treaty federalism: the canadian experience

Treaty Federalism: The Canadian Experience

Julie Simmons

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2008

Treaty Federalism: The Canadian Experience

Julie Simmons

Paper prepared for the International Colloquium “Competitive Federalism – International Perspectives“ organized by the Liberal Institute, Friedrich Naumann Foundation, Potsdam, Germany, 3rd July, 2008.

Contents

Introduction 5

Federal-ProvincialRelations:FromCompetitivetoConstitutionaltoCollaborativeandTreatyFederalism 6

DecentralizingtheFederation:theEvolutionofFiscalFederalism 12

PolicyDevelopmentsfollowingDecentralization:ACompetitiveRacetotheBottom? 15

UnderstandingPatternsofConvergence 18

References 21

TreatyFederalism:TheCanadianExperience �

Introduction

InmanywaysthestructureoftheCanadianfederationisverydifferentfromtheGermanfederation.Mostnotably,theCanadianconstitutiondividesbetweenfe-deralandprovincialgovernmentpowerstolegislate,implementandadministerinspecificpolicyareaswhereastheGermanfederationisnotedfortheconcentrationoflegislativepowersatthecentre,andadministrativepowersamongtheLänder.Additionally,theGermanfederationcontraststheCanadianfederationintermsoftherepresentationoftheconstituentgovernmentsinthecentralinstitutionsofgovernment.Despitethechallengesofan“interlocked”system,manyCanadianobserverslookadmiringlytotheGermanexampleofLändergovernmentrepresen-tationintheBundesratandlamenttheineffectivenessofprovincialrepresentationintheCanadianSenate.

Butdespitethedistinctionsinthestructureofthetwofederations,therearesi-milaritiesintheconversationsamongpoliticians,academicsandordinarycitizensregardingtheperceptionof“problems”withthefederationandhowto“fix”them.Thesearchforwaystomakethetwoordersofgovernmentmoreeffectivelycreateanddeliverpoliciestocitizens,questionsabouttheappropriatedegreeofautono-myforconstituentunitsofthefederation,concernsaboutwhetherpoliciesshouldbepermittedtovaryacrossconstituentunits.ThedivergentinterestsofaspecificLandinnegotiationswiththecentralgovernment,thetensionbetweenconductingconstitutionaldeliberationsinatransparentmannerinvolvingtheinputofcitizensandnegotiatingcompromisesacrossgovernments–allofthesethreadsofdebateareapparentinCanadaaswell.

As inGermany,competitive federalismhasbeenasubjectofacademicdebate.Verticalcompetitionisadynamic,virtuallyalwayspresentindiscussionsamongthePremiersoftheprovincesandthePrimeMinisterinCanada.However,asCa-nadaisarelativelydecentralizedfederation,horizontalcompetitionisalsoevidentfromtimetotime.ThispaperconsidershowtheconceptofcompetitivefederalismhasbeendefinedinCanadianscholarship,andreviewstheinstitutional,economicandpoliticalcharacteristicsoftheCanadianfederationthatcontributetofederal-provincialcompetitionandinterprovincialcompetitioninCanada.Iwillexplorehow“treatyfederalism”or,inotherwords,negotiatingnon-constitutionalagree-mentsbetweentheprovincesandthefederalgovernment,hasbecomeessentialtothefunctioningoftheCanadianfederationintheabsenceofthepossibilityofconstitutionalchange.Thepolicyimpactofsuchagreements,negotiatedprimarilyinthelate1990sisjustnowbecomingevident.Intheorysuchagreementshave

� TreatyFederalism:TheCanadianExperience

furtherdecentralizedtheCanadianfederation,providingprovinceswithevenmoreautonomyintheirspheresofjurisdiction.Inshort,inafederationwhereformalconstitutionalchangehasprovenimpossibleinthelastfewdecades,verticalcom-petitionhascometobemediatedthroughtreatyfederalism.Theprogressivelyunconditionalnatureoffiscaltransferstoprovincesfromthefederalgovernment,coupledwithprovincialjurisdictionoverimportantpolicyareassuchashealth-care,educationandsocialservices,giveprovincesconsiderablediscretioninthecreationofprovincialwelfarestates.

Proponentsofdecentralizationof competencieswithin federations inGermanyandelsewherehavearguedthatlocalgovernmentswithgreaterautonomywillbemorelikelytoderegulatemarkets,reducetheirtaxesandwelfarestateservicesallinanefforttocompeteformobiletaxpayersandbusinesses.Whilesomewelcomesuchdynamics,othersinfavourofmorerobustsocialpolicieshavearguedagainstdecentralization.Neverthelesstheassumptionunderlyingbothargumentsisthesame.Moreautonomousconstituentunitswilladjustthebalancebetweenthemarketandthestateinfavourofthemarket(Scharpf2005).Giventherecentde-velopmentsinCanadianfederalism,thisispossibletoconsiderifthisassumptionholdstrueinpractice.Drawingupontheevidenceaccumulatedfromacademicstudiestodate,thispaperrevealsthatadownwardspiralofinterprovincialcom-petitionhasnotresultedfromCanada’sdecentralizedarrangements.Thepoliciesofprovincesaregraduallyconverginginseveralareas.However,itisnotalwaysinthedirectionthatwemightexpect.AsGerardBoychuckhasargued,theeffectsofdecentralizationare“multiple,complexandcontradictory”(2003:269).Thispaperconcludesbyconsideringwhatmightaccountforthesepreliminaryfindings.

