zhang shiying - the double meaning of essence

Front. Philos. China 2009, 4(1): 143–155 DOI 10.1007/s11466-009-0009-2

Translated by Zhang Lin from Beijing daxue xuebao 北京大学学报 (Journal of Peking University), 2007, (11): 23–29 ZHANG Shiying ( ) Department of Philosophy, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China E-mail: [email protected]

RESEARCH ARTICLE

ZHANG Shiying

The double meanings of “essence”: The natural and humane sciences — A tentative linkage of Hegel, Dilthey, and Husserl

© Higher Education Press and Springer-Verlag 2009

Abstract Early in Aristotle’s terminology, and ever since, “essence” has been conceived as having two meanings, namely “universality” and “individuality”. According to the tradition of thought that has dominated throughout the history of Western philosophy, “essence” unequivocally refers to “universality”. As a matter of fact, however, “universality” cannot cover Aristotle’s definition and formulation of “essence”: Essence is what makes a thing “happen to be this thing.” “Individuality” should be the deep meaning of “essence”. By means of an analysis of some relevant Western thoughts and a review of cultural realities, it can be concluded that the difference between the attitudes toward things of the natural sciences and the humane sciences mainly lies in the fact that the former focus on the pursuit of universal regularity, whereas the latter go after the value and significance of human life. The movement from natural things to cultural things is a process in which essence shifts from universality to individuality. It is the author’s contention that what should be stressed in the fields of human culture and society is the construction of an ideal society that is “harmonious yet not identical”, on the basis of respecting and developing individual peculiarity and otherness. Keywords essence, universality, individuality, natural science, human science, culture 摘要 “本质”最早在亚里士多德的用语中包含有两重含义：一是指“普遍的东

西”(“共相”)，一是指“个体的东西”(“这个”)。在西方哲学史上长期占统治

地位的思想片面地认为：“本质”就是指“普遍的东西”。但实际上，“普遍的东

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西”并不能涵盖亚里士多德对“本质”的界定和表述：本质是使一事物“恰恰地是

这个事物”的东西。“本质”的深层含义应是“个体性”。通过对西方一些相关思

想观点的分析和文化现实的考察，可以得出结论：自然科学与人文科学对待事物的

态度的区别在于：前者重普遍性规律的追求,后者重个体性的人生价值意义的追求。

从自然物到文化物是一个由以普遍性为本质到以个体性为本质的转化过程。在人文

社会领域应该强调的是：在尊重和发扬个人的独特性和差异性的基础上,建立“和而

不同”的理想社会。

关键词本质，普遍性，个体性，自然科学，人文科学，文化

1

The word “essence” (“Wesen” in German) that is translated into Chinese as 本质 originated from the Greek to ti en einai, first used by Aristotle and meaning the original being of a thing. Wu Shoupeng translated it into “zenshi 怎是” (Aristotle 1959, p. 6). Aristotle often used to ti en einai and ousia interchangeably. In Chapter 4–6 of volume Z of his Metaphysics, Aristotle focuses on issues concerning “essence,” contending that the essence of a thing is its “species of a genus” (genous eidon). For example, in the statement that a “human being is an animal with two feet,” “animal” is the “genus”, while “with two feet” is its “species”, and a “human being is an animal with two feet” tells of the essence of a human being (Aristotle 1959, Vol. z, 1030a11–13, 1037b14–21). For one thing, the “essence” of Aristotle refers to universality in that both “genus” and “species” are universals. “A species of a genus” also refers to what is called “form” by Aristotle. However, whether “form” is universal or individual is still at issue in that “a species of a genus” can be sub-categorized into more levels. The lower the level of a species is, the nearer it approaches the individual; hence the “form” becomes an individual (Aristotle 1959, 1038a9–35). Thus, “essence” becomes “this”, viz. the individual rather than the universal. As a consequence, Aristotle failed to offer a precise answer as to whether “essence” is universal or individual. In the history of Western philosophy after Aristotle, “essence” began to appear with multiple meanings: It might refer to an individual thing or the character of a thing, to reality with its opposite as appearance or the universal (universality), to a species of a genus, to the idea or meaning of a thing, etc. (Schimidt 1978, p. 727). Summed up, these meanings are still within the scope of the question left by Aristotle: Namely, they either hold that essence is individual or insist that essence is universal (universality). The theory of ideas presented by Plato, Aristotle’s instructor, is the earliest theory stressing the issue of universality (Russell 1963, p. 169). According to Plato, the nature, character, and reality of a thing lie in universality whereas an individual thing is unreal. In

