the berlin historical review

The Berlin Historical Review Vol.01/No.02 (2013)

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The Berlin Historical Review

The open-‐access History Journal

ISSN 2196-‐6125 Volume I • Issue 02 • Special Issue • Autumn 2013

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Special Issue Autumn 2013


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The Berlin Historical Review The open-‐access History Journal

Volume 01/No.02 (2013) Published by Julia Kompe

Berlin, 2013

ISSN 2196-‐6125 Founding Editor & Editor-‐in-‐Chief

Julia Kompe King’s College London & Humboldt University of Berlin Editors

Rhyannon Bartlett-‐Imadegawa St. Anne’s College, University of Oxford Sam Walton University of Sussex & University of Texas at Austin David Coates University of St Andrews Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de . All articles published by and in the Berlin Historical Review are licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-‐NonCommercial-‐NoDerivs 3.0 Unported License. Click here for more information: http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-‐nc-‐nd/3.0/deed.en


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Contents Editorial Welcome 04 My Meeting with President Kennedy: A Personal Account Morris Wolff 06 "Hey skinny, your ribs are showing". What can the success of Charles Atlas’s business tell us about the American Male Psyche in the early 20th Century? Conor Heffernan 10 Goodbye my lover, Goodbye my friend? The Future of the Transatlantic Relationship Mirco Reimer 20 For US eyes only? The untold story of the British reaction to the Iran-‐Contra Affair Sam Hamberger 41 Open Call for Submissions 60 Open Access & Copyright Policy 61


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Editorial Welcome On behalf of the Editorial Board, I would like to welcome you to the Autumn 2013 issue of the Berlin Historical Review! Firstly, we would like to thank our readers for all the positive feedback that we have received since the publication of our Inaugural Issue earlier this year, and which we have gratefully taken on board. We are also very proud to announce, that the Berlin Historical Review has recently received the annual award for outstanding commitment to historical research and scholarship by the History Department of the Humboldt Universität zu Berlin. Thankful for this recognition of our achievements, we hope that you will now enjoy this long-‐awaited, first Special Issue of the Berlin Historical Review on American History. We are honoured to publish an account of Morris Wolff’s meeting with President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, in 1963 as the centrepiece of this themed release. It offers a revealing and poetic picture of the man just months before his tragic assassination; who was driven by ideals for the future and invested his hope in the youth of the world to bring about peace, at perhaps the most tense moments in the Cold War. Mr. Wolff has kindly chosen the Berlin Historical Review to publish the account of his personal meeting with President John F. Kennedy, which gives valuable insight into a more personal interaction that this charismatic President had with his peers, and how he hoped to engage with the future leaders of the world. The words of Mr. Wolff are especially poignant, as this month marks the 50th anniversary of the terrible event of President John F. Kennedy’s assassination. This issue enjoys an American theme to complement the piece on one of its most famous citizens. The articles will touch on the history of America during on the 20th century, dealing with both its foreign policy and an internal crisis of masculinity; John F. Kennedy is a luminary of the former, and an exception to the latter. The first article, by Conor Hefferman, uses a concrete historical example to make an ambitious case that there was a national crisis in American masculinity during the first half of the 20th century. In providing a focussed narrative of the Charles Atlas programme and its unusual successfulness during recessions in the US, the article utilises sources with skill and precision to bring insight into the complex history of the perception of masculinity. Hefferman provides a focussed narrative of the Charles Atlas programme that utilises sources with skill and precision. It is a fine monographic essay which enlightens the subject of American masculinity during the middle of the century. Secondly, Mirco Reimer examines the lens of American foreign policy, and global leadership, through its relationship with European integration. It is a well-‐researched article examining a complex and controversial subject. Reimer utilises an attractive and flexible style of prose to make an interesting and thought-‐provoking argument. In the third article Sam Hamberger further investigates the complexities of US foreign policy by examining the reaction of one of its most important allies, Great Britain, to a major scandal, the Iran-‐Contra affair. By making extensive use of what materials he was able to access, he gives an outside perspective on the actions of a sometimes arrogant and corrupt


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US administration. In this endeavour he discovers a hugely nuanced, and very enlightening, array of responses from both the British state and the British press. An intelligent and insightful conclusion to the theme that allows a new understanding of Great Britain's role in a Cold War context Special Relationship. Taken together, Reimer and Hamberger’s articles lend a small window into the leadership of the United States in 20th history. The socio-‐cultural history narrative provided by Hefferman adds to the picture by providing a sense of context for desirable qualities in a leader during times of crisis. This issue, and Mr. Wolff’s account, hint at the different course that history may have taken if not for three bullets. We hope that you will enjoy reading this first special issue of the Berlin Historical Review and we look forward to receiving your comments and feedback. We also welcome potential contributions for future issues at any time. Please do not hesitate to get in touch with us: [email protected] Best wishes, Rhyannon Bartlett-‐Imadegawa, David Coates, Sam Walton and Julia Kompe Editor-‐in-‐Chief

Morris Wolff The Berlin Historical Review

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My meeting with President Kennedy

A Personal Account by Morris Wolff

Abstract: This article relates a personal account by Morris Wolff, of his meeting with President John F. Kennedy in April 1963, as the International President and Secretary General of the Association Internationale des Etudiants en Sciences Economiques et Commerciales (AIESEC). Keywords: President John F. Kennedy, AIESEC, Cold War, Nuclear Test Ban Treaty It is hard to believe this November 22nd will be the fiftieth anniversary of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. It seems like only yesterday I had the honor and privilege of meeting with him privately in the Oval Office in the White House. In April 1963, I was living in Washington D.C. while working at the Department of Justice as an aide to then-‐Attorney General Robert Kennedy. I had just graduated from Yale Law School in January, and landed a highly sought after position in the Office of the Legal Counsel as part of a five-‐man team charged with writing the initial draft of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At 26 years of age, I was an idealistic young man living in an idealistic time, and I fit right in with the ideology of the young president and his brother. At the time I was also the International President and Secretary General of the Association Internationale des Etudiants en Sciences Economiques et Commerciales (AIESEC). This youth-‐run program enabled international exchange students to intern in both for-‐profit and non-‐profit businesses worldwide. AIESEC’s goal was, and remains, to affect peaceful change in the world ‘one student at a time.’ At that time it was the largest student exchange program in existence. That April the annual international meeting of AIESEC’s presidents was held in Washington D.C. and Attorney General Kennedy had graciously prepared a reception for them. They had assembled from countries all around the globe, and many of them were the best and the brightest from the world’s developing countries. Attorney General Kennedy was so impressed with their intelligence and ability to key in on the heart of global issues, that he decided it would be in the President’s best interest to meet them. As he and I sat talking following the reception, he called the President and convinced him to set aside time the following day to meet with the entire contingent in the Rose Garden at the White House. It was agreed I would meet at 8a.m. to brief President Kennedy on the group, its goals, its progress to date on accomplishing those goals, and how I thought the President’s relationship with the group might help further world peace.


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The next morning, April 10th 1963, dawned clear and beautiful. I had made many prior trips to the Oval Office to hand-‐deliver private messages between the attorney general and the President, but this was a private 45-‐minute meeting with a president I admired and respected. I was so excited I couldn’t sleep and awoke at 4a.m. The excitement built as I drove to the White House; the smell of cherry blossoms from the trees surrounding the Tidal Basin of the Jefferson Memorial filled the air. Once I reached the White House, President Kennedy’s appointments secretary, Evelyn Lincoln, came to meet me at the front door of the West Wing. She ushered me inside and we stopped for a moment to look at the new President’s Dining Room, recently refurbished by Jackie Kennedy. We reached the Oval Office and Mrs. Lincoln knocked gently on the closed door. ‘Mr. President. I have Morris Wolff here to see you.’ She opened the door and the President walked towards me. I stood quietly transfixed in the doorway, taking it all in. Every time I visited this office was like the first time. There is an amazing aura to it and it never gets old. I looked down at the sky blue carpet with the great Presidential Seal in the middle. I looked up at the president’s dark brown Lincoln Desk sitting majestically just in front of the capacious bay window, giving a stunning view of the Washington Monument, which was bathed in the early morning sunlight. The President was reading a memo stamped ‘Top Secret.’ Only later did I learn this was his initial notice of the sinking of the American nuclear submarine, USS Thresher. At that very moment, it was lying on the bottom of the Atlantic Ocean with all hands trapped inside, with Soviet and Cuban sabotage suspected. He waved his hand and invited me to sit down on the blue couch next to his rocking chair. As he walked the few short steps back to his chair, he grimaced slightly and looked away so I would not be able to see his pain. It was evident his back was hurting from the injury he received when his patrol torpedo boat PT 109 was rammed and cut in half by the Japanese destroyer Amagiri, during World War II. He covered the grimace with a smile. I had sent him my resumé and a ‘talking-‐points’ fact sheet for AIESEC the previous night, and the president now held them. He was a dedicated speed-‐reader and I watched as he practically inhaled the sheets’ contents. In my life, I have never seen anyone digest material that quickly, and the President adapted it all into the Rose Garden speech he gave just minutes later; He was a brilliant and amazing man. ‘Morris, I read your resumé and the Fact Sheet about AIESEC that you sent over in advance. Having those talking points will be very helpful,’ he said. ‘When I talk with them, I want to hear their views and find out what is happening in their world, in their countries. I want to hear about life back home and how they see their own lives and the future unfolding.’

The President was genuinely interested in how these young men and women were

faring, as he felt world peace hinged on the decisions their generation would make in the coming years. We were in the heart of the Cold War and he had just stared down Russian President Nikita Khrushchev six months earlier during the Cuban Missile Crisis, and knew the future of the entire human race hung daily in the balance. He was preparing to address the build-‐up of nuclear weapons worldwide, and felt this group of young people from around the world would be a great sounding board for his ideas.


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He sat down in the rocking chair, looked up, and began to speak. “I am in the final stages of negotiating a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty with the Russians and this visit from your students comes at a perfect time. In a month I will make it known that I will sign the treaty, and the Russians will sign as well. This will not be made public today, but I will emphasize peace and the need for an end to nuclear competition in my remarks to your AIESEC students this morning during the Rose Garden ceremony.”

The president then laid out to me his plan to end the Cold War, and to start moving toward a genuine peace. He explained his comprehensive global peace initiative that was to be the key accomplishment of his administration as he prepared to run for re-‐election in 1964. He wanted to create open and transparent communications with the Russians. He said he had the red “hot line” phone for emergencies but he wanted more than that. He wanted to strengthen programs such as the Peace Corps and AIESEC. He also wanted to exchange governmental personnel between the U.S. State Department and the Soviet Foreign Ministry.

President Kennedy realized there were serious roadblocks threatening any chance of a durable peace and that he needed help from all nations and all generations. He continued to speak, “Your AIESEC program is strong, independent, non-‐political and non-‐governmental. You don’t look for handouts and your students travel great distances to live with a family and work with a company in a foreign country. Graduates of this program will be our future world leaders and they will have good values that will make a real difference in our chances for world peace. That is my top priority. I want to change the world’s atmosphere of war and bring about lasting peace.” One month later during the commencement speech at American University he would explain those plans for peace to a waiting world, plans that included high-‐level discussions with Soviet leader Khrushchev on the ban of nuclear weapons and an end to the Cold War. The president and I continued to talk and he spoke of his desire to end our presence in Vietnam, to soften relations with the Soviet Union, and to bring about a world peace that would stand the test of time. Looking back on our meeting, what amazes me is the fact that although he knew of the dire importance of the sinking of the Thresher, he focused himself entirely on the issue of world peace and his meeting with the AIESEC presidents. To me this emphasizes the importance President Kennedy placed on peace… even as the threat of war with the Soviet Union and Cuba seemingly loomed on the horizon.

As our meeting ended, we both went out into the Rose Garden where he spoke about that peace to young men and women who would remember his words and take them home to their peoples. As I started to leave he led me back to his office. As we entered, the atmosphere had decidedly changed. Waiting for the president were Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, the National Security Advisor, Press Secretary, Pierre Salinger, and Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense. Their faces were somber as they waited to assist the president in determining how our country would react to the possible sabotage of the Thresher.

President Kennedy remained friendly and attentive to me. He led me over to his desk and took from the right top drawer a tie clip honouring the 12 days of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Until then it had only been given to key officials like Bobby Kennedy and Dean Rusk,


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who were deeply involved in the actual deliberations. It was wrapped in cellophane with blue velvet backing and a blue and white ribbon across the top of it. He handed the small maroon leather box to me. I was thrilled and speechless. “This goes with your Kennedy Medal,” he said. “We have loved your visit.”

He stood beside the Lincoln desk and continued to speak. “Morris, war solves nothing on any permanent basis. War just leads to more violence. My administration has taken steps against war as an instrument of foreign policy, and you will see these moves happen in the next few months. I will lay out a major initiative and strategy for achieving a lasting and genuine peace.” How could I have known that just seven short months later his life would end… as would his dreams of world peace.

President John F. Kennedy was my hero. He was cool, nonchalant, detached, and humorous. He was a man with a vision and a specific plan for achieving genuine peace and lasting security in the world… and I was privy to his plan. What an honor. Few knew how deeply passionate this great man was when it came to achieving peace among all men. As I left the White House that day, it was if I was floating along on the scent of the Cherry blossoms. I felt as if world peace was at hand, because I had heard it spoken from the lips of the most powerful man on Earth… President Kennedy. It was as if I had been let in on a secret that few would ever know. I cherish this memory beyond words.

Conor Heffernan The Berlin Historical Review

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"Hey skinny, your ribs are showing". What can the success of Charles Atlas’s business tell us about the American Male Psyche in

the early 20th Century?

Conor Heffernan

History and Political Science B.A., Trinity College Dublin (Dublin, IRL)

Abstract: By focusing on the early years of the Atlas business, specifically 1929 to 1948, this paper will look at what the success of Atlas’s business tells us about the American male psyche’s definition of masculinity during this time.1 The paper contends that Atlas’s business came at a profound juncture in US history, during which there was a perceived crisis of masculinity in the male psyche in both the public and elites. It will be argued that Atlas’s business was successful because it asseverated that it could provide qualities that men believed they needed and wanted at this time Keywords: 20th Century US, The Great Depression, body image, Charles Atlas Fitness and the fitness industry are relatively un-‐mined topics for historical research. Such research as exists tends to focus on biographies of famous figures in the industry, rather than analyse societal trends and identity formation. This paper will juxtapose both approaches. In the early twentieth century, Charles Atlas and his business partner Charles Roman created a mail order workout course, which continues to this day and has had over thirty million customers.2 By focusing on the early years of the Atlas business, specifically 1929 to 1948, this paper will look at what the success of Atlas’s business tells us about the American male psyche’s definition of masculinity during this time.3 This paper contends that Atlas’s business came at a profound juncture in US history, during which there was a perceived crisis of masculinity in the male psyche in both the public and elites. It will be argued that Atlas’s business was successful because it asseverated that it could provide qualities men believed they needed and wanted at this time. In doing so, this paper will firstly give a brief historical background to establish the existing crisis of masculinity. Then, Atlas and Roman themselves will be studied briefly as the two key figures, to establish the public personae of both men. The product, and more importantly its advertising, is then examined to elucidate its marketing campaign. Lastly, the paper will examine the qualities 1 Psyche being taken to mean the male perception of this era. Taken from Oxford Dictionary definition: “the human soul, mind, or spirit”, Oxford Dictionary, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/psyche, (Date accessed: 19th February 2013).

2 Bean, J., [email protected], ‘Early Business Records’, 19th February 2013. 3 Psyche being taken to mean the male perception of this era. Taken from Oxford Dictionary definition: “the human soul, mind, or spirit”, Oxford Dictionary, http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/psyche, (Date accessed: 19th February 2013).


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which Atlas’s product purported to provide: namely, a sense of control, increased sexual vigour and attractiveness, and a strong personality. Such qualities, it will be argued, were taken to represent the cornerstones of masculinity in the male psyche at this time, in response to a perceived crisis of masculinity.

When discussing the historical background of Atlas’s product and perceived crisis of masculinity in the male psyche, this paper distinguishes between short and long term societal trends in the USA. Firstly, with regard to health, in the early to mid-‐1800s in the US, men of rotund proportions were considered the embodiment of health and fitness.4 Muscularity was associated with the working class, toiling in fields or factories.5 This perception began changing from the 1860s onwards with the adoption of physical culture, generally defined as “the sum total of a society’s activities and attitudes connected with physical development and education”.6 There was a societal change that brought anew acceptance of exercising as a means of improving the body. The change was primarily due to the increased interest in sport among the upper classes, and also due to the rise of the concept of ‘Christian Muscularity’ among the lower classes, whereby a good Christian was seen as a strong Christian.7 Men such as Eugen Sandow and Bernarr McFadden became, for many, living embodiments of physical culture in the early twentieth century, and both proved very successful in spreading physical culture in the US before the arrival of Atlas.