Federal-Provincial Relations: From Competitive to Constitutional to Collaborative and Treaty Federalism

Verticalcompetition,orcompetitionbetweentheprovincesandthefederalgo-vernmentwasmostapparentwhenPierreElliottTrudeauwasprimeministerofCanada in the 1970s and early 1980s (Simeon andRobinson 1990). This era,knownas“competitivefederalism”intheacademicliterature,wasalsomarkedbyconsiderablefederal-provincialconflict.Thisperiodisdefinedbythegrowthofprovincialwelfarestates,conflictsoverrevenuesharingfollowingtheexpansionoftheoilsectorinAlberta,andthecontinuedriseofnationalisminQuebec.This


eraculminatedwiththepatriationoftheConstitutionin1982absenttheconsentoftheprovinceofQuebec.

Butinmanyrespects,verticalcompetitionisalwayspresentinCanadianpolitics.Considerthefollowing. Theconstitutionenumeratesexclusiveareasoffederalandprovincialpolicyjurisdiction.1Yet,thecomplexitiesofmodern-daydecisionmakingmeanthatthefederalandprovincialgovernmentsmustcommunicate,ifnotjointlydevisepolicy,inanumberofcriticalpolicyareas.Forexample,envi-ronmentalpolicyinCanadaisnotspecifiedintheCanadianconstitutionaseit-herafederalorprovincialareaofjurisdiction.However,withtheabilitytosigninternationaltreatiesresidingwiththefederalgovernment,andjurisdictionovernaturalresourcesresidingwiththeprovincialgovernments,implementationoftheKyotoAccordrequiresajointapproach.Moreover,theprovincesrelyonthefede-ralgovernment’sfiscalcapacityforfundingsocialpolicieswithintheirboarders.Provinceshavejurisdictionoverhealthcare,socialassistanceandeducation.Re-venuegenerationthroughdirectandindirecttaxationispossibleforbothordersofgovernmentinCanada.Yet,bythemselves,provincial“ownsourcerevenues”haveproveninadequatefordevelopingthemodernwelfarestate.Bothprovincialandfederalgovernmentshaveatendencytoblametheotherorderofgovernmentfortheshortcomingsofpolicies,andcompetetotakecreditforpoliciesthatarepopularamongCanadians.

Canadianfederalismisalsocompetitivebecause,unlikeinGermany,provincesaresoweaklyrepresentedinCanada’scentralinstitutionsofgovernment,andsinglepartygovernmentsformtheexecutivesinparliamentarysettingsineveryprovince.Accordingly,provincialpremierscancompellinglychallengethefederalgovern-ment,arguingthatthey,ratherthanelectedmembersofthenationalparliament,arethebestspokespersonsfortherightsofcitizenswithintheirboarders(BakvisandSkogstad2008).

Thediversityofdemographiccharacteristicsoftheprovincesalsoaddstothecom-petitivetendenciesoftheCanadianfederation.40%ofCanada’spopulationlivesinOntario,oneofthetenprovinces.TheFrenchspeakingpopulationofCanadaisthemajorityinoneprovinceQuebec,whileallotherprovinceshaveEnglishspea-kingmajorities.QuebecandOntarioformtheindustrialheartlandofthecountry,

1 Theresidualpowerlieswiththefederalgovernment,thoughthedecisionoftheJudicialCom-mitteeofthePrivyCouncilinmanyearlycourtcasespostConfederation1867leadtoamoredecentralizedfederationthatwasintendedbythefathersoftheconfederation.Theresidualpowerwasnarrowlyinterpreted.

� TreatyFederalism:TheCanadianExperience

whilethefourprovincestothewestofOntarioandthefourprovincestotheeastofQuebechaveeconomiestraditionallybasedonnaturalresourcedevelopmentandextraction.ThereareconsiderableeconomicdisparitiesacrosstheprovinceswithAlberta,hometomuchofCanada’soilandgasreserves,representingtherichestoftheprovinces.Ontarioissecond,withitsindustrialbase.However,oneofthepoorestprovinces,Newfoundland,ispoisedtobecomeoneofthemoreaffluentoneswiththegrowthoftheoffshorepetroleumindustryintheAtlantic.Pollingdatasuggestthatcitizensfromprovinceseconomicallyandgeographicallyloca-tedontheperipheryofthecountryfeelasenseofalienationfromtheindustrial,politicalandgeographicalcentreofthecountry(Henry2002).Eachprovincehasitsownelectoralcycle,distinctfromthecentral(orfederal)governmentelectoralcycle.ThecitiesofVancouver,TorontoandMontrealarethemostpopulardestina-tionsforCanada’slargeimmigrantpopulation.Accordingly,theprovincesofBritishColumbia,OntarioandQuebecexperienceculturalandsocialchallengesdifferentfromthoseofotherprovinces.Asaresultofthesedynamics,thedialogueamongprovincesandbetweenprovincesandthefederalgovernment,asitplaysoutinthetelevisedandprintmedia,canhaveacompetitiveundercurrent.

HowhaveCanadiangovernmentsdealtwiththesecompetitivedynamics? The1980sandearly1990swerepunctuatedbytwomajorattemptstoformallyamendtheconstitution.Oneofthemainthrustsoftheseproposedamendmentswastogiveprovincesgreaterautonomyindecisionmaking.SuchautonomywasthoughttobeessentialtothepreservationofQuebec’sdistinctivenessinthefederation.Anotherobjectiveoftheproposedamendmentswastogiveprovincesgreaterre-presentationinthesecondchamberofCanada’sfederalparliament.Ultimately,boththeMeechLakeAccordof1987andtheCharlottetownAccordof1993wererejected,thefirstbyselectprovincialgovernments,thesecondbycitizensinrefe-rendaheldacrossthecountry.