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Russell’s opinion, the meaning of a thing and our thought can only be expressed by language meaning universality in lieu of those proper names meaning individual things. Platonism has governed Western philosophy for several thousand years, and hence the main school of thought in Western philosophy holds that “essence” is universality. Plato once said that “the interest and the work of philosophy” (“das Interesse und das Geschäft der Philosophyie”) consist in the “cognition” of “species and genus” (“die Gattungen”) (Hegel 1970b, p. 59). “Species and genus” are universals called, by Plato, “ideas.” Just as Hegel contends, this is what people sometimes translate into species or genus (Gattung, Art): “Idea is of course species or genus,” and “is usually named universality” (Ibid., p. 63).

To be sure, in our process of cognition, when we recognize the universality of various individual things, we would grasp the essence of them to a certain extent, and hence deepen our cognition of things. Take for instance a flower and tree: When both of them are plants, the universal concept “plant” indicates their essence. This perspective treating universality as the essence of things has undoubtedly contributed much to the development of Western natural science, which aims at seeking for natural regularities, that is, universality. the natural sciences focus their research on finding out universality by means of various methods (experiment, induction, deduction, etc.). Plato’s celebrated thesis, to wit, “the interest and task of philosophy lies in recognizing universal things,” lays a solid theoretical foundation in philosophy for the substantial development of Western science, although according to Plato, the universality of idea pursued by philosophy is far higher, deeper, and broader than that pursued by mathematics and science.

However, does the essence of things only stop at the phase of universality? As stated by Aristotle, “essence” is what makes a thing “be” a thing, what “defines” (“gives a definition to”) a thing (Aristotle 1959, Vol. z, 1030a6–7, 1031a12), and what makes a thing “happen to be this thing” (Aristotle 1959, 1030a3–5). In this way, we may ask, can a thing be defined only by means of universality? Can universality “happen to” define “this thing”? Take a “Confucian temple” for example: If people designate the essence of it only by “temple” before confirming that a “Confucian temple is a temple,” we may press: is “temple”, the universal, that which makes a Confucian temple “happen to be” the essence of itself? Obviously, merely saying that a “Confucian temple is a temple” fails to demonstrate that a Confucian temple happens to be the essence of itself rather than the essence of a common temple. It follows that instead of giving the most exact and the deepest essence of “the thing happening to be this thing,” universality can only demonstrate the superficial essence of a thing. Anything in the world, insofar as its peculiarity is concerned, is unique. Universality by no means equals uniqueness and hence cannot demonstrate the essence of a thing

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that “happens to be this thing.” The case is rather this: the higher the degree of universality and the wider its range, the further it is to the “happening to be this thing” of a thing; contrarily, the lower the degree of universality and the narrower its range, the nearer it is to the “happening to be this thing” of the thing. Again, in the case of a Confucian temple, when the universality of “a Confucian temple is a temple” is broadened to “a Confucian temple is a group of buildings,” the essence of the Confucian temple is beyond our reach. Whereas, when the universality of a Confucian temple is narrowed down to “a Confucian temple is the crystallization of Chinese traditional culture” or “a Confucian temple is the crystallization of Confucian traditional culture,” the essence of the Confucian temple is at hand.

