Afternoon Session - 2002 Meeting

Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting_2002

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BerkshireHathaway

Warren Buffett and Charlie Munger discuss why it's difficult to know when a stock bubble willburst, strongly criticize "creative accounting," and warn that speculating is not investing.

1. Blue Chip Stamps plunges under Buffett and Munger 蓝筹邮票在巴菲特和芒格下跌

WARREN BUFFETT: You've heard us talk here about the importance of ourmanagers.However, occasionally, Charlie and I get involved in management ourselves.And wewould normally be too modest to claim any great accomplishments. WARREN BUFFETT：您听过我们在这里谈论我们经理的重要性。然而，偶尔，查理和我自己也参与管理。而且我们通常太谦虚而无法取得任何重大成就。

But we have had one rather incredible performance which, since Charlie participated in it aswell I do — I think if we put up the slide on the company that Charlie and I have managedpersonally, you'll see that this entity — you can't — Charlie, here it is, right here. 但是我们有一个相当不可思议的表现，因为查理参与了我的表现 - 我想如果我们把查理和我亲自管理的公司放在幻灯片上，你会看到这个实体 - 你可以' t - 查理，就在这里，就在这里。

It's one where we took over 30-odd years ago.And as you can see, the 46,000 became —what? 这是我们30多年前接手的地方。正如你所看到的，46,000成了 - 什么？

VOICE: That's the wrong slide. 声音：这是错误的幻灯片。

WARREN BUFFETT: Oh.Excuse me.Are you sure?Oh. WARREN BUFFETT：哦。打扰一下。你确定？哦。

VOICE: Oh, yeah. 声音：哦，是的。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK.Well, I guess we better put up the next slide. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。好吧，我想我们最好提出下一张幻灯片。

We — (laughter) — they got that first one — they got it reversed.We were doing 120 millionwhen we took over, and we're now doing $46,000 a year.But we may get a bounce one of theseyears.(Laughter) 我们 - （笑声） - 他们得到了第一个 - 他们让它逆转了。当我们接手时，我们做了1.2亿，现在我们每年的收入是46,000美元。但是这些年我们可能会反弹一次。 （笑声）

That was a company that also had a lot of float — (laughs) that we were attracted to.And theinteresting thing is, you know, this was Blue Chip Stamps. 那个公司也有很多浮动 - （笑）我们被吸引了。有趣的是，你知道，这是蓝筹邮票。

Although Blue Chip was a copy, of a sort, of Sperry & Hutchinson, which really was the maininventor of trading stamps on any large scale in the country, and they go back to the 19thcentury. 虽然Blue Chip是Sperry＆Hutchinson的副本，它实际上是该国任何大规模交易邮票的主要发明者，它们可以追溯到19世纪。

But if you think about it, S&H Stamps — Green Stamps — or Blue Chip Stamps, had manysimilarities to frequent flyer miles.You know, the only difference being that, you know, you gotthem a lot at, like, grocery stores and all of that and then you had to lick them and put them in abook.Whereas now, it's all done electronically. 但如果你考虑一下，S＆H邮票 - 绿色邮票 - 或蓝筹邮票，与飞行常客里程有许多相似之处。你知道，唯一的区别是，你知道，你得到了很多东西，比如杂货店和所有这些，然后你不得不舔它们

并将它们放在书中。而现在，它都是以电子方式完成的。

But the basic underlying business was very similar to frequent flyer miles, which have thisincredible hold on the American public.But somehow, we were not able to make the transfer. 但基本的基础业务与常旅客里程非常相似，这对美国公众来说具有令人难以置信的优势。但不知

何故，我们无法进行转移。

We haven't yet made the transformation, let's put it that way, from the lick-it stamp to somethingthat the public will accept. 我们还没有进行改造，让我们这样说，从舔stamp印章到公众会接受的东西。

But we've still got $47,000 of revenue annually from the entire state of California, so we'rebuilding a base.(Laughter) 但我们每年仍然从整个加利福尼亚州获得47,000美元的收入，因此我们正在建立一个基地。 （笑声）

Charlie and I continue to spend most of our time working on this one. 查理和我继续把大部分时间都花在这个上面。

2. Shareholders share the wealth through philanthropy 股东通过慈善事业分享财富

WARREN BUFFETT: Let's go to area 7. I think we stopped in area 6 last time, and we'll go fromthere. WARREN BUFFETT：我们去第7区。我想我们上次在第6区停了下来，我们将从那里开始。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, my name is Mort November.I'm from Cleveland, Ohio.I'm here withmy wife, Iris, who in 1986 founded the Statue of Liberty Collectors’ Club. 听众会员：是的，我的名字是Mort 11月。我来自俄亥俄州克里夫兰市。我和我的妻子艾丽丝在一起，她于1986年创立了自由女神像收藏家俱乐部。

I wanted to tell you personally what Berkshire Hathaway has meant for me.By owning it, wehave become philanthropists in Cleveland.And the way it happened is we sold all our otherstock.It was never any fun owning it, and I could never understand that my stock went down andthe CEO's bonuses went up. 我想亲自告诉你Berkshire Hathaway对我的意义。拥有它，我们已成为克利夫兰的慈善家。它的发生方式是我们卖掉了所有其他股票。从来没有任何乐趣拥有它，我永远不会明白我的股票下

跌，首席执行官的奖金上升。

So, I got rid of that, and we took all of that money and we're doing things for children inCleveland.On May 16th, we're sending a group — (applause) — thank you. 所以，我摆脱了这一点，我们拿走了所有这些钱，我们正在为克利夫兰的孩子们做些事情。 5月16日，我们派出一个小组 - （掌声） - 谢谢。

On May 16th, for the tenth year in a row, we're sending a group of children from ClevelandMunicipal Schools, who win the trip by doing good work in their class and good work in thecommunity, to Dearborn, Michigan, Henry FordMuseum, Greenfield Village.It's a lot of fun forthem and it's really a lot of fun for us. 5月16日，我们连续第十年派出一群来自克利夫兰市立学校的孩子，他们在班上做了很好的工作，在社区做了很好的工作，去了密歇根州迪尔伯恩，亨利福特博物馆，格林菲尔德村。这对他

们来说很有趣，对我们来说真的很有趣。

We invested in a building in the Cuyahoga National Park for campers, and hopefully we'll beable to help put up an addition to a library in East Cleveland, Ohio, which really needs all thehelp it can get.

我们在Cuyahoga国家公园为露营者投资了一座建筑，希望我们能够帮助在俄亥俄州东克利夫兰建立一个图书馆，这真的需要它能得到的所有帮助。

So, my wish for you gentlemen is that you have many, many more years of good health and thatwe have the opportunity to see you on this stage, or any stage, for as many years as you want.Isalute you both. 所以，我对你们绅士的愿望是，你们有很多很多年的健康状况，而且我们有机会在这个阶段，或

任何阶段，在你想要的多年里见到你。我向你们致敬。

WARREN BUFFETT: Thank you.(Applause) WARREN BUFFETT：谢谢。 （掌声）

It's terrific what a number — a large number — of Berkshire shareholders, particularly the ones,perhaps — well maybe not particularly — but in the Omaha area, because they go way back tothe partnership, and a number of them are in their mid-seventies or thereabouts. 一个数字 - 很多 - 伯克希尔的股东，特别是那些 - 或许也许并不特别 - ，但是在奥马哈地区，因为他们回到合作伙伴关系，并且他们中的一些人处于他们的中间 - 这真是太棒了七十年代左右。

But there have been a lot of things that have come out of the stock.In fact, there's been asuggestion that somebody may do a book on some of the things that have flowed from variousBerkshire shareholders. 但是股票已经出现了很多东西。事实上，有人建议有人可能会对伯克希尔各股东的一些事情做一

本书。

And I'm sure many of you know about the case of Don and Mid Othmer.Don went to CentralHigh, here in Omaha.Mid Othmer's mother, Mattie Topp, was a wonderful woman, who was acustomer when I started selling securities when I was 20 or 21, and she ran a dress shop. 而且我相信很多人都知道Don和Mid Othmer的情况。唐去了奥马哈的中央高地。 Mid Othmer的母亲Mattie Topp是一位很棒的女士，当我20岁或21岁开始销售证券时，她是一名顾客，她经营着一家服装店。

And they, you know, they left about $750 million to a group of mainly 4 or 5 charities, one ofwhich was the University of Nebraska. 他们，你知道，他们为一组主要是4或5个慈善机构留下了大约7.5亿美元，其中一个是内布拉斯加大学。

But there have been all kinds of things.And there may actually be something done on that atsome point, but I'm glad to hear what you're doing in Cleveland. 但是有各种各样的事情。实际上可能会在某些时候做点什么，但我很高兴听到你在克利夫兰做的

事情。

3. Hard to pick pharmaceutical winners 3.很难挑选药品获奖者

WARREN BUFFETT: Let's hear from area 8, please. WARREN BUFFETT：请听一下8区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, my name is Jennifer Pearlman from Toronto, Canada. 听众：嗨，我叫加拿大多伦多的Jennifer Pearlman。

Mr. Buffett, in 1998, you were asked to comment on the pharmaceutical industry, and at thattime your answer was that you considered it a mistake not to have taken a basket approach tothe industry. 巴菲特先生，1998年，你被要求对制药行业发表评论，当时你的回答是，你认为不采取一揽子方法进入该行业是一个错误。

