BENJAMIN (KOKOY) T.G.R. Nos. 165510-33ROMUALDEZ,Petitioner, Present: Davide, Jr.,C.J. (Chairman), - versus - Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna,JJ.HON. SIMEON V. MARCELO,in his official capacity as the Ombudsman,and PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONON GOOD GOVERNMENT,Promulgated:Respondents. September 23, 2005x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- xDECISIONYNARES-SANTIAGO,J.: This is a petition for certiorari[1]under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the resolutions dated July 12, 2004,[2]and September 6, 2004[3]of the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP)/Ombudsman, recommending that informations be filed in the Sandiganbayan charging petitioner Benjamin Kokoy T. Romualdez with violation of Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) for non-filing of Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SAL).[4] The antecedent facts show that on February 22, 1989, 24 informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429 were filed against petitioner before the Sandiganbayan for his alleged failure to file the SAL from 1962 to 1985.[5]A warrant of arrest was issued on February 28, 1989,[6]but this was not served because of petitioners exile from the country. On October 21, 1991, he filed through counsel aMotion to Recall Warrants of Arrest,[7]alleging that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) was invalid for lack of jurisdiction. He also filed anUrgent Ex-Parte Motion to Hold in Abeyance Implementation of Warrants of Arrest and/or to Recall the Same.[8] On November 4, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order to defer the enforcement of the arrest warrant on the condition:(1) that the cash deposit equivalent to the aggregate amount of the bond shall serve as a provisional cash bond for the accuseds temporary liberty upon his personal appearance to the court;(2) that the cash deposit shall be made within five (5) days from receipt hereof by movants counsel, said act of deposit representing the conformity of the accused to the conditions hereof;(3) that the accused himself shall arrive in the Philippines within thirty (30) days from counsels receipt hereof;(4) that accused shall personally present himself to this Court on the next succeeding working day after his arrival for completion of the bailbond process.[9]Due to his non-compliance with these terms, the Sandiganbayan denied on January 24, 1992[10]petitioners motion to recall the warrant of arrest. Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Sandiganbayan denied on April 24, 1992. It also declared that until petitioner submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court, the issue regarding his compliance with the conditions imposed in the resolution of November 4, 1991, will not be entertained.[11]Hence, on May 27, 1992, he filed a petition[12]with this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 105248, assailing the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated January 24, 1992, April 24, 1992 and November 4, 1991. In a Decision dated May 16, 1995, this Court declared invalid the preliminary investigation conducted by the PCGG for lack of jurisdiction. However, it held that the invalidity or absence of a preliminary investigation did not affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or impair the validity of the informations. Thus, the Sandiganbayan was ordered to suspend the proceedings pending the holding of a proper preliminary investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman.[13]The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged Resolutions of January 24, 1992 and April 24, 1992 are AFFIRMED; but the respondent Sandiganbayan is DIRECTED to order the Office of the Ombudsman to forthwith conduct a proper preliminary investigation of the charges embodied in the informations filed against petitioner; to suspend the proceedings pending termination thereof; and thereafter to take action on petitioners cases as may be warranted by the results of said preliminary investigation. IT IS SO ORDERED.[14] Pursuant to the above Decision, the Sandiganbayan ordered[15]the petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit, the PCGG its reply-affidavit, and the OSP its report on the reinvestigation.Petitioner failed to file his counter-affidavit as directed. On April 27, 2000, he returned to the Philippines and voluntarily surrendered.[16] He filed aMotion to Quashon June 2, 2000.[17] The clarificatory hearing scheduled on the same date was reset to June 9, 2000. On June 8, 2000, one day before the scheduled clarificatory hearing, the Sandiganbayan denied in open court petitioners motion to quash[18]and the reconsideration thereof and also terminated the preliminary investigation.[19] His arraignment scheduled on June 26, 2000[20]was reset to July 28, 2000.[21] On July 27, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition[22]with this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 143618-41. He assailed the orders of the Sandiganbayan (1) denying his motion to quash and his oral motion for reconsideration; (2) ordering the termination of the preliminary investigation; and (3) setting his arraignment on July 28, 2000. He claimed that the criminal cases against him were based on void informations, hence, the Sandiganbayan must be enjoined from arraigning him on July 28, 2000.On July 30, 2002, we granted the petition holding that it is the prosecutor which is the Ombudsman, and not the PCGG, which must subscribe and file the informations because the crimes ascribed to petitioner do not relate to alleged ill-gotten wealth, and were therefore, beyond the ambit of the PCGGs jurisdiction. The informations were filed by PCGG, an unauthorized party and could not even be cured by conducting another preliminary investigation. Since the informations were invalid, they cannot serve as basis for criminal proceedings. We also found that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it abruptly terminated the reinvestigation.[23]The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition isGRANTED. The assailed orders of the Sandiganbayan dated June 8, 2000 areANNULLEDandSET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.[24] Pursuant to the foregoing Decision, the Sandiganbayan in a resolution dated February 10, 2004, dismissed Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429.[25] On March 3, 2004, the OSP directed petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit. He failed to comply so another order dated April 14, 2004 was issued but this was returned because petitioner was not found in the given address. On April 26, 2004, petitioner filed aMotion to Dismissinstead of a counter-affidavit.[26] He alleged that the order involved previously dismissed cases, hence, there was no legal justification for the OSP and the Ombudsman to further conduct preliminary investigation. On May 12, 2004, petitioner filed a counter-affidavit[27]adopting all the allegations in the motion to dismiss. The PCGG filed itsOpposition[28]insisting that the quashal of the informations for lack of authority by the PCGG to file the same did not mean that petitioner is already exempt from criminal prosecution. The Ombudsman can still file new informations should it find that probable cause exists. In a Memorandum dated July 12, 2004,[29]the OSP ordered theMotion to Dismissfiled by petitioner expunged for being a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section 3(c), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and Section 4(d), Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman. Considering that the motion to dismiss was grounded on the quashal of the informations and not on lack of jurisdiction, the OSP declared the motion to dismiss as a mere scrap of paper. Also, the petitioner was deemed to have waived his right to file a counter-affidavit. As such, his counter-affidavit was not given due course. Consequently, based solely on complainants evidence, the OSP determined there was probable cause that petitioner violated Section 7 of RA No. 3019 and accordingly recommended the filing of 24 informations before the Sandiganbayan.On September 6, 2004, the OSP denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[30]Thereafter, 19 informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049 were filed with the Sandiganbayan for failure of petitioner to file his SAL for the period 1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,[31]while 4 informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 04-231857-04-231860[32]were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila for petitioners failure to file his SAL from 1963 to 1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the Department of Foreign Affairs. Hence, this petition on the following grounds:I. RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION TO DISMISS THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF CRIM. CASES NOS. 13406-13429 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE SAID CASES HAD ALREADY BEEN DISMISSED BY THE SUPREME COURT AND BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN;II. RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND/OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN CONDUCTING A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED OFFENSES THAT HAD ALREADY PRESCRIBED. The issues for resolution are the following: (1) whether or not the Ombudsman acted with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss the preliminary investigation; and (2) whether or not the offenses charged against petitioner have prescribed.Petitioner argues that respondents act of proceeding with the preliminary investigation constitutes patently reversible error. He claims that since Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429 have already been dismissed, the PCGG should have filed a new complaint with a new docket number. He insists that the Ombudsman could not conduct another preliminary investigation using the old docket numbers.Petitioner also maintains that the offenses for which he was charged had already prescribed in February 2001, hence the preliminary investigation conducted anew by the Ombudsman should be terminated.In their Comments,[33]respondents aver that the dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429 did not mean that the preliminary investigation was terminated, as this Court specifically directed the Ombudsman to conduct the same. Besides, the Ombudsman is duly authorized to investigate on its own or upon complaint the acts or omissions of public officials or employees. Thus, it need not wait for the filing of another complaint before conducting a preliminary investigation. Respondents also deny that the offenses have prescribed since the period was tolled when the petitioner was out of the country. The petition lacks merit. Petitioner came to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure imputing grave abuse of discretion on the Ombudsman in denying his motion to dismiss the preliminary investigation.A petition for certiorari is the proper remedy when any tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy at law.