecisionmaking forums in ways which favor pre terred outcomes." Ellen Jones,"Defense R&D Policymaking in the USSR," in Jiri Valenta and William Potter, eds.,
15
VA
Finally, within the Ministry of Defense there are also the five services. Most
of the requests for new weapons, and the number of systems required, come from the
services. Each service directs some weapons development and each is responsible for
the oversight required at factories, research institutes, and design bureaus. 13 Requests
for new or improved weapons from within the servies could come from the various
scientific-technical committees (which would be alert to new technological possibilities),
the operations staff (which would be sensitive to mission requirements), or the field
commanders (who would promote even more applications-oriented requirements). 14
Within each service there is a Deputy Commander in Chief for Armaments, whose
functions include
specification of 'tactical-technical requirements' for new weapons systems;representation on the state, a.ccept.ance commissions wichevaluate new 'designsand prototypes- and administration of he teams of military representatives(voenpredy)' at defense production plants.
These organizations, which are the services' main technical directorates, are "[the]
primary interface between the MOD [Ministry of Defense] consumer and the
developer/producer [of new weapons systems]." 16
5. The Defense Industry
On the purely economic side of the house, implementation of defense policy is
the responsibility of the governmental administrative apparatus--the Council of
Ministers. The State Planning Commission (GOSPLAN), which operates under the
Council of Ministers, coordinates the thousands of organizations producing all the
products throughout the economy, including those needed in the defense sector.
Soviet Decisionmakingfor National Security (Los Angeles: Center for International and
Strategic Affairs, University of California, 1984), p. 125.13Jones, "Defense R&D," p. 125..4 Alexander, Decision-M.aking, p. 19. The orientation or bias of requirements
would thus seem to be partly determined by their origins: as one moves from thescientific-technical committeeg to armaments -directorates to operations staff to fieldcommands, one would expect a shift from technical to mission influence.
15John A. McDonnell, "The Soviet Weapons Acquisition System " in SovietArmed Forces Review Annual vol. 3 (Gulf Breeze: Academic International Press, 1979),p. 178.
16Jones, "Defense R&D," p. 125.
16
Military production, however, is administratively segregated from civilian production. 17
The defense industrial sector consists of nine main ministries: four weapons productionministries, and five component production ministries. 18 Among these ministries, theone that is responsible for the design, development, and production of all aerodynamicsystems is the Ministry of Aviation Industry (MAP).
6. The Ministry of Aviation Ministry (MAP)
The MAP, like most of the other industrial ministries, plans, controls, andoversees the operation of research institutes, design bureaus, and production plants.Its organization structure is typical of most defense industry ministries. 19 The scientific
research institutes (Nil) of the defense industry carry out both basic and appliedresearch.20 Most research projects are financed from the state budget allocated to the
*MAP, but there are also some external contractual agreements with other ministries
and organizations. The Nil's play a critical role in the design of new weapon systemsthrough the compilation of their research and test results into handbooks, which arethen distributed to the design community. These handbooks contain material,structural, and procedural specifications for all approved aerodynamic systems andcomponents. The results of the Nil research are made available because many of thedesign bureaus do not have the staff or facilities to carry out their own research. The
publication of handbooks for designers was instituted to establish common, proventechnical guidelines and keep designers abreast of new developments. 21
it The military plan is sent separately to production facilities, which must satisfyits goals as a first priority. Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 20.
"8The "weapons production" ministries are the Ministry of Aviation Industry(aircraft. engines, parts air-breathing missiles), Ministry of Defense Industri"(conventional weapons) Ministry of Shipbuilding Industry (shi s and submarines). and;vinistrv of General Machine Building ballistic missiles). Among the "componentroducton" ministries are the Ministry o1 Electronics Industry (electronic components),
.linistry of Radio Industry (electronic products), Ministry of Medium Machine Building(nuclear weapons), Mipistry of Machine Building (amnhunition), and; Ministry of' themeans of Communication (communications equipment). Alexander, Decision-,Araking, p.
19Anton Dobler, "The Soviet Aviation Industry," Paul Murphy, ed., The SovietAir Forces (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 1984), p. 81.
20Work in the research institutes includes aerodynamic and structure researchprimarily in support of the aircraft design bureaus, engine, research and testing for thepropulsion design bureaus, and applied research on metallic materials. Dobler, "SovietAviation Industry," p. 84.
21McDonnell, "Soviet Weapons Acquisition," p. 181.
17
. -.. , Iw.J . - ' U U "W -!N* - 1 ?'., --.: -- ' "- - Vi- . 1 ' .H n."i'. ' J. -I.- . W ,
This arrangement of keeping applied research separate from design and
development has several mixed consequences. On the one hand, it means that funding
for applied research does not depend on specific weapons requirements. Also, there is
a strong institutional tendency towards commonality of parts, which has a desirable
effect on such things as ease of maintenance and sustainability. On the other hand,
while it is true that designers typically take what is available from the research
institutes, rather than "gold-plating" new systems, it also means that there is little or no
apparent incentive to incorporate new technologies. 22
The design bureaus (OKB's) are the "managers" of the acquisition process.
Because they are located "at the central node between research and product, user and
planner," they supply the leadership and coordination necessary in the chaotic
4 processes of an unresponsive economy. 23 An especially important part of the design
criteria is "producibility." This means that the designer must work closely with the
production plant and make sure that the design he is proposing does not draw upon
hard-to-get resources or components, or exceed the -technological capability of the
production plant. The chief designer of the OKB has a great deal more autonomy in
running his organization than most managers enjoy elsewhere in the Soviet economy
and is personally associated with the success or failure of his project. As an
illustration, the products (that is, the aircraft) have come to be identified by the first
two or three letters of the designer's name: MIG-25 (Mikoyan and Gurevich), SU-24
(Sukhoi), TU-22M (Tupolev). This practice is still followed and reflects the prestige
that redounds to successful designers. 24
Even with all the administrative positions, research institutes and design
bureaus, the bulk of resources comprising the Soviet aviation industry are the series
22This does not means that there is no innovation or technological developmentpresent--only that it has not manifested itself clearly to Western observers. It will beshown later that, not only is there reason to be cautious about the notion of "Sovietdesign, heredity," but theie has in tact been significant technological advancement inthe fighter design community.
23Alexander, Decision-1Making, p. 24.24 McDonnell, "Soviet Weapons Acquisition," p. 182.
18
SV%
production plants. The locations of some of these plants are shown in Figure 1. These
series production plants try to be as self-sufficient as possible, due to the problems in
supply characteristic of the Soviet economy. Nevertheless, there are a number of other
plants involved in the production of components, even if the subcontracting base is not
nearly as extensive in the USSR as it is in the US.
Source: Doble, aSovit IAiato nuty"p
Fi r OF oNts
ICHAR10V 119
NI.NDOM~ AI UAN LC LA
1011 TASMaOff IAI o
Source: Dobler, "Soviet Aviation Industry," p. 90.
Figure 1. Location of Soviet Aircraft and Aircraft Engine Plants
- In the same way that OKB's tend to specialize by aircraft type, so too do theproduction plants try to specialize (bombers, transports, fighters, helicopters). Once adesign has been selected, the factory responsible for series production is 'subordinated"to the originating design bureau. The 0KB dispatches teams to help the factory "tool
up" and to oversee production in other ways.
19
So long as production continues, the [design bureaul retains the authority tomonito'i manufacturing techniques to ensure that the integrity of the design is notviolated. In this they are both suppor.ted and cross-c'hecked by the militaryrepresentatives [voenoredv] who exercise quality control and certitf" thatproduction is acceptable [tb the Ministry of Defiense and the Air Force]. Becauseof the evolutionary nature of Soviet w apons design, it is not uncommon for agiven factory to produce several generations of a p-articular system . designedby the same'[OKBl. Thus, a tradition may develop . . . [that leads] to an alfiiostpermanent relationship . . . it is reasonable to suspect that factory managersgrfer, other things being equal, to retain ,9KBj 'bosses' with whorii they Eave
uilt up a satisfactory working relationship.
In addition to long familiarity with each other, the lengthy tenures of military
industrial managers, designers, and government administrators, has helped to create a
community of shared interests and values that induces "a strong sense of the value of
continuity in design and production. "26
In this environment, things are less competed for than they are "arranged."Weapons tend to be developed along very clearly established lines, and assignments
tend to be fixed by tradition, especially where technologies are stable. In the event of
entirely new systems or advanced technology, there may be multiple prototypes and a
side-by side competition to select a design for series production.
While in the past, the primary measure of success in military production was
quantitative, in recent years the emphasis has increasingly been on qualitativeimprovements, especially with regard to the application of new technology. 27 Through
modernization, expansion, and mechanization, as well as higher wages andnon-pecuniary compensatory incentives such as housing, the Soviet aviation industry is
now on a par with Western aircraft industries in many areas. 28 As mentioned briefly
" 25McDonnell, "Soviet Weapons Acquisition," pp. 183-184.26Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 23.27General Secretary Brezhnev named the 1976 Five Year Plan the "Plan of
Quality." Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 60.28"In the areas of forging, extrusion, metal removal, and metal joining.
developments and applications are generally on a level with those of the West. Withi-selected categories or these fields--including forging and extrusion press construction.electro-discharge and ultrasonic machining, glue-welding, electro-slag welding, pulsedarc and magnetic arc welding--Soviet techno [ogy is advanced. Heavy presses used inaircraft construction include the world's lark6st forging press (70,CJO0 metric toncapacity) and a 20,000 metric ton capacity extrusion press. Emphasis is now beinggiven both to improving the fabrication of aircraft structures from conventionalmaterials and to advan-cing the state of the art in high-temperature materialsfabrication and in the construction of lightweight. structures. In some areas wheretechnology lags behind Western countries. e.g., in advanced computer-comtrolledmachine tools and equipment process controls, roreign equipment has been purchased[or stolen] to fill existing gar or to stimulate indigenous development. Dobler,Soviet Aviation Industry, p. .3.
20
% %' 1aI C.. .1Z' 1 1
% -.,%'
earlier, and in addition to the quality control function exercised at the production
plants by the OKB, the main technical directorates of the services also dispatch to the
factory teams of observers. These are the military representatives (voenpredy), whose
functions are also of a quality control nature. The close involvement of the military
representatives is intended to elicit a measure of producer responsiveness quite
uncommon elsewhere in the Soviet economy. "This . . . [presence] helps explain the
remarkable contrast between the level of Soviet military and civilian technology." 29
7. The Military-Industrial Commission (VPK)
Finally, there is one last organization which plays a very important role in
Soviet weapons acquisition: the Military-Industrial Commission (VPK). In fact, the
VPK is widely held to be the single most powerful and important organization involved
in defense production. 30Holloway suggests that the VPK may be an executive arm of
the Defense Council,30 while Alexander states that it may be answerable to the
Secretary for Defense Production of the Central Committee. 31 Regardless, the VPK is
made up of the, top executives of the key defense manufacturing industries and
coordinates the development of all Soviet weapons, as well as the acquisition of
Western technology. A recent US Department of Defense report characterizes the
VPK
as the expediter for weapons development projects . . . . [It] is the principalSoviet niutary instrument for eliminating 39r circumventing the mefficienciescharacteristic 6f the Soviet economic system.
B. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
Thus, the Soviet military economic sector in general, and the weapons acquisition
process in particular, does indeed differ in significant ways from the civilian sector of
the economy. For example, in the military sector, the "customer" (i.e., the Ministry of
Defense) plays a dominant role. This is in sharp contrast to the typical
producer-customer relationship in the civilian sector, in which the buyer is truly at the
29jones, "Defense R&D," p. 126.30David Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1983), p. 111.31Alexander, Decision-Making, p. 21.32Soviet Acquisition of Militarilv-Signifjcant Western Technology: An Update
(Washington, D.C.: Department of DEfense, 1985), p. 4.
21
mercy of the producer.33 There are at least two ways in which this "dominance" by thebuyer is reflected. The first, and probably the most important, is the system of priority
associated with military production. In the absence of an automatically-functioning
market mechanism, such as prices that reflect cost, all criteria for military production
must be bureaucratically determined. The determination to accord priority to one or
another program is sufficient to transfer scarce resources to the military sector without
bidding up their prices. The tendency for these scarce resources to flow in the militaryproduction sector of the Soviet economy means that there is no immediate market
penalty (higher prices), however, it also means that Soviet costing for defense typically
understates capital input.34
A second way in which the buyer-producer relationship is reversed from its
"normal" Soviet quality is that there is a highly-structured system of controls, enablingthe "customer" to exercise a kind of "oversight" with respect to the quality of the
system under production. In fact, "the military customer is given the right to rejectproduction which does not meet its standards." 35 There are a variety of means and
instruments by which this quality control is assured. These include very specificwritten requirements concerning the minimal operational capabilities the new system of
to possess, a willingness to budget vast research and procurement expenditures, a
formal assignment to design and production facilities of military officers with wide
responsibility for ensuring quality control, and a healthy disregard for the niceties of
procedure, which allows the political leadership to intervene anywhere in the processwhen required. The defense sector's relationship to the civilian sector in the Soviet
economy has been characterized as an island of excellence in a sea of mediocrity.
Nevertheless, despite these differences between the two sectors, the military
sector does share certain characteristics witht the rest of the Soviet economy. It is,
after all, a centrally-planned, socialist organization in which production is allocated vianon-economic means. That is, production is determined by political preference, rather
than "through the market." As in other parts of the Soviet economy, the defense
33McDonnell, "Soviet Weapons Acquisition," p. 175.34This argument is not true across the board: for example, in many cases, wages
are higher in the defense-oriented industries, precisely in to attract "scarc'e" engineeringtalent and skilled labor. For the most part, however, it resources are needed to fulf imilitary production requirements, it is. sufficient to put the full veight of the politicalstructure behind the levv--no economic "incentive" is needed where political power isunitary and all-encompassing.
35McDonnell, "Soviet Weapons Acquisition," p. 175.
22
N' N - € , "• "e , r " '' 7 " " ' ) ",.- 'e . . . -. -. -. . e . ", - . .-. -, - . -
sector must live with the optimistic planning targets that often create shortages of
necessary resources. This outright lack, due to administratively-mandated quantitative
allocations, means that resources on hand are not fungible; "a simple money budget is
not adequate to guarantee the availability of resources that have not been planned and
allocated in detail."36 Unreliable supplies engender an environment in which producers
are reluctant to innovate with regard to finding new suppliers and new components.
The lack of competition generates no incentives to differentiate products. This state of
affairs in the military production production sector, as in the civilian sector, results in a
*' strong tendency toward conservatism in both product design and development
processes. The "risk-avoidance" characteristic of the Soviet society as a whole also has
important consequences for the Soviets' ability to integrate and make full use of new
technology. This systemic weakness will be addressed in greater detail later in this
thesis.
Another characteristic of the military sector found as well in the civilian part of
the economy is a result of the supply problem endemic to Soviet industry--that is the
pursuit of autarky by ministries, through the vertical integration of important supply
industries. This is quite common in the defense industry, but especially so in the
Ministry of Aviation Industry, in which
90 to 95 percent of all aviation production (airframes aeroengines, instruments,avionics) 34is] concentrated in the enterprises of the Ministry of AviationIndustry.
It is not clear whether the "priority system" allows vertical integration to take place in
order to offset systemic problems, or is so wholly ineffective that the defense industry
must evolve that way in order to survive.
Overall, the Soviet bureaucratic environment appears optimized to meet the
special needs of the Soviet weapons acquisition process. It has taken advantage of the
strengths and avoided many of the weaknesses of the Soviet technical and industrial
base. Specifically, the organizational structure tends to develop technically-mature
36Alexander, Decision-.1faking, p. 30.3 'Holloway, The Soviet Union and the Arms Race, p. 119.
23
............ ,.................................. ................................., .. , ,-" : - ,
weapons systems and avoids the typical sloppiness of Soviet civilian production. In
addition, the Soviets are sometimes able to streamline an otherwise inflexible process to
acconunodate what is new and technically challenging.
Nevertheless, a significant weakness in the Soviet system is the general lack of
incentives for technological advances or innovation, either in the weapons being
produced or the production processes themselves. With production quotas and
responsibilities determined by government fiat, there is no spur to use the technology
to increase product differentiation. The strongest preference by far, on the part of
both designers and producers, is to supply systems that emphasize continuity with
earlier, sanctioned practices and capabilities.
When technological advances do occur, they are likely to be oriented toward one
application and to be ill-integrated into or non-existent in other areas. For example, a
new machine tool designed for a particular purpose on the assembly line is unlikely tobe incorporated into any process other than that for which it was specifically designed.
bought or stolen. In the case of Soviet fighter aircraft, this means that while
technological advances do occur, they do so erratically and unevenly--their benefits
accrue to one type of aircraft at a time, rather than raising the overall capability of the
Soviet fighter force, or even the design and production community as a whole. Section
III will address the precise nature of these technological improvements in Soviet fighter
aircraft over the past forty years, with a view to laying the groundwork for a close look
at the evolution of Soviet air employment doctrine in Section IV.
24
*~ 24
I1. THE EVOLUTION OF SOVIET FIGHTER DESIGN
A. 1945-1953, THE GERMAN LEGACYThe development of postwar Soviet fighters has its roots, more than any-where
else, in German design and production facilities. Because of British and Americanstrategic bombing, the German aircraft industry was concentrated in the eastern part of
Germany. When the Soviet Army swarmed into Germany at the end of the war,approximately 80% of Germany's aircraft industry fell into Soviet hands (see Figure 2,next page). Production facilities all over eastern Europe were seized by the Soviets. InCzechoslovakia, operational Messerschmitt-262 aircraft were captured, as well asseveral types of jet aircraft engines. 38 Entire factories were dissassembled and removedto the Soviet Union (see Figure 3, page 27).
The Soviets also seized numerous precision tools, instruments, machine tools, andfacilities for their production. In addition to all the above-listed material resources, theSoviets captured a number of important people in the German design community.These included Dr. Gunther Brock (in charge of the German experimental aeronauticsinstitute, Deutsche Versuchsanstalt fur Luftfahrt in Berlin), Rudolph Rental(Messerschmitt's project engineer for the ME-163 and ME-263), Dr. Adolph Betz(Germany's foremost authority on swept-wing aircraft), and Siegfried Gunther (a seniordesigner at Heinkel). In addition to these, some German estimates as to the totalnumber of people taken from Germany to the Soviet Union run as high as 300,000,
including production workers. 39
These assets "paid ofl' for the Soviets because very soon after the war, Sovietdesign bureaus began to produce new fighter designs incorporating the technologiescaptured in Germany and making use of production facilities removed to the SovietUnion. Of particular significance, many designs began to incorporate swept wings.The Germans' operational ME-262 jet fighter had only a slight sweepback
38Among them were: the Walter 4,400 lb. thrust rocket engine, which poweredthe ME-163; t e blueprints for the S-011. an advanced Heinkel jet engine, and samplesof Bayerische Motoren Werke's BMW 003 coaxial turbojet, which would in time powersome of the first Soviet jet fighters. Asher Lee, Tfe Soviet Air Force (London:Duckworth, 1961), p. 73.
39Asher Lee, The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces (New York: Praeger, 1959), pp.234-235.
25
- a - a.o
to. S 0 V E" T €
W : EST E R S Vo
. -_.-, • POLANrj
Z19
RANC - " 0 ,E.,,I"''NE G I -N
5 W I-T ZtRLAND %.r-,.
o0 s -.". .11, ...-" s
Source: US Strategic Bombing Survey "Aircraft Industry Survey,' FigureVII-2, based on data from the German Air Ministry, cited in Anthony Sutton,Western Technology and Soviet Economic Development, 1945-1965 (Stanford:Hoover Institution, 1973), p. 256.
Figure 2. Location of German Aircraft Engine Plants, 1945
26
0*
* J 5%~4 C S* C -
-,' ., " .-. ."-". .. /-.",".",.-.".".. . -. ,. "- .,." -" -. " ." -." ,. "-" . .. ' -"..-" ."""..."."-"."-",.',",, -" " ,",",',"-"
Location Total production Total production Disposal ofType of engine produced 1939 -1944 Dec 1944 plant in 1945
Daimrler-Benz Stettin 3082 250 Probably(603) removed to
U.S.S.R.Daimler-Benz Berlin, - 65 Not known
(6W1.603.606) MarienfeldeDaimler-Benz Bussing 13.805 - Not removed
(601.605.606.610) (Brunswick) to U.S.S.RDaimler-Benz Henschel 13,119 600 Not removed
( 601.605) (Kassel) to U.S.S.R.Daimler-Benz Manfred Weiss 1.189
(605) (Budapest)Daimler-Benz- Steyr 1.885 65* (605) Probably
IDaimler-Benz Prague 311 76 removed to(603) U.S.S.R.
Daimler-Benz Austria 2,890 77(603) (Ostmark)
Daimler-Benz Genshagen 30.833 700 100 percent(601.605.606,610) removed to
U.S.S.R.*Daimler-Benz Goldfisch 80 percent
(601.605.606.610) udrondremoved at(Heidelburg) end of 1946
BMW (801I) Allaco- 17,529 526 82 PercentMunich* removed at
end 1946UBMW (801) Klockner 4.206 150 Not removed(Hamburg) t0 U.S.S.R.*BMW (801) Spandau 5.695 326 Probably
(Berlin) removed*BMW (132) Eisenach 4,099 -100 percent
ggpan 2500 removed to,h mo by U.S.S.R.BMW (323) Zuhlsdort 3,227 September 45 100 percent
removed toU.S.S.R.
Junkers (004,012) MAldestein - -100 percent(Dessau) trmoved to
U.S.S.R.Junkers (004) Kothen -- 100 percentIunkes004) Nordhausen 10pecnremoved to
U.S.S.R.
LSource: Strategic Bomb' *qg Survey, "Aircraft Division: Industry Report,'Number 84 (January 1947), Table VII-1. Sutton, Western Technology, pp.25 9-260.
Figure 3. Dispositon of Main German Aircraft Engine Plants
27
(approximately 15 degrees), but there had been experimental prototypes with
fully-swept wings.The MIG-15, which is the'first aircraft in this thesis' data base, appears to have
been based on German data compiled for the sweptback version of the
Messerschmitt-262. The original aircraft was designed in 1946. That same year, theSoviets purchased 55 Rolls-Royce centrifugal compressor-type turbojet engines fromthe British. These engines were better suited to Soviet production methods; they weresimpler than the German axial flow designs the Soviets had until then been attempting
to copy. 40 In 1956, USAF General Nathan Twining toured the Moscow plant in whichthe Soviet copy of the Rolls-Royce engine was produced and noted that it was equipedwith machine tools from several western countries, including the United States.41 The
new British powerplants available to the Soviets, as well as the benefit of German windtunnel test data on swept-wing designs, enabled the MIG-15 to approach the "sound
barrier."