I was wondering if you could revisit the issue, now that valuations have contracted sodramatically. 我想知道你是否可以重新审视这个问题，因为现在估值已经大幅缩减。

And also, considering that health care spending is outpacing inflation, and that there aresignificant moats in the industry, I was wondering if you could share with us your thoughts onthe health care industry at large. 而且，考虑到医疗保健支出超过了通货膨胀率，而且行业中存在重要的护城河，我想知道您是否

可以与我们分享您对医疗保健行业的看法。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie may be better equipped on that than I am, but it certainly — it'sbeen, as an industry, a very, very good business over time.And if you take the aggregate capitalin it and what it's earned over time, it's been a very good business. 沃伦·巴菲特：查理可能比我更好，但肯定 - 随着时间的推移，作为一个行业，它是一个非常非常好的企业。如果你把它的总资本和它的收益随着时间的推移而获得，这是一项非常好的业务。

And we did make a mistake, your memory's 100 percent accurate, in we’d — in what we said inearlier meetings, because we should have taken a package approach.We actually did buy atiny, tiny bit, but that's worse than buying none almost.I mean, it's just aggravating — back therein '93. 我们确实犯了一个错误，你的记忆是100％准确的，在我们之前 - 在我们之前的会议中所说的，因为我们应该采取一揽子方法。我们确实买了一点点，但这比几乎买不到的更糟糕。我的意思

是，这只是加重 - 在93年回到那里。

It’s certainly the — they're certainly the kind of businesses that, as an industry, we canunderstand.We would not have great insights on specific companies.So, if we did something,we would be more inclined to do it on an industry-wide basis. 当然，他们肯定是那种作为一个行业，我们可以理解的企业。我们对特定公司没有很好的见解。

因此，如果我们做了某些事情，我们会更倾向于在整个行业范围内这样做。

It's hard to evaluate the individual companies.As you know, Bristol-Myers has recently had a bigstumble, and even Merck has fallen back.And so, it's hard to pick the winners.

评估各个公司很难。如你所知，布里斯托尔 - 迈尔斯最近有一个很大的失误，甚至默克也倒下了。因此，挑选获胜者很难。

But that's no reason not to have a basket approach to the industry.And at some valuation level,it would be something we would think very hard about.And it's something where we could putquite a bit of money if it happened, which is another plus to us. 但是，没有理由不对该行业采取一揽子方法。在一定的估值水平上，我们会非常认真地思考这个

问题。如果它发生的话，我们可以投入相当多的钱，这对我们来说是另一个好处。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I mean, failed to get it right the last time.We'll probably fail to get itright the next time.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我的意思是，最后一次没能做对。我们下次可能无法做到正确。 （笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: I don't know what he had for lunch.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我不知道午餐吃什么。 （笑声）

4. Accounting at Coca-Cola and its bottlers 4.可口可乐及其装瓶商的会计

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, we'll go to number 1. Well, wait a second, is there anybody at number9?Probably not, now. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，我们会去1号。好吧，等一下，9号有人吗？可能不是，现在。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, there is. 观众：是的，有。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK, good enough.Nine. WARREN BUFFETT：好的，够好的。九。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Phil McCaw (PH), from Greenwich, Connecticut. 听众：来自康涅狄格州格林威治的Phil McCaw（PH）。

Could you discuss if and how you take into account the individual balance sheets of the Coca-Cola bottlers to the Coca-Cola Company, and if you view various regulatory control issues as apotential problem for Coca-Cola? 您能否讨论一下您是否以及如何考虑可口可乐公司向可口可乐公司提供的个人资产负债表，以及

您是否将各种监管控制问题视为可口可乐的潜在问题？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, certain Coca-Cola bottlers became quite leveraged, the onesthat were, in general, acquiring companies.Coca-Cola Enterprises certainly became veryleveraged over — it started out fairly leveraged, and it became more leveraged in recent times. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，好吧，某些可口可乐瓶装商已经变得非常有杠杆作用，而这些瓶装

商一般来说都是收购公司。可口可乐企业肯定变得非常有杠杆作用 - 它起初相当有杠杆作用，最近它变得更具杠杆作用。

And they have a business that's a solid, steady business, but it's not one with abnormalprofitability.So, it can take leverage, in the sense that it won't be subject to huge dips, but it alsois a business where it's very tough to increase margins significantly. 他们的业务是一个稳固，稳定的业务，但并不是盈利能力异常的业务。因此，它可以采取杠杆作

用，因为它不会受到巨大的下跌，但它也是一个很难大幅提高利润率的企业。

So, if most of the money goes to debt service, you know, that is something that you have to takeinto account when you value the equity. 因此，如果大部分资金用于还本付息，您知道，这是您在评估股权时必须考虑的事项。

It's a fairly capital-intensive business, the bottling business.On average, you'll probably spendbetween 5 and 6 percent of revenues on capital expenditures just to stay in the same place. 这是一个资本密集型企业，装瓶业务。平均而言，您可能会花费5％到6％的收入用于资本支出，只是为了留在同一个地方。

And in a business that, before depreciation, makes — and interest and taxes — makes maybe15 cents on the dollar, having 5 or 6 cents on the dollar go to capital expenditures is a prettyhealthy percentage of that.That's true at the Pepsi-Cola bottling company, too. 而在一项业务中，在折旧之前， - 和利息和税收 - 使得美元可能达到15美分，拥有5美元或6美分的资金支出是相当健康的百分比。在百事可乐装瓶公司也是如此。

It's just the nature of the bottling business.It's a reason why I like, basically, the syrup businessbetter than the bottling business.It's less capital-intensive. 这只是装瓶业务的本质。这就是为什么我喜欢糖浆业务比装瓶业务更好的原因。它的资本密集程

度较低。

And I think that the bottling business is a perfectly decent business.It isn't a wonderful businessbecause the — it's very competitive out there. 我认为装瓶业务是一项非常不错的业务。这不是一件好事，因为它在那里非常有竞争力。

I mean, on any given weekend, the big supermarket in town, or the Walmart, or whatever, isgoing to be featuring one or the other of the colas, and they’re going to — it's going to be basedon price.And you're going to read ads saying, you know, 12 for something or other, or 6 forsomething or other. 我的意思是，在任何一个周末，镇上的大型超市，或者沃尔玛，或者其他什么，将会有一个或另

一个可乐，他们将会 - 它将基于价格。并且你要阅读广告，你知道，12或者其他东西，或6或者其他东西。

And it has become something where a lot of people will switch from one to another, based onprice, on that weekend.And that makes it a tough business for bottlers.But it's a decentbusiness.

在那个周末，很多人会根据价格从一个人切换到另一个人。这对瓶装商来说是一项艰难的业务。

但这是一项体面的业务。

But it doesn't, in terms of the Coca-Cola Company, itself, its bottlers are going to do perfectlyOK over time.And they've got to earn enough money to be able to sustain that kind of capitalexpenditure and earn a cost of capital. 但就可口可乐公司而言，它本身并没有，随着时间的推移，其瓶装商将会做得非常好。他们必须

赚到足够的钱才能维持这种资本支出并赚取资本成本。

And if they get in trouble, it's because, if they pay too much for another bottler, it gets tough tomake the math work. 如果他们陷入困境，那是因为，如果他们为另一个装瓶商付出太多代价，那么让数学运算变得困

难。

Was there a second question about Coca-Cola then, too? 还有关于可口可乐的第二个问题吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I was curious if you concern yourself, when you see FASB-typeissues come out about control — 听众会员：嗯，如果你关心自己，当你看到关于控制的FASB类型问题时，我很好奇 -

WARREN BUFFETT: No. Yeah, no, I understand.I’m talking — WARREN BUFFETT：不。是的，不，我明白。我在说话 -

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Combining all the balance sheets, type of thing. 观众成员：结合所有资产负债表，物品类型。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, that really doesn't make any difference to us.I mean, in the end, theCoca-Cola Company, there's no question about it in my mind, the Coca-Cola Company needs asuccessful bottling group in order to prosper as a syrup manufacturer. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，这对我们没有任何影响。我的意思是，最后，可口可乐公司，在我看来毫无疑问，可口可乐公司需要一个成功的装瓶集团才能成为糖浆制造商。

But the profitability of bottling will allow that.And the capital requirements at the — at Big Coke,as it's called — are relatively minor, so most of the money they make can either be used asdividends or share repurchases. 但装瓶的盈利能力将允许这样做。大可可的资本要求，就像它所说的那样 - 相对较小，所以他们赚的大部分资金可以用作股息或股票回购。

But nobody's going to run out of money at Coca-Cola, nor are their bottlers, basically, going torun out of money.So, it is not a big balance sheet issue at all.And whether the figures areconsolidated or otherwise, the economics are basically the same. 但是没有人会在可口可乐公司用完资金，基本上他们的装瓶工人也不会用光钱。因此，它根本不

是一个很大的资产负债表问题。无论这些数字是否合并，经济学基本相同。

I mean, you have a, you know, there's not going to be a capital crunch of any kind.It would showdifferent ratios if you consolidated and if you didn't, but it really wouldn't change the basiceconomics any. 我的意思是，你有一个，你知道，不会有任何形式的资本危机。如果你巩固它会显示不同的比