It seems that there is a process wherein the essence of a thing is revealed. In the first instance, what is revealed is the simple individuality of the perception of a thing, such as a colorful flower revealed in sight or the overall appearance of a Confucian temple. In the second instance, the universality of things will be revealed, such as a flower is a plant or a Confucian temple a temple. What is finally revealed is the unity of the universality and the particularity (universal thing and particular thing) of things — i.e. individuality at a higher level, in the traditional Chinese example of a plum blossom with noble character or a Confucian temple with the significance of Confucian culture. The revealing process of essence that I am describing here is rather cursory. On the contrary, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind is a voluminous work describing the revealing process of essence which, in this aspect, offers us a great model. Hegel says, “Substance is essentially subject” (“Die Substanz ist wesentlich Subjekt”) (Hegel 1970a, p. 28). Substance refers to the “object of ego” as a knower (Ibid., p. 39). The process whence the object or thing is recognized and revealed mentally is simultaneously the process wherein the self-cognition and self-revealing of the essence of this object or thing are done. This process goes from the easy to the difficult: At the initial phase, the thing (substance) is devoid of subjectivity, just being “this”. As regards “what is this,” the knower knows nothing. That is to say, the essence of the thing has yet to appear so it can only be said that it is “being nothing” when people want to know what the essence is at the time. This is called “Sense-Certainty” by Hegel. Along with the proceeding development of its movement in consciousness, the thing goes through the phases from “Sense-Certainty” to “Perception” and on to “Understanding”; hence, the essence of the thing appears from nothing to some specific qualities. For example, as salt, the thing is white, salty, and cubical, etc. It will further appear as a universal, i.e. universal regularity, in the instance to follow: This flower is a plant and the salt is a mineral, both subject to a certain universal regularity, and so on. This is generally called “essence” or “supersensible essence” (Zhang 2007a). As held by the philosophical principles of Chinese philosophical circles in the 1980’s, the


essence of a thing as such is all over, and what would be done next is merely to change the world in accordance with natural essence and regularity. Hegel however argues that the in-depth essence of a thing remains to be touched on in the recognition of this universality. His phenomenology of mind developed from various phases of “Sense-Certainty”, “Perception”, “Understanding”, etc. which belong to consciousness, to the phases of “Self-consciousness” and even “Reason”, “Spirit”, “Religion”, and “Absolute Knowledge”. None the less, it’s in the last phase of “Absolute Knowledge” that “substance” completely reveals itself as “subject”, and that the thing reaches and reveals its most deep-seated essence, called “absolute essence” (“das absolute Wesen”) by Hegel (Hegel 1970a, p. 495, 583, 584). After expatiating the “essence” in the sense of “universality and universal regularity” in the “Understanding” phase, Hegel spends nine tenths of the space in his Phenomenology of Mind discussing the historical and cultural activities of the entire human society (including politics, law, virtue, arts, religion, philosophy, etc.). In the view of Hegel, the singular activity of “consciousness” (with “Understanding” as its top phase) holds that the object is outside the self, according to which the recognized “essence” will by no means be the deep essence of a thing or an object. It is his contention that the in-depth appearance of “essence” will not be reached unless some activities with the attitude that the object belongs to self (this is also a phenomenological attitude) are carried out: that is, the historical and cultural activities of the whole human society that he mentions in various phases from “self-consciousness” to “reason”, “spirit”, “religion”, and “absolute knowledge”. Ostensibly, Hegel incorporates the historical and cultural activities of the entire human society into the appearing process of the “essence” of a thing. That is why he calls the “essence” in the phrase of “Absolute Knowledge”, after the progression from “Self-consciousness” to “Reason”, “Spirit”, and “Religion”. “Absolute essence” is the name for the highest and deepest essence.

It stands to reason that, compared with the “absolute essence” in the phase of “Absolute Knowledge”, the supersensible “essence” in the phase of “Understanding” is too abstract and superficial, whereas the former is concrete as well as profound. The key to the question is that the latter holds that object lies outside the subject, while the former takes the opposite attitude. For that matter, the essence that the latter achieves, namely the abstract and universality, appears so general that it fails to hit any particular individual. In Aristotle’s words, it fails to demonstrate that a thing “happens to be this thing.” For the same matter, none of the “essences” in various phases which belong to the “conscious phase” (“Sense-Certainty” or “meaning”, “perception”, and “understanding”) can be said to be real essence: “The being in meaning, individuality as well as its opposite, universality, in perception — and the empty and internal thing in understanding (“das leere Innere” referring to abstract essence and regularity — by the writer) —