Even so, the Soviets, like others trying to increase flight speeds, experiencedproblems in the transonic region. This is a category of flight speeds in which theairflow around the aircraft is partly subsonic and partly supersonic (.7 Mach to Mach1.3). Airflow velocity above the wing's surface is always greater than the aircraft's
flight speed. When the flight Mach number increases, so do the local velocities at thethickest part of the wing. At some point, usually around .7 Mach, the local maximumvelocity reaches Mach unity (Mach 1.0). The flight Mach number at that point is
called the critical Mach number.At free-stream air speeds above the critical Mach number, a number of
undesirable flight characteristics develop, such as local shock waves on the wingsurface. At slightly higher speeds, one encounters the drag-rise Mach number (or forcedivergence Mach number), at which the drag coefficient increases, the lift coefficient
decreases, and there are unwelcome changes in the pitching moment coefficient. Thesecharacteristics of transonic flight cause local stall situations on the wings, leading touncontrolled rolling. They also contribute to "tuckunder," in which the nose has a
tendency to pitch down. The shock wave produced by supersonic flight can also causebuffeting, usually caused by turbulent air flowing around the horizontal stabilizers.
40Sutton, Western Technology, p. 264.41Aviation Week and Space Technology, 2 July 1956, p. 29.
28
Yet another difficulty encountered in this region is "buzz;" the rapid oscillation of
control surfaces. Buzz causes early metal fatigue and difficulty in using non-powered
control mechanisms. These are the sorts of problems the Soviets encountered with the
MIG-15. It had many faults, including a
serious tendency to stall [and] spin in tight tu.rnLs], poor behavior at any highangle of attack [even low speedd an progressive y worse buzz and snaking as[thel Mach number rose beyond .88.
These deficiencies can be overcome, or at least ameliorated, by a variety of
.4 measures. Clearly, the problem is one of getting the critical Mach number and the
drag-rise Mach number up as high as possible for a given free-stream airspeed. This
can be done by decreasing the wing's thickness (measured by the thickness/chord
ratio), or increasing the wing sweep (which has the effect of decreasing the aspect
ratio). Each of these has advantages and disadvantages. The choice depends,
theoretically, on the mission requirements of the aircraft being designed.
Both sweeping the wings and reducing the thickness/chord ratio will delay the
onset of the critical Mach number and the drag-rise Mach number. In both cases,
however, the lift coefficient will also fall. The lower lifting ability of the wing is likely,
all other things being equal, to require higher takeoff and landing speeds, which entail
a longer ground run and longer runways. This is a significant consideration if a force
planner wants to use aircraft "at the front;" that is, at makeshift airfields and landing
strips close behind the leading edge of the combat area. Increasing the wing sweep
also increases induced drag and can pose stability problems. Decreasing the airfoil
thickness poses structural problems and actually results in a heavier wing than wouldI
be the case if it were thicker. Finally, because the wing normally has a considerable
amount of usable volume, decreasing its thickness will reduce fuel-carrying capacity, in
turn affecting the combat radius of the aircraft.
Clearly a designer faces a number of compromises and tradeoffs in the
determination of these characteristics. The evolution of these characteristics in the
aircraft designed at the MIG OKB from 1945-1953 represent a clear intention to
pursue higher flight speeds, seemingly regardless of the impact on other flight
characteristics. Figure 4 (next page) shows the evolution of thickness,'chord ratio from
a42
"12Bill Gunston, Aircraft of the Soviet Union (London: Osprey Publishing. 1983).p. 175.
29
.
44h
1945-1953. As the MIG OKB moved from one airframe design to the next (MIG-15 to
MIG-17 to MIG-19), it progressively decreased the thickness/chord ratio. Internal fuel
tankage decreased only slightly, however, due most likely to the fact that each new
design was longer than its predecessor. Combat radius did not suffer because new
iterations of powerplants were increasingly efficient (see Figure 5, next page).
Maximum thrust also increased, incorporating for the first time *an afterburner in the
MIG-17 FRESCO C (Figure 6, page 31). The drop in the ground run for the MIG-19
series reflects the replacement of the VK-IF powerplant with two new RD-9 series
engines (Figure 7, page 32). Wingsweep was increased by ten degrees each successive
series (Figure 8, page 32). The slope of the line describing wingsweep is the inverse of
the slope of the line describing aspect ratio, which is to be expected (see Figure 9, page
33, for evolution of aspect ratio).
TH 12
G ....................... .........................
A MI G-191 FAIM~
I T . . u'., -4c "
I I i | , , , , , . I
0 1945 1947 i;4 3 951 1953YEARi OT AIR¢CRArT D SIGN
Figure 4. Evolution of Thickness/Chord Ratio (1945-1953)
30
0|
300.
C 2 90 ...... ... .. ... .... .......... ................ ... ........ ..
B 26 ... ................A - ,:: G-±7 FF.ES ',0
............. * rn .
2X - .............. ...... .........................I- *
2. ---........ ........................... ...............................F '
* 945 I".47 1949" 1951 19a53
.$g'OF -IP.FT IZ5i~r
Figure 5. Evolution of Combat Radius (nm) (1945-1953)
-4-
8000 I I:MIG-07FRESCO C-
X 7000 r .......................,....... ..................................I I
S "
S I-.. .............. ....: ... .... .... ...... ............
1945 1947 1949 195± ±953
YEAR OF AIRCRAFT DESICN
Figure 6. Evolution of" Maximum Thrust (ibs) (1945-1953)
,L.
31
-"J'~ ~ 5000," "" , ' '' .- " .' .- € , . ..- . . . . . . .. .. . . .. ... ... .. . .... ... .. ... ..
d ," d d ' ." . " .. ,, ', ,'*'' c '" • ' ' • ,., .- % .- ' . ,' " . . ' .- '-, . . " . . " " . " " . -
-J -. 7A M-.R-p JK - '
3000 ,
GU 2 5 X . ................ .............................. ...............
ND
2 0 0 0 .. ......... .... .. .. ........ .. ........ ..... .. ..... ......
r
. ... .. ........
1545 1.7 1i79 -951
11AR OF AIRCRAFT DESIGN
Figure 7. Evolution of Ground Run (ft) (1945-1953)
57 ..7.53~~~. ~MI-i RE
*IS 49k........ ...........................1 4 . .. ............. ... ... ....... ...... ............... ..........
IN
S 5 .. .. .. .. .... .. .. . ... . . . . . .
37 -................ ..............., ....... . .. ... ... .....
1945 1147 V.49 1951 1S53
YEAR OF AIRCRAFT DESIGN
Figure 8. Evolution of Wingsweep (degrees) (1945-1953)
32
_-,,.5. W % . % % 5," " . " " . " . ". % ," . " . " " . " . - . . - . % . . - - - % - . . "
A 4 .6 . .. ..- I
4................ ............. ...., .. ; ............... ............ ... :. .............. .. ........ .. ..
T E- - .... ** '' - .. .I- S .. ' I 1
1445 1947 1949 1951 1953YEA; or AUC;AT7 DZ~;
Figure 9. Evolution of Aspect Ratio (1945-1953)
The significant design changes of the 1945-1953 period are generally associated
with the wing: increasing its sweep angle, making it thinner, and decreasing the aspect
ratio. These changes were aimed at making the aircraft fly at higher speeds. Figure 10
(next page) aggregates the most interesting of these characteristics in their evolution.
The right lower rear corner of the box represents characteristics of low, slow flight.
The left upper front comer was clearly the goal from 1945-1953.
This is an interesting depiction because the evolution of design in 1945-1953 runs
counter to the avowed Soviet employment concept for aircraft in that time period
(about which more later). Stalin's "five permanent operating principles" emphasized
the World War 1I-type of operation as being the model for any future conflict. Soviet
air assets in WW II were used almost exclusively in support of ground operations. The
vast majority of sorties were of the ground-attack type; targets were on the battlefield
or located closely beyond the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA). Aircraft were
deployed close to the front, where they would be better able to respond on short notice
to tasking from the combined arms commander.
33
~~~~~~ C* 4 ** -
5P-E 41," .. .i
,''-.. .-"'' -; . . . 8.22.... i 2.' 6.2
2.. . '- 3.6 4. 4 4.6 5.1 4.2 1CK"s
ASPICT
Figure 10. The Trend Toward Supersonic Flight
One of the requirements for ground support aircraft is that the pilot sI ,,uld be
able to find his targets; in particular this means that it should be possible to distinguish
friendly from enemy forces. This is very hard to do at high speed or high altitude. The
ideal platform for ground attack missions is one that is low and slow. This
combination of characteristics allows the pilot to acquire his targets and eases the
problems of coordination between forward air controllers (FACs) and ground attack
•" aircraft.This is clearly not the trend of aircraft design in the Stalinist period. It is clear
that the MIG OKB was designing air defense fighters that could fly higher and faster
throughout the 1945-1953 period. It was in the areas of swept wings and afterburning
turbojets that the biggest technological advances were being made in the period. It
seems reasonable, therefore, to advance the proposition that despite the avowed
employment concept for Soviet air forces in the immediate postwar period, the
newly-available German technology found its way into applications not previously
demanded by doctrinal requirements.
B. 1954-1964, A CHANGE IN EMPHASIS
Around 1953-1954, the MIG OKB developed the basic concept for theMIG-21-FISHBED. Gunston says that stipulated features included ability to carry
34
i:34
limited all-weather radar and AAMs with secondary guns and bombs, to operate under
RSIU (Markham) secure ground control, and to have highest possible flight .... range
was discounted. 43 The MIG-21 was developed with two different wing planforms--one
was a swept-wing identical to the MIG-19 and the other was a pure delta wing, which
was the design MIG later adopted. The MIG-21's thinner wing section. sharper
leading edge, and smaller aspect ratio continued the trend established 1945-1953 toward
aircraft with higher flight speeds (see Figures 11 and 12, next page).
This evolution naturally led to a delta wing.44 The FISHBED'S wing design,
combined with a newly-designed engine, gave the aircraft a higher maximum speed at
altitude than its predecessors (see Figure 13) The scatterplot in Figure 14 shows not
only the increase in maximum Mach at altitude for the MIG-21 FISHBED but also for
the MIG-25 FOXBAT (Figures 13 and 14 on page 37).
The FOXBAT was designed as a single-mission aircraft to counter the proposed
US XB-70 supersonic bomber. That the FOXBAT was built anyway when the B-70
was cancelled is a confirmation of the thesis that a new weapon system than can be
built will be built (a mechanistic version of the "technological imperative" model).
Gunston says that the FOXBAT's design "owed much to (the) A-5 Vigilante;" that the
aircraft's "high wing and wide boxy fuselage mainly comprising inlet ducts and engines"
was "pioneered by Vigilante." 45 The Foxbat was never designed to engage in air-to-air
combat with other fighters, but rather as a "straight-line" interceptor for high-altitude
applications and fairly long range. When the XB-70 was cancelled, the FOXBAT was
purchased primarily as a long-range, high-speed, high-altitude reconnaissance platform.
The FOXBAT's wing loading is indicative of its mission (see Figure 15, page 38). In
general, low wing loading is desirable for air-to-air combat, while the opposite is
desirable for a straight-line air defense interceptor. Good cruise efficiency requires high
wingloading values.
The MIG-23 FLOGGER was designed in approximately 1963. Its most
immediately recognizable feature is its variable-geometry wing. The variable-geometry
wing (VGW), or "swing-wing", was "so similar to the NASA,-GD (General Dynamics)
43Gunston, Aircraft, p. 180.4 4Francis J. Hale. Introduction to Aircraft Performance Selection, and Design
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), p. 17.4 5Gunston Aircraft, p. 190 and Bill Gunston, Modern Air Combat (London:
Salamander Books Ltd, 1983), p. 132.
35
T
r * :"
I- "..- MIG-i7 MIG-23/27. . .. . . . . . . . ... . .
S/ ~MIC-i9 SU-7. .............. .....................................
D ............................ ...............
SU-;T " MI G-Zi
0 1945 1950 1955 . 1960 1965
'zECi OF AIRCRAFT DESIGN
Figure 11. Evolution of Thickness/Chord Ratio (1945-1965)
7L.A .
S9 - . .
C S b................. ..............TP .. . .... ... ... .. .. ... ... ... ... .. .. ... .. ... ....... ... ... ... ...
.. .. ... .. ... .... • .. . ... ... ...... ......... ... .....: .. ..
1945 1950 1955 1960 1965
YEAR OF AIRCRAFT DESIGN
Figure 12. Evolution of Aspect Ratio (1945-1965)
36
A/# k , ' ,, ' , ' - t " . , " . " ,," " . " . , - . - . - . . . . ... . .
-~* - 7L - -. 4h - -
[..1
-C__ -,-
C.o
Source: Janes All the World's Aircraft 1980-1981, p. 192.
Figure 13. MIG-21 FISHBED
.......................-.r- . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
S......-............ ........... ......... ...........-"
P* g ' . g * . 3 =
,'. : 0 . ............. ...V0.
1' i945 1956 1955 1.96i 5
Figure 14. Evolution of Maximum Mach at Altitude
37
" ,".-.'-"- , .. "". - . -'..-'...';.-'..-.} -% ;.'.i-i.,;.,.i. -- 2-.;°'"'-.. " 'i,- ''. .. ,:d -. '''-.:'.,'. :'-. :
1 4 0 . . ........... ... ... . .. .... . .....wN 120 . .- -.G v .FWATL M
100 . I . ,,
I .......... .. .. ......G
(; 6 0 ............... ....;. . .: . . . . . . . . . . . ........
40m,.4 S . I
1945 1950 1955 1360 1965
YEAR OF AIRCRAFT DESIGN
Figure 15. Evolution of Wingloading (1945-1965)
aerodynamics of (tle) F-l I it was probably plagiarized. " 4 6 That may bc so, but the
fact remains that the Soviets apparently had their reasons for going with the VGW
design. One, and probably the most likely, is that the designer faces a genuine dilemna
in determining an aircraft's wing sweep--a high sweep with low aspect ratio is necessary
for high speed, while a low sweep with high aspect ratio is required fbr good low speed
performance. 47 If the conflicting mission requirements of the Khrushchev period could
not be reconciled (or just as likely, anticipated by the OKB) the V(;W seems like an
acceptable solution (see Figure 16, next page). There are other possible explanations,
however, such as the desire to decrease takeoff and landing speeds (by increasing the
lift-drag coeflicient of the wing in the forward-swept position), or to reduce supersonic
drag and delay transonic buffet and instability (with the wing in the fully-swept
position).
The Khrushchev period saw the "resurrection" of the SUKIIOI OKB and the
acquisition of several SUKI 101 designs. The first of these was the SU-7 FITIAt, and
its variants. This aircraft was first designed in 1954 on the basis of earlier designs
46Gunston, Aircraft of the Soviet Union, p. 186.47ILeiand IM. Nicolai, Funtamentals of Aircrafi Design, (San Jose: NIYI'S, 198,4),
pp. 7-17.
38
,,
-. -... . . . .
!7
Source: Janes 411 the World's Aircraft 1980-1981, p. 195.
~Figure 16. MIG-23 FLOGGERi Sukhoi had done at the Tupolev OKB. The FITTER had a very highly-swept wing
(see Figure 17, next page). The 62-degree wingsweep and the FITTER s Lyulka AL-7F7" turbojet engine, gave it a high penetration speed. In general it can be said that the'-' SUKHOI OKB tends to use Lyulka engines, while MIG prefers powerplants made byI the Tumanskiy design bureau. Figure IS (page 40) shows the evolution of maximum
(afterburning) thrust and the generally more powerful Lyulka engines. In 1961~SUKHOI used a Tumanskiy engine for his SU-15 FLAGON, with predictable results~for its relative maximum thrust.
~The FITTER had some severe limitations-.for example, very small internal fuel~tankage. This led to the requirement for a heavy load of external fuel carriage, which, made impossible any significant weapons load. Thus, the figures commonly cited fori these two characteristics obscure the true capability of the aircraft: the necessity of
choice between uel and weapons was essentially a choice between an aircraft with
"long legsh but little ordnance, or one with a heavy load of ordnanace that could not(be flown to great depth. Nevertheless, the SU-7 FITTER did have good low-level
stability (what Gunston calls "docile flying qualities") and good structural integrity and
i . 3 9
SU K H OI K B ten s to us Lyulk engine, whil M,, prefers powe r ns ma e b
Source: Janes All the World's Aircraft 1980-1981, p.
Figure 17. SU-7 FITTER
-4
XU#1 .. . . . . . .. . . . . . . .I. . . . . . . . I U. . .. . . .
M 200006................ ............ .................. g.. : .....
0 ~LY1JLXA
-. 40o . .. .. SU 1
1445 1950 1955 1960 1965
YEAR OF AIRCRAFT DESIGN
Figure 18. Evolution of Maximum Thrust (Ibs) (1945-1965)
40
toughness. In addition, it also had a large ordnance-carrying capacity, although
subject to range limitations (see Figure 19).
(Y 1o00
•. .I
D 1 i5 .........-....................................... _
.............. ............... .... . ...................C .SO-7 F17TER-
i . ... . . . . . . . ..I . . . . . . . .. . .. . . .. . . . . . . . . .. .
T -Y -t
Y~POf AIU0.T DE514,N
Figure 19. Evolution of Ordnance-CarryingCapabity (Ibs) (1945-1965)
The FITTER's highly-swept wings and its external weapons/fuel load combined
to give it a very high rotation speed and, consequently, a long ground run (almost
7,900 feet). In fact, this was true too for the other SUKHOI designs of the period
(SU-9 FISHPOT B, SU-11 FISHPOT C, and the SU-15 FLAGON A; see Figure 20,
next page). This tended to be true of all PVO air defense interceptors, which could
count on long, high-quality runways. If these same aircraft were called upon to
operate "at the front,' they woud have found it nearly impossible to do so from
shorter, often unimproved wartime strips in the forward area. One wonders how the
SU-7 FITTER could have been used at all.
The SU-9 and the SU-ll FISHPOT aircraft were based on the delta wing designs
SUKHOI had worked on but rejected for the FITTER. They shared a number of
features with the SU.7, such as the tail section and the fuselage (Figure 21, p. 43).
41
V"17'.-77- --, 777-7 7777
* X 1000)
St.. .St-4.'F1!S!? 4. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .
: . .
4 ,? ............. .. .. ................ . ... .......... ......... . .
D SU-15 FLAG;ON "
2 - " -.... . . . . . . . . .
1 45 t?50 1955 19&' 1965
'111 OF 4IIRCRW'T t'ESIN
Figure 20. Evolution of Ground Run (ft) (1945-1965)
Unlike the SU-7, however, the FISHPOT aircraft were not easy to fly. Although the
SU-1I had only two AAMs while the SU-9 had been equipped wit' , four, the SU-lI's
missiles had a range approximately three times as great as the SU-9's and its air
intercept (Al) radar was more powerful, with search and track capability about double
that of its predecessor.The SU-15 FLAGON, a version of which in September 1983 shot down a South
Korean Boeing 747 passenger aircraft, was designed in approximately 1962-63. Its
internal fuel capacity was increased somewhat over earlier designs, perhaps prompted
by the requirement to get to distant intercept points from inland (high-quality) airfields
with long runways. In general, PVO air defense interceptors had greater combat radii
than Air Force (VVS) fighters (see Figure 22, next page).
To summarize fighter developments in this period, the MIG OKB continued its
trend toward building faster aircraft, primarily for the air defense mission, but also for
reconnaissance. MIG aircraft were also a part of the VVS inventory, but their design
characteristics did not optimize them for the ground support role. After producing the
MIG-25 FOXBAT to meet a threat which never developed (the XB-70), the MIG OKB
began the FLOGGER series, which included a VGW design in order to accomodate a
*variety of requirements which could not otherwise be reconciled and to* provide a
mcasure of flexibility in employing the FLOGGER.
42
"""
IP I -
Source: Janes All the Worlds Aircraft 1980-1981, p. 211.
Figure 21. SU-11 FISI-POT
I 1200 ,
............. .......... . .
200:-.......................... .. ......... ..............--
-- ±45 1950 1955 1901965
IIAR OF AUiChAFT DFESUN
Figure 22. Evolution of Combat Radius (nm) (1945-1965)
J,
43
'%p.
(these provide for greater thrust), and it is lighter in weight. Finally, the R-25 has an
advanced, high-pressure ratio compressor with a significantly lower specific fuel•' "consumption than earlier powerplants.50
SUKHOI temporarily departed from the long-standing association of his design
bureau with the Lyulka engine when the SU-15 was designed. He chose to use the
Tumanskiy R-11 engine found in the early FISHBED aircraft, and later switched to the
upgraded R-13, just as had the MIG OKB. In addition to new engines, the FLAGON
E and FLAGON F models have a slightly redesigned wing; they have a larger span and
outer portion of reduced sweep, which creates a "kink" in the wing's leading edge
(Figure 23, next page). This kink is a vortex inducer, performing the same kind of
boundary layer control function provided for in the FISHBED by flap blowing. The
FLAGON makes use of both devices, suggesting increased attention on the part of
SUKHOI to the limitations imposed by the demands of an aircraft with a rotation".4-
speed of approximately 215 knots and a takeoff ground run of nearly 8,000 feet.
The new FLAGON aircraft also have a new Al radar; the Twin Scan, which
replaces the older Skip Spin. Open source information is hard to find on the Twin
. Scan but it is probably more powerful than its predecessor and may have enhanced
ECM,,ECCM (electronic counter-countermeasures) features.
In the ground attack arena, MIG determined around 1965 that the original
design for the MIG-23 FLOGGER was not really adequate for the ground attack
mission, and began development of a follow-on making use of the basic air defense
FLOGGER airframe. The FLOGGER D has no Al radar but a broad, flat,'downsloping nose containing a variety of sensors for the air-to-ground mission. The
aircraft also includes armored side panels, a new six-barrel gun and a new weapons and. avionics fit (see Figure 24, page 47).
The FLOGGER D has a doppler navigation radar and a laser designator in its
nose. There are bomb racks on the fuselage, in addition to five pylons, which may be
plumbed for fuel carriage. The aircraft is capable of carrying twice as much ordnance
as its air-to-air cousin. Commensurate with its ground attack role are fixed air inlets
4:- and engine nozzle. Finally, the FLOGGER has an ECM januner pod on the wing
leading edge, and a head-up display (HUD). 51
50Janes All the World's Aircraft, p. 845.51A HUD is a pane of glass, on which is projected such necessary flight data
symbology as speed, heading, altitude, weapon status, etc. The data "is generated
r, 45
.1
."'i.i ' ','O'W ', . . . - - - .r . " , ,' * : . • , " . . ." " •_
17__ F
Source: Gunston, Aircraft of the Soviet Union, p. 276.
Figure 23. SU-15 FLAGON E/F
Another new ground attack aircraft in this time period was SUKHOI's SU-17FITTER C and FITTER D. These designs attempted to retain what was good in the
original SU-7 FITTER, and improve what was detrimental to performance. To thisend SUKHOI made a variety of changes, the first and most obvious being the addition
of VGW. This increased the aircraft's lift coefficient, reducing rotation and approachspeeds by about 40 knots, and decreasing the groundrun by about 5,800 ft. Turn
radius was halved and control forces were reduced significantly. Thus, Gunston says
that the SU-17's
in-flight agility, range and field length have all benefited [alsoL from the newLyulka engine, wni~h thou gn more p owerful actually burns luel rather lessrapidly t4n the [earlier] AL-F-I; and there has been a modest increase in fuelcapacity.
electronically and ibcused at infinity. .This allows the pilot to keep looking outsidc thecockpit, which is safer and more el9cctive in combat.