率，如果你没有，它会显示不同的比率，但它确实不会改变基本经济学。

Charlie? 查理？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. 听众会员：谢谢。

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I don't think it changes anything on a basic level.But ideally, in theworld, you wouldn't have capitalization structures that are designed partly for appearance'ssake. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，我不认为它在基础层面上有任何改变。但理想情况下，在世界范围内，你不会拥有部分出于外观考虑而设计的大写结构。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. 听众会员：谢谢。

WARREN BUFFETT: We — thank you. WARREN BUFFETT：我们 - 谢谢。

5. Accounting is a starting point, but it doesn't always reflect reality 会计是一个起点，但并不总能反映现实

WARREN BUFFETT: We pay a lot of attention to what we regard as the reality of the balancesheets and economic conditions and cash situation, all of that of a business.And sometimes wethink accounting reflects reality, and sometimes we don't. WARREN BUFFETT：我们非常关注我们认为资产负债表的现实，经济状况和现金状况，以及所有业务。有时我们认为会计反映了现实，有时我们却没有。

It's a good starting point for us always, but I mean, there are companies in the United — there'sat least one company, at least last year, that was using a 12 percent investment returnassumption on its pension plan, and there are other companiesthat use, I think, even below six,certainly six. 对我们来说，这是一个很好的起点，但我的意思是，美国有一些公司 - 至少有一家公司，至少在去年，它的养老金计划使用了12％的投资回报假设，还有其他公司我认为，使用甚至低于六，当然是六。

And in the end, should we look at the figures the same of one company, particularly if thepension fund's a big element, that uses 12 and six?No, we look at what it says they're using. 最后，我们应该看一下这家公司的数据，特别是如果养老基金是一个大元素，使用12和6？不，我们看看它们说的是什么。

But, in our minds, we don't think the company that's using a 12 percent assumption is likely todo any better with their pension fund than one of the one's that's using six.In fact, we mighteven think the one that's using six is likely to do better because we might think they're morerealistic about the world. 但是，在我们看来，我们并不认为使用12％假设的公司可能会更好地使用养老基金，而不是那个使用6个养老基金的公司。事实上，我们甚至可能认为使用六的人可能做得更好，因为我们可能认为他们对世界更加现实。

So, we start with the figures of the companies we look at, but we've got our own model in mindas to what they will look like.It's true of the businesses we own a hundred percent of.Some ofthem have some debt in them, some of them don't, partly that situation's inherited. 因此，我们从我们所看到的公司的数字开始，但我们已经考虑了它们的样子。对于我们百分之百

拥有的企业来说，这是真实的。他们中的一些人有一些债务，其中一些没有，部分是这种情况继

承。

In the end, we've got the same metrics that apply to them, whether they happen to have somedebt on their own particular balance sheet or not, because in the end, we're not going to bewilling to have very much debtat all at Berkshire. 最后，我们有相同的指标适用于他们，无论他们是否碰巧在自己的特定资产负债表上都有一些债

务，因为最终，我们不会愿意承担很多债务在伯克希尔。

And where it's placed doesn't really make any difference because we're going to pay everythingwe owe, no matter where it is.And it's almost an accident whether company A or company Bhas a little debt attached to it. 放置它的地方并没有什么不同，因为我们将支付我们所欠的一切，无论它在哪里。公司A或公司B是否附加了一点债务几乎是一个意外。

6. New goodwill accounting is "making sense" 6.新的商誉会计“有意义”

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 10, is there anybody there? WARREN BUFFETT：第10区，那里有人吗？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, sir.My name Adam Chud.I'm from Columbus, Ohio.I attend theOhio State University. 听众：是的，先生。我叫Adam Chud。我来自俄亥俄州的哥伦布市。我参加了俄亥俄州立大学。

My question is, your comments on the new standards for the accounting of goodwill? 我的问题是，您对商誉会计新标准的评论？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the question about the new standards for goodwill. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，有关商誉新标准的问题。

Actually, if you read, I think, the annual report — maybe the 2000 annual report, and maybeeven earlier.

实际上，如果您认为年度报告 - 也许是2000年年度报告，甚至可能更早。

But we prescribed — we said what we thought would be the preferable system for how goodwillwas handled, namely, that it would not be amortized, and that combinations of companies beaccounted for as purchases.And it pretty well is what ended up coming out of the accountingprofession. 但我们规定 - 我们说我们认为最好的处理商誉的系统，即它不会摊销，而且公司组合应作为购买来计算。它最终来自会计专业。

So, the goodwill rules now are in accord with what we believe they should be.And for a longtime, they weren't. 因此，现在的商誉规则与我们认为应该是的一致。很长一段时间，他们不是。

You might argue that it was against our interests to have what we think proper accounting hasput in, because some people were averse to buying businesses because of a goodwill chargethey would incur, whereas it didn't make — it made no difference to uswhatsoever.We justlooked at the underlying economics. 你可能会认为，我们认为适当的会计已经存在，这是违背我们的利益的，因为有些人不愿意购买

商业，因为他们会产生善意，而它没有做 - 这对我们没有任何影响任何。我们只看了基础经济学。

So we may have a little more competition, even, on buying businesses simply because now,competitive buyers are not faced with a goodwill charge which may have bothered them butdidn't bother us.I regard the present goodwill rules as making sense. 因此，即使是购买企业，我们也可能会有更多的竞争，因为现在，有竞争力的购买者并没有面对

可能会困扰他们但却没有打扰我们的商誉。我认为目前的善意规则是有道理的。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, I agree. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我同意。

WARREN BUFFETT: OK. WARREN BUFFETT：好的。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you. 听众会员：谢谢。

7. I used a hearse to pick up your aunt for a date 我用灵车来接你的阿姨约会

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 1. WARREN BUFFETT：第1区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: My name is Martin Wiegand, from Bethesda, Maryland. 听众：我叫Martin Wiegand，来自马里兰州贝塞斯达。

Thank you for hosting this wonderful and formative shareholder meeting.Thank you also forrunning Berkshire in a manner that is an example to corporate America and the world.You makeus proud to be shareholders. 感谢您举办这次精彩且形成性的股东大会。也感谢您以一种美国企业和全世界的榜样运营伯克希

尔。你让我们为成为股东感到自豪。

My question, you touched on just before the lunch break.Did the compensation plans atBerkshire and its competitors have anything to do with the mispriced insurance policies theyissued? 我的问题，你在午休前谈到了。伯克希尔及其竞争对手的薪酬计划是否与他们发布的错误定价保

险政策有关？

And if so, has Berkshire or its competitors changed their compensation plans to correctly pricethose policies? 如果是这样，伯克希尔或其竞争对手是否改变了他们的薪酬计划以正确定价这些政策？

WARREN BUFFETT: Incidentally, I asked you this last year, I think, but are you my Martin's sonor grandson? WARREN BUFFETT：顺便说一句，我想，去年我问过你，但你是我的马丁的儿子还是孙子？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Son. 听众：儿子。

WARREN BUFFETT: Son, OK.Good enough.It — Martin's father and I went to high schooltogether.Matter of fact, your Aunt Barbara and I went to high school together also. 沃伦巴菲特：儿子，好的。够好了。它 - 马丁的父亲和我一起上高中。事实上，你的芭芭拉阿姨和我一起上了高中。

And she went out on one date with me, and that was the end.(Laughter) 她和我约会了，结束了。 （笑声）

It was not because I didn't ask her out again.(Laughter) 这不是因为我没有再问她。 （笑声）

I picked her up in a hearse.I think that kind of put the — (Laughter) 我在灵车中接她。我觉得那种 - （笑声）

8. General Re's "cultural drift" 8.雷将军的“文化漂移”

I think compensation plans lead to a lot of silly things, but I would say that, at Berkshire'sinsurance companies, I don't think our problems resulted from compensation plans at all.