[34] InPunzalan v. Dela Pea,[35]lack of jurisdiction and excess of jurisdiction were distinguished. Respondent acts without jurisdiction if he does not have the legal power to determine the case. Where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps his authority as determined by law, then he is performing a function in excess of his jurisdiction.Grave abuse of discretion impliesa capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. In other words, the power of discretion is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.[36] In denying the motion to dismiss the preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman resolved: After a careful evaluation of the arguments/contentions of both parties, complainant (PCGG) and respondent Romualdez, the undersigned finds the contentions of the PCGG more credible. The Motion to Dismiss filed by respondent Benjamin Romualdez should be expunged, the same being a prohibited pleading. Sec. 3 (c) of Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides that the respondents shall not be allowed to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of a counter-affidavit. Thus, it is incumbent upon the accused to file a counter-affidavit, and not a motion to dismiss. Moreover, Section 4 (d) of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman provides: No motion to dismiss shall be allowed except for lack of jurisdiction. Respondent argued in his motion to dismiss that Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429 were already dismissed by the Sandiganbayan by virtue of its Minute Resolution dated February 10, 2004, and not lack of jurisdiction. Hence, such motion is a mere scrap of paper, without any legal force and effect.... The authority of the Office of The Special Prosecutor/Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation in these cases is pursuant to the Supreme Courts Decision dated July 20, 2002 in G.R.F Nos. 143618-143641 entitled Benjamin Kokoy T. Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan. The Honorable Supreme Court specifically stated in said Decision that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it prematurely terminated the preliminary investigation being conducted by this Office on June 8, 2000, which the Supreme Court itself ordered.Hence, the quashal of the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429 before the Sandiganbayan, First Division for lack of authority of the PCGG to file the same is without prejudice to the filing of new informations by this Office should it find probable cause after the conduct of preliminary investigation....Respondent Romualdez failed to file his counter-affidavit and/or present his controverting evidence despite the sending of notices and copies of the complaint with supporting evidence to his known address and through his counsel on record. However, he opted to file a Motion to Dismiss, through his counsel, which this Office cannot take cognizance for reasons cited hereof.In view thereof, these cases must be resolved on the basis solely of the complainants evidence.Thus, after a careful evaluation of the evidence on records, the undersigned finds that respondent violated Section 7 of R.A. [3019] since the time he was appointed Technical Assistant, with the rank of FAO, Class III in the Philippine Consulate, Ambassador and Provincial Governor of Leyte from 1961 until February, 1986 he never filed his Statement of Assets and Liabilities.[37] The ruling of the OSP/Ombudsman is consistent with the Decision of this Court inVelasco v. Hon. Casaclang,[38]where we held that, the Deputy Ombudsman properly denied the motion to quash and motion for reconsideration of petitioner therein, pursuant to the applicable provisions of the Revised Rules of Court and Administrative Order (AO) No. 07 of the Ombudsman. Section 4 (d) of AO No. 07 disallows a motion to quash (or dismiss) except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. In that case, as in this one, no absence of jurisdiction is perceived.The Constitution vested the Office of the Ombudsman with powers and duties to investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient act or omission of any public official or employee.[39] Section 15(1) of R.A. No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989 delineated the investigatory and prosecutory functions of the Ombudsman, to wit:SEC. 15.Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:(1) Investigate and prosecuteon its ownoron complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has the primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of such cases; We held that the OSP/Ombudsman is the proper authority to conduct the preliminary investigation of the alleged offenses committed by petitioner. Pursuant thereto, there is no need for a new complaint to be filed by PCGG because the Ombudsman, on its own, may conduct a preliminary investigation of offenses committed by public officers. Moreover, the denial of his motion to dismiss was concomitant with Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman disallowing a motion to dismiss except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Besides, we held inRomualdez v. Sandiganbayan,[40]that:The Sandiganbayan also committed grave abuse of discretion when it abruptly terminated the reinvestigation being conducted by Prosecutor Lucero. It should be recalled that our directive in G.R. No. 105248 for the holding of a preliminary investigation was based on our ruling that the right to a preliminary investigation is a substantive, rather than a procedural right. Petitioners right was violated when the preliminary investigation of the charges against him were conducted by an officer without jurisdiction over the said cases. It bears stressing that our directive should be strictly complied with in order to achieve its objective of affording petitioner his right to due process.Petitioners claim that the preliminary investigation be dismissed because it referred to the same docket numbers of the dismissed informations, is erroneous. The assignment of a docket number is an internal matter designed for efficient record keeping. It is usually written in the Docket Record in sequential order corresponding to the date and time of filing a case.[41]This Court agrees that the use of the docket numbers of the dismissed cases was merely for reference. In fact, after the new informations were filed, new docket numbers were assigned,i.e., Criminal Cases Nos. 28031-28049. Plainly, these are entirely different cases from those that have been dismissed given that Criminal Cases Nos. 13406-13429 were not mentioned.Petitioner also alleges that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion in not dismissing the preliminary investigation on the ground of prescription of the offense. This allegation is a matter of defense which must be settled in a full-blown trial. Evidence must be received to resolve the case on its merits.InDomingo v. Sandiganbayan,[42]we considered the following in resolving the issue of prescription: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the period of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was interrupted. Petitioner is being charged under Section 7 of R.A. No. 3019, a special law. Section 11 of the same statute provides for the period of prescription for the offense charged,i.e., 15 years. However, the applicable rule on the time the period of prescription starts to run is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, which provides: SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. This Court quotes the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Reynato S. Puno inPresidential Ad Hoc Committee v. Hon. Desierto:[43]The law on prescription of special crimes like violation of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft Law) is provided for in Section 2 of Act No. 3326,viz:SEC. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof ...The application of this provision isnot simple and each case must be decided according to its facts. It involves a careful study and analysis ofcontentious facts: (a) when the commission of the violation of the law happened; (b) whether or not the violation was known at the time of its commission, and (c) if not known then, the time of its discovery. In addition, there is the equallydifficult problem of choice of legal and equitable doctrinesto apply to the above elusive facts. For thegeneral ruleis that the mere fact that a person entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises, does not prevent the running of the statute. This stringent rule, however, admits of anexception. Under the blameless ignorance doctrine, the statute of limitations runsonlyupon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, courts decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff neither knew nor hadreasonable meansof knowing the existence of a cause of action.Given all these factual and legal difficulties, the public respondent should have ordered private respondents to answer the sworn complaint, required a reply from the petitioners and conducted such hearings as may be necessary so he could have all the vital facts at his front and, upon their basis, resolve whether the offense charged has already prescribed.(Emphasis supplied) It is noteworthy that petitioner did not raise the defense of prescription in his motion to dismiss the preliminary investigation. It is only in this petition that he raised this issue. As this case has never progressed beyond the filing of the informations against petitioner, it is only prudent that evidence be gathered through trial on the merits to determine whether the offense charged has already prescribed. A preliminary investigation is merely inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare the complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy.[44] Consequently, the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to dismiss the preliminary investigation. Not only did the Ombudsman have the jurisdiction to conduct a preliminary investigation under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770, but he also acted within the legal bounds of the authority conferred upon him when he denied the motion to dismiss under Administrative Order No. 07. As a rule, the Court shall not unduly interfere in the Ombudsmans exercise of his investigatory and prosecutory powers, as provided in the Constitution, without good and compelling reasons to indicate otherwise.[45]WHERFORE, the petition isDISMISSED. The resolutions dated July 12, 2004 and September 6, 2004 of the Office of the Special Prosecutor, areAFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Romualdez vs Marcelo G.R. Nos. 166510-33July 28, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 information against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.