Long-‐term trends of immigration and industrialization increased in America during this time, with many immigrants from Europe bringing their interest in fitness across the Ocean.8 Jaqueline Reich has noted that the rise of immigration and industrialization in the US led some social commentators to believe that American men were becoming too feminine.9 Indeed, Kimmel has argued that the long-‐term trend of economic competition in the US led to a destabilized sense of masculinity in the US during the nineteenth century.10 These perceived crises of masculinity can contribute to our understanding of why physical culture became popular in the US in this period. Pettegrew, writing in 2007, argued that men sought a muscular body type during the era as a way of differentiating themselves from women.11

Short-‐term societal trends also provide a window into the male psyche at this time. Atlas’s business managed to make profits during the Great Depression in America, throughout the era of Roosevelt’s New Deal, and also during the build up to, and duration of, the Second World War.12 Both contemporary and modern commentators have noted that

4 Chapman, David L., Sandow the Magnificent: Eugen Sandow and the Beginnings of Bodybuilding (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1994), p.2.

5 Ibid, p.2. 6 Roach, Randy, Muscle, Smoke, & Mirrors: Volume I (Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse 2008), p. 5. 7 Greene, Warren, A Child of Three Fathers: Physical Culture and the Birth of the Modern FitnessMagazine, MA Thesis, Lehigh University: Pennsylvania, USA (2003), p. 5.

8 Greene, A Child of Three Fathers, p. 5, and Reich, Jacqueline, ‘The World's Most Perfectly Developed Man': Charles Atlas, Physical Culture, and the Inscription of American Masculinity’, Men and Masculinities, 12 (2010), p. 456.

9 Reich, ‘The World's Most Perfectly Developed Man', p. 452. 10 Ibid, p. 452. 11 Pettegrew, John, Brutes in Suits: Male Sensibility in America, 1890-‐1920 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007), p. 309.

12 Ibid, p. 313.


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during the Great Depression, men blamed themselves for the economic crash.13 Indeed, Atlas’s business partner, Roman, noted in 1942 that their business tended to do well during times of crisis, as men believed they were unemployed due to a lack of physical power.14 Conversely, it could be argued that the loss of employment may have led to a sense of emasculation in some men during the Great Depression, by which engaging in physical self-‐improvement allowed them to regain a sense of control. Such a postulation is echoed in Wiegers’s work, where he argues that men turned to fitness as compensation for social changes that left them feeling stripped of power.15 Added to this, the build-‐up to the Second World War in the 1930s and 1940s made men more conscious of their bodies, as military fitness became a talking point in the media.16 Physical fitness then became not just a matter of pride; it might be argued that it became a means of survival and self-‐preservation. Taken as a whole, these long-‐term and short-‐term societal trends go some way to explaining the society and male psyche that Atlas and Roman tapped into.

This paper will now give a brief biography of the public persona presented by Charles Atlas and his business partner, Charles Roman. Randy Roach perhaps summed up the fitness industry best when he described much of it as ‘muscle, smoke and mirrors’.17 Atlas himself was an almost mythical embodiment of many of the prevailing societal changes. He was an Italian immigrant, who, according to legend, went from being a ‘97 pound weakling’ as a boy, to winning Bernarr McFadden’s ‘Most Perfectly Developed Man’ competition in 1921 and 1922. After Atlas’s victory in 1922, it is said that McFadden ceased holding the competition, as Atlas would win every time.18 Atlas himself preached and practiced a healthy, clean life, reminiscent of the idea of ‘Christian Muscularity’ of the previous century.19 Some contemporaries compared Atlas’s physique with that of a Greek God.20 Atlas set up a mail order business in 1922, but it did not take off until 1929 when he met Charles Roman. Roman was a $35-‐a-‐week account executive at the New York Advertising Agency before he met Atlas. According to legend, Roman told Atlas that the advertising he had been using was not working. Months later, Roman became Atlas's partner in their new company. Roman preferred, it seems, to allow Atlas be the face of the campaign, while he focused on the marketing aspect.21 Nonetheless, upon Roman’s death, the New York Times obituary declared Roman to have been ‘the Brains Behind the Brawn’.22

13 Black, Jonathan, ‘Muscle Man’ Smithsonian, 40:5 (2009), p. 66. 14 Zolotow, M., ‘You, Too, Can Be a New Man’, Saturday Evening Post, (7 February 1942), p. 59. 15 Wiegers, Yvonne, ‘Male Bodybuilding: The Social Construction of a Masculine Identity’, The Journal of Popular Culture, 32 (1998), p. 148.

16 Ibid, p. 3 and Zolotow, ‘You, Too, Can Be a New Man’, p. 61. 17 Roach, Muscle, Smoke, & Mirrors, p. xii. 18 Gaines, Charles, Butler, George, and Roman, Charles P., Yours in Perfect Manhood, Charles Atlas: The Most Effective Fitness Program Ever Devised (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), p. 26. Also importantly, McFadden held the competition after the success of a similar competition held by Eugen Sandow first in 1901; according to Chapman, Sandow the Magnificent, p. 135.

19 Gaines, and Butler, in Yours in Perfect Manhood, quoted Atlas as saying, “We are created in God’s image and God doesn’t want to be a weakling”, p. 92.

20 Atlas, Charles, Everlasting Health and Strength, (New York, 1936),p. 7. 21 Greene, A Child of Three Fathers, p. 46. 22 Pace, Eric, ‘Charles Roman, the Brains Behind the Brawn, Dies at 92’ http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/20/business/charles-‐roman-‐the-‐brains-‐behind-‐the-‐brawn-‐dies-‐at-‐ 92.html, (Date accessed: 18 January 2013).


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With Charles Atlas as the face and Roman as the brains, the business flourished. The company made over $300,000 in 1941 alone.23 To understand the business’s success in the economic climate in the 1930s, it is necessary to examine the product that was marketed and sold. The product itself was a mail order workout program, delivered in twelve lessons that promised a radical change in physique and appearance if followed dutifully.24 The programme demanded dedicated commitment from the user to be effective. What was novel, and to the course’s advantage, was that no equipment was necessary. The program was based on what Roman termed ‘Dynamic Tension’, meaning muscles would be built by pitting one muscle against the other.25 Roman, the main figure behind the advertising, used bold statements such as “Let me prove I can make you a new man”, “Don’t be a half man’, or “I manufacture weaklings into men”.26 The most famous of the Atlas ads was a comic strip, supposedly depicting an episode from Atlas’s life, in which a young man (‘Mac’) is bullied on a beach in front of a girl, who then goes home in shame and begins the Atlas course, finally defeating the same bully, and gets the girl. It was accompanied by the caption ‘the insult that made a man out of Mac’. It was a powerful indication of what a man should be; strong willed, attractive and with a muscular body.27 Pettegrew has called this ad, “one of the most formative commercial texts on normative American masculinity ever seen”.28 Toon and Golden go further and called it “the greatest mail order ad of all time”.29

The delivery of the ads was as important and effective as the messages themselves. Famously ‘the insult that made a man out of Mac’ advertising was produced in dozens of comic book strips, and is regarded as one of the most successful comic advertising in US history.30 The strip reached out to adolescent teenagers. The message of what strength and muscles could achieve was delivered at an important time of identity formation for many teenagers.31 Zolotow, writing in 1942, noted “for twenty years, the iron muscled body of Atlas has fascinated adolescents”.32 Roman himself noted that in the early years of the business, the average age of the men subscribing to the course was between 15 and 25.33 While marketing was primarily geared towards younger generations, Atlas was quick to point out that his workout could be done by all ages.34 Notwithstanding, it is generally agreed that the course was marketed towards the young.35 Atlas himself contributed to the promotion of his product by participating in numerous public exhibitions, further enhancing his image in the public eye as a man of herculean strength and beauty.36 Along with these public exhibitions, Atlas’s advertisements circulated in a number of magazines with a huge

23 Newman, Maria, ‘Hey Skinny! Charles Atlas Lives!’, New York Times, 31 May 2001,p. 3. 24 Atlas, Everlasting Health and Strength, p. 42. 25 Gaines, and Butler, Yours in Perfect Manhood, p. 67. 26 Charles Atlas, as quoted on the Official Website for Charles Atlas, http://www.charlesatlas.com/, (Date accessed: 6 January 2013).

27 Ibid. 28 Pettegrew, Brutes in suits, p. 310. 29 Golden, Janet, and Toon, Elizabeth, ‘Rethinking Charles Atlas’, Rethinking History, 4 (2000), p. 80. 30 Duncan, Randy, and Smith, Matthew J., The Power of Comics: History, Form and Culture (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2009), pp. 96-‐97.

31 Ibid, pp. 96-‐97. 32 Zolotow, ‘You, Too, Can Be a New Man’, p. 21. 33 Pace, ‘Charles Roman, the Brains Behind the Brawn, Dies at 92’. 34 Atlas, Everlasting Health and Strength, p. 39. 35 Greene, A Child of Three Fathers, p. 48. 36 Ibid., p. 49.


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geographical spread. In 1942 alone, Atlas’s business advertised in some one hundred and twenty five pulp-‐paper magazines.37

Having discussed Atlas and Romans’ product, along with its advertising, this paper will now examine what this product can illuminate about ‘elite’ (represented by Atlas, Roman and their published advertisements) and public perceptions of masculinity and the crisis of masculinity at this time. This allows an insight into the male psyche of the time. It is interesting that the success of the product came after America’s successful engagement in the First World War and a period of relative prosperity, followed by the trauma of the Great Depression. Perhaps it was not surprising that the youth of America were attracted to a programme that seemed to promise increased physical strength and self-‐discipline. This paper argues that elite perceptions about masculinity were partly concerned with control, and indeed their programme marketed the idea that men had to take control of their lives. This is made clear in several of the advertising techniques used in promoting the Atlas product. As mentioned earlier, Roman asserted that their business tended to do well during times of crisis, as men believed they were unemployed due to a lack of physical power.38 Atlas in 1936 wrote, “This is essentially the age of survival of the fittest”39, and Atlas advertised that his workout course held “the key to your future”.40 Accordingly the message being promulgated was that physical power equated taking control of one’s destiny.

Control in the Atlas advertisements extended beyond physical power: it included control over one’s body and habits. Lesson One of the Atlas Dynamic Tension Course elucidated this thus: “the first great step necessary is the reformation of habits”.41 Atlas called this “personal power”, and certainly it represented a new means of control over ones’ self.42 Early Atlas advertisements challenged men to “take charge of your life”.43 Indeed in 1936, Atlas wrote that if one had any secret habits they wanted to be rid of, they needed his course.44 Lesson One of the Dynamic Tension workout also demanded that ‘students’ “mastered methods for acquiring great internal strength”.45 Coupled with this, Atlas’s company sent out testimonial forms to students asking them to note any changes in their will power since beginning the course.46 Uses of such forms present a powerful reminder of the effectiveness of the marketing campaign. Control over ones’ body and mind was thus seen as the epitome of masculinity by elites.

How did the public respond to this idea? Letters to Charles Atlas from ‘students’ (as he called his customers) of his workout provide an interesting window of study into the male psyche. One student’s wife, ‘B.A.’ wrote to thank Atlas, as due to his workout course, her husband had stopped drinking alcohol completely.47 Another student wrote to Atlas claiming

37 Zolotow, ‘You, Too, Can Be a New Man’, p. 21. 38 Ibid, p. 60. 39 Atlas, Everlasting Health and Strength, p. 19. 40 Gaines, and Butler, Yours in Perfect Manhood, p. 110. 41 Atlas, Charles, Dynamic Tension Lesson One, (New York, 1948), p. 1. 42 Atlas, Dynamic Tension Lesson One, p. 1. 43 Gaines, and Butler, Yours in Perfect Manhood, p. 69. 44 Atlas, Everlasting Health and Strength, p. 27. 45 Atlas, Dynamic Tension Lesson One, p. 5. 46 Atlas, Charles, Confidential Progress Report for the Personal Attention of Charles Atlas [Letter], Atlas Collection, 4:27, (1929), Smithsonian Museum, Washington.

47 Gaines, and Butler, Yours in Perfect Manhood, p. 146.


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“today I feel no man can rule or oppress me”, exhibiting the importance of control over one’s destiny.48 A recent study by Pope, Phillips and Olivarelia, found that control is a major incentive for men to exercise.49 Certainly this seems to have been the case for some ‘students’ of Charles Atlas during this time. ‘M.H.’ from Texas informed Atlas “my body will show anyone how I am today”.50 Wiegers has argued that physical culture at this time was tied to a strong work ethic, and that ‘out of shape’ bodies represented laziness and weakness for some.51 Thus, elite ideas of control seem to have resonated greatly with some of Atlas’s ‘students’ as a defining characteristic of masculinity. Control indicated a strong work ethic and discipline in a period of instability.

Control was not the only issue that characterised masculinity for elites such as Atlas and Roman; Sexual health and attractiveness were also cornerstones of masculinity in the male psyche. Chapman, writing on Eugene Sandow, a predecessor of Atlas, wrote that one aspect of physical culture Sandow promoted was that it helped those men with a ‘lack of vigour’, a euphemism for sexual impotency.52 Atlas, writing in 1936, was more subtle in his advertising, by highlighting the dangers that could befall a marriage in which the husband is too tired “and constantly interested only in ‘sitting down to rest’ at night”.53 It is often forgotten that Atlas published a series of books on sex at the end of the 1920s, aimed at informing men on the finer points on love.54 Such a message was combined with the idea that Atlas’s workout made men more attractive to the opposite sex. This was most strongly suggested in ‘the insult that made a man of Mac’ ads, in which the newly muscled man gets the girl after defeating the bully.55 Men were encouraged to “show your girl what you're really made of”.56 Elite perceptions of masculinity were in part driven by the idea that muscularity was attractive to women. Hence masculinity was, in part, defined by elites with reference to its success in attracting the opposite sex.

Once again, letters sent to Charles Atlas from clients are informative. Very revealing is the letter from ‘R.B.’ to Atlas, informing him “I got my girlfriend through you”.57 ‘J.C.S.’ wrote of how it “never ceases to amuse me to see the expression on their [his friends’] faces when they grab my arm in a friendly gesture and feel the muscle there”.58 ‘J.D.’ kept his message to Atlas short, informing him “I think that I look much better inside and outside”.59 It is interesting to note that this idea of muscles increasing attractiveness was prevalent in the time of Sandow and is enjoying aresurgence today. In the late twentieth century, a study by Pope found that most respondents believed they would be more attractive to women if

48 Zolotow, ‘You, Too, Can Be a New Man’, p. 21. 49 Pope, Harrison G, Phillips, Katherine A., and Olivardia, Roberto, The Adonis complex: The Secret Crisis of Male Body Obsession (New York: Free Press, 2000), p. 280. 50 Gaines, and Butler, Yours in Perfect Manhood, p. 147. 51 Wiegers, ‘Male Bodybuilding’, p. 11. 52 Chapman, Sandow the Magnificent, p. 76. 53 Atlas, Everlasting Health and Strength, p. 28. 54 Atlas, Charles, Debt Collection Notice and Testimonial [Letter], Atlas Collection, 4:27, (1929), Smithsonian Museum, Washington.

55 The Official Website of Charles Atlas (http://www.charlesatlas.com/). 56 Gaines, and Butler, Yours in Perfect Manhood, p. 69. 57 Ibid., p. 146. 58 Ibid, p. 149. 59 Ibid, p. 150.


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they had an additional fourteen kilograms of muscle.60 The correspondence to Atlas shows that this idea was prevalent among many of his customers as well. Attractiveness and success with the opposite sex, it would seem, made up part of the male perception of masculinity at this time.

The final aspect of masculinity perceived by elites and the public that this paper will look at is personality. Dynamic Tension promised, “Others will see, by your bearing, that you have personality, reserve power and magnetism”.61 How important was personality for elite perceptions of masculinity? Atlas’s short pamphlet written in 1936 is telling. Atlas wanted his ‘students’ to become “the perfect man, mentally and physically”.62 Atlas lamented that as a ’97 pound weakling’, he had no personality.63 Such writings were accompanied by advertisements for Atlas’s course grandiosely declaring, “You cannot be a leader and a weakling. The weak, timid man is afraid. He lacks the courage, the daring and the strength. He has no poise, no self-‐confidence…everyone detects [sic] the weakling”.64 Frederick MacMonnies, writing a testimonial about Atlas in the 1920s, seems to echo Atlas’s advertising, noting that he had “observed that Health and Strength accompany honesty and integrity”.65 According to Atlas advertisements, weaklings not only couldn’t lead, their employment status was unstable: “be the husky who’s hired, while the weaklings are fired”.66 Such a message came soon after the Great Depression and during the build up to the Second World War, demonstrating that a cornerstone of masculinity for elites were men of strong conviction and personality. Weigers has argued that for many, exercising allows them to make powerful statements about who they are.67 While this argument related to 2003, it certainly is relevant sixty years earlier for Atlas, who believed that a strong body went hand in hand with a strong personality. His students seemed to agree.

‘T.A.’ writing on behalf of her husband, wrote that he had “changed in looks and personality” since he began Atlas’s course.68 Very revealing is the letter from ‘M.M’ that thanked Atlas, “I shall always think of you as the man who has brought me from darkness into sunshine and gave me the status, which has enabled me to become a real man among men”.69 It appears, in the words of one Atlas ‘student’, that men were “very proud of their body, thanks to” Atlas. This pride in physical appearance seems, at least from some of Atlas’s students, to have had a beneficial effect on their personality. Returning to the quote from another former student, “today I feel no man can rule or oppress me”, it can be suggested that for many, a strong body correlated with a strong personality.70 Another Atlas student

60 Morgan, John F., ‘From Charles Atlas to Adonis Complex – Fat is more than a Feminist Issue’, The Lancet, 356 (2000), p. 1373.