In1995whentheprovinceofQuebecheldareferendumonsovereignty,andthefederalistsidewonbyonepercent,thenPrimeMinisterJeanChretienembarkedonaneraofnon-constitutionalrenewalofthefederation.Oneofthegoalsofaseriesofintergovernmentalagreementsonissuesfromtheenvironmenttointer-nationaltradetohealthcare,wastore-balancethepowersofthefederalandpro-vincialgovernmentswithoutformalconstitutionalchange.ItwasthoughtthatanewspecificationoftherolesandresponsibilitiesofthetwoordersofgovernmentmightjustdemonstratetoQuebecerstheflexibilityoftheexistingfederal-provin-cialarrangementandatthesametimerespondtothepressuresinseveralotherprovincesforgreatersayinshapingcross-Canadianpolicies(Lazar1998).


IntheCanadiancontext,theterm“treatyfederalism”isnormallyassociatedwithAboriginalpolitics.FirstNationsarguethatatransferofsovereigntyfromFirstNationscommunitiestothe“crown”hasnevertakenplace,andthuswhendis-agreementsbetweenthefederalgovernmentandAboriginalcommunitiesariseinmoderntimes,thesovereignpartiesmustcometogethertonegotiatenewunder-standings,allthewhilemaintainingtheirrespectivesovereignty(Hueglin2000).FromanAboriginalperspective,treatiesentail“mutualrecognitionofnationhoodandaffirmationsofcommitmenttoacontinuousnation-to-nationrelationship”(Ladner2003,p.171).AsHueglin(2008)pointsout,inmanyrespects,federal-provincialnon-constitutionalnegotiationsarealsoaformoftreatyfederalisminthateachorderofgovernmentissovereigninitsownspheresofjurisdiction,andtheresultofthesedeliberationscanbecontract-likearrangementsbetweenthetwoordersofgovernmentwhich,fromtimetotimearerevisited,renegotiatedandsometimesreplaced,allwithouttheformaltransferofauthorityfromoneorderofgovernmenttoanother.

SuchintergovernmentalpolicymakingispossibleintheCanadianfederationbyvirtueofthemarriageofWestminsterstyleparliamentarydecision-makingtotheinstitutionoffederalism.Withthepowertospeakonbehalfoftheirgovernments,premiersandtheprimeminister,alongwiththeothermembersoftheirrespectiveexecutivesthusengagein“executivefederalism”(Smiley1976).Suchextra-parlia-mentaryintergovernmentalrelationshavedefinedCanadianfederalismthroughoutthedevelopmentofthemodernwelfarestate.2

However,whereasinthe1960stheprovincesacceptedfederalleadershipandin-fluenceinprovincialspheresofjurisdictioninexchangeforfederalfinancing,inthepost-referendumera,theyhavebeenmuchlesslikelytodoso.Inthissense,forsomeoptimisticobservers,thepost-referendumintergovernmentalnegotiationshavehadthepotentialtobeevenmoretreaty-likethanthoseofthe1960sinthattheprovincesaretonegotiatewiththefederalgovernmentonequalfootingwithneithersubordinatetotheother.Hence,someCanadianscholarshavecometolabel thepost-referendumeraofnon-constitutionalagreementsas “collabora-tivefederalism,”amaturationofthe“cooperativefederalism”ofthe1960s.Thefoundationof“collaborativefederalism”istheviewthatthefederalgovernmentoughtnottouseitsfederalspendingpowerinunilateralways,ordeveloppolicy

2 IntheimmediatepostWorldWarIIera,thefederalgovernmentwasinasuperiorfiscalposi-tion.However,throughthetransferof“taxpoints”totheprovincesin1977,thegovernmentofCanadanowcontrolsaslightlylargerportionoftaxrevenuesthandotheprovinces(HueglinandFenna,2006:325).

10 TreatyFederalism:TheCanadianExperience

withprovincesthroughintergovernmentalagreementsnegotiatedinahierarchicalmanner,withthefederalgovernmentholdingthespendingpowertrumpcard(Ca-meronandSimeon2002;Lazar2000;Desautels1999).Provincesroutinelyexpresstheviewthattheyshouldnothavetoanswertothefederalgovernmentforhowtheyspendmoneytransferredtothemfromthefederalgovernment.

Thereisnowconsiderablerecognitionthatthepost1995negotiationsenroutetointergovernmentalagreementsvaryfrompolicysectortopolicysectorintheex-tenttowhichtheyreflectthecollaborativeortreatymodelofnon-subordination(e.g.Lazar2006).Generallyspeakinghowever,theresultingaccordsoragreementscontainabroadsectionenumeratingthecommonpurposesoffederalandprovin-cialgovernmentsandprinciplestowhichtheybothagree,commitmentstoworktogetherandexchangeinformationandcommitmentstoreporttocitizens(ratherthantoeachother)ontheefficacyofpoliciesundertakenasaresultoftheag-reements.Occasionallytheagreementsincludemechanismsofresolvingdisputes.Agreementsmayalsoleavetheoptionformorespecificbi-lateralagreementsbet-weenanyoneprovinceandthefederalgovernment,thuspermittingasymmetricalarrangementsacrossthefederation(SimeonandNugent2008).

