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1 The Economics of Crime and Justice Johnny Cash at Folsom Prison, 1968

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The Economics of Crime and Justice. Johnny Cash at Folsom Prison, 1968. Topics. Prisons in America Correctional Bureaucracy in CA The Serious Offender/Career Criminal Terrorism: A Preview. Bureaucracy: Readings. Albert Hirshman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty exit: voting with your feet - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: The Economics of Crime and Justice

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The Economics of Crime and Justice

                                                                      

Johnny Cash at Folsom Prison, 1968

Page 2: The Economics of Crime and Justice

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Topics

Prisons in AmericaPrisons in America Correctional Bureaucracy in CACorrectional Bureaucracy in CA The Serious Offender/Career CriminalThe Serious Offender/Career Criminal Terrorism: A PreviewTerrorism: A Preview

Page 3: The Economics of Crime and Justice

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Bureaucracy: Readings

Albert Hirshman, Albert Hirshman, Exit, Voice and LoyaltyExit, Voice and Loyalty exit: voting with your feetexit: voting with your feet voice: political actionvoice: political action

Anthony Downs, Anthony Downs, Inside BureaucracyInside Bureaucracy survival of the bureaucratsurvival of the bureaucrat

Page 4: The Economics of Crime and Justice

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XIII. Lecture Thirteen: “Managing Prison Stocks and Flows: TheCorrectional Bureaucaracy”, Professor Phillips

References: A. Blumstein, "Prisons: Population, Capacity andAlternatives" (RBR), James Q. Wilson (Ed.) Op. Cit.,(RBR)Phillips & Shapiro, "Prison Costs and PublicExpenditures" (RBR)Albert Hirshman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Ch. 1Anthony Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, Ch. 9

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Prisons in America

Are we the land of the free and the home of Are we the land of the free and the home of the brave?the brave?

Are we the gulag?Are we the gulag?

Or both?Or both?

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Likelihood of Going to Prison in a Lifetime

1/4

1/6

1/23

1/10

For

Newborn

Prevalence of Imprisonment in the U. S. Population, 1974-01Source:

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Imprisonment Rates Per 100/000

http://virlib.ncjrs.org/Corrections.asp

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1012 % Current/Total 25%

1.3 million in prison; 4.3 million out but formerly in

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Current & Former Prisoners Ever Incarcerated, 1974

In 12%

Formerly In88%

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Current & Former Prisoners Ever Incarcerated, 2001

In23%

Formerly In77%

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2.7% of Adults have been in prison, one time or another

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And the % is projected to rise

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If born in 2001, chances or ever going to prison 6.6%

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If born a black male in 2001, lifetime chance is 32.2%, 1/3

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Growth rates in State and Federal Prisoners, 1995-2002

Prisoners in 2002

Source

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Comparative International Rates of Incarceration

1980

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The U.S. Incarceration Rate is Higher than for Russia, and South Africa; 7 times Italy and 8 times France

                      

        

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CA Criminal Justice: examplesAlbert Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty Exit: choosing to live in a gated communityExit: choosing to live in a gated community Voice: lobbying for Voice: lobbying for per se per se laws for DUIlaws for DUI Voice: lobbying for victims’ rights bills and Voice: lobbying for victims’ rights bills and

ballot initiativesballot initiatives

Page 22: The Economics of Crime and Justice

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No Czar for CA CJS

Offenses per Capita

$ ExpendituresPer Capita

Crime Control Technology

Control Costs + Damages to Victims

optimum

High Cost Inefficiency

Page 23: The Economics of Crime and Justice

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No Czar for CJS

Offenses increase, public demands safetyOffenses increase, public demands safety Elected officials can increase police faster Elected officials can increase police faster

than they can build prisonsthan they can build prisons Arrests rise, courts clogArrests rise, courts clog prison capacity risesprison capacity rises number of parolees risesnumber of parolees rises

Page 24: The Economics of Crime and Justice

California Criminal Justice Expenditures By Function, 1992-93

Corrections35%

Law Enforcement48%

Prosecution5%

Public Defense2%

Courts10%

Page 25: The Economics of Crime and Justice

California Criminal Justice Expenditure Shares

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%6

7-6

8

69

-70

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Fiscal Year

Sh

are

Corrections

Courts

Public Defense

Prosecution

Law Enforcement

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Corrections FunctionCorrections Function

Probation DepartmentsProbation Departments JailsJails

city and countycity and county Youth AuthorityYouth Authority California State Department of CorrectionsCalifornia State Department of Corrections

prisons prisons

Page 27: The Economics of Crime and Justice

State Department of Corrections as a Proportion of California Corrections .