我认为薪酬计划导致很多愚蠢的事情，但我想说，在伯克希尔的保险公司，我认为我们的问题根

本不是由薪酬计划引起的。

I think we had an — and we're talking about General Re here basically, because that's wherewe had the problem. 我想我们有一个 - 我们基本上都在谈论General Re，因为那就是我们遇到问题的地方。

I think General Re had an enormously successful operation, which went on for a long time.And Ithink that there was some drift away, perhaps because competitors were drifting away in a bigway, too, from certain disciplines, and we paid a price for that. 我认为雷将军的运作非常成功，这种情况持续了很长时间。而且我认为有一些偏离，也许是因为

竞争对手也在某种程度上从某些学科中飘走，我们付出了代价。

But I don't think the comp plans entered in at — in any significant way, if at all, into the fact thatwe did drift away for a while. 但是我认为comp计划并没有以任何重要的方式进入我们已经离开一段时间的事实。

I think it — I think you want to have rational comp plans.I think we've got a rational comp plan atGeneral Re, but — and it's quite similar to what we had before.And I just don't think that was theproblem. 我认为 - 我认为你想要合理的计划。我认为我们在General Re有一个合理的补偿计划，但是 - 它与我们以前的相似。我只是不认为那是问题所在。

It's very difficult, it's difficult in the investment world, when other people are doing things thatlook like they're working very well, you know, and they get sillier and sillier.It’s — it could bedifficult for many people to not succumb and do the same things. 这是非常困难的，在投资界很难，当其他人做的事看起来他们工作得很好时，你知道，而且他们

变得更加愚蠢和愚蠢。这是 - 很多人可能很难不屈服并做同样的事情。

And that happens in investments, but it also happens in insurance.And it was, you know, it's acompetitive world, and your people are out there every day, and they're competing againstSwiss Re, and Munich Re, and Employers Re, and all of these people. 这种情况发生在投资中，但也发生在保险业中。你知道，这是一个竞争激烈的世界，你的员工每

天都在那里，他们正在与瑞士再保险公司，慕尼黑再保险公司，雇主公司以及所有这些人竞争。

And you've worked hard to get clients, and the client says, "I want to stay with you, but thecompetitor says if I go with him, I don't have to do this or that, or I can get it alittle cheaper," orwhatever.You know, it's tough to walk away.And it may even be a mistake to walk away incertain cases. 并且你努力工作以获得客户，而客户说，“我想留在你身边，但竞争对手说，如果我和他一起去，我不必这样或那样，或者我可以得到它便宜一点，“或者其他什么。你知道，走开很难。在某些情况下离开甚至可能是错误的。

So, I just think that there was a — what you might call a cultural drift.I don't think it was a shift,but it was a drift.And I think it was produced, in part, by the environment in which the company

was operating.And it took a jolt to get it back.And I think that it is back. 所以，我只是觉得有一种 - 你可以称之为文化漂移。我不认为这是一个转变，但这是一个漂移。我认为它部分是由公司运营的环境产生的。它需要一个震动来恢复它。而且我认为它又回来了。

I think it's probably stronger than ever in terms of what we have now, but I would not attribute itmuch to the compensation system. 我认为就现在的情况来说，它可能比以往任何时候都更强大，但我不会将其归因于补偿制度。

But I have seen a great many compensation systems that are abominations and lead to allkinds of behavior that I would regard not as in the interest of shareholders.But I don't thinkwe've had much of that at Berkshire. 但我看到很多赔偿制度都是可憎的，导致各种行为，我认为这不符合股东的利益。但我认为我们

在伯克希尔并没有那么多。

Charlie? 查理？

9. "Demented" and "immoral" stock options 9.“疯狂”和“不道德”的股票期权

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I think if you talk generally about stock option plans in America, yousee a lot of terrible behavior caused.And, no doubt, they do a lot of good at other places.Butwhether they do more good than harm overall, I wouldn't know. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，我想如果你一般性地谈论美国的股票期权计划，你会发现很多可怕的行为造成的。而且，毫无疑问，他们在其他地方做了很多好事。但我不知道他们是否比整体伤

害更重要。

I think, in particular, if you have a corporation where a man has risen to be CEO, and he nowhas hundreds of millions of dollars in the stock of the company. 我认为，特别是，如果你有一个公司，一个人已经成为首席执行官，他现在有数亿美元的公司股

票。

He's been loyal to the company and the company's been loyal to him for decades, and he hashis directors vote him a great stock option annually to preserve his loyalty to the company, andhis enthusiasm to the business when he's already old, I think it'sdemented. 他一直忠于公司，公司几十年来一直忠于他，而且他的董事每年投票给他一个伟大的股票期权，

以保持他对公司的忠诚度，以及当他已经老了，他对业务的热情，我认为这是痴呆症。

WARREN BUFFETT: How about when they grant options as he leaves the company? WARREN BUFFETT：当他离开公司时，他们何时授予选择权？

CHARLIE MUNGER: I — and I also think it's immoral.I think that there comes a time when —(Applause) CHARLIE MUNGER：我 - 我也认为这是不道德的。我觉得有一段时间 - （掌声）

I don't think you would improve the behavior of the surgeons at the Mayo Clinic, or the partnersof Cravath, Swaine & Moore, if you gave the top people stock options in their sixties. 我不认为你会改善梅奥诊所外科医生的行为，或Cravath，Swaine＆Moore的合作伙伴，如果你在六十年代给予最高人选股票。

I mean, by that time, you ought to have settled loyalties, and you ought to be thinking moreabout the right example for the company than whether you take another hundred million foryourself. 我的意思是，到那个时候，你应该已经解决了忠诚，你应该更多地考虑公司的正确榜样，而不是

你是否为自己再拿一亿。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, well, we had a case — (Applause) WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我们有一个案例 - （掌声）

We've inherited some option plans because the companies we merged with had them.And insome cases they got settled for cash at the time, in some cases they continued on, dependingon the situation. 我们继承了一些期权计划，因为我们合并的公司有它们。在某些情况下，他们当时以现金结算，

在某些情况下他们继续，取决于具体情况。

But more money has been made from options at Berkshire by accident, and that, you know, thisis not — it just happened that way, but more money was made by people that had options onGeneral Re stock during a period when General Re contributedto a decrease in value ofBerkshire. 但是，伯克希尔的选择意外得到了更多的资金，而且，你知道，这不是 - 它只是发生了这种情况，但是在General Re贡献的那段时间里，通用再保险公司可以选择更多的资金。伯克希尔的价值下降。

So we had all of the other managers essentially, in a great many cases, turning in fine results,and we had a bad result at General Re, and yet more money, by a significant margin, was madeunder options at General Re than hadbeen made probably by all other entities combined. 所以我们所有的其他管理人员在很多情况下都取得了良好的结果，而且我们在General Re上取得了不好的结果，而且在General Re的选项下比在可能由所有其他实体组合而成。

But it was an accident, but that's the point, it leads — it can lead to extremely capriciouscompensation results that have no bearing on the performance of the people that, in somecases get great benefits, and in other cases people did great jobs andwere — their efforts werenegated by results elsewhere. 但这是一个意外，但这就是重点，它导致 - 它可以导致极其反复无常的补偿结果，这些结果与人们的表现没有关系，在某些情况下可以获得巨大的利益，而在其他情况下，人们做得很好，他们

的努力被其他地方的结果否定了。

So, it’s — it would be very capricious at Berkshire — you can argue that at Berkshire, for thosethat succeed me and Charlie, that anybody that is in the very top position at Berkshire has got

the job of allocating resources for the whole place. 所以，它在伯克希尔会非常反复无常 - 你可以争辩说，在伯克希尔，对于那些接替我和查理的人来说，任何在伯克希尔处于最高位置的人都有为整个地方分配资源的工作。

There could be a logically constructed option plan for that person, and it would make somesense because they are responsible for what takes place overall. 对于那个人来说，可能有一个逻辑上构建的期权计划，这将有一定意义，因为他们对整体发生的

事情负责。

But a logically constructed plan would have a cost of capital built into it for every year.We don'tpay out any dividends, so why should we get money from you free? 但是，逻辑上构建的计划每年都会为其建立一个资本成本。我们不支付任何股息，那么我们为什

么要免费获得您的资金？

We could put it in a savings account and it would grow in value without us doing anything.And afixed-price option over 10 years would accrue dramatic value to whoever was running the place,if they had a large option, for putting the money in a savings account or in government bonds. 我们可以把它放在一个储蓄账户里，如果没有我们做任何事情，它会增值。 10年以上的固定价格选择对于经营该地方的人来说，如果他们有大量选择，将钱存入储蓄账户或政府债券，将会产生

巨大的价值。

So, there has to be a cost of capital factor in to make options equitable, in my view, that therecan be cases where they make sense.They should not be granted at below the intrinsic value ofthe company. 因此，在我看来，必须有一个资本因素的成本来使选项公平，可能存在有意义的情况。不应以低

于公司的内在价值授予它们。

I mean, the market — a CEO who says, you know, my stock is ridiculously low when a merger— when somebody comes around and wants to buy the company, but then grants himself anoption at a price that he's just gotten through saying isridiculously low, that bothers me. 我的意思是，市场 - 一位首席执行官说，你知道，当合并时我的股票价格低得离谱 - 当有人来到这里并希望收购该公司时，但是后来给他自己选择的价格只是他刚刚说的是可笑的低，这让我感

到困扰。

So if somebody says, you know, I wouldn't — we don't want to sell this company for less than$30 this year because it's going to be worth a lot more later on, you know, my notion is that theoption shouldbe at $30 even if the stock is 15. 因此，如果有人说，你知道，我不会 - 我们今年不想以低于30美元的价格出售这家公司，因为它以后的价值会更高，你知道，我的观点是该选项应该是即使股票是15，也要30美元。

You know, otherwise you have a — actually a premium built in of — for having a low stock pricein relation to value.And I've never gotten too excited about that. 你知道，否则你有一个 - 实际上是内置的溢价 - 因为与价值相关的股票价格较低。而且我从来没有对此过于兴奋。

Charlie, you have any further thoughts on options? 查理，您对选项还有进一步的想法吗？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, we've been — we're so different from the rest of corporate Americaon this subject that, you know, we can sound like a couple of Johnny One Notes, but I don'tthink we ever quite tireof the subject.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，我们一直都是 - 我们和美国其他公司在这个问题上有很大不同，你知道，我们听起来像是一对Johnny One Notes，但我认为我们不会厌倦这个主题。 （笑声）