Canadahassurvivedtheconstitutionalimpasseofthe1990sinpartbecauseofthesenewproductsofexecutivefederalism.However,theseintergovernmentalagreementsarenotwithouttheircritics.First,itisimportanttorealizethattheseintergovernmentalagreementsarevirtuallyneverlegallybinding,andintheory,canbeignoredbythegovernmentswhonegotiatedthem,andbythegovernmentswhoaresubsequentlyelected.Second,theyaretheproductofextra-parliamen-tarynegotiationsandthuslackthetransparencyoflegislativesettings.Indeed,insomepolicysectorsthereareeffortstodirectlyengageinterestedpolicyadvocatesininformationexchangeandevendeliberationenroutetotheestablishmentofanintergovernmentalagreement.However,theresultsoftheseeffortsareoftensidelinedinthepushandpulloffederal-provincialnegotiation(Simmons2008a).Accordingly,thereisademocraticdeficittoexecutivefederalism.Third,totheextent thatprovincescandevelop “local” solutions topolicyproblems throughgreaterdiscretionintheirspheresofpolicyjurisdiction,thereisconcernthatthecross-Canadianfabricofsocial,economicandenvironmentalpolicywillunravel.

Inshort,adifferentiatedsenseofcitizenshipmaysupplantauniversalsenseofcitizenship.AsKeithBantingexplains,

Nationalsocialprogramscreateanetworkofintimaterelationsbet-weencitizensandthecentralgovernmentthroughoutthecountry,

TreatyFederalism:TheCanadianExperience 11

helpingtodefinetheboundariesofthenationalpoliticalcommunityandenhancingthelegitimacyofthestates…Socialprogramscontrol-ledbythecentralgovernmentcanbecomeinstrumentsofnationbuil-ding,helpingtomediateregionaltensionsandstrengthenthestatesagainstcentrifugalforcesrootedinterritorialpolitics.Alternatively,socialprogramsdesignedandcontrolledattheregionallevelcanbe-comeinstrumentsforstrengtheningregionalculturesbyenhancingthesignificanceoflocalcommunitiesinthelivesofcitizens,therebyreinforcingdifferentiationandcentrifugaltendenciesatthenationallevel(1995:270-271quotedinBoychuk2003:277).

MorespecificallyintheCanadiancontext,themechanicsofthisargumentareasfollows:federalinterventioninsocialpolicythedomainoftheprovinces,intheformofconditionalfiscaltransferstotheprovincesarefundamentalinensuringconsistencyinsocialcitizenshipentitlementsacrossCanada.

Asnotedattheoutset,arelateddebatefocusesonwhetherdecentralizationwillleadtoacompetitiveraceamongconstituentunits inafederationresultinginlessliberalpoliciesthanthosecreatedthroughcentralizeddirectives.Theclassicracetothebottomtheorysuggeststhat, intheabsenceofcentralgovernmentoversight,federalconstituentgovernmentsarelikelytolowertaxes,adoptweakenvironmentalpolicies,shrinktheirwelfarestates,andrelaxlabourlaws,allinaneffortattractmobilecapital.Byadoptingsomeofthesestrategies,constituentmembersofafederationaremorewelcominghostsforbusinessesandamobilelabourforce.Moregenerouslocalsocialprogramswillbecome“welfaremagnets”(SchramandKruger,1994),whichwill,inturn,forcegovernmentstoadjustthe-seprogramsdownwards.Moregenerallythereisaconcernthatdecentralizationwillmakethedevelopmentofnewsocialpolicydevelopmentsallthemorediffi-culttoachieve.

Beforeexploringwhethertheseconcernshavebeenbornoutfollowingthenego-tiationofseveralnewintergovernmentalagreementsinCanada,itisusefultofirstconsider,bywayofexample,howthedivisionofrolesandresponsibilitiesbetweentheprovincesandthefederalgovernmenthasbeentransformed,allwithoutformaltransferofconstitutionalauthority.


Decentralizing the Federation: the Evolution of Fiscal Federalism

Intermsoffiscalrelationsbetweenthetwoordersofgovernment,twomajorde-velopmentshavetakenplaceinthepost-referendumerathathaveenhancedtheautonomyofprovincialgovernmentsinthesphereofsocialpolicy.First,thefe-deralgovernment’swatershed1995budgetremovedsomeofthestringsattachedtopaymentstotheprovinces.Second,in1999nineofthetenprovinces(absentQuebec)agreed to theSocialUnionFrameworkAgreement,whichsignificantlycurbedtheabilityofthefederalgovernmenttodirectsocialpolicyoutcomesintheprovincesthroughthedevelopmentofnewsharedcostprograms.

IntheConstitutionAct1867therearejustthreeconcurrentareasofjurisdiction:immigration,agricultureandoldagepensions.“Hospitals,asylumsandcharities”however,areareasofexclusiveprovincialjurisdiction,alongwitheducation.ThisdivisionofpowersmeantthatthewelfarestatewasactuallyslowtogrowinCa-nada.Forexample,thejudiciaryruledthatthefederalgovernmentdidnothavetheauthoritytoestablishanunemploymentinsuranceprogramduringthedepres-sion.3However,beginninginthe1950s,Canadiangovernmentsbuilttheirwel-farestatesbytakingadvantageofshared-costprogramsinitiatedbythefederalgovernment.Thefederalgovernmentinducedprovincestodevelopandspendonsocialwelfareprogramsbymatchingdollarfordollarfundsprovincesputtowardsjobtraining,post-secondaryeducation,hospitalsandmedicalinsuranceplans,tonameafew.In1961,majorcashtransferstotheprovincesrepresentedapproxi-mately24%ofprovincialrevenue.By1999,however,thisnumberwoulddeclineto13%(Brown2002:68).