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%73

-74

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Fiscal Year

Sh

are Cities and Counties, CYA

Dept. of Corrections

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California Corrections BureaucracyCalifornia Corrections Bureaucracy Prisoner and Parole PopulationsPrisoner and Parole Populations

StocksStocks Felon New Admissions From CourtFelon New Admissions From Court

Inflow to PrisonInflow to Prison Prisoners Released to ParolePrisoners Released to Parole

Outflow from Prison/Inflow to ParoleOutflow from Prison/Inflow to Parole Parole ViolatorsParole Violators

Outflow from ParoleOutflow from Parole Discharges from Parole and DeathsDischarges from Parole and Deaths

Outflow from ParoleOutflow from Parole

Page 29: The Economics of Crime and Justice

California Department of Corrections1996California Department of Corrections1996

Prisoners145,565

Parolees100,935

Felon NewAdmits46,487

Releases to Parole111,532

Dischargedand Died27,691

57,984Parole Violators Returned to Custody

Parole Violators With a New Term 17,525

Parolees AtLarge18,034

Discharged and Died3,984

Absconded29,376

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Correctional Trends in California: Custodial PopulationsCorrectional Trends in California: Custodial Populations

Prisoners Per CapitaPrisoners Per Capita Institutional PopulationInstitutional Population

FelonsFelonsCivil Narcotics AddictsCivil Narcotics Addicts

Parolees Per CapitaParolees Per Capita Parole and Outpatient Population Parole and Outpatient Population

Supervised in CaliforniaSupervised in California

Page 31: The Economics of Crime and Justice

California Prisoners and Parolees, Per Capita .

0

0.0005

0.001

0.0015

0.002

0.0025

0.003

0.0035

0.004

0.0045

0.0051

96

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Year

Rate

Prisoners Per Capita

Parolees Per Capita

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California Department of Corrections:

Total Parole and Outpatient Population

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California Correctional and Parole Officers .

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Correctional Officers

Parole Officers

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Correctional Trends in California: Inflows to PrisonCorrectional Trends in California: Inflows to Prison

Felon New Admissions from CourtFelon New Admissions from Court Parole Violators Returned to CustodyParole Violators Returned to Custody Parole Violators With a New TermParole Violators With a New Term

Page 35: The Economics of Crime and Justice

California: Inflows to Prison .

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96

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Felon New Admissions to Prison

Parole Violators Returned to Custody

Parole Violators With New Term

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Two Policy IssuesTwo Policy Issues

Composition of New Admissions from CourtComposition of New Admissions from Court Large Volume of Parole Violators Returned to Large Volume of Parole Violators Returned to

PrisonPrison

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SERIOUSNESS SURVEY (and months served in prison)

RATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF EACH OF THE FOLLOWING BEHAVIORS ON A SCALE FROM ZERO( LEAST SERIOUS) TO TEN( MOST SERIOUS):

MEAN1. HOMICIDE _9.7__362. MASS POISONING ( e.g. TYLENOL) _8.3__ 3. FORCIBLE RAPE _9.4__664. ARSON: SET FIRE TO A GARAGE _7.8__5. SELLING HEROIN _6.2__6. AUTO THEFT _5.7__177. EMBEZZLEMENT OF $1,000 _4.6__8. PROSTITUTE IN A HOUSE OF PROSTITUTION _3.5__9. POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA _2.3__1310. SNIFFING GLUE _2.0__

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At Least Two Inefficiencies

Using scarce prison space for less serious Using scarce prison space for less serious drug offendersdrug offenders

using scarce prison space for recycled using scarce prison space for recycled parolees returned to custody ( drug test parolees returned to custody ( drug test violators)violators)

Consequence: composition of prisoners Consequence: composition of prisoners rises for drug offenders and falls for violent rises for drug offenders and falls for violent offendersoffenders

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Citizen Reaction to Release of Violent Offenders Voice: Three Strikes LawVoice: Three Strikes Law

Polly Klass abduction and murder by a Polly Klass abduction and murder by a released violent offenderreleased violent offender

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Part II. The Serious Offender (the power of ideas) Theoretical Justification for Detention Theoretical Justification for Detention

PolicyPolicy

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Part IIPart II The Serious OffenderThe Serious Offender

a few serious criminals account for most crimesa few serious criminals account for most crimes if free, each serious offender would commit crimes at the if free, each serious offender would commit crimes at the

rate of rate of per yearper year if there are N serious offenders, they would commit if there are N serious offenders, they would commit *N *N

offenses per year, if freeoffenses per year, if free if there are PR serious offenders in prison, then we save if there are PR serious offenders in prison, then we save

*PR offenses per year*PR offenses per year the net observed offenses per year is:the net observed offenses per year is:

OF = OF = *N - *N - *PR = *PR = (N -AD*S)(N -AD*S)

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Population

Serious Offenders, N

Prisoners, PR

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Population

Serious Offenders, N

Prisoners, PR

If the Serious Offender Population grows faster than the PrisonPopulation then crime gets worse

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Population

Serious Offenders, N

Prisoners, PR

If the Prison Population grows faster than the Serious OffenderPopulation then crime gets better

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Thinking About the Serious Offender

Visually: subpopulationsVisually: subpopulations Stocks and FlowsStocks and Flows TransitionsTransitions