61 Atlas, Dynamic Tension Lesson One, p. 9. 62 Atlas, Everlasting Health and Strength, p. 18. 63 Ibid., p. 14. 64 Ibid, p. 19. 65 MacMonnies, F., Testimonial [Letter] Atlas Collection, 5:13, Smithsonian Museum, Washington (1922). 66 Atlas, Everlasting Health and Strength, p. 20. 67 Wiegers, ‘Male Bodybuilding’, p. 147. 68 Gaines, and Butler, Yours in Perfect Manhood, p. 146. 69 Ibid, p. 155. 70 Zolotow, ‘You, Too, Can Be a New Man’, p. 21.


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wrote that he was now a “he-‐man” thanks to the workout.71 It seems that many who subscribed to the Atlas workout course accepted the elite perception that a strong personality was a pillar of masculinity.

By focusing on the early years of the Atlas business, specifically 1929 to 1948, this paper looked at what the success of Atlas’s business can tell us about the American male psyche during this time. The paper contended that Atlas’s business came at a profound juncture in US history when there existed a perceived crisis of masculinity in the male psyche, and that the business was successful because it asseverated that it could provide qualities that men were perceived to need at this time. This mode of investigation raised interesting insights about the male psyche and its perceptions of masculinity. In examining this, the paper gave a brief historical background of this time to establish the crisis of masculinity that existed, examined the public persona of Atlas and Roman themselves, followed by an analysis of the product and its marketing. Once the historical background and message of the product were established, the paper moved on to the qualities which Atlas’s product purported to provide, namely a sense of control, increased sexual vigour and attractiveness, and a strong personality. Such qualities, it was argued, were seen as the cornerstone of masculinity needed to address the perceived crisis of masculinity in the male psyche at this time. The success of Charles Atlas’s business provides a window of insight into some qualities identified as important to the male perception of masculinity during this time period. Many ‘students’ of Atlas would surely agree with Reich that the Atlas workout programme was one of the most “formalised plans of mainstreamed American masculine identity formation”.72

71 Atlas, C., Debt Collection Notice and Testimonial. 72 Reich, ‘The World's Most Perfectly Developed Man', p. 446.


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Bibliography Primary Sources Atlas, Charles, Confidential Progress Report for the Personal Attention of Charles Atlas, [Letter] Atlas Collection, 4:27, (1929), Smithsonian Museum, Washington. Atlas, Charles, Debt Collection Notice and Testimonial, [Letter], Atlas Collection, 4:27, (1929), Smithsonian Museum, Washington. Atlas, Charles, Dynamic Tension Lesson One, (New York, 1948). Atlas, Charles, Everlasting Health and Strength (New York, 1936). MacMonnies, F., Testimonial [Letter] Atlas Collection, 5:13, (1922), Smithsonian Museum, Washington. Zolotow, M., ‘You, Too, Can Be a New Man’, Saturday Evening Post (7 February 1942), pp. 20-‐21; 59-‐61. Secondary Sources Black, Jonathan, ‘Muscle Man’ Smithsonian, 40:5 (2009), pp. 64-‐71. Bean, J., [email protected], ‘Early Business Records’, (19 February 2013). Chapman, David L., Sandow the Magnificent: Eugen Sandow and the Beginnings of Bodybuilding (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1994). The Official Website of Charles Atlas, http://www.charlesatlas.com/ [accessed: 6 January 2013). Duncan, Randy, and Smith, Matthew J., The Power of Comics: History, Form and Culture (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2009). Gaines, Charles, Butler, George, and Roman, Charles P., Yours in Perfect Manhood, Charles Atlas: The Most Effective Fitness Program Ever Devised (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982). Golden, Janet, and Toon, Elizabeth, ‘Rethinking Charles Atlas’, Rethinking History, 4 (2000), pp. 80-‐84. Greene, Warren, A Child of Three Fathers: Physical Culture and the Birth of the Modern Fitness Magazine, MA Thesis, Lehigh University: Pennsylvania, USA (2003).


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Morgan, John F., ‘From Charles Atlas to Adonis Complex – Fat is more than a Feminist Issue’, The Lancet, 356 (2000), pp. 1372-‐1373. Newman, Maria, ‘Hey Skinny! Charles Atlas Lives!’, New York Times, 31 May 2001, p.3. Oxford Dictionary, ‘Psyche’ http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/psyche, [accessed: 19th February 2013]. Pace, Eric, ‘Charles Roman, the Brains Behind the Brawn, Dies at 92’ http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/20/business/charles-‐roman-‐the-‐brains-‐behind-‐the-‐brawn-‐dies-‐at-‐92.html [accessed: 18 January 2013]. Pettegrew, John, Brutes in Suits: Male Sensibility in America, 1890-‐1920 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007). Pope, Harrison G, Phillips, Katherine A., and Olivardia, Roberto, The Adonis complex: The Secret Crisis of Male Body Obsession (New York: Free Press, 2000). Reich, Jacqueline, ‘The World's Most Perfectly Developed Man': Charles Atlas, Physical Culture, and the Inscription of American Masculinity’, Men and Masculinities, 12 (2010), pp. 444-‐461. Roach, Randy, Muscle, Smoke, & Mirrors: Volume I (Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse 2008). Wiegers, Yvonne, ‘Male Bodybuilding: The Social Construction of a Masculine Identity’, The Journal of Popular Culture, 32 (1998), pp. 147–161.

Mirco Reimer The Berlin Historical Review

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Goodbye my lover, Goodbye my friend? The Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

Mirco Reimer

American Studies and History B.A., University of Southern Denmark (Odense, DK)

Abstract: Today, the situation is quite similar to that of forty years ago. The mood in America is dominated by a fear of American decline, the country is exhausted from long wars and the economic situation has not been this bleak for a long time. At the same time various regional power centers are rising, in particular in economic terms. The United States need a strong Europe at its side to tackle the challenges the world is facing. But the European Union is still far away from becoming an international heavyweight like the United States and, although on a smaller scale than the U.S., China. To enter the Champions League of international politics, the European Union needs to develop a more unified voice on foreign and security policy and acquire the military capability an international heavyweight needs. In today’s globalised world, where borders are becoming more and more obsolete, a strong and united Europe would likely make the world more prosperous and safe. But Europe needs to step up. America and Europe have to draw onto the past and remind each other of the long history of cooperation, while at the same time acknowledging the need to move forward and find new common ground. The alternative would be that the world would break into different centers of power, which might very quickly become rival centers of power. Therefore, the United States and Europe are bound to recognize that they have important values in common. Keywords: Transatlantic Relationship, European Union, United States, American decline, International politics

Introduction: Changing Times

“My administration supports European Union, and Europe`s development of stronger institutions of common purpose and action. We recognize that we will benefit more from a

strong and equal partner than from a weak one.” – William Jefferson Clinton

We are living in a time where the United States is rebalancing its efforts towards the Pacific.1 So does Europe. Both parties seem to hold the belief that “Asia is the future”.2

1 Bader, Jeffrey A., Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2012).

2 See Jacques, Martin, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order (New York: Penguin, 2009), Zakaria, Fareed, The Post-‐American World: And the Rise of the Rest (London: Penguin, 2009), Mahbubani, Kishore, The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One


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Simultaneously the United States is trying to bring its own house into order -‐ financially, politically and reform-‐wise.3 In Europe, equally, economic recovery has been sluggish and the European Project towards a supranational state, or at least a political union, is ongoing and seems leaderless.4 Therefore Henry Kissinger’s notion "who do I call if I want to speak to Europe"5 is still relevant, maybe more than ever.

When one is writing an essay about a topic as vast as the transatlantic relationship, certain consequences follow. Transatlantic relations are being engaged in a variety of areas but this essay only deals with the main policy lines, due to the limited amount of space. Since I am an American Studies student my essay will address the question from an American point of view, while often neglecting the European observations and discussions. I will also not go into theoretical aspects and debates, like the debate between traditionalists and revisionists; how important American support for European integration was; the reasons for American support of European integration and the literature on crisis and/or cooperation in the relationship, to name only a few themes. Even though these are interesting questions, I can only refer to the numerous publications on these topics.6

Furthermore, this essay rests in large parts on the work others have done. In particularly, Geir Lundestad’s magnificent works7 and the two superb edited volumes “The End of the West?”8 and “The Future of Transatlantic Relations”9 have to be highlighted,

World (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013), Tipton, Frank B., The Rise of Asia: Economics, Society, and Politics in Contemporary Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1998).

3 See for example Haass, Richard N., Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America's House in Order (New York: Basic Books, 2013).

4 See Morgan, Glyn, The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justification and European Integration (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2005).

5 Kissinger has himself denied the ownership of the phrase and said it may actually been coined by a European politician. Nevertheless, the phrase has become so famous and attached to Kissinger that I will give him the honour. See more: ‘Europe still seeks Voice, Kissinger says’, The Wall Street Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304830704577492901066964924.html, 27.06.2012, (Date accessed: 07.07.2013).

6 See, for instance, Skogmar, Gunnar, The United States and the Nuclear Dimension of European Integration (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Lundestad, Geir, Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-‐1997 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998); Reyn, Sebastian, Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with De Gaulle, 1958-‐1969 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2010); Hanhimäki, Jussi M., Zanchetta, Barbara, and Schoenborn, Benedikt, Transatlantic Relations since 1945: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2012); Hynes, Catherine, and Scanlon, Sandra, Reform and Renewal: Transatlantic Relations during the 1960s and 1970s (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars, 2009); Giauque, Jeffrey Glen, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955 – 1963 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina, 2002) and Heller, Francis Howard, and Gillingham, John, The United States and the Integration of Europe: Legacies of the Postwar Era (New York: St. Martin's, 1996).

7 Lundestad, Geir, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003); Lundestad, Empire by Integration; Lundestad, Geir, ed., Just Another Major Crisis? The United States and Europe since 2000 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008) and Lundestad, Geir, No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe -‐ Past, Present and Future, (London: MacMillan, 1998).

8 Anderson, Jeffrey J., Ikenberry, G. John, and Risse-‐Kappen, Thomas, eds., The End of the West?: Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2008).

9 Dorman, Andrew M., and Kaufman, Joyce P., eds., The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Series, 2010).


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because they are the foundation for this essay. I am deeply grateful for the astonishing work these scholars have done. They have enlightened me on almost every page.

Finally, to write an essay about the future is difficult. As Lundestad has acknowledged, historians “are good at proclaiming matters inevitable once they have happened” but “rather bad predicting matters before they happen.”10 I will, nevertheless, give it a shot.

A Brief history of Transatlantic Relations From 1945 – 9/11

“If you would understand anything, observe its beginning and its development”-‐ Aristotle To have a look at the future of the transatlantic relationship, first of all, we need to establish a solid historical foundation. Therefore, I will offer a brief history of transatlantic relations from 1945-‐9/11, to begin with.

Interestingly, the American integration policy on Europe has undergone few major changes since 1945.11 Lundestad identifies three major turning points: 1949-‐1950, the beginning of European integration and the proposal for the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); 1962-‐1963, when the French president Charles de Gaulle challenged the American policy and rejected Great Britain’s membership of the European Economic Community (EEC); and finally, 1969-‐1970, when, under Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, Washington modified the American support for European integration.12 A fourth major turning point can, and should, be added: The crisis over the (coming) invasion of Iraq in 2002-‐2003.

But overall, the relationship between the United States and Europe from 1945 to the end of the Cold War was characterized by strong American support towards European integration. This American approach of integration, rather than domination, was different from other Great Powers throughout history. As Jean Monnet, one of the “founding fathers” of European integration, observed: “This is the first time in history that a great power, instead of basing its policy on ruling by dividing, has consistently and resolutely backed the creation of a large Community uniting peoples previously apart.”13

Thereby I am not suggesting that the United States was acting primarily as a Good Samaritan. Naturally, America had its own motives and interests. But these were, arguably, the best for a continent that twice in a half century nearly had been ripped apart by internal disputes and power feuds. Therefore, from an American point of view, the strategy of integration served the U.S`s interests while at the same time stabilizing Europe.14 Lundestad has put this brilliantly, highlighting: “In American eyes an integrated Europe was not only the

10 Lundestad, Empire by Integration, p. 169. 11 European integration in the early 1940s and onwards to the 1990s, from an American point of view, meant western European integration. With the end of the Cold War, European integration became a continental policy, in the beginning focusing more on the numerous new European states.

12 Lundestad, Empire by Integration, p. VI. 13 Quoted in Lundestad, Empire by Integration, p. 3. 14 In particular the cases -‐ or counterbalancing -‐ of (Western) Germany and the Soviet Union were the single most important bricks in the European chessboard.


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most efficient way for Europe to run itself, but, as we have seen, it was also widely perceived as resulting in the smallest expense for the United States.”15

Naturally, as a matter of national interest16 Washington wanted to exercise some form of control over Europe, but at the same time America did not want to be viewed as an “Empire”17, which exercised its power on the old continent.18 Furthermore, there was no doubt that American did not want Western Europe to be a third major force -‐ next to the United States and the Soviet Union – in the international politico sphere. Therefore the U.S. wanted to integrate as many European states a possible in its Atlantic framework.

This attitude of European integration was dominant in the strategic thinking of American administrations after 1945. The Truman Doctrine, articulated in 1947, made it clear that the United States was willing to play an economic and security role in Europe after the Second World War.19 Unlike after World War One, when the U.S. turned inwards and became isolationist, America now had an international outlook which cemented its role as the world’s leading power after 1945. The Truman Doctrine was one year later followed by the European Recovery Act, more commonly known as the Marshall Plan, which became law in April 1948. The Marshall Plan linked America with the European countries and helped Europe recover from the war. Of course, these policies were not altruistic. The United States pursued an agenda which would force the European countries to work together, ultimately creating the framework for the European Union. Washington was helping Europe to become strong (-‐er) which at the same time gave America trading opportunities. The U.S.`s underlying principle was that only stable economies could resist the Soviet Union and consequently build their own military to defend themselves and lift the burden from the United States.20 This attitude was predominant in American thinking for many decades and stretched all the way towards the end of the Cold War, when then-‐President George H. W. Bush noted:

15 Lundestad, Empire by Integration, p. 163. 16 The national interest is a country's goals and ambitions whether economic, military, or cultural. For more information see for example Frankel, Joseph, National Interest (New York: Praeger, 1970).

17 The term Empire is fiercely debated, but I will go with the ‘classical’ interpretation according to which an Empire is an extensive group of states or countries ruled by a single monarch, an oligarchy, or a sovereign state. The territory is usually of greater extent than a kingdom as, for example, the British Empire, the Byzantine Empire, or the Roman Empire. For a discussion on the term Empire see: Münkler, Herfried, Imperien: Die Logik der Weltherrschaft: Vom Alten Rom Bis Zu Den Vereinigten Staaten, (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2005), and Burbank, Jane, and Cooper, Frederick, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2010).

18 Whether the terms ‘hegemon’, ‘empire’, ‘sphere of influence’ are appropriate to use in this context can and is still being debated. See Mazower, Mark, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New York: Penguin, 2012).

19 With the Truman Doctrine, President Harry S. Truman established that the United States would provide political, military and economic assistance to all democratic nations under threat from external or internal authoritarian forces, like the Soviet Union. The Truman Doctrine effectively reoriented U.S. foreign policy towards a more global outlook, away from its usual stance of withdrawal from regional conflicts not directly involving the United States, to one of possible intervention in far away conflicts. See ‘Truman Doctrine’, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian: http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-‐ 1952/TrumanDoctrine, (Date accessed: 01.08.13).

20 Dorman, Andrew M., and Kaufman, Joyce P. eds., The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Series, 2010), pp. 8-‐10.


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“The Union States has long supported European unity because of our strong conviction that it was good for Europe, good for the Atlantic partnership, and good for the world…A strong united Europe is very much in America`s interest. A more united Europe offers the United States a more effective partner, prepared for larger responsibilities.”21

This attitude shifted initially after the 1968 presidential election which brought Richard Nixon into office. During the Nixon administration, the United States no longer pushed strongly for a supranational form of European integration. Instead it was up to the Europeans to decide which way they wanted to go. With the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 an, apparently, more favorably attitude towards Europe entered the White House. Carter was the first American president to visit the European Commission in Brussels, a clear sign for his support towards a supranational European project. Nevertheless, Carter`s pro-‐European rhetoric could not overshadow that the decade from 1973-‐1983, which later became known as the “stagnant decade”, was characterized by the cooling between Washington and Europe.22 Under President Reagan the development continued until 1985-‐1986 when the adoption of the Single European Act (SEA) aimed to establish the free flow of persons, goods, capital and services by 1992.23 This meant that the European Communities were reaching an important step in their evolution: A fully integrated market.