Canadaisnowdistinguishedfromotherfederationsinthatinalmostallofitsin-tergovernmentaltransferstaketheformofblockpayments.In1977thesharedcostapproachtobuildingthewelfarestatehadbeenreplacedwithablockgrantapproachforallmajorpolicyareasexceptforprovincialsocialassistance(wel-fare). Themajorblockgrant forpostsecondaryeducationandhealthcarewasnotunconditionalhowever.ProvinceshadtomaintainthetenetsoftheCanadaHealthActintroducedbythefederalgovernmentin1984.Thisactaimstoensure“universalcoverage”forall“medicallynecessary”hospitalandphysicianservices.Doctorsarenotpermittedtobillpatientsforsuchservices,andnoprivatehealth

3 TheConstitutionAct1867wassubsequentlyamendedsothatthefederalgovernmenthadjurisdictionoverunemploymentinsurance.


insuranceschemesexistfor“queuejumping”asisthecaseintheUnitedKingdomandNewZealand,forexample(Floodetal2008).Inadditiontothisblockfundingandownsourcerevenues,mostprovincesfundedtheirprovincialhealthprogramsthrough theunconditionalEqualizationProgram,first introduced in the1950s,whichaimstoredistributefundsfrom“have”provinces,ormoreaffluentones,to“havenot”provincesorlessaffluentones,accordingtoaspecificformula.4Whilethisformulahaschangedovertime,thisprogramisintendedtoensurethatallprovinces,irrespectiveoftheirindividualfiscalcapacity,canprovidecomparableservicesatcomparableratesoftaxation,aprinciplenowenshrinedintheCana-dianConstitutionAct1982.

In1995thefiscallandscapechangeddramatically.Inanefforttobalanceitsownbudget,thefederalgovernmentunilaterallyreduceditstransferpaymentstotheprovinceswiththeintroductionoftheCanadaHealthandSocialTransfer.Thisnewblockfundcollapsedtheremainingsharedcostprogramforsocialassistancewiththeblockfundforpostsecondaryeducationandhealthcare.AsidefromtheCanadaHealthActrequirements,theonlyotherconditionattachedtothenewtransferasitpertainedtosocialassistancewasthatprovincescouldnotintrodu-ce“residencyrequirements.”Thatis,ifaprovincewantedthefederalmoneytheycouldnotestablishasocialassistanceprogramthatrequiredcitizensto live intheirprovinceforaspecificlengthoftimebeforebeingeligible.Thus,theCanadaHealthandSocialTransfersignificantlydisentangledthefederalgovernmentfromtheprovincesinthefieldofsocialassistance.Considerableprovincialdiversityinprogramswasnowpermitted.

Verticalcompetitiontoavoidblameforthesubsequentpressuresonthehealthcaremarkedthefederal-provincialrelationsofthelate1990sevenamidstthespiritofcollaboration.Asprovincesstruggledtocontinuetomeetcitizenexpectationsforsocialprograms,andadheretotheCanadaHealthAct,premierssoughttobringgreaterpredictabilitytothefederaluseand“disuse”ofthefederalspendingpowerandsoughtanevengreaterroleinestablishingprinciplestoguidesocialpolicy.Withareducedfederalfinancialpresenceinprovincialsocialprograms,provin-cialgovernmentscouldcompellinglyarguethattheyhadagreaterrighttojudgewithintheirownprovincialboundarieswhatwasinthenationalandprovincialinterestsoftheirresidents.

4 OntarioistheonlyprovincenevertohavereceivedEqualizationpayments.Currentlytherearefour“have”provinces:BritishColumbia,Alberta,SaskatchewanandOntario.


TheSocialUnionFrameworkAgreement(SUFA)istheresultofthoseefforts.Foroverayearintergovernmentalofficialsmettonegotiateadeal,tonoavail.TheninJanuaryof1999,thenPrimeMinisterJeanChrétienmetwithpremiersinaclosedmeetingathisresidence,andnineofthetenpremiers(absentQuebec)agreedtonewtermsfortheuseofthefederalspendingpowerwithanofferofanadditional2.5billiondollarsforhealthcareonthedinnertable.

Underthenewagreement,thecollaborationbetweenthefederalgovernmentandtheprovincesisrequiredinshapingfuturesocialpolicies.Thefederalgovernmentagreesnottointroducenewcostsharedorbockfundedinitiativesinhealthcare,post-secondaryeducationsocialassistanceandsocialserviceswithouttheagree-mentofamajorityofprovincialgovernments.Atfirstglance,thisappearstobeasignificantconstraintonthefederaluseofitsspendingpower.Thisisparticularlynoteworthybecauseofthesharedunderstandingamongmanysocialpolicyadvo-catesinCanadathatfederalgovernmentoversightofsocialprogramsisessentialtostrengtheningsocialpoliciesinthefederation.Kent(2007)opinesthatSUFAvirtuallyclosesthedooronthistraditionaluseofthefederalspendingpowerbe-causeofthelikelihoodofthefourlargestprovincesinCanada(representing85%ofthepopulation)optingoutofanynewfederalsocialpolicyinitiatives.

However,atthesametime,SUFAstatesthat“whenthefederalgovernmentintro-ducesnewCanada-wideinitiativesfundedthroughdirecttransferstoindividualsororganizationsforhealthcare,post-secondaryeducation,socialassistanceandsocialservices,itwill,priortoimplementation,giveatleastthreemonths’noticeandoffertoconsult.”Thisaspectoftheagreementisremarkablefortworeasons.First,itpermitsthefederalgovernmenttoexerciseitsspendingpowerbygivingfundsdirectlytocitizensororganizationsforprogramsinareasofprovincialre-sponsibilitywithout the consent of the provincial governments.Inthissense,SUFAconstrainsoneuseofthefederalspendingpower,butfacilitatesanother.ItisnotsurprisingthattheQuebecgovernment,whichhasneveracknowledgedthelegi-timacyofthefederalspendingpower,didnotagreetoSUFA.Itisalsonotsurpri-singthat,giventhecash-strappednatureoftheotherprovincesstillreelingfromthecutsinthefederal1995budget,theothernineprovincialpremiersagreedtothesetermsinexchangeforadditionalfundsforhealthcare.