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Mean Time Served: One Year

Relations Between Stocks and Flows

Inflow OutflowStock, Dec 31100 PrisonersJan 1, year one

100 AdmitsJan 1, year two 100 releases

In equilibrium: inflow = outflow

Jan 1, year two100 Admits

Jan 1, year three100 releases

outflow is proportional to the stock: 100 = 1* 100

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Mean Time Served: Two Years

Relations Between Stocks and Flows

Inflow OutflowStock

Jan 1, year one 100 Admits

Jan 1, year two 0 releases

Jan 1, year two100 Admits

Dec 31, year one100 prisonersDec 31, year two200 prisoners

Jan 1, year three100 releases

Jan 1, year three100 Admits

In equilibrium: inflow = outflow

outflow is proportional to the stock: 100 = 1/2* 200

Page 53: The Economics of Crime and Justice

Crime Generation: The Serious Offender (Active)

Crime Control: Incapacitation (Inactive)

Probability of arrest, conviction, and imprisonment equals q J

probability of remainingactiveequals1- q J

Average Time Served equals s

Probability of Release equals 1/s

Figure 3A : Dynamic Serious Offender Model

probability of remianing inactive equals 1- 1/s

---------------------------------------------------------------

next state

active inactive

active 1- q J q J

inactive 1/s 1- 1/s

current state

Figure 3B: Probabilities of Transitioning From Incapacitated to Free and Back ------------------------------------------------------------------------

P. 96, Lecture 6 Notes.

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Illustrative Example Suppose for a career criminal, time committing Suppose for a career criminal, time committing

crime = time behind bars,crime = time behind bars, 1/(1/(q J) = sq J) = s s is time behind bars, e.g 2 years s is time behind bars, e.g 2 years and and is offenses per year, e. g. 30 per yearis offenses per year, e. g. 30 per year q is probability of being arrested and convicted q is probability of being arrested and convicted

per offense, per offense, J is the probability of imprisonment if J is the probability of imprisonment if

convicted, e.g. 2/3convicted, e.g. 2/3 then q = 1/40 per offense, and then q = 1/40 per offense, and q = 3/4 per yearq = 3/4 per year and and q J, the probability of arrest, convictionq J, the probability of arrest, conviction and imprisonment is 1/2and imprisonment is 1/2

Page 55: The Economics of Crime and Justice

Crime Generation: The Serious Offender (Active)

Crime Control: Incapacitation (Inactive)

Probability of arrest, conviction, and imprisonment equals q J

probability of remainingactiveequals1- q J

Average Time Served equals s

Probability of Release equals 1/s

Figure 3A : Dynamic Serious Offender Model

probability of remianing inactive equals 1- 1/s

---------------------------------------------------------------

next state

active inactive

active 1- q J q J

inactive 1/s 1- 1/s

current state

Figure 3B: Probabilities of Transitioning From Incapacitated to Free and Back ------------------------------------------------------------------------

P. 96, Lecture 6 Notes.

1/21/2

1/2

1/2

Page 56: The Economics of Crime and Justice

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Terrorism in the USA

Home grownHome grown Foreign importsForeign imports RemediesRemedies

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Learning from History

Skyjacking in the USASkyjacking in the USA first in the USA was 1961first in the USA was 1961

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Learning from Economics

Thwarting embezzlementThwarting embezzlement inspection, I. E. auditinspection, I. E. audit

Page 59: The Economics of Crime and Justice

Recent History of US Terrorism Post 9-11Post 9-11

Cabinet position for Homeland SecurityCabinet position for Homeland Security Pre 9-11Pre 9-11 BombingsBombings

World Trade Center, New YorkWorld Trade Center, New York Murtaugh Federal Building, Oklahoma Murtaugh Federal Building, Oklahoma

CityCity Black ChurchesBlack Churches

SkyjackingsSkyjackings

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http://www.state.govhttp://www.state.govOffice of the CoordinatorOffice of the Coordinatorfor Counter-Terrorismfor Counter-TerrorismPatterns of Global TerrorismPatterns of Global Terrorism

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Reward: $2,000,000

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Actual and Attempted Bombings in the US .

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Casualties from Bombings, US .

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ARA: InterAmericaAF: AfricaEAP: East Asia and the PacificEUR: EuropeNESA: Near East and South Asia

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Americas

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Europe

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Skyjackings

The first skyjacking was a Peruvian carrier The first skyjacking was a Peruvian carrier in February 1931in February 1931

The first skyjacking of a US carrier was a The first skyjacking of a US carrier was a National Airlines flight destined for Key National Airlines flight destined for Key West Florida on May 1, 1961West Florida on May 1, 1961

Page 79: The Economics of Crime and Justice

Economics 160, Economics of Crime and Justice, Midterm Grades, Spring ‘04 Scores: Range 69-140

Median 105 N = 138 Grade Distribution: # A+ 137- 2 A 129-136 9 A- 121-128 11 B+ 113-120 18 B 105-112 30 B- 99-104 21 C+ 93-98 12 C 87-92 11 C- 81-86 9 D+ 95-80 4 D 69-74 4 Total: 138