In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the information in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal prosecution; that new information may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman need not wait for a new complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.

Issues:

(a) Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos. 13406-13429 was a nullity?

(b) Whether the offenses for which petitioners are being charged with have already prescribed?

Held:

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in recommending the filing of 24 information against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-23185704-231860 pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.

G.R. No. 88979 February 7, 1992Lydia O. ChuaVs.The Civil Service Commission, the National Irrigation Administration and the Department of Budget and Management.Facts:In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A.6683 was enacted to provide for the early retirement and voluntary separation of government employees affected due to reorganization, those who may avail were regular, casual, temporary and emergency employees, with rendered service minimum of two years.Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authoruty (NIA) for over 15 years as a coterminous employee of 4 successive NIA projects. She availed of the above mentioned law only to be denied as the CSC who deemed her unqualified, being a coterminous employee. She was instead offered a severance of monthly basic pay for each year of service.Issue:Whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail of the early retirement benefit as a coterminous employee.Held:It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like casual and emergency employees, because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they complied with the requirements of the law, which in this case, was done by Linda Chua. On that note, the court believes that the denial of petitioners application for early retirement benefits by the NIA and CSC is unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive due to the fact that she is entitled to the benefits of the same law because she served the government not only for two (2) years which is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. In four (4) governmental projects.Wherefore, the petition is granted.-Statutory Construction-

Chua v. Civil Service CommissionG.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)

FACTS:RA 6683 provided benefitsfor early retirement and voluntary separation aswell as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Section 2 covers those whoare qualified:Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employeesofthe National Government. The benefitsauthorized under this Act shallapply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardlessof age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years ofgovernment service as of the date of separationPetitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits ofthe program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with RespondentAdministration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitionertoRespondent Commission yielded the same result.

ISSUE:W/N Petitioners status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from thebenefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).

HELD:The petition isgranted.The Early Retirement Law would violate the equalprotection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustainRespondents submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class ofgovernment employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law.The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case.

Chua v. Civil Service CommissionCase No. 60G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992)Chapter IV, Page 164,Footnote No.146Facts: In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A.6683 (2 December 1988)was enacted to provide for the early retirement and voluntary separation of government employees as well as involuntary resignation to those affected due to reorganization.Those who may avail were regular, casual, temporary and emergency employees, with rendered service minimum of two years. Sec. 2.Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of theNationalGovernment,includinggovernment-ownedorcontrolledcorporationswithoriginal charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act. Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authority (NIA) for over 15years as a coterminous employee of 4 successiveNIA projects. Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that sheisqualifiedtoavailofthebenefitsoftheprogram,filedanapplicationonJanuary30,1989withtheNIA but was denied and lateron with the CSC whowas likewise denied.She was instead offered a separation benefits of monthly basic pay for eachyear of service. a)co-terminous with the project When the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same; Issue: Whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail ofthe early retirement benefit as a coterminous employee.Held:It was stated that a coterminous employee is anon-career civil servant like casual and emergency employees, because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they complied with the requirements of the law, which in this case,was done by Linda Chua.On that note, the court believes that the denial of petitioners application for early retirement benefits by the NIA andCSC is unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive due to the factthat she is entitled to the benefits of thesame law because she served the government not only for two(2) years which is the minimum requirement under the lawbut forfifteen (15) years. In four (4) governmental projects. Wherefore, the petition is granted.