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are no more essences but rather are just moments of self-consciousness. … In contrast to consciousness itself, they are, simultaneously, purely disappearing essences (rein verschwindende Wesen)” (Hegel 1970a, p. 138). That is to say, the “essences” in such phases as “meaning”, “perception”, and “understanding” are not authentic ones (“no more essences”) but just “disappearing moments” in the process wherein “essence” itself appears. In the example previously used, the thought of this passage by Hegel will proceed as follows: neither the saying that “a Confucian temple is a group of buildings” nor the statement that “a Confucian temple is a temple” can be said to have demonstrated the “essence” of a Confucian temple in that a “group of buildings” and “temple” are no more than “disappearing moments” in the self-appearing process of the “absolute essence” of a Confucian temple, viz. the transitional essence. Only when we say “a Confucian temple is the crystallization of the traditional culture of Chinese Confucianism (we provisionally say so), can we be said to reach or near the “absolute essence” of a Confucian temple. This assertion indicates that after thousands of years of manifestation and the depositing of Chinese traditional history and culture, the essence that a Confucian temple conceives points out, concretely as well as profoundly, the “happening to be this thing” rather than the abstract, superficial, and indiscreet essence as embodied by a “group of buildings” or “temple”. Perhaps a Chinese Phenomenology of Mind is needed to reach the “absolute essence” manifested by the statement “a Confucian temple is the crystallization of the traditional culture of Chinese Confucianism.”

Needless to say, there is one aspect that transcends time in Hegelian “absolute essence” which, in the past, was the focus of our (myself included) criticism of Hegel’s philosophy. Carefully scrutinized, however, Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind particularly stresses that “absolute essence” or “pure concept” must manifest itself in concrete history (including the history of human knowledge) as well as time. In addition, most of this book is devoted to the depiction of this aspect. If we slice off this part (it is a faulty expression in this great work), we can still argue that Hegel’s “absolute essence” is the unity of particularity and universality, the concrete and highest individuality, rather than abstract universality.

The key reason that Hegel’s “absolute essence” can hit upon individuality and demonstrate the “happening to be this thing” of a thing lies in its phenomenological thought: “Substance is essentially subject.” Neither a thing nor an object can have so-called independent, exterior, and objective meaning without a subject. Hence the essence and meaning of a thing or a phenomenon relies on a subject which takes uniqueness and individuality as its characteristics. Also because of this, the “absolute essence” of a thing cannot but equal “happening to be this thing” instead of the abstract universality in the phase of “Understanding”.


2

Some would perhaps suggest that the “absolute essence” or “happening to be this thing” is no more than an artificial product inseparable from human beings, and hence lacks objectivity: Only the regularity or essence in the Hegelian phase of “Understanding” is objective. Meanwhile, the “absolute essence” that Phenomenology of Mind reaches via various phases of the historical cultural activities of human society is subjective, and hence incapable of being the essence of natural things. Obviously, such questions result from an ignorance of the basic views of phenomenology, which led the questioners to fail to get the true essence of Hegel’s statement “substance is essentially subject.” Neither Hegel nor Husserl ever denied the independent existence of things outside man, but nevertheless, both the Hegelian proposition that “substance is essentially subject” and Husserl’s method of parenthesizing exterior things tend to point out that any exterior thing unrelated to subject and consciousness is of no significance, let alone to its essence or to telling what its “essence” is. When we make use of universalities such as “flower” or “plant”, “organism”, etc. to demonstrate the essence of some individual flower, we conclude that this essence is objective. Is it because the universality of “plant” exists independently without correlating with subject or consciousness? In effect, without subject and consciousness, none of the so-called universalities of “flower”, “plant”, “organism”, are meaningful. All the universalities result from the abstract activities of subject and consciousness. The “primary quality” of Locke, even the most abstract “number”, is also “subjective as well as objective”, which would not be without the participation of subject and consciousness (Zhang 2007b).