At the same time the subject of economic integration presented challenges to the transatlantic relationship because it became clear that both sides had different interests. While Europe was focused on a regional economic policy, America was thinking globally. Especially agricultural policy was, and continues to be, a sensitive subject where both sides regularly accused each other of protectionist’s policies.24 The atmosphere improved under Reagan’s successor, former vice-‐president George H. W. Bush. This was also due to the fact that Washington considered the developments in Europe in the aftermath of the Cold War to be crucial. An American interagency study in the summer of 1989 concluded that the “accelerated political integration within the EU (is) unstoppable and that US opposition to the process would both be futile and counterproductive.”25

So while the political climate was improving, it was not only a consequence of President Bush`s outlook, but also an inevitable process. Furthermore, the policy change had economic and political reasons. The end of the Cold War, the liberation of Eastern Europe, and the reunification of Germany meant new geopolitical realties and while Washington welcomed the developments, it was careful to leave the economic dealings to the EC. Still the single market was a great economic advantage for America, which by 1988

21 Bush, George H. W., ‘Statement on the European Community Summit’, (11. November 1991), Public Papers of the Presidents, George Bush Presidential Library, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=3733&year=1991&month=12, (Date accessed: 03.07.13).

22 Lundestad, Empire by Integration, p. 109. 23 The Single European Act was the first major revision of the 1957 Treaty of Rome -‐ which had led to the founding of European Economic Community – and set the objective of establishing a Single market by 31 December 1992.

24 For more information see Lundestad, Empire by Integration, pp. 110-‐113. 25 Peterson, John, Europe and America in the 1990s: The Prospects for Partnership (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1993), p. 48.


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had committed 38 percent of its total investment in Europe.26 Furthermore, realpolitik played a decisive role as well. The Bush administration saw a strong EC in a positive light, because, in their opinion, it enabled a smoother integration of a newly reunited Germany into Europe.

The Maastricht Treaty, signed in February 1992, constituted a turning point in the European integration process. For the first time, a distinctive vocation for a political union was claimed and the creation of the European Union and a single European currency, the Euro, was to follow. The United States welcomed these “historic steps toward economic and political union” and again, a dose of realpolitik characterized the American rhetoric. 27 The Bush administration judged that the recent developments towards a monetary union were imperative and it was further analyzed that the monetary union would help American businesses in Europe.28

Bush’s successor, William Jefferson Clinton, had to manage a difficult balancing act. On one hand, he was elected because George H. W. Bush, allegedly, had been too preoccupied with foreign affairs. Clinton’s election was therefore interpreted as a sign that the American people wanted to look inwards and therefore had voted for a candidate who only seemed to be interested in foreign policy when it had a positive effect on the American economy.29 At the same time, Clinton gave the Europeans more leeway. His administration looked favorably on both the widening and the deepening of the European Union and was a proponent of the enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. These developments fitted well into Clintons agenda for two reasons: It played into the administrations idea of “democratic enlargement” while simultaneously promoting market reforms in these countries.30 Consistently, the American agenda, and somewhat more positive European stance, reflected the geopolitical change after the end of the Cold War.

The European developments played well into Clinton’s insistence that the Europeans needed to do more, both in terms of their own defense and global security issues. Since America wanted to do less after the end of the Cold War, other countries had to do more. Because the Europeans had benefited from the American security umbrella for almost fifty years it was comprehensible that the U.S. wanted to offload some of its burdens.31 The problem, though, was that the Europeans did not build up their own resources. Instead,

26 For a detailed analysis see Calingaert, Michael, European Integration Revisited: Progress, Prospects and U.S. Interests (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1996), in particular pp. 152-‐175.

27 Bush, George H. W., ‘Statement on the European Community Summit’, 11 November 1991, Public Papers of the Presidents, George Bush Presidential Library, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=3733&year=1991&month=12, (Date accessed: 03.07.13).

28 See more: Henning, C. Randall, ‘Europe’s Monetary Union and the United States’, Foreign Policy, No. 102 (Spring 1996), pp. 84-‐85.

29 For a detailed analysis see: Gardner, Anthony Laurence, A New Era in US-‐EU Relations? The Clinton Administration and the New Transatlantic Agenda (Aldershot: Avebury, 1997).

30 The Clinton administration’s idea of ‘democratic enlargement’ is premised on the idea that an expanding circle of market democracies would bolster American security and prosperity. See more: Brinkley, Douglas, ‘Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine’, Foreign Policy, No. 106 (Spring 1997), pp. 110-‐ 127.

31 See more: Dale, Reginald, ‘Why Washington Wants a Strong EU’, The New York Times, 29.11.1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/29/business/worldbusiness/29iht-‐think_6.html, (Date accessed: 01.08.13).


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they were reducing their defense forces and cutting their defense spending considerably.32 And when 9/11 struck the United States the transatlantic relationship was challenged both by terrorism and the muscular and militaristic American foreign policy of the George W. Bush administration.

After 9/11: Gulliver Unbound33

“When I take action, I'm not going to fire a $2 million missile at a $10 empty tent and hit a camel in the butt. It's going to be decisive.” -‐ George W. Bush

After the events on 9/11, the different crisis management became apparent in all its dramatic. For most Americans, and its elected leaders, the terrorist acts presented a huge shock. Not since 1814 had the United States been attacked on its homeland and a feeling of vulnerability had suddenly overcome the world’s most powerful country. As a consequence America’s foreign and domestic policy changed dramatically.34 Europeans had a different approach to the attacks since they were not the targets and European history is somewhat more littered with acts of terrorism.35 While Europe also adjusted its security measures – like Regulation (EC) 300/2008 and the appointment of a European Anti-‐Terror Coordinator – life almost moved on as before, even after the terrorist attacks in London and Madrid.36

The transatlantic relationship suffered profoundly from the terrorist acts on 9/11. The Bush administration’s response to the terrorist attacks, with the proclamation of a “War

32 Gordon, Philip H., ‘“Europeanization” of NATO: A Convenient Myth’, International Herald Tribune, 07.06.1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/07/opinion/07iht-‐edphil.t.html, (Date accessed: 01.08.2013).

33 The title for the chapter is inspired by Hoffmann, Stanley, and Bozo, Frederick, Gulliver Unbound: America`s Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2004).

34 It also has to be highlighted, that the end of the Cold War, to some extent, lead to the erosion of liberal internationalism in the United States. The bipartisan coalition was widely held together by the external Soviet threat. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, politics no longer stopped at water’s edge and foreign policy became exposed to partisan warfare. See Kupchan, Charles, ‘Atlantic Orders: The Fundamentals of Change’ in Lundestad, ed., Just Another Major Crisis?, pp. 43-‐46.

On the change in Americas changing domestic and foreign policy see Halper, Stefan A., and Clarke, Jonathan, America Alone: The Neo-‐conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004); Leffler, Melvyn P., and Legro, Jeffrey, In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11 (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2011); McGarrity, Nicola, Lynch, Andrew, and Williams, George, Counter-‐ terrorism and Beyond: The Culture of Law and Justice after 9/11 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010); Yoo, John, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005) and Tirman, John, The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration after 9/11 (New York: New Press, 2004).

35 See Engene, Jan Oskar, Terrorism in Western Europe: Explaining the Trends since 1950, (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004) and Alexander, Yonah and Kenneth A. Myers, Terrorism in Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1982).

36 See more: Shearman, Peter, and Sussex, Matthew, European Security After September 11 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) and Kallas, Sim, ‘Ten years after 9/11: What has been done in Europe to make flying safer from Terrorist attacks?’, European Commission, 09.09.2011,

http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-‐ 2014/kallas/headlines/news/2011/09/10-‐years-‐after-‐9-‐ 11_en.htm, (Date accessed: 19.07.13).


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on Terror” and the invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq, evoked suspicion in Europe.37 In the aftermath of the attacks on 9/11, the European support had been unambiguous. America`s European allies offered support and intelligence, the German chancellor Gerhard Schröder even indicated strongly that Germany would assist militarily.38 The French newspaper Le Monde, usually skeptical towards the U.S., proclaimed “We are all Americans”.39 But with the announcement that counterterrorism operations could be widened and with the proclamation of an “axis of evil” the Bush administration was going too far. Had Bush chosen to make use of European support, listened to the Europeans take on the best counterterrorism strategy and tried to build a large coalition to fight terrorism, the last decade would have looked somewhat different. But Bush and his cabinet chose a different road.

The world now witnessed the Bush administration’s increasingly nationalistic rhetoric. Bush was suggesting that America was strong, undefeatable and would now fight terrorism globally. But how and by whom terrorism ought to be fought was an American call, not a call by the alliance or the international community. The coalition, i.e. NATO and international organizations, could not determine the mission; the coalition was to be determined by the mission. Bush’s announcement that the United States had the right to secure itself against countries that harbor or give aid to terrorist groups, its controversial policy of preventive war, and a willingness to unilaterally pursue U.S. military interests, gave Europeans more and more the impression that the American Giant now was unbound.40 As Josef Joffe, contributing editor of Time magazine and publisher-‐editor of the German newspaper Die Zeit, observed: “There has never been a Gulliver as Gulliveresque as 21st century America.”41

Looking back, it is convenient to blame the Bush administration. Nevertheless, we still have to remind ourselves that the Bush era, even though the 43th president left the

37 The transatlantic relationship had witnessed crises before, like the dispute over German rearmament in 1950-‐ 1955; the Suez crisis of 1956; the Gaullist challenge of the mid-‐1960s; and the rifts over the wars in Bosnia. But the crisis over Iraq has been the most serious so far, because both sides failed to adapt or compromise for such a long time. Also, it has to be added that the debate over the invasion of Iraq not was a “United States versus Europe” crises but a crisis in which the United States split the European bloc. For a short but comprehensive overview see Hitchcock in Anderson, Jeffrey, Ikenberry, John and Risse-‐ Kappen, Thomas, eds., The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2008).

38 A quite remarkable statement, when one considers Germanys past and the ongoing debate about the countries reluctance when it comes to military engagements. See: Ulrich, Bernd,Wofür Deutschland Krieg führen darf. Und muss: Eine Streitschrift (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2011).

39 Lundestad, No End to Alliance, p. 273. 40 Krauthammer, Charles, ‘Charlie Gibson's Gaffe’, The Washington Post, 13.09.2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-‐dyn/content/article/2008/09/12/AR2008091202457.html, (Date accessed: 02.08.2013). According to Charles Krauthammer, who was the first to use it in June 2001, the phrase has had four distinct meanings, each one succeeding another throughout the eight years of the George W. Bush presidency: Firstly, unilateralism; secondly, after 9-‐11-‐2001, the “with us or against us” policy on terror; thirdly, a doctrine of pre-‐ emptive war, e.g. Iraq; and fourthly, the idea that the fundamental mission of American foreign policy is to spread democracy throughout the world. See also ‘Vice President Tells West Point Cadets "Bush Doctrine" Is Serious’, American Forces Press Service (June 2, 2003): http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28921, (Date accessed: 02.08.13).

41 Joffe, Josef, ‘Gulliver Unbound: Can America Rule the World?’, John Bonython lecture at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney, The Sydney Morning Herald, 06.08.2003, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/08/05/1060064182993.html, (Date accessed: 02.08.2013).


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White House four and a half years ago, is an unfinished discussion. Clearly, the first term of the Bush`s administration was characterized by a disrupted transatlantic relationship, but how erupted the relationship was, is difficult to predict. Still, as Charles S. Maier, Professor of History at Harvard University, has highlighted, we can with some certainty speak about a strong rupture, while simultaneously bearing in mind that “the rupture has been relatively brief” and that the Bush administrations “imperial intoxication” was more an “imperial interlude” than a persistent feature of U.S. foreign policy.42 The Bush administrations second term showed that even the muscular Bush administration had realized that no country could solve the world’s problems alone -‐ in particularly not when it comes to an ill-‐defined “War on Terror” -‐ and that multilateralism is almost always necessary.43 The leadership of Bush`s successor, Barack Obama, indicates that America has learnt this lesson and taken it into account.

The Future of the Transatlantic Relationship

“It is not in the stars to hold our destiny but in ourselves” -‐ William Shakespeare

If the United States wants to remain as the world’s superpower, one of its priorities should be to rethink, reevaluate and revise its policies regarding the transatlantic relationship. President Obama already in his inaugural address in January 2009 made it clear that the relationship between the United States and Europe had to be restored. The election of Obama saw a president coming to the White House who might have not had great foreign policy experience, like his predecessor, but had a broader global outlook and understanding than Bush junior had.

But at the same time, Americans, and Obama, have to remember that “Europe” is not only one country, with own priorities and national interests, and that the “European Union” still has (too) many voices, while at the same time (trying to) representing a collective interest.44 Cases like the NSA-‐Snowden controversy will further erode the trust in the United States’ leadership. Alliances do not just happen; they are made, as Michael Cox, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, has emphasized, and they can only flourish when the indispensable nation in the alliance, read the United States, is trusted and respected. Obama needs to be careful that his security policies do not

42 Lundestad, Geir, ‘Introduction’, in Lundestad, ed., Just Another Major Crisis?, p. 10. Also, we have to bear in mind that the transatlantic relationship already was eroding during the 1990s over Yugoslavia, the evolution of the European Union, and increasing American unilateralism in the second term of the Clinton administration. See more: Bozo, Frédéric, ‘The US Changing Role and Europe’s Transatlantic Dilemmas: Toward an EU Strategic Autonomy?’ in Lundestad , ed., Just Another Major Crisis?, pp. 97-‐100.

43 Geir Lundestad , ed., “Just Another Major Crisis?: The United States and Europe since 2000”, (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008), page 11. See also Nye, Joseph S., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002).

44 Kaufman, Joyce P., ‘The United States and the Transatlantic Relationship: A Test for U.S. Foreign and National Security Policy’, in Dorman and Kaufman, eds., The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice, pp. 58-‐59.


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undermine the relationship as a whole.45 But Europe also has some business of its own that it needs to take care of.

Europe`s Missing Phone Number

“Where did we start? As a peace project among adversaries. What is our greatest accomplishment? The spread of stability and democracy across the continent. And what is our task for the future? To make Europe a global power; a force for good in the world.” –

Javier Solana

Former U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower had hoped that he would “live long enough to see a United States of Europe come into existence.”46 He did not.

Forty four years after Eisenhower’s death the European Union is still a work in progress. From the early aftermath of the Second World War, the United States had hoped to see a fast development where Europe went beyond economic integration towards a political and supranational union. For the U.S., economic integration was only the first step on a way which ultimately should embed federal institutions and culminate in a political union. The ultimate American hope was that history would repeat itself and America’s federal experience would be repeated on the European continent.47

Today, this hope seems to have vanished. Even though Washington was careful not to push too much for a European super-‐state, there were aspirations that Europe after the end of the Cold War soon would establish a counterweight in international politics and take some of the burdens the United States had token upon them for so many decades. Eisenhower had already in 1960 lamented that “we are spending too many billions all around the world without the Europeans taking a commensurate load.”48 For decades Washington had believed that a unified Europe would automatically lift burdens from the United States because the two allies shared, almost all, basic interests. During the Nixon and Kissinger era this assessment changed and today the debate is still ongoing. With the end of the Cold War defense budgets were cut even more, while the Clinton administration increased its defense budget at the end of his second term, meaning that Europe fell even more behind in a time were America had hoped the burden would be shared more evenly.49

45 On the problems of legitimacy, although during the Bush era, see also: Kagan, Robert, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), p. 86.

46 ‘Meetings with the President, February 6, 1957' [DDE Diaries] Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/1–

3157, Eisenhower Library, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-‐57v04/d218#fn1, (Date accessed: 19.07.13.)

47 Lundestad, Empire by Integration, p. 3. 48 Ibid., p. 90. 49 Korb, Lawrence J., and Conley, Laura, and Rotham, Alex, ‘A Historical Perspective on Defense Budgets’, Center for American Progress (July 6, 2011),

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/budget/news/2011/07/06/10041/a-‐historical-‐perspective-‐on-‐ defense-‐ budgets/, (Date accessed: 02.08.13).


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On Mars and Venus

“Americans are from Mars, Europeans are from Venus: they agree on little and understand each other less and less.” – Robert Kagan

European leaders do not see their countries intervening around the world. America, on the other hand, has an arguably lower level of tolerance, mainly because it has the military capability to take on its enemies. So while European states emphasize the importance of finding diplomatic solutions and want to focus narrowly, America is thinking globally. Of course this approach has to be seen in the light of their different historical experiences. Europe, traumatized by its own bloody history of the 20th century and benefiting from American protection during the Cold War, might have forgotten that it is sometimes necessary to fight to preserve freedom. America, on the other hand, has historically resorted to force more quickly and seems to be less patient with diplomacy. In short: Americans more frequently use the stick, while Europeans favor the carrot.

According to Europeans, this phenomenon can be explained by the fact that Americans generally see the world more black and white -‐ divided between good and evil -‐ while Europeans see a more complex picture. To exaggerate this point: Europeans see problems and want them solved; Americans see threats and want them eliminated. Therefore, and because they have the ability to do so, Americans sometimes tend towards unilateralism, and are more willing to operate outside international organizations and international law strictures.50 Robert Kagan famously noted: “Americans are from Mars, Europeans from Venus.”51 Kagan’s statement contained an element of truth that many found uncomfortable. Nevertheless, while he certainly had a point, Kagan failed to acknowledge that his description was only true at a particular moment of time -‐ during the first term of the Bush administration and in particular in the run up to the invasion of Iraq -‐ not a description of the transatlantic relationship in general.52

And another important fact has to be acknowledged. As former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brezinski noted, the relationship has undergone some interesting changes in the last seventy years. After the Second World War, it was Europe that “yearned for guaranteed U.S. power but had no effective power themselves.” Today, Europe feels relatively secure and it is “the United States that needs committed allies.”53

This does, however, not mean that Europe can continue with its modified version of American isolationism. Europe should do more militarily and take the lead more frequently, especially when the events occur in its own backyard. As former British Prime Minister Tony Blair has noted: “There are two types of nations similar to ours today. Those who do war fighting and peacekeeping and those who have, effectively, except in the most exceptional circumstances, retreated to the peacekeeping alone.”54 Europe needs to participate more in

50 See Kagan, Of Paradise and Power. 51 Ibid. 52 Andrew M. Dorman and Joyce P. Kaufman, ‘Conclusion’ in Dorman and Kaufman, eds., The Future of Transatlantic Relations, p. 234.