TreatyFederalism:TheCanadianExperience 1�

Policy Developments following Decentralization: A Competitive Race to the Bottom?

HowhasSUFAaffectedsocialpolicyandhowhavetheother“treaties”ofthepost-referendumeraaffectedthefunctioningofthefederation?Hasamoredecentra-lizedfederationcontributedtointerprovincialcompetitionandadownwardspiral?Itisbeyondthescopeofthispapertoconsidereveryagreement.However,theanswerisnotstraightforward.Intheareaofhealthcare,thefederalgovernmentcontinuestodemandthatprovincesupholdthetenetsoftheCanadaHealthAct,ensuringthatirrespectiveoftheprovinceinwhichtheylive,Canadianshaveequi-tableaccesstoastateregulatedhealthcaresystem.Thus,evenwithconsiderablefundingpressures,therehasbeenlimitedprovincialexperimentationwithotherformsofhealthcareprovision.Withitsbudgetbalanced,thefederalgovernmentin2004agreedtoatenyearfundingarrangementforhealthcare,followingamajorhighprofilesummitofthepremiersandtheprimeminister.Interestingly,someofthe41billiondollarsthatthefederalgovernmentestimatedthisdealrepresentedwas“targeted”towardsreducingwaitingtimesforspecificsurgeries,butnotaconditionofreceiptforthefunding.

Indeed,thereareprovincialvariationsinhealthcaresystems.Forexample,provincialgovernmentshavemademarginalchangestotheirrespectivelistsofmedicalpro-ceduresfundedundereachprovincialinsurancescheme,andregionalboardshavebeenintroducedinmanyjurisdictionsasawayofcuttingthecostsofhealthcaregovernance.Alberta,theprovincemostoutspokeninchallengingtheuniformityimposedbytheCanadaHealthAct,publishedareportin2001whichcreatedaroadmapforintroducinggreaterprivatecareprovisionsinthepubliccaresystem.However,evenAlbertashiedawayfromthisdirectionofreformwhenitbecameapparentthatthecitizensinthisprovincedidnotsupportit(Maioni2008).TherehavealsobeensomeinstancesofviolationsoftheCanadaHealthActuponwhichthefederalgovernmenthasnotacted.Nevertheless,thefederalgovernmentcon-tinuestoprovidetheconditionalglue(intheformoftheCanadaHealthAct)re-sultinginuniformityofnormsguidinghealthcareregimesintheprovinces.

Outsideofthehealthcarearena,theevidenceismixed.Harrison(2006a)concludesfromsixcross-provincialcomparisonsofpolicythatprovincesarenotengagedinaspiralofdecliningtaxes,shrinkingwelfarestatesandlabourandenvironmentalregulationsandarecapableofresistingcompetitivepressures.Indeed,thereissomeevidenceofdownwardtrendsinstandards.ForexampleinhisconsiderationofsocialassistanceprovisionsintheprovincesBoychuck(2006)identifiedadecline

1� TreatyFederalism:TheCanadianExperience

acrossprovinces.Atthesametimehowever,hehasconcludedthat“thereislittleconcreteevidenceofasignificantshiftintheactualprovisionofsocialassistanceresultingdirectlyfromthechangingfederalroleinthefield(2003:269).Incon-trast,McKenzie(2006)identifiedanoverallincreaseinprovincialtaxesonbusinessoverthelastthirtyyears.Inthecasesofenvironmentalstandards(Olewiler,2006)andeconomicdevelopment(Brown2006)provinceshaveattemptedtocoordinatetheirpolicies,inanefforttopreventacompetitiveracetothebottom.Perhapsmostintriguingly,GreenandHarrison(2006)discoveredofa“convergenceinthemiddle”inminimumwagesettingacrossprovinces.Theonlyclearevidenceofaracetothebottomwasonprovincialtaxesontobacco(Harrison2006b).

ResearchonCanada’sNationalChildBenefitalsosuggestsagradualconvergenceacrossprovincesoveratenyearperiod(Simmons2008b).In1998theprovincesandthefederalgovernmentdevisedanewsocialprogramverymuchinaccordancewiththeparametersofSUFA.TheNationalChildBenefithastwocomponents.ThefederalgovernmentsupplementstheCanadaChildTaxBenefit,providingad-ditionalincometolowincomefamilies.ThisadditionalincomeisknownastheNCBSupplement. Provinces,with jurisdictionover socialassistance,may thenreducesocialassistancerecipients’incomesbythevalueoftheNCBSupplement.Theprovincesthenreinvestthesefundsinavarietyofprovincialprogramsbene-fitingchildrenandfamilies.Whilethereisnonetchangetotheincomesofsocialassistancerecipients,theworkingpoor,orlowincomefamiliesnotonsocialas-sistanceseeanincreaseintheirincomes,and,intheory,anincreaseinprogramsandservicesprovidedbytheirprovincialgovernment.