52Gunston, Modern Air Combat, p. 160.
46
.,.
* _ - - -. L- -
.1*
IF
Source: Janes All the World's Aircraft 1980-1981, p. 194.
Figure 24. Comparison of MIG-23 (top) and MIG-27 (bottom)
Eight highly-rated pylons give the aircraft a good ordnance capacity; four of thestations are plumbed for fuel tankage and go a long way toward increasing combatradius. A wide variety of weapons can be carried by the FITTER, including all kindsof general purpose bombs, rockets of various sizes, ASMs and, like nearly all otherground attack aircraft in the VVS, nuclear weapons. Avionics include a navigationradar, laser designator, HUD, ECM and, as do most Soviet fighters, a radar warning
receiver (RWR).The final aircraft considered in this section is the SU-24 FENCER, a
totally new design owning no direct relationship to any existing type from thesame 0KB. Indeed it owes more to the American F-I ll than to anV3 othersingle type, even to the almost certainly mistaken use of side-by-side seats."
53Gunston, Modern Air Combat, p. 162.
47
The SU-24 has a tremendous ordnance-carrying capacity; approximately l8,000 lbs. It
also has very "long legs," a multipurpose radar, laser designator, full ECM suite, a
multisensor weapon-delivery system, and a full set of leading- and trailing-edge slats
and flaps for excellent control and stability. If the FENCER is anything like the
European Panavia Tornado--and there is good reason to suspect that at least many of
its components are similar--it can operate over a wide range of flight regimes with
smooth and fatigue-free low-level missions. (See Figure 25, next page).54
The evolution of Soviet fighter technology in the 1964-1973 period can best be
characterized by pointing to the growth in recce, ECM, and ordnance-carrying
capacity. In the area of reconnaissance, the FISHBED If was deployed with a wide
variety of sensors, including a real-time television downlink. This is one of
various technical means designed for .speeding up the processing and transmisionof reconnaissancg 5intormation to the interested parties directly from on board theaircraft in flight."
When the Soviets developed the ability to acquire targets beyond the FEBA and
deep in the enemy's rear area, it became possible for them to consider deeper attacks
than had previously been the case. As will be shown later, this is exactly what they
did, despite the enormous relative cost of transmitting reconnaissance data
electronically via a data link compared to flying a sensor over enemy territory, imaging
targets, and returning to base for processing, analysis and subsequent dissemination.
In the area of ECM, the Soviet aircraft of this period are equipped with
360-degree RWR coverage. These are typically the simplest and least -. pensive (in
terms of the burden imposed on aircraft performance) of ECM devices. By means of
54In 1984 Manfred Rotsch (the German head of the Planning Department ofMesserschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB), one of the three participants in the PanaviaTornado program) was arrested for passing to the Soviets critical information aboutthe Tornado. The Washington Post has reported that "Rotsch has probably betrayedthe complete plans for the Tornado fighter plane" and that "because of the kind ofinformation compromised, the Rotsch case surpasses in importance that of GunterGuillaume, a close advisor to then-chancellor Willy Brandt, w1q osc unmasking as a spycaused Brandt to resign in 1974." William Drozdiak. "Soviets Seen Escalatine Drive-for West's Industrial Secrets," The Washington Post, 24 October 19S4, p. A26. The vS)epartment of Defense has also publicly cited this case as articularly serious and adds
that Rotsch had operated as a spy froffn 1967-1984. See Soviet Acqiisition of MilitarySignificant Western Technology: An Update (Washington, D.C.: Dcpafitmcnt 6fDefense, 1985), p. 20.
55Marshal of Aviation S. Krasovskiy, "Trends in the Use of Aircraft in a NuclearWar," Voennaya ,ysl', March 1967, in Selected Readings From 'Militarv Thought,'196-1973 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 152.
48
,&
Im.1.ICPGICl-ota~ipolf T:n o
Trnlto: ond igtrbme
Figurec 25. CopaionoPanzc~h6aaIounx TONAO ando'2 FNE
SI,.Z
flashing lights on a cockpit display or an audible tone, the RWR notifies the pilot that
a hostile radar has established a track.56 The target aircraft can then undertake some
form of countermeasure. This can range from brute force "noise jamming" to very
sophisticated types of deception.
In noise jamming the target aircraft transmits a noise-like signal on the same
frequency band at which the enemy radars were operating. In this case, the noise-like
signal strength would exceed that of the weaker target echo-return, whiting out a
sizable portion of the enemy's radar display. A drawback to noise jamming is that it
dissipates power; for an aircraft it may be difficult to "outshout" a ground-based radar
facility. Noise jamming can be spread across several bandwidths (barrage noise
jamming) or concentrated on one known threat frequency (spot jamming). This is the
far more efficient form of jamming but it requires knowledge of the enemy's radar
frequencies. Furthermore, even when spot janmming can be employed, it is seldom
direc ional in nature; the energy is radiated in all directions, wasting 99.9 percent. 57
This has focused attention on "power management," by which ECM resources
should be more integrated, automated, effective and efficient, by deploying the best
jamming strategy for the particular situation at hand.58 Power management techniques
are used on the US F-15 and F-Ill. The Soviets are well aware of the importance of
these ECM techniques and their countermeasures. 59
One type of deception involves beam-splitting, which measures the point of the
strongest echo-return corresponding to the center of the radar beam. The deception
jammer (repeater) retransmits the received radar pulse with power inversely
proportional to that with which it was received. This introduces severe azimuth and
56"Tvpicallv an RWR is arranged to warn that a track has been establishedwhenever a highs PRF (pulse repetition frequency) . . . is sustained for a preselectedperiod." Gunsfon, Modern Air Combat, p. 52.
57Gunston, Modern Air Combat, p. 54.58"Jammers Add Effectiveness, Complexity," Aviation Week and Space
Technology. 27 January 1975, pp. 63-77.59"One measure of Soviet understanding of the importance and principles ofelectronic warfare is to be found in the contents of a 444-pae textbook published in
the USSR in 1968 entitled 'Principles of Jamming and Electronic Reconnaissance.authored by S. A. Vakin and T. N. Shustov. One, long-time U.S. airbornecountermeasures designer describes the book's contents as very impressive . . .. TheSoviet textbook on electronic warfare (whch was translated 15v the USAF's ForeienTechnology Division in 1969), reveals that Russian specialists'are well aware of thevulnerabiriiv of conical-scan type radar to (this kind of) deception." "Jamnimers addEfelctivenegs, Complexity," Aviation Week and Space Technologv, 27 January 1975, pp.63-77.
50
elevation target position errors. Another type of deception is range gate stealing, in
which the repeater retransmits the skin echo at high power and then progressively
. introduces time delays, stealing away the "range gates" and causing the threat emitter
-i to track the stronger false target. These techniques and others must be assumed to be
capabilities of Soviet fighters, particularly in those cases where ECM pods are carried.Both the MIG and SUKHOI OKB's made improvements to existing designs and
created new ones in this time period. New avionics systems, better powerplants,
increased attention to ECM and greater ordnance-carrying capacity characterize the
aircraft designed from 1964-1973.
D. 1973-1985, THE RISE OF AIR COMBAT
The MIG and SUKHOI OKB's developed and sent to production facilities many
new figher designs in this most recent time period. Several improved upon old designs,
in some cases with marginal upgrades; others contained such great improvements that
new designators were assigned. Among the former, MIG created the FLOGGER G in
about 1975, incorporating a better Al radar than that on the FLOGGER B. The
FLOGGER G also was given a new powerplant, the Tumanskiy R-29 replacing the
R-27. The change boosted the FLOGGER G's military power and maximum
(afterburning) thrust, increasing both sea level Mach performance (Mach at altitude
was not affected) and thrust-to-weight ratio. The Soviets have been continually
searching for better propulsion systems for their fighters. That they are keenly
interested in Western developments is undeniable (see Figure 26, next page).
MIG also brought out a new version of the FLOGGER ground attack variant,
the FLOGGER J. Open sources indicate only that the FLOGGER J includes new
nose sensors to improve ground attack performance. SUKHOI also improved its
ground attack offerings with the FITTER H and FITTER K. Among the
improvements in these aircraft is the modification of the dorsal spine, possibly
permitting increased internal fuel tankage or additional avionics and ECM. A large
number of these aircraft are used in the tactical reconnaissance role.
The basic FOXBAT airframe was retrofitted with a new Al radar, giving the
newly-created FOXBAT E a limited lookdown,'shootdown capability similar to that
found on the FLOGGER air-to-air fighters. The FOXBAT E also now carries new
AAMs (AA-7 APEX and AA-8 APHID) instead of or in addition to its older AA-6
ACRID AAM's.
51
.1
4 ." *. % " ". > -. " q % '% "b.. .%. ' " ' * "'v ""-2' ° " * .,%"" "" " ."." ' ." * ". . ' ' . ' "". - .#
-C 40opCOXCe,
7.4 I5t- 1*K
.5 4 ?90,y 195 9l06O ~ Pod ncp30 o j
Pac3 44. vOCT o''ue,* RHK ac Be Oj paT
HbIZ .Afluowe lot
V axsFngn-hrs-o-egt ai
Y axis: Earin offrst-tflight raiSource: Ponamarev, Aviazsiya, p. 188.The Tumanskiv R-29 "is simpler than the corresponding American F-100* (upper right *ofabove graph), with fewer compressor stages and a much lowerpressure ratio- but it is more powerful." Janes All Tihe Worlds Aircrayt,1984-1985, p. 95
Figure 26. Soviet Interest in Western Propulsion Systems
52
The FOXHOUND, designed about 1974, uses the basic FOXBAT airframe, but
has a longer fuselage and extended empennage. Air inlets are also slightly changed.
FOXHOUND also has a two-seat cockpit, a new pulse-Doppler Al radar and eight
new AAM's, including the long-range, radar-guided AA-9. 60 The Department of
Defense has stated that
the documentation on the F-18 fire control radar served as the technical basis for
new lookjlownishootdown engagement radars for the latest generation of Sovietfighters.
Until very recently, Soviet fighters have not had the ability to engage targets
flying near the ground, because their Al radars have "lost" the relatively weak target
radar echo in the "clutter" caused by the ground or sea (which reflects radar energy).
The development of computers and software to distinguish the target from the ground
clutter meant that the Soviets were no longer limited to "blue-sky shots."
Other important features on the new generation of Al radars also add to combat
capability. In the past, different parts of the target aircraft being illuminated presented
echo returns of various strength, which caused the tracking radar to shift its aim point
around the target, "introducing spurious angular rate data into the lead angle
computation."62 New techniques eliminate this "glint" problem.
Another valuable feature is "raid assessment," which allows pilots to determine
the size of incoming raids beyond visual range (BVR). Track-while-scan is a feature
that allows a pilot to look for and engage multiple targets simultaneously. Previously.
Al radars had two modes: search and track. One could not be in operation while the
other was engaged. Track-while-scan (TWS) allows the pilot to track one or more
targets while continuing to search for more enemy aircraft.
60"The extended range and track-while-scan radar capability for the aircraft wasdeveloped and tested extensively in the MIG-31 [FOXHOUNDI against a variety of'targets including drones simulafing cruise missiles at Vladin-rovka a test site on' theCas an Sea .... The FOXHOUND is designed to cruise at high altitudes and en-asefighter targets in the look-down shoot-down-mode with radar-uided missiles. In testsw th the FOXHOUND's weapon system. Soviet pilots successTullv intercepted targetswith a radar sinature under 1 'square meter at altitudes below 2(.)o fleet wN'hilethemselvesl f1vinz at an altitude above 20,000 Ft." Clarence A. Robinson, Jr.. "Soviets
Deploying Ne6v Fighters," Aviation IWeek and Space Technology, 2S November 19S3,pp. 1820.
61 Military Significant Western Technolokv, p. 8.62Phillir J. Klass, "New Radar Developed for F-18," Aviation ITeek and Space
Technology, 1 6 January 1978, p. 55.
".53
-'5.
*5~%
TWS is a feature designed to work with active radar-guided missiles, which can
be launched in a "fire and forget" mode.63 The FOXHOUND's Al radar has been
reported to be "able to handle 20 targets, tracking four and identifying ihe rest even in
ground clutter."64 This would give it a capability remarkably similar to the US F-14
TOMCAT, whose AWG-9 Al radar can "(detect and track) more than 20 targets while
launching and guiding six different targets." 65 And in fact, "some intelligence officials
believe that technology has been obtained by the Soviets from F-14's in Iran."66 The
US Department of Defense has publicly confirmed that F-14 fire-control radar
documentation has been compromised. 67
In this time period the SUKHOI OKB designed the SU-25 FROGFOOT for
close-air support of ground forces. Its mission makes the FROGFOOT the Soviet
counterpart to the USAF A-10, although in planform it resembles the Northrop A-9,
which lost the USAF competition to Fairchild's A-10 design. The SU-25 has very high
aspect.ratio wings (6.42), non-afterburning engines, and ten weapons pylons--it is
clearly designed for the close air support role. The FROGFOOT has been in service in
Afghanistan since 1981, where it has been engaged primarily in coordinated low level"" close air support operations with MI-24 helicopter gunships.
The MIG-29 FULCRUM is comparable in size to the USAF F-16 FALCON but
has an advanced Al radar, new AAM's, new engines, greater combat radius, and better
turning performance than its predecessors. It includes the "state-of-the-art avionicsevolving from systems designed originally for the FOXHOUND."6 Unlike the
FOXHOUND, however, the FULCRUM has a thrust-to-weight ratio greater than
unity, lower wingloading, and can attain Mach 1.2 at sea level. The SU-27 FLANKER
has slightly better capabilities.
63 Previously, "radar-guided" AAM's actually were "semiactive radar-guided"because they required the platform aircraft to 'paint the target 'til the missilespla shed"--tlie weapon simply received reflected radar energy. The disadantage ofsuch a system is that it requires the launch aircraft to remain pointed at its target, avulnerability in air-to-air combat.
64David M. North, "Soviets Test Two-Seat MIG-25 Version," Aviation Week andSpace Technology, 28 March 1977, p. 18.
65Clarence A. Robinson. Jr., "US Reexamines Fighter Needs," Aviation Week andSpace Technology, 23 April 1979, p. 19.
66 "Soviets Press Production, New Fighter Development," Aviation Week andSpace Technology, 16 March 1981, p. 56.
67Militarily Significant Western Technology, p. 8.6 8Robinson, "US Reexamines Fighter Needs," p. 19.
54
Two trends are discernible in this period. One is the progressively improved
ability to detect and engage BVR targets. The second is the increased maneuverability
of Soviet fighters. The ability to detect targets at a distance is a function of the Al
radar's search capability. The greater the radar's power, the earlier the detection. If a
target can be acquired without giving away one's presence, then the attacker has the
advantage in the form of surprise. The importance of surprise cannot be overstated
because "four out of every five aircraft shot down by fighters never saw their
assailant." 69 The second trend, greater maneuverability, is also important because, if
surprise is the most important attribute of successful air combat, the ability to
outmaneuver the adversary comes in second; it confers the ability to stay out of the
enemy's weapons lauch envelope and to continually threaten him.
The evolution of Al radar search and track capability is shown in Figures 27 and
28 (next page). Also important to the development of a first-look, first-shot capability
are long-range missiles. Figure 29 (page 57) shows the evolution of maximum AAM
ranges. This increasing capability is reflected in the frequent Soviet assertion that
historically, 70 percent of all air-to-air kills were made on the first pass.70 As designers
have over the years created more maneuverable fighters with greater combat
persistence, the Soviets have increasingly noted that the first pass probability is not
always 100% and have apparently experimented on a limited basis to develop tactics
that reposition the fighter for another shot opportunity. This interest in maneuvering
air combat increases when the Soviets have received fighters capable of maneuvering
(i.e., with relatively high thrust-to-weight ratios and reduced wingloadings; see Figures
30 and 31, pages 57 and 58).
These two trends now exist simultaneously. On the one hand, technology has
again made it possible to engage in certain types of close-in, hard-turning air combat,
while at the same time, new weapons and electronics have given fighter aircraft
long-range, off-boresight kill capabilities that relax the past requirement for stern
conversion. Figure 32 (page 59) captures the unambiguous trend in first-look,
first-shot capability, Figure 33 (page 60) shows the evolution of "maneuverability;"
69 Gunston, Modern Air Combat, p. 187.70"Since the first pass would be made under GCI control, and the attack would
be at ver' high airspeeds and at relatively lone ranges with radar missiles, a secondpass at tlie target did not seem likely. There w'ould-be no need for close combat tooccur." Rana Penninaton, "Pilot Initiative in the Soviet Air Force," in Murphy, SovietAir Forces, pp. 149-15"6.
55
8 . . . .. ..
_ 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . -
• r M~tI 29 F 3RUM -N 60-
. .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. ... ..
1950 1955 1960 1965 - 1970 1975 1
YEAR OF AIR.CT DESIGN
Figure 27. Evolution of AI Radar Search Range
.1150
SM4-311 FC)UND
c 90h.- ......... . . .
1 . . . ... .... ... . ........ . .... 11 SU-27 FrLA.KIP
C 9A.0 . . . . .. . . .. .... . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . .K
R : MIG-Z9 FULCPUM i. . .. . .. .. . . .. . . .. . . I .. . .... . . . .. ... . .. . .. . .... . . . .
M4-25 FOXBAT I. : IE- 30 .........i.. ........... . ......................" . . ..
• -I
1950 1;.55 1 i965 1970 1975 1980
YEA Of AIRCiAFT DESIGN
Figure 28. Evolution ofAl Radar Track Range
56
i -_,..-., ...,-. ,-. -....-. -.....'-..- ,.- +' .. 99 .,-. ,,..,,- ---v .. -. -. :.-;.. ;. ; . . .;. -.-..2:- ... . *. -. -7. .:-
48 ,.
- " . .. 111.• ."
P 20 . .... ....... ..... ..... -... . •.. .. •... . .. . . . .... .... . "
0 I --g ;-- ------ . . . . . . . .. . .. .
0. 50 0 55 i 90 1 965 19'70 1 975 i 9@0
YEAR OF AIRCRAFT" DES10;
Figure 29. Evolution of AAM Range - ..
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . ... .. .I
'... . . . . . . . .. . . ..... . . . .. . . . . . . . . . ..
0 .0 .3 ................. .......... ... ..... . . . . . . . . . . . .
151 0955150 i9) 1970 190
YEAR OF AIiCRAT DE~i1N
Figure 30. Evolution of Thrust-to-Weight Ratio (lbs)(1945-1980)
57
".:: -:.''':.:":"'.Z .. ' -" ';4 a '. ',, ',':'"'"-".".,"'- :''."".""V ,",,. """,". '"". ""LrANK"!? "";- '-
0q.i. '~'.J~~ iO0 J '...........~u~ ... : . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .......... . MYMs& fI~ & i .'M'g~ P ~ * " L ~-
I gO p. .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . ... . . . .. .-. . .i . . . .
, 14:~ . .II1 &
....... . . ...............D
* :T'~JLCRtJ? ._*'3 :FAn-P -
ov ~ ~ . . . . . . . . . ... . . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . .
19W0 1950 1960 1970 198)YEAR ,.U AiRr ;AT DM4$NI,
'I Figure 31. Evolution of Wingloading (1945-1980)
greatest ability to maneuver is in the far comer (upper left rear). If we use SEARCH
to stand for long-range kill capability (it is correlated to TRACK at higher than .99
and MSLRANGE at higher than .95), we can combine these two trends.7 1 Maximum
maneuverability amd maximum kill-range are shown in Figure 34 (page 60) in the far
corner.
Since 1973, then, the Soviets have developed a new aircraft especially for the
close air support (CAS) role, new aircraft approaching a first-look, .first-shot capability,
and increasingly maneuverable fighters with advanced avionics and weapons. Before
looking at the interaction between these technological developments and Soviet tactical
air employment doctrine, it is necessary to turn to the evoluion of Soviet militarydoctrine since World War II. This topic is covered in the next section.
71SEARCH, TRACK and MSLRANGE are the names of three variables in thisthesis' data base. For a more complete description of the data base, including theaircraft included in the study, see Appendix A.
58
.40
N
30 6 0 150 0 TRC KSEARCH
Figure 32. Evolution of Long-Rangc Kill Capability
59
0.9
102
Figure 33. Evolution of Miancuvcrability
1±~i=- IFOM~OUNDT b-FOAAT E
.. ..-- .I..
Z.4I104 i ~ .
A1 IJ;~k, 14 24A,
Figurc 34. Evolution of MaximiumManeuverability and IMaxinium Kill- Range
60
IV. THE EVOLUTION OF AIR EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
A. 1945-1953, THE STAGNATION OF MILITARY DOCTRINEThe immediate postwar period (1945-1953) was one of little doctrinal innovation
and characterized by strict adherence to Stalin's "five permanent operating principles."These five principles (the stability of the rear, the morale of the army, the quantity andquality of the divisions, armament, and the organizing ability of the commanders) were
formulated in 1941 as the basis for Soviet military thinking. They are some of themost important principles for the conduct of conventional warfare and theconventional war concept dominated Soviet military thinking until long after Stalin's
death in 1953. As a result, Soviet military thinking in the early- to mid-fifties was little
different than Soviet militan, thinking had been in the Second World War. TheStalinist legacy was a straitjacket on the development of doctrine and inhibited theexploration of ideas regarding nuclear weapons and intercontinental war. Despite thefact that nuclear weapons were under development in the Soviet Union at this time, nodoctrinal discussion was allowed during Stalin's lifetime.72
This same point is made in a number of studies of Soviet doctrine of the period.H.S. Dinerstein explains that Stalin's formulation of the five permanently operatingprinciples "became the last and only word on the subject for more than ten years. " ,
Dr. Jonathan R. Adelman also criticizes Stalin's omissions in formulating Sovietmilitary doctrine. He refers to the importance of surprise, nuclear weapons, and theimpact of foreign military doctrine. Like Dinerstein, Adelman points out that "Stalinist
.
7 2Harriet Fast and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder:Praeger, 1979), pp. 38-46.
73Dinerstein goes on to criticize the concept, savin : "... This formulation is sotruistic as to be almost devoid of meaning. Obulv "the country with the strongereconomy, the better morale, superior equipment, large'r forces, and abler commanderswill wii the war. The only realy substantive point in Stalin's formula was hisconclusion from the above premiss: that transitory factors such as surprise could notdetermine the outcome of the war. He arc'ued thaf the Germans, who had already lostthe advantages derived from surprise, would lose the war because they were inferior inthe perman~ntlv operating factors." H. S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union:AA ucear f'eapohs and the Revolution in Soviet Military and Political Thinking (NewYork: Praeger, 1959), pp. 6-7.
5% ' 6 1
military doctrine generally emphasized conventional land war over possible nuclear air
war."74
Soviet analysts in the post-Stalin period shared this view. Writing in the Soviet
General Staff journal, Voennaya Mysl' (Military Thought), in 1964, General Major S.