The action of consciousness can be roughly divided into two directions: from concrete to abstract and from abstract to concrete. In the first direction, the generality of universality widens, so much so that it sublimates into the concept of identity such as “number”. This identity hence becomes the standard for objectivity: that is, the biggest generality or the most abstract identity has the greatest objectivity. This is also the meaning of objectivity in terms of natural science. Modern science pursues digitization and quantification, reducing everything to mathematical formulas; this is due to its taking abstract identity as the standard for objectivity, and to its contention that only by doing so can it reach the most objective and most scientific level. This shows that the objectivity of natural science by no means originates from some so-called thing-in-itself exterior to subject and consciousness but rather results from the abstract action of consciousness. Dilthey holds the same standpoint. To him, the view with respect to “objectivity as pertaining to things which exist independently of the experience, thought, or consciousness of the person or ‘subject’, judging,

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perceiving, or otherwise ‘minding’ things, that is, the view of attributing the meaning of objectivity to ‘thing in itself’ (Sein an sich), is ‘a sort of nonsense’. It’s not because such kind of objectivity is ‘silly’, but because such objectivity could not have vital or cognitive meaning” (Ermarth 1987, p. 82). Moreover, “Dilthey’s objectivity does not originate from, nor cultivate in, Sein an sich…There is no absolute standpoint wholly ‘other’ from what is to be known” (Ibid., p. 83). Also, “In Dilthey’s view, the natural sciences are an activity and product, an expression, of historical human reason” (Ibid., p. 50). Dilthey argues that the object of natural science, “outer experience”, is also “a mode of experience, and as such is internally related to intending consciousness” (Ibid.). He says, “the exterior world is a relation of pressure embedded in life, that of impulse and resistance. The actuality of the exterior world only exists in the life-relation whose actuality just means that the relations of psychological construction contrast to the scope of spiritual science. Therefore, there is no transcendent thing contrary to the consciousness embedded in it” (Dilthey 1927b, p. 332). In a word, the general regularity and objectivity achieved by natural science do not lie in some independent exterior reality but result from the abstract activity of human consciousness (Ermarth 1987, p. 32; Makkreel 2003, p. 415). This view of Dilthey is worthy of acknowledgment.

In the other direction of conscious activities, namely that moving from abstract to concrete, the degree of universality becomes lower, so much so that concrete individuality is increasingly approached. For instance, from “a Confucian temple is a group of buildings,” we can further recognize that a “Confucian temple is a temple,” and that the “Temple of Confucius is the one located in Qufu,”…and so on and so forth, until the recognition that “a Confucian temple is the crystallization of the traditional culture of Chinese Confucianism.” In this way, along with the progressing of the movement wherein consciousness reduces the scope of universality, we can increasingly approach the essence of “happening to be this thing” of a Confucian temple. Here, essence refers to individuality, which sets up a sharp contrast with the universal essence achieved in the opposite direction. Can we however conclude hereby that this essence is subjective, and hence that there is no objectivity in terms of the humane sciences?

In my view, the objectivity of neither the natural sciences nor the humane sciences lies in exterior things independent of subject and consciousness. They share this point but differ from each other in the meanings of their respective objectivities. As mentioned before, the objectivity of the natural sciences is the identity that has reached an abstract level, and hence the more abstract and universal a thing is, the more objective it becomes. On the other hand, the investigation with regard to the humane sciences should not cease at the phase of abstract identity. It demands that the process be reversed after conscious activities reach the level of abstract identity, to wit, from abstract to concrete,


reducing the universal things to individual ones step by step. A stock example of this reduction is the Confucian temple mentioned previously. It has been the main thinking trend of modern Western philosophy from Dilthey on that universality is stressed in the study of nature, whereas individuality is emphasized when it comes to the investigation as for man. The view that tries to keep a balance between the natural sciences and humane sciences on universal regularities has been out of date due to its failing to respect the individuality and dignity of man.

In the humane sciences, objectivity refers to something other than abstract identity. Dilthey once differentiated the significances of the two objectivities but failed to present detailed elaboration (Dilthey 1927b, p. 71). As interpreted by Michael Ermarth, in Dilthey’s view, “Objectivity in the ved-world and the human sciences consists in tracing relations, within a set of horizons and coherences. These relations are, so to speak, followed interpretively and reflectively” (Ermarth 1987, p. 82). Relations are demonstrated by this kind of objectivity which “begins with a ‘point of interest’ and explicates a web or constellation of meanings, values, situations, roles, and world-views” (Ibid., pp. 82–83). For example, the objective explanation of an important historical event includes interpretations with respect to such relational networks as interest, value, worldview, etc. The objectivity of the humane sciences is relative because it includes interpretation (Ibid., p. 88). The “interest”, “value”, “worldview”, etc. here refer to cultural factors like activities of interest, ethics, and morality, aesthetics, philosophy, etc., aiming at their respective significances. Human life is the unity of these activities and the cognitive activities of the natural sciences mentioned above. In the life-world, these significances of a thing, together with those of scientific cognition which aim to achieve abstract identity, construct another unity. Every individual person, and even every individual thing in human life, is a concrete unity as such. The objectivity of science lies in abstracting this concrete individual with rich significance, leaving aside the significances of philosophy, aesthetics, morality, and interest so as to achieve abstract identity (that is, Locke’s “primary quality” or number). On the contrary, the objectivity of the humane sciences rests with the shift from the abstract to concrete, transcending (not abandoning) the significance of abstract identity, and hence further reducing the above-mentioned significances to their organic unity. What is needed here is the “coherence” of various significances and relations mentioned by Dilthey: The higher the coherence between these significances and relations, the more objective, authentic, and concrete the “coherence”. Objectivity here means authenticity and concreteness. Take a concrete flower for example: We can abstract it, from the perspective of the natural sciences, step by step, into “plant”, “organism”, … even into some abstract identity that can be expressed in mathematical formulas. Nevertheless, we can also reverse the procedure to the perspective of the humane sciences, viz. reduce the abstract

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identity of mathematical formulas, step by step, to an organic unity with various particular significances [“organism”, “plant”, “flower”, “plum blossom (e.g.),” plum blossom with implications of Chinese traditional culture-…], so as to display the concrete characters of the plum blossom in the life-world of Chinese people. E.g., the plum blossom has once been described as something that “when it withers and turns into earth, its fragrance still retains” (Yongmei 咏梅 (Ode to Plum Blossom) by Lu You), which is the real, concrete character as well as objectivity of plum blossom in the life-world of Chinese people. The essence of plum blossom grasped in this way therefore conceives not only scientific cognitive significance such as “organism”, “plant”, “flower”, etc., but also the meanings of virtue, aesthetics, philosophy, etc. of Chinese traditional culture. For another example, some individual person can also be grasped from the two aspects of the natural sciences as well as the humane sciences: We can abstract him by saying “this man is a rational animal,” “… a two-foot animal,” “…an animal,” and so on. We can also reduce this, from the perspective of the humane sciences, to “this man is a person with Chinese traditional cultural character,” “…a philosopher with Chinese traditional cultural character,” “…a philosopher with Chinese traditional cultural character who is engaged in the study of Lao-Zhuang 老庄 (Laozi and Zhuangzi) philosophy,” … In this progression, we are increasingly approaching the most authentic and most concrete personality of the person, and hence his objectivity.

In the same vein, the objectivity of a national culture can also be grasped from the standpoint of the organic whole and individuality. A nation is composed of a variety of individual people. The humane sciences should stress the individuality of people, respecting their respective dignities, and pay attention to the organic whole “integrated as one” by a good many individuals of the nation as well. Without the organic whole and individuality, a nation would lose its authenticity and concreteness, and its objectivity.

3

There is no insurmountable gap between natural things and human things. Firstly, the so-called “thing-in-itself” alienated from the human world is of no significance. Secondly, in factual history, natural things completely beyond the reach of human beings are becoming fewer and fewer. Anything in the life-world of mankind conceives human elements. As for human beings and things, we can treat and grasp them either from the perspective of the natural sciences or from the perspective of the humane sciences. A human is a natural being as well as a human being, and human life is the unity of nature and human culture. On the other hand, as a human being, man takes transcending natural things as his


orientation. As Dilthey asserts, a human being as a part of nature may and should demonstrate something via natural science. In this way, “spiritual science” depends on “natural science” to a certain extent. None the less, human life is by no means totally determined by nature in that natural science can only interpret cause-and-effect relations with regard to natural aspects of man, whereas the spiritual aspects, viz. human purposefulness and the meaning of value, go beyond the reach of cause-and-effect relations in the natural aspect of the human. That is to say, the dependence of the humane sciences on the natural sciences is relative. Or, the humane sciences are in a measure independent of the natural sciences. Dilthey calls this individuality “relative independence” (Dilthey 1927a, pp. 15–17). “Human action is characterized by some purposefulness beyond the interpretation from natural science” (Makkreel 2003, p. 54).

This differentiation of attitudes toward the humane sciences and their natural counterparts can be eventually summed to that between the individuality- orientation and the universality-orientation. While the natural sciences go after universal regularities, the humane sciences focus on pursuing the value and significance of human life of individuality. Dilthey thus attaches great importance to the role played by individuals in promoting the development of history (Dilthey 1927a, p. 53). However, Dilthey is by no means an individual libertarian who runs counter to Hegelian historical philosophy. He argues that while the individual is the carrier (Träger) of history, he is a “crossing point” (Kreuzungspunkt) of interactions between various social relations (Ibid., p. 37, 87). Human beings cannot but subject to the lively correlation of socio-historical actuality” (Makkreel 2003, pp. 55–56). It can be seen, from Dilthey’s differentiation of the two attitudes of the natural sciences and the humane sciences, how simple the view appears to be when it totally characterizes the humane sciences as seeking for universal regularities.

Taking the view the human being as the “crossing point” of various historical social relations as a starting point, Dilthey emphasizes particularly that human individuality is composed of a “culture system” (Kultursysteme) and “exterior social organization” (die aüssere Organization der Gesellschaft) (Dilthey 1927a, p. 43), and that the former refers to cultural activities such as language, science, art, religion etc. whereas the latter refers to family, nation, etc. In our opinion, nevertheless, both of them can be fit into the category of cultural activity in the global sense. According to Dilthey, every individual is a “carrier” as well as “cultivator” of cultural value (Ibid., p. 87; Makkreel 2003, pp. 56–57, 60). This makes us think of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind in which the “absolute spirit” — “absolute subject” is one carrying a long developing process of history and culture. As long as we criticize the “absolute” of Hegel and his artificial system (this is also what dissatisfies Dilthey), what is conceived in Phenomenology of Mind will surface, namely every individual is the carrier of

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the subject during the long-developing course of culture and history. Different people reflect this process from different perspectives of being a “crossing point” and in different ways, which are the manifestation of respective individualities.

The process with natural things and cultural things as its two extremes is one wherein essence shifts from universality to individuality. The shift from the attitude of the natural sciences to that of the humane sciences covers a process whence universalization (generalization) changes into individualization, a process where emphasis shifts from commonality to idiosyncrasy. Focusing entirely on seeking common ground in the field of human society will result in linking the humane sciences to the natural sciences, and the human to thing. It is my contention that what should be emphasized in the field of human society is to respect and develop individual particularity and idiosyncrasy, and to set up an ideal society “harmonious yet not the same” on the basis of the philosophical ontology of being “different but communicating” rather than pressing “difference” with “identity”, or pressing individuality or particularity by means of universality or unity.

Will emphasizing the humane sciences valuing particularity and its status lead to the effacement of the important significance of the natural sciences? This is not so. As has been mentioned before, at the same time that Dilthey emphasizes the independence of the humane sciences from the natural sciences, he argues that the independence is relative. Dilthey attaches great importance to, rather than denying, the close relationship between the humane and natural sciences, and to the fact that nature is where spirit bases itself. As he says, “Spiritual actuality is the upper limit of its natural counterpart while natural actuality is necessarily the basic prerequisite of spiritual life” (Dilthey 1927a, p. 17). Dilthey agrees that humane sciences should get support from natural sciences (Ermarth 1987, p. 35). Differing from Dilthey, Husserl all the more inclines to connect the natural sciences to the humane. According to Husserl, the humane sciences will undoubtedly show interest in the natural sciences, but the nature thereof is by no means the same as understood by the natural sciences, i.e. a heterogeneous and alien thing. What is more, the view that the humane sciences need heterogeneous and alien support, and that the natural sciences and nature have absolute independence, is wrong. In this way, on the part of Husserl and contrary to what Dilthey holds, it is not that the humane sciences have relative independence but that the natural sciences have nothing but relative independence (Ibid., p. 36). According to Husserl’s theory of intentionality, the study of “nature” by the humane sciences lies in purely taking “nature” as the object of intention. — This is however what the humane sciences concern rather than what te natural sciences do (Ibid., p. 41). On all accounts, in Dilthey’s view, a human being cannot be alienated from nature, whereas Husserl holds the opposite view, viz. a human being can be alienated from nature. While Dilthey merely established a status for humane sciences, Husserl’s theory of “transcendental reduction” seems


to have dismantled the hedge between the humane and natural sciences, offering the former an absolute priority (Ibid., p. 40, 42). In addition, “Husserl’s aim is not only to demonstrate the independence of the human from the natural sciences, but also to halt the ever-increasing alienation of natural science from life” (Ibid., p. 43). Husserl’s intention of overcoming “alienation” is worthy of approval. A voice advocating the attribution of the natural sciences to the humanities can be heard today in the intention to overcome the “alienation” of present cultural life. Has Husserl’s “theory of transcendental reduction”, nevertheless gone too far? It is my contention that the intention of isolating human life from nature is impractical. The imbroglio of thought between Dilthey and Husserl was originally hard to clarify, but in any event, Dilthey’s assertion that “spiritual science” is “relatively independent of” “natural science” is more practical and more accurate.

What should be particularly pointed out here is that besides presenting the thought of “intersubjectivity” and the “life-world” in his old age, Husserl belittled history, prescribing essence as universality but ignoring the importance of individuality. All these run counter to his intention of stressing the priority of the humane sciences and overcoming the alienation of the natural sciences from human life. The “purity” of his philosophy has in effect alienated history and culture hence human life. Comparatively, Dilthey’s philosophy gets closer to human life.

References

Aristotle (1959). Metaphysics (in Chinese). Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan Dilthey (1927a). Diltheys Gesammelte Schriften I, Verlag von B, G, Teubner Dilthcy (1927b). Diltheys Gesammelte Schriften VII, Band, Verlag von B, G, Teubner Ermarth, Michael (1987). “Objectivity and Relativity in Dilthey’s Theory of Understanding”.

In: Dilthey and Phenomenology. Washington, D C Hegel (1970a). Werke 3. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag Hegel (1970b). Werke 19. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag Makkreel, Rudolph (2003). Biography of Dilthey (in Chinese). Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan Russell (1963). A History of Western Philosophy (in Chinese), Vol. I. Beijing: Shangwu

yinshuguan Schimidt, Heinrich (1978). Philosoplosches Woerterbuch. Stuttgart Zhang Shiying (2007a). “Xianxiangxue kouhao ‘mianxiang shiqing benshen’ de yuantou —

Heige’er de jingshen xianxiangxue” 现象学口号“面向事情本身”的源头——黑格尔的《精神

现象学》 (“The origin of phenomenological slogan‚ ‘back to things themselves’ — Hegel’s Phenomenology of Mind”). Jianghai xuekan 江海学刊 (Jianghai Academic Journal), Vol. 2

Zhang Shiying (2007b). “Jingjie yu wenhua” 境界与文化 (“Mental realm and culture”). Xueshu yuekan 学术月刊 (Academic Monthly), Vol. 3

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zhang shiying - the double meaning of essence

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