A lot is horribly wrong in corporate compensation in America.And the system of using stockoptions on the theory they really don't cost anything has contributed to a lot of gross excess.Andthat excess is not good for the country. 在美国，公司薪酬中存在很多错误。在理论上使用股票期权的系统实际上并没有花费任何成本，

这导致了大量的过剩。这种过剩对国家不利。

You know, Aristotle said that systems work better when people look at the different outcomesand basically appraise them as fair.And when large percentages of people look at corporatecompensation practices and think of them as unfair, it's not good for the country.(Applause) 你知道，亚里士多德说，当人们看到不同的结果并基本上评价它们是公平的时，系统会更好地运

作。当大部分人看到公司薪酬实践并将其视为不公平时，这对国家来说并不好。 （掌声）

WARREN BUFFETT: It will be hard to change though, because basically, the corporate CEOshave their hands on the switch.I mean, they control the process. WARREN BUFFETT：虽然很难改变，因为基本上，公司的首席执行官们都在转变。我的意思是，他们控制着这个过程。

You can have comp committees and all of that, but as a practical matter — I've been on 19public boards, Charlie's been on a lot of them. 你可以有comp委员会和所有这些，但作为一个实际问题 - 我已经在19个公共董事会，查理已经在他们很多。

And in the end, the CEOs tend to get pretty much what they want.And what they want tends togo up every year because they see other people getting more every year.And there's aratcheting effect, and the consultants fan the flames.And it's very difficult to get changed. 最终，首席执行官倾向于获得他们想要的东西。他们想要的东西往往每年都会上升，因为他们看

到其他人每年都会变得更多。并且有一种棘轮效应，而顾问则煽风点火。并且很难改变。

And right now, you've got corporate CEOs descending upon Washington, doing everything fromtrying to persuade to threaten your elected representatives to not have options expensed.Andit’s — I think it's kind of shameful, actually. 而现在，你已经让公司的首席执行官们在华盛顿下台，做了一切，从试图说服威胁你当选的代表

到没有选择费用。而且 - 实际上，我认为这有点可耻。

Because it, you know, this group, who is getting fed very well under the system does not want tohave those — what clearly is a compensation expense recorded because they know they won't

get as much.I mean, it's that simple.And it's not based on anything much more complicated.(Applause) 因为它，你知道，这个群体在这个系统下得到很好的喂养并不想拥有那些 - 显然是记录了补偿费用，因为他们知道他们不会得到那么多。我的意思是，就这么简单。而且它不是基于任何更复杂

的东西。 （掌声）

10. Float size isn't limiting investments 10.浮子尺寸不限制投资

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 2? WARREN BUFFETT：2区？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon.David Winters, Mountain Lakes, New Jersey. 听众会员：下午好。大卫温特斯，新泽西州高山湖泊。

Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, thank you for hosting "Woodstock for Capitalists."I know it's a lot offun for everybody, and I think a lot of fun for you, too. 巴菲特先生和芒格先生，感谢您主办“资本家伍德斯托克”。我知道这对每个人来说都很有趣，我觉得你也很开心。

Assuming growth of low-cost float and the sins of the past do not impede progress, does thesheer size of the float create constraints that change the allocation of future investments tomore high-quality fixed-income obligations rather than equity coupons or workouts thatcan growover time? 假设低成本浮动的增长和过去的罪行不会妨碍进展，浮动的庞大规模是否会产生约束，将未来投

资的分配改为更高质量的固定收益义务，而不是股权优惠券或锻炼随着时间的推移可以增

It seems otherwise Berkshire is incredibly well positioned if valuations ever decline. 如果估值有所下降，伯克希尔似乎处于非常有利的地位。

WARREN BUFFETT: Well, I think the answer is we probably are pretty well positioned ifvaluations decline. 沃伦巴菲特：嗯，我认为答案是，如果估值下降，我们可能处于相当有利的位置。

And it's a good question.If you have 37 billion of float, are you going to be more constrained toconventional investments than if you were working with a half a billion or a billion, as we werenot so long ago? 这是一个很好的问题。如果你有370亿的浮动资金，那么你是否会比我们不久前的五亿或十亿工作更加局限于传统投资？

As long as you have a huge capital position, which we have and will continue to have, and aslong as you have a lot of outside earning power, which we have and will continue to have, I don'tthink we're constrainedvery much. 只要你有一个巨大的资本状况，我们已经并将继续拥有，并且只要你拥有我们拥有并将继续拥有

的大量外部收入力量，我认为我们不受约束非常。

I mean, that — we'll always want to have a significant level of liquidity, relative to any kind ofpayment pattern that we see for a good length of time. 我的意思是，相对于我们在很长一段时间内看到的任何一种支付模式，我们总是希望拥有大量的

流动性。

But we will probably be operating with so much capital and with so much earning power,independent of the insurance business, and with so much liquidity, that we really will be able tomake decisions as to where — as to how — the assets should bedeployed, in terms of, simply,where we see the best returns and virtually no risk. 但是，我们可能会以如此多的资本运作，拥有如此多的盈利能力，独立于保险业务，并拥有如此

多的流动性，我们真的能够决定资产应该在何处 - 如何 - 简而言之，就我们看到最佳回报而且几乎没有风险而言。

And sometimes we see virtually no risk in equities when they're extremely cheap.We don't seethat situation now, but we could see it again.And I don't think we'll be much — I don't think we'llbe very constrained when the time comes. 有时，当股票非常便宜时，我们几乎看不到股票的风险。我们现在没有看到这种情况，但我们可

以再次看到它。而且我认为我们不会太多 - 我认为当时机成熟时我们不会受到很大限制。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, our constraint doesn't come from structure, it comes from a lack ofenthusiasm for stocks generally.The bonds are held as a default option. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，我们的约束不是来自结构，而是来自对股票普遍缺乏热情。债券作为默认选项持有。

11. Price of gold not a factor in valuing a business 11.黄金价格不是估值业务的因素

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 3. WARREN BUFFETT：第3区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Dear Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger, my name is Adrian Chur (PH), and I'ma shareholder from Hong Kong. 听众：亲爱的巴菲特先生和芒格先生，我的名字是阿德里安库尔（PH），我是香港的股东。

Thank you for your leadership and inspiration, as always.It's wonderful, always, listening toyou.If I may, I would like to ask of you both gentlemen, a question in two parts. 一如既往地感谢您的领导和灵感。总是很好听，听你说。如果可以的话，我想问你们两位先生，

两个部分的问题。

Perhaps I can ask the second part after you've answered the first part.The first part of thequestion relates to the Fortune article dated 10th of December you included in our shareholdermaterials.

在你回答完第一部分之后，也许我会问第二部分。问题的第一部分涉及您在我们的股东资料中包

含的12月10日的“财富”文章。

In this article, you mentioned that one couldn't explain the remarkable divergence in markets bydifferences in the growth of GNP.However, one could explain the divergence by interest rates. 在本文中，您提到无法通过GNP增长的差异来解释市场的显着差异。但是，人们可以解释利率的分歧。

The first question I have is this: I wonder, sir, if you were to look at the price of gold during thetwo periods of times you mentioned, that is to say 1948-'64 and '64-'81, if the explanationcouldbe even more clear? 我提出的第一个问题是：先生，我想知道，如果你在你提到的两个时期内查看黄金的价格，也就

是说1948 -64和'64 -'81，如果解释的话可能会更清楚？

Thus, the logical reason would be why the Dow in '48 was 177 was because — and half thelevel of 1929, of 381 index points — is because of the 71 percent devaluation of the Americandollar from 20.5 cents an ounce to 35 cents anounce, which would put the fair value of the Dowat 166, after factoring in the record 50 percent per capita gain of the 1940s that you hadmentioned. 因此，合乎逻辑的原因将是48年道琼斯指数为177的原因 - 而1929年的381指数点的一半 - 是因为美元贬值71％，从每盎司20.5美分降至35美分。在考虑到你提到的20世纪40年代人均收益创纪录的50％之后，道琼斯指数的公允价值将达到166。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, I grew up in a household — and my sisters are here — where goldwas talked about frequently.So I've been exposed to a lot of thinking on that over the years. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，我在一个家庭长大 - 我的姐妹们都在这里 - 经常谈论黄金。所以多年来我一直在思考这个问题。

I don't really think gold has really — the price of gold, I should say — has anything, really, to dowith the valuation of businesses. 我真的不认为黄金确实存在 - 我应该说，黄金的价格与企业的估值有关。

It may reflect certain things that are going on in prices attached to those businesses at giventimes. 它可能反映了在特定时间附加到这些企业的价格中发生的某些事情。

But I would not regard — I mean, the price of gold does not enter into my thinking in any way,shape, or form, in terms of how I value a business today, a year ago, 10 years ago, or tomorrow. 但我不认为 - 我的意思是，就我今天，一年前，十年前或明天的业务价值而言，黄金的价格不会以任何方式，形式或形式进入我的思考。

When we look at Larson-Juhl, the custom picture frame operation, you know, I'm not thinkingagainst — I'm not thinking of that and relating it in any way to what gold has done. 当我们看看Larson-Juhl，自定义相框操作时，你知道，我并没有反对 - 我没有考虑到这一点，并以任何方式将它与黄金所做的相关联。