Kozlov said:
In the first postwar period (1946-1953) the development of Soviet military theorypredominantly proceeded alone the traditional path of eneralization and'analvsfsof the experience of the past War, of working out on this basis conclusionsndrecommendations for the conduct of armed conflicts by conventional means.'
This analysis meant that the Soviets saw victory in a future war as resulting
from the accumulation of successful battles fought along continuous and slowlychanging fronts. Frontal breakthroughs would be achieved by the deliberatemassing of soldiers and equipment on the main axis of attack. with a high densityof men, tanks, artillery, and planes in the strike sectors followed by envelopmeftand thrusts to the rear76 Ground forces would be predominant in the Europeantheater of a future war.
Still other observers of Soviet military doctrine repeat this refrain. Raymond
Garthoff blames "the legacy of Stalinist stagnation" on the "virtual canonization" of
Stalinist military doctrine as it existed in 1945. 77 Stephen M. Meyer characterized theplanning constraints placed on the General Staff in the postwar period as arbitrary. 78
In this regard, Soviet failure to discuss the importance of nuclear weapons and their
impact on modern warfare did not, however, prevent them from developing their own
nuclear weapons. Dinerstein points out that the decision to develop the new
technology only means that the Soviets, while seeing them as important, did not
74Clearly, Soviet writers were significantly influenced by World War II; " . . . afuture major war was seen as cast in. ttie mold df World War II--that is. as a protractedland war in which ground troops, supported by tanks. artillery, and planes, would playthe decisive role." Dr. Jonathan t. Adelnian, "The Evorution of Soviet Miliiar"Doctrine, 1945-1984," Air University Review, March-April 1985, pp. 27-28.
75General Major S. Kozlov "The Development of Soviet Military Science AfterWorld War II," Voennaya .M1ysi', february 1964, p. 29.
76Adelman, "Evolution," p. 28.77Ravmond L. Garthoff, Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age (New York: Praeger,
1958), pp. 61-63.78Stephen M. Meyer, Soviet Theater Forces: Development of Doctrine and
Objectives (Letchworth: Garden City Press, 1983), p. 12.
62
- - - -- * 1q--_. , -, - .wy .
consider them decisive.
Stagnant doctrinal development did not mean stagnant weapons dyelopment. Itmeant, rather, an absence of criteria for makin the9 best decision as to theallocation of resources among various weapon systems.'
Thomas W. Wolfe argues that both Western and Soviet writers have judged
Stalin too harshly. Although it is clear that most, if not all, hold Stalin responsible for
the delay in Soviet doctrinal accommodation to the nuclear age, Wolfe explains that
Stalin's orientation was "partly the product of necessity" and partly the result of his
preoccupation with Europe. Because Stalin felt that the principal opponent in the
postwar period would be the United States, which first had a monopoly on nuclear
weapons and later an advantage in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the kind of
conventional military power the Soviet Union could bring to a conflict would not be
very effectively brought to bear directly against the United States.80
Even though the actual numbers of the Group of Soviet forces in Germany
(GSFG) remained at a fairly constant 400,000 troops in the early 1950's, the Soviets
upgraded and improved both the field armies and their supporting tactical air assets.81
The development of Soviet tactical air assets was a consequence of Soviet experience in
World War II. In that war, "the great majority of all Soviet Air FoTce activity ... was
directed towards the support of the ground forces."82 Marshal Sokolovskiy has said
that 76% of all Soviet Air Force (SAF) sorties flown in WW II were carried out by
tactical air assets in support of the ground forces and that in the future, "the Air Force
was destined primarily to support the ground forces in actions taking place directly
79 Dinerstein, War, p. 9.80 "If the United States was to be deterred from pressing its nuclear advantage
the Soviet forces at hand would have to do the job, and the place where they couldbest be brought to bear was obviously Europe . . the Sovie Union could ih effect
/4 hope to make Western Europe a hostage for American good behavior .... Lacking asvet the means to adopt a strategy of fiuclear deterrence . . .Stalin had no choice...but to rely on Russia s tradition'il threater forces as the primarv instrument of Sovietmilitary'policy." Thomas NV. Wolfe. Soviet Power and Europe,'1945-1970 (Baltimore:Johns -lopkiris Press, 1970), pp. 33-37.
8t Within the Ground Forces, the Soviets increased battlefield mobility andfirepower with new tanks (T-54) and artillery, as well as mechanizing the logistics train.The 24th Air Army in East Germany included some 500 MIG-15 rAGOT-fihters bv1952 and be2an to receive the MIG-17 FRESCO fighters in 1953. Wolre, SovidiPower, p?. 39-40. Also, Robert A. Kilmarx, A History cf Soviet Air Power (New York:Praeger. 1962), p. 229.
82M. J. Armtage and R. A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age (Urbana:University of Illinois Press, 1983), p. 141.
63
J,
4~..z.,~~
over the battlefield."8 3 Another observer of Soviet air activity in WW II says that the
SAF was
thoroughly imbued with the spirit of the offensive throughout the depth of tlewhole offensive zone, concentrating on the lines of the main land force thrusts.
Thus, the legacy of WW II to the SAF and its employment concepts was one which
ostensibly concentrated the main strength of the SAF on the battlefields and close
enemy rear areas.
As was pointed out earlier, however, ground attack was not the orientation of
Soviet fighter design at this time. The inmiediate postwar years were a time of
significant changes to the wing, designed to make the aircraft fly higher and faster in
the air defense role. The impetus for air defense designs came from outside the Soviet
Union; German aircraft, prototypes, test data, factories, designers, engineers, and
production personnel were all captured by the Soviets at the end of the war. This was
truly acquisition of foreign technology on a massive scale. However, it was technology
oriented towards Germany's defense problems, not the USSR's. Thus. although
Germany was designing air defense aircraft to cope with US and British strategic
bombing, and even though the Soviets' avowed air employment concept was of the
ground attack variety, the USSR nevertheless incorporated German technology into its
new aircraft designs.
This had important consequences for the way fighters were used in the Korean
War. One would have expected, looking at their doctrine, that Soviet-trained
Communist forces would fly ground attack missions in the Korean War. In fact,
however, Chinese air employment concepts suggest a predilection fbr the air defense
mission. The Soviet-supplied, Soviet-trained. and in some cases Soviet-flown, Chinese
Air Force MIG-15 and MIG-17 fighters were not flown in support of ground force
actions, even in the north. They were used for air defense against UN bombers
involved in interdiction nissions over northwest Korea.
83Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy, ,[ilitary Strategy, SovietDoctrine and Concepts (London: Pall Mall, 1963), pp. 130, 158.
84Arritage and Mason, Air Power, p. 141. citing I. V. Timokhovich. TheOperational Art of the Soviet Air Force in the Great Patrioti tJ ar (Moscow: Voenizdat,1976), p. 9.
64
This, of course, is how the Soviets trained them to fly their fighter aircraft. TheSoviets in turn employed their tactical fighter assets in the manner they did, not
because their military doctrine so directed them (it directed that ground attack missionsshould be flown), but rather, because the available technology drove them to pursue airdefense-type missions. At the same time, the recently-acquired German air defensetechnology constrained them from executing the types of ground attack missions one
would have expected by looking at their military doctrine.
B. 1954-1964, A PERIOD OF TRANSITIONWhen Stalin died in 1953, an era of Soviet military doctrine is widely held to have
come to an end. However, the near unanimity that attends characterizations of the1945-1953 period disappears in descriptions of the post-Stalin era. For example, theScotts claim the impact of Stalin's death was immediate. 85 Like the Scotts, Dr.Adelman also claims that, "freed from the straitjacket of postwar Stalinism," the Sovietmilitary went through "rapid and radical changes" in doctrine, and that the
dominant motif of the period (1954-1964) was a recognition of the revolution inmilitary affairs wrought by the advent of nuclear weapons and missiletechnology."
Thomas Wolfe, however, claims that the Stalinist tradition persisted after his passing. 87
Stephen Meyer also argues that the Soviet military leadership maintained some
important ideas left over from the Stalinist period. 88
It is clear that there is little agreement on the nature of the doctrinal changes inthe years after Stalin's death. Although all the authors identify the period as one inwhich the Stalinist hold on military thinking is relaxed, there is no such agreement as
85Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 39.86Adelman, "Evolution," p. 29.
"87 Stalin's persistent endeavor to improve Soviet capabilities for theater warfarein Europe was to help prolong the dominance of a continental miflitary tradition in theSoviet st rategic outlook." Wo'lfle, Soviet Powver, p. 35.
88"The first was that strategic bombing of an enemy's population centers andeconomic-industrial facilities was hikelv to be ineffective in forcing capitulation ....The second impression was that. while nuclear weapons did represent an enormousincrease in deliverable firepower, they were not decisive (or absolute) weapons ....Nuclear weapons were not the princital means of military combat, but would continueto play a supportive role in mtary operations . . . Thb balanced development of allcombit arms was necessary, with the Ground Forces as the main arm." Meyer,Theater Forces, pp. 12-13.
65
iI
to how quickly the Soviets adapted their ideas to new technology and other military
doctrines, notably that of the United States. In fact, the period should be considered
transitional; it was characterized by a number of extensive doctrinal debates within the
professional Soviet military jounals and newspapers, and there were many cases of
public reversals of opinion and even public reprimands. All of these suggest that a
great deal of uncertainty surrounded the development of new weapons and the
consideration of new doctrines and employment concepts. The decade frofi 1954-1964
emerges as one of doctrinal uncertainty, confusion, and ambivalence.
In July 1953, five months after Stalin's death, Admiral of the Fleet N.
Kuznetsov was quoted by Pravda as saying, "The experience of the Great FatherlandWar alone is no longer sufficient." 89 Raymond Garthoff says that this offhand
comment in fact betrays the inadequate theoretical foundation of military doctrine. 90
In September, Voennaya Mysi' carried an article by General Major N. A. Talenskiy
that appeared to criticize the long-standing Soviet reliance on Stalin's five permanent
operating principles.91 The Scott's say that Talenskiy did not actually challenge Stalin's
formulation, but did imply that the five permanent operating principles were not
basic. 92 Dinerstein, on the other hand, says that "Talenskiy rejected Stalin's formula"
and that "for the first time since 1945 a Soviet publication had envisaged a possible war
of the future essentially different from World Wars I and II." 9 3
Talenskiy's article opened the floodgates of discussion as nearly a dozen articles
and letters on theoretical issues were published in the following year. Garthoff argues
persuasively that "no official line on the subject existed" and that "this was a real, and
not a staged, discussion. "9 ' As well, it seems fairly safe to suggest that Talenskiy's
ideas were responsible ones, as he had for several years been the editor of the military
newspaper, Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star), and at the time of his article in T'oennava
Mysl' (September 1953) he was chief editor of that professional journal. Nevertheless,
89Admiral of the Fleet N. Kuznetsov, Pravda, 26 July 1953. Quoted in GarthoffL
Soviet Strategy, p. 63.90Garthoff, Soviet Strategy, p. 63.9 1General Major N. Talenskiv, "On the Question of the Character of the Laws of'
Military Science," P'oennaya Mysl', N ovember 17953, p. 30.92Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 40.93Dinerstein, War, p. 9.94Garthoff, Soviet Strategy, p. 10.
66
" N " " • " ".'5-" ,.,,--, -" -','. , .. ',." .. .,. ".' .'.'%.*. ,' ',,',',.',.'
despite the absence of an "official" line in 1953, the Scotts claim Talenskiy had clearly
conunitted an indiscretion, as he was removed from his position as editor of the journal
in June 1954 and "banished" to the Institute of History in the Soviet Academy of
Sciences.95 Furthermore, the issues he had raised in his article were dealt with in
summary fashion by Defense Minister A. M. Vasilevskiy in a February 1954 article he
wrote for the Soviet military newspaper, in which he reiterated the Stalinist position.96
Later that same year the Minister of Defense repeated his p6sition that "the outcome
of a war is determined ... by permanently operating factors."97
The following year Marshal Zhukov became the new Minister of Defense. The
Scotts state that when Zhukov assumed his new command, he criticized Stalin's
permanent operating principles in a secret speech to his top officers. 98 In February
1955 Tank Marshal P. Rotmistrov published an article in Voennaya Mvsl' which
publicly, sharply, and permanently broke with the Stalinist legacy. 99 Rotmistrov argued
that surprise (characterized by Stalin as a transitory factor) had throughout history
been of great significance in combat. Now, in an age of nuclear weapons, surprise
could determine the outcome of the entire war. Thus, Mark Miller says that "taken
together, the Rotmistrov and Talenskiy articles, in effect, repudiated the permanently
operating factors as the basic law of war."100 By the end of 1955, Stalin's hold on
Soviet military thought seems to have been loosened considerably--within "the year.
Stalin's military views appear to have been rejected by the majority of Soviet military
theoreticians. "10 1
Nevertheless, although the five permanent operating principles were no longer
considered sufficient as basic laws of war, they did continue to exercise their influence
in that (being truisms, as Dinerstein pointed out) they were reflected in "two threads of
9 5Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 40.96Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevskiv, "On Guard Over the Securit" of
Our Soviet Motherland," Krasnaya Zvezda, 23 Febr'uary 1954. Scott and Scott, ArmedForces, p. 40.
9 7Marshal of the Soviet Union A. Vasilevskiv "The Great Lesson of History,"Krasnaya Zvezda, 7 May 1954. Scott and Scott, Arrized Forces, p. 40.
98Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 40.9 9Marshal of Tank Forces P. Rotmistrov "On the Role of Surprise in
Contemporary War," Voennaya Mysl', February 1955, pp. 18-19.10 S0 Mark E. Miller, Soviet Stratezic Power and Doctrine: The Quest for
Superiority (Coral Gables: Current Affairs Press, 1982), p. 34.101 Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 70.
67
", -"- -' '-" -" ."-""-" "-" "-""-""-" " " "" "" ' ": '" " ." " - -"' "" "- "' "4" "" '" " " "'-" "' "' "';"- "'- ",".'" "" " . "- "' "" ? '- -"1
continuity" running through Soviet military doctrine into the late 1950's. Stephen
Meyer identifies these as being that "war could only be won by destroying the enemy's
military forces; and nuclear weapons were not the decisive means of warfare." 102
General Major G. I. Pokrovskiy makes a similar point in his book:
But strategic weapons, by their very nature, cannot be considered as independentand self-stilfficient. The onlh correct view regarding the use of various weapons inwarfare is the view of Soviet militarv science: to wit, that all forms of armamentsand technology must be employed in warfare in as close and well-organizedcombined operhtion. Under such conditions, strategic weapons must be regardedas a part of the armament of the armed forces, entering into the general systemas an important and irreplaceable link. but not replacing and supplantink anyother means of combat. Soviet militarv science teaches that, wi-thoftwell-organized combined operations of all firms and services (land armies1 ,dirforces, and naval fleets), one cannot successfully wage contemporary warfare.
General of the Army K. Moskalenko makes a similar argument in an article he wrote
for Krasnaya Zvezda, as does Marshal Rotmistrov. 104 Garthoff noted this in his survey
of doctrinal writings.105 He further argues that even the organizational structure of the
Soviet Ministry of Defense reflected the Soviet conmmitment to a combined arms
doctrine of warfare, with emphasis on the importance of the Army. 106
In August 1957 the Soviets successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic
missile (ICBM) and in October of that year the world's first artificial satellite, Sputnik
I. The impact of missile technology on Soviet military doctrine was significant, if not
102Meyer, Theater Forces, p. 13.103General Major G. I. Pokrovskiv, The Role of Science and Technology in
Modern War (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1956). Translated by Raymond Garthofi' (NewYork: Praeger, 1958), p. 70.
104 "Soviet nfflitar3' science decisively rejects [that one can] achieve strategicvictory by means ... o one or another new weapon .... no such weapons... possess. . . all-powerful qualitites. Historical experience teaches that with the appearance of'new technology, new more powerful and more destructive weapons. the significance of'men on the bI'ttlefield not only does not decrease, but increases all the mofe." Generalof the Army K. Moskalenko, Krasnaya Zvezda, 25 Sep tember 1954. Also, "I.t isentirely clear that atonic and hydrogen weapons alone without the decisive operationsof the ground forces with their' contemporary material cannot decide the outcome ofthe war." Rotmistrov, "Role of Surprise," p. 25.
l°sGarthoft's survey of "all available Soviet military periodical and otherpublications reveals at leagt eighty specific reaffirmations of th'e rejection of reliance onone-weapon strategies in the -eriod 1953 through 1957, and none diverging from it."Garthotl, Soviet Strategy, p. 76.
106"The Army is predominantly represented (the senior dozen military cheifs allare Army, including the head of' the combined Air Defense Forces,. with the" Navy andAir Force chiefs currently ranking about thirteenth and fourteenth in standinef: andthe General Staff of the 'Armed Forces is the former Army General Staff upgiaded."Garthofl, Soviet Strategy, p. 82.
68
_ &ii
immediate. The Soviets saw in the ICBM an opportunity to break the US advantage
in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which in the late 1950's were the bombers of
Strategic Air Command.1 07 Garthoff claims that this view was disseminated in part for
propaganda purposes and that, in fact, the true evaluation by the Soviet military of the
bomber threat was less extreme.1 08 In addition, Stephen Meyer says that
The pairin of .owerful thermonuclear warheads with long-range missiles .(i.e.,tIRvM anIC~B M) was an obvious combination. By 1958 some prominent
Soviet military leaders begaf, 9 to point to the nuclear rocket weapon as thedecisive weapon of the times.
And indeed they were, as Dinerstein makes clear in quoting General Major Talenskiy's
March 1958 characterization of the intercontinental ballistic missile as a "decisive
weapon." 110 This period saw what the Scott's say are "radical changes in all aspects of
warfare," following the introduction of the nuclear weapon and the missile.111
Just prior to these developments in missile technology, the XXth Party Congress
was held in 1956, at which Khrushchev denounced Stalin and called for a
reexamination of military matters. In response to Khrushchev's proposal the Soviet
General Staff began a series of seminars and discussions, in which all high-ranking
officers participated. The result of these discussions was the determination that future
10 7Marshal Vershinin was quoted in a Pravda article in September 1957 assaving. "Now the expectation that America's remoteness will spare her military blowsin'the event of a new war is no longer tenable .... great distances will no longer playa decisive role. What was once inaccessible has now become within easv reacli.Intercontinental ballistic missiles can deliver the most terrible weapon, the ydrogenbomb, instantly to the remotest regions on any continent on earth .... missfles nowcall into question the expediency of further developing bomber aircraft, since theformer are more reliable and depdndable." Marshal ol Aviation K. A. Vershinin, "Onthe Bellicose Statements of American British and West German Generals, Answers ofthe Commander-in-Chief of the Air Forces of the USSR, Marshal of Aviation K. A.Vershinin, to Questions by the Pravda Correspondent," Pravda, 8 September 1957.
08 Garthol, Soviet Strategy, p. 223.109Meyer, Theater Forces, p. 14.110"General Major Talenskiv said in so many words that intercontinental ballistic
missiles were decisive weapons. By this time there could be no doubt that Talenskivspoke for others beside himself . . . 'the Soviet monopoly possession of' the decisiveweapon of our time .... the Soviet Union employs the c mor advantaees it has eainedfrom possession of the decisive modern weapon. GarthofF, Soviet Strategy, p. 227n.
lllScott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 41.
69
"-,
Soviet military doctrine should be based on the availability of nuclear weapons and
missiles.1 12
Penkovskiy tells us that at the time, the proceedings and conclusions of the
seminars were state secrets, but were gathered together in a "Special Collection of
Articles," and published for the benefit of educating the Soviet officer corps.
Penkovskiy's notes on the "Special Collection" were intended to provide the West with
a clear picture of the new military doctrine under development in the Soviet Union.
Among the features of this new military doctrine, according to Penkovskiy, were that:
a future war would begin with a sudden nuclear strike, and; the war would be very
short. 113
In accordance with these changes in Soviet military doctrine, First Secretary
Nikita S. Khrushchev played a large role in the creation in May 1960 of the Strategic
Rocket Forces as a separate service of the Soviet armed forces. The Strategic Rocket
Forces (SRF) represented the elite of the Soviet military. The Scotts observe that the
SRF have, since their creation, always been considered the premier service and that the
SRF commander has always taken precedence over the commanders of the other four
services (Ground Forces, Air Force, National Air Defense, and Navy). 1 4 Khrushchev,
in addition to presiding over these organizational changes in the Soviet military, also
provided an outline of the new doctrine in his speech to the Supreme Soviet in January
1960. The speech assured the listeners that the USSR had large stockpiles of nuclear
weapons and that
the Air Force and Navy have lost their former importance. These arms are beingreplaced and not reduced. Military aircraft is almost entirely being replaced brockets. We have now drastically 'reduced and will reduce furthef, till, or evefldiscontinue, the production of bomfbers and other obsolete aircraft.
Khrushchev went on to say that
112Oleg Penkovskiv, The Penkovskiy Papers (New York: Doubleday, 1965),translated by Peter Deriabin, p. 24S.
113 Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers, p. 250.
114Scott and Scott, Armed Forces, p. 137.115Nikita S. Khrushchev, speech to Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet on 14
January 1900, On Peacejid Coexistence (Moscow: Foreign Languages PublishingHouse. 1961), pp. 148-163.
70
a country's defensive capacity .is not determined by the number of men underarms . . . [q rather] depends in decisive measure on the firepower that countrycommands.
As a consequence, Khrushchev defended manpower cuts in the armed forces from their
1955 level of 5.76 million down to 3.26 million in 1958. He also proposed to further
cut manpower by over a million men. 117 This was a sharp break with the earlier view
that nuclear weapons were not decisive and that "balanced development of all combat
arms was necessary," with the Army remaining the dominant service. 118
This revision of military doctrine elevated the new nuclear missile weapons to a
privileged place in the Soviet defense schema. Navies, air forces, and ground forces all
came to be seen as less important, if not already obsolete. Combined arms doctrine--in
which all the services contributed to military operations by pursuing a single, integrated
combat plan for the fulfillment of strategic objectives within the theater--no longer
appears to have held sway. The dominant military assumption was that military goals
could now be accomplished independently and exclusively by nuclear missiles.
Soviet military planners in this time frame were faced with having to try and find
a niche for the air forces within the rather restrictive confines of this new militarv
doctrine. Two elements combined to generat, in the Khrushchev period a continued
emphasis on air defense. First, with theoretical writings of the period increasingly
emphasizing the importance of strategic nuclear weapons and the "threat" posed by the
bombers of Strategic Air Command, it was to be expected that Soviet air employment
concepts would gravitate toward the air defense mission. Second, technological
advances had wrought havoc with Soviet military theory, rendering seemingly irrelevant
the hard-won experience of World War I, including the importance of battlefield
ground attack missions. 119 However, the Soviets' failure to fly ground attack missions
in Korea, despite their declared intention to use aircraft in the future the way they had
in World War II, can best be explained by pointing to the nature of fighter design in
116Khrushchev, Coexistence, pp. 148-163.117Khrushchev, Coexistence, pp. 148-163.