Inasmuchasthefederalgovernmentprovidesadditionalincometolowincomefamilies,thefederalspendingpowertakestheformofadirecttransfertocitizens,aspermitted inSUFA. The federalgovernmentprovides incomesupport,whiletheprovincesaretoprovideservices,thusdisentanglingtherelationshipbetweenthetwo.Inasmuchasprovincescandecidehowtospendthemoneytheysavethroughreducingsocialassistanceincomes,andarenotdirectlyaccountabletothefederalgovernment,thisisnotaconditionalgrant.

Thisnewschemeisnotwithoutitscritics.(PulkinghamandTernowetsky,1999;McKeen,2001;Pattersonetal2004).However,itsuggeststhatnewsocialpolicydevelopmentispossibleintheabsenceofthefederalgovernmentimposingit.Intermsofthenatureofprovincialinvestments,initiallytherewasconsiderableva-riationacrossprovinces.However,itnowappearsthatmostprovincesarefollow-ingasimilarpatterninasmuchastheyprovideaprovincialchildbenefit(incomesupplement)tolowincomefamilies(Simmons2008b).


But,lookingtothefieldofearlylearningandchildcare,onecanalsomakethecasethatthenewsocialpolicydevelopmenthasbeenobstructedfollowingSUFA.In2006theOrganizationofEconomicCo-CooperationandDevelopmentreportedthatspendingonearlyeducationandcareofchildrenasapercentageofGDPislowestinCanada.WearealaggardcomparedtoWesternEuropeandevencompa-redtotheUnitedStates.Whilemostindustrializedcountrieshavewellorganizedsystemsofearlylearningandchildcare,thereisnonationalapproachinCanadaandnoprovincehasalargescalesystemofhighqualityearlylearningandchildcare programs even thoughmothers’workforce participation is relatively high(FriendlyandWhite2008).Thisisdespitetherecognitionamongchilddevelop-mentresearchersthatsuchearlyyearprogramsareimportantforchildren’sfuturedevelopmental,socialandeconomicsuccess.

Inthe2004federalelection,asignificantpartoftheLiberalpartyplatformwasearlylearningandchildcare.Ultimatelythispartywontheelection,formingaminoritygovernment.Afterlengthynegotiations,socialservicesministersfromacrossthecountryagreedtofourprinciplestoguidethefutureofearlychildhooddevelopment.Careshouldbehighquality,universal,accessibleanddevelopmen-tallyfocused(QUAD).However,becausedifferentprovinceshaddifferentvisionsastohowtoimplementthesefourbroadprinciples,thefederalgovernmentwasunabletogettheprovincestoagreetoamorespecificprogram.Accordingly,thefederalgovernmentthennegotiatedindividualfiveyearbilateralagreementsforfundingforprovincestobegintodevelopcomprehensiveearlylearningandcareschemes.Ultimately,theminoritygovernmentfell,andthenewfederalminoritygovernment,undertheConservativeParty,backedoutofalltenagreementsafteroneyear.Instead,thenewfederalgovernmenthaschosentoexerciseitsspendingpowerbyforgingdirectfiscalrelationshipswithcitizens,ratherthanwithprovin-ces,andnowprovidesaverysmall($1200)annualtaxableallowance(presumablyforchildcare)tofamilieswithchildrenundersix.

FriendlyandWhite(2008)summarizethesituationthisway:“Threeyearsofin-tergovernmentalnegotiations[…]haveleftusexactlywherewewerebefore:withnonationalearlylearningandchild-caresystemandwithlittleprogressinmostregions.ThispolicyoutcomereflectsafailureofthewayfederalismispracticedinCanada”(p.197).Inthepast,thefederalgovernmentcouldhaveimposeduponprovincesanewsharedcostnationalprogram.Now,inhavingtoworkcollabora-tivelywiththeprovinces,thedevelopmentofanationalschemehasprovenelusi-ve.Thenon-legalnatureofintergovernmentalagreementsmeantthatthenewlyelectedconservativegovernmentcouldbackoutofthebilateraldealsmadebyitspredecessor.However,itisimportanttorecognizethatthefederalLiberalgo-

1� TreatyFederalism:TheCanadianExperience

vernmentlackedpoliticalwilltoimposeanationalprogramonprovinces.Inthissense,itisnotsomuchthatSUFArestrainedthefederalgovernmentbutthatthefederalgovernmentrestraineditself.

Understanding Patterns of Convergence

Tosumup,inthetreatyfederalismorcollaborativefederalismera,provinceshavegreaterautonomyinanumberofpolicyareasfromtheenvironmenttosocialpo-licy.Thefederalgovernmentcannotunilaterallyintroduceconditionalsharedcostgrantsasawayofhomogenizingpoliciesacrossprovinces.Newintergovernmen-talagreementsarelesshierarchicalthanthoseofthe1960sinthatprovincesaregenerallynolongeraccountabletothefederalgovernmentforhowtheyspendfundstransferredfromthefederalgovernment,butrather,aredirectlyaccountabletocitizensthroughissuingpublicreports.Undertheseconditions,onecanarguethatCanadahasbecomeamoredecentralizedfederation.However,todate,thereislittleevidencesupportingeithertheviewthatgreaterdecentralizationleadstoacompetitiveracetothebottom,orthatgreaterdecentralizationhaspreventedthedevelopmentofnewsocialprograms.Thereareseveralinstancesofconvergence,suggestingthat“differentiatedcitizenship”hasnot(yet)overtaken“universalciti-zenship.”Moreover,thereislittleevidenceofconvergenceatthe“lowestcommondenominator.”Convergenceisalsosometimestheresultofdeliberateattemptstocoordinatepolicyacrosstheprovinces.