53 Kaufman, ‘The United States and the Transatlantic Relationship’ in Dorman and Kaufman, eds., The Future of Transatlantic Relations, p. 58.

54 Andrew M. Dorman and Joyce P. Kaufman, ‘Introduction’, in Dorman and Kaufman (eds.), The Future of Transatlantic Relations, p. 2.


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the fighting, recognizing its limitations while at the same time expanding its military strengths.55 At the same time, Europeans have to be reasonable about their opportunities and constraints. Today, the European Union`s gross national product (GDP) might surpass that of the United States, but when it comes to the military strength and political organization the EU has a long way to go before it reaches the U.S.56 Not only during the Gulf War and in the former Yugoslavia became it clear that only the United States can undertake large-‐scale military action.

But this might not necessarily be a problem. Europe has other expertise -‐ for example in areas as humanitarian assistance, crisis management and peacekeeping. Furthermore, the European states are by far the world’s leading foreign aid donors. Europe should advance its own position even more in these areas while at the same time expanding its military strengths considerably. This would enhance the EU`s strategic position as an upcoming global leader. This does not mean that Europe will become a strategic opponent of the United States. The notion of the EU as a challenger to the United States is at best fanciful when considering the power disparity between the two. Europe does not need to challenge the United States, but it must be better in supplementing America, while at the same time advancing its own geopolitical stance. At the moment, Europe has neither been able to mitigate U.S. policies nor to supplement them. Further advancement is needed. A more autonomous Europe would fare better, be more respected and more powerful on the global scene.57

Converting the Transatlantic Relationship

“We, the United States and the European Union, affirm our conviction that the ties which bind our people are as strong today as they have been for the past half century” – 1995

American-‐European Council conclusions statement

Both America and the United States would be better off if they acknowledged their changing circumstances more openly and converted their relationship to a more pragmatic and practical business relationship. This does not mean that they do not have a lot to gain by sticking together, they definitely should, but as Henry R. Nau, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at the George Washington University, has noted: “A looser, less institutionalized transatlantic community may be preferable.”58

55 Scholars like Charles Kupchan have advocated that the Europe Union should acquire the military capability to work more effectively on its own and closer with the United States. See: Kupchan, Charles A., ‘The Atlantic Order in Transition: The Nature of Change in U.S.-‐European Relations’ in Anderson, Ikenberry, and Risse-‐Kappen, eds., The End of the West?, pp. 124-‐126. Furthermore, Operation Artemis, a European Union-‐led military mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the Ituri conflict, could serve as a good example. See Bozo, ‘The US Changing Role’ in Lundestad, ed., Just Another Major Crisis?, p. 108.

56 Furthermore, the appearance of the European Union has sometimes led to the observation that Europe has a national interest. While this might be correct, recent events like the invasion of Iraq have shown that Europe still is a long way from articulating a common supranational interest.

57 Bozo, ‘The US Changing Role’ in Lundestad, ed., Just Another Major Crisis?, pp. 112-‐114. 58 Nau, Henry R., ‘Iraq and Previous Transatlantic Crises: Divided by Threat, Not Institutions or Values’ in Anderson, Ikenberry and Risse-‐Kappen, eds., The End of the West?, p. 110.


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The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is an obvious theme.59 The concept in itself is nothing new. Already during the Clinton administration – with its focus on free trade agreements like NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) – the concept of a Transatlantic Free Trade Agreement (TAFTA) was discussed, and again in 2007, but the agreements then faced serious obstacles like growing protectionism. This will likely again be an important issue, in particular when it comes to agriculture and culture quotes, although with a bigger chance to succeed this time.60 Today, the economic relationship between the United States and Europe is already very close. According to William Wallace, Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics, it represents the world`s most intricate and intimate economic relationship worldwide.61 Even though the economic attention has shifted away from the Atlantic and to the Pacific, the European and American market economies remain the essential core of the global economic system.62

While America and Europe have the same ideological and cultural parents they have evolved in two opposite directions. Their liberal upbringing and insistence on democracy and free trade still binds them together, but it is not a special relationship anymore. Both sides should be thankful for that, since the reason for their cohesiveness to start with was a common Soviet enemy. This threat has disappeared and this fact will likely do its part that transatlantic relations will become more fractious in the future.63 The events on 9/11 changed America and have been the paramount subject of U.S. foreign policy since 2001. But this new terror threat is not enough, and to vague, to constitute a new “Soviet threat” that will bind the two powers together. The events of 9/11 remain a much larger event in American thinking than in European and the conflict management and solutions are not identical.64 At the same time, America has become more pacific and global in its outlook, as Frederic Bozo has highlighted.65 Therefore, the transatlantic relationship needs to be redefined.

59 Certainly not the only example of a transatlantic economic partnership, when one considers the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). See more: Wallace, William, ‘Leadership or Partnership? Can Transatlantic Leadership be Shared?’ in Lundestad, ed., Just Another Major Crisis?, p. 160-‐162.

60 NAFTA -‐ with its members the United States, Canada and Mexico -‐ had been under way since diplomatic negotiations started back in 1986 among the three nations and was signed by President George H. W. Bush in December 1992, but had to be ratified by Congress. Clinton did not alter the original agreement, but his administration made to supplements with the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC) and the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). The House of Representatives approved NAFTA on November 17, 1993 and Clinton signed it into law on December 8, 1993. NAFTA went into effect on January 1, 1994. See more: Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945, p. 264.

61 Wallace, ‘Leadership or Partnership?’ in Lundestad, ed., Just Another Major Crisis?, p. 174. 62 See Quinlin, Joseph P., ‘Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy’, Center for Transatlantic Relations (Washington D.C.: March 2003).

http://transatlantic.sais-‐jhu.edu/publications/books/drifting_apart_monograph.pdf, (Date accessed: 02.08.13).

63 Cox, Michael, ‘From the Cold War to the War on Terror: Old Threats, New Threats, and the Future of the Transatlantic Relationship’,in Lundestad, ed., Just Another Major Crisis?, p. 71.

64 Lundestad, The United States and Western Europe since 1945, p. 282. 65 Bozo, ‘The US Changing Role’, in Lundestad, ed., Just Another Major Crisis?, p. 98.


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Today, Europe is no longer a war-‐mongering continent, but a stable and peaceful continent. It has taken its own safety, largely, in its own hands and is its own continental stabilizer.66 But at the same time, the establishment of a political union, a common security and foreign policy and the development of a single, unified, European voice is a rather dozy process.67 The last twenty years have shown that there is still a long way to go before Europe can act as a dominant voice in international politics.68

Consequently, the United States sees a continent without a voice and focuses on bilateral relationships -‐ especially with the powerful nations like Great Britain, France and Germany -‐ instead.69 Therefore, the old continent is an ambivalent character in the great concert of international power relations: No single European state can become a superpower, but together this might be possible. Still, the European states focus more on their national sovereignty than on the bigger, geopolitical picture, where Europe is falling behind.

Conclusion: Everybody needs a best friend

"But having stated these various issues [between the U.S. and Europe], I am absolutely–I’m actually of the belief that it is possible that we will enter an extraordinarily creative period.”

-‐Henry Kissinger

A look into the books of history could help. Today, the situation is quite similar to that of forty years ago. The mood in America is dominated by a fear of American decline, the country is exhausted from long wars and the economic situation has not been this bleak for a long time. At the same time various regional power centers are rising, in particular in economic terms. In 1971, Nixon stated that “when we think in economic terms and economic potentialities, there are five great power centers in the world today”.70 Today, we are seeing a similar development, albeit the countries are different. The so-‐called BRIC countries – Brazil, Russia, India and China – are joined by other emerging economies like

66 Henry Kissinger had already noted in 1969: “The future of a united Europe depends more on developments in London, Paris and Bonn than to strictures from Washington” and he was, of course, right.

67 And here, one can not underestimate the importance of personal relationships. If Europe wants to pursue a common foreign and security policy it should also elect high profile leaders to represent this policy as the leaders of the Union, not second rate politicians or diplomats. Today, it is still obvious that the national leaders in countries like Germany and France, for example, do not want high profile leaders leading the European Union.

68 Also, in many states there is a division in outlook between the political elite and the society which they represent. The political elites tend, for example, to recognize the changing challenges, especially in terms of security, faster than their electorates. Consequently, there is a division between the views of the political elite and those of the wider society, for example, when it comes to the financial crisis and the crisis management. This in turn has led to frictions and misunderstandings. See Kaufman and Dorman, ‘Conclusion’ in Dorman and Kaufman, eds., The Future of Transatlantic Relations, pp. 232-‐234.

69 At the same time, the European Union is struggling with the fact that its two most powerful members, Germany and France have rather different ideas about the future of the European Union. See more: Bozo, ‘The US Changing Role’ in Lundestad, ed., Just Another Major Crisis?, pp. 103-‐106.

70 Nixon was talking about the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, China and Japan. Quoted in Lundestad, Empire by Integration, p. 101.


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Turkey, Indonesia and Mexico. The geopolitical structure is changing once again and America and Europe need to be at the forefront of these developments.

The United States need a strong Europe at its side to tackle the challenges the world is facing. The EU has, finally some would argue, emerged as the predominant organization on the old continent and as a pole in the international system. Slowly, the EU is defining its own identity and its national interest, and will arguably, and hopefully, increase its international influence in the years to come. This is welcome, but the European Union is still far away from becoming an international heavyweight like the United States and, although on a smaller scale than the U.S., China. To enter the Champions League of international politics, the European Union needs to develop a more unified voice on foreign and security policy and acquire the military capability an international heavyweight needs.71 To be brief, the EU needs to show the world that it can act more and talk less.

Today, John F. Kennedy’s case for Atlantic interdependence is topical and truer than ever. America does not regard a strong and united Europe as a rival, but a partner.72 In today’s globalised world, where borders are becoming more and more obsolete, a strong and united Europe would likely make the world more prosperous and safe. But Europe needs to step up. As Lyndon B. Johnson noted in 1966: “The nations of Western Europe can only fulfill their proper role in the world community if increasingly they act together.”73

America and Europe have to draw onto the past and remind each other of the long history of cooperation, while at the same time acknowledging the need to move forward and find new common ground. “Neither the United States nor the European nations will be able to identify more effective, compatible, or reliable partners among global players”, as Stanley R. Sloan, Founding Director of the Atlantic Community Initiative, has sharply observed.74 The forces of globalization will further increase the interdependence between the two parties and highlight that they need to develop compatible strategic perspectives where it is necessary and agreeable. The alternative would be that the world would break into different centers of power, which might very quickly become rival centers of power.75

The question is not whether the transatlantic relationship will survive, but how it will be redefined and what it will be. But in the end, the common structure of interests and values will preserve the alignment. Therefore, the United States and Europe are bound to recognize that they have important values in common. To anchor a popular Norah Jones song, everybody needs a best friend and Europe and America should be happy they are each

71 Kupchan, ‘Atlantic Orders’, in Lundestad, ed., Just Another Major Crisis?, p. 54. 72 I do, however, not suggest that the transatlantic relationship between the United States and the European Union Is becoming more balanced and equal. Lundestad has noted: “The United States never had a balanced relationship with anyone; nor is it likely to have one with the EU.” See more: Lundestad, ‘Introduction’ in Lundestad, ed., Just Another Major Crisis?, p. 14.

73 Lundestad, Empire by Integration, page 9. 74 Lundestad, ‘Introduction’, in Lundestad, ed., Just Another Major Crisis?, p. 14. 75 Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair anchored the same considerations in relations to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. See: ‘PM focuses on Iraq and Domestic Agenda’, The National Archives, 28.04.2010, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040105034004/http://number10.gov.uk/page3535, (Date accessed: 18.07.2013).


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other’s.76 Barack Obama`s words, spoken in Berlin five years ago, are timeless, topical and urgent in the debate on the future of transatlantic relations:

“…If we are honest with each other, we know that sometimes, on both sides of the Atlantic, we have drifted apart...There have been differences between America and Europe. No doubt, there will be differences in the future. But the burdens of global leadership continue to bind us together...In this new century, Americans and Europeans alike will be required to do more – not less.”77

76 Jones, Norah, ‘Everybody needs A Best Friend’, Youtube, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rZ_kWxCXaUI, (Date accessed: 02.08.2013).

77 Barack Obama: "A World that Stands as One", Speech as prepared for delivery (Berlin, Germany: 24.07.2008), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/07/24/obama-‐in-‐berlin-‐video-‐of_n_114771.html, (Date accessed: 02.08.2013).


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Bibliography Primary Sources Presidential Papers Bush, George H. W., ‘Statement on the European Community Summit’ (11 November 1991) [Public Papers of the Presidents], George Bush Presidential Library, http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/public_papers.php?id=3733&year=1991&month=12 ‘Meetings with the President, February 6, 1957' [DDE Diaries] Department of State, Central Files, 840.1901/1–3157, Eisenhower Library, http://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1955-‐57v04/d218#fn1 (Date accessed 19/07/13). Secondary Sources Books Alexander, Yonah, and Kenneth A. Myers, Terrorism in Europe (New York: St. Martin's, 1982). Anderson, Jeffrey J., Ikenberry, G. John, and Risse-‐Kappen, Thomas, eds., The End of the West? Crisis and Change in the Atlantic Order (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2008). Bader, Jeffrey A., Obama and China's Rise: An Insider's Account of America's Asia Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2012). Burbank, Jane, and Cooper, Frederick, Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2010). Calingaert, Michael, European Integration Revisited: Progress, Prospects and U.S. Interests (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1996). Dorman, Andrew M., and Kaufman, Joyce P., eds., The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Perceptions, Policy and Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Series, 2010). Engene, Jan Oskar, Terrorism in Western Europe: Explaining the Trends since 1950 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2004). Frankel, Joseph, National Interest (New York: Praeger, 1970). Gardner, Anthony Laurence, A New Era in US-‐EU Relations? The Clinton Administration and the New Transatlantic Agenda (Aldershot: Avebury, 1997).


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Giauque, Jeffrey Glen, Grand Designs and Visions of Unity: The Atlantic Powers and the Reorganization of Western Europe, 1955 -‐ 1963 (Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina, 2002). Haass, Richard N., Foreign Policy Begins at Home: The Case for Putting America's House in Order (New York: Basic Books, 2013). Halper, Stefan A., and Clarke, Jonathan, America Alone: The Neo-‐conservatives and the Global Order (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004). Hanhimäki, Jussi M., Zanchetta, Barbara, and Schoenborn, Benedikt, Transatlantic Relations since 1945: An Introduction (New York: Routledge, 2012). Hayward, Jack, Leaderless Europe. (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008). Heller, Francis H., and Gillingham, John R., The United States and the Integration of Europe: Legacies of the Postwar Era (New York: St. Martin's, 1996). Hoffmann, Stanley, and Bozo, Frederick, Gulliver Unbound: America`s Imperial Temptation and the War in Iraq (Lanham, MD: Roman & Littlefield, 2004). Hynes, Catherine, and Scanlon, Sandra, Reform and Renewal: Transatlantic Relations during the 1960s and 1970s. (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars, 2009). Jacques, Martin, When China Rules the World: The End of the Western World and the Birth of a New Global Order (New York: Penguin, 2009). Kagan, Robert, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003). Leffler, Melvyn P., and Legro, Jeffrey, In Uncertain Times: American Foreign Policy after the Berlin Wall and 9/11 (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2011). Lundestad, Geir, Empire by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-‐1997 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1998). Lundestad, Geir (ed.) Just Another Major Crisis?: The United States and Europe since 2000 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2008). Lundestad, Geir, No End to Alliance: The United States and Western Europe: Past, Present and Future (London: MacMillan, 1998). Lundestad, Geir, The United States and Western Europe since 1945: From "empire" by Invitation to Transatlantic Drift (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2003). Mahbubani, Kishore, The Great Convergence: Asia, the West, and the Logic of One World (New York: PublicAffairs, 2013).