"18 Meyer, Theater Forces, p. 13.119 Primarily as a result of Khrushchev's reforms, the Soviet military was
wrenched out of its accustomed ways of" thinking and forced to reorganize "in lide withthe technological facts of lifle, as h [Khrushchev] saw them." Wolfe. Soviet Power. p.136. This meant shifting from an almost exclusive preoccupation with continental landwarfare to a new concern for the difliculties imposed by strategic nuclear warfare.
71
Z r .. r r -
oV'
the immediate postwar years; they had moved toward a capability of higher and faster
flight with their newest fighters, making nearly impossible any serious contibution to
ground support.
Beyond that, despite the fact that air defense had "always been the weakest part
of Soviet air power ... by 1955 the Soviet Air Force had all the major elements of a
first-class strategic air defense organization."1 20 As a result of these improvements.
PVO Strany (National Air Defense) was made a separate independent service in 1955,
which forced the Soviet Ground Forces to relinquish control over regional defense
matters. This broke a forty-year tradition in which
all Soviet armed forces within a region were subordinate to the ArmyCommander. Now [1959] the PVO has its own, independent headquarterg,sometimes w tin the Army region, sometimes side by side with the Army
4/ organization.
In addition, PVO appears to have had priority over the Air Force in selecting new
pilots from flight school.122
,.. The growing importance of air defense continued throughout the Khrushchev
period until 1963, when the "bible" on Soviet military strategy appears. This was V. D.
Sokolovskiy's Soviet Military Strategy. 123 Sokolovskiy's book offers some interesting
contrasts to Khrushchev's 1960 "new strategy" speech. In particular, the Soviet
military, unlike Khrushchev, was concerned about how to actually fight and win a
future war, not just deter it through nuclear sabre-rattling, bluff, and bluster.
Sokolovskiy thus insisted that the final victory in war could be assured only through
the combined action of all arms and services. As part of this formulation then, he and
those with whom he wrote saw "continued uses for tactical and fighter aviation, and a
growing importance for the role of reconnaissance" aircraft in a future war. 124 This
formulation was both a return to more traditional Soviet military views, as well as a
"corrective" whose purpose was to realign Soviet air doctrine with its actual and
120Lee, The Soviet Air Force, pp. 109-120.121 Lee, The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces, p. 126.
122Lee, The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces, p. 126.123 V. D. Sokolovskiv. Voenna'a Strategiva. Translated by the Rand Corporation
as Soviet Military Strategy/(Santa Monica: Rzind Corporation, '1963).124Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy, p. 54.
72
eNN
emerging capability. To this end, air doctrine was reoriented from strictly air defense
to include other missions, such as reconnaissance and ground attack. Nevertheless, the
impact of the recently-acquired air defense-oriented technology continued to influence
Soviet doctrine.
Especially since the enunciation of "Flexible Response" by the Kennedy
Administration, the Soviets perceived an increased emphasis placed on tactical air
power by American and NATO planners. The Soviet response came in the form of air
defense:
Because of the fact that tactical air forces -in many armies are one of the mainmeans for delivering nuclear weapons, air defense troops are becomineincreasingly important to the ground forces . . . . It is more important that thlighters oT the air defense have the tactical and technical qualities, and the missileand electronic equipment, to enable them to reliablv destrov enemy aerial targetsat any altitude and at ranges that will protect the trbops from enemy air attXcks.... the role and i-niortance of the National PVO have increased
imeasurably . . . . Fighters will evidently play a considerable role in theNational PVO system in the coming years. 'By increasing their speed. altitude.and range, and by improving their mnissiles and radar, fighters can continue tocombat "Enemv bo'mbers successfully. A modern air defense fi2hter must be ableto remain al6ft for a pro-longe4 pieriod, execute radar patrolR, and shoot downenemy aircraft at any altitude.
But Sokolovskiy also defended the ground attack role and Soviet ability to execute it:
Tactical fighters and fighter-bombers will obviously still be able to supportground troops on the battlefield effectively . . . . thEir speed and altitude" miustsurpass those of enemy aircraft. Front lire aircraft can be particularly efIectivein destroying enemy nuclear weapons, especiallv missiles, on the battlefield.Aircraf't still have the important nussion, of aeria!'reconnaissance for all brancesof" the armed forces . H. Hence reconnaissance aircraft and instruments of aerialreconnaissance are continually being improved with respect to their ability toiaetect e y t ets traveling at high speeds and altitudes at any time of day'andin any weathier. ' -
-" Ultimately, Soviet force planners were able to generate political support for the
reconnaissance and ground attack roles, both a motivating force for and a consequence
of MIG's FOXBAT program and SUKHOI's new ground attack FITTER designs. By
the end of the Khrushchev period then,
125Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy, pp. 344-345.126Sokolovskiy, Military Strategy, p. 347.
73
the basic integrity of the ground forces and their supporting tactical airarmies--which together comprised the combat backbone of the theaterforces--was kept intact, and the validity of the j,9mbined arms doctrine underwhich they operated was emphatically reindorsed.
The ten years from Stalin's death were a period of transition from the
employment concepts of World War II to new concepts, which would ultimately find
expression in the theater nuclear offensive. The early, post-Stalin years, however, were
characterized by confusion, uncertainty, and ambivalence. One very strong theme,
however, was that of the importance of air defense, stimulated in large meausre by the
growing ability of the MIG OKB to deliver increasingly capable air defense fighters.
As the period progressed, Soviet planners came to see the force imbalance that had
come of the earlier, disproportionate improvement in air defense. Eventually, air
doctrine reemphasized reconnaissance and ground attack, as well as air defense. By the
end of the period then, employment concepts began to reflect the possibility of
combining nuclear weapons with traditional combined arms doctrine.
C. 1964-1973, THE NUCLEAR PERIOD
The Soviet theater nuclear offensive, which predominated in the 1964-1973
period, was characterized by the following two propositions: nuclear weapons play the
leading role in Soviet theater warfighting capability; escalation is considered highly
likely. That is, the Soviet strategy in this time period called for an in-depth, massive,surprise nuclear strike, in conjuction with an immediate high-speed air and ground
exploitation. 128 Soviet military doctrine had changed since the 1950's in that the
Soviets allowed for the possibility of an "opening conventional phase . . . that
subsequently escalates to all-out intercontinental war." 129
The Soviets' dominant preference in the 1960's was to be able to fight and win a
nuclear war in Europe. A "nuclear-oriented Soviet theater doctrine ... had, as it were,
acquired a new lease on life." 130
127 Wolfe, Soviet Power, p. 147.12 S5ee Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 19"76).129 Douglass, Nuclear Offensive, p. 11.130Wolfe, Soviet Power, p. 458.
I,
V 74".
-61.7 W
The Soviet emphasis in the mid- to late-1960's on theater nuclear war is reflected
in the number of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM's) deployed opposite
NATO at that time. "By about 1965, the Soviets had over 600 IRMRBM(intermediate- and medium-range ballistic missile) launchers deployed" and close to
1,000 by 1970.131 This is the force that would execute the initial nuclear fire barrage(or mass strike) that would have taken place in a Soviet theater nuclear offensive. 132
The second part of such an offensive was to be "rapid exploitation by the groundforces." In fact, "the real heart of the Soviet [theater nuclear offensive was] the ground
forces . . . what might be called the exploitation forces." 133 The importance of the
ground forces in the theater nuclear offensive reflected the previously-mentioned returnto the long-held Soviet preference for combined-arms operations, which had briefly
been eclipsed in the Khrushchev years.
The US policy of "Flexible Response," formally adopted during the Kennedy% Administration, admitted the possibility of a conventional phase to a European war,
but it was based on the assumption of Western military superiority at both theintercontinental and theater-nuclear levels of war. Given this superiority, the West
could tolerate inferiority in conventional forces because NATO always retained theflexibility to escalate to a higher level of conflict where dominance (superiority) wouldbe restored. This helps explain why the Soviets perceived escalation in a European wasas "inevitable." The Soviet response was to prepare for that escalation; the result was
the operational concept for the theater nuclear offensive.Instead of facing the untenable situation of having only a massive nuclear
response to a theater-level nuclear war, the Soviets refined their doctrine and theircapabilities for waging war under new conditions. Unlike the US, which did no more
than declare its need to be able to right on "any rung of the escalation ladder," 134 the
Soviets identified early in their debate the essential nature of deterrence and
131 Miller Quest for Superiority, p. 83. Also Robert P. Berman and John C.Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: Reauirements and Responses (Washington, D.C.: TheBrookings Institution, 1982), p. 136.
132Douglass, Nuclear Offensive. p. 45.133Further "the ground forces in effect, su ort or complete the work of the
nuclear strike." bouglass, Nuclear Offensive, pp. 4- Z8.134Jeffrey Record, NATO's Theater Nuclear Force Modernization Program: The
Real Issues (Washington, D.C.: Corporate Press. Inc. 1981). pp. 16-36. Recordcharges that NATO ffas failed to establish an operational doctrine for theater nuclearweapons--a failure that he claims persists to this day.
75
C.%
war-fighting. For instance, writing in Voennaya Mysl °, two theoreticians wrote in 1968:
A position which in our view is erroneous on the theoretical level and harmful onthe practical level is that which, cunts only on the possibility of preventing warand ignores its being unleashed.1
It was in large measure the Soviet concern for a genuine nuclear war-fighting capability
that generated the requirement for the theater nuclear offensive. This is not to say that
the Soviets wanted a war in Europe, let alone a nuclear war. It is simply that
Soviet doctrine and military posture do not distinguish between deterrent andwarfighting nuclear capabilities . . . the better the Soviet armed forces areprepr'red to fight and win a nuclear war, the more effective they will also be as adeterrent to an attack on the Soviet Union; at the same time, tie ability or Sovietforces to fight and wi 6a nuclear war provides indispensable insurance igainst thefailure of deterrence.'
Within the context of this increased need to fight a nuclear war, evolving Soviet
air employment concepts sought a way to use the aircraft currently in and entering the
inventory that would combine traditional combined arms precepts with tactical nuclear
weapons. As we have seen, these tended to be fast, high-flying aircraft suited best for
the air defense mission, but included as well a recently-acquired (if limited) ground
attack capability. Other aircraft, such as the FLOGGER and the FOXBAT had some
limited flexibility regarding their employment. For example, the FOXBAT, if it could
not be used against the US B-70 for which it was designed, could serve in a more
general air defense role, as well as serve as a high-altitude, high-speed reconnaissance
platform.
The air employment concept for the theater nuclear offensive emphasized ground
attack and reconnaissance missions. The latter included both pre- and post-strike
reconnaissance, as well as "armed strike reconnaissance" or "free hunt." 137 The major
135General Major N. Sushko and Lieutenant Colonel V. Kozlov, "TheDevelopment of Marxist-Leninist Teaching on War and the Army," Voennaya Mysl' ,
April 1968, p. 95.136Leon Goure; Fov D. Kohler: and Mose L. Harvey The Role of Nuclear
Forces in Current Soviet Stratepy (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies,University of Miami, 1974), p. .
137Aviti reconnaissance must now be conducted to a very great depth . . .,.Aviation can only support tank forces with timely information on the enemy by wideuse of the entire complex of modern photo and' radiotechnical means, wlclh 'pernutrapid and accurate transmission of reconnaissance information." Col. V. Kuznetsovand Col. B. Andreyev, Selected Readings from 'Military Thought,' 1963-1973
76
r,. ...-.Y-PJ'.,\..-..A.- A,..,,A ... '..,....."S-...S
mission for frontal aviation was to locate and destroy mobile targets and to identifyw/ "new or newly activated airbases."138 Aircraft were also envisioned as being especially
effective when combined with tank forces in deep offensive operations. 139
The theater nuclear offensive's initial fire barrage was a variation on "suppressiveterrain fire," an artillery employment concept that began to lose credibility in the wakeof the hard experience of Arab artillery crews in the 1967 and 1973 wars.
Subsequently, the Soviets began to shift the focus of their tactical requirements, ending
the period of the theater nuclear offensive, and ushering in the theater strategic
conventional operation.
D. 1973-1985, THE CONVENTIONAL PERIOD
1. -IntroductionThe Soviets believe that the ever-present threat of uncontrolled escalation to
intercontinental nuclear war in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Europe,
as well as improvements in the capability of weapons of all types, particularly aircraft,
have made obsolete old forms of conducting warfare. More specifically, the Soviets
believe that with greater firepower, longer weapons ranges, faster response times due to
automation and computer-assisted decision-making, and with greater mobility, it is
increasingly necessary not only to take advantage of scientific and technological
developments in order to prosecute the offensive, but it is also increasingly urgent to
engage enemy forces (which themselves have increased range, mobility and lethality)
throughout the depth of the theater.
In fact, this evolution of weapons capability and its impact on military
doctrine is nothing new. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, former Chief of the Soviet General
Staff, described in his 1985 book, History Teaches Vigilance, how the organizational
structure of armed forces has changed over the centuries. He notes the ever-greater
capability of weapons and the subsequent requirement that the organizing principle for
their use be changed to reflect more accurately the threat and the capability inherent in
the new technologies. He concludes by stating:
(Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1982), p. 127.138Douglass, p. 67.1391n combination with tactical and operational missiles, aircraft carrying nuciear
weapons were to "clear a path in a short time for tank groupings to swiftly penetrateinto the operational depth of a resisting enemy." Kuznetsov and Andreydv, SelectedReadings, p. 125.
77
/4..
Thus, the creation of new weapons and new militar equipment . . .,.quirescorresponding changes in the methods of conducting iilitary operations.
2. The Theater Strategic Conventional Operation
The basic field command in the Soviet schema is the front. Presumably
because it was a wartime command, the front did not formerly exist in peacetime on a
day-to-day basis. The closest Western equivalent to a front is a NATO Army Group.
Several fronts comprise a Theater of Military Operations (TVD). It is within the
context of these TVD's that the Soviets now do their combat planning, apparently
having listened closely to the arguments put forth by Marshal Ogarkov. The 1985
issue of the US Defense Department's 1985 Soviet Military Power says:
With the advent of longer range and more capable aircraft and missiles, coupledwith increased troop mobirity and maneuverability, Soviet concepts foremployment of' combined arms'units and formations are evolvine accordinglv.The Soviets believe that modern warfare would substantiallK exceed -theframework of front operations. As a result, they envision a largef scale militaryoperation, which they refer to as a theater strategic operation . . . While tneSoviet concept of the front as a large combat formation in the field remainsessentiplly intact, the Soviets are n6w focusing on operations by groups offronts.
TVD's have in the past, as have fronts, been a wartime organization only.
However, in 1979 the Soviets appear to have established the Far Eastern TVD, a major
command reorganization probably intended to coordinate the activities of all the Soviet
armed forces opposite China and to provide the structure in peacetime that would be
necessary for rapid conversion to a wartime footing. 142 Since then, the Soviets have
established several peacetime TVD's. 143
The significance of the peacetime establishment of TVD's is that it may
represent the "culmination of a long-standing eftort" on the part of the Soviets to
streamiline their command and control structure. 144 In the past the wartime-only
existence of a TVD meant that its creation was indicative of impending hostilities (or
14 0Marshal of the Soviet Union N. V. Ogarkov, Istoriya Uchit Bditel'nosti(History Teaches Vigilance) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1985).
*.14 1US Department of Defense. Soviet Military Power 1985 (Washington, D.C.:US Government Printing Office, 1985), p. 15.
142Berman and Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces, p. 13.14 3Soviet Military Power 1985, p. 16. See also Jane's Defense Weekly (Surrey:
Jane's Publishing Conipany Limited). 13 April 1985, pp. 623-624.144 Michael J. Deane, et al., "The Soviet Command Structure," Strategic Review,
Spring 1984, p. 66.
78
at least that the Soviets perceived hostilities to be imminent). For the West, the
creation of a TVD may have served as a strategic warning indicator--now that warning
would no longer be available. In addition, however, the existence in peacetime of a
wartime organization streamlines planning and staff work, and eliminates the problems
attendant to passing command at a critical point in time. 145
Several TVD's comprise a Theater of War (TV). The US Department of
Defense (DOD) has identified at least three TV's: Western, Southern, and Far Eastern.
The Far Eastern TV appears to be much the same as the Far Eastern TVD; that is, the
CINC of the Far Eastern TV may be dual-hatted as the commander of the Far Eastern
TVD. A similar situation may exist for the Southern TV and the Southern TVD. The
Western TV, however, includes all three TVD's opposite NATO, as well as two oceanic
TVD's. Clearly, the commander of the Western TV would be in charge of a
tremendous number of forces. His command would include, according to the DOD: 98
Soviet maneuver divisions; 55 non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) maneuver divisions;
42,300 tanks; 33,165 artillery, rocket launchers, and morters (over 100mm); 4,545
tactical aircraft; 1,120 naval combatants (excludes SSBN's); and 1,145 naval aviation
aircraft. 146 Thus, the Western TV is the Soviet Union's largest command.
When Marshal Ogarkov assumed new duties in September of 1984, it was
widely reported that he had been demoted for one or another transgression. This is
hard to believe. Ogarkov presided over the establishment of this new commandstructure while he was Chief of the General Staff. He had written about it and given
speeches on the topic; it is more likely that Ogarkov was never demoted. He may have
.'1 assumed command of the Western TV, which would explain Georgi Romanov's
comment in Helsinki 13 October 1984 that "Marshal Ogarkov commands the Soviet
:2" Union's largest western force."147 In short, the most compelling argument is that after
writing about and arguing for reform in the Soviet command structure for several
*' years, and then presiding over the changes, Ogarkov was given the opportunity to
command the most important position in the new Soviet command structure..
1 l4 SDeane, "Soviet Command Structure," p. 66.146Soviet Military Power 1985, pp. 12-14.14 7 Dusko Doder, "Ousted Soviet Chief of Staff Returns to Scene as Author,"
WPashington Post, l0 June 1985, pp. 16-17.
79
One of the most important reasons the Soviets changed their command and
control structure was to streamline it, to decrease response time in a crisis. Response
time is of critical importance when facing a nuclear threat. Until recently, the
dominant assumption in Soviet military doctrine was that nuclear weapons would be
used in a European war--if not at the outset, then after a conventional phase of
uncertain duration. By 1977, though, when the Soviets began deploying the SS-20
IRBM in significant numbers, NATO no longer had dominance at the theater level.
Since then, Soviet doctrinal writings, which had previously assumed that a war would
go nuclear because NATO would escalate, have maintained that a European conflict
would not necessarily be nuclear. 148 Nevertheless, he does not rule out a nuclear
option, for whatever plans the Soviets have for defeating NATO without nuclear
weapons, they surely plan for the contingency that NATO will escalate.
_V"" In fact, this is a concern that Joseph Douglass addressed when he discussed
the theater nuclear offensive. He identified as a major problem for the Soviets the
issue of when and how to transition from conventional to nuclear war. 149 This problemremains and, as a result, the Soviets plan to destroy or degrade NATO's nuclear,
tactical air and, command and control assets as early in the war as possible. It would
fall to the TVD or TV conunander to coordinate these diverse combat operations, and
in the event, to resolve the dilemma of
abandoning a conventional advantage too soon and not exercising a nuclearoption, too tardil. . . C. Contrary .to the popular notion of an automaticescalaion process. Soviet military writings convey serious attentiqto a strict setof military preconditions ... surfounding the decision to escalate.
As CINC of the Western TV, Marshal Ogarkov may be responsible for the
command and control of Soviet escalation strategy:
[the] overall organization of their high comm and is now optimised for theconduct of the non-nuclear strategic deep ollensive. [Although there] is littledoubt that the final and explicit authorization to use nuclear weapons comes
148"Conventional war now seems to be the norm, nuclear war the exception."James M. McConnell The Soviet Shift in Emphasis from Nuclear to Conventional: I-eMid-term Perspective (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analysis, 1983), CRC 490, Vol. II,p. 27.
149Douglass, Nuclear Offensive, p. 94.
'5°Dennis M. Gormlev and Douelas M. Hart, "Soviet Views on Escalation," TheWashington Quarterly, Fall 1984, pp. 8W-81.
80
,e: s-o. .,_._,.t',7 -".".".. . , ."- , . . . o . , . .,.. •,-. ." - ' .". - ," . ' "..,. ' " .,
from the Defence Council . . . the hinieing of the Cltire process of nuclearescalation . . . [on the CINC of the We'tern TyJshould guarantee a relativelysmooth transfer from non-nuclear to nuclear war.
To sununarize this portion of the argument, it is clear that the realignment of
the Soviet command structure is significant for a variety of reasons. One is that it puts
the Soviets on a wartime footing in peacetime, which both deprives NATO of an
important strategic warning indicator of impending hostilities and also decreases Soviet
response time in dealing with crisis situations. Another is that it may provide a focal
point for the problems associated with nuclear escalation. Most important for this
argument, however, is that the newly-established TVD's and TV's are the command
echelons for the exploitation of the newest military technologies, including advanced
tactical fighter aircraft. That means that these new combat formations can more
effectively make use of greater firepower, longer ranges, greater lethality, and greatermobility. These new command echelons can swiftly execute operations to a depth in
the enemy's rear area that could not previously be done by a combined arms
commander.
3. The Operational Maneuver Group
An important adjunct to these changes in command and control is the renewal
of interest in high-speed exploitation forces. The Operational Maneuver Group
(OMG) as an outgrowth of the World War II Mobile Group, is designed to energize
the attack and "raise the tempo of the advance." 15 2 If a Soviet commander were able to
move a large force, such as an OMG, deep into enemy territory early in the offensive
(D + I or D + 2), he would not only make it very difficult for NATO to employ nuclear
weapons, but would himself threaten those weapons. The US Department of Defense
(DOD) believes the OMG attempts to "impose a theater-wide 'deep battle' and place
NATO in just such an untenable position. 153 The widespread improvement and
expansion in Soviet helicopter forces provides potential OMG forces with a significant
151Yossef Bodanskv "Ogarkov Confirmed as Western Theater C-in-C." Jane'sDefence 1I'eeklv, 22 October 1984, p. 716. See also Bodansky, Jane's Defence lUeekil,17 August 1985, p. 304.
152Christopher Donnellv, " Soviet Operational Concepts in the 1980's " su-portingpaper to the European Secuirity Study in Strenm'iheninw Conventional beterrcence itEurope: Proposals for the 1980's(Bostoh: Nimrod Press,l9S3), pp. 105-136.
1 Soviet Military Power 1985, p. 71.
,I
a". 8',
increase in mobility.154 This application of modern technology helps solve a genuine
problem for the Soviets--achieving rapid conventional success under the constant threatof nuclear escalation.15 5 Further, if the OMG is taken from the assets of the second
echelon, NATO may find its attacks against "follow-on forces" and the second echelon
to be in vain.
The appearance of the Operational Maneuver Group clearly represents asignificant departure for the Soviet ground forces, which have, since the development
of tactical nuclear weapons, been structured and prepared for an "echeloned" battle in
Europe. Echelonment provided a way for the Soviets to cease concentrating men and
material, and thereby reduce NATO's temptation to strike with nuclear weapons and
to reduce the effects of any enemy nuclear fire. Instead of advancing on a broad front
and several days later finding, assigning, and executing an operational breakthrough,
the Soviets are increasingly interested in achieving their objectives quickly enough to
present NATO with a fait accompli.