EN BANC[G.R. No. 146943. October 4, 2002]SARIO MALINIAS,petitioner,vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ, ANACLETO TANGILAG and VICTOR DOMINGUEZ,respondents.D E C I S I O NCARPIO,J.:The CaseBefore us is a petition for review on certiorari[1]of the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC for brevity)en banc[2]dated June 10, 1999 and October 26, 2000.The assailed Resolutions dismissed the complaint[3]filed bypetitioner Sario Malinias (Malinias for brevity) and Roy S. Pilando (Pilando for brevity) for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6646[4]and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.[5]The FactsPetitioner Malinias was a candidate for governor whereas Pilando was a candidate for congressional representative of Mountain Province in the May 11, 1998 elections.[6]The Provincial Board of Canvassers held the canvassing of election returns at the second floor of the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, Mountain Province from May 11, 1998 to May 15, 1998.[7]On July 31, 1998, Malinias and Pilando filed a complaint with the COMELECs Law Department for violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646, and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. Blg. 881, against Victor Dominguez, Teofilo Corpuz, Anacleto Tangilag, Thomas Bayugan, Jose Bagwan who was then Provincial Election Supervisor, and the members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers. Victor Dominguez (Dominguez for brevity) was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province.Teofilo Corpuz (Corpuz for brevity) was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Anacleto Tangilag (Tangilag for brevity) was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province.Malinias and Pilando alleged that on May 15, 1998 a police checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province blocked their supporters who were on their way to Bontoc, and prevented them from proceeding to the Provincial Capitol Building.Malinias and Pilando further alleged that policemen, upon orders of private respondents, prevented their supporters, who nevertheless eventually reached the Provincial Capitol Building, from entering the capitol grounds.In their complaint, Malinias and Pilando requested the COMELEC and its Law Department to investigate and prosecute private respondents for the following alleged unlawful acts.3. That on May 15, 1998 at the site of the canvassing of election returns for congressional and provincial returns located at the second floor of the Provincial Capitol Building the public and particularly the designated representatives/watchers of both affiants were prevented from attending the canvassing.x x x4. That the aforementioned Mass-affidavits support our allegations in this affidavit-complaint that we and our supporters were prevented from attending the provincial canvassing because of the illegal checkpoint/blockade set-up by policemen in Nakagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mt. Province and as an evidence to these allegations, Certification of the Police Station is hereto attached as Annex D and affidavits of supporters hereto attached as Annex E, both made an integral part of this affidavit-complaint; and that said mass-affidavits show that the Provincial canvassing were not made public or (sic) candidates and their representatives/watchers prevented because of barricade, closure of canvassing rooms, blockade by armed policemen that coerce or threaten the people, the candidates or their representatives from attending the canvassing;[8]In support of the complaint, several supporters of Malinias and Pilando executed so-called mass affidavits uniformly asserting that private respondents, among others, (1) prevented them from attending the provincial canvassing, (2) padlocked the canvassing area, and (3) threatened the people who wanted to enter the canvassing room.They likewise alleged that the Provincial Board of Canvassers never allowed the canvassing to be made public and consented to the exclusion of the public or representatives of other candidates except those of Dominguez.[9]Consequently, the COMELECs Law Department conducted a preliminary investigation during which only Corpuz and Tangilag submitted their joint Counter-Affidavit.In their Counter-Affidavit, Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting up of a checkpoint at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province and securing the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building, to wit:3. We admit having ordered the setting up of check points in Nakagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province; as in fact, this is not the only checkpoint set up in the province.There are other checkpoints established in other parts of the province, to enforce the COMELEC gun ban and other pertinent rules issued by the Commission on Election during the election period.4. Policemen were posted within the vicinity of the capitol grounds in response to earlier information that some groups were out to disrupt the canvass proceedings which were being conducted in the second floor of the Provincial Capitol Building.This is not remote considering that this had happened in the past elections.In fact, during the canvass proceeding on May 15, 1998 a large group of individuals identified with no less than affiants-complainants Roy S. Pilando and Sario Malinias was conducting a rally just in front of the capitol, shouting invectives at certain candidates and their leaders.This group likewise were holding placards and posted some in front of the capitol building.x x x[10]After the investigation, in a study dated May 26, 1999, the COMELECs Law Department recommended to the COMELECen bancthe dismissal of the complaint for lack of probable cause.[11]In a Resolution dated June 10, 1999, the COMELECen bancdismissed the complaint of Malinias and Pilando for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause against private respondents.On October 26, 2000, the COMELEC dismissed Malinias Motion for Reconsideration.Hence, Malinias filed the instant petition.The Comelecs RulingIn dismissing the complaint against private respondents, the COMELEC ruled as follows:As appearing in the Minutes of Provincial Canvass, complainant Roy Pilando was present during the May 15, 1998 Provincial Canvass.He even participated actively in a discussion with the members of the Board and the counsel of Congressman Dominguez.The minutes also disclosed that the lawyers of LAMMP, the watchers, supporters of other candidates and representatives of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines were present at one time or another during the canvass proceedings.The minutes does not indicate any charges of irregularities inside and within the vicinity of the canvassing room.Pursuant to Comelec Res. No. 2968 promulgated on January 7, 1998, checkpoints were established in the entire country to effectively implement the firearms ban during the election period from January 11, 1998 to June 10, 1998.In Mountain Province, there were fourteen (14) checkpoints established by the Philippine National Police way before the start of the campaign period for the May 11, 1998 elections including the subject checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province.Thus, the checkpoint at Sabangan, Mountain Province was not established as alleged only upon request of Congressman Dominguez on May 15, 1998 but way before the commencement of the campaign period.Granting arguendo that the Congressman did make a request for a checkpoint at Sitio Nacagang, it would be a mere surplusage as the same was already existing.Furthermore, an alleged text of a radio message requesting advice from the PNP Provincial Director at Bontoc, Mt. Province was attached to complainants affidavit-complaint.However, said person by the name of Mr. Palicos was never presented to affirm the truth of the contents and the signature appearing therein.[12]Finding that Malinias failed to adduce new evidence, the COMELEC dismissed Malinias Motion for Reconsideration.[13]The Courts RulingThe sole issue for resolution is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing Malinias and Pilandos complaint for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for alleged violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646 and Sections 232 and 261 (i) of B.P. 881.We rule that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion.For this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, the tribunal or administrative body must have issued the assailed decision, order or resolution in a capricious and despotic manner.There is grave abuse of discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari when there is a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all in contemplation of law.[14]Such is not the situation in the instant case.The COMELEC dismissed properly the complaint of Malinias and Pilando for insufficient evidence, and committed no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.First,Malinias charged private respondents with alleged violation of Section 25 of Republic Act No. 6646, quoted, as follows:Sec. 25.Right to be Present and to Counsel During the Canvass.Any registered political party, coalition of parties, through their representatives, and any candidate has the right to be present and to counsel during the canvass of the election returns; Provided, That only one counsel may argue for each political party or candidate.They shall have the right to examine the returns being canvassed without touching them, make their observations thereon, and file their challenge in accordance with the rules and regulations of the Commission.No dilatory action shall be allowed by the board of canvassers.In the present case, Malinias miserably failed to substantiate his claim that private respondents denied him his right to be present during the canvassing. There was even no showing that Malinias was within the vicinity of the Provincial Capitol Building or that private respondents prevented him from entering the canvassing room.As found by the COMELEC and admitted by Malinias, Pilando was present and even participated actively in the canvassing.[15]Malinias failed to show that his rights as a gubernatorial candidate were prejudiced by the alleged failure of his supporters to attend the canvassing.Malinias claimed that even though Pilando was present during the canvassing, the latter was only able to enter the room after eluding the policemen and passing through the rear entrance of the Provincial Capitol Building.[16]This allegation, however, is not supported by any clear and convincing evidence.Pilando himself, who was purportedly prevented by policemen from entering the canvassing room, failed to attest to the veracity of this statement rendering the same self-serving and baseless.In an analogous case where a political candidates watcher failed to attend the canvass proceedings, this Court held:Another matter which militates against the cause of petitioner is that he has not shown that he suffered prejudice because of the failure of his watcher to attend the canvassing.Had the watcher been present, what substantive issues would he have raised?Petitioner does not disclose.Could it be that even if the watcher was present, the result of the canvassing would have been the same?There is therefore no merit in petitioners claim that respondent Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion in issuing its questioned decision.And, as emphatically stated in Sidro v. Comelec, 102 SCRA 853, this Court has invariably followed the principle that in the absence of any jurisdictional infirmity or an error of law of the utmost gravity, the conclusion reached by the respondent Commission on a matter that falls within its competence is entitled to the utmost respect, xxx.There is justification in this case to reiterate this principle.