Howdowemakesenseofthesefindings?Simeonhasrathereloquentlyandsuc-cinctlyobservedthefollowing:“federalismpermitsdivergenceanddifference;itdoesnotrequire it.” Forhim,thepresenceofconvergence inprovincialpolicyoutcomesevenwithoutthesamedegreeoffederalinterventioncommoninthe1960s,isattributabletosharedpolicypreferencesamongCanadiancitizens,irre-spectiveoftheprovinceinwhichtheylive.Hereasonsthat,“evenifpolicy-makinganddeliveryarehighlydecentralizedtoprovincialgovernments,iftheircitizensallembracesimilarconceptionsofsocialcitizenship,theresultswillalsobesimilar”(Simeon2006:39).

OnepossibleexplanationfortheabsenceofracestothebottomisthatoneoftheprincipleassumptionsofthisargumentdoesnotholdintheCanadiancase.Boy-chuck(2003)observesthatinaneraofglobalizationandinternationalcompeti-


tion,mobilityofcapitalwithinacountryisasimportantafocusforgovernmentsasthepossibilityofcapitalexcitingacountryentirely.However,theassumptionofcitizenmigrationinsearchofthemostgenerouspackageofprovincialbenefitsrequiresgreaterscrutiny.ParticularlyinCanada,wherecitizensliveinfivediffe-renttimezones,isnotareality.

Theredoes seem tobe evidencehowever, that provinces sometimes engage in“benchmarking”whichresultsinconvergence,thoughnotnecessarilyatthelo-westcommondenominator.Harrisonconcludesthatprovincialgovernmentslooktothestandardsinotherprovincestoevaluatethereasonablenessoftheirown,seekingtoremain“in-line.”Harrison’s(2006b)considerationofprovincialtobaccotaxesrevealedthatemulationacrossprovincesisparticularlyevidentwhenpoliticalactors,notnecessarilygovernment,publicizevariancesacrossprovinces.Seekingtoavoidvoterpunishment,outlierprovincesfallinstep.MyownresearchontheNationalChildBenefitalsorevealsthisbenchmarkingdynamic.However,anevenmoresignificantinfluencehasbeentheroleofspecificpolicyentrepreneurswhonetworkwithpublicservantsthroughthewebofexecutivefederalismandspreadideaswhichinturninformpoliciessimilarindesign(Simmons2008).

Butthepresenceofsimilarprogramsinprovinces,evenintheabsenceoffederallydevisedconditionalsharedcostprogramsmustbeunderstoodagainstthebackdropofCanada’sEqualizationProgram.Withoutthetransferofrevenuefromonepro-vincetoanotherviathefederalgovernmentthroughthisprogram,therewouldnodoubtbefundamentallydifferentpatternsofconvergenceanddivergenceintheCanadianfederation.Thisprogramdoesnotpre-determineprovincialconvergenceorpreventracestothebottom,butitensuresthatprovinceshavetheabilitytocreatecitizenshipentitlementsatotherplacesonthetoptobottomcontinuum.

SomeobserverscontendthatCanadian’scommitmenttoredistributionofwealthacrosstheprovincesthroughtheEqualizationProgrammayerodeasthepercen-tageofCanadians living incities rises,andCanada’sethnicdiversity increases.Canada’srateofforeignborncitizens–roughly18%issecondonlytoAustralia’s.Thefearisthaturbandwellerswillbemoreconcernedwithpovertyintheircitythanwithpoverty inaprovinceseveraltimezonesaway,andthat immigrants,lessfamiliarwithCanada’sfederalpoliticalcommunity,willbelessconvincedbythelogicofEqualizationpayments(Chaudhry,2006).Nevertheless,otherspointoutthat,whileprovincesmaybickerabouttheequalizationformula,noprovincedirectlyattackstheprincipleofequalizationitself(Simeon2003:139).Opinionpollssuggestthatsupportforthetransferofmoneyfromrichertopoorerprovinceswasat85%in2004(Noel2006:63).Moreover,publicopinionresearchsuggests


thatwithinonegeneration,thechildrenof immigrantshavevirtuallythesamevaluesasthosewhoseparentswereborninCanada(Mendelsohn2003citedinNoel2006:64).ContrarytofindingsinWesternEurope,“thereappearstobenodirectimpactofethnicdiversityonsupportforsocialwelfareprograms”(Soroka,JohnstonandBanting2007:296).

Federalismisaprocessasmuchasitisastructure.TheeraoftreatyfederalismhasseenCanadaaroundtheconstitutionalimpasseofthelate1980sandearly1990s.Intheabsenceofconstitutionalchange,theCanadianfederationconti-nuestoevolve.Ourexperiencewithrelativelyautonomousconstituentunitshas,todate,notsignificantlyerodedCanadians’senseofuniversalcitizenshiporCa-nadians’commitmenttoredistributionofwealthacrossprovinces.Whetherthiswillremainthecaseisnotclear.Nevertheless,theCanadianexperienceremindsusthattherelationshipbetweenautonomyanddecentralizationandconvergenceanddivergenceiscomplexandconsiderablyinformedbytheenvironmentinwhichittakesplace.


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If you wish to support our work:Commerzbank BerlinBIC 100 400 00Donations account: 266 9661 04Donation receipts will be issued.

Prof. Julie Simmons is an assistant professor at the University of Guelph, Ontario and holds a PhD from the University of Toronto. She teaches in the fields of public policy and administration and Canadian politics. Her research focuses on how federal and provincial governments jointly make social and environmental policy and why it is difficult for citizens to access these processes. She has contributed to publications of the Forum of Federations (2003) and the Institute of Intergovernmental Reforms at Queen’s University (2004). She was previously employed at the Ontario Ministry.

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