The Soviets have moved in this direction, despite their prior readiness toexecute a theater nuclear offensive, because they
believe it would be difficult to control escalation once the weapons have beenused, and therefore they would hope to win without recourse to the nuclearoption. In the Soviet vew the ability to control the course and outcome of aconflict employing nuclear weapons is, at best, uncertain. The Soviets seek toreduce the un~ertaintv & managing the degree of freedom of the threat, i.e.,NATO's nuclear forc".
The purpose behind the energized attack and advance envisioned by the use of
such devices as OMG's is to impose a train of events on NATO faster than NATO can
respond, deny NATO time to mobilize, reduce logistics problems for Warsaw Pact
forces, and impose minimum damage on captured territory.'5 7 As an illustration of
154At "Army level about 20 attack regiments have been formed vith up to 60I-li1 and Hind attack helicopters each." Soviet Military Power 1915, V. 6:1. Thelnernational Institute for Strategic Studies' The 1985-1986 Military Balance p188-191) also says that at Army level there is a helicopter regiment with 4(0 MI- 4Hind and 24 MI:8 lip helicopteis. In addition, tank and motorized rifle divisions eachhave a helicopter squadron with six each of' Hind and I lip.
'5 Phillip A. Peterson and John G. Hines, "The Conventional Offensive in SovietTheater Strategy," Orbis, Fall 1983, p. 721.
156Donnelly, Strengthening Deterrence, p. 45.157Donnelly, Strengthening Deterrence, p. 46.
82
_. -.
how effective the proper execution of thc OMG's mission could be, a front-lcvcl OMG
(committed on the first day of fighting and right behind the leading edges of the first
echelon), could seriously disrupt NATO nuclear release procedures. Figurc 35, depicts
the request sequence for nuclear release authority and its attendant time lapse.
REQST SQEC
NCA I
NATO MC
SHAPE I I
AFCENT-
CENTAG.
CORPS IEVIRANSMISSION
DIVISIONMPR(ESNI I'mi
DIV ARTY * DcSION
DELIVERYUNIT"
DELIVERYSYSTEM
TIME IN HOURS 0 -10 to 25 30
Source: )epartmcnt of the Army, Field Manual 100-5 (1977). Quoted inRecord, Force Modernization, p. 35.
Note: This chart is the best available representation of this request sequen".It may not be completely accurate, but it serves to illustrate the generalproblem of nuclear release procedures for NATO.
Figure 35. Request Sequence to Fire Nuclear Artillery
It should be clear that, depending on the success of the OMG (and it is by not
means certain that the OMG will be successful), it is possible that large, tank-heavy
operational raiding forces will be in action deep inside NATO's tactical defenses wellbefore NATO can even decide to respond with nuclear weapons. This use of the 0MG
represents a sharp departure from past Soviet combat capabilities, in terms of combat
formations, depth of mission, and its form of maneuver. 158
158The Soviets have developed two new structures of approximately corps size,
83
4. The Soviet Air Forces Reorganization
Closely related to both the changes in command and control structures and
the development of the OMG is the reorganization of the Soviet Air Forces. In order
to understand the significance of-the reorganization, it is necessary first to know how
the Soviet Air Forces (SAF) were organized prior to the current rationalization.
Reorganization is not new to the SAF. At the beginning of World War I1 the
SAF was comprised of five parts: Long-Range Bomber Aviation; Reserves of the
Supreme High Command (VKG); Frontal Aviation; Army Aviation; and Troop
Aviation. The confusion that resulted during the opening phases of the war between
the USSR and Nazi Germany led the Soviets to simplify their Air Forces into two
branches. These were Long-Range Aviation (LRA) (subordinated to the VGK), and
the Tactical Air Armies (assigned to the fronts). 159 This arrangement continued until
the late 1970's. Beginning in the late 1970's, the Soviets disbanded LRA and the
Tactical Air Armies, and restructured part of PVO Strany. Since then, all LRA
(bombers) and some Frontal Aviation (tactical) aircraft were organized into five new
Strategic Air Armies. The rest of the Frontal Aviation assets and nearly half of PVO
Strany's interceptor force were combined into Air Forces of the Military District or
Group of Forces. Finally, the helicopters that had been part of Frontal Aviation were
separated and reformed into an organization now called Army Aviation. 160
The current organization of the SAF goes a long way toward helping the
Soviets achieve a capability for a successful conventional offensive in Euripe. In part,
this capability is a function of new technology, but the reorganization is also an
attempt to "develop and implement new operational concepts." 161 There is a "pleasing"
symmetry evident between the SAF reorganization and the likely concept for Soviet air
employment in a war against NATO and the restructuring of the combined arms
which are ideal for the OMG mission. DOD says these new corps "contain in excess of450 tanks, 600 infantry vehicles and armored pe'rsonnel carriers, and 300 artillery' piecesand multiple rocket liunchers . . . . Additional units of this type are expected to beformed once testing and evaluation are completed." Soviet J[ilitiry Power 1985, p. 63.
159These Tactical Air Armies came to be called Frontal Aviation.160Soviet Military Power, p. 81.16 1"Until Soviet Frontal Avaiation began to receive its current generation of
aircraft, a Soviet air opera.tion against NATO air and nuclear assets would .p robablvhave been ineffective. Soviet tactical aircraft of the 1960's were characterized b" lightbomb loads and short ran-e. But over the last decade, Soviet units and even uhits-of'the non-Soviet Warsaw Fact (NSWP) states, have been equipped with increasinglymore capable and sophisticated aircraft." Phillip A. Petersen, "Reorganization T'rendts,"'Murphy, Soviet Air Forces, p. 267.
84
N %.
- - -. . . . . .
command and control structure discussed earlier. That is, the Soviets realize that the
role of a particular TVD may change during the course of a war and that the shifting
of air power between theaters acquires significant importance. Petersen suggests thatin the Western USSR (possibly that geographic area under the control of the CINC of
the Western TV) two Strategic Air Armies, normally subordinated to the VGK, could
be "allocated" to both the Western and Southwestern TVD's, "with a variablepercentage of the longer-range bombers [in another Strategic Air Army] swinging to
whichever TVD was perceived by the Supreme High Command [VGK] to have the
greatest requirement." 162
To reconstruct just precisely which air assets would go where, it is necessary
to determine which aircraft are in which Air Army. DOD makes it clear that the five
Strategic Air Armies of the VGK currently contain the following aircraft: TU-95
BEAR, M-4 BISON, TU-22M BACKFIRE, TU-16 BADGER, TU-22 BLINDER, andSU-24 FENCER. 163 It is also possible that some of these Air Armies control fighterand reconnaissance aircraft. 164 DOD also suggests that the BEAR and BISON aircraft
are combined into a single Air Army designed for intercontinental and maritime strikes.Given the intercontinental nature of these missions, it is likely that this would be the
Moscow Air Army. 165 It is clear from other sources that the two Air Armies DOD
refers to as being comprised entirely of former Frontal Aviation assets are the Legnicaand Vinnitsa Air Armies. 166 These are the "FENCER Air Armies." 167 The Smolensk
Air Army "controls about 12 bomber bases in the Western Soviet Union, with
BACKFIRE, BADGER, and BLINDER assigned. 1 68 Finally, the Irkutsk Air Army in
the Soviet Far East may control BACKFIRE, BADGER and FENCER aircraft.1 69 By
162 Col. Yu. Bryukhanov, "The Massed Employment of Aircraft," Voennaya Mysl',June 1969. Quoted in Petersen, "Reorganization Trends," pp. 277 ana 340.
163Soviet Military Power, p. 33.164 Petersen, "Reorganization Trends," p. 276.165Petersen, "Reorganization Trends," p. 282.166 Petersen "Reorganization Trends," p. 282. See also the International Institute
for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1 985.-1986, pp. 26-27 and William M. Arkinand Richard W. Fieldhousc. ,Auclear Battlefields: Gobal Links in the Arms Race(Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, r985), pp. 263 and 267.
167 Soviet Military Power, p. 34.168Arkin and Fieldhouse, Global Links, p. 261.169Arkin and Fieldhouse. Global Links, p. 255. It is unlikely that the Irkutsk Air
Army controls BEAR or BISON aircraft, as Arkin and Fieldhbuse indicate. Soviet
85
•
dividing up their strategic air assets in this manner, the Soviet would be able to
"provide support for specific theaters of military operations [TVD's] and to assure the
flexibility to reallocate aircraft as necessary during wartime."170
While Soviet strategic air assets can apparently be subordinated from the
VGK down to the TV or even the TVD levels, the Air Forces of the Military Districts
and the Groups of Forces are designed primarily to be used by the front commander,
as frontal aviation. 171 These aircraft would execute a wide range of missions, including
air defense cover, reconnaissance, ground support, and interdiction. These valuable
contributions notwithstanding, the Soviets understand air superiority to be an
absolutely essential condition for victory in war. The Soviets, therefore, intend to
attain air superiority through the execution of a theater-wide strike of massive
proportions at the very outset of a war in Europe. Because this air operation would be
so critical to the Warsaw Pact's success,
[nmostL if not all, of the aviation assigned to the combined arms fronts [i.e., theAir Forces of the Military Districts,GOF] in a given theat 2 of militaryoperations must initially supl5ort the overall theater air- operation].
The requirement that front-level fixed-wing aircraft participate in the
theater-wide air operation at the beginning of the war deprives the maneuver
formations of their support for an indefinite period of time. As a result, the Soviets
have greatly expanded the role of helicopter, separating them from the former Frontal
Aviation organization, and aggregating them together into the newly formed Army
Aviation. There are a variety of reasons that the Soviets prefer helicopters over
high-performance fixed-wing aircraft for the "close air support" mission. These include
Military Power 1985, makes clear that only one Air Army is designed forintercontinental strike, and it is more reasonable'to suppose that it is the Moscow AirArmy that has this responsibility. In addtion, it is possible, since there are FENCER'sin the Far East, that Irkutsk controls some of these relatively new tactical bombers.performing in the Far East the functions of the Smolensk, Lgnica and Vinnitsa AirArmies in the West.
170 Soviet Military Power 1985, p. 33.
war. 171Military Districts and Groups of Forces typically become fronts in time of
1 2Petersen and Hines, "Conventional Offensive," p. 713.
86
7- 0 0 -5 3 -_M -9 -VF TP -3 -C -3 RX W3-7 AM 9 -r -7 -. -7 -. 1 *-. 3
fewer logistics problems, deployment closer to the forward edge of the battle area, andimproved capability to conduct reconnaissance. In addition, like fixed-wing aircraft,
helicopters can both concentrate and disperse rapidly. 173
Overall, the SAF reorganization has resulted in a command and control
structure for air assets which makes them more responsive to requirements at every
command echelon. At the strategic level (greater than 500 km) the VGK, TV, and
TVD commands have long-range air assets that can be used to execute the air
operation at the outset of a war, and can later be progressively "allocated" to
subordinate commanders on critical axes of advance within the theater of military
operations. At the operational levels (100 km to 500 km), front commanders have
fixed-wing air assets which will probably be relinquished to higher authorities at the
outset of a war, but which, after the air operation, will be "returned" for the support of
front level objectives. In addition, the front commander now has control not only of
fomer Frontal Aviation tactical aircraft, but also a large number of former PVO Strany
air defense interceptors. These can be used to enhance the front's air defenses when
necessary, as well as perform other missions, such as limited ground attack and
reonnaissance. In the meantime, the front's subordinate combat maneuver formations
will not have been without air support; at the tactical level (up to 100 km), division,
army and front commanders have a great many attack helicopters (and perhaps
eventually get the SU-25 FROGFOOT ground support fighter) in the new Army
Aviation organization.
Soviet writers frequently extol the virtues of aerial fire support. They
recognized that the command and control structure that existed prior to about 1980was not flexible or responsive enough to meet the needs of their evolving operational
concepts. Specifically, the old LRA structure was too cumbersome to accomplish the
important missions in depth that might suddenly arise during combat, such as
destroying recently discovered enemy nuclear weapons or concentrations of enemy
aircraft. Also, the previous generation of fighters and fighter-bombers did not have the
range or payload capability to effectively establish fire superiority in general, or aira':
,
"ae 17 3 -'In order to free aviation of the front to participate in deep attacks in atheater of military operations, helicopters would nave to assume m~uch of the-'S responsibility for aderia I fire support of the ground forces. The resurrection of 'army
aviation. suggests that the Soviets have found a solution to the problems involved ii* conducting Weep-theater strikes in support of the TVD objectives while at the sarme
timed rovidirn direct air support to the ground forces." Petersen, "Reorganization
.0 87
superiority in particular. The realignment of air assets, such as FENCER and
BACKFIRE, into Air Armies of the VGK centralized their control and
made it possible to broadly, maneuver aviation, to quickly create powerfulaviation groupings or) the majorst'ategic sectors, and sharply alter the ratio offorces in favor oFSoviet aviation.s ,
Centralized control also eases the airspace management problem. The subordination
of former PVO interceptors to front commanders is a recognition that offense anddefense in the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) are too intimately related to
each other to be separated administratively. It may also represent a growingappreciation for the exceedingly high cost of "single-mission aircraft" and the gradual
development of Soviet aircraft design to the point where a particular airframe may
effectively perform multiple missions.
Finally, the development of Army Aviation is clearly an attempt to redress theorganizational absence of a necessary combat capability: that of providing direct,
closely controlled, responsive ground support to maneuver formations. Combinedarms commanders now have dedicated air assets organized in a structure that closely
resembles the wartime structure of the ground forces themselves.
The reorganization has been driven by the increased ranges, accuracy, and
speed of weapons--not only was it possible to deliver strikes at tremendous depth and
with impressive accuracy, but it also became increasingly urgent to do so because tfe
adversary had much the same capability. The reserve Air Armies of the VGK arecreated from former LRA and some former Frontal Aviation assets. They are
specifically designed to provide flexible firepower to TV/TVD combined armscommanders and, when they can be spared, to front commanders who need the extraair support because their advance lies on the theater's main axis of advance.
Army Aviation is made of the old Frontal Aviation helicopters and possiblythe SU-25 FROGFOOT ground support fighter. Army Aviation appears to allocate to
front commanders two regiments of attack helicopters; armies now have one such
174N. Daayev and V. Chernitskiy "Trends in the Development of theOrganizational Fofms of Frontal and Lontange Aviation During the Great PatrioticWar," Voyenno-lstoricheskiy Zhurnal, October 190.
88
. , . , " . , - . " " . ' . . . ,, -, - -
regiment assigned, and motorized rifle and tank divisions each have a squadron ofhelicopters assigned. These are organic fire support units, dedicated to the close air
support mission.
Aircraft which previously had been control led only at the national level (such
as BACKFIRE) appear now to be "available" to the combined arms commander at thei TV/TVD level, significantly increasing the reach of aerial firepower in the theater ofwar and the theaters of military operations. Also, the maneuvering of air assets from
one TVD to another, between levels of command (such as would be the case when a
TVD commander appropriates tactical air assets from his subordinate front
* ~commanders to carry out theater-level objecti 'ves), and between fronts themselves, is
much easier. The principle is that each command echelon has its own "dedicated" air
assets that can be used in support of "unique" combat objectives, however, a superior
commander has the authority to requisition aircraft to accomplish the objectives of a
higher command echelon, or to adjudicate the disputes that would inevitably arise
between coordinate commands as to the additional air assets to which they are entitled.
- For example, a TVD commander would determine if one of his subordinate front
commanders, operating on a secondary axis within the TVD, should relinquish his air
assets to an adjacent front, which lies on the main axis of advance and is in abreakthrough position. Another form of maneuver is that envisioned by transferring
the assets of an entire Air Army from one TVD to another. An example might be the
deployment of Vinnitsa Air Army assets from the So.uthwestern TVD (opposite
Turkey, Greece, and Italy) to the Western TVD (opposite Germany), where they would
augment the efforts of the Legnica Air Army.
5. The Air Operation
Throughout the period during which the theater nuclear offensive was the
dominant operational concept for continental land warfare, the Soviets were compelled
to keep their forces dispersed. This was one of the purposes of echelonment, the first
echelon of which Was essentially the nuclear strike itself. The rapid development of
aircraft and missile capability permitted replacement of the nuclear fire barrage with a
conventional fire plan whose effects would be great enough to both neutralize NATO's
air assets and destroy NATO's nuclear weapons, thus establishing general fire
superiority over NATO. The vehicle for the conventional fire plan is the "air
operation," the post-WW 11 effectiveness of which was demonstrated in the 1967 Israeli
4" strike on Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian airfields at the outset of the Six-Day War.
89
WN
The air operation is expected to last several days. During that period, there
would be only limited ground support available to maneuver formations, while most
fixed-wing assets (except those on nuclear-withhold) would be engaged in phased wave
attacks on NATO airfields, nuclear storage, and command and control facilities. The
device for reducing aircraft losses in NATO's air defense environment is the "air
corridor;" one or two of which would be established per front. 175 These penetration
corridors would be created through the execution of a highly structured series of
"/ phased attacks on NATO's air defense system. These integrated attacks would be
made against radars, missile sites, airfields, and command and control facilities, and
would include extensive stand-off-, escort-, and self-protection januming and electronic
deception. The progression of the attack after the first waves would be highly
dependent on tactical reconnaissance and battle damage assessment. After the
corridors are opened and NATO's air and nuclear assets have been sufficiently
neutralized to prevent escalation and blunting of the Warsaw Pact offensive, fixed-wing
assets would be progressively released back to the fronts for ground support duties and
front-level objectives. Because the Soviets realize that 50 percent of NATO's firepower
rests with NATO air assets, successful execution of the air operation is necessary for
establishing fire superiority early in the war and is, in fact, the linchpin of current
Soviet doctrine. With a thorough look at the evolution of both Soviet fighter design
and Soviet air employment doctrine now complete, we can turn to a more rigorous
analysis of the interaction between the two. That effort is undertaken in the next
section.
175Col. Aleksander Musial, "The Character and the Importance of AirOperations in Modern Warfare," Polish Air and Air De ense Review 1982, 12.
uoted in Phill. A. Petersen and Maior John R. Clark, Soviet Air and Antiairperations," Air Universi9y Review, March-April 1985, Vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 36-54.
90
V. QUANTIFYING THE PROBLEM
A. THE COMPONENTS OF FIGHTER CAPABILITY
This section of the thesis seeks to quantify the evolution of Soviet fighter aircraft
technology and air employment doctrine. The purpose is to more systematically and
le I objectively measure their covariation and assess their relationship to each other. Of
the 80 variables in the data base, 10 were chosen for the factor analysis. These 10variables, presented in Table I (next page), appeared in earlier explorations of the data
to best describe the evolution of fighter technology.'176 They have the virtue of
reflecting the importance of the weapons and avionics suites, rather than just the
physical characteristics of the airframe and its propulsion system. The design of the
aircraft itself is important, to be sure, but, as was shown earlier, the most significant
changes to date in that area were the adoption of the swept wing and jet propulsion in
the last days of the World War 11 and the immediate postwar years. Since then, the
biggest changes have been in the fields of weapons and aviation electronics (avionics).
Thus, this selection of ten variables is designed to illuminate precisely those areasthat have experienced the maximum growth and development over the past forty years.
The maneuverability variable, however, does capture a number of important features of
the airframe and its propulsion system, and stands as an adequate surrogate for more
exact measures of maneuverability."' 7 In addition, it seemed that these ten variables
would accurately describe the two basic dimensions of the Soviet fighter force, air
* 4. combat and ground attack. Finally, this particular combination resulted in the fewest
factors accounting for the maximum variation in the observations.
*1The purpose of this Q-factor analysis 178 as to identify two profiles of aircraft:
air combat (AA) and ground attack (GA). Characteristics commion to AA fighters
should cluster together on an "AA dimension," while characteristics common to GA
176See Appendix A for a more complete description of the data base.
open Tunrt n specific excess power for Soviet fighters have not been found in
178Fator nalyis aplied to units (individuals, nations, aircraft, etc.) is Q-factoranalysis; the intent fs to detect patterns of profile similarity. R-factor analysis, morecommnon, is based on correlations between variables.
91
eV-
TABLE I
LIST OF VARIABLES USED IN FACTOR ANALYSIS
NAME 0 VAPIA LE DESCPIPES CE:
TRACK air interce;t radartrack range
SEARCH air intercept radarsearch range
MSLRANGE maximum air-to-air
missile (AAM) rang*
NUMBERMSLS maximum numoer ofAAM's
ICRAIUS combat radius for air combat, subsonicarea intercept; forground attacL, HI-LO-HIand 50% ordnance
, TURATIO thrust-to-weigh'. ratio maximum after-burnin tnrus;diviaed by combat weight
(50% fuel and 100% ordnance)
MANEUVER maneuverability ratio of TWRATIO to combatwingloading (combat weight
divided by wing area)
ORDNANCE maximum weight of groundattack ordnance
SUNS number of guns
-V STATIONS number of weapons pylons
* aircraft should cluster together on a "GA dimension" at a right angle (orthogonally) to
the air combat fighters. Table II (next page) presents the correlation matrix input for
the factor analysis.
Table III (page 95) presents the estimates of communality, which dcscribe the
variation in one variable that can be expected from the shared influence of all the other
92
.% %
TABLE II
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR FIGHTER MATRIX (FTRMAT)
TRACI SEARCH MS.RANE: NUMEERMSLS ,,RADUS TWAT,, MANZUVEF ORDNAKE GUNS 5TA7ION:
MSLRAN E 1.Ei: , -;,a .. . :2 " .7: CC..'S.... .. "?4I NUMBERMSLS . .7=S 7. S2 ' ..7... .. 0 ̂ ,% -, " :E * .
!CRADIUS ,.)7 E : .- :74- .4E72 ........ ... ..T.RATI. •0 . .,C ... ,, :.O v:,c .S 0. -.r.: ' r-.255, . ,. .'"iMANEUVER .I0834 , -.)86. -.E6i23 22 .OG2 I... -0-' 6 6IORDNANCE 1'" 72 ,7:f 1_27 2o Z V :. 00000-.
GUNS -. 3 ; -. 256G. ..... -1A49 i.UC' ' - "-7S.TAT!ONS .!7E,- 17"r-.. ... .. .. . .. . 7 7" -r ; :uJ::
variables. Table IV (next page) presents the results of the factor delineation. It shows
that all of the variance can be accounted for by nine linear combinations of these
factors, and that over 82% can be accounted for by just three factors (factor matrices
in Tables V and VI, page 95).The final varimax-rotated factor matrix in Table VI shows the three vectors and
their highest loadings. The first factor (Long Kill) is the long-range kill capability of
Soviet air combat fighters. One would expect a high positive correlation between the
derived Variable (Long- Kill), which would require long-range radar detection andtracking, long-range AAM's and multishot capability, and high values for the variables
SEARCH, TRACK, MSLRANGE, and NUMBERMSLS. This factor alone accounts
for nearly half of the observed variance in Soviet fighter capability. It reflects the
long-standing Soviet penchant for ground-controlled intercept (GCI) vectoring of air-,4 defense fighters for a single-pass shot and subsequent return to base. It also reflects
the more recent design of first-look, first-shot, beyond-visual-range (BVR) killcapabilities.