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Marquand, David, The End of the West: The Once and Future Europe (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2011). Mazower, Mark, Governing the World: The History of an Idea (New York: Penguin, 2012). McGarrity, Nicola, Lynch, Andrew, and Williams, George, Counter-‐terrorism and Beyond: The Culture of Law and Justice after 9/11 (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2010). Morgan, Glyn, The Idea of a European Superstate: Public Justification and European Integration. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 2005). Münkler, Herfried, Imperien: Die Logik Der Weltherrschaft: Vom Alten Rom Bis Zu Den Vereinigten Staaten, (Berlin: Rowohlt, 2005). Nye, Joseph S., The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002). Peterson, John, Europe and America in the 1990s: The Prospects for Partnership (Aldershot: Edward Elgar, 1993). Reyn, Sebastian, Atlantis Lost: The American Experience with De Gaulle, 1958-‐1969 (Amsterdam: Amsterdam UP, 2010). Shearman, Peter, and Sussex, Matthew, European Security After September 11 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004). Skogmar, Gunnar, The United States and the Nuclear Dimension of European Integration (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). Tipton, Frank B., The Rise of Asia: Economics, Society, and Politics in Contemporary Asia (Honolulu: University of Hawaiʻi, 1998). Tirman, John, The Maze of Fear: Security and Migration after 9/11 (New York: New Press, 2004). Ulrich, Bernd,Wofür Deutschland Krieg führen darf. Und muss: Eine Streitschrift (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 2011). Yoo, John, The Powers of War and Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs after 9/11 (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005). Zakaria, Fareed, The Post-‐American World: And the Rise of the Rest (London: Penguin, 2009). Articles Brinkley, Douglas, ‘Democratic Enlargement: The Clinton Doctrine’ Foreign Policy, No. 106 (Spring 1997), pp. 110-‐127.


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Henning, C. Randall, ‘Europe’s Monetary Union and the United States’, Foreign Policy, No. 102 (Spring 1996), pp.83-‐100. Kagan, Robert, ‘America`s Crisis of Legitimacy’, Foreign Affairs, 83:2, (March 2004), pp.65-‐87. Newspapers and Online Articles Dale, Reginald, ‘Why Washington Wants a Strong EU’ The New York Times, (November 29, 1994): http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/29/business/worldbusiness/29iht-‐think_6.html, (Date accessed: 01.08.13). Gordon, Philip H., ‘“Europeanization” of NATO: A Convenient Myth’ International Herald Tribune, 07.06.1996, http://www.nytimes.com/1996/06/07/opinion/07iht-‐edphil.t.html, (Date accessed: 01.08.2013). Joffe, Josef, ‘Gulliver Unbound: Can America Rule the World?’ [John Bonython lecture at the Centre for Independent Studies in Sydney] The Sydney Morning Herald, 06.08.2008, http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/08/05/1060064182993.html, (Date accessed: 02.08.2013). Kallas, Sim, ‘Ten years after 9/11: What has been done in Europe to make flying safer from Terrorist attacks?’, European Commission, 09.09.2011), http://ec.europa.eu/commission_2010-‐2014/kallas/headlines/news/2011/09/10-‐years-‐after-‐9-‐11_en.htm, (Date accessed: 19.07.2013). Korb, Lawrence J., and Conley, Laura, and Rotham, Alex, ‘A Historical Perspective on Defense Budgets’, Center for American Progress, (July 6, 2011), http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/budget/news/2011/07/06/10041/a-‐historical-‐perspective-‐on-‐defense-‐budgets/, (Date accessed: 02.08.13). Krauthammer, Charles, ‘Charlie Gibson's Gaffe’, The Washington Post, 13.09.2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-‐dyn/content/article/2008/09/12/AR2008091202457.html, (Date accessed: 02.08.2013). Obama, Barack, ‘A World that Stands as One’, Speech as prepared for delivery, (Berlin, Germany: 24.07.2008, Berlin, Germany) in The Huffington Post: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/07/24/obama-‐in-‐berlin-‐video-‐of_n_114771.html, (Date accessed: 02.08.2013). Quinlin, Joseph P., ‘Drifting Apart or Growing Together? The Primacy of the Transatlantic Economy’ Center for Transatlantic Relations, Washington D.C., (March 2003), http://transatlantic.sais-‐jhu.edu/publications/books/drifting_apart_monograph.pdf, (Date accessed: 02.08.13).


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‘Europe still seeks Voice, Kissinger says’, The Wall Street Journal, 27.06.2012, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304830704577492901066964924.html, (Date accessed: 18.07.2013). ‘PM focuses on Iraq and Domestic Agenda’, The National Archives, 28.04.2003, http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20040105034004/http://number10.gov.uk/page3535, (Date accessed: 18.07.13). ‘Truman Doctrine’, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-‐1952/TrumanDoctrine, (Date accessed: 01.08.13). ‘Vice President Tells West Point Cadets "Bush Doctrine" Is Serious’, American Forces Press Service, (June 2, 2003): http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=28921, (Date accessed: 02.08.13).

Sam Hamberger The Berlin Historical Review

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For US eyes only? The untold story of the British reaction to the

Iran-‐Contra Affair

Sam Hamberger

History B.A., University of Sussex (Brighton, UK)

Abstract: This article investigates the British reaction to the Iran-‐Contra affair of the Reagan Administration. The reaction is assessed at two levels of political society, the state and the press, in order to establish the dominant views in the UK. 'The state' being policy-‐making central government headed by PM Thatcher and 'the press' representing the wide range of published material. The relevance of these views to America is subsequently assessed, allowing a new understanding of Britain's role in a Cold War context Special Relationship. This essay sets the context for analysis by detailing the unfolding of events in both Iran and Nicaragua, the approach of the "Teflon" President, the rise of the National Security Council, and the dynamics of the Special Relationship. I argue that the state's view of the Iran-‐Contra affair was critical, but the main cause of concern was the lack of British involvement. The affair changed the dynamic of the Special Relationship, with the state regarding America more warily than before, the exception of being Thatcher's unrelenting support of Reagan. The British press questioned both Reagan and America's competence and credibility, after Britain was alienated by the secretive policy but welcomed back in the post-‐affair fall-‐out. Overall, the British perspective of the Iran-‐Contra affair is an under-‐studied topic and the contrasts between state and press level opinion were both revealing and fascinating. Keywords: Iran-‐Contra Affair, Thatcher, Reagan, US-‐UK relations, Cold War The Iran-‐Contra affair was the label attributed to two covert American foreign policy operations of the Reagan administration which were exposed in November of 1986. The first began in 1982, when Congress banned military support of the Contras in Nicaragua, and the Reagan administration found alternative ways to achieve their policy goal. The second concerned the Middle East, with American arms being sold to Iran, beginning in 1985, despite the US being publically allied to Iraq, and Iran being subject to an arms trade embargo. In this article I will investigate the British response to these events, by which I mean to compare and contrast the opinions of two different levels of British political society: namely, the state and the press. In so doing I will establish the dominant views in the UK, and can then analyse their relevance across the Atlantic, expanding the scope of focus to enable a wider understanding of the British role in the Western alliance. This dissertation focuses on a largely ignored subject, the literature on the affair being centred on establishing how the events unfolded, investigating the decision-‐making hierarchy which


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made the affair possible, considering whose responsibility the affair ultimately was, and assessing the various investigations that occurred as a result of the exposure.

Furthermore, even alternative narratives stop at further exploring the role of Israel in the leading of the trade of munitions with Iran,1 or address the issue from the perspective of political science2. Having said this, the existing historiography provides background information and context, as well as illustrating the basic debate regarding the definition of the Iran-‐Contra affair. Some authors argue that “the two operations had different origins, justifications and outcomes, which need to be separately specified”3, leading them to entitle the scandal the Iran-‐Contra affairs, or to divide the events entirely, referring to Irangate and Contragate individually4. However, as the policies were enacted by the same personnel, were intrinsically inter-‐connected to the point where they contributed to each other’s existence, mutually sustaining and growing to the extent that they did, I view it as the Iran-‐Contra affair.

In order to thoroughly investigate the British perspective of events centring on the November of 1986, I scrutinise not only the various opinions of the affair itself, but also the way it affected both the Anglo-‐American ‘special relationship‘and the judgment of President Reagan. These points of focus enable a wider analysis of Britain’s role in American foreign policy and, equally, on the international stage, in a Cold War context. The British perspective will be addressed on two fundamental levels: ‘state‘, being the policy-‐making central government, and ‘press‘, being the published literature representing a wider range of opinions. Illustrating the view held by the state is vital to understanding the interaction between the Reagan Administration and that of the UK, both in terms of official policies and on a more informal basis, and also significant in revealing how the Iran-‐Contra affair affected the status of the special relationship and the British government’s attitude towards Reagan. Equally, the opinion of the press is fundamental to uncovering the more diverse beliefs across Britain, identifying the extent to which the British press was critical of the American leadership, and of Britain’s relationship with that leadership as a result of the Iran-‐Contra affair.

Having first used the secondary literature to familiarise myself with the topic, in providing context and exploring the surrounding issues, I then employed a variety of primary sources to comprehensively investigate the British reaction to the affair. In terms of primary sources that portray the opinion of the state, official policy papers from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, discussion between embassies, and cabinet discussions on the relevant topics would have been ideal. However, due to the contemporary nature of my investigation those documents fell under the jurisdiction of the 30 year law, which ensures government privacy. Original documents can be released prior to the passing of 30 years, if

1 See S. Segev’s book The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel’s Role in the Iran-‐Contra Affair and H. Amirahmadi edited work The United States and the Middle East: Search for new perspectives.

2 See J.B. Thompson’s thesis Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age and more specifically R. Busby’s Reagan and the Iran-‐Contra Affair: The Politics of Presidential Recovery.

3 L. Cliffe “Iran-‐Contra Affairs” in L. Cliffe, M. Ramsay and D. Bartlett, The Politics of Lying: Implications for Democracy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000) p.95.

4 See L. Cliffe, M. Ramsay and D. Bartlett, The Politics of Lying: Implications for Democracy (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan 2000) and, vitally, T. Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-‐Contra Affairs (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991).


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an application under the Freedom of Information Act is successful; however, there are limits to the application as, not only is there a £600 cap on how far the search for the desired documents can reasonably be pursued, but the government has complete discretion over this process. Unfortunately, due to the delicate nature of Britain’s current policy in the Middle East, I was informed that any application submitted in relation to this issue would be refused. This led me to think more creatively about how the opinions of the state could be accurately represented by primary sources.

To this end, I obtained the views of Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher using sources from the Thatcher Foundation, and her Complete Public Statements 1945-‐1990 ranging from interviews with a number of TV news channels, written interviews with a variety of companies, speeches at an array of events and scrutiny in the House of Commons at Prime Minister’s question time. Moreover, both Hansard and Parliamentary Papers portray the views of the wider government in both the Commons and the House of Lords. In addition, despite the unavailability of official Department and Cabinet papers, significant insight into the workings of government was gained from examining the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme, a selection of interviews with civil servants detailing their roles and experiences. In order to comprehensively represent the view of the press, I studied numerous newspapers, including The Daily Mirror, The Guardian, The Independent, The Observer, The Times and The Sunday Times; also, the analysis in contemporary journal articles will be employed to add further depth to the press outlook. Having considered the implications of the questionits position amongst current historiography, the topic it focuses on, and the sources that are considered in order to do so, the structure of this essay must also be exacted. Firstly, I will give a more detailed description of how the Iran-‐Contra affair unfolded, whilst also providing historical context on the situation in Iran, America’s role in Nicaragua, the trajectory of the special relationship, and Reagan’s role in his administration. I will then describe the state opinion of, primarily, the Iran-‐Contra affair and, secondarily, both the special relationship and Reagan; correspondingly, these topics will then be discussed using the stance of the press. Finally, I will conclude, describing the results of the investigation into the British reaction to the Iran-‐Contra affair.

In order to accurately assess the British reaction to the Iran-‐Contra affair, a number of topics need to be situated in historical context or be explained: the situations as they were in Iran and Nicaragua, the approach of the Reagan Presidency, the rise of the National Security Council (NSC), the events of the affair itself and, finally, the background of the special relationship. A precedent for relations between the United States and Iran were, arguably, already set, as since the 1950s the US and Israel had jointly dealt with Iran5. However, when the US-‐installed Shah was overthrown in 1979, the replacement was an Islamicist government with anti-‐American overtones6. This change of attitude led to a reiteration of an arms trade embargo against Iran under the Export Administration Act of 1979, the policy originating from an executive order from President Carter7. However, strategy was complicated when on June 14th, a Lebanese man hijacked a plane and took those aboard hostage, demanding the release of 700 Lebanese prisoners held in Israel. The

5 S. Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel’s Role in the Iran-‐Contra Affair (New York: The Free Press, 1988), p. xi.

6 L. Cliffe “Iran-‐Contra Affairs” in L. Cliffe, M. Ramsay and D. Bartlett, The Politics of Lying: Implications for Democracy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000), p.99.

7 Ibid., p.99.


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hostages were reportedly being held by pro-‐Iranian groups in Lebanon. Consequently, despite US support of Iraq in their conflict, America attempted to recover its citizens and, in so doing, got involved covertly with Iran8.

The extent of Israel’s role in this policy decision is debated, as due to their Military Industrial Complex9, they were already supplying Iran with weapons “on winks and nods”10. Wroe argued that “what Israel wanted, America rarely resisted” implying the US were involved “not out of conviction but with a strong prod from Israel”11. Contrastingly, Amirahmadi stated that those involved knew that, should the plan go awry, the blame would be pinned on the Israelis, despite their role being merely middlemen12. Whatever the reason the result is clear; in July 1985 contact was authorised, and by August Israeli arms stocks had been suitably replenished.

In 1979 the US-‐supported Somoza regime in Nicaragua was overthrown by Marxist Sandinista forces, who then established a government after dubious “democratic elections”13. The Contras were a group who rose against the Sandinistas, an odd alliance of political leaders who were opposed to the Somoza regime and his former Generals14. In the US the Contras were portrayed as “freedom fighters” suppressed by an oppressive regime, but in reality the Contras were widely reported to be involved in drug smuggling, and the Sandinistas were not extremist Marxists15. These factors were ignored by the Reagan administration “in the name of anti-‐Communism”16 and, hence, it “committed itself to backing the Contras at all costs”, driven onward by earlier policy successes in Panama and Grenada17.

Reagan’s style of leadership was fundamental to his tenure as President, where “[h]e delegated widely and trusted those to whom he made delegations”18. As Dumbrell describes, he was “relaxed to the point of abdicating authority, emotional to the point of governing by instinct and feeling”, and it was these characteristics from which his popularity stemmed19. However, Reagan’s congenial nature, passive style and intellectual flaccidity were a problem when it came to Foreign policy20; as the Reykjavik Summit exhibited, Reagan was “a disengaged President, one susceptible to confusion in the face on rapidly 8 H. Amirahmadi, ed., The United States and the Middle East: Search for new perspectives (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993) p. 185.

9 Ibid., p.190. 10 L. Cliffe, p.99. 11 A. Wroe, Lives, Lies and the Iran-‐Contra Affair (New York: I.B. Tauris and Co., 1991), pp. 82-‐3. 12 H. Amirahmadi, p.181. 13 L. Cliffe, p.96. 14 M. Schaller, Reckoning with Reagan: America and Its President in the 1980s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 151.

15 L. Cliffe p.107. 16 M. Schaller p.150. 17 T. Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-‐Contra Affairs (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991), p. 27. 18 R.A. Strong, Decisions and Dilemmas: Case Studies in Presidential Foreign Policy Making (New Jersey: Prentice-‐Hall, 1992), p. 182.

19 J. Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-‐American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 2nd Edition, p. 123.

20 M.J. Dickinson, Bitter Harvest: FDR, Presidential Power and the Growth of the Presidential Branch (New York: Cambridge University Press 1997), p.24.


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changing events”. Furthermore, when shots were first exchanged in the Libya bombing campaign, Reagan’s advisers thought it best not to wake him, “a symbol of [his] detachment”21. For the issues that did concern him, however, “Reagan discovered the legitimate power at his disposal was insufficient to meet the demands placed upon his office”22.

The National Security Council (NSC) was originally conceived in 1947 “to be a check on presidential power”, and its role was to ensure there was no asymmetry of information, and all government agencies were coordinated23. During the Reagan years, the NSC staff made progress from being “advisory not operational”, to being capable of operating “covertly-‐covertly, that is to say, from the rest of government”24; the staff possessed excessive zeal, questionable ethics, and inexperience25. The NSC staff were a product of a faulty White House advisory system, according to Dickinson, where ideas were never vetted at a sub-‐Cabinet level, experts were ignored, and no political or legal insight was sought26. The growth of the White House staff led to an increase in specialisation so each agency had a narrower field of concern and, therefore, a wider area of neglect or ignorance27. Furthermore, the NSC were “left, deliberately, with almost total responsibility” for “schemes that were full of controversy and risk”; these factors contributed to the position of the staff at the time of the Iran-‐Contra affair.

Having established the main players and locations, the events of the affair itself cannot go without brief description, taking the two different locations as separate timelines to give the narrative clarity. Firstly to Iran where the Reagan administration sold weapons to Iranian “moderates”, who supposedly supported the release of US hostages, the end of the Iran/Iraq war, the toppling of Ayatollah Khomeini, and, subsequent improvement of relations with the United States28. The actual existence of these “moderates” was controversial at the time29. Wroe argues that the hostages and the strategic importance of Iran were the key motivations behind the policy30. Anti-‐tank missiles were sold by Israel to Iran, with the US replenishing Israeli stocks, huge quantities of arms changing hands in return for few hostages throughout the period. Oliver North, an NSA staff member, pressed for additional arms sales with the backing of Reagan31. Their reasons, officially, divergent as Reagan’s heartstrings were pulled by the hostage scenario, while Ollie North had the “neat idea” to transfer the profits from the sales to the Contras, despite federal statutes requiring any profits generated by the executive to be returned to the Treasury32. In May, Reagan authorised one last deal, just as Congress agreed to release funds starting in October.