So, I — it's just not a factor with us, any more than other commodities would be.I mean, youknow, whether it's wheat, whether it's cocoa beans or whatever. 所以，我 - 它不仅仅是我们的一个因素，不仅仅是其他商品。我的意思是，你知道，无论是小麦，无论是可可豆还是其他什么。

It has — you know, it has a certain hold on some people and they — but we don't look at it asan interesting investment and we don't look at it as a yardstick for valuing other investments. 它有 - 你知道，它对某些人和他们有一定的控制 - 但我们不认为它是一项有趣的投资，我们不会将其视为评估其他投资的标准。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, Warren is right when he says that interest rates are very importantin determining the value of stocks, generally.And I think he's also right when he says gold isvery unimportant. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，当沃伦说利率对于确定股票的价值非常重要时，他是对的。我认为他说黄金非常不重要，他也是对的。

12. Warning: Speculating is not investing 12.警告：猜测不是投资

WARREN BUFFETT: And the second part of the question? WARREN BUFFETT：问题的第二部分？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Thank you, sir.The second part of my question is this: given yourassumptions on gold, if you were to factor a significant decline in the value of the dollar againstgold, let's say 40 percent or more, and given the correlation of 1929-'48 and '64-'81 eraspositively to the decline of the dollar, and the negative correlation in the other two areas that youhad studied, would you care to adjust the 7 percent total annual return you were quoted asexpecting for common equity in the coming decade? 听众会员：谢谢，先生。我的问题的第二部分是这样的：考虑到你对黄金的假设，如果你要考虑

美元对黄金价值的显着下降，那么就说40％或更多，并考虑到1929年至48年的相关性。 64 -'81时代对美元贬值的积极影响，以及你所研究的其他两个领域的负相关，你是否愿意调整你所引用

的7％的年度总回报率，以期在未来十年内获得共同股权？

And in conjunction with that, would you care to comment on your expected rate or return on allother major asset classes, perhaps like bonds, real estates?And which would you believe offersthe best value for investors?Thank you very much. 与此同时，您是否愿意评论您对所有其他主要资产类别（可能是债券，房地产）的预期利率或回

报率？您认为哪些能为投资者提供最佳价值？非常感谢你。

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah.Well, except under unusual circumstances, my expected rate — myexpectancy on something like bonds is what bonds are producing at a given time.I don't thinkI'm smarter than the bond market.

WARREN BUFFETT：是的。好吧，除非在特殊情况下，我的预期利率 - 我对债券之类的预期就是债券在特定时间产生的。我不认为我比债券市场更聪明。

Now, you can say, when they — when those rates swing all over, does that mean I swing allover?The answer is pretty close to yes.I mean, that — I don't know what the right rate for bondsis.I think that if there's — 现在，你可以说，当他们 - 当这些利率全部摆动时，这是否意味着我全身都在摆动？答案非常接近是。我的意思是， - 我不知道债券的正确利率是多少。我想如果有的话 -

I'm very leery of economic correlations.I mean, I spent years fooling around with that sort ofthing, and I mean, I correlated stock prices with everything in the world.And the — and youknow, the problem was when I found a correlation. 我对经济相关性非常谨慎。我的意思是，我花了几年时间愚弄这种事情，我的意思是，我将股票

价格与世界上的一切联系起来。并且 - 你知道，问题是当我找到相关性时。

I mean, it’s — (laughs) — you know, you've seen these things on whether the AFC or the NFLwins the Super Bowl and all of that sort of thing.You can find something that correlates withsomething else. 我的意思是，这是 - （笑） - 你知道，你已经看到了这些关于AFC或NFL是否赢得超级碗以及所有这些事情的事情。你可以找到与其他东西相关的东西。

But in the end, a business or any economic asset is going to be worth what it produces in theway of cash over its lifetime. 但最终，企业或任何经济资产将在其生命周期中以现金的方式生产。

And if you own a — if you own an oil field, if you own a farm, if you own an apartment house,you know, with the oil field, it's the life of the oil field and what you can get out of it.And maybeyou get secondary recovery, maybe you get tertiary recovery. 如果你拥有一个 - 如果你拥有一个油田，如果你拥有一个农场，如果你拥有一个公寓，你知道，在油田，这是油田的生命，你可以从中获得什么。也许你得到二次康复，也许你得到三级恢复。

But whatever it may be, it's worth the discounted value of the oil that's going to come out.Andthen you have to make an estimate as to volume and as to price. 但无论它是什么，值得的是石油的折扣价值将会出来。然后你必须估计数量和价格。

With a farm, you might make an estimate as to crop yield, and cost, and crop prices. 有了农场，您可以估算作物产量，成本和作物价格。

And the apartment house, you make an estimate as to rentals, and operating expenses, andhow long it'll last, and when people will build other new apartment houses that potential rentersin the future will find preferable, and so on. 和公寓一样，你可以估算一下租金和运营费用，以及它会持续多长时间，当人们建造其他新的公

寓时，未来的潜在租房者会更好，等等。

But all investment is, is laying out some money now to get more money back in the future.Now,there's two ways of looking at the getting the money back.One is from what the asset itself willproduce.That's investment. 但所有的投资都是，现在正在筹集一些资金，以便在未来获得更多资金。现在，有两种方式可以

看到收回资金。一个是资产本身将产生的。这是投资。

One is from what somebody else will pay you for it later on, irrespective of what the assetproduces, and I call that speculation. 一个是来自其他人将在以后支付给你的东西，无论资产产生什么，我称之为猜测。

So, if you are looking to the asset itself, you don't care about the quote because the asset isgoing to produce the money for you.And that's how — that’s what society, as a whole, is goingto get from investing in that asset. 所以，如果你正在寻找资产本身，你不关心报价，因为资产将为你赚钱。这就是 - 这就是整个社会从投资该资产中获得的东西。

Then there's the other way of looking at it, is what somebody will pay you tomorrow for it, even ifit's valueless.And that's speculation.And of course, society gets nothing out of that eventually,but one group profits at the expense of another. 然后还有另一种看待它的方式，即使它没有价值，有人会为明天付钱给你。这就是猜测。当然，

社会最终没有得到任何结果，但是一个集团以牺牲另一个集团为代价获利。

And of course, you had that operate in a huge way in the bubble of a few years ago.You had allkinds of things that were going to produce nothing, but where you had great amounts of wealthtransfer in the short term. 当然，在几年前的泡沫中，你有很大的作用。你有各种不会产生任何东西的东西，但是你在短期

内有大量的财富转移。

As investments, you know, they were a disaster.As means of wealth transfer, they were terrificfor certain people.And they were, for the other people that were on the other side of the wealthtransfer, they were disasters. 作为投资，你知道，他们是一场灾难。作为财富转移的手段，它们对某些人来说非常棒。对于财

富转移另一边的其他人来说，他们是灾难。

We look solely — we don't care whether something's quoted because we're not — we don't buyit with the idea of selling it to somebody.We look at what the business itself will produce. 我们完全看 - 我们不关心是否引用某些东西，因为我们不是 - 我们不会因为将它卖给某人而购买它。我们看看业务本身会产生什么。

We bought See's Candy in 1972. The success of that has been because of the cash it'sproduced subsequently. 我们在1972年买了See's Candy。成功的原因在于它随后产生的现金。

It's not based on the fact that I call up somebody at a brokerage house every day and say,"What's my See's Candy stock worth?"And that is our approach to anything.

这不是基于我每天在经纪公司打电话给某人说“我看到的糖果股价值多少钱？”的事实。这是我们处理任何事情的方法。

On interest rates, I'm no good.I bought some REITs a couple of years ago because I thoughtthey were undervalued.Why did I think they were undervalued? 关于利率，我不好。几年前我买了一些REIT，因为我认为它们被低估了。为什么我认为他们被低估了？

Because I thought they could produce 11 or 12 percent, in terms of the assets that thosecompanies had.And I thought an 11 or 12 percent return was attractive. 因为我认为就这些公司所拥有的资产而言，它们可以产生11％或12％。我认为11％或12％的回报很有吸引力。

Now the REITs are selling at higher prices and, you know, they're not as attractive as they werethen. 现在房地产投资信托基金以更高的价格出售，你知道，它们没有那时那么有吸引力。

But you just look at — every asset class, every business, every farm, every REIT, whatever itmay be, and say, "What is this thing likely to produce over time?"and that's what it's worth. 但你只要看看 - 每个资产类别，每个企业，每个农场，每个房地产投资信托基金，无论它是什么，并说：“这件事可能随着时间的推移产生什么？”这就是它的价值所在。

It may sell at vastly different prices from time to time, but that just means one person is profitingagainst another, and that's not our game. 它可能会不时以非常不同的价格出售，但这只意味着一个人正在赢得另一个人的利益，而这不是

我们的游戏。

Charlie? 查理？

13. Hard to predict when a bubble will burst 13.很难预测泡沫何时爆裂

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, what makes common stock prices so hard to predict is that ageneral liquid market for common stocks creates, from time to time, either in sectors of themarket or in the whole market, a Ponzi scheme. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，让普通股价格如此难以预测的原因是，普通股的一般流动性市场不时会在市场或整个市场中形成庞氏骗局。

In other words, you have an automatic process where people get sucked in and other peoplecome in because it worked last month or last year.And it can build to perfectly ridiculous levels,and the levels can last for considerable periods. 换句话说，你有一个自动过程，人们被吸进，其他人进来，因为它在上个月或去年工作。并且它