[17]Assuming that Pilando in fact entered the canvassing room only after successfully evading the policemen surrounding the Provincial Capitol grounds, Pilando could have easily complained of this alleged unlawful act during the canvass proceedings.He could have immediately reported the matter to the Provincial Board of Canvassers as a violation of Section 25 of R.A. No. 6646.However, Pilando opted simply to raise questions on alleged irregularities in the municipal canvassing.[18]While he had the opportunity to protest the alleged intimidation committed by policemen against his person, it is quite surprising that he never mentioned anything about it to the Provincial Board of Canvassers.Surprisingly, the COMELEC and private respondents apparently overlooked that R.A. No. 6646 does not punish a violation of Section 25 of the law as a criminal election offense.Section 25 merely highlights one of the recognized rights of a political party or candidate during elections, aimed at providing an effective safeguard against fraud or irregularities in the canvassing of election returns.Section 27[19]of R.A. No. 6646, which specifies the election offenses punishable under this law, does not include Section 25.Malinias further claims that, in violation of this right, his supporters were blocked by a checkpoint set-up at Nacagang, Sabangan, Mountain Province.This allegation is devoid of any basis to merit a reversal of the COMELECs ruling.Malinias supporters who were purportedly blocked by the checkpoint did not confirm or corroborate this allegation of Malinias.Moreover, the police established checkpoints in the entire country to implement the firearms ban during the election period.Clearly, this is in consonance with the constitutionally ordained power of the COMELEC to deputize government agencies and instrumentalities of the Government for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.[20]Second, Malinias maintains that Corpuz and Tangilag entered the canvassing room in blatant violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881.His sole basis for this allegation is the affidavit of his supporters who expressly stated that they saw Dominguez and Corpuz (only) enter the canvassing room.[21]Malinias likewise contends that Corpuz and Tangilag impliedly admitted that they were inside or at least within the fifty (50) meter radius of the canvassing room as they were able to mention the names of the persons who were inside the canvassing room in their Counter-Affidavit.[22]The provision of law which Corpuz and Tangilag allegedly violated is quoted as follows:Sec. 232.Persons not allowed inside the canvassing room. It shall be unlawful for any officer or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, including the Philippine Constabulary, or the Integrated National Police or any peace officer or any armed or unarmed persons belonging to an extra-legal police agency, special forces, reaction forces, strike forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units, barangay tanod, or of any member of the security or police organizations or government ministries, commissions, councils, bureaus, offices, instrumentalities, or government-owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries or of any member of a privately owned or operated security, investigative, protective or intelligence agency performing identical or similar functions to enter the room where the canvassing of the election returns are held by the board of canvassers and within a radius of fifty meters from such room:Provided, however, That the board of canvassers by a majority vote, if it deems necessary, may make a call in writing for the detail of policemen or any peace officers for their protection or for the protection of the election documents and paraphernalia in the possession of the board, or for the maintenance of peace and order, in which case said policemen or peace officers, who shall be in proper uniform, shall stay outside the room within a radius of thirty meters near enough to be easily called by the board of canvassers at any time.Again, the COMELEC and private respondents overlooked that Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not one of the election offenses explicitly enumerated in Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881.While Section 232 categorically states that it is unlawful for the persons referred therein to enter the canvassing room, this act is not one of the election offenses criminally punishable under Sections 261 and 262 of B.P. Blg. 881.Thus, the act involved in Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is not punishable as a criminal election offense.Section 264 of B.P. Blg. 881 provides that the penalty for an election offense under Sections 261 and 262 is imprisonment of not less than one year but not more than six years.Under the rule of statutory construction ofexpressio unius est exclusio alterius,there is no ground to order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because this is a non-criminal act.It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.The rule is expressed in the familiar maxim,expressio unius est exclusio alterius.The rule ofexpressio unius est exclusio alteriusis formulated in a number of ways.One variation of the rule is the principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.Expressium facit cessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters.x x xThe rule ofexpressio unius est exclusio alteriusand its variations are canons of restrictive interpretation.They are based on the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind.They are predicated upon ones own voluntary act and not upon that of others.They proceed from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumeration in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.[23]Also, since private respondents are being charged with a criminal offense, a strict interpretation in favor of private respondents is required in determining whether the acts mentioned in Section 232 are criminally punishable under Sections 261[24]and 262[25]of B.P. Blg. 881.Since Sections 261 and 262, which lists the election offenses punishable as crimes, do not include Section 232, a strict interpretation means that private respondents cannot be held criminally liable for violation of Section 232.This is not to say that a violation of Section 232 of B.P. Blg. 881 is without any sanction.Though not a criminal election offense, a violation of Section 232 certainly warrants, after proper hearing, the imposition ofadministrativepenalties.Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC may recommend to the President the imposition of disciplinary action on any officer or employee the COMELEC has deputized for violation of its directive, order or decision.[26]Also, under the Revised Administrative Code,[27]the COMELEC may recommend to the proper authority the suspension or removal of any government official or employee found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply with COMELEC orders or rulings.In addition, a careful examination of the evidence presented by Malinias shows that the same are insufficient to justify a finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.Obviously, the evidence relied upon by Malinias to support his charges consisted mainly of affidavits prepared by his own supporters.The affidavits of Malinias own supporters, being self-serving, cannot be accepted at face value under the circumstances.As this Court has often stated, reliance should not be placed on mere affidavits.[28]Besides, if Corpuz really entered the canvassing room, then why did Pilando and the representatives of other candidates, who were inside the room, fail to question this alleged wrongful act during the canvassing?Malinias contention that Corpuz and Tangilag impliedly admitted they were inside the canvassing room because they mentioned the names of the persons present during the canvassing deserves scant consideration as the same is not supported by any evidence.Finally,Malinias asserts that private respondents should be held liable for allegedly violating Section 261 (i) of B. P. Blg. 881 because the latter engaged in partisan political activity.This provision states:Sec. 261 (i)Intervention of public officers and employees. Any officer or employee in the civil service, except those holding political offices; any officer, employee, or member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, or any police force, special forces, home defense forces, barangay self-defense units and all other para-military units that now exist or which may hereafter be organized who, directly or indirectly, intervenes in any election campaign or engages in any partisan political activity, except to vote or to preserve public order, if he is a peace officer.Section 79, Article X of B.P. Blg. 881 defines the term partisan political activity as an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office.[29]Malinias asserts that, in setting up a checkpoint at Nacagang, Tambingan, Sabangan, Mountain Province and in closing the canvassing room, Corpuz and Tangilag unduly interfered with his right to be present and to counsel during the canvassing.This interference allegedly favored the other candidate.While Corpuz and Tangilag admitted ordering the setting up of thecheckpoint, they did so to enforce the COMELECs firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968, among others.[30]There was no clear indication that these police officers, in ordering the setting up of checkpoint, intended to favor the other candidates.Neither was there proof to show that Corpuz and Tangilag unreasonably exceeded their authority in implementing the COMELEC rules.Further, there is no basis to rule that private respondents arbitrarily deprived Malinias of his right to be present and to counsel during the canvassing.The act of Corpuz and Tangilag in setting up the checkpoint was plainly in accordance with their avowed duty to maintain effectively peace and order within the vicinity of the canvassing site.Thus, the act is untainted with any color of political activity.There was also no showing that the alleged closure of the provincial capitol grounds favored the election of the other candidates.In summary, we find that there is no proof that the COMELEC issued the assailed resolutions with grave abuse of discretion.We add that this Court has limited power to review findings of fact made by the COMELEC pursuant to its constitutional authority to investigate and prosecute actions for election offenses.[31]Thus, where there is no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law, this Court may not review the factual findings of the COMELEC, nor substitute its own findings on the sufficiency of evidence.[32]WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DISMISSED.The assailed Resolutions of public respondent COMELEC are AFFIRMED.Costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.Bellosillo, Acting C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,andCallejo, Sr., JJ.,concur.Davide, Jr.,C.J.,Mendoza,andSandoval-Gutierrez, JJ.,on official leave.