21 R.A. Strong, p.182. 22 R. Busby, Reagan and the Iran-‐Contra Affair: The Politics of Presidential Recovery (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press 1999), p. 181.

23 R.A. Strong, p. 180. 24 T. Draper, pp. 6-‐15. 25 M.J. Dickinson, p. 24. 26 Ibid., p.24. 27 Ibid., p.30. 28 M. Schaller, p.156. 29 Ibid., p. 157. 30 A. Wroe, p.84. 31 M. Schaller, p. 158. 32 Ibid., p. 160.


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At this point the story begins to unravel, despite the release of another hostage, as the Iranians learned they were being overcharged, prompting the US to ditch their Iranian contact Ghorbanifar as it was clear he was playing both sides33. By September, North had acquired a new contact and, as well as new arms sales, promised the release of terrorists held in Kuwait; another hostage was released34. However, on November 3rd the story broke in Iran, and the next day the government claimed America had been fooled by loyal agents35. In reaction to inquiries made, the Reagan administration attempted a cover-‐up, telling the press it was the Israeli’s project and that the shipments were oil drilling equipment, not arms. The Tower Commission Report, one of the three inquiries, concluded “[t]he Iran initiative ran directly counter to the administration’s own policy on terrorism, the Iran/Iraq war and military support of Iran. The result taken as a whole was a US policy that worked against itself”.

Policy in Nicaragua was, initially, restricted by the 1982 Boland Act, which capped CIA aid to the Contras and ordered that no funds be directed towards toppling the Nicaraguan government36. Reagan then directed his subordinates to “circumvent” the law, firstly thorough giving the Contras ‘surplus‘ weapons for free37. This situation continued until it was revealed that the CIA had planted mines in a Nicaraguan harbour in 1984, which led to CIA activities being kept in check by Congress, thus stimulating the involvement of the NSC as a government agency under less scrutiny38. Another effect was Boland II, a ‘watertight‘ Congressional act, which led one Congressman to declare “the Contras are dead”; Oliver North was charged with ensuring this was not the case. He did so by privatising the funding, raising considerable sums from foreign governments and private citizens, with donations being rewarded with an introduction to the President39. This non-‐intelligence, non-‐agency approach was still illegal as federal statues [...] banned the executive branch from spending funds Congress had not appropriated40. The story began to unfold in this location when Sandinista forces shot down a cargo plane delivering weapons, and the pilot confessed to being part of a secret US plan41. As it became clear that events in Nicaragua and Iran were not unrelated, a stream of lies and cover-‐up stories were released, including: the operation rested solely on the shoulders of Secretary of State George Schultz, the arms were in fact spare parts, operations in Iran were part of a gallant geo-‐political scheme to open Iran and end the Iran/Iraq war, and more42. The three parties allocated to investigate the affair were the Tower Commission, a Congressional Committee, and a special prosecutor; they all undermined but did not condemn Reagan, reportedly “hardly la[ying] a glove on the President”43. Furthermore, no one in Congress appeared to pick up on the part played by Israel or want to impeach a popular President, so “willingly shifted the attention [...] to Central America”. The Teflon nature of Reagan was demonstrated, as due to his

33 M. Schaller p. 162 34 Ibid.p. 162 35 Ibid.p. 163 36 Ibid. p. 151 37 Ibid.p. 151 38 L. Cliffe p. 97 39 M. Schaller pp. 153-‐155 40 L. Cliffe p. 98 41 M. Schaller p. 162 42 Ibid. p. 165 43 Ibid.p. 166-‐169


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authorisations being so vague and his memory of them so hazy, no allegations stuck to him, “although the affair touched and damaged Reagan it could not shake him”44.

Finally, in order to effectively examine the Iran-‐Contra affairs’ effect on the special relationship, it must be put in context. For Reagan, “Thatcher was the leader who set to apply American remedies to a country which had become demoralised and impoverished by an excess of Socialism”45; it was evident that new policy ideas always seemed to emanate from the US46. This was part of a policy drive from Thatcher, attempting to reverse the view that Britain had “gone downhill to the point that we [Britain] had become irrelevant”47. This was true to the extent that, “in some policy areas the Thatcher government operated as little more than an enthusiastic anti-‐Communist client of the United States”48, a number of issues across the period reinforcing this. The US invasion of Grenada (a former British colony) in 1983 saw Thatcher depicted as “Reagan’s obedient poodle”49, the bombing of Libya with planes launched from British bases in 1986 provoked the popularity of literature like Campbell’s “The Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier: American Military Power in Britain”50.

Additionally, conflicts in the special relationship involved Europe, as Britain committed to the Single European Act in 1985 and America’s Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI), potentially creating a level of protection for America from nuclear attack which would leave Europe vulnerable to the conventional missile superiority of the USSR51. Other conflicts in the Anglo-‐American relationship included the East-‐West negotiations on nuclear disarmament52, total disarmament as an idealistic dream of Reagan’s, and America’s budget and trade deficit, which was a concern for those across Europe53. Having said that, the “warmth of the friendship between Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher was intense and unprecedented in recent history”, and Thatcher described the relationship as “natural”, “extraordinary and very very special”54. The basis of the relationship was both deeply historical and contemporary. Thatcher was hugely thankful to the United States for its role in both European history, bank-‐rolling post-‐war Europe, and in the Falklands War in 1982, during which America sacrificed its links with Argentina to share intelligence with the UK55. She expressed this thanks by backing war against the Sandinistas in Nicaragua “enthusiastically”56, and conveying her approval of America’s Rapid Deployment Forces for use in the Middle East, after UK-‐US policy converged in the area57.

44 A. Wroe p. iv 45 J. Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-‐American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan 2nd edition 2006) p. 106

46 M. Balen, Kenneth Clarke: A Biography (London, 4th Estate 1994) p. 156 47 N. Fowler, Ministers Decide: A personal memoir of the Thatcher years (London, Chapman 1991) p. 150 48 J. Dumbrell p. 108 49 C.J. Bartlett, “The Special Relationship”: A political history of Anglo-‐American relations since 1945 (London, Longman 1992) p. 157

50 J. Dumbrell p. 109 51 Ibid. p. 109 52 C.J. Bartlett p. 159 53 Ibid. p. 160 54 J. Dumbrell p. 106 55 Ibid.p. 107 56 Ibid. p. 108 57 C.J. Bartlett p. 164


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Having explained the order of events and situated all the salient issues in context, the British reaction to the Iran-‐Contra affair can now be investigated. I will firstly examine the state response, to establish its interaction with and opinions of the Reagan administration on issues surrounding the Iran-‐Contra affair. In order to do this, I primarily consider a number of aspects of the affair, namely the resultant hearings, the role of Israel, and the UK’s involvement in both Central America and the Middle East. Secondarily, of course, the state’s stance on the special relationship and the contribution of President Reagan in the wake of the affair is also studied. The British state response to the hearings of the Iran-‐Contra affair intriguingly highlights the UK’s participation, or lack thereof, and demonstrates a spectator’s critical scrutiny of the process. No British staff attended the hearings58; this, however, was not seen as a problem by the government as, when requested, Mr. Eggar, a Conservative MP, said that this was due to the fact that “the report of the Congressional committees investigating the Iran-‐Contra affair contain[ed] no information to suggest that British subjects ha[d] broken the United Kingdom law”59. Upon conclusion of the hearings, Conservative MP Rupert Allasan verified that “although the law, as supplied by the Senate, was broken, there were no penalties for Oliver North or for John Poindexter”60, this the apparent effect of what Lord Thomas of Swynnerton described as, “the inventiveness and ingenuity of the American system”61. The role of Israel in the Irangate scandal was ‘major and invidious‘ according to Conservative MP Mr Denis Walters, who was struck by both “the ease with which the Israelis were able to play on the United States Administration’s weaknesses for their own ends”, and “the kid-‐gloved caution with which most of the American media treated this aspect of the affair”62. This highlights not only the British government’s suspicion of other American allies, but also the awareness of weaknesses in the US government.

The British state pursued “a peaceful negotiated solution, not a military one” in Central America, and therefore supported the Contadora process, a diplomatic effort of the Central American countries to establish a more stable area in which to govern, Thatcher stating that “we and the Americans firmly support the Contadora process and will continue to”63. Even when the Contadora process stuttered and collapsed, the Prime Minister herself admitting “it is not easy”, she still persisted: “I don’t think there is a military solution”64. In accordance with this, it was made clear on numerous occasions that “the British government ha[d] not authorised the supply of Blowpipe [missiles] to the Contras”65. Britain’s material contribution to the stability of Central America was maintaining a presence in Belize, as Thatcher emphasised, “we keep troops in Belize to keep democracy”66. When asked about Reagan’s commitment to the Contra cause as a moral responsibility, Thatcher replied “[t]his is a matter for the President. I do not interfere in the

58 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Written Answers, 1/7/87. 59 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Written Answers, 16/12/87. 60 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Commons Sitting, 15/12/88. 61 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Lords), Lords Sitting, 25/3/87. 62 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Commons Sitting, 7/4/87. 63 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Prime Minister’s Questions, 26/2/85. 64 Press Conference for American Correspondents with Margaret Thatcher (London, 3/7/87). 65 See Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Commons Sitting, 7/5/87 and Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Prime Minister’s Questions, 7/5/87.

66 Press Conference for American Correspondents with Margaret Thatcher (London, 3/7/87).


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view which he takes”67. This is indicative of the British state’s sense of detachment from the situation in Nicaragua. Moreover, as Sir Sherard Cowper-‐Coles saw from his embassy position in Washington, as far as Thatcher was concerned, policy in Central America was American policy and, hence, was “of not much concern to Britain”68. However, as Lord Renwick said in 1998, “although people don’t like to admit it, the fact is that Reagan did succeed in Central America”, “American policy over the last 15 years has really been rather successful and we should acknowledge that”69.

British policy in Iran did not vary hugely during the period surrounding the Iran-‐Contra affair, Thatcher herself referencing the continuation when questioned in Parliament as to her role in the Irangate scandal70. This policy was based on the fact that “Britain ha[d] always played a role in the Middle East [...] rather effectively71” and guided by “work[ing] with the United Nations”72. American policy towards Iran was seen as “remarkable” and an “aberration”, as “they [America] accepted the need to sustain Iraq, in order to prevent an Iranian victory”, yet simultaneously decided to arm Iran; consequently, there was an explicit rejection of association or support for US policy in Iran73. A reaction such as this was hardly surprising, considering that officials in Britain “were not informed or consulted about a matter such as this”74. Besides, UK officials were actively misled when John Poindexter assured the British Ambassador that the United States were not making any deals to obtain the hostages, on the very day that McFarlane and North were in Tehran with a plane-‐load of weapons75. The fundamental critique levelled at America by the British state was their handling of a terrorist/hostage situation. The initial “mistake surely was [...] negotiating the sale of arms with a nation which has only and privately supported terrorism”76, Thatcher reinforced the British policy stating “we never give arms or ransom of any kind for hostages”77 and referred Americans to her experience in handling the IRA (Irish Republican Army)78. Having said this, Thatcher recognised that “America’s relations with the Arab world are still strong, and indeed it is important for us all that they should be”; moreover, she labelled the talk of Europe substituting for the US in the Middle East as “misguided”79.

The special relationship was generally hugely well-‐regarded in the opinion of the state, regardless of the Iran-‐Contra affair. Baroness Cox said “we [Britain] must never devalue our relationship with the United States”80, and Thatcher related the connection to that of a family “because if ever there were trouble the relationship is so fundamental that I

67 Press Conference at the British Embassy with Margaret Thatcher (Washington, 21/2/1985). 68 Interview with Sir Sherard Cowper-‐Coles for the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (London, 4/3/2011).

69 Interview with Lord Renwick for the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (London, 29/9/98). 70 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Prime Minister’s Questions, 7/5/87. 71 Interview with Margaret Thatcher broadcast on Mexican Television (en route to Jamaica, 10/6/85). 72 Press Conference for American Correspondents with Margaret Thatcher (London, 3/7/87). 73 Current UK Policy towards the Iran/Iraq conflict, Report and Committee proceedings from the Foreign Affairs Committee (Commons, 10/2/88) pp. 15-‐76.

74 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for ABC News (Washington, 21/1/87). 75 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for CBS’ “Face the Nation” (Washington, 17/7/87). 76 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Lords) Lord Sitting, 25/3/87. 77 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for ABC News (Washington, 21/1/87). 78 Press Conference at the British Embassy with Margaret Thatcher (Washington, 21/2/1985). 79 Written Interview with Margaret Thatcher for HH Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Ltd. (24/3/87). 80 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Lords), Lords Sitting, 25/3/87.


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do not think it would ever crack”81. What is more, Thatcher stated, of the special relationship, “I believe [it] will always be there” due to a sense of shared regard for “law and a fundamental belief in human rights that gives a nation its character”82. Moreover, for Thatcher this link existed because of “how much we [Britain] owe the United States”83 causing her to “want to make a contribution”84 to the alliance; overall, America was seen as “a strong country with a great President, a great people and a great future”85. Britain “play[s] an important part in defence and diplomacy” and “we have a special relationship with the United States on intelligence”; Britain will continue to matter to the US provided “we use these enormous assets with vigour and determination”86. Thatcher stated, “they [the US] still value our advice on international issues”87, so that “when the President wants to get our view [...], there is extensive consultation. It works”88. On the other hand, Thatcher was concerned that events in Nicaragua would follow a similar path to those in Grenada in 198389, where Britain was not consulted until it was too late, failing to impart knowledge becoming a tactic of the American foreign policy framework90. This more mistrustful state attitude towards American policy overseas was exemplified when Thatcher told a top embassy civil servant “to remember that there was no point in engaging in conflict with a friend when you weren’t going to win”91, and furthered when Thatcher was forced to politically manoeuvre around the fact that John Poindexter had lied to the British Ambassador, assuring him there were no weapons being traded for hostages, whilst his colleagues, North and McFarlane, were in Tehran selling weapons92. Overall, the special relationship was a fundamental connection and, no matter how forcefully differences were expressed, it was “as strong as ever”93.

Ronald Reagan was the figure at the centre of the turmoil created by the Iran-‐Contra affair, and this reinvigorated Prime Minister Thatcher’s support for him. She “believe[d] he ha[d] not let go his leadership role in any way”94 and was “a great believer” in the continuation of that leadership 95, dismissing accusations that Reagan was a lame duck President96. Thatcher went out of her way to confirm that the President was well and not, as some rumours purported, on the brink of senility97. Thatcher reacted strongly against the reports that Reagan had lost his international credibility, declaring “I am absolutely astonished! I have dealt with the President for many years and have absolute trust in

81 Press Conference for American Correspondents with Margaret Thatcher (London, 3/7/87). 82 Radio Interview with Margaret Thatcher for the BBC (Washington, 17/11/88). 83 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for CBS’ “Face the Nation” (Washington, 17/7/87). 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for NBC Today (Washington, 17/7/87). 87 Written Interview with Margaret Thatcher for “The Rich Tide” on Anglo-‐American Relations (2/6/86). 88 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for CBS’ “Face the Nation” (Washington, 17/7/87). 89 Interview with Sir Sherard Cowper-‐Coles for the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (London, 4/3/2011).

90 Interview with Lord Renwick for the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (London, 29/9/98). 91 Interview with Sir Sherard Cowper-‐Coles for the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (London, 4/3/2011).

92 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for CBS’ “Face the Nation” (Washington, 17/7/87). 93 TV Interview with Margaret Thatcher for ITN (15/11/1986). 94 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for NBC Today (Washington, 17/7/87). 95 Ibid.. 96 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for CBS News (Washington, 17/7/87). 97 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for CBS’ “Face the Nation” (Washington, 17/7/87).


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him”98. The British state, primarily voiced through Thatcher, condemned the media, stating “in a free society the criticism gets perhaps out of proportion”99, candidly telling one interviewer to “Cheer up! Be more upbeat!”100 However, the wider sources of the state held opinions divergent from Thatcher’s, Lord Thomas of Swynnerton exemplifying this change in sentiment, when pronouncing “this crisis turned what we [Britain] had been accustomed to look on as a strong and determined Presidency into an apologetic one”101. Furthermore, Mr. Brandon-‐Bravo, a Conservative MP, declared Reagan “guilty but asleep”102; Sir Antony Acland, Ambassador to Washington, added insult to injury when he confirmed Reagan “wasn’t an intellectual giant”103.

Another issue in which Thatcher led the rhetoric, was British concern for the state of international affairs and America’s role in those affairs. As the Prime Minister said of the Iran-‐Contra affair, “I think America has a problem at the moment, but I hope that it is not going to dominate things”, for “there is work to do”104. The British government saw America’s role in this work to be prevalent, fulfilling their “traditional leadership role”105 for which “there is no substitute”106. “Big” international issues that needed to be approached with America included issues like South Korea, East-‐West negotiations on Nuclear disarmament, the Iran-‐Iraq conflict and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)107. When asked whether it was true that US influence across the world had been greatly damaged and their credibility was “shredded”, Thatcher replied “you should have as much faith in America as I have”108. Thatcher and her government demanded the leadership of America in dealing with these issues as “if she does not [...] she injures not only herself but she injures the interests of the free world”109.