The second derived factor (Ground Attack) loads most heavily onordnance-carrying capability and the number of weapons pylons. Factor 2 accounts
for another 23% of the observed variance. Finally, Factor 3 loads heaviest on
maneuverability and thrust-to-weight ratio. These are characteristics primarily of the
93
4.%
TABLE III
ESTIMATES OF COMMUNALITY
VARIABLE COMMUNALITY
TRACK .88151SEARCH .90418MSLRANGE .89915
" NUMBERMSLS .72512CRADIUS .69274TWRATIO .73179MANEUVER .92868ORDNANCE .90182GUNS .73063STATIONS .84137
TABLE IV
-. FACTOR DELINEATION
FACTOR EIGENVALUE PERCENT VARIATION CUMULATIVE PERCENT
1 4.83068 48.3 48.32 2.99995 23.0 71.33 1.10636 11.1 82.44 .76276 7.6 90.0
5 .59246 5.9 95.96 .13121 1.3 97.27 .12097 1.2 98.4
8 .10585 1.1 99.59 .04506 .5 100.0
10 .00469 .0 100.0
-9
~94
"-5
TABLE V
UNROTATED FACTOR MATRIX
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3
TRACK .935002SEARCH .917237MSLRANGE .911214NUMBERMSLS .844122CRADIUS .811555
STATIONS .852959MANEUVER -.784461GUNS -.699740ORDNANCE .560274
TWRATIO .615255GUNS .451479STATIONS .443761MANEUVER .386225
TABLE VI
FINAL VARIMAX-ROTATED FACTOR MATRIX
FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3LONG KILL (AA) GROUND ATTACK CLOSE KILL (AA)
MSLRANGE .937756SEARCH .897850TRACK .890637NUMBERMSLS .830859CRADIUS .732850
ORDNANCE .920494STATIONS .902270
MANEUVER .886082TWRATIO .711325GUNS .421414
.1 95
d'. d v Pr----S° . .
AD-Afl5 342 THE ICARUS ILLUSION: TECHNOLOGY DOCTRINE AND THE SOVIET 2/2AIR FORCE(U) NAYAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL MONTEREY CAS K BLACK SEP 96
UNCLASSIFIED F/O 15/? NL
EEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEEll
'I
?' . k
11111 1.0 ~till! - I .-.- ~. .
~.<. 4- us'~ .1~11111= 1
-- -- .- ~.
.' IIIII~~5II~ IinJI~* *-.I
'1
airframe and propulsion system, however, the number of guns loaded third-highest on
this factor so it has been labelled "Close Kill." The close kill capability of an aircraft is
in fact a function of its maneuverability, ability to accelerate, and the number and
quality of its short-range weapons, particularly its guns. This third factor, Close Kill,
describes that small portion of the Soviet fighter force characterized by apparently
good abilities in hard-turning, close-in air engagements. While it corresponds to
'dogfight" capability, it remains to be seen if this latent capability will be exploited by
Soviet pilots and planners.
This factor analysis shows that there are actually three dimensions to Soviet
fighter capability: two of these relate to air combat (Long Kill and Close Kill); another
describes the ground attack role. This factor analysis will help define the framework
for the multi-attribute utility analysis of Soviet fighters and employment doctrine
presented next. It is clear that any such model should incorporate three elements:
long- and close-range kill in air-to-air combat, and ground attack capability.
B. SCORING SOVIET FIGHTER TECHNOLOGY AND DOCTRINE
The multi-attribute utility analysis undertaken in this section uses the framework
developed by the factor analysis. The model here is specifically designed to emphasize
the growth in those performance characteristics highlighted by the factor analysis as
significant to particular mission orientations. In essence, each aircraft in the data base
was given a raw score according to the equation appropriate for its mission category.
That raw score was converted into a "technological index" by dividing it by the raw
score of the lowest-scoring aircraft in the same mission category (the baseline aircraft).
This index of embodied technology is not a measure of combat capability, per se. It
measures the relative position of aircraft in the same mission category with respect to
the technical component of aircraft performance. This technical component is a source
of potential combat capability that may or may not be tapped by the pilot or the
planners who develop employment techniques. In any event, it is by no means
established that the technological level of a fighter aircraft is the best indicator of its
combat potential (this issue will be addressed in the final section of this thesis); it may
only be the most visible and measurable.- With this disclaimer, recall that long-range kill capability is characterized by
long-range air intercept radars, long-range missiles, and a multishot capability. This
combination of requirements is characteristic of Soviet air defense fighters assigned to
96
• • • - . . . ". Ii,
the national air defense organization (PVO). These air defense fighters include the
SU-9 FISHPOT B, SU-11 FISHPOT C, SU-15 FLAGON series (A, D, E and F),
MIG-25 FOXBAT A and E, and the MIG-31 FOXHOUND. The following equationwas used to derive a raw air combat score for these nine aircraft:
[(NUMBERMSLS)(MSLRANGE) + TRACK] CRADIUS = RAW SCORE
Each raw score was then divided by that of the baseline aircraft (SU-9 FISHPOT B) to
derive an index of incorporated air-to-air technology for these air defense interceptors.
Table VII presents these air combat technological index values (TINDEXA).
TABLE VIITINDEXA VALUES FOR AIR DEFENSE INTERCEPTORS
AIRCRAFT TINDEXA
SU-9 FISHPOT B 1.00SU-11 FISHPOT C 1.46
: SU-15 FLAGON A/D 2.65SU-15 FLAGON E/F 3.17
I MIG-25 FOXBAT A 7.51SMIG-25 FOXBAT E 9.77
I MIG-31 FOXHOUND 58.25
The second component of air combat capability is the close-in kill, characterizedby maneuverability and short-range weapons. This element was added to the basic
TINDEXA equation as follows:
{[(NUMBERMSLS) (MSLRANGE) + TRACK] + [MANEUVER + GUNS]) X
CRADIUS
This equation, which included both long-range and short-range kill capability, was used
to derive raw scores for all the other air-to-air fighters (air superiority) in the data base.
These scores were indexed according to the first MIG-15 FAGOT, as shown in Table
VIII (next page).
97
Because most aircraft are able to function in a capacity outside of their primary
mission (however, poorly), ground attack aircraft have some small air-to-air capability.
As a result, TINDEXA scores were derived for all Soviet fighters in the data base, in
order to develop average TINDEXA values for each time period under consideration.
Figure 36 presents the postwar evolution of TINDEXA values, while Table IX shows
the average TINDEXA for each time period (page 100). These figures suggest that
while there were improvements in air combat capability in all periods, the greatest
increase came in period four and the smallest came in period three.
t- " "EX.
O F .. .. ... .
2- . . . m t | . . .. . . . . . .. . . .. . .. .. .. . . m : s
Figure 36. "Evolution of TINDEXA
TABLE IX.
AVERAGE TINDEXA VALUES
1945-1953 1954-1964 1964-1973 1973-1985
1.89 4.16 5.15 21.8099
p 99
The second dimension of Soviet fighter capability is the ground attack mission,
the most important indicators of which were shown to be ordnance-carrying capability
(ORDNANCE) and number of weapons pylons (STATIONS). The latter is an
important addition to ORDNANCE because it represents the flexibility with which
various types of targets can be attacked, as well as the potential number of targets that
can be attacked. Also, because precision-guided munitions (PGM's) are so much more
accurate than "conventional" munitions, PGM-capable aircraft include a constant that
doubles the ORDNANCE contribution to their raw score. This considerably
understates the improvement force planners can expect when calculating damage done
by PGM's compared to older "dumb" bombs, so there is no threat of the raw scores or
the subsequent index values overstating the improvement in ground attack capability in
recent years. In additiion, sea-level maximum airspeed (MACHSL) and combat radius
(CRADIUS) were included to help describe the ground attack aircraft's survivability
and depth of operation, respectively. The ground attack equations were as follows:
if not PGM-capable:
[(ORDNANCEX.0l) + STATIONS] (MACHSLXCRADIUS) = RAW SCORE
if PGM-capable:
[(ORDNANCEX.02) + STATIONS] (MACHSL)(CRADIUS) = RAW SCORE
Ground attack technological index values (TINDEXG) were derived in the same way
as TINDEXA values, except that the baseline aircraft was the SU-7 FITTER A. Table
X (page 101) presents these TINDEXG values.
As with the TINDEXA values, TINDEXG values were also calculated for the
air-to-air fighters. Figure 37 and Table XI show the evolution of TINDEXG and both
TINDEX averages in each time period (page 102). They show that the largest increase
F in ground attack capability came in Period III, during which time air combat capabilityincreased at its slowest rate. These values confirm that Period III can be characterized
as a "ground attack period," while Period IV can be characterized as an "air combat
period." The first Period, during which the MIG OKB was the sole designer of fighter
aircraft included in this study, was characterized by designs which flew faster and
higher than their predecessors--primarily air defense fighters poorly uited to the groundattack role. The second period's TINDEX values show continued improvement in air
combat capability, while the tenfold increase in TINDEXG reflects SUKHOI's reentry
into the design community, notably with the SU-7 FITTER ground attack series.
100
TABLE X
TINDEXG VALUES FOR GROUND ATTACK FIGHTERS
AIRCRAFT TINDEXG
SU-7 FITTER A 1.00SU-7 FITTER B 2.00SU-7 FITTER 2.00SU-17 FITTER C 4.20SU-17 FITTER D 8.42SU-17 FITTER H 9.54SU-17 FITTER K 9.54SU-24 FENCER A 54.57SU-24 FENCER B 54.57SU-24 FENCER C 54.57SU-24 FENCER D 54.57SU-25 FROGFOOT 4.55MIG-27 FLOGGER D 8.72MIG-27 FLOGGER J 8.72
SUKHOI'sreentry into the design community, notably with the SU-7 FITTER ground
attack series.
An aircraft's depth of operation is captured in this study by combat radius
(CRADIUS), which measures the maximum distance from the aircraft's home base at
which it can carry out its combat mission and return to the base from which it took
off. This relationship of the locus of combat to the locus of basing is an important
measure of aircraft capability, but it says nothing about the type of mission the aircraft
is supposed to accomplish. A better indicator of the latter is the relationship of
combat radius to the depth of responsibility corresponding to the command echelon
that controls the aircraft. Thus, a ratio of unity means that the aircraft is capable of
operating at a distance that exactly corresponds tot eh controlling echelon's maximum
depth of responsibility. If this variable (DEPTHRATIO) is less than one, the aircraft
will constantly be under the control of the owning command. When the
DEPTHRATIO is greater than one, the aircraft will either "chop" to a higher echelon
of command (which would have a correspondingly greater depth of responsibility) or
101
7" 2W• . 1
T 4T.
.... . . .. 1
Figure 37. Evolution of TINDEXG
TABLE XIDISAGGREGATED TINDEX VALUES
194I5-1953 1954-19643 1964-1973 1973-1985
GA .18 1.16 9.89 16.66AA 1.89 4.16 5.15 21.80
exercise a degree of autonomy, and possibly initiative, greater than that of aircraftoperating within their command's depth of responsibility. Once DEPTI I RATIO valuesare established for each aircraft it is possible to average the scores for each period andto characterize each period accordingly (sec Table XIII, page 104).
102
TABLE XII
DEPTHRATIO-MISSION RELATIONSHIPS
Depthratio Air Combat Ground AttackAir Defense Air Superiority
Poaint AirDefense
Perimeter
I AirDefense
1. 0)0 FEBACiose Atir
Long-Range Support1.31 Air Defdnse
and Battlefield 4rouna AttacxAnti- Air and
Standoff Superiority BattlefieldPlatform AirMissions Interdiction1.87
interdiction
2.30__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
OffensiveCounter Air Deep StriKeand Escort
The orientation of the DEPTHRATIO scale above makes clear that certain
missions must coincide with others if they are to be effective. For example, effective
close air support missions require correspondingly effective action in the battlefield air
superiority role. Similarly, effective offensive counterair (OCA) strikes in the absence
of ground support missions run the risk of rendering the "air war" irrelevant to the
outcome of the larger combined-arms battle. The most effective force development
demands a good mix of air combat and ground attack capabilities.
103
%
TABLE XIIIDISAGREGGATED AVERAGE DEPTHRATIO VALUES BY PERIOD
1945-1953 1954- 1964 1964- 1973 1973-1985
AA .40 .54 1.23 1.71GA --- 1.25 2.36 2.24
Seen in this light, Soviet fighter development has exhibited periods of growth inone or another dimension of this idealized force mix. The larger of the two
DEPTHRATIO values in each time period dictate the maximum depth of operationthe fighter force can undertake. The greater the disparity between the two values, thegreater the imbalance in the fighter force and its doctrinal orientation. For example, in
Period II, the ground attack component of the fighter force was able to undertakeclose air support missions, but the air combat component was capable only of shallowair defense missions. This would have left the ground attack missions without
protective top cover. Although air combat capability improved in each of the
following period, it still did not keep up with the improvements in the ground attackcomponent.
In Period IV, the reorganization of the Soviet air forces slightly reduced theDEPTHRATIO values for the ground attack component by resubordinating someaircraft to higher command echelons (this has the effect of increasing the size of the
DEPTHRATIO denominator). In addition, the air combat DEPTHRATIO valuescontinued to increase, reducing still further the indicator of force imbalance. As thistrend continues, the Soviet fighter force will theoretically be increasingly capable,technically, of carrying out effective mission (both air superiority and ground attack)well beyond the FEBA.
Figure 38 (page 106). graphically illustrates the sharp disparity between Sovietdoctrinal requirments throughout the postwar period and the ability of the Sovietfighter force to carry out such missions. The X- and Y-axes present ground attack andair combat DEPTHRATIO values, respectively. The four curves correspond to thedoctrinal orientation of each of the four periods. They depict the requirement of
104
'NI-
values for the particular period. The straight lines depict actual fighter force capability
at the time (determined by the average AA and GA DEPTHRATIO values in that time
period). Perfect convergence between doctrine and capability would showv up as an arc
(doctrine), whose ends are connected by a straight line (capability). Deficiencies in
capability (relative to doctrinal requirements) are shown as gaps between the arc's er.&
and the capability line (and highlighted by brackets).
The first postwar period was one of Stalinist domination. The prevailing doctrine
of the period echoed Soviet World War II experience. In terms of air employment
doctrine, the Soviet said they intended to use air assets in a ground attack role. There
were envisioned no air actions independent of the ground forces' operations.
Technological development of the period, however, was not oriented toward ground
A attack aircraft. In fact, the increasing wing sweep, lower aspect ratios and thinnerairfoil sections of Soviet fighters under development at the time were intended toprovide aircraft that flew higher and faster than their predecessors. They were clearly
optimized for the air defense role and had virtually no ability to execute ground attack
missions.
In the second period, after its reestablishment, one of SUKHOI's first designswas the SLI-7 FITTER ground attack fighter. This aircraft remedied the serious
ground attack deficiency in Period 1. In fact, ground attack capability improved so
much that an imbalance was created in the air combat dimension. Specifically, theSoviets were now able to carry out ground attack missions at the FEBA, transformning
the Soviet fighter force from one oriented toward point air defense into one oriented
ostensibly toward offensive operations. But now there was a deficiency in the air
combat role, which was still restricted to air defense.
In Period III both air combat and ground attack capabilities improved. For the
first time, Soviet air combat capability moved out beyond the FEBA and into the
battlefield air superiority arena. Actual air combat capability, however, was just
slightly greater than would have been necessary to meet the doctrinal requirments of
the earlier period. Again, SUKHOI ground attack aircraft (SU-17 FITTER and SU-24FENC ER) "drove" the doctrinal requirements out still further, both reflecting and
ramifying the development in the 1960's of the Soviets' theater nuclear offensive
concept, which married traditional Soviet combined-arms doctrine with the realities of
the modern nuclear battlefield. Since ground attack aircraft were now capable of
interdiction and deep strike missions (while air combat fighters were still restricted to
1' 105
-NC11t
C P
41P
o iU DEEP STRIKEo0 ii
*00
* 0 P40
mI 0
ii 40
IRAIREAI
/ A zSUPPORT0/
., 0,
-i /
UA 0 1 0
n2 U
1- 030 0 t
1106
the battlefield air superiority role), Period III was' characterized by an imbalanced
force, deficient in air combat capability.
The most recent period has seen a slight movement downward of doctrinal
requirments at the same time as the fighter force has seen an increase in air combat
capability. This simultaneous convergent movement has reduced the disparity between
doctrinal requirements and fighter force capability to its lowest point in the postwar
period.' 7 9
The slight movement downward of doctrinal requirements was not, strictly
speaking, a reduction in Soviet visions for the scope and depth of air combat in a
future war. It reflects the reorganization of the Soviet air forces and the design of new
aircraft that "fill in" gaps left in the wake of the very rapid postwar growth in ground
attack capability.
The reorganization of the Soviet air forces resubordinated, among others, some
of the aircraft with the greatest DEPTHRATIO values (the SU-24 FENCER) up to a
command echelon with a greater depth of responsibility than the command echelon at
which they had previously been controlled. This had the effect of reducing the
DEPTHRATIO values for that aircraft, which explains part of the downward
movement. The other explanation lies in SUKHOI's design of the SU-25 FROGFOOTclose air support fighter. This aircraft is designed to operate at very shallow depths (nodeeper than the FEBA) in dedicated support to the front-level ground forces. Since its
DEPTHRATIO value is unity, the average ground attack DEPTHRATIO for Period
I w %vas expected to decrease.
The most interesting elrment, however, of the fourth period's doctrine-technology
relationship is the increase in air combat technological sophistication, a large part of
which is due to the design of the SU-27 FLANKER. The SU-27, with a high
thrust-to-weight ratio, low wingloading, wing-body blending (for good
high-angle-of-attack performance), large internal volume (for good combat radius), aswell as a new advanced radar and AAM's, should confer on Soviet force planners and
pilots a much greater potential for effective air combat than they have had in the past.The FLANKER's DEPTHRATIO of 2.33 makes it a natural choice for escorting the
SU-24 FENCER in interdiction and deep strike missions. In fact, no other air combat
fighter is capable of performing this role. Thus, the SUKHIOI OKB has provided
179 Period I. which DEPTHRATIO values of .40 and 0.0, must be considered tohave had an infinite deficiency, although the difference is less than that for Period IV.
107
I -,- . r +,,." ". s'-, ,",. -" .. ,s"." ". " " " " . " " . .'" .,'' '_ 2" :. 'i' .
Soviet force planners with both the ground attack and air combat aircraft needed for
the deep strikes and offensive counterair missions, of a theater-wide strategic
conventional operation, as well as the capability to execute the earlier theater nuclear
offensive.
.o
I,1
.10
V. .,"€- ; - --% X ,*- -', .... ".-."" .". ,.-.% .-.--.. :,.. -- ,'. '-'-v ..-. .-. . -, .--...
VI. TECHNOLOGY AND DOCTRINE IN PERSPECTIVE
(A MIG on your tail is better than no MIG at all)
The analysis thus far has attempted to compare the most easily-observed
characteristics and performance figures for postwar Soviet fighters with the apparent
employment concept prevalent at the time of each fighter's design. The evolution of
these two phenomena can be depicted in tabular form, as shown in Table XIV.
TABLE XIV
EVOLUTION OF SOVIET FIGHTER DESIGNAND AIR EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
FIGHTER DESIN AIR EMPLOYMENT DOCTRINE
1945-1953 air defense ground attack
1954-1964 continued air defense, air defensebeginning interest inground attack, reccet,abivalence in designrtfelected in VGW
1964-1973 ground attack theater nuclear offensive,ground attack, recce, role
of tactical air uncertain
! 1973-1985 air combat theater conventional offensive
4This figure simply captures in brief form what has already been argued in detail;
that Soviet fighter design has not only progressed largely independently of doctrinal
requirements, but in fact appears to have driven the development of tactical air
employment doctrine over the past forty years. Each period has been marked by a
divergence between force structure and doctrine. Doctrine has changed over the years
in order to incorporate the most advanced technical capability, without apparent
consideration given to the need for balance in the fighter force mix and its convergence
with employment doctrine. Figure 38 (page 106) depicts the direction and magnitude
109
of various correctives, but thus far, the Soviets ultimately appear to be at the mercy of
technological innovation; their doctrine must continually react to it in order to
incorporate it, and later, the resulting force imbalance and capability-doctrine
divergence must be addressed.
This state of affairs, however, is an unfortunate one for threat assessment. It
represents a sort of good news/bad news situation: the good news for the West is that
Soviet technological development puts the cart before the horse and results in a
confused capability-doctrine relationship that could prove disastrous to the USSR in
time of war; the bad news is that periodically the Soviets correct the situation (only to
be faced again with the same cycle of events). .Where, then, does that leave us? What
other variables must be "factored in" to the problem? What will add to the context
within which Western analysts must consider the Soviet air threat? These questions
are dealt with in this final section.
A. GROUND ATTACK
The challenges faced by the Soviets in the ground attack arena are in many ways
the same problems any air force would face (i.e., the "reconnaissance-target
engagement cycle is the same); in other ways, the Soviets have some unique problems
posed by the nature of their doctrinal requirements and the stultifying effects of their
political culture.
An air force seeking to deliver firepower beyond the FEBA faces a considerably
more complex task than simply arming a "ground-pounder" and launching it on its
way. A very large number of functions must be performed in the course of the
reconnaissance-target engagement cycle, no less for the Soviets than for anybody else.
In addition, the precise nature of these functions will change slightly depending upon
the depth of the proposed mission. For example, a deep strike may require escort or
aerial refueling, while a close air support mission may require real-time coordination
with friendly air defense units and deconfliction with friendly artillery and air assets in
the immediate vicinity of the proposed attack. Figure 39 (next page) depicts the wide
range of components possible in a modem ground attack mission.
Because not everything in combat can be predicted and preplanned, provision
must be made for ascertaining the "true state of the battlefield" at any given time. This
information is typically provided by reconnaissance and intelligence assets to the
commander, who in turn generates commands to pursue certain objectives at the
110
-VNI I % %
expense Or others. This cybernetic control Process is at the heart o hreconnaissance-target engagement cycle.oftl
GROUND TARGET ACQUISITION
AIRBORNE WRNING SANDOFFAND CONTROL JMNESFIGnTER
GROUt ) ESCORt JAMMER
%' ~- EFENSE SUPPRESSIONFLIGHTS
' ~-
14A.DEFENSE
4 CONTROL CENTERS & PARTIES
(Boudrenu J.Dich fililary Pwer and MheAdneofTcnogj
Figure 39. Components of a Modern (;round Attack Mission
Reconnaissance of potential targets can come from many sources, includingground patrols and a wide range of reconnaissance (recce) platforms (e.g., dedicated
reconnaissance aircraft, other friendly air missions in the area, satellites, etc.). Thisreconnaissance information must be collected, processed (film developed, tapes read,
pilots debriefed, etc.), and sent to the central tactical air controlling agency, where it
must be combined with reports coming from other sectors of the front. At some point,the number of targets being nominated for attack will exceed the capacity of the system
and a process of elimination should organize the remaining targets by priority. This
determination typically involves such factors as the importance of a target in depth or
the time-urgency of an engaged target on the active battlefield.