SARIO MALINIAS,petitioner,vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, TEOFILO CORPUZ,ANACLETO TANGILAG and VICTORDOMINGUEZ,respondents.G.R. No. 146943, October 4, 2002FACTS:On July 31, 1998, Sario Malinias and Roy S. Pilando, who were candidates for governor and congress representative positions, respectively, filed a complaint with the COMELEC's Law Department against Victor Dominguez, Anacleto Tangilag andothers for their violation of the followinglaws:1.Section 25of R.A. No.6646; and 2.Sections 232and 261 (i)of B.P.Blg. 881.Dominguez was then the incumbent Congressman of Poblacion, Sabangan, Mountain Province. Corpuz was then the Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police in Mountain Province while Tangilag was then the Chief of Police of the Municipality of Bontoc, Mountain Province. The petitioners said that due to said violations, their supporters were deprived from participating in the canvassing of election returns as they were blocked by a police checkpoint in the course oftheir way to the canvassing site at the Provincial Capitol Building in Bontoc, Mountain Province.Amongtheprivaterespondents,onlyCorpuzandTangilagsubmitted their joint Counter-Affidavit, wherein they admitted that they ordered the establishment of checkpoints all over the province to enforce the COMELEC Gun Ban and its other pertinent rules pursuant to COMELEC Res. No. 2968 purposive of the maintenance of peace and order around the vicinity of the canvassing site.Also, theysaidthat thepresence ofthepolicemen withinthesaid area is to prevent some groups who were reportedly had the intention to disrupt the canvass proceedings. They claimed that such a response was not unwarranted as this has already happened in the past, wherein, in fact, the petitioners were among them.COMELECs Ruling:After investigatingtheallegations, COMELEC ruledtodismiss the petition against the respondents for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause.Malinias filed anMR but itwas also denied for failure of adducingadditional evidence thereon. Not satisfied with the same, Malinias filed toSC a petition for reviewon certiorari on this case. ISSUE: Did COMELEC abuse its discretion in dismissing thecomplaint forlack of probable cause?RATIO DECIDENDI OF SC: No. SC AFFIRMED the decision of COMELEC and foundthe conduct of its investigation and ruling on the case to be in accord with its jurisdiction and dutiesunder the law. In this case, COMELEC did not commit any grave abuse ofdiscretion as there is nothing capricious or despotic in themanner of their resolution ofthe said complaint, hence, SC cannot issue theextraordinary writ ofcertiorari.On the said violations, theonly evidence that was successfully presented by the petitioner is themass-affidavits of his supporters, which were considered self-serving and cannot be admitted by the court thus, the same are notenough to prove his claims.Also, the allege violation of the respondents of Sec. 25 of R.A. 6646and Sec. 232 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 are not included in the acts defined as punishable criminal election offenses under Sec. 27ofR.A. 6646 and Sec. 261 and262 of B.P. Blg. No. 881,respectively. Here, Sec. 25 merely highlights one ofthe rights of a politicalparty or candidate during elections whereas, the violation ofSec. 232,which enumerates the persons who are notallowed inside the canvassing site, can only be subjected toan administrative disciplinary action and cannot be punished byimprisonment as provided for under Sec. 264 ofthe same law. Moreover, it is clear inthe defense of the respondents that they did not violate Sec. 261 (i),a criminal offense, which prohibits any officer or employee of political offices orpolice force from intervening in any election campaign or fromengaging in any partisan activity except to vote or maintain public order. In the said defense, the respondents saidthat setting up the checkpoints was done to enforce the COMELEC's firearms ban, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 2968 and notto prejudice any candidate from participating in the canvassing. As such, the actions of the respondents are deemed lawful andnot in excess oftheir authority.Ruling related toStatutory ConstructionUnder the rule ofstatutory construction of expressio unius estexclusio alterius, there is no groundto order the COMELEC to prosecute private respondents for alleged violation of Section 232of B.P. Blg. 881 precisely because thisis a non-criminal act." It is asettled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, orconsequence implies the exclusion of allothers. The rule isexpressed in the familiar maxim, expressio uniusest exclusio alterius. The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is formulated in a number of ways. One variation ofthe rule is theprinciple that what is expressed puts an endto that which is implied. Expressium facitcessare tacitum. Thus, where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, byinterpretation orconstruction, be extended to othermattersEXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUSThe express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Variation: Expressium facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Where a statute is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. Canon of restrictive interpretation.Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.Malinias v Comelec: An attempt to use an administrative charge for a criminal complaint against police officers accused of violating the election code. The court ruled that not all violations of the election code provided for criminal penalties and in this case, the violated provisions only warrant the imposition of administrative, not criminal, penalties.Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos: A group of old men charged with violating the solicitation permit law was acquitted because the term religious purpose was not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, and what the law does not include, it excludes. The law referred only to charitable purposes, which phrase cannot be construed so as to include a religious purpose.