可以构建到完全荒谬的水平，并且水平可以持续相当长的时间。

Trying to predict that kind of thing, sort of a Ponzi scheme which is, if you will, accidentallythrown into the valuation of common stocks by just the forces of life, by definition that's going tobe very, very hard to predict.But that's what makes it so dangerous to short stocks, even whenthey're grossly overvalued. 试图预测那种事情，有点庞氏骗局，如果你愿意的话，只是通过生命力量意外地投入普通股的估

值，根据定义，这将是非常非常难以预测的。但这就是让股票空头变得如此危险的原因，即使它

们被严重高估了。

It's hard to know just how overvalued they can become in addition to the overvaluation thatexists.And I don't think you're going to predict the Ponzi scheme effect in markets by looking atthe price of gold or any other correlation. 除了存在的高估之外，很难知道它们如何被高估。而且我认为你不会通过观察黄金价格或任何其

他相关性来预测庞氏骗局对市场的影响。

WARREN BUFFETT: Charlie and I probably — I mean, I'm pulling a figure out of the air — wehave probably agreed on at least a hundred companies, maybe more, that we felt were frauds,you know, bubble-type things. WARREN BUFFETT：查理和我可能 - 我的意思是，我正在扯出一个数字 - 我们可能已经同意了至少一百家公司，或许更多，我们认为这是欺诈，你知道，泡泡型的东西。

And if we had acted on shorting those over the years, we might be broke now, but we were righton probably just about a hundred out of a hundred.It's very hard to predict how far what Charliecalls the Ponzi scheme will go. 如果我们多年来一直采取行动做空，那么我们现在可能会破产，但我们对的可能只有一百个。很

难预测查理称庞氏骗局会走多远。

It's not exactly a scheme in the sense that it isn't concocted, for most cases, by one person.It'ssort of a natural phenomenon that seems to — nursed along by promoters and investmentbankers and venture capitalists and so on.But they don't all sit in a room and work it out. 从某种意义上说，它并不是一个计划，在大多数情况下，它不是由一个人编造的。这似乎是一种

自然现象，似乎是由发起人，投资银行家和风险资本家等共同进行调查。但他们并不都坐在房间

里工作。

It just — it plays on human nature in certain ways and it creates its own momentum, andeventually it pops, you know.And nobody knows when it's going to pop, and that's why you can'tshort, at least we don't find it makes good sense to short those things. 它只是 - 它以某种方式在人性中发挥作用，它创造了自己的动力，最终它会弹出，你知道。并且没有人知道它什么时候会流行，这就是为什么你不能做空，至少我们发现缩短这些东西是不合理

的。

But they are — it is recognizable.You know when you're dealing with those kind of crazy things,but you don't know when the — how high they'll go or when it'll end or anything else. 但他们是 - 它是可识别的。你知道什么时候你正在处理那些疯狂的事情，但是你不知道什么时候它们会有多高，什么时候结束或什么时候结束。

And people who think they do, you know, sometimes play in it.And other people know how totake advantage of it, I mean there's no question about that. 你知道，那些认为他们这样做的人有时会参与其中。其他人知道如何利用它，我的意思是毫无疑

问。

You do not have to have a 200 IQ to see a period like that and figure out how to have a bigwealth transfer from somebody else to you, you know.And that was done on a huge scale, youknow, in recent years.It’s not the, you know — it's not the most admirable aspect of capitalism. 你知道，你不需要拥有200智商才能看到这样的时期，并弄清楚如何从别人那里获得大笔财富转移。你知道，这是近年来大规模的。你不知道，这不是资本主义最令人钦佩的方面。

14. Stock options as compensation isn't sinful, but … 14.作为补偿的股票期权并不是有罪的，但......

WARREN BUFFETT: Area 4. WARREN BUFFETT：第4区。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Yes, good afternoon, Mr. Buffett and Mr. Munger.My name is Ho Nam(PH), and I'm from San Francisco, California. 观众：是的，下午好，巴菲特先生和芒格先生。我的名字是Ho Nam（PH），我来自加利福尼亚州的旧金山。

I have a question related to an issue you touched on a few moments ago on the debate overwhether or not stock options should be expensed and reflected on the income statement ofcompanies. 关于股票期权是否应该计入费用并反映在公司的损益表上的辩论，我有一个问题涉及你刚才提出

的问题。

With the current system, shareholders are incurring the burden of stock options since exercisedoptions dilute earnings per share. 在现行制度下，股东承担股票期权的负担，因为行使期权会稀释每股收益。

As a shareholder of companies that issue stock options, I think I'm OK with that, especially inentrepreneurial companies that may not have enough cash to attract talent from largercompetitors, or in cases where you have younger employees or lower-level employees whodonot have the cash to purchase stock without the use of options. 作为发行股票期权的公司的股东，我认为我很好，特别是在创业公司中，可能没有足够的现金来

吸引大型竞争对手的人才，或者在你有年轻员工或低级员工的情况下没有使用期权，没有现金购

买股票。

I have a two-part question.If companies are required to expense stock options and it hits —impacts the P&L, does it — would that lead to double-counting the impact of stock options? 我有一个由两部分组成的问题。如果公司被要求支付股票期权并且它点击 - 影响损益，是否会导致重复计算股票期权的影响？

And the second part is, if the use of stock options are largely eliminated, might that impact thecompetitiveness of entrepreneurial companies which help drive innovation and growth andcreate more of a dividing line between shareholders and employees? 第二部分是，如果股票期权的使用在很大程度上被消除，可能会影响创业公司的竞争力，这有助

于推动创新和增长，并在股东和员工之间创造更多的分界线？

WARREN BUFFETT: Yeah, the first question is that there really isn't the double-countingnecessarily. WARREN BUFFETT：是的，第一个问题是，确实没有重复计算。

For example, let's just take a company with a million shares of stock outstanding, selling at ahundred dollars a share. 例如，让我们选择拥有100万股流通股的公司，以每股100美元的价格出售。

And let's say that options are granted for 9 million shares — we'll make it extreme — at ahundred dollars a share.At that moment, you've given 90 percent of the upside to themanagement.We're taking a very extreme example.That's been a huge cost to theshareholders. 而且我们可以说，900万股的期权被授予 - 我们会让它变得极端 - 每股100美元。那一刻，你给了管理层90％的上升空间。我们采取了一个非常极端的例子。这对股东来说是一笔巨大的成本。

Now, interestingly enough, if the stock was selling at $100 a share, the fully diluted earnings areexactly the same as the basic earnings in that year, because the dilution is not counted at allunless the stock is selling above, and then only bythe difference in the market value and what itcosts to repurchase the optioned shares.So, there is not double-counting. 现在，有趣的是，如果股票以每股100美元的价格出售，那么全面摊薄的收益与当年的基本收益完全相同，因为除非股票在上面卖出，否则只计算稀释，然后只有市场价值的差异以及回购期权

股票的成本。所以，没有重复计算。

And you can — you could issue — the very fact that you issued that million, the options on 9million more shares at 100, would undoubtedly cause the price to actually fall well below 100and there would be no dilution shown in terms of the wayGAAP reports diluted earnings. 而且你可以 - 你可以发布 - 你发行了这百万的事实，100个额外900万股的选择，无疑会导致价格实际上远低于100，并且就方式而言没有显示出稀释GAAP报告稀释收益。

The second question, as to whether, if you expense the options, it would discourage the optionuse. 第二个问题是，如果您花费选项，它是否会阻止选项的使用。

Well, the argument, you know, that is made when there — people issue options is that it's doingmore for the company than giving people cash compensation.It may be more convenient thancash compensation, too, for young and upcoming companies. 那么，你知道，当人们发出选择权时，这个论点就是它为公司做的更多，而不是给人们现金补

偿。对于年轻和即将到来的公司来说，它也可能比现金补偿更方便。

But the fact that you are doing something in terms of paying people in a way that you say iseven more effective than paying them in cash, to say that therefore you shouldn't have to recordthe payment, I've never really followed. 但事实上，你所做的事情就是以你所说的方式支付人比用现金支付更有效，因此说你不应该记录

付款，我从来没有真正关注过。

I don't have any objection to options under some conditions.I've never taken a blanket positionthat options are sinful or anything of the sort.I just say they are an expense. 在某些情况下，我对选项没有任何异议。我从来没有采取一揽子立场，选择是有罪的或任何类似

的。我只是说他们是一笔费用。

And to be truthful with people about what you're earning, you should record the expense.And ifa company can't afford to be truthful, you know, I have trouble with that. 为了让人们了解你的收入，你应该记录费用。如果公司不能说实话，你知道，我遇到了麻烦。

And we will take, as we've said, you can pay your insurance premium to me in options.There'dbe lots of companies I'd be happy to take options in and give them credit. 正如我们所说，我们会采取选择权向您支付保险费。有很多公司我很乐意选择并给予他们信任。

I'd take options above the market.Give me a 10-year option 50 percent above the market inmany companies, and we will take that — appropriate number of shares — and take that in lieuof cash. 我会选择高于市场的选择。在许多公司中，给我一个比市场高出50％的10年期权，我们将采取相应数量的股票 - 并以此代替现金。