Once the commander has coordinated all his incoming information and
determined his priorities, he can generate the tasking orders (commands) that set the
target-engagement phase in motion. The tasking order must take into account, in
addition to reconnaissanece/intelligence data, the state and availability of friendly
forces (number of aircraft and crews available, fuel and munitions stocks, support
assets needed and available, attrition rates, etc.). When the tasking order arrives at theoperational unit (for the SAF, this would be a fighter-bomber or bomber regiment), theactual mission-planning can begin. It is possible that a "heads-up" warning mightcome down to the regiment earlier, when it becomes obvious to the centralized tactical
air controlling agency that certain missions are highly probable. In this way, the "nutsand bolts" of mission-planning can begin, even in the absence of known strike package
sizes, support aircraft authorizations, and time-on-target requirements. This entireprocess, including the strike itself and the subsequent battle damage assessment, is
uften designed into a 24-hour cycle.Obviously, in the case of mobile targets, the reconnaissance-target engagement
cycle must be so compressed that the target does not move very far from the locationof its original sighting before it is attacked. This compression requires that certain
targets receive "special handling" in the reporting process and that less senior
commanders be given enough discretion and lattitude to depart from the original planand attack fleeting "targets of opportunity." While these are universal charactcristics
of the reconnaissance-target engagement cycle, they are precisely the sorts of things the
Soviets may be poor at doing.
The Soviets' bureaucracy-burdened society (including the military) is ill-equipped
to handle departures from the expected and the planned. Soviet command and control
112
"p.-
-'. ."9 '"'.?'' ."'.?. . ,. ... ?.v ,. - .. ., .. . . . . . ,, , , %*,g
procedures, including attack planning, is quite rigid and has in the past allowed very
little flexibility. Its highly-specific preplanning, highly-centralized decision-making, and
high penalties for unauthorized deviations make very unlikely the effective and efficient
prosecution of a war as complex as is likely to be encountered in the NATO Central
region.180
Quoting Soviet Lieutenant Colonel A. Zakharenko, Joshua Epstein cites Soviet
combined air-ground efforts, in which
"the results of air strikes against the enemy were of no consequence to the
gunners. Their rounds often struck the same areas that had iust previously beenworked from the air." Tellingly, they add, 'the duplication did not stem fromh anydesire to achieve the maximum possible suppression of the 'enemy,' but froriuncoordinated decisions . ... Was this fire required? With what 4psity? It'sdifficult to say. We had no bomb damage assessment data available.
Epstein also notes "inefficiencies within the Soviets' system of processing and
distributing reconnaissance information."182 He argues that "staff skills have failed to
keep up with the increased tempo of modern combat."183 Again citing Lt. Col.
Zakharenko, Epstein notes that
ground force "combined arms commanders don't have an in-depth knowled e ofaviation subunits and, in turn, aviators fn only judge the development o theground battle in the most general terms. "
Thus, the necessary coordination between Soviet air and ground components may be
sorely lacking.These problems may be magnified with the adoption of the OMG and its concept
of employment. The OMG, to be effective, must engage in imaginative raiding and
must have a wide lattitude for its maneuver. As we have seen, however, the Soviets do
not typically raise a good crop of daring and imaginative commanders in peacetime.
To make matters worse for the Soviets, the OMG should operate in an area of
18°Strengthening Conventional Deterrence, p. 48.
181Joshua M. Epstein. Measuring Military Power: The Soviet Air Threat to Europe(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984),p. 114. Citing Lt. Col. A. Zakharenko,The Lessons of Coordination," Krasnaya Zvezda, 5 August 1977, p. 1.
182 Epstein, Measuring Military Power, p. 117.183Epstein, Measuring Military Power, p. 118.184Epstein, Measuring Military Power, p. 120.
113
-- eF' , . . . . , - , . .•, . ._, "- .. - - . . . , ._-', ,.''',"''''""''' .. ' ' ' '''''''L''''' '''
undisputed air superiority. It may be able to do this only if it operates within the
corridors opened up by the Air Operation.185 This, however, would make the OMG
easy to find, less maneuverable, and quite predictable.
As far as the Air Operation itself is concerned, it is by no means certain to be a
success. The Warsaw Pact offensive in general, and the Air Operation in particular, is
supposed to be a hightly-integrated, minutely-synchronized series of events "dependent
upon a constant flow at a predetermined rate."18 6 The Air Operation requires extreme
preplanning of launch and recovery times, ingress and egress routes, altitude and time
blocks, coordinated air defense and escort operations, and synchronized
times-on-target. 187 If anything goes wrong or -happens unexpectedly, the Soviets may
not be sufficiently able to improvise. Marxist-Leninist "insights" and scientific
planning notwithstanding, von Clausewitz' "fog" and "friction of war" make combat
unpredictable.
B. AIR COMBAT
In the air combat arena, the Soviets have shown themselves in the past to be
lacking in initiative and creativity. In fact, lack of initiative is a real problem in the
SAF, in which peacetime training is typcially routinized and unrealistic. 188 General
Lieutenant of Aviation G. Pavlov complains that "the pilots imitating the target fly
only in a straight line, without changing altitude or speed."189
"Soviet operational practices are surprisingly 'pro forma' with little continuingeffort to enhance their skills under realistic conditions. Manv of their 'sortiesappear to be rather canned 'once around the flagpole and back.' In qhart, theyappear to maintain their flying skills, but not their combat proficiency."
18 5"Resouce limitations may well dictate that the corridor or air superiority
established for the conduct of the air operation must be coordinated with the air-covercorridors created to protect the OMG 's." Strengthening Conventional Deterrence, p.132.
186Strenthening Conventional Deterrence, p. 62.187Jeffrey S. Johnson, Initiative in Soviet Air Force Tactics and Decision Making,
(Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, June 1986), p. 109.188Johnson, Initiative, p. 97.189Epstein Measuring Military Power, p. 100, citing General Lieutenant of
Aviation G. Pavlov, "Inexhaustible Reserve," Krasnaya Zvezda, 4 August 1976, p. 2.190 Epstein, Measuring Military Power, p. 101, citing Edward T. Timperlake and
Steven Leveen, A Methodology for Estimating Comparative Aircrew Proficiency," areport prepared or the Theater'Forces Division, Office of Strategic Research, CehtralIntelligence Agency (Arlington: The Analytic Sciences Corporation, 1981), pp. 7-25.
114
V-NP
Epstein goes on to quote the Directorate of Soviet Affairs, Air Forice Intelligence
Service, as saying: "Pilots fly the same patterns over the same ranges year after year
and then perform poorly when conditions are varied ever so slightly."' 91 This lack of
initiative, hitherto characteristic of Soviet fighter pilots, is in "consonance with
well-known Soviet operational practice," in which "the Soviets place heavy stress on
the importance of GCI directives in shaping the contours of the [air] engagement."19 2
Benjamin Lambeth points out that
for -,ears, going as far back as World War 11 the Soviet Air Force has resistedhe iea of allowing Jts pilots much independence and has instead, 9qressed the
importance of maintaining close control over its fighters at all times.
Because the Soviets "routinely export their operational style along with their
arms transfers to client states," it is reasonable to look for clues to Soviet performance
in that of the Chinese (in the Korean War), the North Vietnamese, and the Syrians.194
In Korea, Chinese- and Soviet-flown MIG's typically had a thrust-to-weight ratio
advantage over the US F-86 Sabres; by maintaining maximum speed, the MIG pilots
retained their energy advantage and were able to fly with near impunity in the vertical
plane. In Vietnam, several "extenuating circumstances" led to multi-turn dogfights,
despite the seemingly large technological lead of the US F-4 Phantom over enemy
fighters.195
191Measuring Military Power, p. 102, citing Directorate of Soviet Affairs, AirForce Intelligence Service, 'Soviet Press Selected Translations, April 1977, p. 86.
192Benjamin S. Lambeth, "Moscow's Lessons from the 1982 Lebanon Air War,"a Project Air Force Report prepared for the United States Air Force (Santa Monica:Rand, 1984), p. 1.
,19Lambeth, "Moscow's Lessons," p. 20.194Lambeth, "Moscow's Lessons," p. 29.
195"During the early years of the Vietnam conflict the low-wing-loaded, low-T/W[thrust-to-weigh,] MIG7 FRESCO opposed the US F-4 Phantom. With nearly aten-year technologv advantage, a powerful air-to-air radar, semi-active radar-guidedSparrow missiles Q [rear.quarter] head-seeking Sidewinders, and supersonic speedcapability, the fhantom migit have been considered more than a match for thesubsonic guns-onlv MIG-1T. Several extenuating circumstances however, greatlyaltered the balanc6. The long-range, all-aspect Sparrow missile, tor instance. oftehcould not be used, since it was usually impossible to identify the target .as hostileexcept visually at close range. By that time the MIG-17 was probaboiv inside theweapon s minimum-range capabilifies and tended to remain there during subsequentmaneuvering. Since t his missile was not 'dogfight capable,' and tHe Phantomsgenerally lacked gun armament, only the RQ Si evinder remained viable against themore maneuveragle MIG. Even so, energy tactics should have allowed the F-4 toescape or to remain neutrally engaged until the MIG pilot lost sight or had to retire.Unfortunately for the Amencans, the Phantom crews often were poorly trained in
115
In more recent year, however, Syrian performance against the Israeli Air Force
(IAF) and the attendent Soviet analysis of those engagemen's may provide some
important clues as to the current state of Soviet air combat skills and preferences.
During the June 1982 air battles over Lebanon, the IAF jammed voice- and data-links
between Syrian aircraft and their GCI sites. 196 This caused the Syrians to lose "an%'
semblance of air discipline and [the Syrians] quickly became split up into isolated pairs
and singles." 197 Lambeth goes on to say that "the Soviet Air Force currently operates
under a similar close-control doctrine and would be comparably vulnerable to enemy
jamming interference."1 98 As we have seen, however, the Soviets are now receiving
"equipment that would allow it, in principle, to go well beyond that restrictive
operating doctrine. 1 99 Lambeth's analysis of the Soviets' lessons from the 1982 air
engagements suggests that while the Soviets may "have this problem increasingly in
mind," they nevertheless drew some fundamentally wrong conclusions from the combat,
particularly regarding the true threat from all-aspect missiles and the subsequent
requirements for their employment. These interpretations, Lambeth concludes, offer"ground for guarded encouragement among American fighter pilots."200
C. TOWARD THE YEAR 2000
The technologies incorporated into the Soviets' new SU-27 FLANKER and
MIG-29 FULCRUM seem optimized not solely for the high-altitude, high-speed, BVR,"single-pass shot" type of engagement, but also for the best possible performance in the
primary maneuver region (less than Mach 1.0 and 10,000-30,000 foot altitudes). 20 1 This
energy .techniques were faced with a much smaller enemy aircraft that was hard to
tracK visually, and sometimes lacked the combat endurance for extended engagementsfar from their bases. These circumstances often led to hard-turning engagements. tothe advantage of the MIG's. The MIG's also were generally blessed wNith better
round-based radar control and could spot and identify the Phantoms at longdis.rances because the F-4 engines smoked badlv. Therefore, the MIG's often reacheda finng osition, or at least gained substantial advantage, before being detected."Robet . Shaw Fighter Combat: Tactics and Maneuvering (Annapolis: NavalInstitute Press, 10$5), p. 175.
S 196Lambeth, "Moscow's Lessons," p. 6.197 Lambeth, "Moscow's Lessons," p. 9.198Lambeth, "Moscow's Lessons," p. 21.199 Lambeth, "Moscow's Lessons," p. 20.20 0Lambeth, "Moscow's Lessons," p. 27.201 In practice, high-Mach speeds are not very useful in combat. They use up
fuel at enormious rates and severely restrict maneuverability. At high altitudes as well,turning performance is limited.
116
may reflect increasing Soviet interest in close maneuver combat.20 2 If this trend is as
strong as its proponents insist, it would represent a sharp departure from the recent
past, in which Soviet fighter pilots have typically been GCI-bound and notably lacking
in initiative. However, the new technologies incorporated into recent designs certainly
seem compatible with greater pilot autonomy in at least two respects. First, if the new
fighters (SU-27 FLANKER and MIG-29 FULCRUM) are indeed intended for
"intruder'-type missions beyond the FEBA, they will be operating outside of GCI
range. The pilots of these aircraft will then have no choice but to exercise a degree of
independent thinking not previously seen in the postwar Soviet Air Force. Second, the
close combat maneuvering that these aircraft make possible may also place unremitting
demands on pilot creativity and initiative. Finally, the history of Korea and Vietnam
suggest that the Soviets are not incapable of maneuvering air combat.
General Lieutenant N. N. Ostroumov has written that in front-controlled
aviation, preference will be given to aerial engagements with enemy aircraft, while in
theater-controlled operations, preference will be given to attacking enemy aircraft on
their own airfields. 203 This distinction suggests that the long-range kill might be sought
in the course of escorting the air operation, perhaps in order to limit the disruption to
the planned execution of that effort. Maneuvering engagements might be more likely
to take place after frontal aircraft had been released back to the subordinate commands
from which they had originally been requisitioned. This interpretation is supported by
Jeffrey Johnson's argument that the Air Operation (ground attack) commanders have
historically "stifled" the initiative that air superiority fighter pilots would like to
develop.204
It has been argued in any event, that if both sides are increasingly equipped with
long-range all-aspect missiles, then it is possible that air combat will not progress
beyond the initial head-on pass. A better explanation for incorporating both long- and
202"Close maneuver combat . . . has been recognized by the Soviets andincreasing emphasis on independent tactics and pilot initiative is evident in recentSoviet aviation publications. Rana Pennington "Pilot Initiative in the Soviet AirForces," Murphy, The Soviet Air Forces p. .2. 'The 1985 issue of the DOD's SovietMilitary Power, sa s that "since 1980 tundamental changes have occurred in Sovietfighter tactics and training., The introduction of an air-to-air combat training progr.am,incorp1orating air combat in a visual environment against maneuvering targets, is asignificant step forward" (pp. 86-87).
203General Lieutenant of Aviation N. N. Ostroumov, cited in Phillip A. Petersenand Maior John R. Clark, "Soviet Air and Antiair Operations," Air University Review.March-April 1985, Vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 36-54.
204 Johnson, Initiative, p. It.
117
. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. " " " '... . . ." " "" " '
close-range kill mechanisms into modem Soviet fighters may simply lie in the expectednature of a future war and the nature of tactical engagements. In the electromagnetic
environment likely to be encountered in the NATO Central Region, many of the* long-range systems on air combat fighters simply will not work. Second, even
off-boresight, all-aspect weapons have optimum launch envelopes. Thus, the aerialengagement that otherwise might have evolved into a BVR 'face shot" or a long-range,
off-boresight kill, may come to involve maneuvering into a shorter-range kill envelopeand "'degenerating" into a classical "dogfight." This appears to be a scenario the
Soviets may be anticipating. In the past, NATO has typically had an advantage overthe Soviet Air Force in maneuvering in the vertical plane and fighting at higheraltitudes, where Soviet fighters could not mainatin their maneuver energy. However,the Soviets have maneuvered in the past and appear increasingly interested in
challenging the current NATO superiority in that arena. They will attempt to do this
with new weapons, new tactics and new force employment concepts.If the Soviets are able to overcome the institutional drag that has thus far
plagued their society and military, as well as fix the apparent shortcomings in their
reconnaissance-target engagement cycle; if they are able to flawlessly execute the AirOperation, establishing their air superiority over NATO and eliminating NATO'snuclear arsenal at the very outset of a war; if they are able to make the OperationalManeuver Group concept and the new command and control arrangements work; and,last but not least, if Soviet fighter pilots are able to ride a very steep learning curve inthe first day or two of a European war and survive, then the Soviets may indeed winthe next war very quickly, without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons. Until then,however, even with new weapons and advanced technology, Soviet tactical air
A superiority is as much an illusion as Icarus' unthinking disregard for the circumstancesand context surrounding his own disastrous flight.
118
APPENDIX A
THE DATA BASE
The data base is described in the following manner: each entry contains the
name of a variable and what that variable measures or describes. In addition, some
entries contain further comments (type of data, ground rules, numerical derivations,definitions, etc.).
AIRADAR: air intercept radar (I = yes, 0= no);
AIRSRCHAZ: air intercept radar search azimuth;
ARM: antiradiation missile (I = yes, 0= no);
ASM: air-to-surface missile (I= yes, 0=no);
ASPECT: wing aspect ratio (wingspan squared divided by wing area);
CALIBER: caliber of largest gun;
CEILING: combat ceiling;
CHORD: wing thickness to chord ratio;
CLIMBRA TE: aircraft rate of climb;
CRADIUS: combat radius (for air combat, subsonic area intercept; for ground attack,
HI-LO-HI and 50% ordnance)
DESIGNYEAR: year of aircraft design;
DIGDATALINK: digital data link (1 = yes, 0= no);
DOPPNA V. doppler navigation (1 = yes, 0 = no);
ECHELON: depth of responsibility of command echelon to which aircraft is assigned(front= 160nm, ADD= 608nm, theater= 270nm)
ECM: electronic countermeasures (1 = yes, 0 =no)
EMPTYfWGT: aircraft empty weight;
119
%e% vii0a~p ~~.~.~' '
ENDURE endurance (time aircraft can remain aloft in combat configuration);
ENGINES: number of engines;
ENGINETYPE: type of engines (engine make and model number);
EXFUEL: external fuel capacity;
FIRSTFLT: year of aircraft's first flight;
FUELFRAC: fuel fraction (fraction of maximum weight taken up by full fuel load);
GARADAR: ground attack radar (1 =yes, 0=no);
GLIMIT: aircraft G-limit;
GROUNDRUN: takeoff ground run (distance in feet aircraft in combat configurationrequires for takeoff)
GUNS: number of guns on aircraft;
HUD: head-up-display (1 = yes, 0 =no);
INFUEL: internal fuel capacity;
INNA V: inertial navigation (1 = yes, 0 no);
IOC: initial operational capability (year of IOC);
IRSTS: infrared search and track system (I = yes, 0- no);
LASDES: laser designator (1= yes, 0= no);
LASRANGE: laser ranging device (1 =yes, 0= no);
LDSD: lookdown/shootdown capability (I =yes, O= no);
LED: lift-enhancing devices (I = yes, 0 = no);
MACHSL: maximum sea-level airspeed (MACH);
MANEUVER: maneuverability [ratio of TWRATIO to combat wingloading (combat
weight divided by wing area)]
MAXPOWER: maximum engine thrust;
120
WT
MILPOWER: maximum non-afterburning engine thrust;
MSLRANGE: maximum air-to-air missile (AAM) range (for radar-guided AAM's,
high-altitude, head-on, fighter-size target; for infrared-guided AAM's, look-up,
tail-aspect, fighter-size target)
NUMBERMSLS: maximum number of AAM's;
OKBCODE: design bureau code (1=MIG, 2=SUKHOI);
ORDNANCE: maximum weight of ground attack ordnance, or air-to-air weapons.
whichever is greater
PERIOD: period of aircraft's design (1= 1945-1953, 2= 1954-1964, 3= i964-1973,
4 = 1973-1985)
RECCE: reconnaissance capability (photographic, SLAR, infrared, electronic;
I = yes, 0 = no)
R WR: radar warning receiver (1 = yes, 0 = no);
SEARCH: air intercept radar search range;
SPANLOAD: spanloading (combat weight divided by wingspan);
STALLSPD: aircraft stall speed;
STATIONS: number of weapons pylons on aircraft;
TERRA VOID: terrain avoidance radar (1 = yes, 0 = no);
TERRFOLL: terrain following radar (I = yes, 0= no);
TOTALFUEL: total fuel capacity;
TRACK: air intercept radar track range;
TRACKSCN: track-while-scan radar (1= yes, 0 =no);
TWRA TIO: thrust-to-weight ratio [maximum afterburning thrust divided by combat
weight (50% fuel, 100% weapons)]
VGIW: variable-geometry wing (1 =yes, 0= no);
121
9W'
WINGLOAD: wingloading (combat weight dividedby wing area);
WINGS WEEP: wingsweep (sweep of wing leading edge).
122
.1 .. .. 'j . . -; .. : .: ;....?::.:.:? ;:. ,; - :: ;-: ;;i.: :: :-:
The aircraft that comprised the data base were the following:
MIG-15 FAGOT (A), MIG-15 FAGOT(B)
MIG-I7 FRESCO A, MIG-17 FRESCO B, MIG-17 FRESCO C,
MIG-17 FRESCO D, MIG-17 FRESCO E
'MIG-19 FARMER A, MIG-19 FARMER B, MIG-19 FARMER C,MIG-19 FARMER D, MIG-19 FARMER E
MIG-21 FISHBED A, MIG-21F FISHBED C, MIG-21PF FISHBED D,MIG-21PFM FISHBED F, MIG-21R FISHBED H, MIG-21MF FISHBED J,
MIG-21SMT FISHBED K, MIG-2lbis FISHBED L, MIG-2lbisF FISHBED N
MIG-23 FLOGGER A, MIG-23M FLOGGER B, MIG-23MF FLOGGER G
MIG-27BM FLOGGER D, MIG-27BN FLOGGER J
MIG-25 FOXBAT A, MIG-25R FOXBAT B,'D, MIG-25M FOXBAT E
MIG-29 FULCRUM
MIG-31 FOXHOUND
SU-7B3 FITTER A, SU-7BM FITTER B, SU-7BKL FITTER B
SU-9 FISHPOT B
SU-11 FISHPOT C
SU-15 FLAGON A, SU-15 FLAGON D, SU-15 FLAGON E, SU-15 FLAGON F
SU-17 FITTER C, SU-17 FITTER D, SU-17 FITERR H, SU-17 FITTER K
- SU-24 FENCER A, SU-24 FENCER B, SU-24 FENCER C, SU-24 FENCER D
SU-25 FROGFOOT
SU-27 FLANKER
* 123
fl ,t. ,. p : ir &U . Lr : Lr(L: S . .U S-t - LE. , L,. r. %S W..S run- . L. iV 5 SEL .-t LE * -. .LU .- U . U.t :-f... ,
APPENDIX B
SAMPLE METHODOLOGY
The following weights were assigned to ECHELON values:
MIG-23 FLOGGER A/B/G:
6% theater
76% front
18% air defense district
MIG-25 FOXBAT A/E:
30% front
70% air defense district
MIG-25R FOXBAT B/D:
12% theater
88% front
MIG-29 FULCRUM:
30% theater
30% air defense district
40% front
SU-24 FENCER:
65% theater
35% front
SU-27 FLANKER:
30% theater
30% air defense district
40% front
124
*WV 'I rw,. ** -sin-n-K ra r -?W wr XR.z 7r1 WW' *"- -W -
For example, the calculations to determine the DEPTHRATIO value for the
MIG-29 FULCRUM were as follows:
30% x 270nm (weighting factor x theater depth)
30% x 608nm (weighting factor x ADD depth)
40% x 160nm (weighting factor x front depth)
327nm = ECHELON value
DEPTHRATIO = CRADIUS,'ECHELON
DEPTHRATIO = 620/327= 1.89 = MIG-29 FULCRUM DEPTHRATIO
125
4m~
amt
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