REDEENDO SINGULAR SINGULISReferring each to each; referring toeach phrase or expression to its appropriate object, orlet each be putin its proper place, thatis, the words should betaken distributively. As a rule, it requiresthat the antecedents and consequences should be readdistributively to the effect that each word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by context most appropriately relatedand to which itis most applicable.King vs Hernandez.The employment of the three Chinese as salesmen and purchaser in the store of Macario King is a violation of the Section 1 of the Retail Trade Act which provides that only citizens of the Philippines can engage in retail trade, aswell as ofSection 2-A of theAnti-Dummy Law which prohibits Chinese citizens to intervene in the management, operation, administration orcontrol of such business, whether as an officer, employee or laborer with or without remuneration. The context of the law seems to be clear onwhat its extent and scope seem to prohibit but also because the same is infull accord with the main objective that permeates both the Retail Trade Law and the Anti-Dummy Law. The one advocates the complete nationalization of the retailtrade by denying its ownership to any alien, while theother limits its management, operation, administration and control to Filipino citizens. The prevailing ideais to secure both ownership and management of theretail business in Filipino hands. It prohibits a person not a Filipino from engaging in retail trade directly or indirectly while it limits the management, operation, administration and control to Filipino citizens. These words may be technically synonymous in the sense that they all refer to the exercise of a directing, restraining or governing influence over an affair or business to which they relate, but it cannot be denied that by reading them in connection with the positions therein enumerated one cannot draw any other conclusion than that they cover theentire range of employment regardless of whether they involve control ornon-control activities. When the law says that you cannot employ an alienin any position pertaining tomanagement, operation, administration and control, "whetheras an officer, employee, or laborertherein", it only means one thing:the employment of a person who is nota Filipino citizen even in a minor orclerical or non-control position is prohibited.The reason is obvious: to plug any loopholeor close any avenue that a nunscrupulous alien may resort to flout the law or defeat its purpose, for no one can deny that while one may be employed in a non-control position who apparently is harmless he may later turn out to be a mere tool to further the evil designs of the employer. It is imperative that the law beinterpreted in a manner that would staveoff any attempt at circumvention of this legislative purpose.DISSIMILUM DISSIMILIS EST RATIOThe courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that thelegislature intended a distinction orqualification.Doctrine of Necessary ImplicationNo statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application. There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What isimplied in a statute isas much a part thereof asthat which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain allsuch provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose, or to make effectiverights, powers, privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including allsuch collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and logically inferred from its terms.Natu vs TorresIn applying the doctrine of necessary implication, we took into consideration the rationale behind the disqualification of managerial employees expressed in Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Sanchez, thus: ". . . if these managerial employees would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty tothe Union in view ofevident conflict of interests. The Union can also become company-dominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership." Stated differently, in the collective bargaining process, managerial employees are supposed to beon the side ofthe employer, to act as its representatives, and to seeto it thatits interests are well protected. The employer is not assuredof such protection if these employees themselves are union members. Collective bargaining in such a situationcan become one-sided.It is the same reason that impelled this Court to consider the position of confidential employees as included in the disqualification found in Art. 245 as if the disqualification of confidential employees were written in the provision. If confidential employees could unionize in order tobargain for advantages for themselves, then they could be governed by theirown motives rather than the interest of the employers. Moreover, unionization of confidential employees for the purpose ofcollective bargaining would mean the extension of the law topersons or individuals who are supposed to act "inthe interest of" the employers.It is not farfetched that in the course of collective bargaining, they might jeopardize that interest which they are duty-bound to protect. Along the same line of reasoning we held in Golden Farms, Inc. v. Ferrer-CallejaEXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUSThe express mention of one person, thing, orconsequence implies the exclusion of all others. Variation: Expressium facit cessaretacitum. What is expressed puts an end towhat is implied. Where a statute isexpressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. Canonof restrictive interpretation. Where a statute,by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation orconstruction, be extended to others. The rule proceedsfrom the premise that the legislature would not have made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine itsterms to those expressly mentioned.Centeno v Villalon-PornillosA group of old men charged with violating thesolicitation permit law was acquitted because the term religious purpose was not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, and what thelaw does not include, itexcludes. The law referred only to charitable purposes, which phrase cannot beconstrued so as to include a religious purpose. The issue is whether the solicitation for the religiouspurposes, (renovation of a church) without first securing apermit from Regional Office ofDepartment of Social Services, constitutes a violation of PD 1564, making it a criminal offense for any person to solicit orreceive contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes without securing a permit. The resolution on the issue depends on whetherthe phrase charitable purposes includes a religious purpose. The Court ruled inthe negative, by applying the maxim expression unius est exclusion alterius, thus: it will be observed thatthe 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treatthe words charitable and religious separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word charitable is only one of three descriptive words used in Sec 28(3), Art VI of the Constitution which providesthat charitable institutions, churches and parsonages xxx and all lands, buildings and improvements, actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or educational purposesshall be exempt from taxationxxxThat these legislative enactments specifically spelled out charitable and religious in anenumeration, whereas PD 1564 merely stated charitable or public welfare purposes, only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended to include solicitations forreligious purposes within its coverage. Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.CASUS OMISSUSCasus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from anenumeration in a statute must be heldto have been omitted intentionally.This needs two laws. In expressio unius, its just the enumeration you are looking at, not another law.People vs Manantan: Manantan was charged with a violationof Sec54 of Revised Election Code. The defense moved todismiss the information on the ground that as justice of peace , the defendant is notione of the officers enumerated in Sec 54 of Revised Election Code. Under the rule ofcasus omissus pro omisso habendus est, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to be intentionally omitted. The maxim casus omissus can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. The application of the rule casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a caseis criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that aparticular person, object or thinghas been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is not omission. For in its mostextensive sense the term judge includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justice of peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. The intention of the legislature did not exclude the justice of peace from its operation. In sec54 there is no necessity to include the