The press opinion of the Iran-‐Contra affair, its various facets, and its effect on both the special relationship and Reagan’s administration will now examined. In order to do this I examine the view of American foreign policy making, the personnel involved, the role of Britain, the part played by Reagan, how developments affected the special relationship, and the affairs’ effect on the international credibility of the US. The reaction across Britain, and the rest of Europe, was a “mixture of astonishment, amusement and horror”110 to the revelation of the events surrounding the Iran-‐Contra affair. The central source of alarm was the “kind of people responsible” for running foreign policy111, “a small group of unqualified and irresponsible officials” who determined policy “without reference not only to Congress,

98 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for CBS News (Washington, 17/7/87). 99 Press Conference for American Correspondents with Margaret Thatcher (London, 3/7/87). 100 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for CBS’ “Face the Nation” (Washington, 17/7/87). 101 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Lords), Lords Sitting, 25/3/87. 102 Hansard Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Commons Sitting, 18/6/89 103 Interview with Sir Antony Acland for the British Diplomatic Oral History Programme (London, 23/4/2001). 104 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for ABC News (Washington, 21/1/87). 105 Ibid.. 106 Press Conference with Margaret Thatcher (en route to Jamaica, 17/7/87). 107 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for CBS’ “Face the Nation” (Washington, 17/7/87). 108 Ibid.. 109 Interview with Margaret Thatcher for CBS News (Washington, 17/7/87). 110 M. Howard, “A European Perspective of the Reagan Years”, Foreign Affairs (Volume 66 1988), p. 483. 111 Ibid., p. 484.


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the State Department or the Department of Defense but to the President himself”112. That referred to, of course the “cabal of liars” that were the NSC113, whose operation was “filled with intelligence shortfalls, which included a limited knowledge of the Iranian officials involved”114. It was, however, reported that “a senior Israeli official came up with the idea of increasing the price of weapons [...] and diverting the surplus to the Contras”115. Moreover, it was speculated that “the Israeli dealers, whose links with Iran long predate the McFarlane/Poindexter deal, could have used the US request as a cover”116. Overall, US foreign policy was seen as a “clattering train” with “no one in charge”117.

The personnel involved in the Iran-‐Contra Affair were the subject of some fairly polar judgments from the press, no matter what the results of the multiple enquiries were. Oliver North was described as “brave, corrupt, obsessional, charming, self-‐deluded and hard working” possessing a “low-‐cunning which fooled nobody”118. A man picked out from amongst the shadows by the press in Britain was the then recently dead William Casey, a former Director of the CIA who was described as the “puppet master” behind operations in Nicaragua119. Another, Attorney General Edwin Meese, depicted as the “mastermind behind the cover-‐up”, was the last of the Reagan Californian coterie; the “ethically economic”120 Meese “used America’s most senior legal position to advance his friends”121. The stand-‐out favourite in the British media was Secretary of State George Schultz, described as a “belligerent Buddha” for his “open, unhesitating answers” in front of the Congressional committee which emphasised the difference between himself and the “bumbling” Meese122.

The role of Britain in the Iran-‐Contra affair was another issue the British press reported commonly. Queries into official awareness of the affair were prevalent as “the Liberal leader [...] challenged the Prime Minister about the extent of her knowledge of the Contragate arms deals and demanded the closure of an Iranian company’s London offices which have been implicated in arms transactions”123. Furthermore, “in the Commons Minister, led by Mrs Thatcher, have been able to rebuff Labour’s curiosity about the efforts to buy [...] blowpipe missiles for the Contras”124. Moreover, a British defence contractor involved in selling $10million of arms to the Contras made the deal with a Syrian, who was wanted for alleged terrorist movement on both sides of the Atlantic; the involvement of a reputable British firm again drew questions as to whether the deal was made with “official knowledge”125. In addition, “well placed sources” claim British officials warned the United States in 1985 and ’86 that it was dealing with “some nefarious people and some complete

112 Ibid., p. 484. 113 A. Brummer and M. White, “IC Panel indicts Reagan’s ‘cabal of liars’”, The Guardian (19/11/87). 114 A. Brummer, “Reagan’s grasp slipping away”, The Guardian (15/1/87). 115 A. Brummer, “Israel blamed for Irangate”, The Guardian (31/12/86). 116 K. Lustig, “Israel next for scapegoat role”, The Observer (30/11/86). 117 M. White, “The way to make Reagan look a fool or a knave”, The Guardian (17/12/86). 118 I. Brogan, “Spotlight on all the President’s sleazy men” The Observer (3/5/87). 119 A. Brummer and M. White, “IC Panel indicts Reagan’s ‘cabal of liars’”, The Guardian (19/11/87). 120 M. White, “The way to make Reagan look a fool or a knave”, The Guardian (17/12/86). 121 J. Adams, “Meese’s enemies to move in for the kill” The Sunday Times (26/7/87). 122 Ibid. 123 A. Travis, “Steel challenge on arms deals”, The Guardian (31/12/86). 124 A. Brummer and M. White, “British Irangate Puzzle”, The Guardian (15/5/87). 125 S. De Bruxelles and D. Leigh, “Contras’ arms deal set up by wanted Syrian”, The Observer (12/4/87).


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amateurs” in its attempt to supply the Contras126. Besides, it was reported that two arms dealers from Norwich had dealt with North and both confirmed that he didn’t know what he was talking about127. What is more, Major Walker, head of a British security firm, was recruited by Oliver North and authorised to perform military operations in Managua128. However, “the much vaunted British connection in the Iran-‐Contra Affair [was] only awarded one paragraph in the telephone directory-‐sized report”129.

The British press’ stance toward Reagan was a condemning one, and from the outset his style and intellect were criticised, describing him as a “president quite ignorant of the world outside America” and disliking his tendency to “delegate immense authority”130. Reagan’s inaction in policy meetings was reported on, as “he sits as the laidback chairman of his advisors [...] waiting for some kind of genial consensus to emerge”131. Reagan casting the Contras as inspirational freedom fighters akin to the Founding Fathers lacked conviction132. However, as the affair unfolded, Reagan’s “fundamental offence” was seen as “rather than acknowledge the first error (over Iran), then responsibility (over Nicaragua) he reached instinctively for damage limitation and ‘spin control’ and was encouraged to do so”133. As the following events unfolded the President seemed to lose his grip on his surrounding, and it was released that he “may have been on pain-‐killing drugs at the time” leading to confusion and yet more stories that his old age was overtaking him134. The “depressed and disorientated”135 President was then blamed by the Tower Commission for the persistence of failing policy in Iran136. Reagan “had failed his constitutional duty to uphold the laws of the United States and repeatedly misled the American people137. Just over a year after the unveiling of the Iran-‐Contra affair, President Reagan was “not a lame duck but a dead duck” as, in one day, “the President lost both his political clout and his moral authority”, leaving him “vague, bemused and baffled”138.

The affect of the Iran-‐Contra affair upon the dynamic of the special relationship, as reported by the British press, saw a remarkable transformation. Initially, America’s policy was largely based around their clandestine activities, shutting out most allies, including Britain139. Furthermore, America’s “allies found themselves relegated to satellite states”, “their loyalty assessed by their readiness to accede unquestioningly to American demands”140. Conversely, once the Iran-‐Contra affair had been revealed and America’s integrity, credibility, and influence was damaged, the Anglo-‐American relationship took an altered course. Prime Minister Thatcher took it upon herself to “do everything she [could] to reinforce American leadership of the Western Alliance”, looking to “reaffirm Reagan’s 126 Ibid. 127 S. De Bruxelles and H. O’Shaughnessy, “North riddle over London arms link”, The Observer (26/7/87). 128 S. De Bruxelles, “Plan for Secret ex-‐SAS unit in Afghanistan”, The Observer (22/11/87). 129 A. Brummer and M. White, “IC Panel indicts Reagan’s ‘cabal of liars’”, The Guardian (19/11/87). 130 M. Howard p. 484. 131 M. White, “Ron, Nancy and no laughing face”, The Guardian (15/12/86). 132 M. Howard p. 487. 133 M. White, “The way to make Reagan look a fool or a knave”, The Guardian (17/12/86). 134 A. Brummer, “White House rejects claim of fading Reagan memory”, The Guardian (23/12/86). 135 A. Brummer, “Reagan’s grasp slipping away”, The Guardian (15/1/87). 136 M. Tran, “President’s motives in Irangate are charged”, The Guardian (26/1/87). 137 A. Brummer and M. White, “IC Panel indicts Reagan’s ‘cabal of liars’”, The Guardian (19/11/87). 138 S. Hoggart, “Dead duck in charge at the White House”, The Observer (22/11/87). 139 M. Howard p. 486. 140 Ibid. p. 490.


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authority in the wake of the Iran-‐Contra affair141. Declaring war on all fronts, she even dealt with Reagan’s reported struggles with age when, “in a rare moment of humour”, she stated “antiques get more valuable as they get older”. The Prime Minister also resolved conflicts within the special relationship by dismissing past squabbles142. The reaction across the Atlantic was tumultuous as “a punch-‐drunk Reagan team” was “clearly delighted that Mrs Thatcher [...was] prepared to plunge into the Iran-‐Contra thicket and carry on with her post-‐election visit to Washington as if everything was fine in the rose garden”; the “Reagan-‐Thatcher manifestation of the partnership ha[d] often required Mrs Thatcher to take the flak”143. For these reasons Margaret Thatcher has been acclaimed as the United States of America’s “best, truest friend”144.

The Iran-‐Contra affair had an impact on America’s international credibility, with specific causes triggering wide-‐reaching effects. The unchecked way in which power was used in foreign policy, without the knowledge of the entire legitimate policy-‐approving structure, was “a blow to the credibility of the US as a reliable power”. In addition, there was outrage when the US was uncovered selling arms to a terrorist group in exchange for hostages as “an international agreement had been achieved, with great difficulty and largely at the insistence of the United States itself that no ransom money should ever be paid to terrorist groups”145. Whilst policy in the Middle East had undermined confidence in the US’ ability to operate there, policy in Nicaragua was seen as typical “yanqui” imperialism146. The Iran-‐Contra affair also stimulated economic consequences as a weakened US suffered financially as import duties in American goods were raised in Europe147; furthermore, the affair was one of a list of pressures which contributed to “a definite move against the dollar”148. It appears that Reagan was not only “on the run from his own people”149.

In conclusion, in this article I have explored the British view of the Iran-‐Contra affair through examining primary sources representing the state and the press. The state view of the Iran-‐Contra hearing was quite a critical one, but the main concern was the lack of British involvement. The British also revealed the role of Israel in the affair and was condemning of the perceived ease with which the US was manipulated. The British state’s policy in Central America was a conservative one, holding its ground in Belize; however, there was a hint of begrudging respect for the effectiveness with which America operated. Similarly, policy in Iran was consistent and condemning of the US, whilst simultaneously regarding their importance in the region. The state’s assessment of Britain’s relationship with America was hugely favourable, but changed due to the affair, whilst still regarding the connection as vital they became more wary of the process of American operations. Ronald Reagan was a figure which divided state opinion, with Margaret Thatcher defending him to the hilt whilst

141 M. Jones, “Thatcher ready to give Reagan boost”, The Sunday Times (5/7/87). 142 Ibid.. 143 A. Brummer, “Galloping to the rescue: Mrs Thatcher’s weekend visit to Washington”, The Guardian (17/7/87).

144 S. De Bruxelles, “Strong in the arm, weak in the head”, The Observer (9/8/87). 145 M. Howard, p. 486. 146 Ibid., pp. 486-‐87. 147 I. Stelzer, “American Account: Trade shots just the start”, The Sunday Times (18/1/87). 148 I. Stelzer, “American Account: Paris pledges lack promise”, The Sunday Times (1/3/87). 149 S. Hoggart, “Dead duck in charge at the White House”, The Observer (22/11/87).


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her colleagues in parliament and Whitehall were more critical. Thatcher again played a crucial role in the holding aloft of America as world leader in the face of the Iran-‐Contra affair; her support was unerring on this subject as she thought that for the US to step down from its traditional leadership role would injure the free world. The British press were, firstly, attracted to reporting something similar to the American press as to how this policy was created and enacted, but having said this the British press included the influence of Israel as a factor in considering foreign policy influences. The press were also drawn to inspecting the roles played by individuals involved in the affair, condemning the likes of North and Meese whilst holding high the example of Schultz. The press covered the role of Britain hugely in reference to the Iran-‐Contra affair and were, after the amount of exposure, somewhat disappointed that this perspective on the affair had not permeated across the Atlantic. In contrast to sections of the state opinion, the press condemned the role of Ronald Reagan, recounting his flaws and impotence in the face of the fall-‐out. The press reported that the special relationship entirely transformed as a result of the Iran-‐Contra affair, with Britain initially being held at arm’s length and alienated by secretive policy, and then Thatcher was welcomed over during the fall-‐out of the affair in order to support and boost her friend and ally. So far decreased was America’s international credibility, that the British press reflected upon its decline as a result of the affair, having numerous economic implications and raising serious questions. Overall, the British perspective of the Iran-‐Contra affair is a thoroughly under-‐studied topic and the contrasts between state and press level opinion were both revealing and fascinating.


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Newspaper Articles A. Brummer and M. White, “British Irangate Puzzle”, The Guardian (15/5/87). A. Brummer and M. White, “IC Panel indicts Reagan’s ‘cabal of liars’”, The Guardian (19/11/87). A. Brummer, “Galloping to the rescue: Mrs Thatcher’s weekend visit to Washington”, The Guardian (17/7/87). A. Brummer, “Israel blamed for Irangate”, The Guardian (31/12/86). A. Brummer, “Reagan’s grasp slipping away”, The Guardian (15/1/87). A. Brummer, “White House rejects claim of fading Reagan memory”, The Guardian (23/12/86). A. Travis, “Steel challenge on arms deals”, The Guardian (31/12/86). I. Brogan, “Spotlight on all the President’s sleazy men” The Observer (3/5/87). I. Stelzer, “American Account: Paris pledges lack promise”, The Sunday Times (1/3/87). I. Stelzer, “American Account: Trade shots just the start”, The Sunday Times (18/1/87). J. Adams, “Meese’s enemies to move in for the kill” The Sunday Times (26/7/87). K. Lustig, “Israel next for scapegoat role”, The Observer (30/11/86). M. Jones, “Thatcher ready to give Reagan boost”, The Sunday Times (5/7/87). M. Tran, “President’s motives in Irangate are charged”, The Guardian (26/1/87). M. White, “Ron, Nancy and no laughing face”, The Guardian (15/12/86). M. White, “The way to make Reagan look a fool or a knave”, The Guardian (17/12/86). S. De Bruxelles and D. Leigh, “Contras’ arms deal set up by wanted Syrian”, The Observer (12/4/87). S. De Bruxelles and H. O’Shaughnessy, “North riddle over London arms link”, The Observer (26/7/87). S. De Bruxelles, “Plan for Secret ex-‐SAS unit in Afghanistan”, The Observer (22/11/87). S. De Bruxelles, “Strong in the arm, weak in the head”, The Observer (9/8/87). S. Hoggart, “Dead duck in charge at the White House”, The Observer (22/11/87).


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Secondary Sources Books A. Wroe, Lives, Lies and the Iran-‐Contra Affair (New York: I.B. Tauris and Co. 1991). C.J. Bartlett, “The Special Relationship”: A political history of Anglo-‐American relations since 1945 (London: Longman 1992). H. Amirahmadi, ed., The United States and the Middle East: Search for new perspectives (New York: State University of New York Press, 1993). H.B. Johnson, Sleepwalking through History: America in the Reagan years (New York, W.W. Norton 2003). J. Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-‐American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 2nd edition. J.B. Thompson, Political Scandal: Power and Visibility in the Media Age (Oxford: Polity Press, 2000). L. Cliffe, M. Ramsay and D. Bartlett, The Politics of Lying: Implications for Democracy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2000). L. Fisher, Presidential War Power (Kansas: University Press of Kansas 1995). M. Balen, Kenneth Clarke: A Biography (London, 4th Estate 1994). M. Howard, “A European Perspective of the Reagan Years”, Foreign Affairs (Volume 66 1988), pp. 478-‐93. M. Schaller, Reckoning with Reagan: America and Its President in the 1980s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). M.J. Dickinson, Bitter Harvest: FDR, Presidential Power and the Growth of the Presidential Branch (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). N. Fowler, Ministers Decide: A personal memoir of the Thatcher years (London, Chapman 1991). R. Busby, Reagan and the Iran-‐Contra Affair: The Politics of Presidential Recovery (Basingstoke: Macmillan Press 1999). R.A. Strong, Decisions and Dilemmas: Case Studies in Presidential Foreign Policy Making (New Jersey: Prentice-‐Hall, 1992). R.O. Freedman, ed., The Middle East from the Iran-‐Contra Affair to the Intifada (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1991).


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S. Iyengar, Is Anyone Responsible? How Television Frames Political Issues (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). S. Segev, The Iranian Triangle: The Untold Story of Israel’s Role in the Iran-‐Contra Affair (New York: The Free Press, 1988). T. Draper, A Very Thin Line: The Iran-‐Contra Affairs (New York: Hill and Wang, 1991).


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