But that means we simply like, you know, the value of what we're getting better than theequivalent amount of cash and we think the company that gives it to us has incurred anexpense. 但是，这意味着我们只是喜欢我们比同等数量的现金更好的价值，我们认为给予我们的公司已经

支付了费用。

We've received something of value, they've given something of value up, and that's income tous and expense to them. 我们收到了一些有价值的东西，他们给了我们一些有价值的东西，这对我们来说是收入，也是他

们的代价。

And I think all of the opposition, at bottom, to the — to expensing of options comes from peoplewho know they're not going to get as many options if they're expensed.And you know, theywould like cash not to be expensed, but they can't get away with that, you know.I mean — 而且我认为所有反对意见的消费来自那些知道如果他们被支出而不会获得多少期权的人。而且你

知道，他们希望现金不被支出，但他们无法逃脱，你知道。我的意思是 -

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah.(Laughter) CHARLIE MUNGER：是的。 （笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: If you had an accounting rule that said the CEO's salary should not becounted in cash, believe me, the CEOs would be in there fighting to have that rule maintained. WARREN BUFFETT：如果你有一个会计规则，说首席执行官的工资不应该用现金计算，相信我，首席执行官会在那里争取维持这条规则。

I mean, because no one would — they would feel that they were going to get more cash if itwasn't expensed, and options are the same way. 我的意思是，因为没有人愿意 - 他们会觉得如果没有费用，他们会获得更多现金，选项也是一样的。

It’s another argument I get a kick out of, I was just reading it the other day, where they say,"Well, options are too tough to value." 这是另一个争论，我只是在阅读它，他们说，“好吧，选择太难以评估了。”

Well, I've answered that in various forms, but I notice that — what is it, Dell Computer, youknow, has a great number of put options out, and it's going to cost them a lot of money on theput options theyhave out. 好吧，我已经以各种形式回答了这个问题，但是我注意到 - 它是什么，戴尔电脑，你知道，它有大量的看跌期权，并且它们会在看跌期权上花费很多钱出去了。

And for a company to say, "We can't figure out the value of options, and therefore we can'texpense them," and then at the same time be dealing in billions of dollars' worth of options, theyare saying,"We are out buying or selling options in the billions of dollars, but we don't know howto value these things."That strikes me as a little bit specious — a little disconnected, cognitivedissonance, as they say. 对于一家公司来说，“我们无法弄清楚期权的价值，因此我们无法支出它们”，然后同时处理价值数十亿美元的期权，他们说， “我们以数十亿美元的价格购买或出售期权，但我们不知道如何评价这些东西。”这让我觉得有点似是而非 - 正如他们所说，有点断线，认知失调。

Charlie? 查理？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Yeah, I'm not at all against stock options in venture capital, forinstance.But the argument that prominent venture capitalists have made, that not expensingstock options is appropriate because if you expense them it would be counting the stock optionsdouble, that's an insane argument. CHARLIE MUNGER：是的，例如，我根本不反对风险投资的股票期权。但是，着名的风险资本家所做的论证，即不花费股票期权是合适的，因为如果你花费它们就会将股票期权加倍，这是一

个疯狂的论点。

The stock option is both an expense and a dilution, and both factors should be taken intoaccount in proper accounting. 股票期权既是费用也是稀释，在适当的会计中应考虑这两个因素。

John Doerr, the venture capitalist, as he argues to the contrary, is taking a public position that,"Were it offered to me as part of my employment, I would rather make my living playing a pianoin a whorehouse."(Laughter) 风险投资家约翰·杜尔（John Doerr）反驳说，他正在采取一种公开的立场：“作为我工作的一部分，我愿意为我提供帮助，我宁愿以妓女的身份在钢琴上谋生。” （笑声）

WARREN BUFFETT: We always get to the good stuff in the afternoon.(Laughter) WARREN BUFFETT：我们总是在下午找到好东西。 （笑声）

I hope the children are in bed. 我希望孩子们都在床上。

15. Hard to predict what happens after a bubble bursts 15.很难预测泡沫爆发后会发生什么

WARREN BUFFETT: Number 5. WARREN BUFFETT：第5名。

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Good afternoon.My name is Bob Baden (PH), from Rochester, NewYork. 听众会员：下午好。我叫Bob Baden（PH），来自纽约罗切斯特。

Mr. Munger, this morning, while discussing index funds, you used the example of Japan as areal example of poor performance of a major index over a long period. 芒格先生，今天上午，在讨论指数基金时，你用日本的例子作为长期主要指数表现不佳的一个真

实例子。

Indeed, the S&P 500 index declined over 60 percent, in real terms, from the early '60s throughthe mid-'70s. 实际上，从60年代初到70年代中期，标准普尔500指数实际下跌超过60％。

Could you discuss the mental models you use to consider the impact of inflation or deflation onyour investment decisions and the likelihood of either occurring over the next decade? 您能否讨论一下您用来考虑通货膨胀或通货紧缩对您的投资决策的影响以及未来十年发生的可能

性的心理模型？

CHARLIE MUNGER: Well, that's partly easy and partly tough. CHARLIE MUNGER：嗯，这部分容易，而且部分艰难。

If interest rates are going to go way up, you can obviously have a lot of deflation of stockprices.And a lot of that happened in the American period you're talking about. 如果利率上升，你显然会有很多通货紧缩的股票价格。很多事情发生在你所谈论的美国时期。

What's interesting about Japan is that I don't think anybody thought that a major modernKeynesian democracy, pervaded by a good culture in terms of engineering, product quality,product innovation, and so forth, could have a period where you would have negative

returnsover 13 years without major depression either. 有关日本的有趣之处在于，我认为没有人认为现代凯恩斯主义民主在工程，产品质量，产品创新

等方面的良好文化中可能会有一段时期会产生负面回报。 13年没有严重抑郁症。

WARREN BUFFETT: (Inaudible) WARREN BUFFETT :(听不清楚）

CHARLIE MUNGER: I think — and that it would occur while interest rates were going down, notup.I think that was so novel that the models of the past totally failed to predict it. CHARLIE MUNGER：我认为 - 当利率下降而不是上涨时会发生这种情况。我认为这是如此新颖，以至于过去的模型完全无法预测它。

But I think these anomalies are always very interesting, and I think it's crazy for Americans toassume that what's happening in Argentina, what has happened in Japan, are totallyinconceivable forever in America.They are not totally inconceivable. 但我认为这些异常总是非常有趣，我认为美国人认为在阿根廷发生的事情，日本发生的事情在美

国永远是不可想象的，这是疯狂的。它们并非完全不可思议。

WARREN BUFFETT: You had a huge bubble in equity prices in Japan, and now you've hadinterest rates go to virtually nothing. 沃伦巴菲特：你在日本的股票价格泡沫很大，现在你的利率几乎没有变化。

You've had the passage of time, the country hasn't disappeared.People are going to work everyday, and you've had this — the Nikkei, you know, now at a third of what it sold for not that manyyears ago.It's an interesting phenomenon. 你已经过了一段时间，这个国家还没有消失。人们每天都要去上班，而且你已经拥有了这个 - 日经，你知道，现在它的价格已经超过了很多年前的三分之一。这是一个有趣的现象。

CHARLIE MUNGER: And huge fiscal stimulus in the whole period from the government. CHARLIE MUNGER：整个政府期间的巨额财政刺激措施。

WARREN BUFFETT: Post-bubble periods, I think, depending on how big the bubble is and howmany were participating in it, but post-bubble periods, I think, can produce fallout that noteveryone will be terribly good at predicting. 沃伦·巴菲特：我认为，泡沫破灭后的时期取决于泡沫的大小以及参与泡沫的人数，但我认为泡沫后时期会产生影响，而不是每个人都会非常擅长预测。

16. Ben Graham and the long/short model 16.本格雷厄姆和长/短模型

WARREN BUFFETT: Six? WARREN BUFFETT：六个？

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Hi, I'm Steve Rosenberg (PH).I'm 22, from Ann Arbor, Michigan.It's aprivilege to be here.

听众：嗨，我是Steve Rosenberg（PH）。我今年22岁，来自密歇根州的安娜堡。能够来到这里是一种荣幸。

First, I'd just like to thank you both for serving as a hero and positive role model for me andmany others.Much more than your success, itself, I respect your unparalleled integrity. 首先，我要感谢你们为我和许多其他人担任英雄和积极的榜样。远远超过您的成功本身，我尊重

您无与伦比的诚信。

I have three quick questions for you.The first is how a youngster like myself would develop anddefine their circle of competence. 我有三个快速问题。首先是像我这样的年轻人如何发展和定义他们的能力圈。

The second involves the role of creative accounting in the stories of tremendous growth andsuccess over many years.GE, Tyco, and IBM immediately come to mind for me, but I washoping you could also discuss that issue in relation to Coke. 第二部分涉及创造性会计在多年来巨大增长和成功的故事中的作用。 GE，泰科和IBM立刻想到了我，但我希望你也可以讨论与可口可乐相关的问题。

Some people have said that their decision to lay off much of the capital in the system onto thebottlers, who earn low returns on capital, is a form of creative accounting. 有些人说，他们决定将系统中的大部分资金用于赚取低资本回报率的装瓶商，这是一种创造性会

计。