LYDIA O. CHUA,petitioner,vs.THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, THE NATIONAL IRRIGATION ADMINISTRATION and THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,respondents.PADILLA,J.:Pursuant to the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, Republic Act No. 6683 was approved on 2 December 1988 providing for benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary separation due to reorganization. Deemed qualified to avail of its benefits are those enumerated in Sec. 2 of the Act, as follows:Sec. 2. Coverage. This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters, as well as the personnel of all local government units. The benefits authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees, regardless of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation. Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the PC-INP are excluded from the coverage of this Act.Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on 30 January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which, however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service Commission yielded negative results.1Her letter for reconsideration dated 25 April 1989 pleaded thus:xxx xxx xxxWith due respect, I think the interpretation of the Honorable Commissioner of RA 6683 does not conform with the beneficent purpose of the law. The law merely requires that a government employee whether regular, temporary, emergency, or casual, should have two consecutive years of government service in order to be entitled to its benefits. I more than meet the requirement. Persons who are not entitled are consultants, experts and contractual(s). As to the budget needed, the law provides that the Department of Budget and Management will shoulder a certain portion of the benefits to be allotted to government corporations. Moreover, personnel of these NIA special projects art entitled to the regular benefits, such (sic) leaves, compulsory retirement and the like. There is no reason why we should not be entitled to RA 6683.xxx xxx xxx2Denying the plea for reconsideration, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) emphasized:xxx xxx xxxWe regret to inform you that your request cannot be granted. The provision of Section 3.1 of Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 does not only require an applicant to have two years of satisfactory service on the date of separation/retirement but further requires said applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status as of December 2, 1988, the date of enactment of R.A. 6683. The law does not contemplate contractual employees in the coverage.Inasmuch as your employment as of December 31, 1988, the date of your separation from the service, is co-terminous with the NIA project which is contractual in nature, this Commission shall sustain its original decision.xxx xxx xxx3In view of such denial, petitioner is before this Court by way of a special civil action forcertiorari, insisting that she is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic Act No. 6683. Her arguments:It is submitted that R.A. 6683, as well as Section 3.1 of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 89-1 requires an applicant to be on a casual, emergency, temporary or regular employment status. Likewise, the provisions of Section 23 (sic) of the Joint DBM-CSC Circular Letter No. 88-1, implementing guidelines of R.A. No. 6683, provides:"2.3 Excluded from the benefits under R.A. No. 6683 are the following:a) Experts and Consultants hired by agencies for a limited period to perform specific activities or services with a definite expected output:i.e. membership in Task Force, Part-Time, Consultant/Employees.b) Uniformed personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines including those of the Philippine Constabulary and Integrated National Police (PC-INP).c) Appointive officials and employees who retire or elect to be separated from the service for optional retirement with gratuity under R.A. No. 1616, 4968 or with pension under R.A. No. 186, as amended by R.A. No. 6680 or P.D. No. 1146, an amended, or vice- versa.d) Officials and employees who retired voluntarily prior to the enactment of this law and have received the corresponding benefits of that retirement/separation.e) Officials and employees with pending cases punishable by mandatory separation from the service under existing civil service laws, rules and regulations; provided that if such officials and employees apply in writing within the prescriptive period for the availment of the benefits herein authorized, shall be allowed only if acquitted or cleared of all charges and their application accepted and approved by the head of office concerned."Based on the above exclusions, herein petitioner does not belong to any one of them. Ms. Chua is a full time employee of NIA entitled to all the regular benefits provided for by the Civil Service Commission. She held a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A, a position which belongs to the Administrative Service. . . . If casuals and emergency employees were given the benefit of R.A. 6683 with more reason that this petitioner who was holding a permanent status as Personnel Assistant A and has rendered almost 15 years of faithful, continuous service in the government should be similarly rewarded by the beneficient (sic) purpose of the law.4The NIA and the Civil Service Commission reiterate in their comment petitioner's exclusion from the benefits of Republic Act No. 6683, because:1. Petitioner's employment is co-terminous with the project per appointment papers kept by the Administrative Service in the head office of NIA (the service record was issued by the Watershed Management and Erosion Control Project (WMECP), Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija). The project, funded by the World Bank, was completed as of 31 December 1988, after which petitioner's position becamefunctus officio.2. Petitioner is not a regular and career employee of NIA her position is not included in its regular plantilla. She belongs to the non-career service (Sec. 6, P.D. No. 807) which is inherently short-lived, temporary and transient; on the other hand, retirement presupposes employment for a long period. The most that a non-career personnel can expect upon the expiration of his employment is financial assistance. Petitioner is not even qualified to retire under the GSIS law.3. Assumingarguendothat petitioner's appointment is permanent, security of tenure is available only for the term of office (i.e.,duration of project).4. The objective of Republic Act No. 6683 is not really to grant separation or retirement benefits but reorganization5to streamline government functions. The application of the law must be made consistent with the purpose for which it was enacted. Thus, as the expressed purpose of the law is to reorganize the government, it will not have any application to special projects such as the WMECP which exists only for a short and definite period. This being the nature of special projects, there is no necessity for offering its personnel early retirement benefits just to induce voluntary separation as a step to reorganization. In fact, there is even no need of reorganizing the WMECP considering its short and limited life-span.65. The law applies only to employees of the national government, government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters and local government units.Due to the impossibility of reconciling the conflicting interpretations of the parties, the Court is called upon to define the different classes of employees in the public sector (i.e. government civil servants).Who areregular employees?The Labor Code in Art. 280 (P.D. No. 492, as amended) deems an employment regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. No equivalent definition can be found in P.D.No. 807 (promulgated on 6 October 1975, which superseded the Civil Service Act of 1965 R.A. No. 2260) or in the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292 promulgated on 25 July 1987). The Early Retirement Law itself (Rep. Act No. 6683) merely includes such class of employees (regular employees) in its coverage, unmindful that no such specie is employed in the public sector.The appointment status of government employees in thecareer serviceis classified as follows:1. permanent one issued to a person who has met the requirements of the position to which appointment is made, in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Service Act and the Rules and Standards promulgated in pursuance thereof;72. temporary In the absence of appropriate eligibles and it becomes necessary in the public interest to fill a vacancy, a temporary appointment should be issued to a person who meets all the requirements for the position to which he is being appointed except the appropriate civil service eligibility: Provided, That such temporary appointment shall not exceed twelve months, but the appointee may be replaced sooner if a qualified civil service eligible becomes available.8The Administrative Code of 1987 characterizes theCareer Serviceas:(1) Open Career positions for appointment to which prior qualification in an appropriate examination is required;(2) Closed Career positions which are scientific, or highly technical in nature; these include the faculty and academic staff of state colleges and universities, and scientific and technical positions in scientific or research institutions which shall establish and maintain their own merit systems;(3) Positions in the Career Executive Service; namely, Undersecretary, Assistant Secretary, Bureau Director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director, Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, all of whom are appointed by the President.(4) Career officers, other than those in the Career Executive Service, who are appointed by the President, such as the Foreign Service Officers in the Department of Foreign Affairs;(5) Commission officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces which shall maintain a separate merit system;(6) Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, who do not fall under the non-career service; and(7) Permanent laborers, whether skilled, semi-skilled, or unskilled.9TheNon-Career Service, on the other hand, is characterized by:. . . (1) entrance on bases other than those of the usual tests of merit and fitness utilized for the career service; and (2) tenure which is limited to a period specified by law, or which is coterminous with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or which is limited to the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made.Included in thenon-career serviceare:1. elective officials and their personal or confidential staff;2. secretaries and other officials of Cabinet rank who hold their positions at the pleasure of the President and their personal confidential staff(s);3. Chairman and Members of Commissions and boards with fixed terms of office and their personal or confidential staff;4. contractual personnel or those whose employment in the government is in accordance with a special contract to undertake a specific work or job requiring special or technical skills not available in the employing agency, to be accomplished within a specific period, which in no case shall exceed one year and performs or accomplishes the specific work or job, under his own responsibility with a minimum of direction and supervision from the hiring agency.5. emergency and seasonal personnel.10There isanother type of non-career employee:Casual where and when employment is not permanent but occasional, unpredictable, sporadic and brief in nature (Caro v. Rilloroza, 102 Phil. 70; Manuel v. P.P. Gocheco Lumber Co., 96 Phil. 945)Consider petitioner's record of service:Service with the government commenced on 2 December 1974 designated as a laborer holdingemergencystatus with the NIA Upper Pampanga River Project, R & R Division.11From 24 March 1975 to 31 August 1975, she was a research aide withtemporarystatus on the same project. On 1 September 1975 to 31 December 1976, she was with the NIA-FES III; R & R Division, then on 1 January 1977 to 31 May 1980, she was with NIA UPR IIS (Upper Pampanga River Integrated Irrigation Systems) DRD. On 1 June 1980, she went to NIA W.M.E.C.P. (Watershed Management & Erosion Control Project) retaining the status oftemporaryemployee. While with this project, her designation was changed to personnel assistant on 5 November 1981; starting 9 July 1982, the status becamepermanentuntil the completion of the project on 31 December 1988. The appointment paper12attached to the OSG's comment lists her status as co-terminus with the Project.The employment status of personnel hired under foreign assisted projects is consideredco-terminous, that is, they are considered employees for the duration of the project or until the completion or cessation of said project (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 39, S. 1990, 27 June 1990).Republic Act No. 6683 seeks to cover and benefitsregular, temporary, casualandemergencyemployees who have rendered at least a total oftwo (2) consecutive years government service.Resolution No. 87-104 of the CSC, 21 April 1987, provides:WHEREAS, pursuant to Executive Order No. 966 dated June 22, 1984, the Civil Service Commission is charged with the function of determining creditable services for retiring officers and employees of the national government;WHEREAS, Section 4 (b) of the same Executive Order No. 966 provides that all previous services by an officer/employee pursuant to a duly approved appointment to a position in the Civil Service are considered creditable services, while Section 6 (a) thereof states that services rendered oncontractual, emergencyorcasualstatus are non-creditable services;WHEREAS, there is a need to clarify the aforesaid provisions inasmuch as some contractual, emergency or casual employment are covered by contracts or appointments duly approved by the Commission.NOW, therefore, the Commission resolved that services rendered on contractual, emergency or casual status, irrespective of the mode or manner of payment therefor shall be considered as creditable for retirement purposes subject to the following conditions: (emphasis provided)1. These services are supported by approved appointments, official records and/or other competent evidence. Parties/agencies concerned shall submit the necessary proof of said services;2. Said services are on full time basis and rendered prior to June 22, 1984, the effectivity date of Executive Order No. 966; and3. The services for the three (3) years period prior to retirement are continuous and fulfill the service requirement for retirement.What substantial differences exist, if any, between casual, emergency, seasonal, project, co-terminous or contractual personnel? All are tenurial employees with no fixed term, non-career, and temporary. The 12 May 1989 CSC letter of denial13characterized herein petitioner's employment asco-terminouswith theNIA projectwhich in turn wascontractualin nature. The OSG says petitioner's status isco-terminouswith the Project. CSC Memorandum Circular No. 11, series of 1991 (5 April 1991) characterizes the status of aco-terminous employee(3) Co-terminous statusshall be issued to a person whose entrance in the service is characterized by confidentiality by the appointing authority or that which is subject to his pleasure or co-existent with his tenure.The foregoing status (co-terminous) may be further classified into the following:a) co-terminous with the project When the appointment is co-existent with the duration of a particular project for which purpose employment was made or subject to the availability of funds for the same;b) co-terminous with the appointing authority when appointment is co-existent with the tenure of the appointing authority.c) co-terminous with the incumbent when appointment is co-existent with the appointee, in that after the resignation, separation or termination of the services of the incumbent the position shall be deemed automatically abolished; andd) co-terminous with a specific period, e.g. "co-terminous for a period of 3 years" the appointment is for a specific period and upon expiration thereof, the position is deemed abolished.It is stressed, however, that in the last two classifications (c) and (d), what is termed co-terminous is the position, and not the appointee-employee. Further, in (c) the security of tenure of the appointee is guaranteed during his incumbency; in (d) the security of tenure is limited to a specific period.Aco-terminous employeeis a non-career civil servant, likecasualandemergencyemployees. We see no solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly extends its benefits for early retirement toregular, temporary, casualandemergencyemployees. But specifically excluded from the benefits are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP.