a ‘meteoric’ career in hungarian politics · 2014-05-07 · 1 1 a ‘meteoric’ career in...
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A ‘Meteoric’ Career in Hungarian Politics Applying the Leadership Capital Index
András Körösényi
Center for Social Sciences
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
1014 Budapest, Országház utca 30.
Péter Ondré
Center for Social Sciences
Hungarian Academy of Sciences
1014 Budapest, Országház utca 30.
András Hajdú
Institute of Political Science
Corvinus University of Budapest
1093 Budapest, Fővám tér 8.
The study of political leadership is a developing segment of political science. Empirical
research in comparative politics and government reveals, though often indirectly, the growing
importance of political leaders in liberal democracies (e.g. Sheffer 1993; Jacobs-Shapiro
2000). The decline of political parties in recent decades (Mair 2005; van Biezen and Katz
2001; Blondel 2005) arguably mirrors the increasing personalization and Americanization of
politics in Europe. Some authors write about the ‘presidentialization’ of European politics
(Poguntke and Webb 2007), while others see it as a new epoch in the history of representative
democracy. Parallel to the decline of political parties, the emergence of an ‘audience
democracy’ (Manin 1997) and a trend toward ‘leader democracy’ has been explored
(Körösényi 2005; Pakulski-Körösényi 2012). Empirical political science also reveals the
emergence of illiberal democracies or hybrid regimes in some post-communist countries and
in the third world as well (Zakaria 1997; Diamond 2002). The introduction of new analytical
tools of the LCI may be a major contribution to the field. The above mentioned trends make
the application of this Index even more relevant.
The ongoing research led by Mark Bennister, Paul t’Hart and Ben Worthy (Bennister et al.
2013) aims to operationalize the concept of political (leadership) capital and make it
measurable by creating a Leadership Capital Index (LCI). This ambitious endeavour develops
the concept from a heuristic device to an empirical method suitable for tracking the
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performance and achievement of individual leaders and also for making systematic
comparative analyses of different leaders. The aims of this endeavour seem to us quite useful.
This paper consists of five sections. First, we make three comments on the conceptualization.
Second, we try to refine the LCI by introducing new variable and proposing an amendment to
the methodology. Third, we give an overview of the Hungarian political context and the
political career of Ferenc Gyurcsány. Fourth, we analyse the LCI of Gyurcsány and finally,
we summarize our results.
1. Comments on the conceptualization
The LCI draws on Bourdieu’s concept of the forms of capital (1986) and that of political
capital (1991) and also on the application of them by political scientists. We believe that at
least three questions should be answered to strengthen the conceptual basis of the LCI. First,
whether leadership capital is a synonym for political capital, or a distinct subtype of it, or an
entirely different concept. Second, whether political and/or leadership capital is a perception
or is it a concrete, objective (or objectified) actual capacity or power, or a combination of
both. Third, whether an incumbent’s capital is different from political leaders’ capital (e.g.
opposition leaders). We will argue that Bennister et al. (2013) fail to make a clear conceptual
distinction regarding the first question, give an adequate, although only an implicit answer to
the second question, and indicate the third problem but neglect to deal with it.
1. Leadership and political capital: synonyms or different concepts?
In Bennister’s article both the literature review and the conceptualization slide unnoticeably
from political capital to leaders’ political capital, i.e. leadership capital (Bennister et al.
2013). We challenge this identification of these notions as equivalent and argue that
leadership capital is not a synonym for political capital, but a distinct concept. To understand
the nature of leadership capital, we go back to Bourdieu’s conceptual differentiation of
financial, cultural and social capital (Bourdieu 1986). We argue that leadership capital differs
not only from financial capital, but from social (and political) capital as well.
Social capital is a network of mutual acquaintance and recognition in a group; in Bourdieu’s
concept it is a network of connections, which one can mobilize if necessary. It is an exchange
based on mutual trust (Bourdieu 1986, 8–9; Schugurensky 2000, 3).1 We define political
capital as social capital in the field of politics. Political capital is accumulated and possessed
by all politicians, including opposition leaders, backbenchers and professional politicians.
Professional politicians accumulate their political capital (i.e. their social capital in the field of
politics) throughout their career, until their retirement or the end of their life. They have to
keep a balance between taking and giving credit, in the mutual exchange of favours, to be a
reliable member of the political group or class. They have a long-term personal interest in
having a profitable yield on their investments, but not abusing (overusing) this delicate
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network of favours. To sum up, political capital is accumulated by work, a potential capacity,
owned by each member of the political class.
Leadership capital, unlike political capital, is not acquired and accumulated by every member
of the political class or by each politically engaged citizen. Most politicians never have a
chance to be a top-ranking political leader, such as a party leader or a chief executive.
Leadership capital refers to something special, in connection with the very delicate and
uncommon activity of leadership. Regarding leadership capital, we refer to incumbent
leaders, leaders of political parties, parliamentary groups and movements. We refer to MPs
sitting on the ‘front bench’, (to use the British parliamentary term), rather than the average
back-benchers. Leadership capital is not just the individual level of political capital (Sorensen
and Torfing 2002, cit by BW 2012, 4), but different from it. Leadership capital is something
in addition to political capital. Leaders are exceptional politicians; they stand for and are
selected for positions of power. Leadership capital is credit given as an authorization or
delegation to make decisions and act in the name of the given group (cf. Bourdieu 1986, 10).
Leaders need political capital (a network of relationships, mutual trust, capacity to influence
decisions) otherwise they could not wield power in an incumbent position effectively. But in
addition to it they need leadership capital, which is exceptional personal acceptance,
approval, and recognition, a credit for future wielding of power.
Unlike average politicians, who continuously acquire and accumulate political capital, taking
care to keep a balance between taking and giving credits in the mutual exchange of favours
(transactional), political leaders selected for positions of power are under strong pressure to
overuse their connections, their parliamentary backing, their connections in the party, and
their popularity with the public. Leaders are under strong pressure to spend their accumulated
political capital as well as their leadership capital in order to get things done. They cannot
avoid risk-taking to get things done and to acquire additional political and leadership capital
for the future.
Our thesis is that political and leadership capital are two different kinds of capital. Below, we
summarize some of the traits of leadership capital that differentiate it from the notion of
political capital:
(1) Just as political capital is mutual trust in exchange, i.e. a horizontal relationship, so
leadership capital is a vertical one. It is a credit given from ‘below’ as an entrustment, an
authorization to represent the community, make decisions, and execute them in the name of
and for those represented. Unlike political capital, it is a one-way transmission of credit.
(2) While political capital exists in a horizontal network, leadership capital is acquired in a
competitive struggle in strategic situations by individual actors.
(3) While political capital is, like social capital, an accumulated capital of mutual favours,
acquaintances and recognition, and thus a lasting, durable capacity, leadership capital can be
gained and lost abruptly by political actions, and is thus more volatile. While the former can
be characterized by a high level of reproducibility, the latter is a capacity that is hard to build
up but easy to lose (Bourdieu 1986, 10, 13).
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(4) Just as political capital can be accumulated through more routine activity (in the same way
as holding office), so leadership capital can be acquired through leadership, in other words
though decisions, mobilization and risk-taking actions.
(5) While political capital is an objective capacity, or at least it is objectified and
institutionalized (in formal positions and jurisdictions) to a greater extent, leadership capital is
a subjective capacity, a perception of a single leader as a person.
(6) While political capital can be accumulated in an arena that can be associated to a positive-
sum game, leadership capital can be acquired in a zero-sum game (there is one leader of each
party, there is one prime minister and one president in a country. Political capital, like social
capital, is distributed more evenly, i.e. it is accessible for more or less all members of the
political class. Leadership capital, on the other hand, is distributed more unevenly, since it is
earned in a zero-sum game.
(7) Political capital is a more common phenomenon, acquired by all average, everyday
politicians who are members of the political class and of a profession. Leadership capital is
more exceptional, like charisma, or like winning a duel or a championship. Drawing on
Weber’s conceptual distinction between two types of politics as vocation, we can say that
while professional politicians, who live ‘from’ politics, necessarily have a stock of political
capital; leaders with a political ethos, who live ‘for’ politics, have leadership capital in
addition to their political capital (Weber 1994, 318).
(8) Political capital is a dense network of connections of mutual trust based on past
experience; leadership capital is credit for the future for a single individual. We have seen
above that political capital is an ex post phenomenon, which can be accumulated through
continuous, long-lasting achievement in the past, while leadership capital is given ex ante for
the future, not necessarily based on past achievement.
2. Leadership capital: Perception or the capacity to lead?
On the basis of Bourdieu’s theory three forms of capital can be distinguished: social capital,
cultural capital and symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1986). The first one refers to the density of
social relations, the second one concerns the accumulated knowledge of a society, and the
third refers to prestige as a value in a community. The logic of the LCI mentioned above is
parallel with the threefold categorization of Bourdieu, since the index includes skills as
cultural capital, relationships as social capital, and reputation as symbolic capital. So from a
theoretical point of view the LCI corresponds to Bourdieu’s framework and applies these
forms of capital to political leaders. But seen from a methodological aspect the LCI
contradicts the classic approach because it focuses mainly on the perception of leadership
instead of the capacity for it. We assume that the LCI in the form presented here is a
perception-oriented method which concentrates on the reputation of the leader, in other words
the symbolic capital. Only the longevity of the leadership and the election margin for party
leadership are hard variables, the other eight elements of the LCI measure the various types of
perception. In the dimension of reputation it is the correct way. The polling data and the trust
in leadership are of course variables measuring the reputation. But the LCI is useful for
analysing the skills and the relations through the measurement of perception too. The work
presented estimates not the power, the capacity to lead, but rather the impression of the
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researchers regarding skills and relationships. And this is a significant difference. Impressions
about the image, charisma, trustworthiness, skills and relations belong to the field of symbolic
capital. The problem is that using this method we cannot measure the real capacity to lead,
merely the impression of the researchers of the cultural and social capital of the leader. In this
form the LCI is a perception index which is not be a suitable tool for exploring the empirical
relevance of Bourdieu’s theory on leadership.
This dilemma can be resolved in two ways. In the first place the methodology of the LCI can
be changed. In the dimensions of the skills and relationships – similarly to longevity and the
election margin – we shall use hard variables which are able to analyse capacity, and power
instead of perception. To measure communicative performance we can study the agenda-
setting skill of politicians through media analysis or their performance in public debates. To
study effectiveness we can use pledge research i.e. comparing election pledges with public
policy, and to measure policy vision we can analyse the content of the manifestos. Of course
these methods require much time and effort but in this way we can make a break with the
perception-oriented approach. On the other hand we can challenge the theoretical roots of the
LCI and instead of Bourdieu’s theory we can concentrate on the leader-follower relationship
i.e. the trust in leadership (e.g. Gillespie – Mann, 2004; Burke et al., 2007).
3. Leadership capital: similar or different for those in power and their rivals
Before applying the LCI we have to clarify the concept of political leader. The main dilemma
is how to distinguish politicians from leaders, in other words, what falls within the ambit of
the LCI. Can we use this method to analyse an opposition leader, a cabinet minister, or an
influential éminence grise? Our assumption is that ministers and influential backbenchers
cannot be treated as political leaders because in most cases they lack the adoration, the honour
and the charisma on which the leader-follower relationship is based. In the case of opposition
leaders the conditions of such a relationship are given. The members of the party or the
movement trust in the leader, in her skills and in her capability to lead the party and the
country. So while we reject the exclusive linkage of political leadership to holding office, at
the same time we have to emphasize the differences between the incumbent and the
opposition leaders.
First of all there is distinction in the field of responsibility. Incumbent leaders have to deliver
benefits, fulfil the pledges and need a moderate and sustainable policy programme. They have
to deal with internal and external crises and their bad decisions are punished severely by the
voters. Opposition leaders do not encounter such expectations. They can present policy vision
without feasibility or responsibility for implementation. In crisis they lacks personal
responsibility, can use populist promises and can avoid taking unpopular measures.
Secondly the political capital of incumbent leaders is challenged permanently. Prime
ministers have to take political risks, manage crisis, clash with different social classes and
take unpopular measures. So they need to manage their political capital continuously. By
contrast, opposition leaders can accumulate political capital without any pressure to spend it.
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Generally they can avoid participating in unpopular programmes and they are rarely affected
by big scandals. So although incumbent leaders have to manage their political capital
continuously, opposition leaders can accumulate it calmly and continuously.
Third, incumbents have large-scale tools to lead i.e. they have both soft and hard power (Nye,
2008). Based on Nye’s theory we can apply the term of soft and hard power in the case of
political leadership too. In politics hard power is the chance the leader has to decide about
resources and positions. In this way they can resolve conflict, get the support of different
pressure groups, weaken their rivals and satisfy their followers. Holding office is closely
linked to hard power, which is the solid basis of leadership. Soft power is rather a
psychological ability to get support and manage conflict. Soft power relies on persuasion, the
charisma of leaders, and their rhetorical and tactical skills. Opposition leaders only have soft
power but with it they can lead a movement and gain popularity.
Finally, comparing incumbent and opposition leaders there is a notable difference in the work
of the LCI. In the case of incumbent leaders there are features (such as longevity,
parliamentary effectiveness) which can be measured objectively by the LCI and which
concern the ‘clear zone’ of state power. When analysing prime ministers we can see their
trusted associates in office, their leadership style, their effectiveness and their policy
commitment. By contrast we have an impression of the skills and habits of the opposition
leader but our picture of their relations, policy profile or ability to lead a country is far less
clear.
2. Refining the LCI
Before embarking on the empirical analysis of Ferenc Gyurcsány’s career we shall try to
refine the method of the LCI to enhance its validity and try to make it a dynamic tool capable
of describing the trajectory of capital management. Political science has various tools and
methods for analysing leadership, for example case studies, interviews, process tracing,
comparing career paths and content analysis. Using these we can characterize and categorize
political leaders, and work out medium-level theories concerning the various natures of
leadership style. But all of these techniques are qualitative methods based mainly on
perception, and are thus subject to the bias of the researcher or the participants. This problem
weakens the strength and the validity of the analyses mentioned and frequently leads to an
evaluative debate. The LCI initiated by Bennister et al. (2013) aims to overcome this
weakness and offers a quantitative method of studying political leaders. The ten-component
LCI analyses the skills, relations, and the reputation (in line with the cultural, social and
symbolic capital) of the leaders, measuring these features on a five-point scale. At the same
time along with the integrated hard-method elements (durability, poll results) the LCI includes
soft methods to explore leadership capital, so it does not exclude researcher bias completely.
Half the variables are based on researcher judgment which can of course generate different
results when applied to the LCI concerning the same political leader. Our aim is to moderate
this vulnerability, so we suggest not including researcher judgment in the LCI. Accordingly,
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we measure the communicative performance and the management skills with the average
value of recorded expert judgments. This too is a qualitative method and based on
impressions, but the broader sense enables us to avoid severe distortion. In addition we have
changed the measurement of the parliamentary effectiveness. Instead of using researcher
judgment, we estimate effectiveness with viscosity in the government-parliament relationship.
In this way we measure the fulfilment rate of the legislative programme of the government in
the current six-month period. It is passed to parliament by the prime minister and includes the
bills which will be proposed by the government in the next period. The fulfilment rate is given
as a percentage and this result is converted to the five-point scale. The viscosity signals the
parliamentary effectiveness of the prime minister.
One of the most important aims of the LCI is to provide a dynamic tool for analysing political
leaders. Bennister et al. (2013) presented different paths to the accumulation and loss of
leadership capital, which in most cases resemble an inverted U trajectory. Of course there are
different ways of obtaining and spending leadership capital over time. Meteoric leaders can
gain and lose their capital and position rapidly, whereas rock solid capital endures throughout
the course of holding office. However in the study presented there the LCI does not function
as a dynamic tool and cannot measure the path of leadership capital management. The
analysis of Tony Blair presented by Bennister et al. (2013) shows a single value for Blair’s
capital rather than a trajectory, so in this form the LCI is not able to produce a curve
concerning the process of obtaining and losing capital. According to the authors, Tony Blair
was a medium-capital leader in 2005, but we know nothing about his capital in 1998 or in
2003, and without any earlier data they show not a decline in capital but a medium level of
capital. We assume that in the early years of his premiership Blair was a stronger and more
influential leader than after the scandals and the Iraq war, but the LCI does not address this
difference. We try to eliminate this problem the following way. First of all we have to note
that the dimensions of leadership analysed differ in nature. Communicative and management
skills are more or less permanent in a political career. Of course, capabilities can develop or
wane in time but the perception does not change suddenly, and clear turning-points cannot be
determined. So the data obtained by the LCI are partially constant: skills vary over time but
only moderately. At the same time, reputation and relationships change sharply in time, so in
these dimensions we can run the LCI dynamically. In the course of our analysis we take data
at six different points in time, which were the milestones of Gyurcsány’s premiership. In line
with these milestones we will map the trajectory of Gyurcsány’s capital.
In addition we have added a new variable to the LCI which compares the media capital of the
leaders. We have attempted to measure media capital with a 3-component index which refers
to the ‘journalist-based social capital’ and ‘media cultural capital’ (Davis–Seymour, 2010).
We asked media experts and journalists to evaluate Gyurcsány’s media performance, his
relationship with the Hungarian media and the skill and knowledge of his cabinet in the field
of media-work.2 We graded the averages of the data on a five-point scale, and this value
represented the media capital of the leader.
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Table 1. The components of the LCI (Bennister et al. 2013) Criteria Variable Method Measurements
1 Political/policy vision Expert judgment 1. Completely absent
2. Unclear/inconsistent
3. Moderately clear/consistent
4. Clear/consistent
5. Very clear/consistent
2 Communicative
performance
Expert judgment 1. Very poor
2. Poor
3. Average
4. Good
5. Very good
3 Media capital Expert judgment 1. Very weak
2. Weak
3. Average
4. Strong
5. Very strong
4 Personal poll rating Relative to the rating at the
most recent election
1. Very low (<-15%)
2. Low (-5 to -15%)
3. Moderate (-5% to 5%)
4. 1-5%
5. 5-10%
5 Longevity Time in office 1. <1 year
2. 1 – 2 years
3. 2 – 3 years
4. 3 - 4 years
5. >4 years
6 Party leadership Election margin for the
party leadership
1. Very small (<1%)
2. Small (1-5%)
3. Moderate (5-10%)
4. Large (10-15%)
5. Very large (>15%)
7 Party polling Party polling relative to
most recent election result
1. <-10%
2. -10% to-2.5%
3. -2.5% to 2.5%
4. 2.5% to 10%
5. >10%
8 Party cohesion, lack of intra-
party cohesion
Expert judgment 1. Very low
2. Low
3. Moderate
4. High
5. Very high
9 Policy performance,
management skill
Expert judgment 1. Very weak
2. Weak
3. Moderate
4. Strong
5. Very strong
10 Parliamentary effectiveness Viscosity 1. Very low
2. Low
3. Moderate
4. High
5. Very high
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3. The Hungarian case
The antecedents
Post-communist politics is often characterized by the weakness of the political parties, unions
and civil society, and by a minor role for constitutional and institutional constraints. The
transition period opened the arena to a few ambitious political leaders, who founded political
movements and parties, occupied important government positions, and who for a while
seemed to determine the political process. However, none of them emerged as a political
leader who shaped the political process throughout the 1990s.
József Antall, the first democratically elected Prime Minister (1990–1993), died early, before
completing his mandate (see Table 1). The ex-communist Gyula Horn was able to reorganize
the post-communist MSZP (Hungarian Socialist Party) and win an absolute majority at the
1994 general elections. He gained votes from the millions who were disappointed in the poor
performance of democratic politics and in the economic transition. Horn, however,
disappeared from the front line of politics after his electoral defeat in 1998. The left-liberal
SZDSZ was politically influential, and became a coalition partner in each socialist
government between 1994 and 2008. But neither within the party nor in its voting base, was
there a prominent political leader with unambiguous and enduring support and acceptance.
József Torgyán, the extravagant leader of the Smallholders party, was a heavy-weight
member of each right-wing coalition government of the decade. However, he had a poor
reputation in the political elite and in the dominantly left-liberal media due to his anti-
establishment, populist rhetoric and policy profile. He lost the battle with Viktor Orbán for the
leadership of the right-wing opposition during the 1995–1998 period. Viktor Orbán, the leader
of Fidesz was on the stage throughout the whole decade, but his party achieved only modest
electoral and parliamentary success until 1998. Between 1995 and 2000, however, he was
able to take the lead gradually on the right. Orbán’s electoral victory in 1998 and his
premiership (1998–2002) really marked a milestone in his career. From 1998 onwards he
became not only the unchallenged leader of the Right, but the major reference point for his
rivals on the Left. Since then Orbán has dominated Hungarian politics. Although Orbán
suffered serious blows afterwards, losing both the 2002 and 2006 elections, he survived. He
was able to strengthen his leadership within his party, keep the right wing block together and
even widen its electoral base with regular political campaigns and citizens’ mobilization. He
set the political agenda and shaped the political process even in opposition. As a strong,
charismatic leader, Orbán has dominated the political Right permanently, without a
challenger, since 1998.
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Table 2. Prime ministers, political affiliation and party composition of governments in
Hungary 1990–2014
name political
affiliation
parties in the coalition in office
József Antal (MDF) Right MDF-FKGP-KDNP 1990–1993
Péter Boros (MDF) Right MDF-FKGP-KDNP 1993–1994
Gyula Horn (MSZP) Left-liberal MSZP-SZDSZ 1994–1998
Viktor Orbán (Fidesz) Right Fidesz-FKGP-MDF 1998–2002
Péter Medgyessy (independent) Left-liberal MSZP-SZDSZ 2002–2004
Ferenc Gyurcsány (MSZP) Left-liberal MSZP-SZDSZ 2004–2006
Ferenc Gyurcsány (MSZP) Left-liberal MSZP-SZDSZ 2006–2008
Ferenc Gyurcsány (MSZP) Left MSZP (minority) 2008–2009
Gordon Bajnai (independent) Left-liberal MSZP (minority) 2009–2010
Viktor Orbán (Fidesz) Right Fidesz-KDNP* 2010–2014
*formally an independent party, but de facto a Christian democratic wing of Fidesz.
Source: based on Körösényi-Tóth-Török 2007, 46-49.
The Blitzkarrier of Ferenc Gyurcsány
From 1989 onwards the strength of the MSZP lied in its organization, rather than in its
leadership. The old guards, who took high-ranking party positions in the pre-1990 communist
period, dominated the leading bodies of the party until the end of the 1990s. After the 1998
electoral defeat, however, a new, younger generation appeared in the party leadership.
Although they had begun their political career in the communist party or its satellites in the
Kádár era, they were more successful in adjusting to the demands of the post-transition
period, in terms of both their communication and their political profile. Ferenc Gyurcsány
joined the party in 2000 then achieved a Blitzkarrier. First, he became an advisor to Péter
Medgyessy, the party’s candidate for premier in the 2002 campaign, then obtained a
ministerial position in Medgyessy’s cabinet, and succeeded him in 2004 as a PM. In 2006
Gyurcsány became the first Hungarian PM who was re-elected in office. By 2006 he had
become a champion, a hero of the left-liberal electorate and the left-liberal media.
(Debreczeni 2006; Körösényi 2006.) How did this happen?
The story began earlier. Ferenc Gyurcsány started his political career in the KISZ (Hungarian
Young Communist League) in the 1980s, but after the regime change he left the political area
and turned to the world of business. Although he was out of politics, he had strong family
links to the MSZP during this period. His mother-in-law was the Chief of Staff under Horn
between 1994 and 1998, and his wife worked in the Finance Ministry in the same period
(Debreczeni, 2006). In 2001 he returned to politics as a member of the campaign team for
Peter Medgyessy, the socialist candidate for the premiership. Since the MSZP had no
unambiguous candidate from the party leadership before the 2002 parliamentary elections, as
a candidate for premiership it put up a former apparatchik of the communist regime,
Medgyessy.3 Medgyessy was able to defeat Orbán with his technocratic-profile and anti-
political image (both of which were highly appreciated in Hungarian political culture) and
comprehensive welfare pledges. But the lack of political experience and the weakness of his
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political background within the socialist party proved to be a serious handicap for him.
Medgyessy had difficulties in keeping the socialist-liberal coalition together and was forced to
‘resign’ from office4 in August 2004 by the SZDSZ, his liberal coalition partner.
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uncertainty arose about his successor. Gyurcsány, who served as minister for sport and youth
affairs in Medgyessy’s cabinet, was one of the three potential premier candidates, although he
had only moderate support within the party elite and party leadership.
Gyurcsány’s Premiership
Milestone 1: The election for premiership
After Gyurcsány became a member of the socialist-liberal cabinet in May 2003, he started to
build new contacts with the lower levels of the party through his ministerial position. He
travelled around the country, personally visited many local party organizations and several
local governments led by socialist politicians. With his new, energetic style he became the
new star in the MSZP, and received many invitations to local sports days, village fetes and
other events in the provinces. He exploited this, and in February 2004 he was elected as
president of a county organization (Debreczeni 2006). The leaders of the MSZP opposed
Gyurcsány’s rise. The favourite of the party leadership was Péter Kiss, a bureaucrat-like
politician, but he lacked overwhelming support in the rank-and-file in the party. After
Medgyessy’s resignation, an extraordinary MSZP party congress was convened to select his
successor as PM. In the meantime, the socialist party leadership and the parliamentary caucus
signalled their choice for premiership. Gyurcsány lost against Péter Kiss in the Presidium of
the party and Gyurcsány was only the third of the three candidates in the parliamentary
caucus.6 But he won the decisive battle of the intra-party election at the extraordinary party
congress with overwhelming support from the delegates of local party organizations. The
reason for Gyurcsány’s popularity among the party rank-and-file was that he seemed an
appropriate leader against Orbán, who turned out to be a serious political threat even as an
opposition leader. The left-liberal media and the liberal SZDSZ also supported Gyurcsány. He
was the favourite of those people on the left who were frustrated with the sluggish capacity
for renewal of the old-fashioned, post-communist MSZP.
As we mentioned Gyurcsány also has a strong ideological commitment. After the right-wing
victory in 1998 Gyurcsány became acquainted with Anthony Giddens’ works and the
ideological profile of the New Labour. He wrote articles about the Third Way and the new
social democracy for the left-wing newspapers, indeed he published Giddens’ book The Third
Way in Hungary.7 He presented himself as the modernizer, who tried to create a new synthesis
of Hungarian liberalism and the new social democracy, which was very attractive for left-
wing intellectual circles and among liberals (Debreczeni 2006; Lakner 2011).
Unlike Medgyessy and Bajnai, Gyurcsány was a member of the MSZP, but he was outside the
inner circle of the party leadership. Unlike them, who were asked by the party leadership to
stand for premiership as a candidate of the MSZP, Gyurcsány stood for the highest office in
spite of the will of the party elite. He was a self-selected leader, who had the ambition, the
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desire for power. He was not called upon to be a prime minister (candidate), but fought for it.
It seemed that the Left had found their own leader, a suitable counterbalance to the
charismatic appeal and populist policy of Orbán. Unlike the technocrat-looking Medgyessy,
Gyurcsány had strong rhetorical skills and he was able to engage emotions, to express an
appealing political vision as a modernizer, and to mobilize people in a country which could be
characterized by political apathy and low level of participation. Gyurcsány was the only
answer to the leadership crisis of the MSZP. Since 2004, Hungarian politics can be
characterized by the rivalry of Orbán and Gyurcsány (G. Fodor-Schlett 2005).
Milestone 2: 100 Steps Program
During his first premiership (2004–2006), Gyurcsány held the balance between the party
platforms and in the coalition. In 2005 he presented the ‘100 Steps Program’ which was a
welfare package and provided benefits to the social groups whose support was necessary to
win the next parliamentary election in 2006. The government decreased corporate tax and
VAT by 5 %, initiated a continuous reduction in personal income tax, increased pensions, and
offered a comprehensive programme in the fields of health-care policy and education. The
‘100 Steps Program’ raised Gyurcsány’s popularity and helped him to stabilize his position
against the various groups within the party.
Diagram 1. The popularity of Ferenc Gyurcsány and Viktor Orbán
As a continuation of this programme, in the 2006 electoral campaign the Prime Minister
promised lower taxes and new large-scale developments. Gyurcsány’s MSZP had a dual
profile combining a left-wing, socially sensitive attitude with a very definite modernization
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Gyurcsány Ferenc
Orbán Viktor
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effort. With this aim Gyurcsány was successful and at the end of 2005 he was the obvious
leader of the left-wing camp.
Milestone 3: The re-election in 2006
The electoral campaign in spring 2006 brought a close and tenacious struggle of the two rival
camps. The popularity of the two main parties and their leaders was broadly at the same level.
Fidesz in opposition started a strong negative campaign while the MSZP emphasized the ‘100
Steps Program’ and the effort the party had put into developing the country. In the end, the
MSZP and its coalition partner, the SZDSZ gained a clear majority in the parliament (Ripp
2006; Lakner 2011) and Gyurcsány became a celebrated leader in the socialist and liberal
camp. After this victory Gyurcsány centralized power within the government to the Prime
Minister’s Office and put his loyalists in the most important governmental positions (Gallai –
Lánczi 2007). In June he withdrew the ‘100 Steps Program’ and announced a drastic policy
switch. Due to these austerity measures (for example VAT increased by 5%, gas prices by
30% and electricity prices by 10–14%), the popularity of the prime minister started to decline
sharply.
Milestone 4: The leaking of the ‘Őszöd Speech’
In September the so-called ‘Őszöd speech’8 was broadcasted on public station. This was a
speech given by Gyurcsány after the electoral victory behind closed doors. In this speech he
admitted that the MSZP had lied during the electoral campaign and in the previous years
about the state of the economy, and he announced the scheduled policy switch. After the
broadcast the speech led to heavy criticism of Gyurcsány in the party and in leftist intellectual
circles. The next day heavy street demonstrations started in Budapest and during the riots the
demonstrators occupied the headquarters of Hungarian Television. The street protest lasted
for months. The governing party lost the municipal elections in October, but the MSZP and
the SZDSZ supported Gyurcsány in a vote of confidence. At the end of 2006 the popularity of
the MSZP hit rock bottom. (Beck et al., 2011; Lakner, 2011). In line with the disturbance in
the left wing camp, Fidesz maintained the pressure on the government and tried to undermine
the legitimacy of the prime minister. The Fidesz parliamentary caucus boycotted Gyurcsány’s
speeches in the Parliament, the party organized a permanent demonstration for the resignation
of Gyurcsány, and initiated a referendum against the unpopular measures. During the second
Gyurcsány cabinet all the reform programs presented failed. The unsuccessful reforms, the
restrictive policy decisions, the growing corruption scandals and the ‘Őszöd speech’ eroded
the governing parties’ and their prime minister’s popularity (Beck et al. 2011; Tóth 2011). In
this situation, Gyurcsány did not seek balance but launched a fight against the status quo
inside the party because he thought the reforms were obstructed by the socialists. In the past
the very broad and colourful background of the MSZP had helped the party’s leaders to
salvage their position in the face of internal criticism. The various power groups balanced
each other out, and the criticisms levelled from different wings finally countered one other.
Gyurcsány was elected as party president in 2007, but he did not follow the strategy of his
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predecessors. He intensified conflicts with the strongest socialist politicians but he
overestimated the opportunities available to him. Already in 2006 he lost one of his most
important supporters, László Toller, who had a very serious car accident. In this situation,
characterized by declining popularity, paralysis of the government, and heavy pressure from
the opposition, Gyurcsány could not win the battle against the party elite.
Milestone 5: The fees abolishment referendum
The referendum about the fee for visiting GPs, the daily hospital fee and tuition fees in higher
education initiated by Fidesz led to the total debacle of the coalition in March 2008. After the
referendum in 2008 and the heavy defeat of the government (more than 80% voted against the
reforms), Gyurcsány intensified the conflicts with the coalition partner too. He decided to lay
off the unpopular minister of health who was nominated by the liberals, which prompted the
SZDSZ to leave the coalition. Already in September 2008 Gyurcsány tried to recall the
liberals to the government with a new program but the leaders of the SZDSZ refused
Gyurcsány’s offer.
Milestone 6: The fall of Gyurcsány as Prime Minister
In October the economic crisis eliminated the last hopes of the socialists for successful
reforms. The government turned to the IMF, which defined the policies of the remaining year
and a half. The government started new austerity measures but could not balance the national
budget. Realizing the dreadful economic and political situation Gyurcsány unexpectedly
resigned as prime minister in March 2009. The declaration shocked the socialists because they
had re-elected Gyurcsány as party president in the same congress (Lakner 2011). Two weeks
later Gyurcsány announced his resignation from the party presidency. As prime minister, he
was replaced de jure three weeks later, through a constructive vote of no confidence, by
Gordon Bajnai, a non-party politician. At that moment everybody thought that the ‘meteoric
career’ of Ferenc Gyurcsány was over and he would never again be a prominent leader of the
Hungarian Left.
4. The analyses of the LCI of Ferenc Gyucsány
The analysis of Gyurcsány’s career using the LCI confirm the decline of his leadership capital
and shows a path that could be predicted from the overview of his premiership. We set data
for the six different moments which were the milestones in Gyurcsány’s career: the election
for prime minister, the declaration of the welfare package, re-election, the Őszöd speech, the
collapse of the coalition, and the resignation. We had 11 variables, but there is no available
data on the level of trust in leader so we measured Gyurcsány’s capital on a 50-point scale
(see table 3).
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Diagram 2. The trajectory of Gyurcsány's leadership capital
We estimated the skills of the former prime minister using the method of expert judgment.
Communication skills and media capital were evaluated by journalists and media researchers
by filling out our survey. They confirmed that Gyurcsány is a talented speaker, and he can
persuade his followers. This was attested in 2004 when he defeated Peter Kiss, the candidate
of the party elite, with an impressive speech in the party congress. He secured the office by an
outstanding oratorical performance. Ironically, the fall of Gyurcsány is also due to a speech
(the Őszöd speech). The media performance of Gyurcsány and his relations with the
Hungarian media were evaluated as ‘good’ by the experts. His policy vision was evaluated by
political scientists as ‘moderate’ and he also managed to sustain a medium-strong party
cohesion. There were no relevant opponent groups in the party in course of the premiership
and Gyurcsány won the vote of no confidence in 2006. Gyurcsány never had a serious
competitor: Peter Kiss, who challenged was Gyurcsány’s rival in 2004 for the premiership,
participated in the Gyurcsány governments and never gave voice to his intent to challenge
Gyurcsány in this position. However, there were serious corruption scandals between 2006
and 2009 which arose from a lack of control over the local party organizations. And the
‘Őszöd Speech’ itself might also have been leaked from within the party. The policy
performance of Gyurcsány was evaluated as ‘bad’ by the experts, based on the policy switch
in 2006, the withdrawal of the former measures and the failed reforms in the second cycle.
The reputation (personal poll rating) of Gyurcsány decreased sharply after the policy switch in
2006 and the ‘Őszöd Speech’. He was unable to rally against the negative trends and when
Gyurcsány resigned his poll rating was below 20 percent. The party polling shows the same
trend: the popularity of the leader and the party declined hand in hand. The parliamentary
effectiveness of the prime minister varied between 45 and 70 percent over this period. We
analysed the effectiveness in the relevant six-month period through the fulfilment rate of the
government agenda.9 The longevity naturally increased with time, so in 2009 it reached its
peak.
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30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
Milestone 1 Milestone 2 Milestone 3 Milestone 4 Milestone 5 Milestone 6
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Table 3. The components of Gyurcsány’s LCI
M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
Policy vision 3 3 3 3 3 3
Communicative performance 5 5 5 5 5 5
Personal poll rating 5 4 4 2 1 1
Longevity 1 2 3 4 4 5
Election margin 5 5 5 5 5 5
Party poll rating 3 4 5 3 1 1
Trust in leader na. na. na. na. na. na.
Media capital 4 4 4 4 4 4
Party cohesion 3 3 3 3 3 3
Policy performance 2 2 2 2 2 2
Parliamentary effectiveness 3 4 3 3 4 4
TOTAL 34 36 37 34 32 33
During his premiership Gyurcsány was a medium capital leader, the LCI shows the highest
rate at the time of his re-election as PM in 2006 (Milestone 3) by 37 points. Gyurcsány’s
skills were evaluated as medium, with strong communicative performance and weak policy
performance. Party cohesion was average at this time. There was no relevant rival of
Gyurcsány on the left. The lack of competitor was made spectacularly clear at the moment of
the resignation when the socialists could not provide a proper candidate and started casting
around for a prime minister mentioning more than a dozen persons with a chance for the
premiership. Gyurcsány’s popularity showed the highest rate in 2006 before the election (see
diagram 1). But some months later the policy switch and the ‘Őszöd Speech’ undermined his
popularity, while the permanent corruption scandals and paralysis of the government later
eroded it continuously. The waning chance for winning the next election in 2010 damaged
Gyurcsány’s prestige in the party, undermined his network, and generated tension with the
liberal coalition partner. At the same time Gyurcsány managed to survive the autumn of 2006
and resigned only after the financial crisis in 2009. Between 2006 and 2009 more than half of
its former voters turned away from the MSZP; Gyurcsány led an ineffective government and
the socialist party was under the permanent pressure of the opposition, which urged the
dissolution of parliament and called for new elections. But the meteoric career ended only in
2009. Now we can see the reasons, the dimensions of the LCI help to explain the fall of
Gyurcsány. But the summed value of the LCI decreased moderately, the distance between
‘heaven’ and ‘hell’ being only 4 points. So in our view the LCI shows, but does not give
sufficient expression to, the decline of capital. The main problem is that the index is
dominated by constant variables. Six of the ten elements based on expert judgment cannot
change over time, and so cannot demonstrate the fluctuations in leadership capital. One of the
four dynamic variables increases automatically with time, so only three variables function as
genuine dynamic tools. As a result, the LCI is dominated by the popularity of the premier and
the party, which undermines the usefulness of the index. It is in accordance with popularity
(diagram 1) but the amplitude of the LCI is smaller. The skills determine the statistical band
within which the LCI can move, so these can represent a solid base for leadership. But to
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develop a genuinely dynamic tool to measure leadership capital more changeable variables
must be integrated into the index. We shall estimate the skills by other methods or shall
evaluate it at different times and so get data continuously. However, we advise against using
retrospective expert judgment concerning different moments because this result could be
distorted by the changing judgment or a posteriori perception of the experts.
5. Conclusion
In the conceptualization we raised three problems. Firstly, we emphasized the difference
between the leadership and the political capital. Political capital is a broader concept which
can be owned by every member of the political class. Leadership capital refers only to the
problem of political leadership, and therefore is held by top politicians. Secondly, we
considered the nature of leadership capital, i.e. it is a form of leadership-follower relationship,
and as such is based on perception; or it is the political capacity to lead based on skills,
relations and reputations. Thirdly we advised making a distinction between leadership capital
of incumbent leaders and the opposition leader. Incumbent leaders have responsibility for
electoral pledges, for policy performance, they have hard and soft power too and they have to
manage their capital permanently while opposition leaders can accumulate it without
challenge.
On the methodological field we tried to improve the reliability of the LCI and attempted to
fashion it into a dynamic measuring tool. We changed the method of research judgment into
expert judgments, based on a survey of 10–15 experts. We measured the leadership capital at
six different points in time and we plotted the trajectory of leadership capital management. It
greatly resembles the polling rate of the premier and his party, which means that this plays a
dominant role in the LCI.
On the empirical field we tested the LCI in the case of Gyurcsány’s premiership and we
analysed the six milestones of the career of the former Hungarian prime minister. According
to our study Gyurcsány is a ‘meteoric leader’ who emerged from within the party, and by
virtue of his tactical and communicative effectiveness he was elected as prime minister, rather
than the solid opponent put forward by the party leadership. After the ‘Őszöd Speech’ he lost
the support of society and the various party platforms, and this led to the continuous decline
of his leadership capital.
1 ‘Social capital is the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable
network of more or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition...’, formulates
Bourdieu (1986, 8). 2 Our questions were: How do you evaluate the relationship of the Gyurcsány cabinet toward the Hungarian
media? What do you think of Gyurcsány’s media performance? What do you think about the knowledge of
Gyurcsány’ staff concerning the work of the media? 3 Medgyessy began his political career in the KISZ (Hungarian Young Communist League) and in the
communist party and came to be a top-ranking government official in the 1987–1990 period (minister of finance,
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then vice-premier), before the democratic transition. In 1990 he went to the financial sector and gained a
technocratic image. He returned to politics first as a finance minister in the Horn cabinet (1994–1998), but he
had no party position and was not even a party member or MP during the 1990’s. 4 In 2002 after he became the Prime Minister it was revealed that he was a secret police agent in the communist
period. This episode undermined his reputation in the liberal political elite of the SZDSZ, the minor partner in
the coalition government, but it had no direct impact of his resignation in 2004, 5 The socialists purposed to replace Medgyessy through a constructive vote of no confidence but before the
motion he resigned. 6 Presidium: Peter Kiss: 103; Ferenc Gyurcsány: 99; Janos Veres: 31. Parliamentary group: Kiss: 90; Veres: 80;
Gyurcsány: 73. Party congress: Gyurcsány: 453; Kiss: 166. 7 In actual fact Gyurcsány himself financed the translation and the Hungarian edition of Gidden’s book
(Debreczeni 2006, 169). 8 In his scandalous speech Gyurcsány uttered the following statements: “There is not much choice. There is not,
because we have fucked it up. Not a little but a lot. No European country has done something as boneheaded as
we have. It can be explained. We have obviously lied throughout the past one-and-a-half to two years. It was
perfectly clear that what we were saying was not true. We are beyond the country’s possibilities to such an
extent that we could not conceive earlier that a joint government of the Hungarian Socialist Party and the liberals
would ever do. And in the meantime, by the way, we did not do anything for four years. Nothing.”
(Népszabadság, 2006. szeptember 18.) 9 http://www.parlament.hu/aktual/archivum/tvalkprog/tvalk.htm
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